NATO Reform - Scholarship@Western

Western UniversityScholarship@Western

Political Science Publications Political Science Department

2003

NATO Reform: New Strategies to AdvanceInternational and National SecurityErika SimpsonPolitical Science, [email protected]

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Citation of this paper:Simpson, Erika, "NATO Reform: New Strategies to Advance International and National Security" (2003). Political Science Publications.97.https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/politicalsciencepub/97

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PugwashN E W S L E T T E R

Volume 40 � Number 2 � December 2003

issued by the Council of the PugwashConferences on Science and World Affairs

Nobel Peace Prize 1995

53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World AffairsHalifax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada, July 2003

Pugwash

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Volume 40 � Number 2December 2003

Editor:Jeffrey Boutwell

Research Assistant: Apple T. Plotnick

Design and Layout: Anne Read

To the Pugwash Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

53RD PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS:

Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and PoliticsHalifax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada, 14-22 July 2003

Welcome Address—Senator Douglas Roche . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Statement of the Pugwash Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Conference Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

53rd Pugwash Conference Working Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Reports of the Conference Working Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Report from International Student/Young Pugwash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Pugwash Returns to Thinkers’ Lodge, 20 July 2003

Opening Remarks—Patrick Boyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Remarks by Joseph Rotblat and Ruth Adams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

PEACE, a poem by Margaret Eaton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Message from the Hon. Kofi Annan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Keynote Address—Honorable Susan Whelan, Minister for International Cooperation, Government of Canada. . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Dorothy Hodgkin Memorial Lecture—Jayantha Dhanapala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Report of the Secretary General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Public Forum—Sir Joseph Rotblat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Select Papers from the 53rd Pugwash Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Walter Dorn, H. Peter Langille, Bas de Gay Fortman, Erika Simpson, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Richard Garwin, Christie Dennison

List of Participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

MEMBERS OF THE PUGWASH COUNCIL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

CALENDAR OF FUTURE MEETINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . inside back cover

The 53rd Conference brought 172 scientists and

scholars from 39 countries to Halifax Canada for

a conference with a familiar format, and at the

same time it was unique in its stimulation of both an intel-

lectual response and a heartfelt intensity in relation to its

theme “Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technol-

ogy and Politics.” The Canadian Pugwash Group, with 30

attendees, was delighted with its role as host, and the

chance to have first meetings with new Pugwashites at the

airport, in the university residences, at meals and, of

course, in the conference venues at Dalhousie University.

Evidence of our success at

fostering the right conference

ambience is found in the fol-

lowing sample comment “I

have benefited a lot in meet-

ing and having introduction

to different professors

around the world and their

diverse views. I found flexi-

bility and responsibility

among the participants which

made me impressed. Indeed

this sort of gathering will

have great impact on global

security affairs. I am also impressed with the working sys-

tem of Pugwash and its background. As a new member, I

am proud of it and will do my best to achieve its aims.”

The opening session of the conference heard a welcom-

ing address by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., Chair, Cana-

dian Pugwash Group, and then received the report of Sec-

retary-General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino. The support of the

host country is demonstrated by several means, the most

visible of which is the participation of senior government

officials. The Hon. Susan Whelan, Minister of

International Cooperation, gave the keynote speech “Pro-

moting Human Security After Conflict.” Minister Whelan

chaired a lively question and answer session that lifted the

whole conference group into “discussion mode.” The first

day was completed with a reception at historic City Hall.

Even as the first sessions began, and throughout, we

received significant media attention nationally and

locally—on TV, radio and newspapers, thus raising public

awareness of current issues in nuclear disarmament, mis-

sile defense, peacekeeping, terrorism, human development

and environmental change.

Eminent speakers addressed the conference through

several invited lectures. Dr. Jayantha Dhanapala, (former)

Undersecretary-General of the United Nations for Disar-

mament Affairs, gave the

Dorothy Hodgkin Lecture, a

central event of the Confer-

ence. Professor M.S. Swami-

nathan, President of

Pugwash Conferences, world

leader in agricultural plant

genetics and the head of the

research institute bearing his

name, at Chennai, India gave

the President’s lecture on the

topic of sustainable food

security. The closing dinner

was addressed by Chris

Bryant, Dept. of Economic Development, Nova Scotia on

the topic “All Security is Local.” Professor Sir Joseph Rot-

blat, Nobel Laureate and founder of the Pugwash move-

ment, gave the Public Forum lecture on the topic “The

Nuclear Issue: Pugwash and the Bush Policies.” It was a

night to remember, as Jo Rotblat received a standing ova-

tion for his incisive analysis of the current problems in

nuclear disarmament. Through media interviews, many

others had a chance to hear his views, and all of us

admired his stamina and patience for interviews in the face

of a very full schedule.

The entire conference convened in Pugwash, Nova

Scotia at Thinkers Lodge, the place of origin, on a day

To the Pugwash Community

Halifax waterfront.

53rd Pugwash Conference

2 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2003

billed as “Back to

Pugwash.” It was a high

point for many who had

spent years in the

Pugwash movement,

because very few of the

Pugwashites had ever

seen Pugwash. The con-

ference grew too large

for the original venue

after only a couple of

years from its first meet-

ing in 1957, at which

there were 22 scientists

from 10 countries. Jo

Rotblat and Ruth

Adams, representing the

1957 group, both addressed the crowd, seated on the

lawn, with the sea in the background. An open plenary

session was held at the local high school, and as we

boarded the buses after the elegant final reception at the

Thinkers Lodge, it was not hard to see that many felt

reluctant to leave. For a day to remember, all Pugwashites

attending would undoubtedly be glad to join us in thank-

ing the Pugwash Park Commission for arranging such a

fine event.

The ultimate goal for this specific Conference was to

advance human security by dialogue with stakeholders,

and by new viewpoints that would strengthen Canada and

the global community in their ability to respond to threats

to human security. The Pugwash Conferences are ongoing;

because of this continuity, the impact level sought for the

conference is enhancement of the freedom and safety of

citizens. The conference outcomes, as seen in the Working

Group Reports, and the various speeches of the confer-

ence, are on the website www.pugwash.org, thus enabling

the possibility of a wide readership.

A number of Working Group papers were very signifi-

cant, and from those, we have selected a representative

group that, we believe,

has enduring value.

Many excellent papers

were presented, but are

not seen in this

newsletter due to space

limitations. We partic-

ularly commend the

ISYP members for their

mature and insightful

contributions to the

WG discussions, and

presented papers. One

of the six papers, the

one from WG6 is from

a student contributor.

Only with financial

contributions and the work of many volunteers and staff

can we proceed with the annual Pugwash Conference on

Science and World Affairs. For the 53rd Conference, we

gratefully acknowledge the support received from several

Canadian government agencies, private foundations, and

friends of Pugwash:

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

(DFAIT); Peacebuilding and Human Security Division;

Canada International Development Agency (CIDA);

Conference Secretariat; Social Sciences and Humanities

Research Council (SSHRC); Province of Nova Scotia;

Regional Municipality of Halifax; Cyrus Eaton Founda-

tion; Ploughshares Fund; Cut Foundation; Nancy Ruth;

Anonymous; Resource and Conflict Analysis Inc.: Post-

Communist Studies, York University; University College

of Cape Breton; International Pugwash; Canadian

Pugwash Group; Members of Canadian Pugwash.

To all who made the effort to come to Halifax, Nova

Scotia, Canada, we say thanks and hope you will come

again.

In peace,

Adele Buckley, Chair, Halifax Conference Committee

Standing: Raymond Szabo, Bryan Jamieson, Margaret Eaton,Giovanni Brenciaglia. Sitting: M.S. Swaminathan, Joseph Rotblat,

Ruth Adams, Patrick Boyer

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2003 3

T H E 5 3 R D P U G W A S H C O N F E R E N C E

Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology and PoliticsHalifax and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Canada, 14–22 July 2003

NATO. The Non-Proliferation Treatyhas been indefinitely extended.

But the one change that Pugwashstands for, the one change the seekingof which won for Sir Joseph Rotblatand Pugwash the 1995 Nobel PeacePrize, the one change directed by theInternational Court of Justice, theone change called for by a myriad ofUnited Nations resolutions, the onechange yearned for by millionsaround the world—the abolition ofnuclear weapons—has not happened.

At the 1981 Conference in Banff,calls were made for a nuclear freezeand to eliminate tactical nuclearweapons from Europe. Afterwards,the Pugwash Council said clearly: “Itis a fallacy to believe that nuclear warcan be won.” Leaders of the nuclearpowers were urged to explicitly denymilitary doctrines which legitimizelimited nuclear warfare. The Councilof the day looked outward at thegrowing human needs for securityand declared: “The investment inarms is non-productive and divertsbadly needed resources from anation’s capacity to meet humanneeds and for development.”

If the Pugwash words were pre-scient in 1981, they are compellingtoday. For, the end of the Cold War

notwithstanding, the world is movingto new levels of danger.

A few weeks ago, the Mayor ofHiroshima, Tadatoshi Akiba, warned:“We stand today on the brink ofhyper-proliferation and perhaps ofrepeating the third actual use ofnuclear weapons.” A few days ago,Amnesty International, in its annualreport, said the world has become amore dangerous place: “The war onterror, far from making the world asafer place, has made it more danger-ous by curtailing human rights,undermining the rule of internationallaw, and shielding governments fromscrutiny.”

These are not cheery forecasts forhumanity. We in Pugwash do notbelong to the “gloom and doom”school, neither do we believe inignoring warning bells.

September 11, 2001 was certainlysuch a warning bell for humanity. Ter-rorism is growing. We must not onlydeal with terrorism but also examinethe whole canvas of violence in theworld. The division of the world intorich and poor, the hegemony of thepowerful over the vulnerable, theretention of nuclear weapons by somewhile proscribing their acquisition byothers—all this is de-stabilizing theworld at the very moment societyshould be concentrating its energieson building a culture of peace.

Pugwash does believe a culture ofpeace is possible. The gathering

Iam honoured, on behalf of theCanadian Pugwash Group, towelcome everyone to the 53rd

Pugwash Conference on Science andWorld Affairs: “Advancing HumanSecurity: The Role of Technology andPolitics.”

I give a special welcome to thePresident of Pugwash, Professor M.S.Swaminathan; the Secretary-General,Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino; theExecutive Director, Dr. JeffreyBoutwell; and the Chair of the Pug-wash Council, Professor MarieMuller, as well as all my colleagueson the Pugwash Council.

Dalhousie University, Halifax,Nova Scotia, and Canada greet youwarmly and we hope that your stayat this conference will be pleasantand productive. The outstandingwork of Adele Buckley and the Hali-fax Planning Committee haveprepared an excellent program foryou.

Only once before, in 1981 inBanff, Alberta, has Pugwash held itsannual conference in Canada. The 22years that have elapsed have seenmany changes. The Cold War, duringwhich Pugwash first brought Sovietand American scientists together, hasended. Russia has entered the halls of

Welcome AddressBy Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.,Chairman, Canadian Pugwash Group


Pugwash Meeting No. 280

forces of civil society may one daybring it about. Pugwash offers theworld that hope.

Indeed, the Pugwash MissionStatement affirms that our purpose isto bring scientific insight and reasonto bear on threats to human securityarising from science and technologyin general, and above all from thecatastrophic threat posed to human-ity by nuclear and other weapons ofmass destruction. The Pugwashagenda extends to ways of alleviatingthe conditions of economic depriva-tion, environmental deteriorationand resource scarcity and exploita-tion that so readily give rise to resent-ment, hostility and violence through-out the world. This noble work isinspired by the Russell-Einstein Man-ifesto of 1955, which called uponleaders of the world to renouncenuclear weapons and “remembertheir humanity.”

Last year, at the La Jolla Confer-ence, the goals for Pugwash’s Tenth

Quinquennium, 2002-2007, were setdown. The very first words of thisstirring call to action speak of “theoverriding peril” to humanity by thevast destructive power of nuclearweapons, and the increased threatdue to proliferation. The listing of thenew dangers and the new strain thenon-proliferation regime is under aresobering. Thus the Pugwash goal ofreducing and eliminating the nuclearperil will be more important thanever in the Tenth Quinquennium.

The Goals Document challengeseach one of us: “Pugwash is stronglycommitted to the goal of abolishingall nuclear weapons. It is imperativethat Pugwash constantly remind theinternational community of theimmorality, illegality, and peril inher-ent in nuclear weapons, and to pro-pose concrete steps toward theirelimination.”

The Pugwash agenda also paysattention to increasing the effective-ness of the Chemical Weapons Con-

vention and the Biological and ToxicWeapons Convention. Conventionalweapons, too, ranging from smallarms to antipersonnel mines to newhigh-technology weapons are of deepconcern to Pugwash. From weaponsof mass destruction to new develop-ments in biotechnology and othersciences, Pugwash accepts the respon-sibility to stress the ethical and moralresponsibility of scientists to furtherthe beneficial applications of theirwork and prevent their misuse.

Almost by definition, Pugwashmust look into the future to helpguide the formulation of the publicpolicy process. That is why it is soimportant to have young Pugwashitesamong us. We must enlarge not onlythe Student Pugwash membershipbut the ways Pugwash as a whole canreach out to new generations of sci-entists, academics, analysts, and pol-icy-makers.

Our work at the Halifax Confer-ence is cut out for us. We are here forthe most serious of purposes: to con-tribute to the safety and human secu-rity of the world around us.

I think it will be hard to exceedthe inspiration that awaits us on ourtrip Sunday to the Thinkers’ Lodge inPugwash, Nova Scotia. This is“where it all began.” The vision ofCyrus Eaton in bringing the first Pug-washites to the Thinkers’ Lodge hasflowed through to today. PatrickBoyer, Giovanni Brenciaglia and thePugwash Parks Commission haveprepared an outstanding program foryou. You have a treat in store.

Welcome again. We are thrilled tohave you in our midst. Enjoy theCanadian hospitality.

Let the conference begin.

Sen. Douglas Roche welcomes conference participants.


Statement of the Pugwash Council22 July 2003, Halifax, Nova Scotia

nisms, are an indication of the seriouschallenges faced by the internationalcommunity in commonly protectinghuman security.

The world today must acknowl-edge, confront, and overcome the cur-rent paralysis engendered by ‘thebanality of nuclear weapons.’ In thesame way that a ‘banality of evil’made possible the holocaust of theFinal Solution, so now has publicacquiescence to the continuedprimacy of nuclear weapons in worldaffairs, almost 60 years after their cat-astrophic effects were demonstratedat Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mademore likely a nuclear holocaust.

The world’s peoples will not, ofcourse, be directly responsible forsuch a catastrophe if it happens, butthey will be its primary victims.Those responsible will be the leadersof countries who have failed to recog-nize that nuclear weapons representthe single, largest danger to the secu-rity of the international community.

Primary among these is the cur-rent US administration, which hasabdicated its moral responsibility asthe world’s strongest power in nottaking the lead to rid the world ofnuclear weapons. To the contrary, theUS administration has declared itsintention of relying on nuclearweapons as a core component of US

national security for the indefinitefuture. This and other US policies rundirectly counter to the full implemen-tation of the thirteen practical steps itand other nuclear states agreed toduring the Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) Review Conference held in2000, as well as to its obligationsunder Article VI of the NPT to workfor the elimination of nuclearweapons. Inter alia, the US adminis-tration is exploring the developmentof new nuclear weapons, may wellresume nuclear testing, has with-drawn from the 1972 ABM Treatyand will shortly deploy missiledefenses (of dubious military value),and seems committed to violating thenon-weaponized environment ofouter space by deploying a spaceweapons test-bed by 2008. Without a180 degree reversal of US nuclearweapons policies, there is no chanceof eliminating the incentives of othercountries to acquire nuclear weaponsand abolishing such weapons entirely.

This failure of American leader-ship by no means absolves a largenumber of other countries and gov-ernments from their failure to actdecisively to eliminate the nuclearthreat.

The withdrawal by North Koreafrom the Non-Proliferation Treatyand uncertainties over its nuclearaims is a major cause of internationalconcern. Through urgent negotiationsand international diplomacy a com-monly satisfying agreement can be

The Pugwash Council, meetingduring the 53rd PugwashConference held in Halifax

and Pugwash, Nova Scotia, isextremely concerned that the dangersposed by nuclear weapons areincreasing the risk of a nuclear cata-strophe. Widening cracks in thenuclear non-proliferation regime, thedeadlock in nuclear arms control,renewed interest in nuclear war-fight-ing strategies, inadequate measures tocontrol and dispose of fissile materi-als, the near term deployment of mis-sile defenses and the prospect ofweapons in space, all point to thevery real possibility of nuclearweapons being used, whether in con-flict, by miscalculation or accident,or by terrorists.

Of equal concern to the Council,and directly related to the militariza-tion of global affairs spawned by theso-called ‘war on terrorism,’ are themarginalization of international insti-tutions, especially the UnitedNations, the diversion of resourcesaway from meeting challenges toglobal sustainability, and a weaken-ing of fundamental civil liberties andbasic human security protections.The illegality under international lawof the war on Iraq, and the disdain ofthe US administration for seekingsecurity through multilateral mecha-



ing the 53rd Pugwash Conference,new technologies hold out bothpromises and challenges in the sus-tainable use of resources and the useof new biotechnologies in agriculture,medicine and other fields. In all suchendeavors, it is crucially importantfor scientists to remember their indi-vidual responsibility regarding thebeneficial applications of their workin promoting true human security forall individuals.

All such improvements in thehuman condition, however, will befor naught if a nuclear catastropheoccurs. The world stands on theknife-edge of the nuclear dilemma.Will it myopically continue to accordnuclear weapons a primary role inworld politics and face the ultimatethreat of nuclear devastation, or willthe global community stand up, sayno, and take the necessary action toat last rid the world of the prospectof nuclear annihilation?

Between now and the 2005 NPTReview Conference, the internationalcommunity has the opportunity tomove decisively away from a contin-ued and dangerous reliance onnuclear weapons. Progress towardachieving the 13 practical stepsagreed to in 2000, as well as the entryinto force of the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty, accelerated reductions inUS and Russian nuclear forcesbeyond what is called for in the May2002 Moscow Treaty, improvedaccounting for and control of fissilematerial, reductions in tacticalnuclear weapons, and solutions toregional nuclear crises, all wouldcontribute to moving the world awayfrom the catastrophic dangers tohuman security inherent in a contin-ued misplaced reliance on nuclearweapons for national security.

incorporating nuclear weapons. In a world where many govern-

ments often emphasize exhortationover concrete action in the pursuit ofa world free of nuclear weapons,Pugwash supports the important con-tribution to the strengthening of theNon-Proliferation Treaty made bythe New Agenda Coalition and urgeseven stronger dialogue between theNew Agenda countries and thenuclear weapons states.

In seeking to mobilize world pub-lic opinion to demand concrete andimmediate steps to reverse currentdevelopments that threaten the use ofnuclear weapons, the Pugwash Coun-cil feels it imperative that globalaction be undertaken to exert all pos-sible pressure on governments to actin concert to rid the world of nuclearweapons.

Human security for the world’speoples is at greater and greater risk.The large majority of them continueto face unacceptable depredation intheir access to water, food, healthcare, resources, and basic security.Intensive international cooperation,especially between industrial anddeveloping countries, is needed toredress these imbalances, many ofwhich contribute directly to humaninsecurity and conflict. As noted dur-

found between the main regionalpowers, in which North Koreareceives security and non-aggressionguarantees while renouncing in a ver-ifiable manner, once and for all, itscapability to acquire nuclearweapons.

In the Middle East, the continuedexistence of Israel’s nuclear weaponsand ambiguity over Iran’s intentionsregarding it’s nuclear infrastructureand the IAEA additional protocolcomplicate efforts to achieve trueregional peace and stability and cre-ate a region free of weapons of massdestruction.

In South Asia, the two newestnuclear weapons states, India andPakistan, need to resolve their long-standing conflict over Kashmir andcross-border terrorism while movingdecisively to reduce the nuclear threatbetween them.

The other four original nuclearpowers—Russia, the UnitedKingdom, France, and China—con-tinue to rely on nuclear weapons fordeterrence despite the inherent dan-gers of doing so. Similarly, the mem-bers of NATO exhibit an irrationalattachment to US nuclear weapons aspart of NATO strategy, at a timewhen NATO faces no threat and canhave no reason for a military strategy



Pugwash Council meets with International Student/Young Pugwash.


M O N D A Y , J U L Y 1 4

19:00-22:00 International Student/Young Pugwash (ISYP) Board Meeting

T U E S D A Y , J U L Y 1 5

14:30-17:30 ISYP Symposium “The Role of the UN after the Iraqi Crisis”

19:30-21:00 ISYP Working Groups A and B

W E D N E S D A Y , 1 6 J U L Y

09:00-12:30 Pugwash Council Meeting/ISYP Conference


T H U R S D A Y , 1 7 J U L Y


11:30-12:30 Pugwash Council members meet with ISYP Pugwash

14:00-15:30 PLENARY SESSION 1 [Closed] (McCain Building, Scotiabank Auditorium) Chair: Douglas Roche

Welcoming address by Chair of Canadian Pugwash Douglas Roche

Report of Pugwash Secretary General Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

16:00-17:30 PLENARY SESSION 2 [Open] Chair: M.S. Swaminathan

Keynote Speaker: Hon. Susan Whelan, Minister of International Cooperation

18:00-19:00 Reception: City of Halifax —City Hall

Remarks: Mayor Peter Kelly

Response: Sec.-Gen. Paolo Cotta Ramusino

F R I D A Y , 1 8 J U L Y

09:00-12:30 Working Groups 1-6 meet (McCain Building)

14:30-18:00 Working Groups 1-6 meet

20:00-22:00 PUBLIC FORUM (McCain- Ondajtee Auditorium) [Open] Chair: Marie Muller Speaker: Sir Joseph Rotblat, President Emeritus—Pugwash (UK)

S A T U R D A Y , 1 9 J U L Y

09:00-12:30 Working Groups 1-6 meet

14:00-15:30 PLENARY SESSION 3 [Open] Chair: Jeffrey Boutwell

Human Security and the Middle East

Speakers: Galia Golan (Israel), Gabriel Baramki (Palestine), Mohamed Kadry Said (Egypt)




16:00-18:00 PLENARY SESSION 4 [Open] Chair: Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Eliminating the Threat of Nuclear Weapons

Speakers: Miguel Marin-Bosch (Mexico), Pan Zhenqiang (China), John Holdren (USA)

18:00-19:00 Pugwash Council meets representatives of National Pugwash Groups

S U N D A Y 2 0 J U L Y

10:00-11:30 Reception at Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia

Introduction and welcoming address by Patrick Boyer

Pugwash: past and present history, comments by Joseph Rotblat, Ruth Adams

11:30-12:30 Tours of Thinkers’ Lodge

12:30-13:30 Lunch at Pugwash District High School & Joseph Rotblat Hall

14:30-16:15 PLENARY SESSION 5 [Open] Pugwash District High School

Chair: Ochieng Adala (Kenya)

Cooperative Security and the Future of Multinational Institutions

Speakers: Robert Lawson (Canada), Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Vladimir Baranovski (Russia),Steven Miller (USA)

16:30-17:30 Closing Reception at Thinkers’ Lodge

17:30 Departure by bus for dinner at Truro (enroute to Halifax)

18:30-20:00 Dinner at Truro

20:00 Departure for Halifax

M O N D A Y , 2 1 J U L Y

09:00-10:30 PLENARY SESSION 6 [Closed] Chair: Anne McLaren (UK)

Reports on Working Groups 1, 2, 3

11:00-12:15 PLENARY SESSION 7 [Open] Chair: Douglas Roche

Dorothy Hodgkin Lecture by Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka)

14:00-15:30 PLENARY SESSION 8 [Closed] Chair: Adele Buckley

Reports on Working Groups 4, 5, 6

16:00-18:00 PLENARY SESSION 9 [Open] Chair: Pervez Hoodbhoy

Presidential Lecture by M.S. Swaminathan

Final remarks by Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Jeffrey Boutwell

18:30-21:30 Reception and Closing Banquet (University Club) M.C.: Adele Buckley

Banquet Speaker: Chris Bryant, Department of Economic Development, Nova Scotia

Downeast Entertainment: Background music and half hour performance

T U E S D A Y , 2 2 J U L Y

09:00-12:30 Pugwash Council Meeting

14:00-16:00 Pugwash Council Meeting



W G 1 : N U C L E A R W E A P O N S

Status of and prospect for nuclear disarmament.Prospects for the 13 steps decided at the 2002 NPTReview Conference

Recent developments in nuclear proliferation

Current strategies and postures of nuclear-armed states.No first use

W G 2 : W E A P O N I Z A T I O N O F S P A C E A N D M I S S I L E D E F E N S E

Missile defense and space weapons

Weaponization of space and its impact on civil activities

Preserving the non-weaponization of space

W G 3 : I N T E R N A T I O N A L C O O P E R A T I O N A N DH U M A N S E C U R I T Y

Role of international institutions in the prevention ofarmed conflict. Civilian protection and humanitarianassistance

Multilateral actions and unilateral initiatives

Post-conflict reconstruction; governance; assistance todemocratization

W G 4 : T E R R O R I S M

Terrorism: its roots and its divisive effects on the worldcommunity

Technology and the prevention of terrorism.Antiterrorism and limitation of civil liberties

Preventing terrorists from obtaining weapons of massdestruction

W G 5 : N E W T E C H N O L O G Y F O R H U M A ND E V E L O P M E N T A N D S E C U R I T Y

Communications, monitoring and informationtechnology for human protection

Agricultural biotechnology

International cooperation to promote equity in humandevelopment

W G 6 : M I T I G A T I O N O F G L O B A LE N V I R O N M E N T A L C H A N G E

Advances in modeling and long-term global energy trends

Initiatives and technology to limit human-induced globalchanges

Access to and availability of energy, water, food



Working Groups


Report on Working Group 1 Nuclear WeaponsCo-conveners: Dr. Jo Husbands (USA) and General Pan Zhenqiang (China)

Rapporteur: Dr. Bob van der Zwaan (The Netherlands)

Next steps for non-proliferationand disarmament

In concreto, achieving full implemen-tation of the 13 practical steps agreedupon at the NPT Review Conferencein the year 2000 is essential. In par-ticular, a number of actions should beundertaken with high priority. Strate-gic nuclear arms agreements betweenthe Russian Federation and the US, inparticular the May 2002 ‘MoscowTreaty’, should be promptly imple-mented and expanded. Reduced war-heads and their delivery systemsshould be dismantled irreversibly in atransparent and verifiable manner.Remaining deployed Russian and USnuclear forces should be de-alerted tofurther reduce the operational statusof nuclear weapons systems. Theentry into force of the CTBT shouldbe achieved, and until that time themoratorium on nuclear testingshould be strictly observed. A processof improved accounting for and con-trol of fissile materials holdingsshould be created on a worldwidebasis. Negotiations should be com-menced on a fissile materials produc-tion ban and reduction plan, and the

role and capacity of the IAEA inthese matters must be strengthened.

Furthermore, the recent US trendtowards expansion of the options forusage of nuclear weapons should bereversed, especially their use againstnon-nuclear weapon countries, asunambiguously allowed in itsNuclear Posture Review. Countries inboth bilateral and multilateral secu-rity alliances with the US, whichinclude policies allowing the first useof nuclear weapons, must resolve thetension between these policies andtheir NPT obligations.

Low-yield and tactical nuclearweapons

The development of new or modifiednuclear weapons should berenounced as contrary to the 2000NPT Review Conferencecommitment to a diminishing role ofnuclear weapons in security policiesand the NPT article VI obligation ofa cessation of the nuclear arms race.Current US movement towards thedevelopment of low-yield nuclearweapons, as well as the concurrentevolution of the designing of evermore powerful conventionalweapons, could blur the distinctionbetween nuclear and conventionalweapons, and could render nuclearweapons more usable. Once thedevelopment of low-yield nuclearweapons reaches its test phase, a col-lapse of the global testing

Introduction

Today, the nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament process faces itsgreatest challenge since the end of theCold War. With the increasinglyurgent danger of regional nuclearproliferation, and with a US Admin-istration that has shifted from its ear-lier nuclear policy, in which nuclearweapons were regarded as weaponsof last resort, to one in which it mayuse nuclear weapons for preemptivepurposes—also in cases of non-nuclear threats and against non-nuclear weapon states—the nuclearnon-proliferation regime is currentlyin a profound crisis.

As participants of WorkingGroup 1, we want to draw renewedattention to the present nuclear disar-mament deadlock, and, while empha-sizing the need to imminently findregional solutions for the world’smost worrisome nuclear emergencies,we point out that increasing urgencyexists to seek a universal eliminationof nuclear weapons. Mankind there-fore ought to address without delaythe lack of progress in solving thesenuclear threats.



REPORTS OF THE CONFERENCE WORKING GROUPS



moratorium of nuclear weapons islikely to follow, and perhaps eventhat of the entire NPT regime itself.

For these reasons, thedevelopment of low-yield nuclearweapons constitutes a significantmenace to the present non-prolifera-tion regime. The prevention of thedevelopment of low-yield nuclearweapons is to be included in futurenon-proliferation efforts. Also exist-ing tactical nuclear weapons shouldbe included in future nuclear disar-mament negotiations. In particular,US tactical nuclear weapons deployedunder NATO auspices in Europeshould be unilaterally removed, and awider process of reduction of US andRussian tactical nuclear weaponsshould be created.

Regional crises

The current crisis on the Koreanpeninsula constitutes one of the mosturgent nuclear threats the world facestoday. While the US – North Koreandeadlock is profound and intricate,we believe that finding a sustainableand peaceful solution to the presentdilemma is not only possible but alsoimperative. Through urgent negotia-tions and international diplomacy acommonly satisfying agreement canbe found between the main regionalprotagonists, in which North Koreais given the security and non-aggres-sion guarantees it desires, whilerenouncing in a verifiable manneronce and for all its endeavors toacquire nuclear weapons. In thelonger run, a gradual process of con-sensus building should lead to aPeace Treaty.

Similarly in other parts of theworld, regional approaches to nuclearnon-proliferation should be realized

that are embedded in the broaderpolitical context of the region underconsideration. More nuclear-weapon-free-zones should be established cov-ering territories as large as possible.In particular, nuclear non-prolifera-tion should be integrated in regionalconflict resolution and confidencebuilding measures in the Middle Eastand South Asia. Such regional andstep-by-step approaches could initi-ate a process towards the universalelimination and abolition of nuclearweapons.

Nuclear relations

During the Cold War, global nuclearrelations rested on two mutually sup-portive arrangements: the elaboratestructure of nuclear deterrence andthe non-proliferation regime. Arough equality of military power wasmeasured in terms of assured mutualdestruction, while uneven distribu-tion of military nuclear capabilitiesassured a rank ordering amongnuclear weapon powers. This balanceof terror created a semblance oforder, based primarily on theunprecedented common interest of allstates in avoiding a nuclearholocaust. Thanks to the NPT,nuclear weapon and non-nuclearweapon states found a commonground in averting the spread ofnuclear weapons with all undertakingrespective obligations.

Today, the situation has funda-mentally changed. The US no longersees nuclear arms control as an essen-tial part of its nuclear policy and isinstigating substantial changes in thenuclear non-proliferation regime.Considerable unease exists aboutcombining the campaign against ter-rorism with preventive or preemptive

counter-proliferation. With possibili-ties of a nuclear response to chemicalor biological attack, a danger nowexists of a further abuse of nuclearweapons. Nuclear war has beenavoided so far largely because of thetaboo against the military use ofnuclear weapons during each succes-sive decade of the nuclear era. Anysuch use in the future would destroywhatever remains of that taboo.

Nuclear awareness

Strengthening public awarenessabout the dangers inherent in nuclearweapons may contribute to a greaterinternational effort for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Formany, the end of the Cold Warimplied the end of the nuclear threat.The lack of public concern regardingthe continuously existing and proba-bly increasing nuclear threat, how-ever, contrasts starkly with the wayinternational events have moved overthe past few years. Efforts toconvince the public that nuclearweapons pose a dangerous liabilityfor mankind need greatly enhanced.An international public informationeffort is needed to raise nuclearweapons higher up the politicalagenda, to a level where governmentswill have to engage in the debate andbe responsive to a growing body ofpublic opinion that is opposed to thepossession and threatened use ofnuclear weapons. Heightened aware-ness should also be realized of thethreat of terrorist use of nucleardevices and materials, or terroristattacks against nuclear facilities,including those related to the civilnuclear power industry.

It is not easy to see an immediateway forward for an effective public



information program that may clarifythe need for a process towards theuniversal elimination of nuclearweapons. One message seems to beclear, however: it is important toremind everyone of the constantnuclear threat and the horrifying con-sequences of the use of nuclearweapons. Whereas the crisis in thenuclear non-proliferation and disar-mament process is enormous, wethink that positive ways exist out ofthe current perilous situation. Muchmore thought and effort are neededto try to escape from today’s nuclearcrisis. The Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs can play aunique role in both educating andproviding expertise information.

Concise summary

• With the increasingly urgent dangerof regional nuclear proliferation,and with a US Administration thathas shifted from its earlier nuclearpolicy, in which nuclear weaponswere regarded as weapons of lastresort, to one in which it may usenuclear weapons for preemptivepurposes, the nuclear non-prolifera-tion regime is currently in aprofound crisis.

• Achieving full implementation ofthe 13 practical steps agreed uponat the 2000 NPT Review Confer-ence is essential.

• A process of improved accountingfor and control of fissile materialsholdings should be created on aworldwide basis, while negotiationsshould be commenced on a fissilematerials production ban andreduction plan, and the role andcapacity of the IAEA herein mustbe strengthened.

• The development of low-yield

nuclear weapons constitutes a sig-nificant menace to the present non-proliferation regime and its preven-tion should therefore be included infuture non-proliferation efforts,while a reduction of tactical nuclearweapons should be included infuture disarmament negotiations.

• Through urgent negotiations andinternational diplomacy a peacefulsolution and commonly satisfyingagreement can be found betweenthe main regional protagonists inthe crisis on the Korean peninsula,in which North Korea is given thesecurity and non-aggression guar-antees it desires, while renouncingin a verifiable manner once and for

all its endeavors to acquire nuclearweapons.

• Similarly in other parts of theworld, regional approaches tonuclear non-proliferation should berealized on the way towards univer-sal elimination of nuclear weapons,and, in particular, nuclear non-pro-liferation should be integrated inregional conflict resolution andconfidence building measures in theMiddle East and South Asia.

• Strengthening public awarenessabout the dangers inherent innuclear weapons may contribute toa greater international effort forrealizing nuclear non-proliferationand disarmament.

Report on Working Group 2 Weaponisation of Space and Missile DefenceCo-Conveners: John Rhinelander (USA) and Rebecca Johnson (UK)

Co-Rapporteurs: Will Marshall (UK), Robert Schingler (USA) and George Whitesides (USA)

Introduction and WorkingGroup Focus

The Working Group on Weaponisa-

tion of Space and Missile Defence

was composed of 22 members from11 countries (including 6 membersfrom the International Student YoungPugwash). This report of the workinggroup is the sole responsibility of therapporteurs, and while there was ahigh level of consensus in the group,this does not necessarily representconsensus on all points.

The majority of the discussionwas focused on continuing efforts onthe prohibition of space weapons asinstigated during the 52nd PugwashConferences in La Jolla and the FirstAnnual workshop on Preserving the

Non-Weaponisation of Space held inCastellón de la Plana, Spain in May2003. The threat assessments, under-lying motivations and argumentsconcerning missile defence (MD) andthe potential weaponisation of spacewere not discussed in detail here sincethey were well covered in Castellón,although the workshop briefly con-sidered two papers from participantson regional debates and implicationsof missile defense, which focused onNorth-East Asia and Britain respec-tively.

Missile Defence

In general, it was agreed that devel-opments in missile defenses couldhave major effects on international



and regional security and that manycomponents in the currentlyproposed multi-tiered, layered systemare technologically far from proven.

Firstly, we discussed that theeffects on regional security must berigorously analysed by each individ-ual country invited to join. It wasargued that the development of mis-sile defense could create a newregional missile arms race in theKorean Peninsula, Japan, China, andTaiwan region. The practical applica-tion of missile defense was debated inthe context of international stabilityand world order, and concerns wereraised that with the current directionunder the leadership by the UnitedStates, ballistic missile defences(BMD) could be detrimental to over-all security.

A useful paper on the revolutionin military affairs (RMA) led to con-sideration of the relationship betweenRMA, increased reliance on spaceassets in a military context, and theideological commitment of the Bushadministration to space control andthe development of missile defensesystems. An important linkagebetween the missile defense debateand the weaponisation of space is theintended US deployment of a testbedfor space-based interceptors in 2008.This is seen as the nearest term threatto the status quo of no weapons inspace. It was noted that while boththe issues of missile defense and spaceweapons are exceedingly important,each needs to be addressed in differ-ent ways. In considering the regionaland international merit anddisadvantages of missile defense,attention must be given to alternativemechanisms and arrangements foraddressing missile threats, controls,

and non-proliferation. One main rec-ommendation was for Pugwash toinitiate regional discussions on theimpact of missile defense for specificregions.

While recognising that a growingnumber of states, including NATO,were being drawn into discussions onBMD collaboration, it was noted thatthere was a need for more informa-tion to inform public debate on theissue, and that the costs appear to beout of proportion with the threatsfrom missiles and the capabilities ofMD systems to aid national security.

Space Security

Following on from the more generaldiscussions in Castellón, the work-shop chose to focus specifically onshort and medium term initiativescurrently being undertaken, and con-sideration of roles for Pugwash andits members. The discussions devel-oped a working objective, as follows:Pugwash should seek to facilitate

incremental steps leading to a com-

prehensive space security architecture

to ensure the peaceful uses of space.

Initiating this discussion, we heardfrom the Canadian Department ofForeign Affairs and InternationalTrade (DFAIT), which has beenworking with international experts todevelop a knowledge base to facili-tate constructive dialogue on theissue of the weaponization of space.This dialogue has evolved to be in thecontext of ‘space security,’ and isdefined to be the ‘equitable, sustain-able, and secure use of and access tospace and freedom from space-basedthreats’. There is development of aSpace Security Index aimed to be aresearch-based trend analysis thatprovides a net assessment of the col-

lective progress, or lack of progress,towards space security. TheCanadian Space Security Index isenvisaged to measure twelve indica-tors within three themes of spacesecurity; space environment (e.g.space debris, allocation of orbitalslots), the intentions of space securityactors (e.g. space military doctrine)and capabilities of space securityactors (e.g. launch capabilities, ASAT,space weapon capabilities).

Space Security Strategy

A considerable amount to time wasspent on widening discussion of thestrategy initiated in the Castellónworkshop, and identifying specificactions for moving forward (see alsothe key papers from the workshop onthe Pugwash website). In this regard,it was felt that Pugwash could playan important role in increasing theknowledge base and the public andpolitical salience of space security.The strategy for preserving the non-weaponization of space is to startwith three themes, which need tointeract in parallel: continue to buildthe knowledge-base and increasesalience; stopping financial resourcesvia the US Congress toward the 2008space weapons testbed; and workingon incremental confidence buildingand regulation steps, while laying thegroundwork for comprehensive inter-national agreements within the spacesecurity architecture. The followingoutlines the three main themes ingreater detail:

1. Increase the knowledge base

• Space Security Index (see above)

– Coordinate a network of expertson space, especially from the sci-entific community, in order to



facilitate the Space Security Index(SSI) and fulfill specified researchand analysis needs

– Produce publication on spacesecurity to collate the knowledgebase gathered in the SSI.

• Increase Salience

–Networking: reaching out to pub-lic, space scientists and spaceusers

–Reach out to space scientists whoare under represented in Pugwash

–Encourage development of aSpace Security Bulletin to informspace community on recent news

–Co-convene a conference withPugwash and Committee onSpace Research (COSPAR) poten-tially on Space Debris

–Reach out to commercial actorsand industries using space assetsand increase their awareness ofthe effects of the weaponization ofspace

–Reach out to military communityand space scientists to encouragedialogue amongst space actorsand users

–Increase public outreach throughspace NGOs

• Further Research and RigorousAnalysis

–Feasibility of threats to space-based assets from ASATs launchedby non-traditional space powers

–Feasibility of a ‘Space PearlHarbor’ scenario

–Space Security Index

-The hazard posed by SpaceDebris

-Access to space and equity

–Costs and Benefits of spaceweapons

–The impact of space weapons onthe commercial space sector

2. Political Initiatives towardsprohibition of space weapons

• Major goal is to make sure thatthere is no US test-bed deployed by2008

–Engage the US Congress in dia-logue to cut spending from spaceweapons development prior to acritical debate

–To convene a roundtable or work-shop to improve the understand-ing of the issue amongstpoliticians.

3. Laying the groundwork for acomprehensive space securityapproach

• Discussions with US Military,Congress and the White House

• Increase the visibility of existing aswell as new research and reports

• Research into verification forpotential agreements

• High-profile spokespeople for pub-lic attention

• International space security summit

• Consider the pros and cons ofadvocating a moratorium on nofirst testing, deployment or use ofspace weapons

• A timeline for political/legal initia-tives

–On-going work on CBMs (debrismanagement, compliance issues,etc.)

–Track II initiatives

–Increase number of parties to theOuter Space Treaty (OST)towards universalisation

–UNGA resolution to multilater-alise agreement on non-interfer-ence with space assets, buildingon the provisions in the CFE andother treaties

Members of Working Group 2.



–Negotiations on banning ASAT,weapons in and from space andinternational rules of the road reg-ulations, either as a protocol tothe OST or as separate legalinstruments.

Recommended Priorities

In order to move forward on thedetailed issues mentioned above, theworking group identified potentialorganizations for each action, someof which already have work under-way on space security-related issues,and some which Pugwash memberscould invite to get them involved inthe space security movement. Belowis a list of the suggested short-termpriorities for Pugwash and Interna-tional Student Young Pugwash tofocus their continued efforts on thespace security movement.

Pugwash priorities

1. Reach out to military communityand space science community toencourage dialogue on space secu-rity including, where possible, par-ticipation in the development ofthe Space Security Index

2. Coordinate further research andwork on space debris as part ofraising awareness of the need forlegally instituted rules of the road

3. Research into potential verificationmeasures to increase the credibilityof political and legal initiatives.

Student/Young Pugwash priorities

1. Push universal ratification ofOuter Space Treaty• Create a Ratification kit• Work with the Space Generation

Advisory Council and possiblythe United Nations Office ofOuter Space Affairs

2. European Union• Input to the development of EU

White Paper on space policy• Increase knowledge among senior

EU people3. Cost-benefit analysis in collabora-

tion with military actors

• Publish in high-level journal• Use that as a connection to meet

more military contacts4. Identify space scientists / and poli-

cymakers for Space Security Indexexpert base

Report on Working Group 3 International Cooperation and Human SecurityCo-convenors: Gabi Baramki (Palestine) and Gerard Toulouse (France)

Rapporteur: H. Peter Langille (Canada)

A recurring theme throughout thisworkshop was the critical importanceof the United Nations. It is widelyviewed as the one international insti-tution committed to encouragingglobal cooperation and the advance-ment of human security. As such,there was considerable support forstrengthening the UN. Given theOrganization’s new responsibilitiesand assigned tasks, many noted theneed for additional resources andfunding. But, there was also supportfor encouraging member states to ful-fill their obligations under the UNCharter. It is noteworthy that thesecommitments do not diminish overtime or with non-compliance. Theyremain obligations of membership.

Human security proved to be atimely, goal-oriented, organizingprinciple; one that facilitated discus-sion of diverse, contemporary chal-lenges. Our workshop reflectednumerous priorities evident in theofficial human security agenda. Wealso discussed further cooperation toensure freedom from fear of violence,the direct violence of war, the struc-tural violence of exploitation and thecultural violence of discrimination.

We have witnessed formativeevents over the past two years. Itappears we should have heeded anearlier promise of a ‘new worldorder’. This one is clearly moredivided, increasingly militarized and,arguably, more risky. Perspectivesdiffer over whether these changes arepermanent or temporal, but there is ageneral sense that we are nowapproaching a crossroads. Our cur-rent trajectory should not providecomfort. It appears that we have lesspolitical control, less capacity tobrake and slow our speed, less capac-ity to determine a safe course. Asidefrom immediate risks, we are alsobeginning to understand the cumula-tive effect of human behavior, withevidence, albeit preliminary, inferringthat we have only one or two genera-tions in which to reinvent ourselves.

Working Group 3 focused on‘International Cooperation andHuman Security’, under the follow-ing headings:

• The role of internationalinstitutions in the prevention ofarmed conflict, protection of civil-ians and humanitarian assistance;



• Multilateral actions and unilateralinitiatives, and;

• Post-conflict reconstruction, gover-nance and assistance to democrati-zation.

Specific Recommendations

The UN’s capacity to monitor, to pro-vide early warning and oversight, aswell as to act in prevention is nowbeginning to benefit from an ‘emerg-ing global watch’. Already, we candiscern the framework for coordina-tion of a global monitoring system inindividuals, NGOs, UN offices andmissions worldwide. There remains aneed for multiple, informal and secretsources of information, as well asrapidly deployable, fact- findingteams. Despite the controversialnature of ‘intelligence’ within the UNsystem, the Organization and themember states should address theprevailing gap in information gather-ing, intelligence and analysis. Thealternative is to be unduly reliant onthe current monopoly held by themost powerful. There is a risk thatwe will continue to be misled.

The report of the InternationalCommission on Intervention andState Sovereignty, The Responsibility

to Protect, has met with unantici-pated resistance. Clearly, it willrequire ongoing efforts to attract sup-port for a new norm and multilateralaction, particularly when it entailsthe use of force to protect civiliansthreatened by genocide and mass eth-nic cleansing. Unilateral campaignscannot be convincingly rationalizedunder such pretenses. Yet legitimatequestions are being raised about‘how’ to protect and with ‘what’,establishing the need to identify andelaborate upon the alternatives. Sup-

portive member states should recog-nize that the essential criteria will belegitimacy, credibility and universal-ity. Civil society will increasinglyexpect more than multilateral ‘coali-tions of the willing’. This may implynot only UN authorization, but alsoUN management. At present, this is atall task, but not mission impossible.

The UN’s capacity to preventarmed conflict, to protect civiliansand to conduct effective peace opera-tions also depends on the extent towhich it can organize reliable andrapid responses to diverse emergen-cies. Regrettably, rather than rapiddeployment, routine delays of 4-to-6months became the norm in the late1990s. Modest progress is evidentwith the recent expansion of theDepartment of Peacekeeping Opera-tions, the development of ‘on-calllists’ for mission headquarters, theexpansion of the UN StandbyArrangements System, particularlythe multinational Standby HighReadiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG).Combined, these now provide a moreeffective foundation for peacekeep-ing. As they remain reliant on promptnational decision-making and accessto well-trained, well-equippednational personnel, there is littleassurance of rapid deployment.

If the UN is to prevent armedconflict and to protect civilians, therewill be a need for further, more ambi-tious efforts and new mechanisms.An additional SHIRBRIG wouldhelp, as would additionalparticipants and a larger brigadepool. In this respect, it might help toencourage complementary nationaldefence reforms, particularly the ear-marking of battalions specifically forUN operations.

There is also an urgent need for aUN Emergency Service—a dedicated,multidimensional ‘UN 911’, that canaddress human needs, including pro-tection, security, health and hope.This service should be composed ofvolunteer military, police and civilianvolunteers that are recruited globally,selected for high standards of profes-sionalism and commitment, and thendirectly employed by the UN. It istime for an in-depth, independent,transnational study to identify thegeneral and specific requirements forstarting and operating such a service.

Contrary to the notion that gov-ernments are constrained by fiscalausterity rendering new initiativesunfeasible, we heard that the ‘inter-national community’ could affordmore effective structures and reformsin many of the areas noted. Govern-mental priorities determine the allo-cation of funding. To cite one exam-ple, with wider cooperation, theproposed Tobin tax of 0.1% on inter-national financial transactions wouldhave yielded $97 billion in 1997.Such a source of funding for the UNsystem would make it less dependenton governmental contributions.

With respect to questions of dis-armament and arms control, it is noteasy to commence or conclude on apromising note. However, it is note-worthy that the International Com-mittee of the Red Cross recognizessignificant reductions in use of landmines globally. The InternationalCampaign to Ban Landmines atteststo the complete elimination of theinternational trade in landmines, aswell as far fewer victims of theseweapons. This progress arises despitethe fact that better de-mining tech-nology has been frequently promised,



but seldom provided. To ensure thisprocess concludes on a promisingnote, Pugwash and other supportiveparties may need to encourage gov-ernments to renew their funding.Many believe those planting minesshould, at least, be held responsiblefor their removal. The big task isin figuring out how to enforcecompliance.

Small arms also figureprominently on the human securityagenda, primarily because of theirlarge impact, low cost and availabil-ity. It is easy to understand why theyare ‘the weapon of choice’ in themajority of contemporary armed con-flicts. We heard compelling testimonyabout the reciprocal feedback loopbetween insecurity, poverty, violenceand acquisition of additional smallarms. We also support the need forbetter incentives to turn in weapons,including individual, national andmultinational buy-back programs.

Regrettably, we are experiencingre-armament today on an unprece-dented scale in every region of theworld. It is past time that the UNcalled the world to account to beginreversing this process. It is proposed,that we call for the UN GeneralAssembly to prepare for, and conducta Fourth Special Session onDisarmament.

Together, we devoted consider-able time to discussing human secu-rity, the rapid militarization of muchof the world and the consequencesfor human welfare. Could Pugwashor a group of individual membersinitiate a study on the interface ofhuman security and military securityto determine whether and to whatextent the concepts are compatible ornot, and whether both can exist

within a single foreign policy?Our working group benefited

from approximately forty-three par-ticipants from twenty-four countries.Within, there was widespread sup-port for Pugwash’s emphasis onanalysis and advocacy. Yet we alsorecognize the need for critical reflec-tion and adaptation of this organiza-tion. It was agreed that one challengeahead is to mainstream gender andyouth analysis, utilizing the widerperspective and strengths of each. Asnoted (and agreed), “men desperatelyneed more creative ideas forovercoming a war system”.

Another challenge is to encouragea much-needed culture of peace,which will necessitate further supportfor peace research and peace educa-tion. We know a few of the implica-tions when there is neither tolerancenor assistance for independent analy-sis, constructive criticism and thedevelopment of policy options. Thisis now an evident trend; arguably onesustained by organized fear and a cul-ture of violence. Clearly, the atten-dant risks merit further research,education and advocacy to counterthis trend.

UNESCO was mentioned favor-ably for a program in peace educa-tion that might be renewed. This UNdepartment shares Pugwash’s long-standing commitment to education,science, culture and ethics, making ita natural partner. We also heard acompelling recommendation for theUN to prepare an annual report onstate of world peace and security.

To effect promising change, anumber of participants suggested theneed for constituency-building withlike-minded groups, preferably on anissue-specific basis.

There was also support for ‘out-reach’ to attract additional scientificexpertise, prominent members, par-ticularly from countries that are cur-rently under-represented andacknowledged leaders in science,such as Nobel laureates in the naturalsciences.

It was proposed that Pugwashparticipate in both the worldeconomic and social forums. Manyexpressed hope that others would notonly enjoy, but also learn consider-ably from a repeat performance ofwhat has already been labeled, ‘thebrilliant Joe show’.

Over the past decade, we gradu-ally recognized the need forintegrated approaches across the fullspectrum of peace operations. Slowly,we drew some connections andlearned that seemingly differentaspects of the human security agendawere actually interrelated. Althoughpolitical and corporate leaders willoccasionally dismiss any connection,elementary students know thathuman security is related to environ-mental security. Given the disappear-ance of the tropical rainforest, is itfor us, or for others to ask the gov-ernment of Brazil what they mightneed to stop the cutting?

Hopefully, we also learned theUN cannot be expected to carry addi-tional responsibilities without addi-tional support and resources. Aneffort could be made to engageregional organizations under the UNumbrella (e.g. OAS, AU and OSCE),encouraging them to take on a moreactive role in support of the UN Secu-rity Council. Success, and quite possi-bly survival, will depend upon theextent to which civil society developsa constituency of support for the UN



through cooperative partnershipswith supportive member states,NGOs, institutes and individuals.There will be a need for reliableinformation, wider efforts to educateat the political level and smart mediacampaigns.

Good governance should not betaken for granted, here or elsewhere.When under intense pressure from

abroad, even respected democraciesmay behave like vicious gang mem-bers. One task that merits furtherthought and a final question is howwe can counterbalance and offsetsome of that pressure. Well-conceived, common approacheswould appear to offer betterprospects than unilateral reactions.

2. “Terrorism is the deliberate target-ing of civilians with a view to killand to intimidate”.

What is interesting about the lat-ter definition is that it makes no dis-tinction between terrorist acts com-mitted by states from thosecommitted by non-state actors.

The need for a precise definitionof terrorism does not only stem fromthe fact that there are more than 200definitions of terrorism but that vari-ous government have opportunisti-cally sought to label legitimate politi-cal opponents in an effort to narrowthe political space.

The need for greater precision inour terminology also extends to theterm “weapons of mass destruction”or WMD. This stems from the factthat the term places in the same cate-gory—chemical, biological, radiologi-cal and nuclear weapons. This is inap-propriate and misleading bearing inmind that nuclear weapons are manyorders of magnitude more powerful,and hence more damaging than theother three and its characteristics andcase of manufacture are completelydifferent. As the choice of words weuse shape responses, it is imperativethat we are as precise as possible withthe words we so loosely use.

On the Origins of Terrorism

Terrorism stems at individual andgroup levels. At the individual level,the Oklahoma bombing committedby Timothy McVeigh springs tomind. Given the random nature ofsuch acts they are far more difficultto control. At the level of groups; onehas leaders of racial, ethnic, religiousor national groups mobilizing follow-ers to commit terrorist acts on the

Report on Working Group 4TerrorismCo-Convenors: Francesco Calogero (Italy) and Pervez Hoodbhoy (Pakistan)

Rapporteur: Hussein Solomon (South Africa)

Abstract

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon,

but what is new today is its scope

and magnitude. Whilst acknowledg-

ing that terrorism does not exist in a

vacuum; the simplistic notion that

poverty leads to terrorism must be

rejected. At best poverty is a facilitat-

ing condition not a necessary one.

There can be no justification for the

taking of innocent life! Today’s ter-

rorists do not only have traditional

small arms and explosives in their

arsenals but the potential to access

nuclear, chemical and biological

weapons. In responding to terrorism,

the centrality of the United Nations

must be stressed as must the legal as

opposed to military approaches. This

would entail the strengthening of

international legal instruments such

as the International Criminal Court

as well as the Chemical and Biologi-

cal Weapons Conventions. In

responding to terrorism a fine line

should be maintained between the

need for security and the encroach-

ment of civil liberties. Responding to

terrorism should not only be the pre-

serve of governments and inter-gov-

ernmental bodies. Indeed members of

civil society have a social responsibil-

ity to join in this global scourge.

Introduction

Terrorism is not a new phenomenonbut what is new today is the scopeand magnitude of this global scourge.This report is divided into four sec-tions. In the first section we look atdefinitions. In the second, the originsof terrorism are explored. Third, thescope and magnitude of terrorism isanalyzed and finally we turn toresponses to terrorism.

On Definitions

Two of the most interesting defini-tions to emerge on terrorism are thefollowing:

1. “Terrorists are people who thinktheir ideas are more importantthan other peoples’ lives”; and



basis of a commonly perceived griev-ance or wrong.

Whilst acknowledging that terror-ism does not exist in a vacuum, thesimplistic notion that poverty leadsto terrorism must be rejected. Underno circumstances can a MohamedAta, the leader of the 9/11 hijackersor Osama bin Laden, leader of theAl-Qaeda network be regarded aspoor. At best, poverty can be a facili-tating condition, not a necessary one.In similar vein, the pro-Israeli policiespursued by the US as well as its sup-port to autocratic Arab regimes wassimilarly jettisoned. In the finalinstance, there can be no justificationfor the taking of innocent life!

But, the origins of this currentwave of terrorism are also intimatelyrelated to opportunity. Indeed, Al-Qaeda owes its emergence to thedecision by the US government toorganize a Great Jihad against Sovietforces in Afghanistan in 1979. TheCIA actively recruited radical Mus-lims from Algeria, Sudan, Saudi Ara-bia, Egypt and further afield to fightthe holy cause as mujahedeen. SaudiArabian money and support fromPakistani intelligence services alsocame to support US objectives inAfghanistan. Washington activelysupported the development of a mili-tant Islam and provided advancedmilitary training to such mujahedeenas Osama bin Laden. By 1988, theUSSR withdrew but the terror campsremained until 2001. By that time,70,000 terror graduates from fiftycountries emerged from its campsand formed the basis of today’s Al-Qaeda network.

This is clearly a lesson of wherelong-term stability and security issacrificed by short-term strategic con-

siderations. Neither were Washing-ton’s policy-makers alone in thisfolly. The Indonesian governmentalso encouraged Islamic radicalism asa bulwark against communism and inAlgeria militant Islam was mobilizedin the national independence struggleagainst the French. Having givenbirth to Frankenstein monsters, bothcountries now find they cannot con-trol these forces as the 100,000 deadAlgerians will testify to in the viciousbattle between Algiers and Islamicmilitants.

Opportunity, however, does notonly arise from the changing geo-strategic nature of world politics butalso from new weapons and commu-nication technology. The fact thatterrorists have in their possessioniridium satellite phones eases com-munication as does the growinginterconnectedness of the worldeconomy where millions of dollarscan be transferred by the press of abutton.

The growing relationship betweenterrorist networks and organizedcrime syndicates is also cause forconcern.

The Scope and Magnitude ofTerrorism Today

Terrorism today takes the form ofglobal networks functioning at local,national, regional and internationallevels. Responses therefore have tooccur at all these levels if one wantsto effectively deal with this scourge.

It is quite interesting that the con-tinent which is most plagued by ter-rorism—Latin America—does notfeature on the `war on terrorism’.Pugwash must seek to give theterrorism plaguing Latin Americagreater visibility in the media and

amongst policy-makers.Terrorists are opportunistic and

seek to achieve their objectives byany and all means available. In thisrespect, the five million illegalfirearms circulating among the MER-COSUR states of South America is acause for concern as is the highlyenriched uranium stockpiles in theformer Soviet Union, which isenough to produce 20,000 nucleardevices. If such HEU falls into thehands of terrorists via say organizedcrime syndicates, it would berelatively easy to gather the rest ofthe components and build a crudenon-transportable nuclear device inthe city to be destroyed. Possibilitiesalso exist of chemical weapon tech-nology passing into the hands of ter-rorists since most reasonably devel-oped states possess crude chemicalweapon technology. The sarin gasattack in a Tokyo subway by theapocalyptic sect, Aum Shinrikyo, is acase in point.

One should also not under-esti-mate the power of biologicalweapons. Ten milligrams (or one fifti-eth the weight of a paper clip) of bot-ulinal toxin could in principle kill25,000 people.

The possibility that terrorist couldtarget a nuclear power plant forattack is also not beyond the boundsof possibility. As such the probabili-ties for terrorist attacks to occurshould form an integral part of stud-ies that investigate the potentialfuture of nuclear energy production.In particular, its vulnerability to ter-rorist attack should be part of pro-grams intended to design innovativereactor types, in which passive safetyfeatures play an important role, andoptions such as the construction of



nuclear power plants undergroundshould perhaps be revisited. The con-struction of rod-or cage-like struc-tures around nuclear facilities to pro-tect against in-flying airplanes as wellas the installation of short-range air-defence systems should also be con-sidered.

Responding to Terrorism

Earlier mention was made of howwords contribute to mind-sets thatshape policies. This point needs repe-tition in our attempt to understandresponses to terrorism. Why a `war’on terror? This suggests the primacyof the military approach to dealingwith terrorists. This military-ledapproach has also seen military inva-sions of Afghanistan and Iraq wherethe chief protagonists, Mullah Omarand Osama bin Laden in Afghanistanand Saddam Hussein and sons inIraq, have disappeared. This military-led approach has also seen largenumbers of Taliban and Baathistsleaving their positions in the face ofthe US military juggernaut and fadinginto the local population. This mili-tary approach has also seenorganized attacks by these elementsagainst government authorities andUS soldiers in these countries. InAfghanistan, Hamid Karzai isreferred to as the “Mayor of Kabul”on the basis that his writ does notextend beyond the capital. Othersbelieve even this is charitable giventhe assassination of members of hisown cabinet and attempts on his lifewithin the city limits of Afghanistan!Moreover, the resumption of heroinproduction in Afghanistan and theirexport to Western Europe and the USshould also be viewed as a source ofconcern. In Iraq, the killing on aver-

age of one American soldier a daysince the fall of the tyrannical regimeof Saddam Hussein also shows up thelimitations of a military-led campaignon terrorism. Indeed, the invasionand occupation of foreign territory indealing with the threat posed by aglobal terror network is itself a ques-tionable military strategy. As themost recent attacks in Riyadh andCasablanca demonstrate Al-Qaedaretains its military capabilities andglobal reach.

Is there an alternative? We believethat there is. Stressing a ‘crimesagainst humanity’ approach is a pos-sible alternative. This would stressstrengthening influential legal instru-ments like the International CriminalCourt as well as the structures of theUN system. Such an approach wouldnot mean the abandonment of themilitary approach but rather that themilitary exists to enforce legal deci-sions.

But should we stress this legalapproach then we need to take stockof certain shortcomings in the legalanti-terror regime. For instance, boththe Chemical Weapons Conventionand Biological Weapons Conventionis designed to counter atrocities com-mitted by states and does not reallymake provision for terrorism com-mitted by non-state actors. Thiswould need to be rectified. Given themultidimensional nature of the ter-rorist threat posed, strengthening thelegal anti-terror regime means notonly strengthening it at internationallevel but also at regional level such asthe Organization of American States(OAS), the Association of South-EastAsian Nations (ASEAN), the Euro-pean Union (EU) and the AfricanUnion (AU).

Responses would also need toreduce the opportunities available toterrorists. In the light of this, theamount of fissile materials fromweapons and other sources that areheld in poorly guarded sites all overthe former Soviet Union and therelated possibility of theft remains agrave threat to world security. Underthese circumstances, should we con-sider a revitalized Nunn-Luger initia-tive to buy these materials?

Responding to terrorism howeveris not only the preserve ofgovernments and inter-governmentalbodies; civil society also has a duty toplay a key role. Here the importantwork of organizations like theBioweapons Prevention Projectwhich aims to strengthen the normsagainst using disease as a weaponneeds to be supported.

Over the past three decades wehave been experiencing a revolutionin biotechnology that are havinggreat impacts on domains as diverseas medicine and food security. How-ever, the techniques used to improvehealth or to protect people from theworst consequences of biologicalwarfare can also be applied to createa new generation of biologicalweapons. Because of the dual-useaspect of biotechnologies, the prohi-bition of any type of biologicalresearch is not feasible. Instead, theclose monitoring of developments intechnology can serve as an earlywarning of activities that could provedangerous. Also it is imperative toeducate students on relevant weaponcontrol regimes in carrying outresearch.

The desire to prevent sensitiveinformation from getting into thewrong hands is understandable and



wise. However there are some whowish to take this further with mea-sures, which may encroach on civilliberties. In January 2003 in the US,for instance, a group of journal edi-tors and authors discussed strategiesto enhance security. One of thesestrategies read as follows: “We recog-

nize that on occasions an editor may

conclude that the potential harm of

publication outweighs the potential

societal benefits. Under such circum-

stances, the paper should be modi-

fied, or not published”. Meanwhile,the editorial comment of Physics andSociety of January 2003 states, “…

since good science, often underlines

national advantages conducive to

security, it is occasionally vital to live

with effective secrecy in order to

enhance security”.In this charged atmosphere there

is also talk of boycott of scientificcolleagues and research laboratoriesbeing closed to foreign students.Under these circumstances, we mustask who determines which publica-tion may be published or not orwhich parts to excise before publica-tion? Who determines which scien-tific colleagues do we interact withand what is the criteria on whichthese judgments are to be made? Thisis something that needs the directintervention of the scientific commu-nity such as that contained inPugwash.

Summary of discussions

Forgotten or suppressed issues. Thetopic of the discussions in workinggroup 5 was New Technologies for

Human Development and Security.In the first session it was suggestedthat the topic of the working groupbe changed to Risks and Threats of

New Technologies: Identifying Cru-

cial Forgotten and Suppressed Issues.The argument behind this suggestionwas that the working group title leftout a crucial issue: that technologiescan be a source of new problems.

Downside impact of nanotech-nology. The commissioned paper onnanotechnology recommended thatPugwash consider endorsing the callof other groups and organisations fora moratorium on certain types ofresearch into molecular and atomicengineering, specifically research intoself-replicating and self-assembling“nanomachines,” to allow for ade-quate reflection and debate. The callfor such a moratorium wasmotivated by a range of concernsabout the possible social, health andenvironmental impacts of such tech-nology, most importantly, in terms ofPugwash tradition, the potentialemergence of a new category ofweapons of mass destruction.

The paper gave rise to a vigorousdiscussion. Some participants con-tested the description of the present

and potential nature of thesetechnologies. The adequateness of theproposed moratorium wasquestioned.

The grassroots scientist. Three pre-sented papers discussed the linksbetween science, technology andgrassroots issues. A clear distinctionbetween science and technology wasemphasised. Science differs fromtechnology with regard to the normsguiding its practitioners. Also the dri-ving forces behind science and tech-nology are different. Science iscuriosity driven. Special—commer-cial or military—interests are usuallythe impulse to technological produc-tion. It was believed that grassrootsproblems currently seem forgotten bymainstream science and technology.The idea of the grassroots scientistemerged. This concept refers to a per-son who uses the scientific approachto grassroots issues. It was mentionedthat scientists should be bettertrained in analysing complex systemsand thinking in new ways.

GMOs and food security. A paperpresented on the effects of geneticallymodified organisms (GMOs) on foodsecurity of developing countriesstated that more attention should bepaid to international attempts to reg-ulate and mitigate the risks of GMO-technologies following the exampleof the Cartagena protocol on

Report on Working Group 5New Technology for Human Development and SecurityCo-convenors: Marie Muller (South Africa) and Suzuki Tatsujiro (Japan)

Rapporteur: Tom Børsen Hansen (Denmark)



biosafety and the InternationalTreaty on Plant Genetic Resourcesfor Food and Agriculture(ITPGRFA). It was argued that therole of profit oriented research anddevelopment on techno-scientific‘progress’ and its ability to addresshuman security issues be addressed.

AIDS as a security issue. A presentedpaper advanced the argument thatthe already known characteristics ofthe present (southern African) andimpending waves of HIV/AIDS pan-demic indicated novel and gravethreats to global security. Noting theunsatisfactory record to date, itexplained how this situation hadcome about and suggested that therewas a precise and urgent task of defi-nition and analysis that was prerequi-site to more successful policy to com-bat the pandemic. Securityconsequences for the “next waves”of HIV/AIDS countries wereoutlined, and concrete scenariosregarding Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia,India and China given. Most immedi-ately, Nigeria and Ethiopia will bethe hardest hit with the social andeconomic impact, as they have thehighest 2010 estimates of adultprevalence rates: 18–26 % forNigeria and 19–27 % for Ethiopia.Both countries are key to regionalstability, have important geo-strategicimplications (west African oil, forexample) and the rise of HIV/AIDSwill strain their governments, as thatof Zimbabwe already is beingstrained.

Health and sustainable development.A paper dealing with the complexityof nutrition in health, disease andsustainable development was put for-ward. It dealt largely with two of the

top-10 world health risks, malnutri-tion and obesity, and aimed at pro-viding some insight into and under-standing of these pathologies. Thepaper concluded that health is not anisolated problem, but one of environ-mental, societal and global concern;humans need healthy environmentsin which to live in order to be healthythemselves. Robbing communitiesand nations of their greatest wealth— the health of their people—drainsthe human and institutional capaci-ties that fuel sustainabledevelopment.

Myths of ICTs. Two papers on infor-mation and communicationtechnologies (ICTs) were presentedand discussed. Myths related to ICTswere pointed out, e.g. that the use ofmobile phones per se offer the poorin developing countries crucial infor-mation that will help them or thatinformation transmitted through theinternet (e-newspapers etc.) helps usmake more rational choices.

Concerns were raised about the‘scientific positivism’ currently sur-rounding ICTs inside and outside sci-entific communities. It was generallyagreed that ICT does have impacts,of course, but that their depth as wellas their nature was still not wellanalysed, and gave no grounds forcomplacent assumptions such as thepresented paper challenged. In dis-cussion, some argued that the man-ner in which the two-edged sword ofICT might cut depended less uponthe technology, more upon the con-text in which these technologies areused. It was suggested that this is acommon feature of all technologies.

Of positive effect of ICT, it wasput forward that ICTs might poten-tially facilitate the rise and / or

growth of social movements andhence promotion of their aims (e.g.public awareness of the nuclearthreat). The life-saving roles of mod-ern telecommunications, for examplein surgery, were described. On thedownside of ICTs the group wasalerted by the potential risks thataccidental disclosure or surveillancepose to human security and privacy,in particular as a consequence of thewar against terrorism. This was inturn countered by noting the reassur-ance which comes from a capacity totrack individuals in circumstances ofcriminality.

Recommendations to Pugwash

An important theme underlying thepaper-discussions was recommenda-tions for future Pugwash activitiesrelated to new technologies. Manypotential areas of concern for Pug-wash emanate from the applicationof new technologies. Even thoughmany of these issues haveimplications for human developmentand security, Pugwash cannot take onall of them. The group consideredcriteria that could be used to selectthe issues for Pugwash to take up. Itconcluded that Pugwash must be ableto add value to or ‘tip the balance’ onsuch issues. Meeting the security cri-terion is axiomatic in selecting issuesfor action by Pugwash. Some specificguidelines were identified:

• If science or technology creates acircumstance that poses potentialthreats to global / human securitythen we, as scientists, have aresponsibility to do somethingabout it.

• If a complex problem is emerging,or a simple problem has to belooked at in a complex context, and



engagement with it is not possiblewithout thinking in a new way.

• If new technologies are required todeal with a problem.

• If issues are systematically forgottenor suppressed.

The issue of what constitutes thetarget group of Pugwash endeavourswas raised. There was general agree-ment on the principle: “horses forcourses;” a principle historically wellrehearsed. Pugwash’s audience is, forsome causes, decision-makers; forother causes the general public is thetarget group.

Based on a careful considerationof the various issues raised in thepapers presented, followed by theapplication of the guidelinesmentioned above, the group madethree recommendations:

• A Pugwash focussed study groupentitled “Threats without enemies:security implications of 21st cen-tury health problems” should beestablished. Pugwash will set up anexpert forum where the visibilityand potential impacts of theHIV/AIDS pandemic upon globalsecurity will be analysed by expertsfrom different disciplines, who willthen formulate policy supportadvice for decision-makers. Themodel in mind is that of thesuccessful series of focussed meet-ings on intervention andsovereignty.

This recommendation fulfils cri-teria b), c) and d). Health issues arevery complex, and connected toenvironmental, societal and globalconcerns. The fact that no one elseis doing something similar supportssetting up the proposed Pugwashfocussed study group.

• A working group at the next year’sPugwash conference in South Koreaon the topic “Early warning andpreventive action on emerging tech-nologies” should be established.Topics within such a workinggroup could be: the character of theearly warning institutions, and thescientific analysis of examples ofpotential threats from emergingtechnologies—downsideconsequences of nanotechnology,biomedical technology etc., andsecurity and privacy issues relatedto ICTs (Echelon etc.). The analysisshould include contextual aspects(commercial, religious, and ideolog-ical etc.) surrounding emerging

technologies, as well as account forthe epistemological and historicalmeta-assumptions on which theyare built.

There was agreement in thegroup that this recommendationfulfils criteria a), b), and d).

• Put on the Pugwash agenda a con-sideration of “a new relationbetween science and grassroots.”

This recommendation fulfils cri-teria b), c), and d). Understandingof and solutions to grassroots prob-lems were considered forgottenissues within mainstream scienceand technology. Discussions of thistopic need to be initiated.

Report on Working Group 6Mitigation of Global Environmental ChangeCo-Conveners: Omar Masera (Canada) and Kit Hill (UK)

Rapporteur: David Sandomierski (Canada)

The theme of this conference is“Advancing Human Security: TheRole of Technology and Politics.”The second part of this titlerecognizes that we need integratedapproaches to ensure our survival.Scientific and social inventivenesstogether will help us address ourcomplex problems. Similarly,“Human Security” is a fertileconcept. We must chose to define“security” broadly. Our security—our safety—is inextricably tied up inthe health of the Earth. It is time toexpand our intellectual horizons toinclude the urgent and real threat ofenvironmental degradation.

Under continuation of recenttrends, we can expect, by 2100, atripling of pre-industrial levels ofatmospheric carbon dioxide, with a

quadrupling almost unavaoidablethereafter. That world would be a“scorched earth:” unbearably highsurface air temperatures, severedrought conditions, dramatic changein ocean levels, and irretrievable lossof biodiversity.

Global Climate Change is primar-ily a human-induced phenomenon. Inthe past fifty years, climate modelswhich combine natural processeswith human intervention correlateextremely well with temperaturerecords.

Levels of consumption, the car-bon intensity of energy sources andprocesses such as deforestation andland degradation all determineatmospheric CO2 levels. Reforesta-tion can reduce CO2 and has localbenefits but cannot be relied upon



alone to abate global climate change.Stabilization of global population

will help. For example, in countrieswhere universal free education hasbeen extended, especially to women,fertility rates are lower. One possiblesolution is to reduce populationgrowth rates through education.

However, it is the high energyconsumption on behalf of the devel-oped world which is most urgent.Carbon-based fuels contain hiddensubsidies that artificially lower theircost, placing a barrier to renewableenergy sources. Wind and solarenergy are too intermittent to provideadequate base loads of electricity. Formany countries, the main alternativeto coal, whose carbon emissions areextremely high, remains nuclearpower. In that sense, countries mayneed to consider keeping the nuclearoption open providing issues such asnuclear proliferation, vulnerability toterrorist attacks and the safe disposalof nuclear waste are solved. Thewidespread move to renewableenergy sources, while desirable,requires a thorough economical andtechnological assessment.

Despite these difficulties, it isurgently important that mitigationstrategies are not sacrificed in favourof adaptation strategies. Whereas thecost of mitigation will be bornelargely by rich countries, poor coun-tries bear the brunt of adaptationmeasures. Further, climate changeinformation risks becomingcommoditized and sold to the highestbidder, giving preferential access tothose least in need. Early knowledgeabout climatic events, for example,can enable rich farmers to exhaustthe supply of drought-resistant seeds.Focus upon adaptation, which is

dependent upon access to scientificdata, can drive a wedge deeperbetween rich and poor.

Many areas of the world arealready facing dwindling waterresources. Given the high prevalenceof transboundary water systems,nations must cooperate throughwater sharing and joint managementin order to avert water-basedconflicts. Concurrently, nations mustbalance their needs for capital invest-ment with an affirmation that wateris a universal human right. Govern-ments must distinguish between dif-ferent uses of water so that water forbasic survival purposes is not com-moditized.

On the one hand, large scale pro-jects such as dams and industrial irri-gation can provide sophisticatedtechnological solutions to waterproblems. On the other hand, watermanagement at the individual level—such as collecting rainwater andusing backyard filtration systems—can vastly increase water yields. Theimposition of inappropriate watertechnologies can undermine socialcohesion. Managers of local waterresources should weigh the high legit-imacy of small-scale, individualefforts against the technologicaladvantage of large-scale projects.

Traditional knowledge has muchto offer science. For example, oralaccounts by the indigenous inhabi-tants of Canada’s Arctic region canprovide researchers with informationabout climate change for which thereis no numerical data. An appreciationof complexity and ambiguity chal-lenges the administrative mind whichtends to artificially compartmentalizeproblems into narrow parts. Techno-logical fixes are no panacea but must

rather be seen as part of a bigger pic-ture.

A “sustainability” paradigmshould inform responses to the globalenvironmental threat. A shift towardsthis paradigm must be achievedthrough the “ultimate” drivers ofsociety: our values and needs, ourknowledge and understanding, ourpower structures and our culture.The participation of a number of dif-ferent actors, termed “Governance,”can accomplish this goal better thanthe more limited conception of gov-ernment. Support for governance ini-tiatives can be bolstered by researchinto, and education about, the ulti-mate drivers of society.

Is sustainability an appropriateconception for Pugwash to adopt?We are familiar with the Russell-Ein-stein manifesto of 1955. As one par-ticipant in our group suggests, how-ever, it may be appropriate toreformulate the manifesto to addressthe pressing needs of today:

We are speaking as an integralpart of planet Earth, whosecontinued provision of a hos-pitable environment forhumanity is in doubt…remember sustainable use andforget the rest… If you can-not, there lies before you therisk of universal death.

The words of TS Eliot give ussober pause to reflect upon thechanging nature of our world: “Thisis the way the world ends/ Not with abang but with a whimper.” Humansecurity today is threatened bynuclear proliferation. But we havemore to fear than the big bang. Thewhimpers contained in the warningsof environmental exhaustion threatenour security just as much. Pugwash



can, and should, assist in bolsteringsupport for sustainable developmentworld wide.

This can be achieved withoutundermining Pugwash’s esteemedposition in the intellectual and politi-cal communities. Pugwash can lendsupport to organizations at the local,national and international levels bycommissioning scientific studieswhose findings would be accessibleto specialists and generalists alike.This working group urges individualsin Pugwash to contribute to the fol-lowing initiatives:

1. Develop a workable interna-tional strategy to implement the thor-ough findings of IPCC. The Intergov-ernmental Panel on Climate Changehas extensive evidence andrecommendations about global cli-mate change. Due to their close rela-tionship with national governments,however, they have not been giventhe mandate to devise a concretestrategy. Pugwash members have theexpertise to translate their findingsinto action, and the independence toadvocate this new strategy tonational governments.

2. Prepare readable and accessiblestudies on specific environmentalthreats in local areas. Grassrootsorganizations can use this data tosupport their advocacy activities.

3. Study how businesses can oper-ate within a sustainability paradigm.If business have access to solid sug-gestions on how to decrease theirecological impact in ways that canincrease their economic efficiency,they will be likely to implement them.Given the increasing role of multina-tional corporations, this recommen-dation is particularly relevant. Pug-wash can advocate the “quadruple

bottom line” that urges business toconsider not only economic but alsosocial, environmental and securityfactors.

4. Related to this, Pugwashitescan contribute to the ongoingresearch and reflection on alternativeeconomic development, wherebyindices such as GDP are replaced bymore holistic measures.

5. Examine the negotiationprocesses of internationalagreements. This is necessary notonly to increase accessibility to theseprocesses but also to indicate inwhich ways diverse perspectives canbe incorporated.

6. Finally, Pugwashites can advo-cate for a “Blue Revolution” thatcalls for water conservation, wisemanagement and equitable distribu-tion of our most necessary resource.

The horrific images of Hiroshimaand Nagasaki capture our imagina-

tion. The mind throbs when it tries tounderstand how quickly so manylives can just vanish. The repulsionthat such cruelty comes at the handsof humans, and the faith that we arewise and compassionate enough toavert it, if only we could get our pri-orities straight, has inspiredPugwashites for decades. But atorched earth and a scorched earthhave the same moribund result. If weare to remember our humanity, wemust remember our capacity forchange. In the face of the very realthreat of global warming andresource exhaustion, Pugwashites canuse their expertise to help society todeal with the complex and intercon-nected nature of our troubles. We arefree to imagine the world we want,and in this world, human securitydepends on environmental sustain-ability. It is time to define our goalsand responsibilities more broadly.

N E T H E R L A N D S P U G W A S H

Sharing the Planet: Population—Consumption—SpeciesScience and Ethics for a Sustainableand Equitable WorldEdited by Bob van der Zwaan and Arthur Petersen

The internationally renowned scholars contributingto this volume aim to fill an often-existing gap: theyassess various specific biodiversity-related features indetail, while attempting not to lose track of the sus-tainability problem at large. Moreover, their purposeis to formulate realistic strategies that cancontribute to bringing about changes in the interna-tional policy arena necessary for reaching a sustain-able and equitable world. The book is intended forscientists, policy-makers, and interested and con-cerned world citizens alike.

Eburon Academic Publishers256 pages February 2004ISBN: 9059720024


dynamics, our evolving sense of pur-pose, ongoing and new projects, rec-ommendations for the Pugwashmovement from the ISYP perspective,and a few questions to guide futuredialogue between and within ourorganizations.

As students and youngprofessionals we are grateful for theopportunity to share our thoughtswith the Pugwash Conferences onScience and World Affairs. It is ourhope that this report can contributeto enriching the ideas and actions ofthe Pugwash Community.

Furthermore, we would like tothank the note-takers for the contri-bution, in particular Moira AnnGoodfellow and Pablo Suarez.

Irna van der MolenJoelien Pretorius

Report on ISYP WorkingGroups A (1,2 and 4)Facilitator: Hugo EstrellaRapporteur: Joelien Pretorius

Group A included three sub-groups,namely a sub-group on nuclearweapons (1), weaponization of spaceand missile defense (2) and on terror-ism (4). Because of the overlap of thethemes and practical considerations,these were all discussed in one work-ing group.

Nuclear weapons

The working group considered threethemes with respect to this topic:

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

We currently face a crisis in the non-proliferation regime: both horizon-tally (India’s and Pakistan’s nuclearweapons tests, Israel’s covert nuclearweapons programme, North Korea’swithdrawal from the NPT, Iran’s ura-nium enrichment programme) andvertically (the US plans to developlow yield nuclear weapons that canbe used in conventional warfare—mini-nukes). This highlights certainflaws in the NPT, namely:• Nuclear weapons states have

preached to non-nuclear weaponsstates, but have not kept their endof the bargain, which is ultimatelyto give up their nuclear weapons.This may be perceived as unjust fornon-nuclear weapons states and ifthreatened these states may decideto withdraw from the NPT asNorth Korea did;

• An incoherent and insufficientresponse to the withdrawal ofNorth Korea as well as to countriesoutside of the NPT (Israel, India,Pakistan). The lift of sanctions onIndia and Pakistan and the militaryaid that these countries receive maysend a message that acquisition of

Introduction

The present document reportsthe discussion of over 30 stu-dents and young professionals

from 17 countries who participated inthe ISYP working groups precedingthe 53rd Pugwash Conference entitled‘Advancing Human Security: the Roleof Technology and Politics’. Each par-ticipant presented a paper along oneof the following topics suggested bythe senior Pugwash Conference orga-nizers:

1. Nuclear Weapons

2. Weaponization of Space and Mis-sile Defense

3. International Cooperation andHuman Security

4. Terrorism

5. New Technology for HumanDevelopment and Security

6. Mitigation of Global Environmen-tal Change: Beyond Johannesburg.

Two ISYP Working Groups wereformed: ‘A’ (comprising themes 1,2and 4) and ‘B’(comprising themes 3,5, and 6). The first two sections offerthe rapporteurs’ report of workinggroups ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively. Sec-tion ‘C’ offers an outline of the pre-sentation made by ISYP to the Pug-wash Council on July 17, 2003,including recent changes in working



REPORTS OF THE WORKING GROUP MEETINGS OFINTERNATIONAL STUDENT/YOUNG PUGWASH (ISYP)



nuclear weapons has littlediplomatic cost;

• Non-nuclear weapons states couldacquire a nuclear fuel-cycle underNPT for peaceful purposes, butthen decide to withdraw and topursue a weapons programme;

• Proliferation to non-state actors(e.g. terrorists) is not included inthe NPT framework.

At the 2000 Review Conferencethe NPT was extended indefinitely.Although, at the time, this was con-sidered to be positive, it may be thatthese flaws are so ingrained in thestructure of the Treaty that it wouldhave been better to negotiate a newtreaty altogether. In the absence ofthis possibility, several suggestionscame up to strengthen the NPT suchas the support of a fissile materialcut-off treaty and additional proto-cols or even a treaty like theproposed Nuclear Weapons Conven-tion (providing for a total ban onnuclear weapons and infrastructuresupporting them) to transcend theNPT.

Regional hot spots: South Asia

The perceptions in India andPakistan regarding nuclear weaponscan be categorized as:• Nuclear optimism: also referred to

as nuclear hawks, people who holdthis view actively support thenuclear weapons programmes andare present in military and govern-ment think tanks;

• Nuclear pessimism: also referred toas nuclear doves or abolitionists,people with this view are againstnuclear weapons and are present inacademia and some NGOs; and

• Nuclear pragmatism: people whohave this view take the realist posi-

tion that the nuclear genie is out ofthe bottle, and it is best to managethe problem through robust com-mand and control systems and con-fidence building measures betweenIndia and Pakistan.

The question was raised whetherPugwash can entertain the pragmaticposition. It seems that some hawksturn into pragmatists when theyretire from governmentestablishments and then it is oftentoo late to affect a real change in gov-ernments’ programmes.

Nuclear Weapons Awareness

In Britain, after the end of the ColdWar, the number of people whoregard nuclear weapons as an impor-tant issue decreased significantly. It islikely that there is a similar trend inother countries. The lack of aware-ness extends to:• The horrific consequence of the use

of nuclear weapons in terms ofhuman and environmental destruc-tion;

• The financial cost of nuclearweapons;

• Arguments that nuclear weaponsmay not increase the actual securityof states;

• The legal obligations of nuclearweapons states to de-nuclearize.

Awareness-raising programmesshould start by identifying thecounter-arguments to the reasonsthat governments give for havingnuclear weapons and these are:• Threat perception and deterrence:

the decision to acquire nuclearweapons are often rooted in histori-cal animosity between countries ora strategic domino effect, whereone country acquires nuclearweapons in response to another

country’s weapons programme. Itis, however, questionable whethernuclear weapons improve the secu-rity of one country vis-à-vis othercountries, or could prevent conven-tional warfare through deterrence.

• Sign of national prestige: it is fair tosay that some governments may seetheir nuclear weapons as essentialto be major powers in the worldand use this to gain public support.In the case of Pakistan’s nuclearweapons, they may be portrayed asthe ‘Islamic bomb(s)’. This view isperpetuated by countries such asFrance and Britain hanging on totheir nuclear weapons in theabsence of a real threat to theirsecurity.

• A weapon of the poor. Convention-ally weak states might acquirenuclear weapons as a cheaperoption than spending a lot ofmoney on conventional weapons toreach comparable levels of militarymight. However, India and Pakistanstill spend money on conventionalforces and their nuclear weaponshave not been successful in dimin-ishing the intensity of their conflict.

With regard to nuclear weaponsawareness initiatives, the workinggroup was briefed on two projects:• An interactive on-line quiz designed

by Oxford University Student Pug-wash where questions are askedand information is given about theamount of nuclear weapons thatexist, the cost of nuclear weaponsand so forth, and where the issue isplaced in the broader context(www.oxford.ac.uk; search forStudent Pugwash).

• An exhibition of photographs fromthe Hiroshima Peace MemorialMuseum by physicians for global



survival by a student group in Hali-fax, which shows the aftermath ofthe use of nuclear bombs.

Other suggestions were:• Nuclear hawks in the political and

military realm should be identifiedand the public should be madeaware of their positions;

• Awareness programmes should alsobe initiated in non-nuclear weaponsstates to inform their citizens aboutthe perils of nuclear weapons as ameasure to prevent proliferation totheir countries.

Missile defense and theweaponization of space

Missile defense

• The Bush Administration has set adate for deployment in 2004/5 fora ballistic missile defense system,which will not only consist ofhomeland defense against inter-continental missiles, but alsoinclude US ‘friends and allies’;

• This will have implications for thestrategic stability in North-EastAsia. Countries such as China andNorth Korea might increase therange and amount of missiles intheir arsenals to maintain strategicdeterrence. Thus missile defensecould lead to horizontalproliferation in the region.

• An alternative to missile defense inthe region may be initiatives toobtain regional missile stability, forexample, placing regionally agreedlimitations on missiles that wouldbreak the security dilemma in theregion.

Weaponization of space

• The issue of space weapons linksup with missile defense in thatinterceptors may be put in spaceand shot from and through space.

Although the 2004/5 deploymentplan does not include spaceweapons, there are plans fordeveloping a test bed in space;

• The US’ withdrawal from theAntiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)in order to pursue missile defense,left a legal loophole to testweapons that could be put in space(the Outer Space Treaty onlyprohibits weapons of massdestruction in outer space and allother weapons on celestial bodies).

• It should be noted that space isalready militarised and that the USis increasingly reliant on space formilitary operations. It is thus oftenargued that weapons in space arestrategically justified for threereasons: to protect military assetsand superiority, to deny it to othercountries, and to fight from space.

• On close inspection: if cost-benefitanalyses are performed, it showsthat military advantage is onlyshort-term

• Any security advantage would bedegraded once other states alsodeploy state weapons (In otherwords, the US might be worse offthan they were before initialdeployment).

Terrorism

• Terrorism is often sketched as acharacteristic of the Post-Cold Warcontext, but it should berecognized that it existed longbefore then. However, after theSeptember 11 attacks, there is afear that terrorists may acquireWMD and missiles to deliver them(an argument to support thedevelopment of missile defense).

• In the aftermath of September 11th,anti-terrorist legislation in Canadawas rapidly adopted withoutsufficient consultation.

• The implications of this for civilliberties are now being realized andthis has been cause for publicdebate.

• One of the lessons learned fromthe process is to explore theinsertion of a ‘sunset clause’ inrushed legislation to ensure areview mechanism and, more ingeneral, to promote civil societyinterest in parliamentary /congressional processes whenimportant legislation is passed.

• The idea that the InternationalCriminal Court should prosecuteterrorists as opposed to nationalgovernments was also discussed.This might establish aninternational norm of condemningterrorism and promoteinternational law at the same time.

• All of this should be seen in thecontext of human security.International economic injustice,international financial institutionsand foreign policy behaviour ofstrong states in developingcountries perpetuate poverty,inequality and a break-down ofstructures. These circumstancescan be a breeding ground forterrorism as well as dictatorships.

• There is a need to makeinternational institutions (e.g. theIMF) accountable for humansecurity and pressurizegovernments to take responsibilityfor their foreign policy behaviour.

Recommendations for S/Y Pugwash

• From our deliberations, the follow-ing recommendations are made toS/Y Pugwash:



• New strategies should be exploredregarding the NPT or new treatiesthat could come afterwards. Aware-ness-raising is a key priority as wellas being informed about changes inmilitary strategies such as the inclu-sion of ‘small’ nuclear weapons inthe US military strategy.

• ISYP should be involved in theConference on Disarmament andfeed ideas into the discourse.

• ISYP should liaison with otherNGOs, especially InternationalNetwork of Engineers and Scien-tists for Human responsibility.

• At future ISYP meetings conflict-simulations could be organized aswell as symposia on peaceful con-flict resolution.

• ISYP could invite Israeli and Pales-tinian Student Pugwash memberstogether to discuss scientific ortechnological issues, such as thoserelated to water management. Thisshould take place in a ‘neutral’ set-ting removed from the region(Europe?).

• Increase awareness about Pugwashamong the general public

• Make ISYP’s application to be oneof the UN affiliated bodies one ofthe major priorities coming out ofthis conference

• ISYP already has a project on theweaponization of space, but itshould also raise awareness withinthe scientific, business, and politicalcommunity in the US and amongallies of the US that mightcontribute to weaponization ofspace through cooperation on mis-sile defense systems. Further atten-tion should be paid to the impact ofspace weaponization on developingnations.

• ISYP should advocate further ratifi-cation of the Outer Space Treaty asa foundation for the efforts to keepspace free from weapons.

• ISYP should advocate a ‘No FirstUse’ / Moratorium Pledge ondeploying weapons in space to rele-vant nations, especially the US.

• ISYP should support the efforts foran international agreement banningspace weapons modelled after theOttawa-process

• ISYP members should write editori-als in major media outlets on thespace weapons issue based onsound scientific arguments toincrease awareness.

• ISYP can also create a spaceweapons quiz for popular education.

Report on ISYP WorkingGroup BFacilitator: Tom Børsen HansenRapporteur: Irna van der Molen

An initial overview of the papers pre-sented in Working Group B led us toidentify many common features thattranscended the divisions proposedby the conference organizers.Inspired by Senator Roche’s encour-agement at the ISYP symposium tocome forward with our own uniqueapproach, we decided to emphasizethose issues which might be underex-posed in discussions at the seniormeeting, and to form the sub-groupsalong three cross-cutting issues that,in our opinion, provided a betterplatform to guide our discussions:• Grassroots aspects of human secu-

rity and new technologies (facilita-tor: Tom Børsen Hansen, note-taker: Moira Ann Goodfellow)

• International cooperation andhuman security (facilitator: Joanne

Macrae, note-taker: Irna van derMolen)

• Environmental Issues and develop-ment (facilitator: Magdalena Kropi-wnicka, note-taker: Pablo Suarez).

ISYP sub-group on grass-rootsaspects of human security and newtechnologies

In the sub-group discussions, sevenpapers were presented on topicsrelated to grassroots aspects ofhuman security and new technolo-gies. The papers fell in twocategories: 1) grassroots science andtechnology and 2) post-conflictreconstruction. Both categories cov-ered conceptual discussion and prac-tical / action-oriented recommenda-tions.

The idea of grassroots sciencerefers to the production ofknowledge relevant to or linked withgrassroots institutions and socialmovements. Grassroots science restsupon particular assumptions, normsand criteria which are partly differentfrom conventional science and tech-nological (industrial and military)research. Grassroots scientific activityought to be guided by inter-discipli-narity, a social responsible approachand new ways of thinking.

Grassroots institutions can bene-fit from the use of technology. It wasargued that the internet cancontribute to the growth of socialmovements. Limiting factors, such asaccess to the internet in developingcountries, were addressed. The over-all conclusion was that the internetcan be helpful in making social move-ments grow.

An example of grassroots sciencewas presented. In the Tamil Nadu,Chengulpet district, India, an attempt



will be made to obtain food securitythrough the establishment of so-called agricultural information ‘clin-ics’. Biotechnological and ecologicalknowledge, as well as practical skills,will be shared with local unemployedpeople, enabling them to initiateeffective agricultural production.

Post-conflict resolution: there istypically an abundance of small armsin civilian hands in post-conflict envi-ronments. These pose a seriousimpediment to post-conflict recon-struction efforts and development.They form part of an intricate cycleof insecurity, violence, and poverty.Combating this problem requirespromoting cultures of peace, commu-nity development initiatives, and vol-untary weapons collection programsat the grassroots level.

Peace education should beactively pursued in peacekeepingwithin a civil-military cooperativeframework. Peace education projectsshould be targeted at different targetgroups, e.g. for different age groups.All of these groups must beapproached in a manner correspond-ing to the characteristics of theirgroup. Peace education programsshould address the concept of nega-tive peace (absence of violence) andcontribute to sustainable peace.

Peace education and peace cultureare reflected in a nation’s peace his-tory. Cultures which have a history ofpeacefulness are better equipped andmore likely to adopt a culture ofpeace, following a conflict or othertype of violent episode, than othertypes of culture. Creating cultures ofpeace is closely linked to peace edu-cation. But how is this accomplished?

The Russell-Einstein Manifesto isa good document and should be used

to actively address current scienceand world affairs issues within aframework of economic democracy.This would ensure the inclusion of alldecision-making processes related tonew technologies.

ISYP sub-group on internationalcooperation and human security

We acknowledge that geographic andcultural differentiation is requiredwhen talking about a concept ascomplex as human security. There isa human security index but this indexneeds further contextualisation. Statesecurity and human security cannotbe seen in isolation, but at the sametime, it would be naïve to assumethat all states consider human secu-rity as a main priority. A state caneven be a threat to human security ifparticular groups are prevented fromhaving access to relevant resources.

Additionally, one should distin-guish between state security and statecapacity for the provision of gover-nance. Human security depends to agreat extent on economic, politicaland social conditions in countries.We have to recognize that some localand regional conflicts cannot simplybe solved by military intervention. Itis not only useful but also necessaryto invest in non-military activities toincrease human security.

One of the issues not alwaysincluded in the debate on humansecurity is how conflicts are affectedby the protection or strengthening ofreligious, ethnic and national identity.We need to understand the complex-ity of structural conditions, temporalfactors and triggering events whichcan result in political conflict.

It seems that we have accepted ahierarchy of values in the human

security debate, in which someaspects, like individual liberty, areconsidered more important thanother values, such as collectiveresponsibilities. This hierarchy isoften reflected in the foreign policyagenda of many countries. The ques-tion is: how useful is the definition ofhuman security if it doesn’t matchpeople’s perception? This is wheredialogue comes in, as well asaccountability and transparency,which are also elements of the so-called ‘good governance’ debate.Since this debate has its own politicalhistory and agenda, there should be aserious effort to open dialogue aboutdifferent perceptions of human secu-rity, accountability and democracy, asthese are often historicallydetermined. Not acknowledging thisignores the reality and is likely toresult in ineffective policies.

Some governments have a politi-cal and economic agenda which is defacto counter-productive to humansecurity. In these cases, one shouldlook for complementary strategieswhich are tailored to the conditionsin each and every country and whichallow for cooperation with civil soci-ety. At the same time, we should rec-ognize that certain mechanismswithin international organisations donot promote human security. Tradi-tional principles such as thesovereignty of states can obstruct theimplementation of human securityprogrammes. International organisa-tions require therefore feedback fromthe local level to make internationalcooperation more appropriate andmore effective. Summarizing, thebasis for ensuring human security liesin ensuring good governance which isin accordance with the reality of



human (in) security as this isperceived by people at local level.

ISYP sub-group on environment anddevelopment

This sub-group acknowledged thatour understanding of problems, ourway of defining problems and theway we try to measure success isoften too narrow. Additionally, theway in which decision-makingprocesses are structured can, andoften does, result in the exclusion ofthose perspectives which try toaddress complexity and interconnect-edness. Simultaneously, it can resultin the marginalization of the interestsof weaker actors, such as women,ethnic groups, minorities, aboriginalcommunities and other vulnerablegroups in society.

Another concern is the strongreflection of neoclassical economicsin policy-formulation. The partici-pants agreed that the perspective ofneoclassical economics is misleading,and that it has too much influence inpolicy formulation.

There was agreement on the needto address key issues in futureresearch, including:• Incorporation of the perspectives

and concerns of marginalizedgroups of society in problem defini-tion, scientific research and policyimplementation;

• Exploration of creative ways totranslate the complexity of socialand natural systems in institutionalframeworks;

• Investigation of the way in whicheconomic forces are shapingscience. Strengthen the funding ofnon-for-profit research that aims atunderstanding and solving the mainproblems that humanity faces.

In terms of concrete steps for thePugwash movement, the followingguidelines for future action were sug-gested:• Address the integrated nature of

development and environment inthe next years’ Pugwash workinggroups

• The ‘Ethics and Science’ initiativeshould try to have an impact onprivate scientific research and tech-nological development;

• Organize an event (or a series ofevents) addressing the changingnature of scientific endeavours inthe context of global economicchange. We should pay attention tothe influence of economic tenden-cies in policies on science and tech-nology and try to counteract thegrowing impact of commercialinterests on the long-range future ofresearch agendas;

• Compile and highlight ‘inspiring’research initiatives that connect sci-ence with social responsibility inorder to attract young scientists toethical aspects of science;

• While discussions and workinggroups are absolutely enriching, webelieve that the Pugwash Confer-ences could allocate more energy toaction-oriented initiatives;

• Allow for more creative formats forPugwash working groups. This mayfacilitate the identification of con-crete action items for participants.

• If senior Pugwash is interested inexpanding participation fromyoung professionals in their deliber-ations, ISYP would be delighted tosit down with the Seniors in orderto explore mechanisms to achievethis.

• We as ISYP would like to learnfrom Senior Pugwash in what ways

they believe we can contribute totheir initiatives and discussions.

Outline of ideas presentedat ISYP & Pugwash CouncilMeeting

Introduction:

• Thank you!• Changes in ISYP working

dynamics:– Renewed atmosphere of enthusi-

asm and cooperation

– Development of concrete ideas

moving forward

– Acknowledged need to document

plans, accomplishments and com-

mitments

• Changes in ISYP conference: papersubmissions, symposium, new focuson brainstorming and project devel-opment

Our evolving sense of purpose:

• Spread the Pugwash way of think-ing among students and young pro-fessionals, across diverse disciplinesand regions

• Facilitate the recruitment of poten-tial new Pugwash members

• Provide the Pugwash conferenceswith a solid, thought-out youngperspective

• Identify emerging set of concerns inthe realm of science and worldaffairs

• ‘Warm-up’ young participants toenrich their individual involvementin the Pugwash working groups

• develop activities and projects tai-lored to the interests of Pugwash-minded young people

- Mechanisms of internationalcooperation which negativelyaffect human security

- Economic forces which areshaping science

Brainstorming: exploring futurecollaboration between Pugwash andISYP

• Questions? Comments?• How can ISYP contribute to Pug-

wash efforts?• How can Pugwash assist ISYP ini-

tiatives?• How can the Pugwash-ISYP dia-

logue be strengthened?• What are the main challenges about

the long-term future of Pugwash?What should we be doing now tostrategically address thosechallenges?

• Other recommendations

– Hold subsequent Pugwash confer-ences in developing countries;organize more events in develop-ing countries

– Support Ottawa-type process tolead to Ban on Space Weapons

– Pugwash/ISYP Collaboration onNuclear Awareness

– Round Table in Washington D.C.to educate politicians on spaceweapons

– Organize events and initiatives toaddress the following issues:- Grassroots science and the role

of marginalized groups in sci-ence;

- Local perspectives of humansecurity and the inclusion oflocal voices / perspectives in sci-ence, policy formulation andimplementation;

Continuing projects and newinitiatives

• Organization of Student/YoungPugwash (Pre-) Conferences

• Activities within National Groups• ISYP symposium• Educational Project• Information and communication

technology• Publications / Outreach• Nuclear Awareness

– Korea 2004 ISYP Symposium

– Sweden 2004 workshop

– Nagasaki 2005 event

– Activities within National Groups

• Support for Emerging and NewNational Groups

• UN Reform and Affiliation• Space Weaponization

Summary of ISYP recommendationsto the Pugwash Council

• Recommendations to enhance fur-

ther cooperation between ISYP and

senior Pugwash

– Organize a meeting in which ISYPand senior Pugwash memberstogether discuss the expansion ofthe Pugwash movement, mecha-nisms to address the generationalgap within the movement, andlooks towards the future;

– Discussion between ISYP andsenior Pugwash members onstrategies to strengthen existinggroups and to establish new S/YPugwash groups in countries suchas Iran, Iraq, South and NorthKorea, Palestine and Israel

– Create more opportunities inwhich senior Pugwash membershave discussions with YP-mem-bers at national level.



Written by Nobel-prizewinner and

former nuclear physicist Joseph

Rotblat, and peace advocate and

scholar Robert Hinde, War No More

provides unrivalled expert insight

into the nature of modern warfare

— including ‘weapons of mass

destruction’. If war is ever to be

eliminated, the pair argue that the

United Nations — as well as non-

governmental organizations,

religious groups, and grassroots

movements — all have an

important part to play! Pluto PressAugust 2003 / 240pp


Opening Remarks by J. Patrick Boyer, Q.C. at Thinkers’ Lodge Sunday July 20, 2003

In July of 1955, the Russell-Einstein Manifesto wasproclaimed. In July of 1957, the first world meeting ofscientists convened in Pugwash.In July 2003, the 53rd World Conference and

Pugwashites return ‘home’ to Canada, to Nova Scotia, tothe Village of Pugwash. . .and to Cyrus Eaton’s Thinkers’Lodge!

For pioneers of the Pugwash Movement, like JosephRotblat and Ruth Adams, this is truly a homecoming.Others of you have alsobeen here before.

Yet for many, todayis the very first directconnection with theplace which gave itsname to a great cause, abuilding which has beenpictured like an iconaround the globe, alocale that has becomeknown to you as both aplace and a concept.

This rather humblesetting is where bridgeswere built, reaching across a perilous chasm of suspicionand confrontation, of military prowess and ideologicalcontention. Thinkers’ Lodge may be tiny, and the Villageof Pugwash small, but in the 1950s the idea that brought22 participants from 10 countries and both sides of theIron Curtain to this place was giant: the need to “think ina new way”.

The World Pugwash Movement was born here as themessage in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto began to crys-

tallize. Thinkers’ Lodge shows it is neither how big a per-son or a place is, nor how modest its scale or humble itsorigins. It is always the commitment and the thinking ofthe people involved that make the difference.

This place, and what transpired here and grewoutward around the globe, is a central part of humanity’sstory. After more than half a century of peril, the people ofthe world have still been spared devastation by thermonu-clear weapons. The Pugwash Movement was nobystander, but an active contributor, to that result.

We now have the unique experience of hearing againhere the same voices of Joseph Rotblat and Ruth Adamsas they recount, on this day when we come “back to Pug-wash”, a perspective which only they possess because they

were in this place at thecreation of the PugwashMovement.

Both Joseph Rotblatand Ruth Adams, par-ticipants in that inau-gural Pugwash confer-ence in July 1957, havelived lives of commit-ment to the highestideals of the Manifesto.The Manifesto calledupon scientists to assem-ble “in conference toappraise the perils that

have arisen as a result of the development of weapons ofmass destruction”. Such a conference to discuss a resolu-tion of that crisis would involve renunciation of war as asocial institution, learning to think in a new way, and find-ing “continual progress in happiness, knowledge, and wis-dom.”

As we now approach the highlight for this day ofremembrance in a lifetime of commitment—the messagesof Jo Rotblat and Ruth Adams—I also express on behalf

PUGWASH RETURNS TO THINKERS’ LODGE

20 July 2003

“This is where bridges were built...”

Patrick Boyer welcomes participants to Thinkers’ Lodge.

charter enacted in 1929 by the Nova Scotia legislature,was to improve conditions in Pugwash and beyond.Thanks to big thinking here in the Lodge, ‘beyond’ in timecame to include the whole world.

It was not the whole world perhaps, but certainly thosewho cared for it, who first came here in 1957. From thatday unto this, our cause has been propelled an inspiringleader, a winner of the 1995 Nobel Peace prize, the Presi-dent Emeritus of the World Pugwash Movement, an hon-ourary member of our Pugwash Park Commission, anoriginal signatory to the landmark Manifesto of 1955which still inspires our greatest deeds today. . .Sir JosephRotblat.

Reunion in Pugwash, 2003Joseph Rotblat

It was almost exactly 46 years ago, in July 1957, when Icame for the first time to this unique place on theNorthumberland Straits, a visit that was to have an

enormous influence on me, in the second half of my life.We came here then because the world situation was

entering a dangerous phase, with a looming nuclear holo-caust; and extraordinary efforts were required to prevent acatastrophe. Now, two generations later, these perils arefacing us again. There is again a need for scientists to takesteps to avert the danger.

Is there a chance that we will succeed? In my opinion,and based on past history, the answer is yes, there is achance. The main fact is that we are still here; that wemanaged to avoid a catastrophic nuclear war, even thoughwe came perilously close to it on several occasions. Manyfactors have contributed to this outcome, but I am surethat the Movement of Scientists that was started here in1957, played a role in it. We were told this by a reliablesource, the Committee in Oslo that awarded us the NobelPrize in 1995. So it is in a mood of anticipation ratherthan dejection that I want to recall some of the eventsrelating to the First Conference, held here, in Pugwash, inJuly 1957.

Before talking about the Conference, I have to recallthe background to that event, the political climate thatprevailed in the world at that time. It is quite possible thatwithout the invitation by Cyrus

Eaton to come to Nova Scotia, there would have beenno international movement of scientists.

of Thinkers’ Lodge and our Pugwash Park Commissionour gratitude for this opportunity to share this place andits legacy with all who come here. Visitors to Thinkers’Lodge discover what transpired here. They grasp howindividuals of courage and people of vision confront thediscouraging work we must still do in a world afflicted yetby a military-industrial-scientific juggernaut and by thoseimprisoned in its old ways of thinking.

When Cyrus Eaton and Joseph Rotblat, Ruth Adams,and the cluster of leading scientists first meet here atThinkers’ Lodge 46 years ago this month, their missionmight easily have been abandoned in the face of suchdaunting odds, had they not been galvanized by the deep-est commitment to building new bridges, thinking in newways, fashioning a new reality from nothing but a dream.

My fellow Commission members and I express ourprofound hope that you will find that spark of higherinspiration that still lives in this place. One of our mem-bers, Dr. Giovanni Benciaglia, himself a nuclear physicistand a relative of Cyrus Eaton, was here for the secondPugwash conference in 1959 and has remained an activePugwashite ever since.

Around that same time, Raymond Szabo, another ofour Commission members, joined Cyrus Eaton as an exec-utive assistant. Ray worked closely with Mr. Eaton untilhis death in 1979, and today in the United States he chairsthe Cyrus Eaton Foundation, a benefactor of the PugwashMovement, and is also vice-chairman of our Commissionhere in Canada.

A third member is Bryan Jamieson, a Nova Scotiabanker and member of a notable local family that throughthree generations has been closely linked with the Eatonfamily. Mary Jamieson, of Pugwash, serves as our Secre-tary and Assistant Treasurer. Kathy Langille, the electedrepresentative to Cumberland County Council from thismunicipality, is also Custodian of Thinkers’ Lodge.

Margaret Eaton, a poet, schoolteacher and counselorin the neighbouring province of New Brunswick, is also arelative of Cyrus Eaton and a student of his life and servesas Archivist and Librarian of Thinkers’ Lodge.

For my part, I first met Cyrus Eaton here at a familyreunion in 1968, little thinking at the time that I myselfwould one day be chair of the very commission he createdback in 1929, or that I would become a Pugwashite at theinvitation of Jo Rotblat to participate in a Workshop onEducation for Global Citizenship here in 1994.

The Pugwash Park Commission’s mandate, under a




Actually, the story began two years earlier, with aManifesto issued in London, in July, 1955. It was draftedby the British philosopher Bertrand Russell and wasendorsed by Albert Einstein in one of the last acts of hislife; he signed it just before be died in April 1955. It wassubsequently signed by nine other scientists, nearly allNobel Laureates, from all over the world, but it hasbecome generally known as the Russell-EinsteinManifesto.

It is a powerful appeal to scientists, to governments,and the general public to take cognizance of the dangeroussituation that has arisen from the development ofthermonuclear weapons (the hydrogen-bomb), and tomake an effort to prevent a catastrophe.

Let me quote two paragraphs from the Manifesto:“We are speaking on this occasion, not as members of

this or that nation, continent, or creed, but as humanbeings, members of the species Man, whose continuedexistence is in doubt.”

“Here, then, is the problem which we present to you,stark and dreadful, and inescapable: Shall we put an endto the human race; or shall mankind renounce war?”

I am now the last survivor of the signatories, and I con-sider it my duty to keep on reminding people of the mes-sage in the Manifesto.

The Manifesto ended with a call to scientists to gettogether in a Conference to seek ways to avert the danger.One of the first responses was the famous letter fromCyrus Eaton, offering to pay all the expenses of the pro-posed Conference, if it were held in Pugwash, NovaScotia.

But it took two years before we actually came here.You have to recall that we were at that time at the heightof the Cold War, with all its mistrust and fears, and hostilepropaganda. In the United States, the malodorousMcCarthy witch hunt was still in the air. Anybody readyto sit down with Soviet scientists, and talk about nuclearweapons and disarmament, was immediately branded as afellow traveller, if not an actual member of the Communistparty. For many American scientists, participation in theConference might have spelled the end of theirprofessional career, let alone obtaining travel funds fromtheir universities. There were no foundations willing toprovide funds for such an enterprise. It was only a fearlessperson like Cyrus Eaton, who broke the taboo, and madethe Conference possible.

Cyrus Eaton was a truly unique personality. He musthave had a streak of the hard capitalist in him: he made a


PEACE

begins in Pugwash

where a blue heron waits for the tide

and the salt boat slips from the harbourat dusk.

At dawn mist rises from the tranquilwater,

and at noon,

beneath the blue and white UnitedNations’ flag,

on the grassy slope stretching to theshore-line,

sit multi-lingual scientists

who have heard the rhetoric of war

but understood the poetry of peace.

Sunlight reflects

from myriad miniature silver doves,

and for a split-second, just an eye-blink,

it coalesces around the invisible silver-white head

of the industrialist-farmer-philosopher,still in our midst,

even though forty-six years have comeand gone

since that first July.

The light flickers there, gaining strength,

before beaming the message

into the gathering darkness

around the globe:

PEACE.

Margaret EatonJuly 21, 2003


by people with left-wing views. The effect of this on thegroup from Britain was peculiar, to say the least. Lord Rus-sell, unable to come to Pugwash himself for health reasons,wanted all the three people who helped him in the organi-zation of the meeting to go to it. But two of these were wellknown in England for their left-wing views, Cecil Powelland Eric Burlop. Eric Burlop was by far the most militant,and Russell felt that his participation might be harmful.And so we ended up with the bizarre situation of Eric Bur-lop actually being in Pugwash, and taking part in the dis-cussion, but officially only as a member of the secretariat,and thus not mentioned in the list of participants.

Of course, no such control could be exercised on theparticipants from the Soviet Union, and the question hasoften been raised whether there was any truth in the alle-gation that the Soviet Government tried to use the occa-sion of the Conference for their propaganda?

The answer is that attempts to use us for such a pur-pose were in fact made, but they were rather clumsy, andwe could see through them easily. To me this became obvi-ous even before the First Conference began here.

Travelling to Pugwash was not then as easy as it isnow. All the participants assembled in Montreal. Fromthere we flew by Mr. Eaton’s private jet—still uncommonin those days—to Moncton, in New Brunswick. Fromthere we travelled to Pugwash by car, a long journeybecause the roads were then very bad.

In the car in which I travelled there were two otherpassengers. One was Academician Alexander Topchiev,the leader of the Soviet Group, a very senior figure in theSoviet Union, with great influence both on science and

politics. But he did notspeak any English. Thisis where the other pas-senger came in. MrVladimir Pavlichenkocame to Pugwash asTopchiev’s translator.But it did not take memore than half andhour of conversationwith him to realize thathe had another role,besides translating. Hewas in fact the KGBman, with the task toensure that the partyline was being followed.


million at a young age, lost it, and made much more soonafterwards. But at the same time he was quite eager to goalong with the communist system in the Soviet Union, byadvocating closer relations with the Soviets at a time whenthis was seen as an almost treasonable offence in theUnited States. It was really extraordinary that, in one andthe same year, he was chosen US Business Man of the Year,and awarded the Lenin Peace Prize.

And with all this, he was also a scholar. He was a vora-cious reader, including books on philosophy. In his famousletter to Bertrand Russell, inviting us to come to Pugwash,he said: “I have read all of your fascinating books againand again.”

He had a great respect for scientists. This is why he setup an educational trust here, in the Eaton Lodge, his sum-mer residence, for scientists to come for relaxation and tosharpen their thinking. This is why this house is also called“The Thinker’s Lodge”. There were some unfriendly com-ments suggesting that he could afford it because all theexpense was tax-deductible, but I am convinced that hewould have done it in any case. However, the fact that itwas the US Treasury that was ultimately financing anorganization that was under investigation by the US Sen-ate for anti-American activities, adds much piquancy tothe story.

I should note here that while Mr. Cyrus Eaton was agracious host, he did not—at that stage—interfere with theactual running of the Conference. This was left entirely inthe hands of Lord Russell and a few of his helpers, whichincluded myself. All the invitations to participants wereissued from my university office in London.

The primary aimwas to ensure the par-ticipation of eminentscientists from bothsides of the Iron Cur-tain, who were alsointerested in andknowledgeable about,the issues to bediscussed. Consciousof the politicalclimate, that I havejust described, LordRussell was anxiousthat the participationfrom the West shouldnot be overrepresented

Nestor Acosta Tieles and Eric Ferguson enjoying Scottish bagpiper.


not from personal contacts. We trusted each other’s scien-tific integrity, and we built on that trust when discussingpolitical issues. This was helped by our decision to con-duct the discussions in the scientific spirit of rationalapproach and objective analysis.

This Conference proved that scientists have a commonpurpose, which can transcend national frontiers withoutviolating basic loyalties.

A very important factor also was the relaxed and con-genial atmosphere of this place to which our hostess, AnneJones, who later became Mrs. Cyrus Eaton, greatly con-tributed with her charm, and her joie de vivre, undimin-ished by being confined to a wheelchair.

I hope that your visit today to this serene location willenable you to capture some of that atmosphere, and that itwill invigorate you to continue our efforts towards aworld of peace, a goal as important today as it was 46years ago.

Reflections, 1957–2003Ruth S. Adams

Looking back across a lengthy span of 46 years, the1957 gathering of scientists in Pugwash still standsout for the bold and forward-looking message it

carried to the world. We remember most immediately, ofcourse, the international consensus of scientists it enunci-ated in the substantive area of controlling nuclearweapons. But no less important was the breakthrough in

On the first day of the Conference, Alexander Topchievmade an important statement. He spoke in Russian, andwas immediately followed by Pavlichenko with the Englishtranslation. But he managed to insert into Topshiev’sspeech some Soviet propaganda. However, he did notreckon with the presence among the American group ofEugene Rabinowitch, who had been born in what wasthen, and is again now, St. Petersburg. So whenPavlichenko finished, Eugene got up and said, “Mr.Pavlichenko, this was not an exact translation”: and thenhe gave a corrected version of the speech. After this,Pavlichenko was much more circumspect. From later meet-ings it became clear that the Soviet contingent included twotypes: genuine scientists, many of them of such eminence inscience that they could afford to speak up openly at ourmeetings even against official Soviet policies; and a fewaparatchiks, who came to toe the party line.

So, were we, from the West, naïve and prey to Sovietpropaganda? Looking at it now, from the perspective oftime, it seems that it actually worked the other way round.Over the years, in many discussions in Pugwash meetings,we managed to persuade our Soviet colleagues that some ofthe policies pursued by the Soviet Government were lead-ing to disaster. There is good reason to believe that ourRussian colleagues, many of whom carried considerableweight in their country, were instrumental in introducingthe radical changes made by Mikhail Gorbachev. In partic-ular, we can claim credit for the halting of the nuclear armsrace. Gorbachev told us this himself. No mean achievementfor a Movement that started here in Pugwash!

Actually, when we came here in 1957, we did notenvisage the meeting as the start of a worldwidemovement of scientists. We, the organizers, considered itinitially as a one-off event. This was so because we fearedthat the Conference would not be successful. The issueswe were going to discuss were so controversial, that evenin the West there were strong divisions on them. We wereapprehensive that these divisions would become muchmore exacerbated when confronted with the ideas fromthe other side of the Iron Curtain.

As it turned out, these fears were unwarranted. TheConference was a great success and we decided to carry onwith the effort by setting up a new organization to whichwe gave the title: “The Pugwash Conferences on Scienceand World Affairs”.

I ascribe this success to several factors. One was that itwas a meeting of scientists. Most of the participants werephysicists, who knew each other from their publications, if


Ruth Adams and Will Marshall.



MESSAGETO THE 53RD PUGWASH CONFERENCE

ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS

The Honorable Kofi Annan,Secretary-General, United Nations

Your gathering

takes place as

we grapple

with a number of

serious issues on the

agenda of international

peace and security. As

we pursue our work in

the service of peace, we

know that our two institutions have much in

common. Both stand for human values that tran-

scend the interests of any one nation state. We

stand together in standing for all.

For almost half a century, Pugwash has made a

unique contribution by exploring ways to chan-

nel the insights and methods of science into the

service of the public good, particularly the cause

of world peace. I applaud the focus of this years

conference on the challenge of advancing human

security, which calls for fresh efforts around the

globe on a number of fronts: eliminating nuclear

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;

curbing the development, production, and export

of long-range missiles; banning weapons from

space; combating terrorism; addressing threats to

the environment; and promoting social and eco-

nomic development through the prudent use of

science and technology. The number of countries

represented at this gathering is eloquent

testimony of your truly global approach to these

and other issues. I thank every one of you for

your commitment, and wish you a most stimulat-

ing conference.

the relationships and depth of communications it embod-ied, at that time especially among scientists, across notonly international borders but social systems, politicalregimes, and hemispheres.

Globalization today has taken on other meanings aswell, some of them controversial, but most fundamentallyit refers to the outward spread to all of the world’s peoplesand to every walk of life, of that original outlook that Pug-wash quite breathtakingly embodied. My own opportu-nity to participate was a result of having worked withEugene Rabinowitch as assistant editor of the Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists. Born in St. Petersburg, the tumultuouspolitical events of his life brought him to Chicago and theManhattan Project during World War II. A prolific writerand sensitive analyst of political issues, he made importantcontributions to the Pugwash movement and attended allof its meetings during his lifetime. Published reports of thediscussions and agreements regularly appeared in the Bul-letin. I must have been one of the youngest participants atthe original gathering. That first meeting was to shapemost of the following decades of my life. But along withthe many strands of continuity of which I remain deeplyconscious, I am no less conscious of the extraordinaryarray of world changes in which we have sometimes reluc-tantly, sometimes eagerly, participated. We need to thinktoday as much about the kaleidoscopic changes of contextthat Pugwash and its membership have endured, adaptedto, and tried both to shape and to anticipate, as we reflecton the community we have become and the long list ofachievements for which we can take credit.

As a young woman finding her way in the post-WorldWar II period, my path of convergence with the concernsthat led to Pugwash focused on human rights that werethen, as now are still, under attack. The stifling ofdiscourse and diversity represented by the McCarthy hear-ings was very much with us then. Peacemaking itself waswidely regarded as suspect, under the threatening cloud ofa nuclear holocaust that was still recent enough for manyof the Cold War calculations accompanying it to come ashighly unpleasant surprises. The many scientists andscholars who had come to the University of Chicago asrefugees had substantially transformed its character, con-tributing directly to the establishment not only of the Bul-letin of Atomic Scientists but later the Federation of Amer-ican Scientists. The Iron Curtain that had descended verysoon after the war had the effect for some time of impris-oning the values and goals of peoples on both sides.

Then out of correspondence in 1955 came the Russell-


Einstein appeal. To those of us in Chicago it was like find-ing a crack in the Iron Curtain. Especially to me, and tomany of those in my generation in that setting, it gavemeaning and set a principled direction that we could fol-low with enthusiasm. It is easy to forget now that war hadhad the universal effect of concentrating science in govern-ment laboratories, on goals and priorities set with essen-tially no regard for scientific imperatives, and under condi-tions of secrecy that greatly impeded communication evenamong immediate colleagues in the same institution. The‘fifties were a time when that force of obstruction wasbeginning to lift, when educational and scientific institu-tions were reasserting their independence, when the needfor open communication and cooperation on common,great problems across all boundaries once again becameapparent. We were a part of that, and very much in theforefront of it.

The physical sciences were still in their government-imposed ascendancy at the time, but excitement was inthe air of coming revolutions in biology. Science in not-for-profit and corporate settings was still largely seen as adifferent kind of enterprise. But there too, coming changewas visible along a distant horizon. These enormouschanges are all around us now, parts of Pugwash’s inti-mate environment. I hope we can find ways to embrace

them, and at the same time shape them within a frame-work of consistent principles and values, just as we origi-nally took leadership in finding an international basis forconfronting the nuclear peril.

Still taken as a given at our first meeting, as I reflectupon it, was the sovereignty of the nation-states fromwhich we all came, and of a general acceptance of theparamount claims which the regimes in most of thosestates felt free to make upon our behavior, basic values,and loyalty. Those paramount claims are more contestedtoday than they were then. The UN is no longer in itsinfancy, even if the limitations of its powers are moreapparent than what we then hoped. Today there are manyinternational communities that embody shared values andloyalties. They do not erase national boundaries, but theymitigate and circumscribe their more absolutist meanings.Pugwash is among the very best of these trans-nationalcommunities. I look back with gratitude and pride on thedecades of my association with it.

Some of you here today are members of the thirdgeneration since Pugwash began, and in itself your pres-ence is dramatic evidence of the success of the Pugwashconferences. As we reflect on our origins we pay tributeto all the young scientists who continue to work for peaceand security.

Participants at first Pugwash Conference, July 1957.


country where the danger and destruction of conflict con-tinued long after fighting stopped because of the millionsof land mines seeded into the ground, how would you feelabout planting crops in those fields?

If you were an entrepreneur in Sri Lanka, or anywhereexperiencing long years of conflict and uncertain truces,how would you feel about creating or expanding a busi-ness to create new jobs, without the assurance of personalor state security? Even if you wanted to take the risk,would it be possible if roads and other basic infrastructure

were still destroyed?Conflict causes devastation: death,

injury, disease, property loss and poverty.What is equally true but bears repeating, isthat violent conflict stops and reverses sus-tainable development—that delicate balanc-ing of social, economic and environmentalelements that are essential to improving thelives of people today, without compromisingthe chances for future generations to do thesame.

Now, I’m certain this isn’t news to peo-ple like yourselves, who are committed topromoting peace, human security, and sus-tainable development. It is only relatively

recently, however, that the international community hasstarted to formally articulate these ideas.

In 1997, at a high-level meeting of the DevelopmentAssistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Eco-nomic Cooperation and Development, or OECD, develop-ment ministers endorsed a policy statement entitled,“Conflict, Peace and Development on the Threshold of the21st Century.” Canada played a significant role in thedevelopment of these DAC guidelines, and with their 2001supplement on “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict.”

Briefly, the DAC guidelines offer some principles topartners engaged in international development for effec-

By Susan WhelanMinister for International Cooperation

Good afternoon, Senator Roche, Professor Swami-nathan, Professor Cotta-Ramusino, Dr. Boutwelland everyone who worked towards making this

conference possible. It is an honour to be with you heretoday.

History and culture make the times of peace and con-flict in every country unique. Even so, thereare clearly some constants across all the dif-ferences. One of them is this: peace andhuman security are basic prerequisites forsustainable development.

Let’s consider for a moment the legacy offour Balkan wars in the 1990’s. During theseconflicts, 200,000 people were killed andthree million residents were forced to fleetheir homes. More than 1,000 UN peace-keepers were killed or wounded. Materialdamage was estimated at 20 to 60 billiondollars. Buried, but not forgotten, there aremore than 300 suspected mass grave sites,and more than three million land minesthroughout the region. Real Gross Domestic Product fellto half of its 1989 levels.

In these horrific numbers that paint a picture of statesin conflict, it’s easy to lose sight of the challenges,tragedies, and triumphs of the individuals caught withinthem.

If you were a parent in Northern Uganda, or someother region where 15,000 children have been killed orkidnapped from their schools during the last 16 years toserve as child soldiers and sex slaves, how would you feelabout sending your child to school?

If you were a farmer in Mozambique, or some other



KEYNOTE ADDRESS:Promoting Human Security: The Experience of Reconstruction

The Honorable Susan Whelan.



tive action in conflict situations. They recognize both theopportunities and the limits of third-party or externalinfluence. Noting that all aid has political consequences,the guidelines call on aid policy makers to try to ensurethat aid does not exacerbate tension, prolong conflict, orreinforce or legitimize parties in conflict, all while maxi-mizing benefits. Other principles call for: transparency;encouraging and maintaining inclusive dialogue; reinforc-ing local capacities; recognizing women as stakeholdersand peacemakers; working with war-affected children andyouth; acting in timely and flexible ways and thinkinglong-term; and using creative, incentive-driven approachesfor constructive engagement. The benefits of peace mustbe seen to be clearly preferable to the perceived benefits ofconflict. Finally, there is a call to “act on the costly lessonslearned about the need for coordinated and coherentaction and policy.” The DAC guidelines are the intellec-tual context for Canada’s post-conflict reconstructionassistance.

To be effective, that assistance must be part of coordi-nated diplomatic, military, trade and aid responses. This issomething we have been doing for a number of years; butagain, it is only recently that the Canadian governmenthas started to articulate what we are calling the 3Dmodel—diplomacy, defense and development—that bringstogether three different departments within the Govern-ment of Canada. The activities of all these departmentshave an impact on developing countries, and the increas-ing policy coherence encouraged by this coordination isessential to strengthening aid effectiveness and promotingsustainable development.

My department, the Canadian International Develop-ment Agency, or CIDA, has a mandate to support sustain-able development in developing countries to reducepoverty for a more secure, equitable and prosperousworld. It is primarily responsible for Canada’s OfficialDevelopment Assistance.

CIDA, the Department of National Defense and theDepartment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade areincreasingly working together on peace building andhuman security, including conflict prevention. Canada’swork on land mines, for example, involves the three mainplayers in diplomacy, defense and development, as well asIndustry Canada.

The Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative, which is a jointundertaking of CIDA and the Department of ForeignAffairs, is another good example of collaboration. AtCIDA, the Peacebuilding Fund provides resources to

Canadian and international groups for a variety of innova-tive projects ranging from small arms collection inMozambique to voter education in Afghanistan. At theDepartment of Foreign Affairs, the Human Security Pro-gram contributes to policy advocacy focused on counter-ing threats of violence and conflict. In fact, some of thefunding for this event today came from this program, andmy colleague Minister Graham sends his regrets that he isunable to attend.

Since the end of the Cold War, the international secu-rity agenda has changed dramatically. Most humanitariancrises today are in conflict zones. Places like Kosovo,Afghanistan and Iraq spring to mind, as do the Congo andLiberia. Most of these conflicts occur within states ratherthan between separate countries. The protracted nature ofthese internal conflicts, and their impact on poverty andhuman rights, has led agencies like CIDA to renew theircommitment to conflict prevention, while having to grap-ple with the realities of post-conflict reconciliation andreconstruction.

Canada’s Human Security Agenda is made up of fiveareas: conflict prevention, governance and accountability,protection of civilians, peace support operations and pub-lic safety. All of these elements, including the respect forhuman rights, are necessary for creating a world in whichpeople live free from fear.

In peace support operations, CIDA and theDepartment of Foreign Affairs work with our Canadianforces and local communities in countries that have expe-rienced conflict to promote the transition to sustainablepeace.

CIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs alsowork with the Office of the Solicitor General, the RoyalCanadian Mounted Police and the Department of Justiceon a number of judicial and police-related activities.

I want to focus on Canada’s work in the Balkans as anexample of our work in post-conflict peace building.

I began this afternoon with an outline of some of theconsequences of the prolonged conflict in the Balkans.From the first, Canada was involved diplomatically andmilitarily, primarily with peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herze-govina, but also taking part in the NATO force whichacted in 1999 to halt and prevent further ethnic cleansingin Kosovo.

Canada was also involved in getting humanitarianassistance to people in need. Meeting basic human needs isalways a primary concern in reconstruction. Since 1999,CIDA has supported the distribution of shelter, winter


clothing, medicine, food and water to more than 900,000returning refugees and displaced persons in the region.

Safety and security is another basic need that is mostobviously lacking during conflict. Canada deployed over250 police officers to Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia tofill the security vacuum in the immediate post-conflictperiods. We created a $20-million mine action program.We supported the rule of law by: deploying forensic teamsto gather evidence for the prosecution of war crimes,developing a self-sustaining correctional service inKosovo, providing training to foster regional cooperationand build capacity in police services, providing training forjudges to improve skills and promote independence andimpartiality, as well as by advising on parliamentaryreform to increase transparency and effectiveness.

We provided budgetary support to the UN mission inKosovo and deployed Canadians with valuable expertisein human rights and justice to multilateral institutionsworking in the Balkans. All of these activities succeeded inproviding a measure of security and stability that allowedother reconstruction and reforms to proceed.

Canada was active in establishing the InternationalCrimes Tribunal to deal with those who have committedatrocities. We also took the lead on the InternationalCriminal Court to ensure that perpetrators of atrocitieswill be held to account by the international community. InMarch, senior Canadian diplomat Philippe Kirsch, a lead-ing figure in the recent establishment of the InternationalCriminal Court, was elected one of its judges and its firstPresident. There can be no impunity for war crimes at anylevel if there is to be a substantive return to rule of law.People must be able to see that there can be, and will be,justice.

In order to help rebuild the quality of life and not justensure survival in the Balkans, we are helping to improvethe quality of health, education, energy and communica-tion services, and we are supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises by addressing constraints to businessdevelopment.

What have we learned from all this activity?First, material aid is not enough. Weak or failed states

need institutions that work, and that are seen to be work-ing so that laws are properly debated and universallyapplied and obeyed. This kind of capacity-building, aswith all development, is most effective in the context of anoverarching and coherent plan for peace, reconstructionand sustainable development.

Second, flexible delivery mechanisms are critical to the

ability of aid agencies like CIDA to respond in conflict andpost-conflict situations. For example, a Civilian Deploy-ment mechanism allows CIDA to deploy a wide range ofCanadian expertise from the public and private sectors toassist partner countries with peace support and reformactivities.

Third, we have a lot more to learn. Like other donors,CIDA has struggled in the western Balkans with the bal-ancing act required to integrate solid analysis and conflictprevention approaches with the day-to-day challenges ofmanaging a development program.

Collaboration and coordination have proven theirworth for Canadian activities in the Balkans. One exampleof the 3D model is the Civil-Military Cooperationprogram. Canadian Forces on the ground help local peo-ple make connections with other individuals and organiza-tions who can help them to accomplish their own develop-ment goals. I had the opportunity to see for myself thiskind of cooperation in action in Bosnia when I visited thatcountry in May this year.

The lessons we are learning in reconstruction activitiesfollow some basic principles:

Local ownership, donor coordination, policy coher-ence, and the need for good governance.

Last September, I launched a policy statement onstrengthening aid effectiveness which was based on thesesame principles. They guide our work in general, and areclearly being applied to our post-conflict reconstructionefforts in Afghanistan, for example.

Under the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, theinternational community and Afghan representativesestablished the interim government for Afghanistan andthe action plan for rebuilding the nation. A significant partof that rebuilding effort involves the re-establishment ofgood governance in the country.

Just over half of the assistance CIDA provided toAfghanistan last year was in support of the government’soperating budget and various programs related to nation-building efforts, to promote stability and prevent furtherconflict, internally and as well as internationally. Thissummer, Canada becomes one of the largest troop-contributing nations to the International Security Assis-tance Force. Together, CIDA and National Defense willbuild on our experience and success in the Balkans byputting a Civil-Military Cooperation program into effect.

The rebuilding of Afghanistan has to be owned byAfghans, but they need international financial support todo it. The 1998 World Bank study “Assessing Aid: What



Works and Why?” concluded that aid should be increas-ingly allocated to poor countries with strong policy envi-ronments to maximize positive results. However, it alsostated that timely reconstruction assistance can have a crit-ical development impact. In poor-performing, low-incomecountries emerging from a situation of protracted conflict,significant amounts of well-targeted aid can have the mostbeneficial impact on economic growth and poverty reduc-tion. Without sufficient outside assistance, they risk slip-ping back into conflict.

All of these lessons learned are also helping to guideour reconstruction efforts in Iraq, which are only justbeginning. Canada’s focus will be assistance to rebuildIraqi institutions. Basic services like health care, water, andsanitation are obviously a priority; but we will also sup-port legal reform, judicial reform and critical elements likepolice and correction services.

The most important lessons about peace, conflict,reconstruction and development are not new ideas in theleast, but they may perhaps be the hardest lessons to learnand put into practice. Nearly half a century ago, in hisacceptance speech of the Nobel Peace Prize, former Cana-

dian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson said:“Just as we cannot in this day have a stable national

democracy without progress in living standards, withouttoo great extremes of wealth and poverty, likewise we can-not have One World at peace without a general social andeconomic progress in the same direction.”

With peace a necessary prerequisite for sustainabledevelopment, and with the journey through peace buildingand reconstruction as long and arduous as it is, conflictprevention is all the more desirable. Very simply, it is cen-tral to poverty reduction and sustainable development.Development agencies must accept the risk of working onconflict and conflict prevention, rather than around it.

In recent years, more than 80 percent of CIDA’shumanitarian assistance has gone to help victims of con-flict—human-made disasters—rather than hurricanes,earthquakes, or drought. We need to turn this power todestroy towards more positive ends, not just to rebuildafter conflict, but to prevent it from happening in the firstplace. The challenges are great, but so is our commitmentto facing them, for peace, for prosperity, for people.

Thank you.



Jayantha Dhanapala

Introduction

My warm thanks tothe Pugwash Con-ferences on Science

and World Affairs for the greathonour of being invited todeliver the Dorothy Hodgkin

Memorial Lecture. I am not a scientist and must admit tobeing among those who have suffered from the schism ofthe ‘two cultures’ of the sciences and the humanities whichC.P.Snow famously spoke of in his historic 1959 RedeLecture. It is a schism which has still to be bridged in mod-ern education even though the complexity of contempo-rary life demands a more holistic and integrated approachto all issues that face us today and which the ubiquity ofICT alone cannot achieve.

I have, however, been a longtime admirer of the firmprinciples and dedicated endeavours of the PugwashMovement which has deservedly earned you all the NobelPeace Prize in 1995.The Russell-Einstein Manifesto of1955—the 50th anniversary of which will be observed in2005—remains an awesomely prescient and inspiring doc-ument for the peace and disarmament movement. As a tes-tament of nuclear disarmament and the abolition of war itwill remain historic. But it is also a virtual HippocraticOath for scientists confronted with the eternal dilemma ofdual use ingenuity. It is a statement of conscience and ofaccountability of all scientists as human beings. AsBertrand Russell wrote in his letter of 5th April, 1955 toAlbert Einstein, “Scientists have, and feel they have, a spe-cial responsibility, since their work has unintentionallycaused our present dangers.” It is not only to scientists

that the Russell-Einstein Manifesto appeals but to scien-tists as human beings faced with the extinction of theirspecies if nuclear weapons are ever used again. This iswhere these two wise men were echoing the words ofImmanuel Kant who once wrote “Science is organizedknowledge. Wisdom is organized life”. We have, 48 yearsafter the Russell-Einstein Manifesto was issued, still tomake the transition from knowledge to wisdom and torespond to its appeal that “We have to learn to think in anew way” on questions of weapons of massdestruction(WMD).

This lecture is in memory of Dr. Dorothy CrowfootHodgkin—chemist, pioneer crystallographer, Nobel Lau-reate and of course—as President of Pugwash—supporterof the humanist and humanitarian cause of nuclear disar-mament. I hope my modest contribution will be seen as anact of homage to her memory.

The Problems

I have chosen to speak on “The Resurrection of Multilat-eral Disarmament” before a group of very distinguishedscientists not because I am a naïve optimist or because Iseek some genetic engineering breakthrough to invent anew clone to bring about transformational change in thedisarmament field. The multilateral system for disarma-ment and arms limitation is widely regarded today asmoribund. The responsible approach for those of us whoremain committed to disarmament through the rule ofinternational law is not merely to engage in hand wring-ing. We must do something to breathe new life into thesystem. Disarmament, especially the disarmament ofWMD, is at a critical crossroad. It is true that we tend toidentify periods of time as being critical when we disagreewith contemporary trends. The Russell-Einstein Manifestorefers to times of peril during the Cold War. It is over a



DOROTHY HODGKIN MEMORIAL LECTURE

The Resurrection of Multilateral Disarmament



decade since the end of the Cold War led to an illusion ofsecurity as the prospect of global nuclear war receded intothe background. The disarmament endeavour did lead topositive results in the past. Concrete reductions of nuclearweapons through actual destruction of missiles followedthe INF and START I. Reductions (but not destruction) ofdeployed strategic weapons followed more recently afterthe Moscow treaty of May 2002 although most of us donot consider this a disarmament treaty. As a result we dohave fewer nuclear weapons deployed today than at theheight of the Cold War. The Comprehensive Nuclear TestBan Treaty (CTBT) was signed in 1996 in a dramaticbreakthrough for the advocates of nuclear disarmamentwho had long seen this as a litmus test of the political willto disarm. These apparent successes are now not onlyunder siege but they stand a real danger of being over-turned as nuclear weapons are, quite unabashedly, beinggiven a new rationale and the dangers of both indefinitepossession and proliferation have acquired a new urgency.Not only has the threshold for the actual use of nuclearweapons been lowered dangerously but allegations ofWMD possession are being trivialized as casus belli with-out verifiable proof. The ideological basis for this existedin some countries before the events of 11 September 2001but today counter-terrorism has been widely cited as thereason for massive increases in military expenditure.

Before we can revive the disarmament process let usanalyze what afflicts it. The problems confronting theworld in so far as WMD are concerned are complex. Iwould like to place them in five categories. The first is thehorizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond thefive nuclear weapon states recognized in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). With the South Asian nucleartests of 1998 we have, de facto, 8 countries with a nuclearweapon capability (not counting the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea). A dilemma, both political and moral,lies at the root of the non-recognition of Israel, India andPakistan as nuclear weapon states. And yet without theiractive co-operation we are unable to make progress onnuclear disarmament let alone nuclear abolition. In everyone of the cases of proliferation since the NPT was signedin 1968, a recognized nuclear weapon state has either wit-tingly (for raisons d’etat) or unwittingly (through carelesscustody of nuclear material and /or technology or naïvetransfer of technology arrangements) been the source ofthe transfer of this technology. The burden of guilt, what-

ever the circumstances, is clear. What are worse are thedual standards being adopted towards proliferation withsome proliferation being regarded as benign and others asbeing downrightly evil depending on the nature of the rul-ing regime in the proliferating country. This Manicheanjudgment is made in terms of the relationship of the prolif-erating countries towards particular powers unmindful ofthe fact that regimes change and with them the relation-ships forged with the powers. The proliferation of nuclearweapons to Israel, India and Pakistan though not formallyrecognized is certainly being accepted as inevitable andirreversible. Realpolitik has played its role in this notwith-standing Security Council Resolution 1172 in respect ofIndia and Pakistan. Countries who have had the capabilityof going nuclear and have not done so have witnessed this‘managed proliferation’ with concern. Some may even beencouraged to harbour secret ambitions to go nuclear. Thepublicly declared stance of the Democratic People’sRepublic of Korea (DPRK) to withdraw from the NPTand announce its nuclear ambitions has raised the fear ofproliferation in North-east Asia beyond DPRK in a sort ofdomino effect. We cannot forge a principled multilateralresponse to violations of non-proliferation norms if somemembers of the international community choose to lookthe other way. All this is symptomatic of a weakening ofthe non-proliferation norm and some cynicism regardingthe subjective manner with which it has been implemented.

The second category of problems is connected to thefirst because of the failure of existing nuclear weaponstates to fulfill their promises to disarm and to achieve thetotal elimination of nuclear weapons. As long as nuclearweapon states continue to enjoy the power, deterrenceeffects and influence derived directly from nuclear weaponpossession we cannot realistically expect the non-prolifer-ation norm to hold indefinitely. This is not to cite therecord of nuclear weapon states as extenuatingcircumstances for nuclear proliferation. No WMD prolif-eration is acceptable. Our moral and indeed our scientificposition would, however, not be complete if we did not atthe same time deplore the continued possession of nuclearweapons by those who have them. The brazen withdrawalof DPRK from the NPT and its open admission of anuclear weapon programme have left the internationalcommunity perplexed as to what credible and effectiveaction can be taken. The IAEA has asked Iran to sign theAdditional Protocol on safeguards as a demonstration of



good faith on Iran’s part and as a means of enabling theIAEA to expand its verification powers. We may well havemore countries following the proliferation route eitherovertly or covertly especially since it is a moot pointwhether the invasion of Iraq has encouraged or deterredmore countries to acquire WMD. The ‘nth country’ syn-drome that was widely discussed in apocalyptical terms inthe 1950s and 1960s has returned to haunt us.

The NPT was expected to be the bulwark to halt thetrend towards proliferation and it has served that purposeadmirably for three decades with the exception of Iraq andDPRK. Do we need fresh mechanisms now or do we needto end forever the casteism or apartheid between the‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’? Those who have nuclearweapons regard it as their ‘ manifest destiny’ while thosewho do not, appear to be under a ‘cargo cult’— if I mayborrow a term from the cultural anthropologists whowrite of the mesmerizing effect of manufactured goodsbeing brought into developing countries by plane. Assum-ing that some supernatural force had endowed these devel-oped industrialized countries with manufactured goods,the traditional societies of Melanesia in the 19th centuryprayed to the spirits of the dead to bring them cargoes ofmodern goods for distribution and restore their golden ageto them. Sadly today the possession of WMD is seen as anattribute of power and development which can ensureindependence and sovereignty. It is a quest to be ‘mimicmen’ which V.S. Naipaul writes of in one of his early nov-els or the ‘Brown Sahib’ syndrome familiar to SouthAsians like me. The attractions of nuclear weapons in par-ticular acquire greater urgency for medium to large sizecountries in conflict-ridden regional situations that have areasonably strong industrial base to sustain a nuclearweapon development programme. That it conflicts withsolemn treaty undertakings and international conventionsis seen as less important than the overriding national secu-rity interest. After all the same argument of the supremacyof national interest is used by nuclear weapon states toabrogate treaties, to refuse to sign other internationallyagreed conventions to protect global welfare and to actu-ally attempt the legal invention of ‘unsigning’ treaties withimpunity.

The third set of problems arises from the serious emer-gence of the danger that WMD may be used by terroristsor sub-national groups for anarchist, secessionist or otherpurposes. This danger predated September 11, 2001. It

was among the reasons why the breakup of the SovietUnion was viewed with such alarm by those who caredabout the safeguarding of nuclear materials and technol-ogy in the former Soviet states and the future of thetrained nuclear scientists there. It was the first time in his-tory that a nuclear weapon state had imploded and wehave not learned any lessons that would make the nextbreak-up of a nuclear weapon state any easier to manage.The visionary Nunn-Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduc-tion programme has contributed greatly towards mitigat-ing the problem but despite this too many reports of leak-ages of material continue to be recorded. It proves notonly that the safeguards are still inadequate but also that ademand continues for such materials with many shadowygroups in the market. After September 11, 2001 when theastonishing scale of the terrorist attacks in the USA wererevealed, the relief that WMD were not used was quicklyreplaced by a deeper anxiety that such use was not beyondthe reach of the organizational capacity of Al Quaeda andsimilarly well-funded and fanatical groups with theirglobal reach. That anxiety is well founded not only inrespect of nuclear weapons and the more likely danger ofa ‘dirty bomb’ (or a radiological device to disperseradioactive material through the use of conventionalexplosives) but also with biological and chemical weaponswhere the detection of clandestine programmes is moredifficult.

A different category of problems exists in the paralysisof the disarmament machinery and the weakening of themultilateral system which provided the context for con-structive and result-oriented multilateral disarmamentdiplomacy. Twenty-five years after the First Special Sessionof the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament(SSOD I) achieved its remarkable Final Document by con-sensus we find the machinery it set up for the deliberationand negotiation of disarmament issues in disarray. The 66member Geneva based Conference on Disarmament (CD)—a direct descendant of the Eighteen Nation Disarm-ament Commission (ENDC)—has not even been able toagree on a programme of work because of disagreementson the priorities of the disarmament agenda. Some statesbelieve that the CD should resume work on negotiating aFissile Material Treaty (FMT) for which a mandate—theShannon Mandate—was agreed upon sometime ago. Oth-ers argue that concurrently with negotiations for a FMTwork should also begin on the prevention of an arms race



in outer space, on nuclear disarmament and on negativesecurity assurances on the basis of mandates that could benon-negotiating if necessary. An earlier compromise for-mula by the then Brazilian Ambassador Amorim has nowbeen elaborated as a proposal from five past Presidents ofthe CD cutting across group loyalties. This has failed tofind acceptance and clearly the main actors in thestalemate are the USA and China. A lack-lustre debate isheld perfunctorily when the CD meets but increasinglymember states are losing faith in the process and somehave withdrawn the Ambassadors they had speciallyaccredited to this important body. Misguided calls for theabolition of the CD are dangerous. It is easier to destroymultilateral institutions than to create them. The CD hasbeen idle for long periods before especially during theCold War and I have no doubt that when political willreappears the CD will resume functioning.

In the cluster of deliberative bodies the First Commit-tee of the General Assembly is the forum for disarmamentand security issues. It meets annually during the autumnfor approximately 5 weeks to go through an agenda ofitems. Some of them are ‘hardy perennials’ which aredebated ritualistically and voted upon. Consensus isreached on a few resolutions but the resolutions onnuclear issues are invariably adopted with a division. Vot-ing patterns have changed over the years with most of theformer Warsaw Pact countries now voting with NATOwhile the countries of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM)are no longer as tightly-knit as during the Cold War. TheSecurity Council’s discussion and action on disarmamentissues has been confined to proliferation of WMD as inthe Summit held in January 1992. It has also addressedcountry-specific situations as with Iraq. Another specialmeeting of the Security Council to discuss WMD prolifera-tion issues is projected for later this year with a view tocreating a mechanism analogous to the Counter TerrorismCommittee (CTC) set up in the immediate aftermath of9/11. This, I fear, will only reignite the concerns of thenon-nuclear weapon states that the casteism of the ‘haves’and ‘have-nots’ is being institutionalized at a time when amore inclusive approach is needed. The more specializeddisarmament forum—the Disarmament Commission—failed to meet in its 50th year in 2002 and this year con-cluded its session without consensus on the two issues ithad on its agenda for four years. In addition the WorkingGroup set up by a resolution of the General Assembly to

agree on an agenda for a fourth special session of the Gen-eral Assembly on disarmament (SSOD IV) failed to reachconsensus.

All these diplomatic failures are of course indicative ofa general malaise in the political arena and cannot beblamed on the machinery itself or its individual compo-nents. Political will is frequently cited in diplomatic nego-tiations— the presence or absence of which can make avast difference. Clearly the political will of key countries ismore important than others. The generation of politicalwill depends largely on public opinion in democracies, onpressures brought to bear on countries and on the policiespursued by incumbent governments. Ultimately it is theworld view of a small group of very powerful countriesthat determines whether multilateral disarmament willwork or not. It could decide to let some aspects of multi-lateral disarmament work in a sort of ‘a la carte’ multilat-eralist approach. This indeed appears to be present situa-tion where on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) wehave a Programme of Action being implemented globally.On antipersonnel landmines, the Mine Ban Conventionand the Additional Protocol of the CCW Convention areworking on parallel tracks. A change of policy of a super-power like the USA can accelerate progress dramatically ashappened when the Clinton Administration decided,against pressures from some vested interests, to beginnegotiations on a CTBT bringing many of its allies to thetable reluctantly. Today with the rejection of the ratifica-tion of the CTBT by the US Senate and the current Admin-istration’s policy the prospects for the entry into force ofthe CTBT are bleak.

Finally there is the category of problems arising fromprevailing strategic or defence doctrines. It is the pursuit ofthese doctrines that influence decision-making in keycountries and until these doctrines are abandoned orrevised the current crisis in multilateral disarmament isunlikely to end. In the time of the Cold War the doctrineof Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was well known.The conventional arms superiority of the former USSRresulted in that country’s adoption of the nuclear policy of‘no first use’. This was abandoned after the Cold Warwhen NATO was perceived to have a conventional armssuperiority. Russian diplomats have told me that they wereinstructed to mine the statements of US representativesduring the Cold War to find arguments in favour of thisvolte face!! Today only China and India have ‘no first use’



policies. It had also been expected that with the end of theCold War there would be a lower salience of nuclearweapons in strategic doctrines and military strategies.However NATO—the only surviving military alliance andwith additional members—remains wedded to the use ofnuclear weapons, admittedly as a weapon of last resort.The efforts of Germany and Canada to have this reviewedhave failed so far and small wonder that Russia thereforeshows more reliance on nuclear weapons today.

The US, as the largest nuclear weapon state, hasrecently issued its Nuclear Posture Review and NationalSecurity Strategy. Both documents represent a fundamen-tal change in post Cold war trends. Firstly the thresholdfor the actual use of weapons is being lowereddangerously as pre-emptive uses are planned even againstnon-nuclear weapon states. The contradiction of this withthe Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justicein 1996 and the Security Council Resolution 984 of 1995providing security assurances for non-nuclear weaponstates is obvious. Secondly the new policy—subsequentlyratified by Congressional budgetary approval—is to beginresearch and development on ‘mini-nukes’ or low-yieldnuclear weapons for specific purposes such as ‘bunkerbusters’ to penetrate hardened and deeply buried targets.The period of notice required for a resumption of nucleartesting has also been shortened although the Bush Admin-istration has repeatedly stated that there is no intention toresume testing ‘for the moment’. The other nuclearweapon states are also reportedly modernizing theirnuclear weapons and continue research and developmentwith a view to developing new generations of weapons.The new salience being given to nuclear weapons takesplace in a context of resurgent militarism as global mili-tary expenditure reaches the heights of the Cold War yearswith the USA clearly in the lead. The unilateral abrogationof the ABM Treaty in order to clear the way for the devel-opment and eventual deployment of ballistic missiledefence systems will also involve huge investments for aprogramme that is of doubtful value especially with theasymmetric warfare strategy of terrorist groups and theacknowledged vulnerability of the system. The distinctionbetween offensive and defensive military doctrines isbecoming blurred. Doctrines which involve the pre-emp-tive use of a weapon of mass destruction institutionalizeviolence. The distinction between the civilized world bas-ing its actions on law and reason and the world of the ter-

rorist using indiscriminate violence on the basis that theend justifies the means must be maintained at all times.

Possible Solutions

I have laid out a litany of troubles. Now what do we doabout it? The enormity of the challenges I have discussedin their five categories cannot be overcome with any onemagic solution. Nor can a half hour lecture hope to sug-gest all the solutions to resurrect multilateral disarmamentthe death of which has been triumphantly proclaimed bythe neo-conservatives of Washington D.C. think-tanks. Ido believe however that the time has come for us all to‘think in a new way’ as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto hasurged us. Innovative ideas do not all come spontaneously.They require a collective endeavour. We have had theexperience of high level commissions produce new ways ofthinking and new concepts in the post World War II era.Institutions like the UN have also produced new ideas like‘human development’ and ‘good governance’ and theongoing project on the intellectual history of the UN willno doubt record this. But institutions have their ownbureaucratic processes and their budgetary problems. Weneed a flexible and supple mechanism to seed a globalchange that will encompass all the global and regionalorganizations including the UN. Just as the Brandt Com-mission sensitized us all to the North/South divide; theBrundtland Commission gave us the concept of ‘sustain-able development’ and the more recent International Com-mission on Intervention and State Sovereignty—sponsoredby our host country Canada—yielded the concept of ‘theresponsibility to protect’ we could also establish a com-mission to analyze the problems of multilateral disarma-ment and prescribe solutions. I have therefore proposedsince April 2002, an International Commission onWeapons of Mass Destruction to be launched with seniorpolitical figures of influence and outstanding experts toexamine the current state of affairs and recommend mea-sures to break out of this situation. I am delighted that theGovernment of Sweden has on 3 July this year announcedthe establishment of such a Commission to be chaired byDr. Hans Blix whose luminous integrity, unquestionedexpertise and rich experience equip him well for the taskahead. We await further details about the Commission tobe made available in the autumn. Some argue that the dis-armament norms created after World War II are no longervalid in a changed global situation although they propose



nothing to replace these norms. A global order is essentialespecially in the context of globalization. We cannotregress to anarchy or a situation where the most powerfuldictate the rules. If we need to refashion or adapt norms orcreate fresh norms we must do so as a global communityseeking the co-operation of all.

The Commission that I have advocated must have abroader mandate than nuclear weapons which was theCanberra Commission’s mandate. Today chemical and bio-logical weapons, despite being the subject of Conventionstotally banning their production and use, have differentlevels of verification. The new threat of terrorism hasenhanced the danger of the actual use of these weaponswhile the lack of universality in the two legal regimes gov-erning these weapons is also worrisome. Civil defence pro-grammes are increasingly preoccupied with the likely use ofthese weapons. The lethality of nuclear weapons in com-parison to chemical and biological weapons is well estab-lished. However, for the purposes of a Commission we donot need to establish a hierarchy of weapons as long as wetreat all WMD in one category because of their commonthreat to humankind, their indiscriminate nature and ourneed to ensure the survival of the human race. The collapseof the seven year process to develop a Protocol tostrengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention(BWC) leaves the BWC without any effective verificationmechanisms. In addition the mandate of the proposedCommission must include both the disarmament dimen-sion and the proliferation aspect. To focus on one to theexclusion of the other would cause a major problem for thecredibility of the Commission. The majority of the interna-tional community belongs to the NPT, the BWC and theCWC and would need to be convinced of the politicalobjectivity of the Commission. The dangers of terroristuses of WMD must also feature prominently in the man-date of the Commission. A carefully composed Commis-sion with due regard to political and geographical diversityand gender balance supported if possible by a panel ofexperts, could over a period of time develop a set of innov-ative and far-reaching recommendations that could get usall out of the present rut. I am personally aware that UNSecretary-General Kofi Annan supports the proposal inprinciple and would be ready to have the Commission pre-sent its report to him in the same way that the InternationalCommission on Intervention and State Sovereignty did.This could have influential policy implications.

Apart from the establishment of an International Com-mission the international community has a tool kit avail-able to it for immediate action. For example, the Board ofGovernors of the IAEA can begin, as it has done with Iran,to demand that all states that plan to have nuclear powerprojects for peaceful purposes must sign the AdditionalProtocol to widen the agency’s verification potential intheir countries. The Article IV provision in the NPT forthe peaceful uses of nuclear energy cannot be read as anabsolute entitlement. It is an incentive and should havebeen more generously implemented by developed coun-tries to fund non-power projects in areas like medicine andagriculture. For nuclear power projects, given the thin lineseparating peaceful and non-peaceful uses of nuclearenergy and the fact that existing arrangements tosafeguard declared facilities have proved inadequate, it isreasonable for additional measures to be taken as a confi-dence building measure internationally. Equally moremoney can be pledged for non-power uses in the same wayas the G8 pledged $20 billion for Co-operative ThreatReduction measures last year. Thus the signature of theAdditional Protocol, hitherto a voluntary measure, will bedeemed to be a pre-requisite for the supply of nuclear pro-jects, fuel and other assistance.

There are other measures open to the internationalcommunity in the nuclear area. Strategic nuclear weaponsremain an important area for action by the nuclearweapon states. Equally important, if not more so, is thequestion of sub-strategic or tactical nuclear weaponswhich must be addressed urgently. While the entry intoforce of the CTBT remains dependent on the political willof the USA we can legitimately expect India and Pakistan,who promised to do so in 1998, to sign the CTBT as a firststep and as evidence of responsible behaviour. On a FMTwhile the CD remains deadlocked it is important thatinformal discussions commence among the 8 nuclearweapon capable countries so that when negotiations in theCD do begin they will have a basis to build on. Anothermeasure that is now being recognized is the need for morefunding for the IAEA and the OPCW to conduct their ver-ification responsibilities as well as to take special measuresagainst terrorist uses of WMD. The strengthening of theConvention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Mater-ial, greater circumspection in the transport of nuclearmaterial and the multilateralisation of the Co-operativeThreat Reduction programme are among other measures



that can be taken without delay.In the chemical weapons area, the OPCW under its

energetic new leadership and with strong US support nowmust prove that its unique verification powers under theCWC can in fact be implemented. This would instill confi-dence in verification procedures and in disarmamenttreaties amidst the propaganda about the virtues of ‘paper-less disarmament’ and the dangers of placing too muchfaith in treaties. Countries like the Russian Federationwith genuine financial difficulties in fulfilling their treatyobligation to destroy chemical weapons will need to beassisted. In the biological weapons area the agreementreached at the resumed BWC Review Conference in 2002augurs well for the prospects of national legislation imple-menting the BWC and for the eventual criminalization ofthe violation of the BWC under domestic laws. Severalother areas will be explored in the three annual meetingsthat will take place before the next Review Conferenceand this is a healthy sign of a multilateral process at work.

The salvaging of the BWC Review Conference is itselfan illustration of how multilateral disarmament diplomacycan be kept alive. It is no secret that creative diplomacy bythe European Union helped to forge a compromise whichthe US tacitly accepted and the NAM acquiesced in out ofa realization that it was the best result that could beobtained in the circumstances. We need more of thesebridge-building exercises across political groups if multi-lateralism in disarmament is to remain robust and produc-tive. Group solidarity is understandable but incircumstances where total failure is so self-evidentlydestructive of the multilateral process, individual diplo-mats with stature and credibility as well as individualcountries with broad acceptance must activate themselvesin the search for compromises. The approach that suggeststhat nothing can be accomplished until political circum-stances are more propitious is essentially myopic and ulti-mately harmful to the cause of disarmament.

A long-term strategy that was identified in the UN Sec-retary-General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Matterswas the need for disarmament and non-proliferation edu-cation to ensure an informed public opinion especially inthe current context of indifference. This led to a GeneralAssembly mandated expert study of the subject and areport with a number of many useful recommendationsendorsed by the General Assembly in 2002. These recom-mendations are in the process of being implemented by the

United Nations but they require the combinedcommitment and resources of the entire global communityfor the results to be seen.

The Role of the Scientist

It is in this context that the role of the scientist in terms ofthe Russell-Einstein Manifesto assumes great importance.The urgent need for a code of ethics to govern scientistsworking in the defence sectors in all countries cannot beoveremphasized. The inherent ambiguities in dual usetechnology are of course difficult and complex. Despitethis or precisely because of this, a code of ethics and a sys-tem of mentoring younger scientists can help to ensuremoral clarity where legal precision may be difficult toachieve. Research and Development programmes in theweapon industry have to depend on scientists. As long asthe right to self defence remains guaranteed by Article 51of the UN Charter and the provisions for the collectivedefence of international peace and security can beexercised by the Security Council under Chapter VII of theCharter we will have armies and we will have weaponswhich nations will seek to modernize. A weapon-freeworld is therefore a Utopian ideal which the scientist can-not expect any more than others. However all of us canlegitimately expect a lower reliance on weapon based secu-rity given its obvious limitations in comparison to themore durable human security that sustainable humandevelopment can achieve through non-military means. Wecan demand that lower levels of arms be achieved toassure security. Thus the pressure from military-industrialcomplexes throughout the world for more resources forweapons development must be resisted by scientists. Thelatest Yearbook released by the prestigious StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reveals thatglobal military expenditure is running at $128 per capitaafter the acceleration we witnessed globally in 2002 osten-sibly because of 9/11. While the USA accounts for 43% ofglobal military expenditure collectively USA, Japan, UK,France and China total 62% of what the world spends onarms. The statistics quoted for 2001 reveals interestingregional variations in military spending with the MiddleEast (6.3%), North America (3%) and Central and East-ern Europe (2.7%) above the global average of 2.3%while Latin America (1.3%), Africa (2.1%), Asia (1.6%)and Western Europe ( 1.9%). While political tensionsundoubtedly contribute towards these figures scientists



engaged in R&D can play a decisive role in rejecting mili-tary solutions to political disputes. We shall never achievethe Millennium Development Goals of the United Nationsat current levels of military expenditure.

Existing treaties like the NPT, CWC and BWCtogether with political commitments solemnly made in thefinal documents of conferences make it abundantly clearthat all states are obliged to achieve the total eliminationof WMD. We are thus faced with the threat of burgeoningconventional weapons and the possible development ofnew types of weapons including those based on new physi-cal principles. Here the need for a code of ethics becomesvital for application across national boundaries. It willprohibit scientists from engaging in any activities that con-travene existing treaties and conventions in the arms limi-tation and disarmament field. Where new weapons orrefinements of existing weapon technologies are contem-plated the principles of humanitarian law and the protec-tion of civilians must be the guideline. National scientificbodies such as Academies of Sciences and internationalscientific organizations must take responsibility for har-monizing codes of ethics and for their implementation. If aplaint is filed against a scientist for violating the code ofethics an inquiry must be instituted and if the verdict isguilty the withdrawal of professional membership andrecognition must follow. It is only by maintaining thehighest standards that we can ensure that scientists do notallow their skills to be subverted or exploited. Where sci-entists, especially those in dictatorships, have beencoerced, whistle-blowing should be encouraged within thecode of ethics as part of our common responsibility to pro-tect humanity. With the functioning of the InternationalCriminal Court it would follow automatically that anyscientist found guilty would automatically be struck offprofessional rolls and be disqualified from pursuing his orher scientific career.

Verification technology is an area where a great deal ofgood work has already been accomplished. The state ofthe art technology installed in Vienna and other parts ofthe world by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of theCTBT and IAEA’s technical equipment and expertise inimplementing safeguards agreements are some outstand-ing examples. More needs to be done in order to remainseveral steps ahead of violators of treaties and to detectclandestine programmes. Satellite imagery has been devel-oped to a remarkable level of accuracy. Although national

intelligence agencies do not divulge their high resolutionimagery even to the UN, commercially available imageryhas enabled NGOs like the Federation of American Scien-tists and others to monitor disarmament related develop-ments and inform the general public of their findings.Greater availability to the public of high resolution satel-lite imagery and improvements in the quality and the read-ing of this imagery will make the detection of clandestineprogrammes by both states and terrorist group morelikely. It will also make for a better informed public at atime when civil liberties are being curtailed andtransparency sacrificed in the campaign against terrorism.The benefits also include greater confidence in the verifia-bility of disarmament agreements and greater confidencethat cheats do not get away with their bad faith actions.Other verification devices and aids could be invented andpopularized as a confidence-building infrastructure to theweb of treaties and conventions that restrain the unbridledpursuit of weapon development. Radar and early warningsystems are also technological areas by which conflicts canbe prevented. Their potential has to be exploited throughthe collective work of scientists. A Canadian proposal fora peacekeeping satellite—PAXSAT—remainsunimplemented for lack of funds while billions of dollarsare spent on new weapons. Scientists can be at the fore-front of public campaigns demanding more resources forpeaceful research to ensure a safer and better world.

Finally there is the task of education in the disarma-ment and proliferation area to which I have referred ear-lier. The dangers of the arms buildup and of proliferationcan best be explained to younger generations by the scien-tific community in terms that are clear and irrefutable. It isan investment in our future. It is a responsibility they haveto their fellow human beings. In the words of the Russell-Einstein Manifesto “Remember your humanity”.

Jayantha Dhanapala is a former United Nations Under-

Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs and a former

Ambassador of Sri Lanka




REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

ment and the elimination of WMDsare concerned, is far fromreassuring—just as the status of con-flicts and hostilities, particularly inregions where nuclear weapons orother WMDs are present, is also farfrom reassuring. Much of our activi-ties of the last year has been devel-oped in this very criticalenvironment.

Nuclear weapons, nucleardisarmament and proliferation

Let us recall that the 2000 NPTreview conference concluded with theapproval of 13 “immediate” steps forsystematic and progressive efforts toimplement article 6 of the NPT, thatmandates the nuclear weapons states“to pursue negotiations in good faithon effective measures relating to ces-sation of the nuclear arms race at anearly date and to nucleardisarmament.”

These steps included: entry intoforce of the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty (CTBT); the banning of theproduction of fissile material; theunequivocal undertaking by nuclearweapons states to accomplish thetotal elimination of nuclear arsenals;the preservation and strengthening ofthe (now defunct) ABM treaty; thereduction of non-strategic warheads,the reduction of the operational sta-tus of nuclear weapons and increasedtransparency; the principle of

irreversibility applied to nuclear dis-armament; diminishing the role ofnuclear weapons in security policies;and the achievement andmaintenance of a nuclear weapons-free world. Most of these steps havebeen dismissed since 2000.

These are difficult moments for thearms control regime:

• It has been shown that treaties suchas the ABM can be disposed ofwhen no longer needed;

• New treaties present a very weakidea of disarmament: the MoscowTreaty projects 1700-2200 strategic(only) warheads per party by 2012;

• There is little limitation to nucleartesting, since we do not have anyforeseeable date for entry into forceof CTBT;

• We do not have any instrument ofverification for the BWC.

Moreover, there is a newlyproclaimed utility of nuclearweapons:

• New (smaller) nuclear weapons areneeded (the USA);

• In its National Strategy to combatWMD, the “US will continue tomake clear that it reserves the rightto respond with overwhelmingforce—including resorting to all itsoptions—to the use of WMDagainst the US, its forces abroad,and its friends and allies”;

Paolo Cotta-RamusinoSecretary General

Throughout its 46 years ofexistence, the main goal ofPugwash has been the elimi-

nation of all nuclear weapons and,more generally, of all weapons ofmass destruction which have broughtthe risk of annihilation to mankind.Scientists (including those whoworked on these instruments ofdestruction), policy makers, and mili-tary people, as well as those activelyinvolved in supportingdisarmament—people of differentnationalities and political opinions—have been brought together over theyears for the purpose of seeking waysof controlling and eliminating themost deadly weapons and promotingcooperation and peace. After the endof the Cold War, many of the prob-lems related to nuclear weapons andWMD did change, but the weaponsthemselves and the relevant risks didnot disappear. In the last period, theissues related to nuclear weapons andmore generally to WMDs have in factbeen at the core of many political ini-tiatives, military interventions andplanning, and decisions of variousnature on the international scene, butunfortunately most of these actionsand decisions were made indirections that many of us regret. Theoverall situation, as far as disarma-



• The lack of progress indisarmament affects all nuclearpower states: their arsenals remainunchanged. And these states con-tinue to consider their nuclear arse-nals as an essential instrument oftheir military (and not onlymilitary) policy.

The security concerns of non-nuclearstates have also increased:

• There is no security guarantee fornon-nuclear-weapon states and, infact, there is even talk about possi-ble preventive attacks againstWMD assets before these weaponsare used;

• We witnessed the instrumental useof the need to fight WMD as a jus-tification for military interventionaimed at regime changing;

• We witnessed the weakening ofinternational institutions, includingthose which should oversee theimplementation of the NPT and thecontrol of nuclear activities. Thewar on Iraq was based on the ideathat international institutions couldnot be trusted.

There is the impression that thoseresponsible for nuclear proliferationget away with it:

• Nuclear proliferation did take placesignificantly, and the consequencesfor the states involved were man-ageable. India and Pakistanacquired good-sized nuclear arse-nals, and pressures against them(sanctions) did not last long. Israelof course gets away with its unde-clared nuclear status due to its so-called exceptional situation;

• Even a comparison between thetreatment reserved to countries thatmay work for nuclear weapons and

to Iraq, shows that being closer tonuclear capability does not neces-sarily imply being subject to astronger pressure.

To quote the very candid statementby CIA Director George Tenet (Feb-ruary 2003):

We have entered a new world of pro-

liferation…. This is taking place side

by side with the continued weakening

of the International non-proliferation

consensus. Control regimes like the

NPT are being battered by develop-

ments such as North Korea’s with-

drawal from the NPT and its open

repudiation of other agreements. The

example of new nuclear states that

seem able to deter threats from more

powerful states simply by brandish-

ing nuclear weapons, will resonate

deeply among other countries that

want to enter the nuclear weapons

club. Demand creates the market.

The desire for nuclear weapons is on

the upsurge….. ..The domino theory

of the 21st century may well be

nuclear.

The risk of nuclear war

The end of the Cold War certainlydid significantly reduce the risk ofnuclear conflicts. But this risk is farfrom being eliminated.• The nuclear weapons of the two

former antagonist superpowers arestill targeted at each other, and asignificant part of them are stillkept on high-alert status, so thattoday we still have the spectre ofnuclear war by mistake or miscal-culation.

• New nuclear states are in situationswhere the risk of conventional con-flict and nuclear escalation is signif-icant. The relations between India

and Pakistan (both nuclear-armed)have several times brought bothcountries to the verge of conflict.There is high tension in North-EastAsia, where a possible new nuclearactor is present. And the largeIsraeli nuclear arsenal is a continu-ous reminder that any conflict inthe Middle East may very wellbecome nuclear.

• There is an abundance of fissilematerial available worldwide, andits disposal is progressing slowlyand with limited resources. There isstill a very serious concern thatsome fissile material may beacquired by nuclear-proliferatingcountries or seized illegally by sub-national groups. If one were tohave available a sufficient amountof fissile material, then building arudimentary nuclear weapon forterrorist use would be a very easytask.

The war on Iraq

The war on Iraq was motivated inpart by the claimed need to combatWMD. The activities of the interna-tional inspectors in the country werehalted by the decision of the US tointervene militarily no matter whatthe result of the inspections. The USdecision was based on what soonappeared to be false claims of Iraqiactivities to acquire nuclear weapons,exaggerated claims about its CBWcapabilities, and unproven connec-tions with the international terroristsof Al-Quaeda.

Even though the government ofSaddam Hussein will be hardlymissed, the use of the motivation tocombat WMD as a justification for amilitary intervention which is in real-ity otherwise motivated, is objectively



weakening the international consen-sus to eradicate such weapons. If theelimination of WMD is used as afalse excuse for a war, the credibilityof the fight against WMD is putunder strain.

Moreover, the war on Iraq high-lighted other important problems.First, the dramatic situation in Iraqafter the conquest of Baghdad hasdemonstrated up to now that there isa crucial difference between winninga war militarily and being able to putin motion all the necessary mecha-nisms to reconstruct a country, eco-nomically, politically and socially.The issue of reconstruction, of secur-ing necessary international guaran-tees and contributions, and of imple-menting the necessary steps todemocratize the country (hardly thesemi-spontaneous phenomenon, withits domino effect on neighboringcountries, that was promised in somepre-war fairy tales) will be issues thatremain with us for a while.

Secondly, the war on Iraq exacer-

bated the already tense relationsbetween the west and the Arab/Mus-lim world. Many Muslims feel thatthey are the target of an internationalcampaign that depicts them as, defacto, the main source ofinternational terrorism. Thesentiment in many Muslim countriesis that Muslims are on the losing/oppressed side in the internationalpolitical arena. Accusations thatMuslim countries harbor the goal ofacquiring WMD is juxtaposed withthe fact that the West and Israelopenly possess such weapons andhave no intention of giving them up.

Thirdly, the war on Iraq hasbrought to international public atten-tion a basic question: is the will ofone nation alone the basis for thenew international order? And what isthe role of existing international insti-tutions? The controversy betweenunilateral vs. multilateral initiativesfrom the point of view of the onlyexisting superpower may be one of achoice between two courses of

actions that need to be compared onthe basis of actual results. But forother nations and peoples of theworld, the alternative is between hav-ing the right to influence worldaffairs or being merely passive sub-jects. Moreover, it is particularlyironic when unilateral initiatives areimposed on the rest of the world withthe proclaimed goal of spreadingdemocracy.

Pugwash activities in the past year

Pugwash has been working for 46years towards the goal of eliminatingnuclear weapons and other WMD.For those 46 years Pugwash has beenpromoting dialogue between coun-tries on opposite fronts, even whendialogue was most difficult. The endof the Cold War represented a dra-matic change in that Russia and theUS were no longer facing each otheras adversaries. But other countrieswith smaller nuclear arsenalsconfront each other and, as alwayswith nuclear weapons, there is therisk that there may be a shift fromtensions and hostility to conventionalconflict and to nuclear escalation(whether planned or inadvertent).This is the case with India and Pak-istan, as mentioned before. Pugwash,which has eminent members fromboth India and Pakistan, has beenvery active during the last year inpromoting analyses, offering sugges-tions for the resumption of the dia-logue (at any level) in the Indian sub-continent, and questioning variousaspects of nuclear policies and strate-gies that are of particular concernsince they contribute to makingnuclear confrontation more likely..There are of course many difficultunresolved issues which are at the

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Foreign Minister Bill Graham



core of the confrontation in theIndian subcontinent. The issue ofKashmir is one of the most difficult.Pugwash promoted in the past yearand will do so in the future a frankdiscussion about Kashmir and otherissues and will cooperate with otherforces in the promotion of dialogueand stability in the subcontinent.

Another critical region is the Mid-dle East, where nuclear weapons arealso present and the risk of nuclearproliferation is significant. Havingbeen involved in the region for a longtime, Pugwash in the past year hasbeen focused on the idea of promot-ing a stable dialogue on securityaspects in the whole middle easternarea. This means not only Israeli andPalestinians, but the Arab and non-Arab countries of the Middle East.The Arab (Saudi) plan for the estab-lishment of normal relations betweencountries of the Middle East was thesubject of a specific workshop inAmman. The Arab plan is the firstsignificant recognition by all theArab states (with no exceptions) ofthe right of Israel to exist in peaceinside the 1967 border, together withthe Palestinian State. It is an impor-tant element in the future peacearchitecture of the Middle East thathas not received enough attentionand recognition. The goal of anuclear weapons-free zone in theMiddle East is also very important,both in general and for Pugwash.This can be attained only in a generalframework of significantly reducedconfrontation in the Middle East,and the Arab plan is an importanttool for that goal.

Iran is a vitally important countryin the Middle East and Pugwash hasbeen active in promoting dialogue

between Iran and other countries(including western countries). In ref-erence to allegations about plans fordeveloping military nuclear capabili-ties in Iran, Pugwash welcomes theprospect that Iran may sign the IAEAadditional protocol and is very muchinterested in working to promote thisimportant development.

North Korea and Iran are coun-tries that in different frameworkshave been mentioned as countrieswith potential or actual nuclear pro-grams. Avoiding a further spread ofnuclear weapons is one of our funda-mental objectives. But we need tounderstand the security needs ofthose countries that are thinkingabout acquiring a nuclear weaponcapability. If we want to preventnuclear proliferation, then a climateof cooperation needs to beestablished. Military actions toenforce counter-proliferation are nei-ther effective nor just. Pugwash has astanding program for cooperationand dialogue in Northeast Asia thatdeveloped slowly in the last year forvarious reasons (SARS included). Butwe are very much committed topushing forward this program in thecoming year.

We have to acknowledge that thestructure of arms control is in crisis.Helping to promote the arms controland disarmament process in all areaswhere this is more feasible and wherethere is hope of obtaining results isan important task to which Pugwashis fully committed. The idea of pre-venting the weaponization of space isone such endeavor. It is a goal whereinternational cooperation can likelybe achieved and which could attractthe attention of the public opinion.Non-weaponizing space means to

prevent aggressive behavior in space,and to prevent dangers to the scien-tific and technological developmentsthat require the use of space. It meansto limit anti-satellite activities and thespread of ballistic missile defense. Itmeans to avoid the spread of activi-ties that are dangerous from manypoints of view, ranging from the riskof polluting space with increaseddebris to the risks associated to desta-bilizing current useful militaryactivities.

Another important activity con-ducted by Pugwash over the yearshas been the continuous monitoringof arms control activities related tochemical and biological weapons.Two workshops are held annually onthese issues which directly affect thework that is being done by the inter-national institutions that deal withchemical and biological weapons, byproviding analyses, proposals and bypromoting dialogue.

Since 2001, Pugwash has beenalso active in seeking to promoteunderstanding of the various aspectsof the new evolution of terrorism.This Pugwash interest, I would saywith particular emphasis, alsoextends to the consequences of thepresent antiterrorist campaign (theso called “war against terror”). Wewant to understand how much thepresent anti-terrorist policies affecthuman rights worldwide and themutual understanding of cultures andpeoples, and also how such policiesin reality affect the evolution of ter-rorist activities. As an example, it isobvious that invading a country withthe reported goal of eliminating therisk of terrorism, and then not effec-tively carrying on its reconstruction,is most likely to backfire in term of



terrorist activities. One of the risks to which

Pugwash has been very active in call-ing the attention of public opinionhas been the risk associated with apossible terrorist use of WMD in gen-eral, and of nuclear weapons in par-ticular. The Pugwash approach hasfocused on the fact that, in order toprevent nuclear terrorism, one imme-diate goal is to effectively control anddispose of all the fissile material thatcomes from the dismantling ofnuclear weapons and from other mil-itary and civilian activities. If thenuclear powers want to help toreduce the risk of nuclear terrorism,they do not need to keep theirnuclear arsenals intact, as they aredoing now. Nuclear weapons areirrelevant to preventing nuclear ter-rorism. What matters is that nogroup (either a sub-national group ora critical nation) should have accessto uncontrolled fissile material. Inthis sense Pugwash has been promot-ing various initiatives to acceleratethe disposal of the most dangerous ofall fissile materials, Highly EnrichedUranium (HEU). One of these initia-tives has been supported by theSwedish Foreign Ministry, whichorganized a case study analyzing apossible European role in thedisposal of excess Russian HEU.

One of the fundamental goals ofPugwash has been, since its founda-tion, the elimination of all nuclearweapons. In this moment we feel thatPugwash is one of the few voices thatare still demanding nuclear disarma-ment and the full implementation ofarticle 6 of the NPT. It is ineffectiveand unjust to demand that smallercountries give up their nuclearoptions when the more powerful

countries refuse to proceed in thesame direction. To this end, Pugwashorganized a workshop on the feasibil-ity of No First Use, and participantsdiscussed how declarations of NoFirst Use can be part of a generalawareness that nuclear weapons aretotally ineffective in addressing con-crete military and political problemsand in fact serve no other role than inpreventing others to use nuclearweapons first. This approach tonuclear weapons, which is in fact atime-honored approach, is very muchat odds with present trends in whichthe idea is to build new types of(smaller) nuclear weapons for tacticalpurposes and to think of resumingnuclear testing.

The goal of eliminating nuclearweapons brings to mind the generalproblem of the social responsibilityof scientists and the more general eth-ical problems which are associatedwith many types of scientific activity.Pugwash began as a group of(mainly) physicists who wereconcerned about their responsibilityin bringing to life the risk of nuclearannihilation. Today, other risks havebeen brought to life by scientists inmany areas, most obviously in biol-ogy and biotechnology. On these

issues Pugwash has started an initia-tive for dialogue in Paris which willcontinue in the future.

Summary

In conclusion, Pugwash is a small butvery active community, which isspread over all the continents. We aretruly an international NGO, with avariety of interests and a variety ofapproaches. We are very much awarethat we were born as a community ofnatural scientists, concerned abouttheir social responsibility, but we arehappy that the evolution of the last46 years has brought more and morepolitical scientists, diplomats, policymakers, and military experts into thePugwash community. Thus, ourapproaches are diverse and concernmany different things, as the list oftopics addressed in the last year (andbefore) shows. But we are very con-scious that the risk of nuclear annihi-lation, the risk of war, and the needto prevent war with dialogue and thepromotion of cooperation, are acommon denominator for all themembers of the Pugwash community.On this common denominator webuilt our activities in the last year andwe will continue doing so for theforeseeable future.




PUBLIC FORUM

The Nuclear Issue: Pugwash and the Bush Policies

“You are either with us or against us”. This was initiallyapplied to the campaign against al-Qaeda, but it puts allthose who do not fully agree with the Bush policies intothe category of villains. There are many, perhaps a major-ity in the world, who are strongly against terrorists, andready to join in actions against them, but are not happywith the Bush policies. These policies are seen by manyoutside the United States as aiming at establishing a UShegemony in the world, and treating international under-takings with contempt, to be adhered to only if they suitthe interest of the United States.

What I find so repugnant about these policies is theirblatant hypocrisy. The USA proclaims itself as the cham-pion of democracy in the world, while actually imposingits will in a dictatorial manner. It is supposed to upholdthe rules of law, yet violates legal commitments underinternational treaties. It castigates members of the UnitedNations for exercising their rights under existing rules buttakes military action against a member state without theauthority of the United Nations.

A central criticism of the United Nations made by theBush team is that it is ineffective, a useless and enfeebledorgan, incapable of taking decisive action. This sort ofcriticism has traditionally been leveled at democracies bytotalitarian regimes. Long discussions and protractednegotiations are an inherent feature of a democratic sys-tem, in which the needs and aspirations of many groups ornations have to be reconciled in a peaceful manner. TheBush Administration has no truck with such approaches,even though it professes to champion democracy.

In my view, such policies are unacceptable in a civilizedsociety because in the long run, they would spell the ruinof civilization.

The pursuit of these policies was evident in the cam-paign against Iraq. The stated justification was to disarmIraq of weapons of mass destruction, but others see it pri-

Sir Joseph RotblatPresident Emeritus, Pugwash Conferences

This paper is mainly concernedwith the nuclear issue, specifi-cally with the dangers to the

world that may arise from the nuclearpolicies of the George W. Bush Admin-istration. But in order to put these

policies into a proper perspective, I have to start withobservations on the general doctrines and strategies of thisAdministration.

I should declare, from the start, that I am strongly criti-cal of the present US Administration in its conduct ofworld affairs. In the highly charged political climate of therecent months—largely related to the Iraq debacle—any-one criticizing the Bush Administration has immediatelybeen branded as anti-American, and placed in the defen-sive position of having to begin with a statement that oneis not anti-American.

So let me say this clearly: I am not anti-American. Onthe contrary, I submit that it is the policies of the currentAdministration that should be called anti-American,because—in my opinion—they do no represent the viewsof the majority of the American people. I am convincedthat these policies would not have been pursued if Al Gorehad won the election in 2000. You will remember that—even with the distraction of Ralph Nader—Al Gore had amajority in the national vote, and it was only throughsome questionable manoevres that he was deprived of thePresidency. It seems to me very unlikely that, had he beenelected, Al Gore would have alienated so many to such anextent.

It is important to note that the current polarization ofthe world is largely the consequence of the Bush slogan:




marily as an attempt to increase the US influence in theMiddle East. There is plenty of documentary evidence tosupport the thesis that the main reason for bringing downthe Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq—and making similarthreats against Syria and Iran—was to change the politicalconfiguration in the Middle East so as to give the UnitedStates political, economic and military control of thatregion.

The history of these endeavours, is now general knowl-edge, but I want to recall some salient points.

Even during the Cold War years, various right winggroups in the United States—who have become known asneo-conservatives—advocated strong aggressive foreignpolicies. These groups had considerable sway during theReagan Presidency, but is was after the end of the ColdWar—and the outcome of the first Gulf War, which theysaw as having left the business unfinished—that theybecame really active. In the spring of 1992 a documentwas produced, called Defense Policy Guidance, which wasstunning in the clarity and ambition of its vision of a newUS foreign and military policy. It called for US dominanceby preventing the rise of any potentially hostile power, andfor a policy of pre-emptive military action against statessuspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. Thedocument was written by two relatively unknown func-tionaries in the Pentagon’s policy department. They werePaul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby; their boss at the timewas Dick Cheney, then Secretary for Defense. All three arenow prominent members of the Bush Administration.

In July 1996, the Institute for Advanced Strategic andPolitical Studies issued a document entitled “A Clean

Break: a New Strategy for Securing the Realm”. The headof the Institute was Richard Perle—for years known as thePrince of Darkness, for his extreme views, and strong sup-port of the Israel lobby. The document called on the thenIsraeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, to adopt aradical change in policy, starting with a repudiation of theOslo Accords, and to be followed by a campaign to elimi-nate Saddam Hussein and destabilize the governments ofSyria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

In February 1998, Richard Perle wrote an Open Letterto President Clinton, demanding a full-scale drive for aregime change in Baghdad. It had 25 signatories, includingmany who are now in the Bush Administration, e.g.:Donald Rumsfeld—now Defense Secretary, and PaulWolfowitz—now Deputy Defense Secretary.

The al-Qaeda attack of September 11 provided theopportunity for these policies to be put into practice. Thecase for a Pax Americana had been set out, and its firststage was implemented in the war against Iraq.

The prolonged squabbles over UN Resolutions andinspections, aiming at giving legitimacy to the war, seem tohave been just a charade, intended to create the impressionthat it was not the USA alone but a coalition that wasinvolved in the anti-Iraq campaign. The decision to over-throw the Saddam Hussein regime having been takenmuch earlier, it was only the time for its implementationthat had to be chosen. This was probably dictated not bythe outcome of the Hans Blix inspections, but by the needto assemble the necessary military strength.

The military strength of the USA is truly awesome.Since the end of the Cold War, the Americans have builtup an enormous military potential. Making use of the lat-est advances in science and the achievements in technol-ogy—and supported by budgets of astronomical dimen-sions—the United States has become the greatest militarypower that ever existed; nearly exceeding in sophisticationall other nations combined. Against this might, the Iraqiarmy, with antiquated tanks and no air-power to providecover, did not stand a chance.

Of course, the fact that Saddam Hussein’s regime wasrotten, and was kept from falling apart entirely by the ter-ror imposed by a small number of thugs, contributed to itsrapid demise. The claim by Rumsfeld et al that Iraq poseda threat to other nations, including the United States, wasjust laughable.

Indeed, the official reason for the military attack onIraq—the removal of weapons of mass destruction—hasproven to be completely indefensible, since no suchweapons have so far been found, despite the intense searchcarried out by large groups of experts appointed by theUSA. As time goes on, and the WMDs are not found, therewill be an attempt to play down the importance of findingthem, but this will not alter the fact that the war wasstarted on false premises.

All the same, it would be hypocritical for those of uswho were against the war not to rejoice over the downfallof a tyrannical regime, and not to admit that this wouldnot have come about so quickly without military interven-tion. But the price we paid for this is far too high: it hasreinstated in world affairs the old maxim that the ends

justify the means.



The events of the recent months are a severe setback tothose who believe that morality and adherence to the rulesof law should be our guiding principles. For the timebeing, the rule seems to be: might is right, and in submit-ting to this rule, the governments of many countries maybe driven to adopt a pragmatic policy; they may be forcedto acknowledge that there is now a single superpower;they may feel obliged to accept the role of the UnitedStates as the world’s policeman.

But this cannot be a permanent solution. Even if theAmericans were less arrogant in pursuing that role thanthey are now, a system with a built-in inequality is boundto be unstable. It is bound to create resentment, a resent-ment that will find expression in various ways, includingan increase in international terrorism. This in turn willforce the “policemen” to take countermeasures, whichwill make the inequality even more acute. Democracy inthe world, as we know it today, would be ended.

This is a possible scenario, but it need not happen. Mymain hope is that the opposition to it will come fromwithin the United States itself. At present, Bush is verypopular and carries a majority of public opinion: this isthe usual wave of patriotism which comes with a militaryvictory, but it is already decreasing significantly. I believethat the strong anti-war demonstrations that we saw ear-lier are a true reflection of the views of the majority of theAmerican people. Somehow, I do not see the Americanpeople accepting the role assigned to them by the cliquethat has hijacked the Administration. Public opinion isbound to turn when the dangers associated with the cur-rent policies become apparent. My main worry is that inthe meantime these dangers may lead to catastrophicresults. The greatest dangers derive from the nuclear doc-trines pursued by the Bush Administration.

These new doctrines have been comprehensivelyanalysed by Steven Miller in a paper, “SkepticismTriumphant”, an updated version of a presentation hemade at the Pugwash conference in Agra last year. He con-trasts the views of the “Skeptics”, by which he means theBush Administration, against those of the armscontrollers. His conclusion is that arms control is dead.

This conclusion is probably correct, but is does not fol-low from this that we have to accept fatalistically the newdoctrines. Arms control and unilateral policies are not theonly options. In his paper, Steven Miller was mainly con-cerned with contrasting these two, and therefore he left

out from consideration another alternative to arms con-trol, namely, nuclear disarmament.

In Pugwash we faced, from the beginning, the dilemmaof the two approaches: arms control versus disarmament.A few years ago we spent much time, in the Council and inspecial workshops, discussing the pros and cons of the twoapproaches.

This dispute has now been brought to an end by theentry onto the scene of the new approach. Arms control isnow dead. But, as discussed earlier, the policy of the BushAdministration, envisaging US world dominance, is unac-ceptable. I submit that this leaves only one option for Pug-wash: to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The elimination of nuclear weapons has always beenthe goal of Pugwash, following the call in the Russell-Ein-stein Manifesto. We have pursued this goal for moral rea-sons, because ethical issues have always played a majorrole in Pugwash: any use of nuclear weapons has beenseen as immoral. But we have also seen in our goals abasic purpose: survival. Any use of nuclear weaponswould carry the danger of escalation and a threat to ourcontinued existence.

But the use of nuclear weapons is explicitlycontemplated in the policies of the Bush Administration.

These policies have been promulgated in a number ofstatements, most of them made during the last year. Thefollowing documents are of particular importance:

• Nuclear Posture Review. January, 2002• The National Security Strategy of the United States

of America. September, 2002• National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass

Destruction. December 2002• National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense. May

2003These policies seem to have two aims: one, a defensive

strategy to make the USA invulnerable to an attack fromoutside; the second, an offensive strategy, to threaten anunfriendly regime with military action, including the useof nuclear weapons, if it attempts to acquire WMDs foritself.

For the first purpose, the decision was made to give ahigh priority to missile defence. As a first step, the USAabrogated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which hadbeen previously considered the bedrock of the arms con-trol system. A hugely increased budget has been providedfor a missile defence project, which is said to be essential




in a world of potential threats from weapons of massdestruction.

But it is in the offensive aspect that the biggest changeshave occurred. The new Nuclear Posture Review spells outa strategy which incorporates nuclear capability into con-ventional war planning. The previous doctrine of deter-rence, by which the actual use of nuclear weapons wasseen as a last resort, when everything else had failed, hasbeen thrown overboard. In the new doctrine, nuclearweapons have become a standard part of military strategy;they would be used in a conflict just like any other explo-sives. This represents a major shift in the whole rationalefor nuclear weapons.

The main reason for this change seems to be the fearthat states seen as unfriendly to the USA may acquireweapons of mass destruction: “We will not permit the

world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten

us with the world’s most destructive weapons”.

In this pursuit, the Bush Administration is prepared togo very far, including pre-emptive strikes: “We must be

prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients

before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass

destruction against the United States and our allies and

friends.” And it goes on: “To forestall or prevent such hos-

tile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if neces-

sary, act pre-emptively.”

The implementation of this policy has already begun.The United States is designing a new nuclear warhead oflow yield, but with a shape that would give it a very highpenetrating power into concrete, the “robust nuclear earth

penetrator”. It is intended to destroy bunkers with thickconcrete walls in which weapons of mass destruction maybe stored, or enemy leaders may seek shelter.

To enable this project to go ahead the US Senate hasalready decided to rescind the long-standing prohibitionon the development of low yield nuclear weapons. Othertypes of warheads are also contemplated.

The new weapons will have to be tested. At presentthere is a treaty prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons(except in sub-critical assemblies), the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty, which the United States has signed but not rat-ified. Given the contempt of the Bush Administration forinternational treaties, little excuse would be needed toauthorize the testing of the new weapon. Indeed, the needto resume testing is now openly advocated.

If the USA resumed testing, this would be a signal to

other nuclear weapon states to do the same. China wouldbe almost certain to resume testing. After the US decisionto develop ballistic missile defences, China feels vulnera-ble, and is likely to attempt to reduce its vulnerability bymodernizing and enlarging its nuclear arsenal. An opinionis building up that: “China should realize that the present

minimum nuclear arsenal is inadequate to meet the new

challenges, and therefore should greatly expand its nuclear

force to the extent that it can be actually used in different

scenarios”. At present this is a minority view, but it maybecome significant should the USA resume testing. Otherstates with nuclear weapons, such as India or Pakistan,might use the window of opportunity opened by the USAto update their arsenals. The danger of a new nuclear armsrace is real.

Another worry about the development of the newbomb is that it would blur the distinction between nuclearand conventional weapons. The chief characteristic of anuclear weapon is its enormous destructive power, uniqueeven in comparison with current chemical or biologicalweaponry, also designated as weapons of massdestruction. This has resulted in a taboo on the use ofnuclear weapons in combat, a taboo that has held outsince Nagasaki. But if at one end of the spectrum a nuclearbomb can be manufactured which does not differ quanti-tatively from ordinary explosives, then the qualitative dif-ference will also disappear; the nuclear threshold will becrossed, and nuclear weapons will gradually come to beseen as a tool of war, even though the danger they presentto the existence of the human race will remain.

For the USA, the distinction between nuclear and con-ventional weapons has already been eroded, as was madeclear in the Nuclear Posture Review, but the situation hasbecome even more threatening with the additional disposi-tion to act pre-emptively.

The danger of this policy can hardly be over-empha-sized. If the militarily mightiest country declares its readi-ness to carry out a pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons,others may soon follow. The Kashmir crisis, in May lastyear, is a stark warning of the reality of the nuclear peril.

India’s declared policy is not to be the first to usenuclear weapons. But if the United States—whose nuclearpolicies are largely followed by India—makes a pre-emp-tive nuclear use part of its doctrine, this would give Indiathe legitimacy to similarly threaten pre-emptive actionagainst Pakistan. George Fernandes, India’s Minister for



Defence, said recently: India had “a much better case to go

for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the United

States has in Iraq.” More likely perhaps is that Pakistanwould carry this out first.

Taiwan presents another potential scenario for a pre-emptive nuclear strike by the United States. Should theTaiwan authorities decide to declare independence, thiswould inevitably result in an attempted military invasionby mainland China. The USA, which is committed to thedefence of Taiwan, may then opt for a pre-emptive strike.

And we still have the problem of North Korea,described by Bush as one of the “axis of evil”. Under theBush dictum not to allow the possession of weapons ofmass destruction by any state considered to be hostile,North Korea will be called upon to close down all workon nuclear weapons. It is by no means certain that KimJong Il will submit to these demands, and a critical situa-tion may arise in that part of the world.

A major worry in this respect are developments inJapan. So far Japan has been kept out of the nuclearweapons club by Article 9 of its constitution:

“…the Japanese people forever renounce…the threat

or use of force as means of settling international disputes.”

However, partly at the urging of the USA, strong ten-dencies are now appearing—with the backing of the PrimeMinister, Junichiro Koizumi—to revise the constitution soas to make it legal for Japan to become a nuclear-weaponstate.

Altogether, the aggressive policy of the United States,under the Bush Administration, has created a precarioussituation in world affairs, with a greatly increased dangerof nuclear weapons being used in combat.

Moreover, if the use of nuclear weapons is made legal,it would preclude passing of laws to prevent the develop-ment of new types of weapons, with even greater destruc-tive potential than current WMDs—a truly horrifyingprospect. Sir Martin Rees, the British Astronomer Royal,gives civilization a 50/50 chance of surviving this century.Others believe that this is optimistic.

What should be the Pugwash stand on this matter?Does the new situation call for a corresponding change inour activities?

Let me first state that I fully support the efforts madeby the Secretary-General towards the resolution of localconflicts, particularly in the Middle East. His success inbringing together personalities from opposing camps

encourages us to continue these activities; they may pre-vent a regional crisis from getting out of control.

But it is the central issue that I am concerned about. Ayear ago, in La Jolla, we have adopted the Goals of Pug-wash for the next five years. The relevant document states:“Pugwash is strongly committed to the goal of abolishing

all nuclear weapons. It is imperative that Pugwash con-

stantly remind the international community of the

immorality, illegality, and peril inherent in nuclear

weapons, and to propose concrete steps towards their

elimination.” In the second year of the Quinquennium it ishigh time to take these steps.

Any attempt to achieve our goals by persuading theBush Administration to change its policies through logicalpersuasion, or by appealing to moral instincts, would behopeless and a complete waste of time. But it may not be awaste of time if such an appeal is made to the general pub-lic. As I said earlier, hope lies in a change of public opin-ion, particularly in the United States, to rise in oppositionto the current policies, and throw them out in the processusually employed in democratic countries, namely, in freeelections. Therefore, my suggestion is that the Pugwasheffort should be towards an acceleration of that process ina campaign to influence public opinion, a campaign basedon principles of morality and equity.

Immorality in the use of nuclear weapons is taken forgranted, but this aspect is very seldom raised when callingfor nuclear disarmament. We are told that a campaignbased on moral principles is a non-starter, and we areafraid of appearing naïve, and divorced from reality. I seein the use of this argument evidence that we have allowedethical considerations to be ignored for far too long. Weare accused of not being realistic, when what we are tryingto do is to prevent real dangers, the dangers that wouldresult from the current policies of the Bush Administration.

The public at large is ignorant about these dangers andwe urgently need a campaign of public education.

The other basic principle is adherence to internationallaw. It is a sine qua non of a civilized society that nationsfulfil their legal obligations and respect international law.World peace cannot be achieved without adherence tointernational treaties.

There is much deliberate obfuscation and brainwash-ing in this respect. Let me illustrate this with the examplewhich happens to be at the heart of the problem, the prob-lem of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).




Pugwash was very much involved in this treaty, in itsearliest years, when we saw it as an important measuretowards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Let me recallthe salient facts about the NPT, to which 98 percent ofnations have subscribed. In accordance with the treaty, allnon-nuclear states that signed it undertook not to acquirenuclear weapons in any way. At the same time, the fivestates which officially possessed those weapons—by virtueof the fact that they had tested them by a certain date—undertook to get rid of theirs. The relevant Article VI reads:“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue

negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to

cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to

nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and com-

plete disarmament under strict and effective international

control.”

By signing and ratifying the NPT, the nuclear memberstates are legally committed to nuclear disarmament. Thehawks in those states, in an attempt to retain nuclearweapons, utilized an ambiguity in Article VI, which makesit appear that nuclear disarmament is linked with theachievement of general and complete disarmament. Butthe NPT Review Conference—an official part of theimplementation of the NPT—at its session in 2000,removed this ambiguity in a statement issued by all fivenuclear weapons states. It contains the following:

“…an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon

states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear

arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all

States Parties are committed under Article VI.”

This makes the situation perfectly clear. The Bush pol-icy, which is based on the continued existence (and use) ofnuclear weapons, is in direct contradiction to the legallybinding NPT.

But the Bush Administration seems to have managedto convince the public that only a part of the NPT, the partthat applies to the non-nuclear states, is valid, and thattherefore states which violate it—as Iran now standsaccused of doing—must be punished for the transgression.The part concerning the obligation of the nuclear states isdeliberately being obliterated. Let me cite two items whichrecently appeared in British national newspapers:

“At a meeting of the IAEA today, the US will urge it to

declare Tehran in breach of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty. The treaty seeks to confine nuclear weapons toRussia, Britain, France, China and America.”

I have emphasized the second sentence because it dis-plays the complete reversal of the purpose of the NPT.

The other newspaper—none other than The Times—reports similarly:

“It [the NPT] was established to stop the spread of

nuclear weapons beyond the original declared nuclear

powers of the US, China, Russia, the UK and France.”

There is no mention of the obligation of the latter.We are being told all the time how dangerous nuclear

weapons are and that they must not be allowed to fall intothe hands of undesirable elements or rogue regimes:

“Weapons of mass destruction … nuclear, biological,

and chemical—in the possession of hostile states and ter-

rorists, represent one of the greatest security challenges

facing the United States.”

What we are not being told is that these weapons arejust as dangerous in the possession of friendly nations. Weare not being reminded that—with the realization of thesedangers—even the United States has undertaken to get ridof its own nuclear arsenal. We are facing here a basic issuein which the ethical and legal aspects are intertwined. Theuse of nuclear weapons is seen by the great majority ofpeople in the world as immoral, due to their indiscrimi-nate nature and unprecedented destructive power. Theirpossession—and therefore likely use—is thus equallyunacceptable, whether by “rogue” or benevolent regimes.

The elimination of nuclear weapons has been thedeclared aim of the United Nations from the beginning,and resolutions to this effect are passed, year after year, bylarge majorities of the General Assembly. Theseresolutions are ignored by the nuclear weapon states, asare all attempts to discuss the issue by the organ set up forthis purpose, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

There is a need to keep hammering home the pointthat America’s stand on the NPT issue is iniquitous. It hassigned and ratified an international treaty which commitsit to get rid of nuclear weapons, yet it is pursuing a policywhich demands the indefinite retention of these weapons.

We have to keep on highlighting the fundamentalinconsistency in the US policies. The USA must make achoice: if it wants to keep nuclear weapons, then it shouldwithdraw from the NPT (which would probably result ina massive increase in the number of nuclear weaponstates). Otherwise, it must abide by the terms of the NPTand get rid of its nuclear arsenals. Tertium non datur.

There is no third way.



I believe that a campaign to educate and influence pub-lic opinion, centered on the issue of the NPT, would standa good chance of being successful.

The task of influencing public opinion is far too big foran organization like Pugwash to undertake by itself. Col-laboration with other organizations would be essential.This would go against our traditional modus vivendi;Puwash has often been accused—perhaps justifiably—ofbeing an exclusive club. But even if our mode of work hasbeen justified in the past, I believe that the time has cometo open up. I am not advocating that Pugwash shouldbecome a mass movement; what I am suggesting is that weshould be more willing to collaborate with other organiza-tions in the sense of spearheading a large effort to provideinformation to the general public. Pugwash is a movementof scientists, but the job of the scientist is not only to dooriginal research; education is an essential element of it.And this is in essence what I propose.

An initiative in this direction has already been startedby the British Pugwash Group. In setting up a “Nuclear

Weapons Awareness Project”, the British Pugwash Groupis collaborating with about a dozen other British organiza-tions, ranging from BASIC (the British American SecurityInformation Council) to MEDACT (Medical Action), fromCND to Greenpeace. An account of this Project ispresented by John Finney in paper submitted to this Con-ference. I suggest that the Pugwash Council should take itup and find ways to implement it on an international scale.

Let me now conclude with some simple observationsof a more general nature, but relevant to the problems Ihave raised in this paper.

I believe in the inherent goodness of Man. What wouldbe the point of keeping the human species if this were nottrue! But then our task must be to ensure that this beliefgains general acceptance.

We still conduct world affairs on the outdated princi-ple that our survival demands being militarily strong. Thisis a remnant of our early history, when Man had to resortto violence in order to survive or to ensure continuation ofthe species. It completely ignores the radical changes thathave occurred as a result of the advances in science andtechnology, changes which make such a stand no longernecessary. If equitably distributed, our resources could besufficient to meet the basic needs of the world population,despite its huge increase.

Moreover, thanks largely to the fantastic progress intechnology, our world is becoming more and more inter-dependent, more and more transparent, more and moreinteractive. Inherent in these developments is a set ofagreements, ranging from confidence-building measures toformal international treaties; from protection of the envi-ronment to the clearance of mine fields; from Interpol tothe International Criminal Court; from ensuring intellec-tual property rights to the Declaration of Human Rights.Respect for, and strict adherence to, the terms of interna-tional agreements are at the basis of a civilized society.Without this, anarchy and terrorism would reign, the veryperils President Bush is allegedly committed to eradicate.While he intends to tackle this issue by military means,we must strive to achieve it by peaceful means. While theBush Administration plans to act unilaterally, we haveto ensure that world security is entrusted to the UnitedNations, the institution set up for this purpose. And wemust link our respect for the law with strong moralprinciples.

Many of you are professional people, trained to lookat problems in a detached, realistic, non-sentimentalapproach. But we are all, primarily, human beings, anx-ious to provide security for our nearest and dearest, andpeace for fellow citizens of our nation and the world. Wewant to see a world in which relations between people andbetween nations are based on compassion, not greed; ongenerosity, not jealousy; on persuasion, not force; onequity, not oppression.

These are simple, some will say romantic, sentiments,but they are also realistic necessities. In a world armedwith weapons of mass destruction, the use of which mightbring the whole of civilization to an end, we cannot afforda polarized community, with its inherent threat of militaryconfrontations. In this technological age, a global, equi-table community, to which we all belong as world citizens,has become a vital necessity.

Sir Joseph Rotblat is co-recipient, with the Pugwash Confer-

ences, of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize. A signatory of the Rus-

sell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955 and one of the founders of

the Pugwash Conferences, he attended the first meeting in

Pugwash, Nova Scotia in July 1957, and later served as the

organization’s President.


UN Peace Monitoring: An Emerging Global Watch?Dr. A. Walter Dorn1, Canadian Forces College

eral relatively powerless to monitorsituations of conflict. Still it was abold experiment in internationalorganization that proved extremelyuseful in the design of its successor.

The advent of the United Nationsin 1945, at the end of the SecondWorld War, was a major step in inter-national organization. The UN begandispatching increasingly ambitiousmissions to the field, with greater fre-quency and more functions than didthe League. Its many field operations,offices and missions have served asthe organization’s “eyes and ears” inconflict areas. The UN Charterempowered the Secretary-General tobring concerns directly to the atten-tion of the Security Council, a rolethat went well beyond the role speci-fied in the League Covenant. The Sec-retary-General has, over time,become not only a vital“clearinghouse” of information fromnations on the state of the world butalso an important monitor of theworld’s conflict situations throughhis own representatives in the field.True, during the Cold War, the Com-munist world, led by a veto-wieldingSoviet Union determined to maintainsecrecy behind an iron curtain, heldthe UN back from much investiga-

tion and action, but the organizationstill gained a great deal of experiencein fact-finding and peacekeepingoperations. With the end of the ColdWar another “evolutionary step” wastaken.

The United Nations now conductsmonitoring on an unprecedentedscale and in new fields, covering anever-growing range of security con-cerns for both nations and individu-als. In addition to verifying peaceagreements and documenting humanrights abuses, the organization hasbeen monitoring elections, trackingarms shipments, identifying sanctionsbusters, overseeing military andpolice forces, inspecting for weaponsof mass destruction, exposing terror-ists, warning of incipient crises, andgathering evidence for internationalcriminal tribunals.

It is appropriate that PresidentWoodrow Wilson, the League’s prin-cipal founder who set out the initialplan for international organization,should have given voice to such a far-reaching vision for worldwide moni-toring. The United Nations, as weshall see, is moving towards a globalwatch to fulfill its growing realm ofresponsibility. The UN is now theworld’s chief information-gatheringinstrument for actual or potentialthreats to the peace. From the haltingbaby steps of the League, to the slowmarch of the UN during the ColdWar, the world organization now

Introduction: “An Eye That DoesNot Slumber”

The League of Nations ... should be

the eye of the nations to keep watch

upon the common interest, an eye

that does not slumber, an eye that is

everywhere watchful and attentive.

—US President Woodrow Wilson,Paris, 25 January 1919

President Wilson articulated thisaspiration for a global watch at thevery dawn of international organiza-tion for peace, when the nations ofthe world were recovering from thethroes of the First World War. Thenational leaders who had gathered inParis in 1919 to negotiate a peacewere only partly committed to theidea of a new system of internationalrules and collective action. Nonethe-less they created the world’s firstinternational organization for peace,the League of Nations. Though theLeague was a important step forwardfor international relations, it neverbecame the “everywhere watchfuland attentive eye” that Wilson envi-sioned. Its investigative bodiesproved slow and cumbersome; itsprocedures for dispatching missionsrudimentary and subject to veto bymember states, and its Secretary-Gen-



SELECT PAPERS



finds itself in a fast run as it tries tokeep up with world events that affectpeace and security. With the end ofthe Cold War, the United Nationsbegan monitoring peace and conflictin ways that would have surprisedand pleased its originators, Wilsonincluded. A decade and half after thefall of the Berlin Wall and the bipolarworld that it symoblized, it is worth-while to take stock of this progress.

Expanded Information-Gathering

The new and expanded monitoringactivities of the United Nations invarious countries make for a longand impressive list, including: track-ing the distribution of humanitarianaid in combat zones; supervising thedisarmament and demobilization ofex-combatants; monitoring elections;monitoring and training police andmilitary forces during reformprocesses; following domestic courtproceedings to verify that they areconducted with due process; follow-ing and encouraging the growth ofcivil society; patrolling the bordersof states to prevent spill over fromaggressive neighbours; determiningresponsibility for the initiation ofwars; delineating borders betweenand within states; reviewing theimplementation of arms controltreaties, and many other novelactivities.

In addition to verifying and con-firming positive, peace-promotingactivities, the UN must also carry outmonitoring to detect a host of illegalor negative activities: observingattacks and the movements of fight-ers in combat zones; searching intru-sively for hidden weapons, includingsmall arms, bio-weapons and nuclearbomb-making materials; tracking

planes in no-fly zones or trespassinginto foreign airspace; uncoveringclandestine arms shipments throughthe cascade of arms brokers; catchingsanctions busters, especially groupsselling illegal commodities that fuelwars (e.g., “blood diamonds”);revealing secret bank accounts andexposing front companies of orga-nized crime and terrorist groups;identifying forged documents that aidthe illegal movement of people andarms across borders; determining ifnational secret agents have violatedinternational laws; exhuming thebodies of persons killed by paramili-tary groups; identifying deliberateattacks against civilian targets; gath-ering evidence for war-crimes trials;uncovering assassination plots beforethey hatch and warning of impendingviolence.

This tremendous expansion ofUN monitoring tasks is paralleled bythe creation of a host of new UNbodies, offices and operations withmonitoring mandates. In peacekeep-ing, where international military andcivilian personnel are deployed toconflict areas to help keep or createpeace, the number of operations sawa tenfold increase in the 1990s com-pared to any previous decade. Thethirty-five new operations in the onedecade is double the number createdin the previous 45 years of the orga-nization. Monitoring is a principalfunction in all peacekeeping opera-tions, and in most of them (observermissions), monitoring is the principalfunction. While there are definite lim-its to information-gathering or “intel-ligence” activities in peacekeeping,the 1990s saw an expansion in theuse of overhead reconnaissance,radio message interception, and tech-

nological surveillance (e.g., usingnight-vision and radar), as well asmore controversial activities such asdeploying peacekeepers out of uni-form (briefly) and employing paidinformants from the localpopulation.2

The 1990s also witnessed the cre-ation of over a dozen missions of anew type, called “political and peace-building missions,” deployed to thefield to monitor and assist with phys-ical reconstruction and social recon-ciliation in countries coming out ofwar and even to prevent conflicts inthe first place.3 The Special Represen-tatives of the Secretary-General(SRSGs), who work in trouble areasor on special issues and who areoften in charge of peacekeeping oper-ations, currently number over thirty,more than at any other time.

In the human rights field, the Spe-cial Rapporteurs who report to theUN’s Human Rights Commission onspecific countries or themes (types ofrights violations) have multiplied,going from six in the 1980s to 17 inthe 1990s. In the first two years ofthe new millennium alone, five newposts of this type were added. Inaddition, the new position of HighCommissioner for Human Rights(UNHCHR), heading an office of thesame name, was created in 1993.UN-sponsored Truth Commissions(or similarly named bodies) saw theiradvent in the 1990s, first in CentralAmerica, then Africa and Asia. InGuatemala, for instance, a “Histori-cal Clarification Commission” wascreated in 1994 on the principle thatthe Guatemalan people had the“right to know the truth” concerningacts of political violence and viola-tions of human rights in their country



for some thirty years. This was com-plemented by an ongoing mission tomonitor human rights using in-coun-try fact-finding teams.

Sanctions committees, withresponsibilities to monitor the imple-mentation of specific sanctionsimposed by the Security Council,have also proliferated. Only twowere established prior to 1990 (forsanctions against Rhodesia and SouthAfrica), while ten were created in the1990s and two have already beenestablished in the first two years ofthe new millennium. These bodies aremaking increased use of expert pan-els and special monitoringmechanisms, which have broken newground in the realm of internationalinvestigation. The expert panels havepublished detailed documentary evi-dence to identify and then “name andshame” individuals, organizationsand governments (including heads ofstate) caught violating Security Coun-cil sanctions or not doing enough tocatch sanctions-busters (or terrorists).In addition to catching sanctions-busters, the UN has tried on numer-ous occasions to assess the impact ofsanctions to determine any unwantedeffects that sanctions may create,especially affecting innocent citizens.

Similarly, in the disarmamentfield, monitoring and inspectionagencies have flourished in recentyears. For decades the only agency inthe UN system conducting on-siteinspections was the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), head-quartered in Vienna. This “nuclearwatchdog” has been sending inspec-tors to declared nuclear facilities inabout 70 countries to verify thatnuclear material has not beendiverted for unlawful or prohibited

purposes, in particular to producenuclear weapons. In the 1990s, sev-eral new international verificationbodies for arms control were estab-lished. A sophisticated system for thedetection of nuclear tests in all envi-ronments (underwater, undergroundand above ground) was developedand tested by the preparatory Com-prehensive Test Ban Treaty Organiza-tion (CTBTO). It employs an array ofadvanced seismic, hydroacoustic,infrasound and radionuclidetechnologies at stations around theglobe which feed information back toheadquarters at the Vienna Interna-tional Centre.

UN investigations of chemicalweapons use were first carried out in1984 in Iran and Iraq by teams sentout by the Secretary-General, provid-ing conclusive evidence that Iraq hadused chemical weapons extensively inits war with Iran, in violation of itstreaty (Geneva Protocol) obligations.The Organization for the Prohibitionof Chemical Weapons (OPCW),established in The Hague in 1996 aspart of the UN system, conducts hun-dreds of inspections each year to ver-ify compliance with a comprehensive

ban contained in the ChemicalWeapons Convention. Under its“challenge inspection” procedure,the OPCW is authorized to carry outinspections on an “any time, anysite” basis upon request of a party.The 1972 Biological Weapons Con-vention, covering the third categoryof weapons of mass destruction, hasno similar inspection system, thoughmost states are in favour of finalizinga verification protocol and institutinga global monitoring and confidence-building system.

Under the 1997 Anti-PersonnelMines Treaty, the UN Secretary-Gen-eral is responsible for organizing fact-finding missions, upon request, toinvestigate allegations of non-compli-ance with the treaty. Also, the Secre-tary-General receives annual reportsfrom parties on the measures theyhave taken to implement the treaty,including the locations and quantitiesof any and all mines.4 Instead of cre-ating a new and costly organizationto administer the treaty and performinspections, civil society wasentrusted with the task of monitoringimplementation of the ban. TheLandmine Monitor, created by the

Sen. Douglas Roche, Sen. Landon Pearson, Geoffrey Pearson, and Walter Dorn



International Campaign to Ban Land-mines (ICBL), is a network of expertsand activists who analyse reportssubmitted by nations to the UN andcompare them with other data gath-ered in the field. The annual report,Landmine Monitor, provides exten-sive new information with frank andobjective assessments of nationalcompliance. This is a good demon-stration of how civil society can befreer to make accusations of non-compliance than governmental orga-nizations and can work well withprogressive governments and the UNto uphold a treaty. A similar partner-ship is developing around the smallarms issue.

For decades, the UN has been theclearing-house for arms controlreports sent to it by governments, forinstance, in accordance with the1968 Outer Space Treaty and the1972 Biological Weapons Conven-tion (and its review conference decla-rations). At the request of the Gen-eral Assembly, the Secretary-Generalhas also established voluntary regis-ters of military expenditures (1980)and of conventional arms (1992). Forthe latter, there is a surprisingly highnumber of submissions, typically 80-90 states reporting annually on theirpossession of conventional weaponsin seven major categories: battletanks, armoured vehicles, large cali-bre artillery systems, combat aircraft,attack helicopters, warships, missilesand missile launchers. Small arms arenot included, but are the subject of anumber of important UN and NGOstudies. There are internationalattempts to create a UN register forsmall arms as well.

This expansion of internationalmonitoring has demonstrated that, as

more responsibilities are given to theUN, new precedents are set, newlessons are learned and new practicesare put in place. Certainly there havebeen set-backs and misadventures(some of them instructive), but theenormous growth of internationalorganization, from the League to thepost-Cold War UN is indisputable.Still, many could correctly point outthat the UN remains far from thelofty ideals that guide it.

While the evolution applies pri-marily to information gathering, to alesser extent a growth has taken placein information analysis and dissemi-nation.5

Information Dissemination

Gathering information on this widerange of targets and situations,though an enormous challenge, isonly half the battle for the UN. Theorganization then needs to analysethe information and then disseminatethe conclusions, either in privatemeetings, at informal or formal meet-ings of bodies like the Security Coun-cil, or at official or public meetings,including the daily press conferencesof the spokesman of the Secretary-General. The UN has become amajor centre for information dissemi-nation crucial to the world’s wellbeing. The UN and its agencies pro-vide us with many of the statisticsthat paint a sobering picture of ourtroubled world.

From various parts of the UN sys-tem, we learn about conflicts that areraging around the world, somealready making the front pages ofnewspapers, others in long-ignoredparts of the world. The annualReport of the Secretary-General usu-ally provides a survey and analysis of

conflicts that are dealt with by theUN. Other UN agencies and officesprovide telling details about thetremendous human toll of modernconflict.

For instance, UNICEF tells usthat in the last decade of the 20thcentury, 2 million children werekilled, 6 million injured orpermanently disabled and 12 millionleft homeless because of conflict. Inaddition, “conflict has orphaned orseparated more than 1 million chil-dren from their families states”,states UNICEF’s State of the World’s

Children report for 2002.6 Evenmore tragically, an estimated300,000 children were forced orinduced into combat in 2001.

Yet another UN agency, theUnited Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR), tells us thatthere are an estimated 35 millionrefugees and internally displaced peo-ple (IDP) in the world7, about one forevery 160 persons on earth. About80 per cent are women and children,fleeing conflict or persecution. Thenumber of people assisted byUNHCR has been about 21-22 mil-lion annually in the years 1998-2001.8 This figure includes12 millionrefugees (55%), 0.9 million asylumseekers (4%), 0.8 million returnedrefugees (4%), 6 million internallydisplaced of concern to UNHCR(27%), 0.4 million returned IDPs(2%) and 1.7 million others of con-cern (8%). Behind each statistic liemillions of face and desperate humanbeings. Asia has the greatest numberof persons “of concern” to UNHCR,with nearly 8.5 million, followed byAfrica with 6.1 million and Europewith 5.6 million people. Another UNorganization, the United Nations



Relief and Works Agency for Pales-tine Refugees in the Near East(UNRWA), keeps tracks of andassists the 3.8 million registeredPalestine refugees in Jordan,Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank andthe Gaza Strip.

The Food and Agricultural Orga-nization issues famine alerts, and theUN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) issuesinternational appeals for help, con-taining telling details about the con-ditions in areas of complex emergen-cies. The situation reports of UN andgovernmental agencies, as well asNGOs, are often posted in OCHA’sexcellent website Reliefweb. Further-more, OCHA developed its ownnews service under the motto of“bridging the information gap” forconflict areas of greatest need:regions of Africa (West, East, Cen-tral, Great Lakes, Horn, South), Cen-tral Asia and recently Iraq. Thereports, often with accompanyingphotos, are filed under the nameIRIN or the Integrated RegionalInformation Network, which is a“UN humanitarian information unit”within OCHA, funded mostly bynational development agencies inEurope, Australia and Canada.

The UN also provides us with apicture of the arms holdings andtransfers. From its voluntary armsregister for major conventional arma-ments, we learn that the US accountsfor about half of the global trade inthese arms (tanks, planes, ships, andweapons of calibre larger than 100mm) and the permanent five mem-bers of the Security Council accountfor well over four-fifths.9 More star-tling, perhaps, is the statistic thatmore than 68 per cent of the arms

trade was absorbed by the developingworld, which can ill afford the cost, interms of both finances and humanlife.10

Small arms are the main killer inthe world, having caused millions ofdeaths in the past decade. In a 1999press release titled “the UN takes aimat small arms”11, UNICEF and theUN Department for DisarmamentAffairs report that small arms havecaused more than 3 million deaths inthe past decade, with the vast major-ity of victims being civilians.

We also learn from UN reports ofhopeful signs of disarmament, espe-cially in countries coming out of con-flict. Cambodia destroyed 15,000weapons in public ceremonies inMarch and June 1999 alone. SouthAfrica has pledged to destroy all sur-plus small arms, including about260,000 automatic rifles andhundreds of tons of ammunition. In1998, China undertook strong stepsto confiscate illicit small arms, result-ing in the destruction of some300,000 weapons.12

The most extensive internationalsurvey of firearm effects and regula-tions was prepared for the UN’sCommission on Crime Preventionand Criminal Justice in 1998. The“United Nations International Studyon Firearm Regulations”13 includesdata and narratives from 69 MemberStates on such issues as firearms-related deaths and injuries, firearmslegislation and relevant initiatives infirearms regulation at the regionaland interregional levels. Theresearchers sought to ensure equitablegeographical representation of coun-tries around the world but were ham-pered by lack of statistics for many.The later fact only supports the over-

all conclusion that small arms are notyet under proper regulatory controlin most parts of the world.

Finally we learn about the humancondition through the UNDP’s flag-ship report, the Human Development

Report. It is not only valuable for theextensive statistics provided on devel-oping and developed nations, butalso in its path-breaking analysis ofthese figures and the introduction ofnew concepts (such as the terms“human development” and “humansecurity” themselves). The reportsshow an unfortunate, though logicalcorrelation between underdevelop-ment and conflict. Of the 35 nationslisted under the category of “lowhuman development” in the Human

Development Report 199914 abouthalf (18) have experienced civil waror fought in international wars in thepast decade. If one includes nationswith neighbours that haveexperienced such wars, the numberrises to a startling 33 of 35 states!

The Need for Knowledge

To carry out its many responsibilities,old and new, for international andhuman security, the UN requiresaccurate and timely information.Finding itself in war zones and in themidst of aggressors, the UN needsbackground information on the his-tory and culture of the local powersand personalities, as well as informa-tion on the current military and politi-cal situation, including both the capa-bilities and intensions of the parties.Without such information, the UNplaces its military and civilian staff inthe field at great risk. These risks canprove unacceptable, as witnessed withthe truck-bombing of UN headquar-ters in Bagdad. With this information,



the UN can operate safer and be amore effective power for peace.

The various goals and roles of theUN can be conceptualized on a sim-plified timeline of conflict, as in Fig-ure 1. As the conflict begins, the UNwill seek to prevent an escalation.During the intensity of combat, themajor UN goal is to mitigate theseverity of the conflict and the impacton the civilian population. As theconflict de-escalates, the UN will seekto prevent another peak by movingthe conflict into termination phase.Finally, once the fighting has stopped,the rebuilding can occur in earnest.

For each UN role, specific infor-mation is required. For early warn-ing, the UN needs to know who isseeking to escalate violence, and spoilthe peace process, and how they areplanning to carry it out. To reactthrough preventive diplomacy anddeployment, it is vital to identify thekey players and means of influence,and to understand the locations,strengths, goals and vulnerabilities,political and military, of potential“spoilers.” UN officials mediatingtalks between combatants shouldidentify areas for quick agreementand discern the more difficult prob-lems to address in the long term. For

humanitarian assistance, detailedinformation about the locations andneeds of the affected populations,and about supplies and deliveryroutes is required. Peacekeepinginvolves constant patrols to monitorthe level of security in the area ofoperation and identify potential haz-ards. Peacebuilding necessitates awide range of economic, social anddevelopment indicators to decidewhich sectors and organizations arethe most receptive and resistant toassistance.

To establish an effective sanctionsregime, it is necessary not only toidentify and catch “sanctionsbusters” through careful border mon-itoring but also to prepare impactassessments on the effectiveness ofsanctions, including both wanted andunwanted effects. When the UNfinally finds itself, as a last resort,engaged in military enforcement orauthorizing it, the organizationshould have detailed military infor-mation, including targeting informa-tion (to minimize, if not avoid, inno-cent deaths) and information on thedefensive and offensive military capa-bilities of the targeted forces. Finally,when the UN authorizes a coalitionto use military force, it should be able

to monitor the coalition’s actions toensure they are strictly in accordancewith their UN mandate and accord-ing to the rules of internationalhumanitarian law.

In war zones, where “truth is thefirst casualty of war”, there is a con-stant need for independent reporting.Even warring parties spouting propa-ganda appreciate a source of objec-tive information, however much theymay seek to bias it. After a peaceagreement is signed, the objectivevoice of an independent outside bodycan make the difference between alasting peace and a temporary cease-fire, as the UN has shown manytimes. Just as a referee is indispens-able in a professional sports match,an impartial arbiter is essential forverifying and promoting the rules ofa peace agreement. Usually, the twosides (conflicting parties) are so dis-trustful of each other that bilateraladversarial verification is problem-atic, if not impossible.

Outside monitoring itself canchange behaviour. If the parties knowthat their illegal activities will beexposed they are often more carefulnot to engage in them. If they knowthat their positive actions will be veri-fied by an independent agency, theywill be more eager to undertakethem. Thus monitoring provides away for a feedback that builds confi-dence of the parties. Should one sideattempt to subvert a peace agree-ment, it is important that the otherside should know about it. False alle-gations can be disproved and trueaccusations placed in the public light.The “fog of war” is graduallyreplaced by the “transparency ofpeace.”

In practice, peace agreementsFigure 1. The predominant goals and roles of the UN at different stages in the timeline of conflict.



have loopholes, nuanced clauses andprovisions that are subject to widelydiffering interpretation. This isanother reason why it is vital to havean impartial body that can provideoutside assistance in dealing with thecomplexities of implementation.

Countless times, the UN has usedits monitoring functions to defusepotentially explosive situations.Whether it be UN military observersin the Middle East stopping a localdispute from escalating, UN controlteams in Cambodia identifying assas-sination plots, UN civilian police inCentral America preventing localpolice from extorting money, or tradi-tional UN peacekeepers insertingthemselves between two armies, mon-itoring the actual or potential com-batants is a common and key element.

Lack of Information

When the UN is information-deficient, it invites a host of maladiesand political disasters. First, it canappear weak and out of touch,thereby losing credibility and author-ity. If the UN officials appear igno-rant of realities on the ground or thereal issues on the negotiating table,they cannot make good mediators.Naive UN field personnel can betaken advantage of by combatantslong accustomed to using trickery,disinformation and deception to gainan upper hand at the negotiatingtable as well as in the battlefield.

For lack of information, greatblunders have been committed in UNhistory. In 1950 in Korea, the UNGeneral Assembly and the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, fully endorsedthe advance of UN forces, led by theAmerican General DouglasMacArthur, across the 3815 parallel

(and all the way to the Chinese bor-der) in an effort to take North Koreaby force, while ignoring the clearwarnings that China wouldintervene. Over two years of warbetween China and UN forcesensued, leaving four million dead.Before the 1973 Yom Kippur War,the UN (along with the US and Israelfor that matter) failed to recognizeEgyptian preparations for its surpriseattack on Israel. In 1982, Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar was caughtunawares of the impending Argentineinvasion of the Falkland/MalvinasIslands, despite his familiarity withthe region and the dispute. In 1993,the Security Council established UNSafe Areas in the former Yugoslaviawithout a proper assessment of thevulnerabilities of these areas. Indeed,the President of the Security Councilat the time, Ambassador Diego Arriafrom Venezuela, later complainedthat the United States was not shar-ing information that was essential forproper decision-making. The tragicmassacres within the “protected”areas of Srebernica and Gorazde inBosnia are a testament to lack offoresight, political will and commit-ment. As we shall see, foresight to seecoming tragedies and political will toreact to them are intimatelyconnected.

Some major “intelligencefailures” occurred in areas where UNpeacekeepers were actually deployed,bringing great embarrassment to theorganization. Examples occurred:• in South Korea in 1950 prior to the

invasion from the North, in whichUN observers were unable to warnof the attack (though they providedimportant confirmation once it hadhappened)

• in Lebanon during the 1958 civilwar, when the US accused UNobservers of being blind to aninflux of fighters and material;

• again in Lebanon prior to and dur-ing the 1982 Israeli invasion, whichcaught the UN by surprise;

• in Namibia in April 1989 whenguerrilla fighters “invaded” unex-pectedly and the UN found itselfforced to sanction the release ofSouth African forces (garrisonedunder a peace accord) which pro-ceeded to massacre of several hun-dred guerrillas;

• in Iraq in 1990 when peacekeepersfailed to report on the impendinginvasion of Kuwait, leaving the Sec-retary-General totally off-guardwhen the attack occurred;

• in Somalia in 1993 during the ill-fated manhunt for GeneralMohammed Farah Aideed;

• in Rwanda in 1994 prior to and athe beginning of the genocide, whenclear warning indicators wereignored;

• in Zaire in 1996 when the UNaborted a peacekeeping operationamidst confusion about the numberand conditions of refugees beingattacked;

• in East Timor in September 1999when the reign of terror caught theUN off-guard and unprepared,forcing it to evacuate and foregopledges to the Timorese people.

In some cases, the blame for UNignorance belongs to field officers; inothers responsibility lies with UNheadquarters and the Security Coun-cil. Usually, blame is spread ratherwidely but ultimately it can be tracedback to the UN member states whodo not provide the UN with theresources, finances staff and author-



ity to carry out the much neededinformation gathering and analysis.Far from discrediting the roles andgoals of the United Nations, thesefailures show how important it is forthe organization to possess the meansto predict and prevent emerging con-flicts. The above examples only sup-port the call for a stronger UN to beable to deal proactively withconflicts. Through a lessons-learnedapproach, the UN can discover waysto avoid repeating past errors andinvest in new approaches andresources to head off future disasters.

The UN Secretaries-General haveconstantly complained that there isinsufficient information to make thebest decisions. “The pool of informa-tion available to the SecretaryGeneralis wholly inadequate,” wrote Secre-tary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllarin his 1991 Annual Report on theWork of the Organization. BoutrosBoutros-Ghali even recommendedthat the UN develop an“intelligence” capability, a proposalwhich was greeted with a chorus ofnays from member states because the“intelligence” word, sometimes asso-ciated with nefarious undercoveroperations, had been used. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has made a boldand valiant effort to establish anInformation and Strategic AnalysisSecretariat (ISAS) within the Secre-tariat, as proposed in the widly-acclaimed Brahimi Report16. But thisinitiative is being resisted by a num-ber of developing states who fear thatthe UN might pry into their internalaffairs. With the new emphasis on theprotection of UN field workers, afterthe tragic Baghdad bombing, a sys-tem for realistic threat assessmentsmay finally be created.

The UN and the InformationTechnology Revolution

Fortunately, a host of new develop-ments are helping the UN overcomethe natural and political barriers toinformation-gathering and to make ita significant player in the informa-tion age. Foremost among them israpidly advancing technology. It ismaking information easier to access,store, analyse and disseminate. Theprimitive teletype machines of the1980s used by the UN offices to printsequential reports from a few wireservices are replaced with desktopcomputers for UN officials, permit-ting them to draw upon a huge num-ber of sources, including dozens ofwire services, using specialized soft-ware (e.g., NewsEdge). The Internethas increased the accessibility, scopeand depth of information fromsources world-wide. The World WideWeb, which is estimated to be dou-bling every year or so, offers newopportunities for both information-gathering and dissemination. As indi-viduals and civil society in the devel-oping world have begun to postcopious amounts of information onthe Internet, a new and special sourceof information becomes availableglobally, including to the UN. On atypical day, the UN receives over200,000 requests for pages from itsweb sites.

Electronic mail has made globalcommunications easier, cheaper andfaster. It is quickly gaining a footholdin developing countries, thereby pro-viding UN officials in New York withindividual contacts at the grass rootslevel in countries far away. In addi-tion, as UN information becomesmore easily accessible to more groupsfrom around the world, the UN bene-

fits from feedback on its work. Thegreater world-wide access to UN doc-uments, which were previously notwidely circulated outside the UN cen-tres in New York, Geneva andVienna, and the subsequent analysisand commentary helps in the creationand improvement of new reports andaction plans. For instance, the Inter-net site Reliefweb.int, operated bythe Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Assistance (OCHA),allows the UN to pool informationresources from the myriad of UNagencies working in the field, as wellas local and international non-gov-ernmental organizations, and evennational aid agencies. Field reportsthat previously would have remainedstrictly within the confines of onedepartment or agency are now avail-able routinely in a timely fashion tovirtually anyone in the world atwww.reliefweb.int.

The wealth of electronic informa-tion would be overwhelming andimpenetrable were it not for theexcellent search engines on the Inter-net—“Google” being the searchengine of choice among manyexperts, surfers and researchers.These search engines permit the websurfer to scan vast sections of theInternet—Google searches over threebillion web pages—in a fraction of asecond in order to produce results(“hits”) corresponding to the searchterms, however specialized theseterms may be. For instance a searchon the term “United Nations moni-toring” gives 1,500 web pages in0.18 seconds.17

Still, the concomitant problems of“information overload and under-use” are common in the UN, as theyare all over the world. With an ocean



of information available, more timeand insight is required to sift throughthe mounds of news and backgroundinformation that are constantly pilingup, and less time seems to be avail-able for analysis and reflection.

The growth of the Internet hasother potential weaknesses for theworld and the United Nations. It fos-ters a dependency on a system subjectto break down and misuse. Examplesof the latter include unwarranted sur-veillance by governments of electroniccommunications (including those ofthe UN), the propagation of computerviruses, the use of the medium forcrime, corruption and other nefariouspurposes, the invasion of privacy inthe form of junk e-mail, etc.

But the overall effects are clearlypositive. In this electronic revolution,it is harder for governments to con-trol or suppress the flow of informa-tion. It is easier for people to spanintercontinental distances using elec-tronic communications. The globalvillage is getting smaller. And the UNgains because of it.

Conclusion

True to Wilson’s vision in 1919, themonitoring capability of the interna-tional community is slowly evolvinginto a global watch. The faltering butpioneering efforts of the League pro-vided the UN with a foundation onwhich to build. The end of the ColdWar allowed the UN to acquireexpanded roles in many new fields tomeet the needs of a very unpeacefulworld. From early warning to peace-building, from disarmament verifica-tion to a terrorist watch, there arenew and expanded responsibilitiesfor the UN.

The evolution of international

organization in the past decade ismanifested in many forms, but it is inits monitoring functions that we seethe greatest growth of roles andresponsibilities. How has this comeabout? Was it the result of a plannedstrategy or sporadic progress drivenby the immediate needs of the day?The answer would appear to be“clearly both”, as evidenced bynumerous case studies. Creative UNleadership at specific times of interna-tional need, if not desperation, per-mitted the development of significantinnovations that brought bothprogress and precedence to UN mon-itoring. An enhancement of the UN’scapacity for observation was a nat-ural step in the information age, anda much needed one, as the globalbody could report more impartiallyand objectively than national govern-ments, especially governmentsinvolved in conflicts.

But how permanent is thisprogress and this process? The UN’sevolution has been far from linear; itfollows a path strewn with manyobstacles and can be characterized as“two steps forward and one stepbackwards.” Some capabilities andfunctions may again be lost (as hap-pened with some League mechan-isms). But much will remain in theform of permanent capabilities, newmandates and new procedures. Once anew role has been successfully demon-strated, the international communityusually finds new applications, espe-cially in an age when global govern-ance mechanisms are sorely needed.The monitoring of national elections,peace agreements, sanctions, humanrights, etc., gradually covered morecountries as the value of these prac-tices were proven and the UN’s own

expertise grew. Even still, the applica-tion of monitoring is not uniform. Thechoice of countries and conflicts thatare monitored is still based more onnational politics (especially from thePermanent Five members of the Secu-rity Council), and less on needs of theaffected populations.

It is important to identify forcesthat have sought to undermine, or atleast slow down the evolution of UNmonitoring. There are many suchforces. Some are natural and, indeed,helpful; others are hostile andobstreperous. Many developingcountries are reluctant to allow theUN to monitor their activities for fearof negative publicity or the exposureof domestic incompetence, corrup-tion, complicity or other wrong-doing. This also holds true for theactivities of the most powerful coun-tries as well. The United States iscareful not to allow the UN tothreaten its dominance in the intelli-gence arena, especially on matterswhere its intelligence reports mightbe challenged (e.g., on the presence ofweapons of mass destruction in Iraq)or US covert intelligence operationsmight be exposed (e.g., Contra arma-ment in Nicaragua, assassinationattempts on Prime MinisterLumumba in the Congo, complicitywith Duvalier regime in Haiti, etc.). Ithas opposed a general purpose armsverification capability for the UN andkept the UN hobbled through its fail-ure to pay its annual dues for aboutthree decades. There are factionswithin the US right-wing that areopenly hostile to the UN and para-noid elements hold that the UN isactually heading a conspiracy tooverthrow the US government!

Are there legitimate pitfalls and



prohibited zones for a UN globalwatch? The issues of privacy, confi-dentiality, misuse of informationmust all be examined. Some fear thecreation of an Orwellian UN inwhich “big brother is watching.”Those studying the UN and thoseknowledgeable about its capacities(and limitations) know that such afear is unfounded. In the distantfuture, however, perhaps 2084instead of 1984, could such concernsbe validated? In human history,whenever and wherever power wasover concentrated, such a concernhas arisen, including in the RomanEmpire, when the question was fre-quently asked, “Who will watch thewatchman?” But the very nature ofthe UN, with its diverse membershipand international civil service makesit difficult to keep secrets or to over-step the bounds imposed by its mem-bers or to take action that woulddilute its moral authority. And withmore democratic nations than everbefore in history (both in absolutenumbers and as a percentage of thewhole), a dependable system ofchecks and balances could easily beset up to regulate UN monitoring.

On a practical level, whatconcrete steps can be taken to pro-duce a better system in the nearfuture? Some feel that it is feasible forthe UN to negotiate information-sharing agreements withgovernments so that it can receive aregular feed of information from adiverse set of nations (which would,presumably, reduce the dangers ofbias). The present author is in favourof such agreements as well as otherbold initiatives: to create a new legalstatus for new UN investigative pow-ers within states; to curtail a state’s

“right of refusal” of fact-findingteams on certain issues such ashuman rights, to develop a UN OpenSkies treaty, which would allow theUN to overfly national territories as aconfidence-building measure (similarto the treaty regime that is now inforce between NATO and the former-Warsaw Pact countries). While theseproposals may seem radical it is not adeparture from the historical devel-opment but a natural and fruitfuloutcome of present trends.

It is clear that UN monitoringshould be conducted where conflict ismost prevalent or most likely tobreak out, but should the monitoringsystem be applied equally to thedeveloped (first) world as well as tothe developing (third) world? Shouldthe UN monitor those states who act(or claim to act) as “enforcers” ofUN decisions and resolutions,whether they be duly-authorized orself-appointed “coalitions of the will-ing”? What practical means havebeen adopted to keep track of suchenforcers to make sure that humanlives are not lost needlessly or care-lessly (as “collateral damage”) andthat human suffering is reduced to aminimum. This type of UN monitor-ing lags well behind the others bothin UN practice and in academicstudy. It would be well for academic/activist groups like Pugwash toexamine the means of monitoringenforcers and further explore thenotion of an emerging global watch.As an “eye that does not slumber”,the UN could serve the world, not as“big brother”, not as a “big bother”(as some might think it) but as "bighelper" that would make both peaceand justice more accessible on theplanet.

Notes

1 Dr. Walter Dorn is an Associate Profes-sor at the Canadian Forces College andVice Chair of the Canadian PugwashGroup. He is currently writing a bookwith the support of a DFAIT HumanSecurity Fellowship on the evolving“Global Watch.” He is a scientist bytraining, with experience on chemicalsensing and arms control verification.He served with the UN in East Timor,in Ethiopia, and at UN headquarters asa Training Adviser to the UN’s Depart-ment of Peacekeeping Operations. Hishomepage is <www.cfc.dnd.ca/dorn>.

2 Dorn, A. Walter, “The Cloak and theBlue Beret: Limitations on Intelligencein UN Peacekeeping”, InternationalJournal of Intelligence and CounterIn-telligence, Vol. 12, No. 4, December1999, p. 414.

3 “Political and Peacebuilding missions”were established by the UN, accordingto the Department of Political Affairsunder its mandate, in Burundi (1993),Afghanistan (1993), Guatemala (1994),Somalia (1995), Liberia (1997), GreatLakes Region (1997), Bougainville(1998), Guinea-Bissau (1999), MiddleEast (1999), Angola (1999), CentralAfrican Republic (2000) and Tajikistan(2000). See “Background Note: UnitedNations Political and PeacebuildingMissions, 1 June 2001”, UN Doc.DPI/2166/Rev.4.

4 These reports are publicly accessible onthe UN’s Web site:<domino.un.org/MineBan.nsf>,(accessed 20 November 2001).

5 The previous two paragraphs may bedeleted in the final version.

6 <www.unicef.org/sowc02/feature6.htm>, accessed 20 November 2001.UNICEF generally defines a “child” asis done in the Convention on the Rightsof the Child: every human being belowthe age of 18 years, though the Conven-tion adds the qualification “ unless,under the law applicable to the child,majority is attained earlier.”

7 . Kofi A. Annan, Foreword, “The Stateof the World’s Children 2002: Leader-ship, United Nations Children’s Fund,”<www.unicef.org/sowc02/pdf/sowc2002-final-eng-allmod.txt>, accessed 20November 2001.

8 The number of refugees or internallydisplaced persons (IDPs) ‘of concern’ to



the United Nations High Commissionfor Refugees (UNHCR), has stood at21-22 million in the years for the firstyears of the 21st century. Informationprovided on the Home Page of theUnited Nations High Commission forRefugees for the beginning of the year2001 (<www.unhcr.ch>, accessed 5October 2001).

9 The six largest exporters of “conven-tional arms” include the five permanentmembers of the Security Council, withthe US taking the lion’s share: US, 47%;Russia, 14%; UK, 8%; France, 7%;Germany 6%; China, 3%. SIPRI year-book, Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute, Stockholm.

10 Press release, “Transparency in Mili-tary Matters Grows”, UN Doc.DC/2799 of 31 July 2001. available at<www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/dc2799.doc.htm>, accessed 20 Novem-ber 2001.

11 UNICEF Press ReleaseCF/DOC/PR/1999/26 of 20 July 1999.Available at <www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr26.htm>, accessed 23 December2003.

12 United Nations Secretary-General,Report of the Group of GovernmentalExperts on Small Arms, UN Doc.A/54/258 of 19 August 1999, p.13.available at <www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/UN%20Documents/Other%20UN%20Documents/A_54_258.pdf>, accessed23 December 2003.

13 “United Nations International Studyon Firearm Regulations” (UNSFR),United Nations Crime and JusticeInformation Network, Vienna, 1998.The report and updates are available at<www.uncjin.org/Statistics/firearms>.

14 United Nations Human DevelopmentReport 1999, United Nations Develop-ment Programme, New York, 1999.

15 The Brahimi report is officially called“The Report of the Panel on UnitedNations Peace Operations”, UN docu-ment reference: A/55/305 andS/2000/809 of 21 August 2000. It isavailable at <www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations>, accessed 23December 2003.

16 Search performed with Google on 30December 2001.

Ironically, improving UN rapiddeployment has proven to be a slowprocess. We have been at it for morethan a decade with national studies,multinational initiatives, interna-tional commissions, panels ofexperts, even conference workshops.

Yet rather than rapid deploy-ment, by 1997 routine delays of fourto six months became the norm. Bytheir nature, emergency situationsusually require prompt responses.And, earlier this year, a representa-tive from Sierra Leone reminded usabout the consequences of slowresponses, warning that delays oftenfrustrated the combatants, encour-aged re-armament, created securityvacuums, provoked ceasefire viola-tions, and further prolonged armedconflicts.1

Last year, the report of the Inter-national Commission on Interventionand State Sovereignty, The Responsi-

bility To Protect, revitalized widerinterest in the use of force to protectcivilians threatened by genocide andmass ethnic cleansing.2 While helpingto initiate a new international norm,it also raised questions about ‘how’to protect and ‘with what’, establish-ing the need to identify and elaborateupon the alternatives.

Increasingly, we hear of ‘coali-tions of the willing’, of ‘regionalarrangements’ and of ‘mercenaryarmies’ as the new preferences. Thereis little doubt that the ‘internationalcommunity’ will exhaust every dubi-ous option before returning to theone universal institution devoted to

‘saving succeeding generations fromthe scourge of war’. There is also thequestionable notion that the UN can-not handle robust operations or oper-ations that entail authorization forthe limited use of force under Chap-ter VII. Everyone knows that the UNhas had difficulties and several seri-ous failures. The successes are seldomheralded. Yet it is noteworthy thatmany of the recent UN operationshave had a robust composition andoften a mandate authorizing the useof force (East Timor, Sierra Leone,the Democratic Republic of theCongo, Kosovo).

This is not to suggest that thenew EU rapid deployment force orthe NATO rapid reaction forces areto be dismissed; they may be quiteuseful in particular circumstances.At best, however, these are temporary‘stop-gap’ measures, not viable long-term options for preventing, manag-ing or resolving armed conflictsworldwide. Given the universalmembership and wider legitimacy ofthe UN, this paper will argue theUN must be better prepared forassigned tasks in diverse peace oper-ations, including protection ofcivilians.

It is relatively easy to see a rela-tionship between rapid deploymentand the protection of civilians.Almost anything can happen to civil-ians when a deployment is delayed by4 to 6 months. If the objective is toprotect, you need to get the missionin place quickly with a crediblepresence.

Preparing the United Nations for RapidDeployment to Protect Civilians H. Peter Langille, University of Victoria



Once again, speakers at this year’sopening session of the UN SpecialCommittee on Peacekeeping Opera-tions stressed that rapid response wasthe key to saving lives and reducingcosts.3 Secretary-General, KofiAnnan concluded his report to thisyear’s committee urging memberstates to intensify their attention andresponse, particularly in the area ofrapid deployment.4

What is new here? The UN Secre-tariat has fulfilled its share of the bar-gain to modernize and reform. Theonus is now very much on the mem-ber states, particularly those from thewealthier developed world whodemanded the reforms as a precondi-tion to further participation.

Although further, moreambitious changes are required, thereare indications of recent progress andcomplementary reforms.5 Five arenoteworthy.

Recent Progress

First, it is encouraging that the UNDepartment of Peacekeeping Opera-tions— DPKO—has been substan-tively expanded to facilitate planning,management and support. At least,there is a new HQ structure, newoffices and 50% more staff. Thatrecruitment process is now largelycomplete. Since the UNTAEAS mis-sion, wherever both possible and jus-tified, robust deployments have beenthe norm.

Second, already, we hear thatthere are sufficient Strategic Deploy-ment Stocks at UN logistics base,Brindisi to provide the basicinfrastructure and kits for promptstart-up of an operation.

Third, the on-call lists for arapidly deployable military mission

headquarters attracted sufficientresponse to fill each of the 154 posi-tions with at least two nominations.It remains to be seen whether thismodel will provide a coherent head-quarters on short notice. That redun-dancy of personnel listed will likelybe needed.

Fourth, the UN Stand-byArrangement System (UNSAS) hasbeen refined and expanded. As ofFebruary, seventy-five Governmentsindicated their support for this sys-tem, with conditional commitmentsof personnel and equipment listed;conditional as in what the memberstates might provide.

A fourth ‘rapid deployment’ levelfor formed units was added to thesystem last summer to encourageMOUs for self-sustainment and clar-ify contingent owned equipment,largely to assist in movement plan-ning and avoid administrative delays.It is early going, but so far only twocountries, Jordan and Uruguay havecommitted to this level.

Within the standby arrangements,however, there are still shortages ofenabling units and there is still a needfor strategic lift capacity.

The Secretariat has also called formore sophisticated military capabili-ties that can deter and respond tothreats by uncontrolled armedgroups. This is easier for some thanothers, but we already have one rela-tively good model.

Fifth, the SHIRBRIG wasdesigned to complement the UNstand-by arrangement, with a multi-national Stand-by High ReadinessBrigade (SHIRBRIG) for UN opera-tions. It has been operational since1999 and although it has yet todemonstrate rapid deployment, the

intent is to provide the UN withapproximately 5000 troops within15-30 days. There are now 15 mem-ber states participating in both theheadquarters and the brigade pool. Ithas quite broad representation,although it needs to attract more. Itsucceeded in its first traditional mis-sion in Eritrea and Ethiopia and itmanaged a fairly quick exit, if not aquick entry. In December, the partici-pating member states agreed, in prin-cipal, that they would consider morerobust operations on a case-by-casebasis, effectively suggesting a jumpfrom the former stipulation forChapter VI peacekeeping to remainrelevant in the current operations,which often entail authorizationunder Chapter VII for the limiteduse of force.

Would 5000 well-trained, well-equipped troops be enough to make adifference? Of course, it depends onthe scope and scale of the particularconflict, but 5000 is the numberMajor-General Dallaire cited as beingsufficient to stem much of the geno-cide in Rwanda. The British didn’tneed to deploy that many to have acalming influence on the savage vio-lence in Sierra Leone. Arguably, acoherent brigade group could be veryuseful in protecting civilians.

The SHIRBRIG is the mostadvanced mechanism to date for UNpeace operations. However, it willhave to be modified if it is to remainrelevant and ready for new tasks.Given Canada’s current Chairman-ship of the SHIRBRIG, there is aunique opportunity to take a leadrole in preparing military capabilitiesfor the protection of civilians. If it isto be ready for robust operations,including the protection of civilians,



the SHIRBRIG will need to expandits membership and the pool of avail-able resources.

Notably, the Brahimi report (thePanel on UN Peace Operations)encouraged member states to cooper-ate in developing coherent brigadegroups that could be made availableto the UN at short notice.6 To date,the SHIRBRIG is alone. It hasexpressed a willingness to share expe-rience and assistance with others whomight consider a similar partnership.Coalitions in other regions areexploring partnerships to emulatethis model of cooperation (includingthe AU, SEEBRIG, ECOWAS andSADC).

Aside from the political challengeof attracting additional commitmentsand capabilities, a major effort willbe required to address the currentvoid in understanding how toprepare military forces to protectcivilians. At present, there is lack ofappropriate doctrine, tactics, trainingand exercises.

A Preliminary Foundation

Combined, these five related effortsnow provide a basic institutionalfoundation for peace operations. Thisis also a foundation that should facil-itate the establishment of further,more ambitious developments andadditional building blocks. Arguably,if it is to succeed, it will have to.

Potential Limitations

To date, this is not a foundationcapable of ensuring rapid deploymentor the protection of civilians. Why?These arrangements still dependupon political will, prompt nationalapproval and funding, as well asappropriately-trained, well-equipped,

national units—conditions that fre-quently stymie and slow responses.

This is evident in the UNSAS andeven in the SHIRBRIG, which alsodepends upon the political will of theparticipating member states and theirprompt national approval, which inturn is frequently far from reliable.

Repeatedly, even in resolutions ofthe UN Security Council, there arewarnings of a commitment-capabilitygap as numerous Member States con-tinue to deny the UN sufficient per-sonnel, mechanisms and funding.That does not bode well for peaceoperations, for protecting civilians orfor overcoming an increasinglydivided, militarised and risky world.

Further, we all know that formany affluent Western memberstates, the political will to contributedeclined markedly with donorfatigue, fear of casualties and appre-hension over extended commitments,costs and stretched resources.

For example, Canada, which wasformerly a leading troop contributornow ranks about 32nd with just over240 military personnel in UN mis-sions.7 But the problem is systemic.Western defence establishments havea strong preference for the big league,big budget, advanced technology,war-fighting roles and a bias towardcoalition operations with Americanforces. This preference is now alsoreflected in Foreign Affairs, althoughthe new emphasis appears to be onNATO peace operations.

Such preferences are not withoutconsequences. In the past four years,the heavy burden in carrying UNoperations has been quietly shiftedonto developing countries, whichnow provide over seventy percent ofthe personnel for UN peacekeeping.

As a result, there are widespread con-cerns about an increasingly unrepre-sentative, two-tiered system that isfar too selective and slow.

In short, we finally have an insti-tutional foundation for peacekeep-ing; it has improved in the past twoyears with the Brahimi reforms and itmight help speed deployments. Butdue to the preferences of the memberstates, this foundation was predicatedon existing arrangements, not neweffective structures. Hence, there isno guarantee of reliability and noassurance of rapid deployment—irrespective of how desperate theemergency may be and irrespective ofwhat is actually happening to civil-ians.

Renewed interest in a new‘standing’ mechanism?

So the wider challenge remains, asdoes the need for more ambitiousbuilding blocks and new structures.One can cite a long list of politicaland financial impediments, but it isalso apparent that the political envi-ronment is changing rapidly in amanner that might be conducive tothe development of options formerlydismissed as naïve ‘long-shots’.

To cite one example, last month,U.S. Secretary of Defense, DonaldRumsfeld informed a group ofdefense industry leaders in Washing-ton that he was considering the devel-opment of a standing internationalpeacekeeping force.8 This would be amajor departure from the ad hoc sys-tem of requesting national approvalfor national assistance and personnelonce a crisis arises. Unlike the condi-tional and quite unreliable standbyarrangements, a standing force is acoherent formation, maintained in



readiness with pre-trained, wellequipped personnel, available forimmediate deployment once autho-rized.

However, as reported, Rumsfeld’sinitial idea was to have the U.S. toorganize, train and lead this newforce, effectively reallocating respon-sibility for peacekeeping to the Penta-gon, not the United Nations.

Last week, it was also reportedthat President Bush met with UN Sec-retary-General Kofi Annan and theUnder-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, Jean Marie Gue-henno, to discuss, among otherthings, options for global peacekeep-ing and the possibility of training a‘ready cadre’ of people from aroundthe Globe.9

While many may see the Bushadministration’s new interest in astanding peacekeeping force as a des-perate policy reversal, a ‘trialballoon’, if not another diversionfrom current problems, Pentagonofficials claim it is being taken seri-ously, even in discussions with othergovernments.10

If that is the case, officials fromvarious member states may soon geta call requesting assistance, if notadvice. This might provide an oppor-tunity for supportive governmentsand organizations to revitalize widerinterest in other options and indicatesupport, albeit only if the focus is re-directed toward the UN. Fortunately,reports indicate the American admin-istration is still thinking this throughand not yet fixed to a particular pref-erence.

One of the central findings of theCanadian study on developing a UNrapid deployment capability, includ-ing a UN standing force, remains

valid: a force alone may be insuffi-cient.11 As most peace operations arenow complex multidimensional mis-sions, involving military, police andcivilian personnel, there is a need forboth robust security forces and usefulservices that address human needsand provide hope. These must beincorporated in both planning anddeployments at the earliest stages.

A UN Emergency Service

A multidimensional UN EmergencyService—a UN ‘911’ composed ofmilitary police and civilianvolunteers—would correspond tothese diverse operationalrequirements of contemporary, aswell as future UN peace operations.

The model of a UN EmergencyService is projected to require a totalof approximately 13,200personnel.12 This number includes alldeployable elements, base supportand administration, as well as theoperational headquarters. The latterwould be expected to ensure two tac-tical-field headquarters (missionheadquarters) were fully functionaland capable of assuming operationalcontrol over one of the two forma-tions of deployable elements. Thedeployable elements assigned to eachmission headquarters would be iden-tical, including a military brigadegroup, three companies of civilianpolice, as well as civilians skilled indiverse humanitarian, peace-buildingand conflict resolution tasks. Thesevarious elements would be within amodular structure allowing deploy-ments to be tailored to the specificdemands of diverse assignments.Each package could carry a crediblemilitary presence, provide uniquesupport and services, and potentially

fulfill a wide array of tasks.There would be no shortage of

individuals willing to volunteer forservice on a paid, full-time basis, sim-ilar to that of UN civil servants.13

Each would be recruited and selectedon the basis of specific expertise andskills, as well as dedication to theprinciples of the UN. To ensure uni-versal representation, applicantswould be encouraged from all mem-ber states.14

According to Kofi Annan and hisUnder-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping, Jean Marie Guehenno,improving UN rapid deploymentremains a priority task; one the UNand various NGOs are still pursuing,despite a lack of tangible supportfrom governments and foundations.That must change!

In his seminal 1957 study, AUnited Nations Peace Force, WilliamR. Frye provided an insight that isworth recalling: that which is radicalone year can become conservativeand accepted the next”.15 We haveyet to achieve Frye’s objective. Thechallenge remains, as does the urgentneed. We should prepareaccordingly!16

Notes

1 Cited in UN, “Rapid Response By UNKey To Saving Lives And ReducingCosts, Speakers Stress In PeacekeepingCommittee, As General Debate Con-cludes”, Press Release, GA/PK/178,March 4, 2003.

2 See: Report of the International Com-mission on Intervention and State Sov-ereignty, The Responsibility to Protect,(Ottawa: International DevelopmentResearch Centre, December 2001).

3 UN, “Rapid Response By UN Key ToSaving Lives And Reducing Costs…”

4 UN, Report of the Secretary-General tothe General Assembly, “Implementationof the recommendations of the Special



Committee on PeacekeepingOperations”, A/57/711, January 16,2003, para. 92, p. 26.

5 For more detailed analysis, see H. PeterLangille, Bridging the Commitment-Capacity Gap: Existing Arrangementsand Options for Enhancing UN RapidDeployment, (Wayne, NJ: Center forUN Reform Education, 2002).

6 United Nations, Report of the Panel onUN Peace Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, para 115.

7 In Canada, it is noteworthy that peaceoperations have been dropped almostto the bottom of the human securityagenda with officials placing theiremphasis on gender and expert civiliandeployment.

8 See Esther Schrader, “U.S. Looks atOrganizing Global PeacekeepingForce”, Los Angeles Times, June 27,2003.

9 Howard LaFranchi, “Bush may forgenew model for global peacekeeping”,The Christian Science Monitor, July 14,2003.

10 For further analysis of this option see,H. Peter Langille, “A global emergencyforce?”, The Toronto Star, July 4,2003.

11 See, Government of Canada, Towardsa UN Rapid Reaction Capability,Ottawa, September 1995.

12 See Langille, Bridging theCommitment—Capacity Gap, pp. 127-128

13 An excellent review of the argumentsfor and against such a development iswithin, Stephen P. Kinloch, “Utopian orPragmatic? A UN Permanent MilitaryVolunteer Force”, International Peace-keeping, vol. 3, no. 4, Winter 1996.

14 This option was outlined in Towards aRapid Reaction Capability for theUnited Nations. Further elaborationwas provided in H. Peter Langille,Maxime Faille, Carlton Hughes andMajor James Hammond, “A Prelimi-nary Blueprint of Long-Term Optionsfor Enhancing a UN Rapid ReactionCapability”, in Davic Cox and AlbertLegault, (eds), UN Rapid ReactionCapabilities: Prospects and Require-ments, (Cornwallis: Pearson Peacekeep-ing Press, 1995), pp. 179-200. Bothinspiration and ideas were derived fromSir Brian Urquhart, “For a UN Volun-teer Military Force, The New York

Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 11, June1993, pp. 3-4 For an early response tothe Urquhart proposal see: LordRichard Carver, “A UN Volunteer Mili-tary Force: Four Views”, The NewYork Review of Books, vol. XL, no. 12,June 24, 1993.

15 William R. Frye, A United NationsPeace Force, (New York: Oceana Publi-cations, 1957), p. 77.

16 This is an appropriate time for an in-depth, independent, transnational studyto identify the general and specificrequirements for starting, maintainingand operating a UN Emergency Service.This study should provide a review ofdiverse options and assess their poten-tial for addressing probable tasks andcontingencies. It should also offer guid-ance into appropriate composition,structure and organization.

Bella Americana: Some Consequences for theInternational Community Bas de Gaay Fortman, Utrecht University1

The view that the United Nations is“dead” (Richard Perle) is not new.For rigid supporters of internationalpeace enforcement—peace by mili-tary means wherever required—theorganization had served its turnalready in 1956 when it failed to putan end to the Soviet occupation ofHungary. Serious disappointmentswould follow: Tibet, Czechoslovakia,Poland, Afghanistan, East Timor, tomention just a few. The UN’s majorconcern has always been inter-

national security in its prime meaningof the avoidance of war, while all thatrefers to “positive peace”—in thesense of peace with justice—is seen assubservient to that strategic thrust. Itwas only after the end of the ColdWar that some new optimism couldarise regarding a corrective role forthe UN in cases of major aggressionand grossly oppressive regimes; yet,what followed were the disappoint-ing 1990s, that period of missedopportunities.

Strikingly, it is precisely that “ide-alistic” peace enforcement discoursethat is now employed by the so-calledrealists who declare the UN to bedead again. It is true, of course, that

Saddam Hussein constituted a majordilemma to the international commu-nity, as Tony Blair put it to the Houseof Commons. However, in suchdilemmas between human rights,democracy and disarmament on theone hand, and international securityon the other hand, it used to be thelatter that tipped the balance. Thiswas probably in line with the inten-tions of the 51 states that had signedthe Charter of the United Nations on24 October 1945, a more realisticdesign than the “softie” Pact of theLeague of Nations. “Negativepeace”, in other words, wasgrounded in that primary emotionof 1945: Never Again!

Yet, what happened in Iraq can-not be simply interpreted as a victoryof American peace idealists againstthe realism of a Security Council inline with the UN’s founders. Oneshould rather speak of a new type ofrealism, based on unilateral economicinterests—the oil supply to theNorth, for example—and, above all,a unipolar view on power. In the Dec-laration of 7 June 1997, signed bymen like Dick Cheney, Donald Rums-feld and Paul Wolfowitz, this new



American realism had already beenmade explicit. An appeal is made toaccept America’s unique role in theworld and to maintain aninternational order conducive to itssecurity, welfare and principles. In hisState of the Union message of Janu-ary 2002, George W. Bush based hispresidential doctrine on the followingthree principles: active global Ameri-can leadership, regime change in thecase of “rogue” governments andglobal promotion of neo-liberaldemocracy. During the past years theUnited States has acted in conformitywith that line, showing time andagain that they are with the UN onlywhen it suits them. Instances comingto mind include the Kyoto Protocoland the International CriminalCourt. Bypassing the Security Coun-cil in a pre-emptive war fits into alsothat picture. Not surprisingly, the USdealt with the “rogue” issue in theMiddle East. Above all, however, inits forceful opposition to the alreadyheavily weakened Iraqi state, Bushhad an excellent opportunity todemonstrate American supremacy asthe foundation of a new internationalpolitical order. How to assess theconsequences of that “New AmericanCentury” in respect of the UnitedNations, and how to react?

In the search for a new foreignpolicy, e.g. in the European Union,reference is sometimes made to a Pax

Americana. With that term, compar-isons come to mind with the PaxRomana at the start of the first mil-lennium and the Pax Britannica in the19th century. Notably, thesehegemonies served “negative peace”,particularly in the case of the BritishEmpire outside Europe.2 The Ameri-can obsession with “axes of evil” and

regime change, however, primarilyimplies war: a series of Bella Ameri-

cana. Strikingly, since 9/11 the UnitedStates considers itself as being “inwar”.

A first reaction, then, that meritsserious consideration is Tony Blair’sattitude of “If you can’t beat them,join them!” While not his officialpolitical line—which moved from thedangers of weapons of mass destruc-tion deployable within 45 minutes to“just war” against regimes that causetheir own subjects unnecessary suf-fering—it would at least be a strategyone could understand. In the newcentury, American military supre-macy is a fact of life, and the onlyway to contain its consequences withregard to the international politicalorder is to stay within the Atlanticalliance. Unfortunately, however, it isnot the coalition but the mission thatdecides policies (“the mission mustdetermine the coalition, the coalitionmust not determine the mission”3).Illustratively, when Blair seemed toface trouble in his parliament,Defense Secretary Rumsfeld rushedto point out the possibility of “goingit alone”. In Washington today, evenNATO is seen as an impediment tothe necessary flexibility. As for theEuropean Union, “disaggregation”appears to be the core of Americanforeign policy, as a State departmentofficial recently declared.4

The price one pays for the “jointhem” formula is its enhancement ofthe position of the current Americanadministration in the struggle forinternational legitimacy. We aretouching upon a complicated notionhere, and one that in internationaldebate is often overlooked. Evenwhen power is “a fact of life”, it is

still confronted with the need forreception by those affected by its exe-cution. The ruled, in other words,have to accept the rule of the rulers.The new American leadership recog-nizes this; hence the “imbedding” ofjournalists in their war machine. Inour modern world, legitimacy is theinescapable condition for holdingpower without repressing one’s ownpeople. Apparently, the legitimationeffort of the Bush II administrationappears to be focused on a combina-tion of ideological persuasion and anemphasis on outcome: “All ’s wellthat ends well.” However, legitimacyis a matter of three things: the rightprinciples and institutions, the rightprocesses and the right outcomes. Asto the principles, the new Americanleadership no longer recognizes theUnited Nations’ Charter as an Inter-national Constitution. Here, a politi-cal philosophical battle has to befought with all possible force, basedon a combination of realism andmoral conviction. As to the former,world peace through world law5 is,indeed, not yet a fully realized optionand most probably never will be. In aglobal context, formation and execu-tion of power without a solid legalbase remains inevitable. But whereverthat takes place, its objectives andfocus have to be questioned continu-ously, and a real effort has to bemade to incorporate not only politi-cal, but also military and economicpower, in an international legal set-ting. Insofar as global power forma-tion cannot be based on principles ofrepresentative democracy, powersharing constitutes the next bestoption. Essential in this respect is notthe incorporation of primarily “thewilling”, but precisely the incorpora-



tion of opposing forces. Militarypower may, indeed, provide security,but it can also attract danger andnew threats6, as illustrated today inpost-war Iraq. International law, aspositivized in the Charter of theUnited Nations and furtherdeveloped through decades of UNpractice, is based on the primaryprinciple of non-intervention.Notwithstanding the internationalcharacter of human rights obligationsas obligationes erga omnes, humani-tarian intervention cannot be basedon unilateralist action.7 It is the prin-ciple of the rule of law, so vigorouslydefended domestically in the UnitedStates, that have to be extended toglobal forms of governance: limitedgovernment, government by law andrespect for subjective rights, both ofindividuals and of groups.

Fortunately, this political philo-sophical confrontation of the “NewAmerican Century” position, basedas it is on the wrong principles, isalready becoming part of the dailydebate within the United States.Europe, that birthplace of interna-tional law, also has to join in thedebate, refuting the attempts at “dis-aggregation”. International civil soci-ety will doubtless take part, too:watch the coming World SocialForum IV in Bombay, January 2004.For Pugwash International, an inspir-ing role seems an obviousconsequence of our strategic thrust ininternational affairs, with the AnnualConference as a prime opportunity.No less important is the internationalcorporate world. An increasing focuson “corporate responsibility” maywell result in a global interest in thesematters, too: watch the comingWorld Economic Forum in Davos,

January 2004. Genuine universalityexists in market-related rights andvalues, rather than in the fundamen-tal freedoms and entitlements follow-ing from the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights whose quinquennialcelebration is loudly announced everyfive years. The People deficit in thenew triple value approach—People,Planet, Profit—in global businessmight worry the participants at theWorld Economic Forum as much as itdoes the non-governmental commu-nity at the World Social Forum.(Rather urgent, by the way, is theestablishment of structural connec-tions between these two principalglobal fora.)

In respect of global legitimacy, adiscussion of the right principles is agreat deal easier than an examinationof the right institutions. There is a lotof well-founded criticism on the UN,and here it is worth listening to thecurrent American administration aswell. (Evidently, a focus on legitimacyimplies that, in terms of their militarysupremacy, the United States is notnecessarily right, but nor is it neces-sarily wrong.) Inefficient and ineffec-tive bureaucracies, irrelevant discus-sions, and endless proceduresundermine the organization. Thepoint is that the right processes, thenext major element in establishinglegitimacy in the realm of globalpower, are necessarily connected withthe United Nations, and it happens tobe that the UN itself suffers from alack of democratic legitimation in itsdecision-making processes. Thisapplies to the United Nations as such,but also to connected agencies suchas the World Trade Organization. Animpression is created that whateverhas been decided in the upper levels,

corrections downstream are neverpossible. Operational structures willhave to be found to facilitate decentand credible association with civilsociety at both the global and thelocal level. It is true, of course, that intheir exclamation, “Thank God forthe death of the United Nations”,Richard Perle and the likes have to beconvincingly confronted. But thatbattle has to be fought with morethan words alone; it is, indeed, hightime for a revitalization of the UnitedNations in line with its new tasks.Hence, Kofi Annan’s immediate reac-tion on the war that bypassed theinternational community—you stum-ble, you fall, you rise, and then youwalk again—misses the seriousness ofthe current crisis in the internationalpolitical order.8

A revitalization of the UN is to befounded in the three grand projectswith which the organization startedafter World War II: internationalsecurity, human rights and develop-ment. The major challenge today is tocreate an approach that integratesacross these ventures’ three separateinstitutional settings: the SecurityCouncil, with its international politi-cal focus; ECOSOC and the humanrights institutions with their juridicalfocus; and the United Nations Devel-opment Program, the specializedagencies and the Bretton Woods insti-tutions with their economic focus.When the Roosevelt Academy inMiddelburg (NL) gives out its “fourfreedoms awards” it nominates notonly four prize winners for the free-dom of speech, the freedom of wor-ship, the freedom from fear and thefreedom from want, but the Academyalso awards a fifth: for the fourtogether.9



In all three major fields of inter-national governance—internationalsecurity, human rights and develop-ment—a re-engineering seems well inplace. If the current crisis were tocontribute to such an undertaking, itmight even be seen as positive.

Finally, there remains the issue ofoutcome. In the three areas of thisinternational mission, our worldtoday is confronted with hugedeficits. The international securitydeficit expresses itself in endless man-ifestations of intra-state collectiveviolence. Grave instances of completefailure of the international commu-nity come to mind here (Rwanda,Srebenica). The realization of humanrights suffers from a huge deficit too,which is all too often submerged inthe general euphoria over humanrights declarations, conferences, com-mittee meetings and workshops.Despite the International CriminalCourt (confronted by the UnitedStates with its “Hague InvasionAct”), a virtually worldwide strugglehas to be fought against the impunityof state-related perpetrators of civiland political rights. Moreover, otherhuman rights problems continue toexist: there is an apparent lack ofprotection offered to minorities; acontinued public-private divide,which paralyzes the struggle againstdomestic violence; and daily non-implementation of economic, socialand cultural rights in a world inwhich so many people’s basic needsremain denied. There is an enormousdevelopment deficit, too, manifestingitself in gigantic inequalities betweencountries and between people. Inspite of all progress made since theUN’s foundation, these deficits arestill far from being effectively tackled.

Confronting these deficits willrequire a different style ininternational politics at all levels. Thisstyle will need to be tuned to the con-sultation and involvement of people,rather than geopolitical maneuvering,and it will need to deal primarily withthe real threats, such as lack of water,rather than outward manifestationsof power like the possession ofweapons of mass destruction.

Within an international settingtuned to negative as well as positivepeace, a special position for theUnited States, with its impressivepower in terms of military, financialand human resources, will have to beaccepted. Essential in that respect is alegal framework based on a re-engi-neering of international principlesregarding sovereignty and the prohi-bition of violence. To further thisgoal, the old principle of proportion-ality applies: even justified interestsare not to be pursued with means thatresult in disproportionate damage topeople outside the actual conflict.

Obviously, then, in the currentcrisis in the international politicalorder, much more is at stake todaythan just international security in anarrow sense. Indeed, it is not merelya revision of the Security Council anda discussion on the prohibition ofviolence between states that are partof the agenda, but also at stake is therole of the United Nations in conflictprevention. For those working onthat agenda, the realism of the UnitedNations’ founders may offerprofound inspiration, but their idealsmay ultimately prove to be even morecrucial.

Notes

1 Professor of Political Economy ofHuman Rights, Utrecht University;

Emeritus Professor of Political Economy,Institute of Social Studies (The Hague).

2 Cf. W.F. de Gaay Fortman, Recht envrede, in B. de Gaay Fortman (ed.),Christendom en oorlog, Kampen: Kok,1966, pp. 146-147.

3 Quoted by Peter van Ham, Pax Ameri-cana als conservatieve revolutie: gevol-gtrekkingen voor Europa, in Interna-tionale Spectator, Vol. 57, No 7/8,July/August 2003.

4 Quoted by Timothy Garton Ash, “AreYou With Us? Are We Against You?”,in The New York Times, 30th May2003

5 See the magnum opus of GrenvilleClark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peacethrough World Law Cambridge(Mass.): Harvard University Press,1958.

6 W.F. de Gaay Fortman, op.cit., p. 151.7 In case of force majeure (“quod est illic-

itas lege necesitas facit licitum”), theinternational community may legitimizethe action through acquiescence (“quitacit consentire videit”).

8 See Jan Pronk, VS en VN, inRoodkoper, Vol 8, No2, Summer 2003,p. 16.

9 In 2002 that was awarded to NelsonMandela.



Introduction

The end of the Cold War led to vastlyreduced tensions between NATO andthe Warsaw Pact. Yet the new millen-nium has been marked by the contin-uance of NATO—indeed its greatexpansion—as well as increasedAmerican tendencies to resort to uni-lateral and isolationist measures.While many people think of the UNas a fifty-year old institution in needof reform, NATO is also a middle-aged organization in need of reform.Wholesale reform will not work.Reforms must be cumulative, builtgradually on existing foundations.For instance, the decision to inviteLatvia, Lithuania and Estonia intothe alliance was one kind of reform.The establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Council and the NATO-Russia Founding Act were others.But NATO needs a much greatertransformation of its structures and

procedures if it is to serve the com-mon security interests of the alliesand others. Today’s ongoing tumultof change necessitates that traditionalpolicies be seriously reconsideredand, perhaps, drastically reevaluated.As September 11th, 2001 made evi-dent, old ways of thinking no longerapply to the world we live in. Thisarticle suggests strategies to reformNATO in order to enhance nationaland international security.

NATO’s Approach TowardNuclear Weapons

Dangerous American attitudestoward pre-emptive nuclear war

Many Europeans and Canadians fearthat the Bush administration willresort to using nuclear weapons in afuture conflict. Although Russia,China, France, and Britain officiallyretain the use of strategic nuclearweapons, American development ofnew theatre and battlefield nuclear

weapons (including the ‘robustnuclear earth penetrator’) is frighten-ing many because of the US adminis-tration’s apparent willingness toresort to their use. As the Bushadministration declares:

“Given the goals of rogue states

and terrorists, the United States can

no longer solely rely on a reactive

posture as we have in the past. The

inability to deter a potential attacker,

the immediacy of today’s threats, and

the magnitude of potential harm that

could be caused by our adversaries’

choice of weapons, do not permit

that option. We cannot let our ene-

mies strike first….To forestall or pre-

vent such hostile acts the US will, if

necessary, act pre-emptively.”1

The development of nuclearweapons-related technology and pos-sible acquisition by terrorist groupsor “rogue states” means the use ofnuclear weapons seems more ‘credi-ble’ now than it has been since theCuban missile crisis. Whereas it iscertainly true that the Americans can-not sit idly by while their security isundermined, the route they are tak-ing—asserting nuclear credibility—will result in a more insecure worldwith a greater, not less, likelihood ofnuclear war. The Western alliance’sconcepts of nuclear deterrence andnuclear pre-emption must move awayfrom the traditional notion of‘defending’ against threats—such asstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons,rogue states or terrorists—towardsan emphasis on minimal deterrence—and eventually nuclear abolition. Butif the US continues on its present tra-jectory—threatening to respond orpre-empt a nuclear, biological orchemical attack with nuclearweaponry—they will incite an arms

NATO Reform: New Strategies to AdvanceInternational and National SecurityErika Simpson, University of Western Ontario

Bob Lawson and panel on Cooperative Security.



race where states will also seek todeter or pre-empt using new types ofweapons like “enhanced radiationweapons”, “space control satellites”and “nuclear-survivable communica-tions systems.” The costs for theworld will be enormous as countriescompete to design weapons for possi-ble use against undeterrable terror-ists, on rogue-state battlefields or inouter space. As a new statement onnuclear weapons policy issued by theboard of the Nuclear Age PeaceFoundation states:

“It is the US insistence on retain-

ing a nuclear weapons option that

sets the tone for the world as a

whole, reinforcing the unwillingness

of other nuclear weapons states to

push for nuclear disarmament and

inducing threatened or ambitious

states to take whatever steps are nec-

essary, even at the risk of confronta-

tion and war with the United States,

to develop their own stockpile of

nuclear weaponry. In this post-Sep-

tember 11th

climate, the United

States has suddenly become for other

governments a country to be deterred

rather than, as in the Cold War, a

country practicing deterrence to dis-

courage aggression by others.2

Reassessing NATO’s reliance onnuclear deterrence strategy

Curiously, the NATO allies continueto profess their reliance on the strat-egy of nuclear deterrence while theUS moves toward a pre-emptive‘first-strike’ strategy that promises toretaliate with nuclear weapons evenin the event of a ‘limited’ chemical orbiological attack. The situation issimilar to the 1960s when the alliescontinued to rely upon mutualassured destruction (MAD) even as

the US developed ‘flexible response’.3

While NATO recently conducted areview process, its reexamination ofthe Strategic Concept simplyreaffirmed its central tenet—thatnuclear weapons are “essential”.Although NATO decision-makersassert that the “Paragraph 32”process is finished, the door needs tobe re-opened to further engagementon the question.4

We need to remember that effortsto change NATO’s deterrent policycan begin at the nation-state level.The thrust for NATO’s recent reviewessentially began because Canada’sparliament released a report callingfor a re-examination of NATO’sreliance on nuclear deterrence andthe Strategic Concept. 5 The Cana-dian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axwor-thy committed his department toattempt to change NATO’s nucleardoctrine—for which he was oftenlabelled a ‘nuclear nag.’6 Yet in thefinal analysis, even American diplo-mats at NATO headquarters wereimpressed with the Canadian initia-tive and the determination of the For-eign Minister and his diplomaticaides, particularly the DeputyAmbassador Robert McCrae.7 In asimilar fashion, working togetherwith other like-minded countries,such as Germany and Norway, itmight be possible to reforge NATO’snuclear doctrine.

Problems with traditionalassumptions about nucleardeterrence

One of the main assumptions theallies need to ask themselves in theirreforging of doctrine is whethernuclear weapons protect the allianceby deterring potential aggressors

from attacking. During the Cold War,strategists assumed that by threaten-ing massive retaliation, nuclearweapons could credibly prevent anenemy from attacking. September11

thdemonstrated there are no guar-

antees that the threat of retaliationwill succeed in preventing anattack—indeed, it may be difficult toretaliate against a sub-stateopponent, like a terrorist group. Alsotraditional arguments against deter-rence still hold true. There are manyways that deterrence could fail,including misunderstanding, miscal-culation, poor communication, irra-tional leadership, and accident.

But, of course, even if some alliesseriously question the efficacy of rely-ing upon deterrence, there mayappear to be little likelihood thathard-line strategists will come to thesame conclusion, in part because it isdifficult to give up on long-heldassumptions. Will this generation ofNATO decision-makers have to retireor die before the allies can relinquishtheir convictions about deterrence? Ineach of Christopher Columbus’s fourvoyages between 1492 and 1504,Columbus believed that “he hadreached Asia, he was in Asia, and itwas from Asia he returned. No one,nothing, to the day of his death, evermade him relinquish that cherishedconviction.”8

On the other hand, recentevidence indicates that, in the wakeof the September 11th crisis,decision-makers in the highest eche-lons of American decision-making—including President Bush and his clos-est advisors—are coming to doubtthe efficacy of deterrence and try tothink more about this strategy. At aNational Security Council on Octo-



ber 9, Vice President Cheney and Sec-retary of Defense Rumsfeld discussedthe possibility that bin Laden (whomthey referred to as UBL) might haveweapons of mass destruction. “UBLmight not be deterrable,” saidCheney. “Well,” the president said,“sponsoring nations of UBL, thosethat support him, might have someinfluence with him. Should we sendsome messages, private or public?”We need to think some more aboutthis, said Rumsfeld.9 Clearly strongadvocates of deterrence from the‘New Right’, like Bush, Cheney, andRumsfeld, now recognize that deter-rence may fail to work with sub-stateactors and many more alternativesare needed.

Since all the NATO allies dependon a relationship of ‘extended deter-rence’ with the US (even if they pro-fess to be nuclear-weapon free ontheir own soil), it is incumbent uponeach of them to re-examinedeterrence strategy with a view togenerating a cornucopia of alterna-tive strategies ranging from reassur-ance to coercion. Verifiable treaties,well-funded inspection regimes, cut-ting-edge technology, strongsanctions, and enhanced control overfissile materials are needed in everyregion of the world. But historyshows that the first steps towards aregional—then global—approach canbe taken by the leaders of individualnation-states through regional orga-nizations like NATO and the EU.Each NATO ally needs to reconsiderits reliance on extended deterrence inlight of the new types of threats andchallenges the international commu-nity now faces.

NATO in the Aftermath of theWars against Kosovo, Afghanistan,and Iraq

The lack of consensus aboutNATO’s collective securityguarantees

The NATO allies responded swiftlyto the September 11 terror attacks,invoking Article V—the collectivedefence provision—of the 1949Washington Treaty the next day.According the US Department ofDefense’s report on allied contribu-tions, the European allies in NATOdeployed AWACS aircraft to the USby October 9. The UK and Francecontributed support aircraft to the aircampaign over Afghanistan,deployed ground troops inside thecountry before the Taliban was over-thrown, and dispatched naval forcesto the Indian Ocean for maritime sur-veillance/interdiction operations.Other NATO nations, most notablyCanada, Italy, and the Netherlands,also sent naval forces to the IndianOcean; Canada, Denmark, Germany,and Norway deployed special forcesinside Afghanistan; and the CzechRepublic deployed a chemicaldefence unit to the region. TheNATO allies also provided the bulkof the 16-nation International Secu-rity Assistance Force in Kabul.10

Apparently all the NATO allies werein agreement about the necessity of acollective response to the attack onAmerica. But the atmosphere of con-sensus dissipated by March 2003shortly before the US attack on Iraq.

In March 2003, Belgium, France,and Germany imposed a veto on thecommencement of military planningto defend another member state,Turkey, in the event of hostilities withIraq. To date, the effects of the

Franco-German ‘dovishness’ havebeen considerable. For example, theformer members of the Warsaw Pactthat either have joined or hope tojoin the alliance are asking whetherFrance and Germany might be pre-pared to veto NATO counter-measures to help them in the event ofa crisis? These countries are particu-larly dependent on NATO’s collectivesecurity guarantee because they arebeing asked to give up much of their‘all-round’ and ‘outdated’ defensivecapabilities in order to contribute‘specialist’ skills. All the allies need toengage in a discussion about whenand how Article V provisions willprotect them during a crisis.

Coping with Americanheavy-handedness

Another fall-’out of the war againstIraq relates to perceptions of Ameri-can heavy-handedness. US Secretaryof Defense Rumsfeld threatened topull NATO headquarters out of Brus-sels unless Belgium agreed to repeal alaw which gives its courts universaljurisdiction to try cases of genocide,war crimes and human rights viola-tions. While Belgian parliamentariansdid agree to change the law to casesin which either the victim or theaccused were residents of Belgium,war crimes lawsuits had already beenfiled against US President GeorgeBush, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair,US Secretary of State Colin Powell,General Tommy Franks, and Secre-tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.11

The new US propensity tothreaten others with extreme mea-sures is, perhaps, most telling in theUnited States’ recent decision to sus-pend military assistance to sixnations seeking NATO membershipbecause they failed to exempt US citi-



zens from prosecution in the newInternational Criminal Court (ICC).As the deadline passed for govern-ments to sign exemption agreementsor face the suspension of military aid,Bush issued waivers for 22 countriesbut he did not include Bulgaria, Esto-nia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, andSlovenia. It is not yet clear whetherthese countries will sign bilateralwaivers in order to obtain militaryaid; but what is clear is that the Bushadministration is taking a moreaggressive approach than has everbeen seen in NATO corridors. Theallies should respond to aggressivebullying just as schools and matureadults respond—with a heavyemphasis on non-violence andrespectful confrontation.12

New Types of Threats toAllied Security

Reconsidering the Nature of theThreat

NATO needs to reconsider andreevaluate perceived threats to theinternational community. Who isthreatened, by whom, and how? Fora while, the fact that there was nolonger a significant Soviet threatimplied that security could bepreserved at much lower levels ofdefence spending. Now the threatsfrom Slobodan Milosevic, Osama binLaden, and Saddam Hussein have ledto calls for greater defence spending.US President Bill Clinton planned toincrease the defence budget in his lastyear in office by hundreds of billionsof dollars, the largest hike in peace-time history.13 Then in the wake ofSeptember 11, US President GeorgeBush announced his plan to increasethe defence budget in 2003 to $380billion, more than double that of the

rest of NATO combined. By one esti-mate, the US is now spending 45 per-cent more on nuclear weapons activi-ties than at the end of the Cold War.And many American diplomats areeager to lecture Europeans and Cana-dians about the need to increase theirdefence spending.14 The NATO alliesneed to discuss whether Americanplans to increase defence spending tosuch high levels are a greater threatto the world’s security than small-scale tyrants like Saddam.

In any discussion of whether theUS itself now poses the most seriousthreat to allied security, some factsneed to be highlighted. After all, it isbetter to judge a nation by what itdoes, not what it says. The US has yetto take its nuclear arsenal off the highalert status of the Cold War. It hasnot renounced first use of or threat touse nuclear weapons under allcircumstances. It opposes the Com-prehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)and it has withdrawn from the ABMtreaty. Plus it is making plans toshorten the time needed to resumetesting of new and more usablenuclear weapons. The situation issimilar to a boy’s gang where theleader is hell-bent on a dangerouscourse. Do the other boys follow himblindly or do they call a meeting toargue about the club’s rules and prin-ciples? Being a member of the NATOclub does not entail unquestioningallegiance to the club’s leader.

Rather than respond in a knee-jerk fashion to the United States’remonstrations, NATO should imple-ment new kinds of defence prepara-tions that are considered vital toNATO—and concomitantly theinternational community’s—concerns. Governments needs to

think carefully about how they willspend their defence dollars andwhere: Is there any need to preparefor high-intensity conflict, as NATOdid during the Cold War, and stilldoes? When and how should theNATO allies contribute to UN-sanc-tioned mid-intensity conflicts, such asthe Gulf War, or NATO-sanctionedmid-intensity conflicts, such as thewar over Kosovo? What kinds ofAmerican defence preparations inEurope (e.g. in Turkey) might be per-ceived as offensive and provocative,rather than defensive and necessary?

Sharing alternative threatassessments and intelligence

For decades, NATO’s assessment ofthe threat has been shaped and influ-enced by American military threatanalyses. While Prime Minister TonyBlair has been exonerated for takingAmerican intelligence at face value somuch so that he was able to argue,fairly convincingly, in favour ofattacking Iraq, citizens will notaccept this sort of back-handed logicin future wars. In future, domesticpublics will demand to see hard evi-dence of a country’s professed tran-gressions, even if the Americansargue they have the evidence but itcannot be released for security rea-sons. Some of the lessons of the waragainst Iraq are that the NATO alliesneed to undertake more of their ownindependent military threatanalysis.15 They need to institute theinfrastructure and procedures neces-sary to carry out their own indepen-dent threat analyses and share theirfindings. In conjunction with UNmonitoring agencies andinternational watchdog institutes,NATO could unite with like-minded



nations to provide the UN SecurityCouncil with timely and accuratethreat assessments based on newinformation (and possibly conflictinganalyses of the threat). Such alterna-tive threat assessments might play avaluable role in ameliorating tensionsand defusing arms spirals in theweeks and months preceding possiblemultilateral or unilateral actions,such as air strikes.

Promoting an atmosphere ofconciliation through NATO

Naturally, critics will retort that shar-ing intelligence—especially contraryevidence as to the nature of thethreat—will not necessarily harnessthe Bush administration from under-taking pre-emptive or unilateralistmeasures. For many American diplo-mats at NATO, the lessons of theKosovo campaign in 1999 and theFranco-German rebuff in 2003 rein-forced their belief that NATO is fartoo cumbersome and bureaucratic.Now that targets have to beapproved by a consensus of all 25members of the NATO club, “coali-tions of coalitions” may seem morepractical16, as exemplified by theUnited States’ ‘coalition of the will-ing’ in Iraq. Even if one or more ofthe NATO allies puts forward con-tradictory evidence about the natureof the threat, the US and members ofits ‘fast alliance’ may choose not toaccept evidence stemming from alter-native sources. A great deal willdepend on the quality of the intelli-gence and in this respect, the moreindependent European partners inNATO (France, Germany and theUK) could have a lot to offer. NATOheadquarters should inculcate a cul-ture where competing interpretations

of threats are encouraged among the25 allies. On the other hand, such anatmosphere of conciliation andacceptance may take a long time andpatient nurturing. As the DitchleyFoundation concluded in a recent dis-cussion of NATO’s future role:

“Whatever the underlying causes,

most of us agreed that this level of

transatlantic insult had not been seen

before and that it had contributed to

an unnecessary crisis, the effects of

which would be with us for some

time. There was a good deal of bro-

ken crockery about.”17

Threats to North American Security

The decline of the Soviet threat previ-ously meant that the North AmericanAerospace Defence Command(NORAD) was no longer as impor-tant to North American security. Butnow some argue that preparing forpossible warfare in space is necessary,and the US (probably in conjunctionwith Canada) will work throughNORAD to develop space-basedinterception capabilities. In hisannual report released on 10 June,the Chief of Canada’s Defence staff,General Ray Henault, stated thatCanada had a common interest withthe US in developing a missile defencesystem.18 In Europe, concerns havelong been raised about the Europeanallies’ possible contributions to theUS military’s global surveillance,warning, and communications sys-tems.19 As many Europeans havepointed out, the American govern-ment needs to be especially carefulthat it is not perceived to be intentupon erecting some kind of ‘FortressAmerica.’ NATO governmentsshould maintain official positions ofnonparticipation in active missile and

space-based defence programs. Theallies should re-emphasize their com-mitment to the basic tenets of theAnti-Ballistic Missile Treaty(although the US and Russia chose toabandon the ABM Treaty) and workto ensure that aspects of the missiledefense program associated withNORAD do not violate the ABMTreaty’s basic principles.

New Threats and Challenges toNATO and the World’s Security

The Threat of Russian NuclearProliferation

The possibility of Russian nuclearweapons and fissile material fallinginto the wrong hands is great.Desperate conditions exist in nuclearcities and biological institutes acrossRussia. Many weapons scientists andengineers are not being paid. The saleof nuclear weapons, materials, tech-nology, and the flight of nuclear sci-entists to other countries is inade-quately monitoried. A sharp drop inweapons research spending has leftthousands of scientists, engineers,and technicians in near poverty.20

NATO should work with other like-minded states through the Interna-tional Scientific and Technical Center(ISTC) in the former Soviet Union toprovide Russian scientists with morelong-term research grants and pro-grams that promote alternative civil-ian employment.21 NATO shouldalso propose that an internationalregistrar of scientists be set-upthrough the UN to track the researchactivities of all scientists in the world.Similar to the UN Arms Registrar,cooperation would have to be volun-tary (in order to preserve academicfreedom). However, over time such aregistrar could contribute to



increased transparency, openness,and scientific security.

Reinforcing the Nunn-LugarProgram

What can be done through NATO tofurther enhance Russia’s nuclear sta-bility? Much of the problem stemsfrom Russia’s weakness, not itsstrength. NATO should press Russiato continue to centralize control of itsnuclear arsenal and consolidatenuclear weapons on Russian soil.More technological and monetaryassistance for Russia is necessary.Estimates are that only 37 percent ofthe potentially vulnerable nuclearmaterial in the former Soviet Union isbeing adequately protected. TheNATO allies can help with morefunds in order to avoid a nucleartragedy from occurring. They mightalso issue a challenge to other richnations, such as Saudia Arabia andJapan, to contribute substantialamounts. With like-minded nations,NATO could also sponsor anti-leak-age programs at Russian nuclearfacilities. As non-nuclear players,allies such as Belgium, Canada, andthe Czech Republic could beperceived as neutral third parties gen-uinely interested in reducing leakageof information and nuclear materialsfrom Russian nuclear storage andlaunching sites.

North Korea’s Nuclear Program

The announcement by the Democra-tic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) of withdrawal from the NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) was dis-turbing but still more frightening isrecent news that North Korea isdeveloping technology that couldmake nuclear warheads small enough

to be placed atop the country’s mis-siles, which could put Japan at risk.The DPRK claims it decided to with-draw from the NPT “to preserve itssovereignty and defend the countryagainst the continuous moves fromthe USA to isolate it.”22 It wouldappear that this is a conflict betweenthe US and the DPRK which shouldnot concern the other NATO allies(except Canada, which would bewithin range of a threatened nuclearattack by North Korea on Seattle).But the Great Powers (US, Russia,China, UK, and France) and smallerEuropean allies cannot absolve them-selves of responsibility for the presenthair-trigger situation. The failure ofthe nuclear weapon states to imple-ment their NPT obligations underArticle VI of the NPT means manycountries like North Korea have theexcuse they seek to obtain nucleararsenals of their own.

The Threat of ConventionalWeapons Proliferation

The United States is the largest con-tributor in the world to the armstrade and arms trafficking. Comparedto the other Great Powers, it has anover-sized military industry that pro-motes American wares with zeal. TheAsia-Pacific and Middle East regionsare engaged in regional arms racesand eager to obtain Americanweapons systems. Countries likeSaudia Arabia are flush with petro-dollars and demand Americandefence products. American compa-nies such as General Motors, are con-tributing to the worldwide arms racein acquiring conventional weapons.All the NATO allies, particularly theUnited States, need to actively dis-courage their own domestic manufac-

turing industries from seeking mili-tary contracts in the Asia-Pacific andMiddle Eastern regions. Negativeinducements could include the elimi-nation of government subsidies andgrants and the closure of loopholesthat permit tax breaks for researchand development for military pur-poses. Government trade missionsand foreign service officers shouldalso be actively discouraged frompromoting significant military indus-try contracts overseas. Each ally musttake action so as not to become animportant supplier of assemblies,components, and sub-components toarms manufacturers in the UnitedStates.

Future Rounds of NATOEnlargement

Delay Further Rounds of Expansion

The first round of NATO expansiontook place in the spring of 1999without widespread Russianapproval. Although Russian Presi-dent Boris Yeltsin conceded at thelast moment to the idea of invitingthe Czech Republic, Hungary, andPoland into NATO, all the Russianparties and most Russians wereopposed to NATO’s enlargementfrom 16 to 19 nations. The secondround of expansion, agreed upon in2002, also runs the risk of incitingold hatreds and new insecurities. Theseven former Soviet bloc nations dueto join the alliance next year are: Bul-garia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. At25 members, NATO will have diffi-culty forging a consensus and the UShas already expressed interest inworking closely, if necessary, with afew close allies, not the entireunwieldy apparatus.



The alliance should postpone anydecisions about soliciting newermembers (such as Japan23) to avoidfurther tensions with Russia, a strongopponent of NATO expansion andthe air wars against Yugoslavia andIraq. The United States and the otherNATO allies should delay openingthe door to further NATO enlarge-ment until the Russian leadershipconsiders that it is an integral part ofEurope’s emerging securityarchitecture.

Include Russia in NATO

NATO’s first priority should be notto create new dividing lines. Areformed NATO, which did not aimto include the most powerful countryin Europe, Russia, would be fatallyflawed. The NATO allies shouldstrive to engage NATO and Russia inan active, cooperative relationshipthat would form the cornerstone of anew, inclusive security structure inEurope. The allies must act stronglythrough NATO, the UN and othermultilateral institutions, such as theG-8 and the International MonetaryFund, to invite Russia into Westernsecurity and economic structures.

NATO’s air attacks on Serbia,Kosovo, and Afghanistan, make iteven more imperative that the alliancemake a supreme effort to welcomeRussia into European decision-mak-ing circles. During the Kosovo war,Russia suspended all contacts withNATO and took its soldiers in Bosniafrom under NATO command. Rus-sia’s decision to step back frominvolvement in NATO, within hoursof the attack on the formerYugoslavia, indicated that the provi-sions of the NATO-Russia FoundingAct were insufficiently attractive for

Russia to remain engaged in discus-sions at Brussels. Russia needed moreincentives and more reassurances.Then during the war on Afghanistan,Russia supported the US war againstterrorism. But the recent controversyabout attacking Iraq revealed that,even despite its desperate need for USfunding, Russia was against attackingIraq without the UN Security Coun-cil’s approval. The US went ahead,despite opposition from Russia,China, Canada, and a host of othercountries. It is still too early to saywhat the damage has been but evi-dently Russia needs to be consulted,not ignored. More incentives couldinclude formally embedded consulta-tion mechanisms, a mutual non-aggression pledge, and a promiseto develop non-offensive defencesystems.

The NATO Allies’ Approachestoward Worldwide DefenceSpending

Maintain Low Levels of DefenceSpending

Since 1997, high-level Americans,such as the US Ambassador toCanada, have repeatedly emphasizedthe need for other NATO members toincrease overall military spending.24

Overall, the non-US NATO membersspent an average of 1.9 percent ofGDP on defence in 2001 ascompared to 2.0 percent in 2000.The Czech Republic, France, Greece,Italy, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, andthe United Kingdom ranked at orabove this average. All other 11NATO members fell below this aver-age, highlighting that Americanremonstrations to spend more arefailing to convince.

For example, Germany is making

drastic cuts in equipment and slim-ming down its organizational struc-tures; its focus has switched to peace-keeping, crisis management, and thewar against terrorism, rather thandefending itself from Cold Warattacks. On the other hand, Canadahas recently increased its defencespending on capital and equipmentsharply. Although Canada’s continu-ing fiscal problems, and its prom-inent role as a proponent of disarma-ment, should constrain its spendingon defence, the country is setting apoor example which other statescould follow. Increasing defencespending is not an option for respon-sible policy-makers.

Many European defence lobbyistsbemoan the continent’s low level ofspending on defence but domesticpublics will not tolerate higher levelsof spending. The newer allies willhave a tough time coming up withthe money to bring their militaries upto NATO’s basic standards of inter-operability.

One defence official noted thatHungary promised to meet 14 of itsinitial 48 goals by its acceptance inMarch 1999 but as of June 2000 hadcompleted only six. “The reason isnot our commitment; the reason ismoney,” that official said.25 Taking astrategic view, however, Hungary’sgeographic location allows NATO toproject into Eastern Europe, andHungary has played an active role inthe Bosnia and Kosovo operations asa host nation supporting NATO’sdeployments and logistics. Similarly,Poland is playing a useful role incharge of NATO’s peacekeeping mis-sion in Iraq. At a meeting in Brusselsin June 2003, Spain and Ukraineeach committed to head a brigade of



an 8,000-strong multinational divi-sion to help stabilize Iraq, which willbe led by Poland with NATO’ssupport.

Calculate each ally’s defencespending fairly

In forthcoming analyses of the allies’abilities to meet an agreed-upon setof capabilities pledges—the “PragueCapabilities Commitments”—thenewer NATO allies need to factorinto the equation alternative sorts ofcommitments (e.g. to UN andNATO-sponsored peacekeeping)because they also improve thealliance’s military preparedness andclose the spending gap between theUS and its European allies. Even theEU’s efforts to field a rapid-reactionforce of 60,000 personnel by 2003should count as a monetary contribu-tion to NATO’s security. After all, UScalculations of their percentage ofGDP spent on NATO include all USdefence spending worldwide—includ-ing US spending in the Middle Easton defence and American foreign mil-itary assistance to Columbia—so itmakes sense to silence critics ques-tioning whether NATO’s Europeanmembers have the will to deliver ontheir spending promises by askingNATO officials to calculate spendingestimates on all types of defenceexpenditures. Individual countriesshould also consider threatening tohalt payment for the costs of NATOenlargement until the United Statesagrees to its fair share of assessed UNdues. If high-level American officialsadmonish the allies for reducedspending on defence, Europeans andCanadians should remind them of theUnited States’ failure to pay its UNdues fully.

NATO’s Approach towardPeacekeeping

NATO overhaul emphasizes rapidlydeployable capabilities

Most of the NATO allies, includingthe United States, are participatingmore heavily in peacekeeping underNATO auspices than in the past.NATO foreign ministers announcedtwo new missions this year:commanding the International Secu-rity Assistance Force in Afghanistanand assisting in Poland’s command ofa NATO-supported peacekeepingforce in Iraq. NATO is also improv-ing its ability to act far beyondEurope and North America througha major restructuring that includescutbacks at NATO headquarters inBelgium and a stronger presence inthe United States. A new commandcentre in Norfolk, Va will overseethis modernization. More robust,rapidly deployable capabilities willchange NATO into “a much morenimble, deployable, action-orientedorganization.” According to Cana-dian Defence Minister John McCal-lum, such a “major streamlining” is“a cultural change that will besignificant.”26

The most significant changeaffects NATO operations, whichwere formerly divided between aEuropean and an Atlantic command.The two will be merged under AlliedCommand Operations, based in Bel-gium and under the authority of USGeneral James Jones. A new entitycalled “Allied Command Transfor-mation” is also being created tosupervise changes to NATO’s mili-tary capabilities, including efforts atjoint training between alliance mem-bers. The most significant develop-ment will be a 20,000-strong ‘NATO

Response Force,’ ready to deploywithin days after its creation in 2003.

At the same time as these peace-keeping initiatives are being planned,the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR)is contributing between 25,000 and32,000 alliance and non-alliancetroops. The Stabilization Force(SFOR, formerly IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina includes about 13,000NATO and non-NATO troops.Finally, NATO members have beenpatrolling the Eastern Mediterraneansince the terrorist attacks of 2001, amission called Operation ActiveEndeavour.

But the risk is that as NATOinvolves its allies in more “out-of-area” operations, similar to Kosovo,Afghanistan, and Iraq, the rest of theworld will come to perceive NATOpeacekeepers as defenders of theAmerican empire. There needs to bea return to the UN as the chief guar-antor of safety because of the wide-spread perception that the ‘NATOclub’ consists mainly of Northern,‘rich’, ‘white’ nations based in NorthAmerica and Europe.

Return to the UN with increasedfunding and contribute to theSHIRBRIG

The UN continues to experience afunding crisis due to member states’failure to honour their financialobligations. Member states of theUN invest an average of $1.40 inUN peacekeeping activities for every$1000 spent on their own armedforces. For example, for every dollarthat it has invested in UN peacekeep-ing, the United States has tended tospend over $2000 on its ownmilitary.27 The NATO allies need tocontribute more money and person-



nel to UN peacekeeping or run therisk of being accused of trying tomaintain the status quo throughNATO peacekeeping. One effectiveway to do this would be to contributestand-by forces and equipment to theUN’s Standby High ReadinessBrigade (SHIRBRIG). Fifteen coun-tries are contributing to the brigade,which successfully monitored theceasefire between Eritrea andEthiopia, but more contributors andresources are needed. SHIRBRIGaims to provide the UN with a jump-start, rapid deployment force of asmany as 5,000 troops within 30 daysnotice.28 While NATO’s new ‘RapidReaction Force’ will be perceived asUS-led and status-quo oriented, eachparticipating state in SHIRBRIGreserves the right to decide whetherto deploy national personnel on acase-by-case basis. Canada currentlyholds the chair and presidency of thebrigade. And there is some hope thatit could be deployed to avert geno-cide in the Democratic Republic ofthe Congo.29

Improve NATO’s PeacekeepingTraining

NATO could do more to help mem-ber states adjust to their peacekeep-ing responsibilities. Peacekeepingduties now include the monitoringand administration of elections, pre-ventive deployment, humanitarianand human rights functions, theenforcement of UN Security Councilresolutions, and nation-buildingmandates. The burden of peacekeep-ing for NATO has dramaticallyincreased and many NATO allieshave valuable experience and knowl-edge that could be used to reshapeNATO and other multilateral institu-

tions in the new era. However,NATO’s institutions and peacekeep-ing infrastructure remain much thesame as they were during the ColdWar, despite the explosion of newoperations. The promising concept ofthe Lester B. Pearson Canadian Inter-national Peacekeeping Training Cen-tre in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia mustbe fully developed and implementedas its original architects intended.30

The Pearson Peacekeeping TrainingCentre is currently only a shell ofwhat it could be. The Chretien gov-ernment arguably implemented itpurely for electoral purposes, not tomake real changes to the military’sapproach to peacekeeping. TheCanadian government must ensurethat the Pearson Peacekeeping Train-ing becomes widely regarded as oneof the best peacekeeping training cen-tres in the world, an invaluableresource for the Canadian Forces,NATO, and peacekeepers worldwide.It must become a centre of learningfor all ranks—not just a place forofficers and civilians to share peace-keeping ideas and experiences.

Conclusion

NATO has limited time and a smallwindow of opportunity to takeadvantage of its fairly benign reputa-tion. It is highly unlikely that thisregional military alliance will be seenin such a positive light ten years fromnow. Indeed, NATO is well-situatedto make the important changes pro-posed thus far in this article becausethe NATO allies did not acquiesce toAmerican pressure to join the war onIraq. It was evident from France,Germany, and Canada’s reluctance tojoin the war that not everyone couldagree on the best methods and most

efficient means of achievingcommonly-valued objectives, includ-ing the ouster of Saddam Hussein.One important lesson is that everyNATO ally—not just the currenthegemon—have a duty and responsi-bility to put forward new ideas andproposals to enhance internationaland national security. As ProfessorJames Eayrs suggested over thirtyyears ago in Fate and Will in Foreign

Policy:“Force is the monopoly of the

Great Powers, for all the good it does

them. But Great Powers enjoy no

monopoly over ideas. The foreign

minister of a small state may not be

able to summon a gunboat in aid of

his diplomacy, to carry a big stick let

alone to brandish it. But he can carry

a briefcase well enough, and stock it

with proposals.”31

Notes

1U.S. National Security Strategy: PreventOur Enemies From Threatening Us,Our Allies, And Our Friends withWeapons of Mass Destruction, Septem-ber, 2002, p. 1 available atwww.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15425.htm

2“The Challenge of Nuclear Weapons inthe Twenty-First Century: A Path For-ward,” June 15, 2003,http://waginpeace.org/articles/03.06/0613kireger_21centruy.htm

3For more information, see Erika Simp-son, NATO and the Bomb: CanadianDefenders Confront Critics, (Kingston& Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Univer-sity Press), 2001, ch. 3

4For further analysis, see PugwashCanada’s presentation to DFAIT, “TheOnly Absolute Guarantee”, April 2003,pp. 4-6

5Report of the Standing Committee onForeign Affairs and InternationalTrade, “Canada and the Nuclear Chal-lenge: Reducing the Political Value ofNuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First



Century,” (Ottawa: Publications Ser-vice), December 1998.

6Senator Douglas Roche, Chairman,Canadian Pugwash Group and ErnieRegehr, Executive Director, ProjectPloughshares, “Canada, NATO andNuclear Weapons,” Toronto, March17, 2001, available at http://www.sen.parl.gc.ca/droche/writings/documents/nuclear/cannatonw.pdf

7Interview by the author with Canada’sDeputy Ambassador to NATO, RobertMcCrae, February 2001 and off-recordcomments by senior members of the USDelegation to NATO, February 2001.

8Quoted in David Campbell, WritingSecurity: United States Foreign Policyand the Politics of Identity, Minneapo-lis: University of Minnesota Press),1992 p. 93. For more information onthe powerful impact of belief systemson decision-making, see Erika Simpson,NATO and the bomb, chs. 3 & 5.

9Bob Woodward, Bush at War, p. 22810 US Department of Defense, “Report on

Allied Contributions to the CommonDefense, Chapter I Executive Summary,available athttp://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2002/02-Chptr1/02-Chptr_tx.html

11For more information, see TheSunflower, July 2003, No. 74; NewYork Times, 14 June 2003; Wall StreetJournal, 13 June 2003

12Barry and Janae Weinhold, “America ata Crossroads: How Should WeRespond to Terrorism?” The ColoradoInstitute for Conflict Resolution andCreative Leadership, September, 2001,available at http://weinholds.org/terror.htm

13AP Online, “Clinton would boost Mili-tary Money,” 19 January 1999.

14Ambassador Gordon D. Giffin, “TheChallenges of Shared Security,”Remarks to the Canadian Club ofMontreal, 11 January 1999;

15A similar recommendation was made in1999 by Canada’s Special Senate Com-mittee on Security and Intelligence,“The Report of the Special Senate Com-

mittee on Security and Intelligence,”January 1999, p. 53-56.

16According to US Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld and Secretary of StateColin Powell in Bob Woodward, Bushat War, p. 49

17The Ditchley Foundation’s News andConference Reports, Report by theDirector, “The Future Role of NATO”,February 21-23, 2003, p. 1, available athttp://www.ditchley.co.uk/news/13.htm

18Ottawa Citizen, 11 June 200319Ann Denholm Crosby, “Defining Secu-

rity Environments for Global Gover-nance: Canada and the US ‘Global Pro-tection System’,” Global Governance,4, 1998, p. 331-353.

20For example, see “Science in Russia:The diamonds in the rubble,” TheEconomist, 8 November 1997 athttp://www.istc.ru/n10.htm

21Susan Eisenhower, “The Proliferationof Russian Know-How,” The Washing-ton Post, 16 January 1998; p. A21 athttp://www.istc.ru/n12.htm. See alsoVictor Alessi and Ronald F. Lehman II,“Science in the Pursuit of Peace: TheSuccess and Future of the ISTC,” ArmsControl Today, June/July 1998 athttp://www.istc.ru/n14.htm

22See http://www.korea-dpr.com/npt.htm23The notion of accepting Japan into the

alliance surfaced in 1997. Part of theappeal is that Japan spent 1 percent ofits GDP on defense in 2001, however itsdefence budget was second only to theUS in absolute terms. While Japan’shistory and constitution have limitedthe size of its defence forces anddiscouraged their deployment abroad,Japan ranked second of all countries incost sharing, offsetting 79 percent of USstationing costs in 2000. See US Depart-ment of Defense, “Report on AlliedContributions to the CommonDefense,” 2002, p. 4

24For example, see; “US Ambassadorslams Canada’s Defence Budget, Sep-tember 4, 2002, available athttp://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20020904/cellucci_defense_020903/Canada/story/

25 Integrating New Allies into NATO,”October 2000, Ch. 3, Restructuringand Modernization, p. 3, available athttp://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?idex=2665&sequence=4

26Daniel Leblanc, “NATO overhaulboosts U.S. role,” June 13, 2003

27Roger Coate, ed., US Policy and theFuture of the United Nations, (NewYork: Twentieth Century Fund Press,1994), 12.

28Howard Peter Langille, Bridging theCommitment-Capacity Gap: A Reviewof Existing Arrangements and Optionsfor Enhancing UN Rapid DeploymentCapabilities (United States: Centre forUN Reform Education), August 2002

29Howard Peter Langille, “Don’t shrugoff the next Rwanda,” Globe and Mail,May 27, 2003

30 Common Security Consultants, [H.Peter Langille and Erika Simpson], A1994 Blueprint for a Canadian andInternational Peacekeeping TrainingCentre at CFB Cornwallis, (Halifax:Government of Nova Scotia, 1994),106 p., reprinted in Minutes ofProceedings of the Special Joint Com-mittee of the Senate and the House ofCommons on Canada’s Defence Policy,issue no. 21, June 14 1994, p. A1-123

and see Common Security Consultantsand Stratman Consulting Inc.[Brigadier-General Clayton Beattie],CFB Cornwallis: Canada’s Peacekeep-ing Training Centre—A Blueprint for aPeacekeeping Training Centre of Excel-lence, (Halifax: Government of NovaScotia, 1992), 70 p., reprinted in Min-utes of Proceedings of the StandingCommittee on National Defence andVeterans Affairs, issue no. 45, 1 April1993.

31 James Eayrs, Fate and Will in ForeignPolicy, (Toronto: Seven talks for theCanadian Broadcasting Corporation),1967, p.84.

Erika Simpson is Associate Professor

of Political Science at University of

Western Ontario.



The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan inlate 1979 turned out to be—contraryto the expectations of the Kremlinleadership—the largest, longest, andcostliest military operation in Soviethistory. The United States, in supportof the Afghan resistance, waged anexceedingly elaborate, expensive, andultimately successful covert war.Unlike other proxy wars in Africaand South America, for the first timeever, the United States supported aguerrilla army firing on Soviettroops. With Pakistan’s General Zia-ul-Haq as America’s foremost allyand Saudi Arabia as the principalsource of funds, the CIA openlyrecruited Islamic holy warriors fromEgypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan andAlgeria. Radical Islam went intooverdrive as its superpower ally andmentor funneled support to themujahiddin. In 1988 Soviet troopswithdrew unconditionally and US-Pakistan-Saudi-Egypt allianceemerged victorious. A chapter of his-tory seemed complete.

Appearances were illusory, how-ever, and events over the next twodecades were to reveal the true costsof the victory. Even in the mid 1990’s—long before the 9/11 attack on theUnited States—it was clear that thevictorious alliance had unwittinglycreated a dynamic now beyond itscontrol. The network of Islamic mili-tant organizations created primarilyout of the need to fight the Soviets inAfghanistan did not disappear afterthe immediate goal was achieved but,instead, like any good military-indus-trial complex, grew from strength to

strength. It now exists with extensivetransnational cooperation, coordina-tion, and close ties. Indeed these non-state actors have repeatedly targetedtheir former sponsors, as well asother states and governments glob-ally—Pakistan, India, Egypt, SaudiArabia, Philippines, Indonesia, Rus-sia, and the United States have beenattacked in recent times.

Prologue To The Soviet Invasion

Building upon the crumbled edifice ofEuropean colonialism, the UnitedStates had emerged as a superpowerat the end of the Second World Warwith vast global strategic andeconomic interests. Desolate andtribal, Afghanistan was of only mar-ginal interest. Although there weresome attempts to increase US influ-ence through economic aid in theearly 1950’s this dry, mountainousand barren land was understood tohave no significant strategic or eco-nomic value. Indeed, there had beenimplicit acceptance of Afghanistan asbelonging to the Soviet sphere ofinfluence. For example, in the Eisen-hower era, Secretary of State JohnFoster Dulles had turned downAfghan requests for American arms.Moreover it placed high value uponPakistan, a key US ally in the fightagainst communism, and saw no rea-son to offend it. Pakistan had—andstill has—a simmering border disputewith Afghanistan over the legitimacyof the “Durand Line” by whichBritish colonialism had rather arbi-trarily divided the two countries.

Because of its geographical prox-

imity, the Soviet interest inAfghanistan was greater. Aid toAfghanistan—motivated both byideals of internationalist solidarityand the desire to increase politicalinfluence—became of considerablesignificance during the first decade ofthe Cold War. By 1956, Afghanistanpossessed Mig-17s, Ilyushin-28s, andT-34 tanks. Suspicions of Sovietdesires to install a socialist regime inAfghanistan were sometimes aired inthe West. But, as a highly fragmentedIslamic tribal society, Afghanistanappeared a highly unlikely candidatefor socialism. Tribal law and tradi-tions held sway, making it impossiblefor Afghanistan to function as a mod-ern nation state. There was neither aproletariat, nor a feudal system in theusual sense. Even today cave-dwellersare common in Afghanistan. Thesubsistence economy provided nomarket of any interest.

Significant changes, with Sovietsupport, began occurring in theperiod of Sardar Muhammad DaudKhan who served as the prime minis-ter of Afghanistan 1953-1963. Thefirst Afghan university wasestablished in Kabul, and in parts ofthe country a small start was madeon public education. Daud’s brother-in-law, Muhammad Zahir Shah, hadbeen the King of Afghanistan since1933. In 1963, he suddenly dismissedDaud. Ten years later, Daud staged acoup, returned to power, and abol-ished the monarchy. Zahir Shah wasexiled to Rome (from where he even-tually returned after the 9/11 attack).Daud was supported by some Armyofficers who later joined the AfghanCommunist Party, and by BabrakKarmal, a leftist politician. (Six yearslater, when the Soviets invaded, they

Afghanistan and the Genesis of Global Jihad Pervez Hoodbhoy, Quaid-e-Azam University



installed Karmal as President ofAfghanistan.) By all accounts, theKremlin leadership was entirely satis-fied with the state of affairs in theearly years of Daud’s rule. Sovietinfluence grew, and the Soviet Unionbecame Afghanistan’s leading tradingpartner as well as its leading armssupplier.

By abolishing the monarchy, how-ever, Daud had removed the one sym-bol of legitimacy that had heldAfghanistan together and establishedthe idea of seizing political powerthrough a military coup. A smallMarxist party, The People’s Democ-ratic Party of Afghanistan, under theleadership of Nur MuhammadTaraki, was to carry this traditionmuch further. From its inception thePDPA was bitterly divided into twofactions, each named after its respec-tive newspaper. Taraki’s “Khalq” fac-tion was made up mostly of Pushtunsfrom rural areas but it aspired to be aLeninist working-class party. BabrakKarmal’s “Parcham” presented itselfas a broad national democratic frontready to work within the system.

Hafizullah Amin, an instructor at theTeachers’ Training School in Kabul,had just received an M.A. at TeachersCollege of Columbia University inNew York. He was described bysome as “all charm and friendliness”but ultimately was directly responsi-ble for the execution of probably6000 political opponents. BabrakKarmal also had a devoted disciple—a former medical student namedNajibullah. In each case, the discipleousted his patron in order to assumethe presidency of Afghanistan. Todaythey are all dead.

In 1978, despite bitter divisions,the PDPA was able to pull togetherenough unity to engineer a coupagainst Daud. The Soviet Union,which was watching the Shah ofIran’s overtures to Daud, had becomewary of Daud and saw a determinedeffort to draw Afghanistan into a US-tilted regional and economic sphere.It endorsed the coup but controllingthis most unorthodox CommunistParty was a nearly impossible task,because its leadership was seriouslydivided, with Karmal challengingTaraki for power from the verybeginning. At the time of the coup, atleast a third of the Afghan Army’sofficer corps was Soviet-trained. Nev-ertheless, nobody in power, inAfghanistan or outside it, foresaw thecoup. Taraki boasted that the news ofour revolution took both superpow-ers by complete surprise.

By a series of decrees, the PDPAset out to change Afghan society. Tobe sure, many of the reforms hadhonorable intent. For example, childmarriages were declared illegal andthe minimum marriageable age forgirls was set at 16. The purchase andsale of women, sanctioned by tribal

law, was deemed an offence, as werebarter marriages. Female educationwas declared compulsory. Thesereforms were to end tragically, butthe reason was not just the conser-vatism of Afghan society. From thevery beginning, the PDPA pursued adisastrous course calculated to pro-voke resistance among the people.Taraki’s name occurred repeatedlyduring a radio or TV broadcast withludicrous titles appended to it, hishouse was turned into a “revolution-ary shrine”, and his shoes, pens, andinkpots were put on display. The tra-ditional Afghan flag with colors ofIslam was replaced with a red banner.Inexperienced and imperious bureau-crats from Kabul infuriated the peas-ants by enforcing clumsy “land-reform”. It was almost as if therevolutionary leaders had decided, inthe name of progress, to outrageevery segment of Afghan society.

By the winter of 1978-79,Afghanistan was up in arms againstthe communists. In the fall of 1978,supported by Pakistan, the Islamic-fundamentalist guerrilla groups thathad operated against Daud between1973 and 1976 reenteredAfghanistan with a force of aboutfive thousand. There followed majorarmed rebellions, which theconscripts in the Afghan Army wereunable to put down. Many of them,horrified at being asked to kill theirown kin, joined the resistance, bring-ing their weapons with them. Units ofthe Afghan Army in the provincialcapital of Asadabad defected enmasse. In March of 1979, an uprisingbroke out in Herat, an ancient citynear the Iranian border populated byShiites, who were enthralled by theKhomeini revolution. These pro-Iran-

Mohamed Kadry Said and panel on HumanSecurity and the Middle East.



ian rebels went from house to houselooking for government collaboratorsand Soviet advisers. About a thou-sand people, including a number ofSoviet advisers and their families,were killed; in reprisal, parts of thecity were destroyed. In June of 1979,Tehran Radio broadcast the appeal ofa senior ayatollah calling upon thepeople of Afghanistan to rise upagainst the Communists. The Shiitepopulation of the Hazarajat regionstaged another uprising.

As detailed in Raja Anwar’s semi-nally important book ”The Tragedyof Afghanistan”, Soviet efforts to reg-ulate Afghan affairs succeeded onlyin worsening the situation. On Sep-tember 4, 1979, Anwar reports,Taraki left for a visit to Havana, andin his absence one of his supportersdrew up plans to assassinate Amin.However upon Taraki’s return from avisit to Moscow, Amin ordered tanksinto all key points in Kabul and hadTaraki arrested and confined to hisquarters. Three weeks later, thefounder of Afghanistan’s revolution-ary party was murdered, on Amin’sorders. Though Amin moved quicklyto placate the opposition, mostly bypromising religious freedom, andthough he was given increasingSoviet military help, he could neitherput down the insurgency nor winwider political support. He turned todiplomacy to relieve the pressure,courting both Pakistan and theUnited States. Yet at the same time hekept asking for more Soviet militaryaid. By July, there were fifteen hun-dred Soviet military advisers assignedto the Afghan Army, and a Sovietlight-airborne battalion was deployednear Kabul for their protection. Inlate November, Amin asked the Sovi-

ets to bring in ten thousand soldiersto protect Kabul, so that he couldfree Afghan forces to attack therebels in the countryside.

The Soviets Invade

In December 1979, Soviet troopscrossed the Afghan frontier and, forthe first time since the end of the Sec-ond World War, forcibly entered theterritory of a sovereign Muslim coun-try. The overriding reason for theinvasion was that the civil strifeinside Afghanistan was viewed in theKremlin as “a seat of serious dangerto the security of the Soviet state” asLeonid Brezhnev put it two weekslater. Afghanistan has a thousand-mile border with the Muslim CentralAsian republics of the Soviet Union,which are populated by Tajiks,Uzbeks, and Turkmens peoples thatalso inhabit Afghanistan. In 1978,there had been a riot of Tajiks againstthe Russians in Dushanbe, a town onthe Soviet side of the frontier. Towardthe end of 1979, the Khomeini revo-lution in Iran was stirring up Islamicnationalism in the entire region, andthe taking of American hostages atthe American Embassy in Tehran onNovember 4th increased the possibil-ity of American military actionagainst Iran within a few hundredmiles of the Soviet border.

An extraordinary meeting of 35Islamic countries met in Islamabadon January 27, 1980 to condemn the“Soviet military aggression againstthe Afghan people” and to urge thatno Muslim country recognize theDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan—the name given by the Soviet-installed government in Kabul. But,pointing to the disunity in the Arabworld, and to its long-standing sup-

port for the Palestinian struggle, theSoviet Union blunted the criticismsubstantially. Four months later thedenunciations began to fade. Thiswas understandable because manyArab countries had strong militaryand economic ties with the SovietUnion.

Reactions in the United Stateswere much harsher. Many US com-mentators believed the invasion wasthe first move in a grand strategicplan aimed at expanding Sovietpower. President Carter quicklyaccepted the judgment of hisnational-security adviser, ZbigniewBrzezinski, that the invasion was athreat to the rest of the region. Carterdeemed the Soviet invasion as “thegreatest threat to peace since the Sec-ond World War,” and on January 23,1980, he announced a policy thatcame to be known as the Carter Doc-trine: “An attempt by any outsideforce to gain control of the PersianGulf region will be regarded as anassault on the vital interests of theUnited States of America, and suchan assault will be repelled by anymeans necessary, including militaryforce.” US experts declared thatLeonid Brezhnev had taken up Peterthe Great’s quest for a warm-waterport and may next break throughlandlocked Afghanistan to arriveeventually at the Persian Gulf byinvading either Pakistan or Iran.Afghanistan now became a metaphorfor the Soviet Union’s boundlessappetite and unpredictable behavior.

America Organizes The Great Jihad

History may well have taken a differ-ent course if the year of the Sovietinvasion had not also been the yearfor presidential elections in the US.



But with Ronald Reagan as the rivalcandidate, Jimmy Carter could notafford to appear soft on the Soviets.Angrily condemning Soviet expan-sionism, Carter withdrew the SALT IItreaty from consideration by the Sen-ate, announced that the United Stateswould boycott the MoscowOlympics, and prepared a major mili-tary buildup, which included a RapidDeployment Force, intended primar-ily for the Persian Gulf. The Adminis-tration requested approval for aC.I.A. covert operation inAfghanistan, and offered Pakistanfour hundred million dollars in aid,which General Zia-ul-Haq, Pakistan’smilitary ruler, dismissed as “peanuts”in an astute political move. Suddenly,Afghanistan had become the focalpoint of American global strategy.

From the day the Soviets invaded,American diplomatic strategy was tomobilize world opinion against theSoviets. American ire was arousednot out of sympathy for the particu-lar victim but by the act of aggressionitself and what it portended for thefuture. Afghanistan was doomed tobe a domino. Officials like RichardPerle, Assistant Secretary of defense,saw Afghanistan not as the locale ofa harsh and dangerous conflict to beended but as a place to teach the Rus-sians a lesson. Such “bleeders”became the most influential people inWashington.

Given the highly conservativenature of Afghan society and thespontaneous resistance to the Afghancommunist resistance, it did not needa genius to suggest that Islamic inter-national solidarity could be used as apowerful weapon. The task of creat-ing such solidarity fell upon SaudiArabia, together with other conserva-

tive Arab monarchies. This duty wasaccepted readily and they quicklymade the Afghan Jihad their centralcause. It was a natural course ofaction to take. First, they feltgenuinely threatened by the Soviets.Second, it shielded their patron andally, the United States, whose directconfrontation with the Soviets wouldhave been dangerous and unwise in anuclear-armed world. But still moreimportantly, to go heart and soul forjihad was crucial at a time whenSaudi legitimacy as the guardians ofIslam was under strong challenge byIran, which pointed to the continuedoccupation of Palestine by America’spartner, Israel. An increasing numberof Saudis were becoming disaffectedby the House of Saud—itscorruption, self-indulgence, repres-sion, and closeness to the US. There-fore, the Jihad in Afghanistan pro-vided an excellent outlet for thegrowing number of militant Sunniactivists in Saudi Arabia, and a wayto deal with the daily taunts of theIranian clergy.

Support for the Mujahideen alsofitted perfectly with the Reagan Doc-trine—a global package of widelypublicized covert aid for anti-Com-munist guerrillas fighting the estab-lished governments in Nicaragua,Angola, Kampuchea, andAfghanistan. Now the United Statesdecided to play in the global game ofguerrilla politics and to do what theSoviets had done in the sixties andseventies when they had encouragedwars of national liberation. The USwould henceforth do the same bysponsoring right-wing guerrillamovements in the eighties.

The US supplied support packagehad three essential components—

organization and logistics, militarytechnology, and ideological supportfor sustaining and encouraging theAfghan resistance.

With William Casey as the direc-tor of the CIA, the largest covertoperation in history was launchedafter Reagan signed the “NationalSecurity Decision Directive 166”,calling for American efforts to driveSoviet forces from Afghanistan “byall means available”. US counter-insurgency experts worked closelywith the ISI in organizing mujahideengroups and in planning operationsinside Afghanistan. Indeed, it wasevident to residents in Islamabad andPeshawar in the 1980’s that largenumbers of Americans were presentand involved in mysterious activities.But the most important contributionof the US was to create internationallinkages and bring in men and mater-ial from around the Arab world andbeyond. The most hardened and ide-ologically dedicated men were soughton the logic that they would be thebest fighters. Advertisements, paidfor from CIA funds, were placed innewspapers and newsletters aroundthe world offering inducements andmotivations to join the Jihad.

At the initial stage of the USinvolvement, fears that the SovietUnion would react harshly againstPakistan prompted caution in supply-ing arms and military technology tothe Afghan resistance. Therefore thestrategy then was to minimize theappearance of American involvementand so preserve deniability. Indeed, inthe early years, the CIA procuredarms of Soviet manufacture capturedby the Israelis during various MiddleEastern wars and even manufacturedsimulated Soviet arms in a clandes-



tine factory. Some time into the war,however, the US began to take amuch more overt position and USsupplied technology played a key rolein defeating the Soviet war machinein Afghanistan.

Perhaps the most decisive singleweapon was the shoulder-firedground-to-air missile known as theStinger. From 1986 the Afghanmujahideen started receiving Blow-pipe and Stinger ground-to-air mis-siles from Britain and the UnitedStates. The first shipment went exclu-sively to the fundamentalist wing ofthe resistance; that is, the threegroups favored by the ISI and headedby Hekmatyar, Khalis, and Rabbani.The new weapons made Soviet heli-copters and low-flying air-supportmissions exceedingly vulnerable and,even today, helicopter and aircraftwrecks litter Afghanistan’s landscape.

The decision to send Stingers waspopular in Congress and seen as away to hurt the Soviets. Some offi-cials in the Pentagon, however, wereaware of the risks that these sophisti-cated weapons channeled through theISI could land up in other places.Indeed, only a few months after thefirst Stingers had been supplied, frag-ments of these missiles were found inthe wreckage of two Iranian gun-boats. A vigorous world arms marketoffered high prices for these missiles,and it is likely that many were soldoff. The number of missiles suppliedby the CIA is said to exceed 1500and their recovery is still under way1.

The third component of the Rea-gan doctrine, emphasizing ideologicalsupport to the Afghan resistance, wasimplemented through extensive pro-paganda in the global mass media.US television channels lavished praise

on the “brave fighters for freedom”and special documentary programswere produced with adaptations forIslamic countries. Less well known isthe extraordinary effort that wentinto creating propaganda for Afghanchildren2.

An example is the textbook seriesunderwritten by US grants throughthe mujahideen-operated “EducationCenter for Afghanistan” in the1980’s. These textbooks sought tocounterbalance Marxism throughcreating enthusiasm in Islamic mili-tancy. A third-grade mathematicstextbook, for example, asks the fol-lowing question:

One group of mujahidin attack

50 Russian soldiers. In that attack 20

Russians are killed. How many Rus-

sians fled?

Another example from a fourth-grade mathematics textbook posesthe following problem:

The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet

is 800 meters per second. If a Russian

is at a distance of 3200 meters from a

mujahid, and that mujahid aims at

the Russian’s head, calculate how

many seconds it will take for the bul-

let to strike the Russian in the fore-

head.

The quotes above are taken fromchildren’s textbooks published undera $50 million grant from the UnitedStates Agency for InternationalDevelopment that ran from Septem-ber 1986 through June 1994 and wasadministered by the University ofNebraska at Omaha. According toCraig Davis, the UNO program staffchose to ignore the images of Islamicmilitancy in the children’s textbooksfor the first five years of the programbecause “the University of Nebraskadid not wish to be seen imposing

American values on Afghaneducators”.

US-sponsored textbooks, whichexhort Afghan children to pluck outthe eyes of their enemies and cut offtheir legs, are still widely available inAfghanistan and Pakistan, some intheir original form3. Years after theywere first printed, they wereapproved by the Taliban for use inmadrassas.

Pakistan Plays The Key Role

In the decade 1979-1989 Pakistanbecame the front-line state in thefight against communism. But it isimportant to realize that Pakistan’sinvolvement in organizing the AfghanIslamic resistance dates much beforethe Soviet invasion of 1979. In 1973,when Daud, a Pushtun, took over thegovernment in Kabul for the secondtime, he renewed encouragement tothe Pushtuns of Pakistan to secedeand join their blood brothers underthe Afghan flag. At that point, thegovernment of Pakistan fought backby organizing the Pushtuns into aguerrilla movement to harass theAfghan government. For fifteenyears, two very different Pakistanigovernments, the civilian governmentof Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the mili-tary regime of Zia-ul-Haq, used theAfghan resistance first as a way ofexerting pressure on Kabul, then as ameans to strengthen the often waver-ing American commitment to Pak-istan. The more the United Statesinvolved itself in the Afghan cause,the more Pakistan would emerge asthe indispensable staging area for thefight against Communism, and themore secure the flow of American aidto Pakistan would be.

Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelli-



gence (ISI) Directorate, with head-quarters in Islamabad, was chargedwith distributing the weapons. Thiswas part of the bargain—in fact thepart that the US profoundly regretstoday—which was the most crucial indetermining the character and com-position of the Afghan resistance.Throughout the Soviet occupation,the ISI gave only token aid to thePushtun tribes identified with ZahirShah even though they were the mostimportant tribes. Zahir Shah himselfwas not allowed to come to Pakistanto organize Pushtun resistance forcesunder his banner, which he attemptedto do on several occasions. Pakistandecided which groups in the Afghanresistance got the $3 billion that theUnited States and its friends pouredin. Most of that $3 billion went toIslamic fundamentalist groups thatrepresented a tiny minority ofAfghans but were favored by the ISI.Pakistan was looking for trusted col-laborators who would help them toestablish a Pakistan-oriented clientstate in Kabul after the war in orderto realize Zia’s dream of “strategicrealignment”4 They wanted to makesure that no U.S. guns or money wentto Pushtuns who might try to getback the lost Pushtun tribal areasthat now make up the NorthwestFrontier province of Pakistan. Alltraining camps were under directcontrol and operated by the ISI.Years after the Afghan war was wonand the Soviets defeated, these campswould be used for training jihadiststo fight in Kashmir, Chechnya,Bosnia, Philippines, Russia, and theUnited States.

By 1985 the Soviets were in badtrouble militarily. They realized thatthey had blundered into a situation

that offered no respite and offered towithdraw without a political settle-ment. The switch in the Soviet posi-tion provoked an immediate switchin the position of Pakistan that hith-erto had only demanded a Sovietwithdrawal. Like the “bleeders” inWashington, Pakistani military andintelligence officials were in no moodto let go of a windfall that hadbrought them immense power, privi-lege, and money. It therefore becamecrucial for them to seek means foravoiding a settlement. Indeed, Zia-ul-Haq considered any kind of deal as abetrayal of Pakistan. He spoke bit-terly to newspaper editors in Islam-abad. “America and Russia havereached an understanding” he said.“By brokering in coal, we haveblackened our face.” In the absenceof a coalition government includingthe Mujahideen, refugees, and theruling PDPA, he said, “Soviet with-drawal would only lead the countryinto chaos, bloodshed, anarchy, andcivil war.” In such a situation, heclaimed that millions of refugees inPakistan would resist being returnedto their homes. But, in fact, thesewere tactical ploys—Zia had a granddesign that envisioned a differentconcept for Pakistan5 and refused tobe distracted.

In 1987, the Afghan governmentof Najibullah extended the olivebranch to Pakistan, declaring a uni-lateral ceasefire and offering a gov-ernment of national unity. This wasrejected. Certainly, this rejection wasa blow to Mikhail Gorbachev whowas now intent on withdrawing fromthe Afghan quagmire. Nevertheless,Gorbachev was undeterred and theRussians withdrew unconditionally.

Some Luminaries Of TheAfghan Jihad

Months after the Soviet invasion, theUS had been pressing hard uponArab governments to get moreinvolved in the Afghan situation.President Anwar Sadat readily com-plied, sending the growing Islamicresistance weaponry and militaryadvisers. This act emboldenedIslamists in Egypt who, together withleftists, had hitherto been suppressedby the government. These EgyptianIslamists were to form the core of acohesive Arab movement based inAfghanistan. The CIA actively soughtvolunteers from Muslim countriesacross the globe to fight the Soviets,emphasizing Islamic solidaritytogether with pledges of full financialsupport. Pre-occupied with a need tobleed the Soviets as much as possible,American officials rarely paused tothink of the doubtful qualities of theindividuals they had chosen to sup-port. Had they chosen to listen towhat the seven resistance groups inPeshawar were openly saying duringthe course of the Afghan Jihad, theirenthusiasm could have been consider-ably dampened.

Osama bin Laden was among thefirst Arabs to go to Afghanistan afterthe Soviet invasion. It was a turningpoint in his life. Speaking to an Arabjournalist, he said “I was enraged andwent there at once” and added that“one day in Afghanistan was likepraying one thousand days in amosque”. He was appalled at thechaos, disunity, and lack of clearobjectives. Although there does notappear to be truth to a frequentlymade allegation that bin Laden wasrecruited by the CIA, he did undoubt-edly benefit from CIA assistance in



establishing a recruitment drive that,over the next several years, wouldbring thousands of Arab fighters intoAfghanistan. He met the expensesfrom his own funds—derived from avast construction empire in SaudiArabia—and set up training camps.The Ma’sadat Al-Ansar became themain base for training Afghanmujahideen. His close links with theISI greatly weakened after the deba-cle in the battle for Jalalabad inMarch 1989, just shortly after theSoviet withdrawal.6

Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri andAhmad Shawqi al-Islambuli wereamong the first Egyptians to arrive inAfghanistan. Zawahiri was an Egypt-ian pediatrician who becameOsama’s second-in-command and adedicated commander. Islambuli toowas a hard-core fundamentalist andbrother of Khalid al-Islambuli, wholater assassinated Sadat. Both meneventually became top-leaders of theAl-Qaida network.

Gulbadin Hekmatyar was ayoung engineering student at KabulUniversity in 1973 when he was con-tacted by a Pakistani official,Naseerullah Babar, who later becameMinister of the Interior under BenazirBhutto and is credited with creatingthe Taliban as a political force. Hek-matyar came from an Afghan rural-tribal background. Contact withmodernity at Kabul Universitychanged him—as happens not infre-quently when East meets West—intoa hard-line Islamist. This made him aPakistani favorite and a major recipi-ent of C.I.A. aid although he was alsowell known for his outspoken con-tempt for the United States. Hedeclared that he would not stop fight-ing until a fundamentalist order in

Afghanistan was established, and ifPakistan closed its doors then hewould continue the fight from Iran.After being elected chairman of thealliance of resistance groups inPeshawar, he declared plans to liber-ate the Muslim republics of the SovietUnion. After the Russians left, Pak-istan picked Hekmatyar to be its manin Kabul, but he had little popularsupport because his forces hadlobbed rockets and artillery shells atthe beleaguered city for months. Hewas dropped when the Talibanappeared on the scene. When the Tal-iban were destroyed by the Americanoffensive he tried hard to fight hisway back into the political scene buthe seems to have lost out and is cur-rently either in Iran or Peshawar.

Burhannudin Rabbani, a gradu-ate of Al-Azhar University in Cairowas another favorite of the ISIbecause of his close integration intothe infrastructure of Islamic move-ments such as the Ikhwan-ul-Mus-limeen and Muslim Brotherhood. Hewas particularly influenced by thewritings of Hasan-al-Bana andSayyid Qutb who called for violentoverthrow of governments in Muslimcountries to establish a true Islamicstate. Rabbani considered both theUS and the Soviet Union as swornenemies of Islam and opposed toIranian and Afghan revolutions.Thousands of Kabul residents werekilled in the fighting between pro-Rabbani and pro-Hekmatyar forcesafter the Soviet withdrawal and theoverthrow of Najibullah.

Younis Khalis, a theologian of thestern Wahabi tradition and a gradu-ate from a Deobandi madrassa wasideologically close to Rabbani butsubsequently split and formed the

Hizb-e-Islami. In an interview Khalistold Eqbal Ahmad that he went toPakistan in 1973 to organize resis-tance forces to fight Daud, whom heconsidered a dangerous modernist,even a Communist.

Ismail Khan, the warlord gover-nor of Herat, and a high-rankingmember of the Jamiat-I-Islami, isaccused of butchering and torturingthousands. His claim to fame is that,during the Soviet occupation herefused to fire on to a crowd and,instead, turned his guns on to theSoviets killing over 350 men andtheir family members. He is currentlywith Hamid Karzai’s government andconsidered a pillar of support by theUS. He also maintains close relationswith Iran.

Today the mujahideen leaders arecondemned universally as murderersand thugs but it shall remain a histor-ical fact that these very men had beencelebrated as heroes in the US media.TV cameras have recorded for pos-terity the day when Ronald Reaganfeted them on the lawn of WhiteHouse, lavishing praise on “bravefreedom fighters challenging the EvilEmpire” and claiming that there were“the moral equivalent of the Found-ing Fathers [of America]”.

Fathering Global MilitantIslamic Revivalism

Why did the Afghan jihad succeedwhen so many other initiatives topromote Muslim unity (e.g. revival ofthe Caliphate in the early 20th cen-tury) failed? In large part, this wasbecause of a gradual but fundamentalchange in Muslim attitudes towardsthe world around them. Islamic fun-damentalism simply did not existuntil approximately 30 years ago as a



political force. Today many impor-tant Muslim leaders are fundamental-ists but, looking back at the last cen-tury, there was not even one!Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk, Algeria’sAhmed Ben Bella, Indonesia’sSukarno, Pakistan’s Muhammad AliJinnah, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser,and Iran’s Mohammed Mosaddeq allsought to organize their societies onthe basis of secular values.

It took barely a generation or twofor the nationalist period to be can-celled out by rising religious fervor.The reasons are complex7 but onetruth stands out—the imperial inter-ests of Britain, and later the UnitedStates, feared independent national-ism. Anyone willing to collaboratewas preferred, including the ultracon-servative Islamic regime of SaudiArabia. In time, as the Cold Warpressed in, independent nationalismbecame still more intolerable. In1953, Mosaddeq of Iran was over-thrown in a CIA coup and replacedby Reza Shah Pahlavi who faithfullyserved US economic and politicalinterests. Again, for economicmotives, Britain targeted Nasserwhile Indonesia’s nationalist presi-dent Sukarno was replaced bySuharto after a bloody CIA-led coupthat left hundreds of thousands dead.

Secular, nationalist governmentsall over the Muslim world startedcollapsing. Pressed from outside, cor-rupt and incompetent from within,they proved unable to defendnational interests or deliver socialjustice. They began to frustratedemocracy and dictatorships flour-ished. These failures left a vacuumthat Islamic religious movementseventually grew to fill. The theoreti-cal basis for such movements had

been laid in the late 1950s byMaulana Abul Ala Maudoodi of Pak-istan, Saiyyid Qutb of Egypt, andlater by Ayatollah Khomenei of Iran.Theirs was a call to arms, to stop thedecay of Muslim civilization and val-ues, and to return to the Golden Ageof early Islam. But their message waslargely ignored until the turn ofevents suddenly made them relevant.

The Iranian revolution was thefirst milestone in forging a strongIslamic militancy. Its impact wouldhave been still greater but for Iran’sShia character. Soon thereafter Gen-eral Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq seizedpower and ruled Pakistan for elevenyears during which he strove toIslamize both state and society. InSudan an Islamic state arose underJaafar al-Nimeiry wherein amputa-tion of hands and limbs wassanctioned. Then, in 1982 the PLOwas decisively routed by the Israelisand forced out of Beirut. This largelysecular organization wassubsequently eclipsed by Hamas, afundamentalist Muslim movement.Every secular government in Muslimcountries was increasingly challengedfrom within by Islamic forces.

Although Muslim frustration keptgrowing, the anger was undirectedand unable to generate a coherentpath of action. The realbreakthrough came when the Afghanjihad pitted Sunnis against commu-nist infidels and gained full supportfrom the world’s most powerfulnation, the United States. Its superborganizational skills, massive humanand technical resources, and single-minded dedication to anti-commu-nism enabled it to create potent andunified Islamic entities. No 20th cen-tury Muslim ideologue could even

have dreamed of such spectacularsuccess. The global jihad industryhad finally come into its own.

At least until 11 September, USpolicy makers were unrepentant,even proud of their winning strategy.A few years ago, Carter’s U.S.national security adviser ZbigniewBrzezinski, one of the key players and“bleeders” of the time gave an inter-view to the Paris weekly Nouvel

Observateur. He was asked whetherin retrospect, given that “Islamic fun-damentalism represents a world men-ace today”, US policy might havebeen a mistake. Brzezinski promptlyretorted:

What is most important to the

history of the world? The Taliban or

the collapse of the Soviet empire?

Some stirred-up Moslems or the lib-

eration of Central Europe and the

end of the Cold War?

What Brzezinski had not quitecalculated was that his “stirred upMoslems” wanted to change theworld. And in this they were to suc-ceed beyond all doubt.

Acknowledgment

My perception of events inAfghanistan was entirely shaped byEqbal Ahmad, my mentor and friend.This essay is unoriginal—it owesheavily to his published and unpub-lished works, and even more to hislectures, thoughts, and the closeinteractions we had over decades. Hisextraordinary depth of politicalanalysis and understanding of worldevents was unparalleled among schol-ars of the subcontinent. His death on11 May 1999 left a deep, permanentvoid in the lives of many.



Bibliography

“Bloody Games”, Eqbal Ahmad andRichard J. Barnet, The New Yorker, 11April 1988.

“Confronting Empire”, Eqbal Ahmad,interviews with David Barsamian, SouthEnd Press 2000.

“The Tragedy of Afghanistan”, RajaAnwar, translated by Khalid Hasan,Verso (Bristol), 1988.

“The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan Rela-tions Under The Taliban”, Imtiaz Gul,Vanguard Books, Lahore, 2002.

“Sectarianism And Ethnic Violence InAfghanistan”, Musa Khan Jalalzai, Van-guard Books, Lahore, 1996.

“Afghanistan: A New History”, MartinEwans, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 2001.

“Islam And Resistance In Afghanistan”,Olivier Roy, Cambridge University Press,1985.

“Soviet-Afghan Relations”, Shamsuddin,Geeta Press, Delhi 1985.

“Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared WarOn America”, Yossef Bodansky, PrimaPublishing, California, 1999.

“Jihad—The Trail of Political Islam”,Gilles Kepel, translated by AnthonyF.Roberts, Harvard University Press,2002.

Notes

1 During and after the US offensiveagainst Al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan,US agents sought to buy back theseshoulder-fired missiles. Even thoughtheir internal batteries have overruntheir shelf-life, they continue to consti-tute a danger to US aircraft. The localarms industry in Darra is said to havefound a way to revitalize the Stingers.According to Pakistani newspaperreports, several Stingers have recentlybeen bought back and the going rate issaid to be around $50,000 a piece.

2 See, for example, Craig Davis in WorldPolicy Journal, Spring 2000. Theauthor, who was a doctoral candidateat Indiana University, conducted field-work in Afghan education in

Afghanistan and Pakistan in 1999-2000. The examples quoted in the pre-sent essay are from his work.

3 As recently as the time of this confer-ence (Nov 2002) books with a similarcontent continue to be used in someschools in Islamabad.

4 This notion of achieving “strategicdepth” has long been espoused by keyPakistani generals including, AkhtarAbdur Rahman (killed along with Zia),Hamid Gul, and Mirza Aslam Beg.This, in fact, was the raison d’etre forPakistan’s unstinting support for theTaliban until 9/11.

5 In an interview with an American jour-nalist Zia said, “All right, you Ameri-cans wanted us to be a front-line state.By helping you we have earned the rightto have a regime in Afghanistan to ourliking. We took risks as a front-linestate, and we won’t permit it to be likeit was before, with Indian and Russianinfluence there and claims on our terri-tory. It will be a real Islamic state, a real

Islamic confederation. We won’t havepassports between Pakistan andAfghanistan. It will be part of a pan-Islamic revival that will one day winover the Muslims in the Soviet Union,you will see.”

6 Osama was extremely angry and con-vinced that the ISI had drawn themujahideen into needless slaughter bydeliberately misinforming them aboutthe strength of Afghan governmenttroops. But, General Asad Durrani, aformer Director General of the ISI,emphatically denied this during ourrecent conversation on this subject and,instead, put the blame on the lack oforganizational discipline of themujahideen.

7 For one analysis of the Muslim world’spredicament with science and modernthought, see “Islam and Science—Reli-gious Orthodoxy and the Battle forRationality”, Pervez Hoodbhoy, ZedBooks, London, 1991.

A Look at the Nature and Utility of Space Weapons: Not YetRichard L. Garwin, Council on Foreign Relations †

In this paper I attempt to sketch theutility of space weaponry, primarilyfrom the point of view of the UnitedStates.

In this I draw upon the excellentRAND book1, “Space Weapons,Earth Wars.” That study was com-missioned by LGen Roger DeKok,DCS Plans and Programs, HQ USAF.I am guided also by the viewsexpressed in presentations and discus-sions of which I am aware over thepast year. But these are my own judg-ments, which will be refined by theinteractions at this Pugwash session.

I come to this study from a back-ground of 40 years as scientist andmanager with the IBM Research

Division, and more than 50 years ofinvolvement with the USGovernment’s national security pro-grams, beginning with the develop-ment and testing of nuclear weapons,and extending to missiles and space.

The US Space CommissionReport2 cited several needs for space-weapon capability:

1. Defensive Counter-space: Toreduce US military space vulnera-bility.

2. Offensive Counter-space: To denythe use of space and space assets toadversaries

3. Rapid and global power projectionto earth.



To address these needs, theRAND Report assesses distinctclasses of weapons:

1. Directed-energy weapons such asspace-based lasers.

2. Kinetic-energy weapons againstmissile targets.

3. Kinetic-energy weapons againstsurface targets.

4. Conventional warheads deliveredby space-based, or space-traversing,vehicles.

In addition, any assessment mustconsider the potential for non-spaceweapons to perform any of thesetasks. This introduces the competingcapabilities of:

1. Surface-based anti-satellite (ASAT)weapons such as high-power lasers,or missiles with pellet warheads, orhit-to-kill vehicles.

2. Rapid-response delivery of conven-tional munitions by forward-deployed cruise or ballistic missiles,or non-nuclear payloads on ICBMs.

And one must also consider coun-termeasures to space weapons and tothese competing systems. A final ele-ment of assessment is the vulnerabil-ity of both space weapons and ofcompeting systems.

In this preliminary assessment, Itake into account the experience ofmy civilian and military colleaguesand their judgments of existing andfuture threats to US military space, aswell as their views of the potentialutility of various space and non-spaceweapons.

Defensive counter-space

We turn to the first application in ourlist, defensive counter-space. Here wediscover that space weapons havelittle capability for meeting the felt

needs identified above. Satellite vulnerability is and prob-

ably will continue to arise in consid-erable part from jamming or otherelectronic countermeasures, sensorblinding from high-powered lasers onearth, and pellet payloads on short-range pop-up missiles. Perhaps themost proliferated vulnerability is thethreat of Denial and Deception, cam-ouflage that undermines the effective-ness of our reconnaissance satellites,or operations scheduled under cloudor when satellites are not in positionto observe. Here is a tabulation ofthreats, with the most likely oneslisted first:

1) denial & deception2) electronic warfare3) attack on ground stations 4) sensor blinding5) microsatellites6) direct-ascent interceptors7) nuclear detonation in space But space weapons do not help to

reduce vulnerability for most of thesethreats,. They are limited tointercepting objects that approachsatellites in a noticeably offensiveway, such as hit-to-kill kinetic energyweapons; and that capability remainsto be assessed.

One of the most effective threatsis a microsatellite in the form of a“space mine.” Surrey Satellite Tech-nology Ltd., a Surrey University com-pany, is a leader in developingmicrosatellite technology, and hasnumerous collaborative programswith other countries and with non-state groups. Although microsatel-lites have peaceful and military non-weapon uses—observation,communication, and the like—theymake particularly good antisatelliteweapons. In this role, a microsatellite

space mine equipped with maneuvercapability exceeding that of thequarry satellite would sit alwayswithin lethal range (even a few tensof meters) ready to explode at amoment’s notice.

A microsatellite as inspectiondevice might have been useful in con-junction with Columbia’s final flight,but a long-endurance microsatellite isa more difficult task. Nevertheless, acautionary tale is this account of aJanuary 29, 2003, US microsatelliteexercise; the XSS-10 repeatedlymaneuvered to within 115 ft of itsfinal-stage rocket, taking pictures. Ashotgun shell could have destroyed asatellite from such a range.

China carried out similar maneu-vers with Surrey technology severalyears ago.

Since in the vacuum of space (aswas known to Galileo) a feather andlead shot fall at the same speed with-out significant drag, a microsatellitewith little payload necessary todevote to other tasks can be equippedto outmaneuver and outlast a majorsatellite, the primary job of which issurveillance, high-bandwidth com-munication, and the like.

It is difficult to counter spacemines once they are in place. It mightbe done with defensive microsatel-lites, but the asymmetric nature ofthe threat (i.e., tiny expenditures forthe microsatellite vs. $200 million-plus for a major US LEO satellite,makes it desirable to prevent theemergence of such threats.

Two general tools for resolvingthe microsatellite dilemma are rules ofconduct in peacetime, and deterrenceby holding non-space assets at risk.

In summary, space weapons aregenerally not good at protecting



satellites. In the case of microsatel-lites, one might plagiarize JonathanSwift and commit to deploy “smallerstill to bite ‘em.” This is an arms racein which United States resources faroutweigh those of any other state,but this advantage is outweighed bythe vulnerability inherent in the costof existing and future high-capabilitysatellites in low Earth orbit.

Power projection and offensivecounter-space

We turn now to the remaining twouses for space weapons, power pro-jection and offensive counter-space.Different space weapons have vary-ing degrees of utility in these areas, sowe will now look at the utility of spe-cific weapons.

We have already seen how usefulspace mines may be AGAINST thosewho have valuable satellites and use-less against those who have none.

Another weapon much discussedis long-rod penetrators. The idea isthat these long tungsten or uraniumrods would be orbited, and (accord-ing to the RAND Report) de-orbitedby canceling their orbital velocity, sothat they would fall essentially verti-cally through the atmosphere, strik-ing their target with enormousenergy. Two problems that will notbe alleviated by the progress of tech-nology: the energy is larger the higherthe orbit, but the fall time is greateras well. The energy of high explosivecorresponds to a material speed of 3km/s, and one does not arrive at asimilar energy per gram from a pro-jectile dropped from altitude untilone reaches 460 km, with acorresponding fall time of 12 min-utes; a fall from GEO takes almost 6hours and provides about ten times

the energy density of high explosive. A rod would need to be guided

accurately to strike its target withinsome meters in order to destroy asurface target by the explosion.

Long rods might be used to pene-trate through earth to hard or deeplyburied targets. However, the physicsof high-velocity impact limits pene-tration depth as shown by high-speedphotography of a bullet impactingsteel at just above 1 kilometer persecond. A copper-jacketed lead bulletfragments against the hardened steel,but in the process produces a pres-sure sufficient to leave a small crater.Very strong projectiles impactingearth or rock at similar speed canpenetrate to depths several timestheir length.

Tests done by Sandia laboratoryconfirm predictions that, even for thehardest rod materials, penetration ismaximum around 1 km/s. Above thatspeed, the rod tip simply liquefies,and penetration depth falls off,becoming effectively independent ofimpact speed. Therefore, for maxi-mum penetration, such rods wouldneed to be orbited at very low alti-tudes, and could only deliver one

ninth the destructive energy per gramas a conventional bomb. The effort isentirely mismatched to the results.

Dominating the cost is the need toput the rod into orbit in the firstplace and later cancel its orbitalvelocity so that it drops back toearth. The propellant required toplace the entire weapon in orbit mustsuffice to lift both the rod and itsattendant deorbiting propellant. Forlow earth orbit, the total velocitychange of about 15 km/s typicallyrequires several thousand times theorbiting mass in propellant. Takingthe typical $10,000 per kg launchcost to LEO, and assuming a 0.1 tonrod with the 3 tons of propellant tostop its orbital motion, the launchcost to orbit would be some $30 mil-lion. And for timely delivery against asingle target at temperate latitude,several rods in each orbit would berequired and a good many orbits—say 10. Clearly, the more conven-tional deorbit maneuver would bepreferable, with a small energychange and the use of atmosphericdrag (combined with wings or a lift-ing-body approach) to preserve muchof the orbital velocity as the rod

John Rhinelander, Bob Lawson and Steven Miller.



approaches the vertical.Whatever the effect actually

achieved against a target, it is far bet-ter to propel the rod directly fromlaunch to target and avoid orbitsaltogether— by placing the rods onballistic missiles. Specifically, a one-km/s penetrator could be providedflexibly by a nominal solid rocketmotor giving an acceleration 30 timesthat of gravity—so 300 m/sec2. Thedesired 1 km/s would be obtained in3.3 s, over a distance of 1.65 km. Aspeed of 3 km/s would take 10 s anda distance of 15 km. The cost wouldbe some $100,000 or less, plus what-ever cost for the terminal guidancesystem—which is surely no greaterfor the ballistic missile than for theorbiting projectile.

Looking now at the common aerovehicle (CAV) carrying conventionalordnance or intelligence payloads,one finds again that this capability isdominated by CAV delivery by ballis-tic or cruise missiles— perhapsguided by observation from space.Indeed, the role of the CAV itself islargely supplanted by the familiar“bus” technology for delivering mul-tiple payloads from a ballistic missilelaunch.

Space weapons and missile defense

We turn now to space weapons (andtheir competition) for missile defense.For boost-phase intercept—BPI—space-based kinetic-energy (hit-to-kill) interceptors are in competitionwith surface-based interceptors (onland or sea, or even on aircraft). Thenon-space options excel against asmall state such as North Korea,largely surrounded by water. For BPI,space-based interceptors must begiven acceleration and divert capabil-

ities very similar to those required forsurface-based interceptors, if they arenot to pass harmlessly by the quarrymissiles. For missile launches from asmall area, space-based interceptorshave their required numbermultiplied by the number of simulta-neous launches, and also by the“absentee ratio” because most of theSBI will be on the other side of theEarth and unable to join the fray fora clustered launch.

However capable the surface-based interceptors would be againstNorth Korea, Iraq, or even againstlaunches from Iran, unless basedwithin the target country they areineffective against ICBMs launchedfrom China or Russia, because theinterior of those countries is so farfrom the borders.

Yet China and Russia are highlycapable powers, and it would bemuch easier for them to destroyspace-based interceptors as the con-stellation is gradually built than itwould be for the US to use the SBIs tocounter ballistic missile launch. Someobservers are skeptical that Russia orChina (or France, for that matter)would destroy SBIs in peacetime, butwhen the question is posed what theUS would do if another statedeployed a vast number of SBIs, theresponse of many of my colleagues isthat we would destroy them—“shootthem down”.

The airborne laser (ABL) underdevelopment and in early flight test(in contrast to the space based laser(SBL) for which no US program cur-rently exists) might serve as a BPIcapability against ICBMs launchedfrom North Korea. In the spirit of a“capabilities based” system, it wouldto some extent complicate NK’s

ICBM program: North Korea wouldneed to deploy from the beginningcountermeasures to mid-course andwould have to consider countermea-sures to an ABL BPI defense. Unlikethe mid-course interceptors which,once deployed, would always beready for use, the ABL would incurlarge operating costs to maintain aconstant presence.

Another weapon of considerableinterest is the Space Based Laser.These weapons could attack overlong distances at the speed of light,although space mines and the ABLcould be equally prompt. A SBLcould also attack terrestrial targets,but only with suitable laserwavelengths to penetrate the atmos-phere. The current candidate SBLlasers cannot attack ground or air-borne targets.

A single SBL, costing billions ofdollars, could typically have a rangeof at most 3000 km, unless the SBLconstellation were conceived to havea large number of redirecting (“fight-ing”) mirrors3. Under those circum-stances, a competitive system coulduse a ground-based laser, redirectedby such mirrors3. Cloud at the GBLsite would cancel the capability of aGBL, so several would be needed tohave high probability that the systemwould be operable at any time. Inany case, the fighting mirrors mightbe classed by the potential victims asweapons in space as well.

An SBL would be a very expensivemeans of attacking a satellite, butmight be more useful for missiledefense purposes. With relatively fewSBL in orbit, one might need to beused at 3000 km range. At that dis-tance, with no loss through theatmosphere, a perfect mirror of 3 m



diameter, and laser power output of 3MW in the 3.8-micron DF band, atarget protected with 3 cm of corkcould withstand about 200 MJm-2

before exposing the target surface tolaser heat. (Some Minuteman ICBMshave had a 0.6-centimeter layer ofcork to protect the booster from skinfriction heating during launch. Such alayer would be vaporized with about50 MJm-2 (5 kJcm-2) from a SBL.)The laser consumes fuel at a rate ofsome 3kg/MWs, or 9 kg/s, and itwould need to fire for 1700 s at theassumed 3000-km range, thus using15 tons of fuel, at a launch cost forfuel of $150 million per targetattacked. At a range of 1000 km, thelaunch cost would be some $16 Mper target.

Other countermeasures are feasi-ble and could be multiplicative—suchas the slow rotation of the boosterduring launch.

A substantial constellation ofSBLs covering the strategicallyimportant region of the Earth couldconsist of 20-50 such satellites, whichcould provide rapid illumination ofmost important points, providingthat the target can be destroyed bythe laser, and that it is not covered bycloud. Cloud coverage is typically 30-40%, but can range to 70% or morein parts of Germany or North Korea.

But, as analyzed in detail in theRAND publication, many targets arenot vulnerable to destruction by SBL,and many that are can be protectedby smoke, by water shields, or inother ways. Aircraft yes, and com-bustible targets or thin-skinned stor-age tanks. But not bunkers, armoredvehicles, or many buildings.

We have already seen that the useof an SBL can easily cost in the range

of $100 million per target and is con-tingent on the target being thin-skinned and not obscured by a cloud.For comparison, a Tomahawk missilecosts some $600,000 and will attackheavily armored and non-flammabletargets, and is not affected by cloud.

Even enthusiasts consider SBLs aweapon to attack very special targets,while most military capability againstsimilar targets is to be provided bymore conventional means. In contrastalmost all portions of the earth arereachable by existing cruise missiles(Tomahawk Block 3) launched fromoutside the 12 nmi limit. The flighttime can be several hours.

For the space-based laser, “rapidresponse” is a sometime thing, sinceit is necessary to have clear air toallow the laser beam to strike the tar-get—no cloud in the way.

With these competitive means ofstriking the target, observation couldstill be provided by non-weapon spaceassets, so that in addition to attack bynavigation (using GPS) one could usea laser-target designator from spacewith observation and designation pro-vided at the time when a destructivepayload arrives in the vicinity of thetarget—an example of non-weaponmilitary space capabilities contribut-ing to US military capability.

In summary, the one target whichcan surely be held at risk at modestcost is important and costly satellites,of which the US possesses by far thegreatest number and value.

The US Space CommissionReport is generally considered as sup-port for the proposition that the USshould proceed to develop anddeploy space weapons in order tocounter the evolution of spaceweapons by others, and to effect the

needed reduction in vulnerability ofUS satellites. In fact the commissiondoes not specifically advocate thedevelopment of offensive weaponryfor deployment in space. In particu-lar, it reads,

“The government…should:• Invest in technologies to permit the

US Government to field systemsone generation ahead of what isavailable commercially to meetunique national security require-ments.

• Encourage the US commercialspace industry to field systems onegeneration ahead of internationalcompetitors.”

Also,“Fourth, we know from history

that every medium—air, land andsea—has seen conflict. Reality indi-cates that space will be no different.Given this virtual certainty, the USmust develop the means both to deterand to defend against hostile acts inand from space.”

And“The US must participate actively

in shaping the space legal and regula-tory environment.”

Conclusions

My own analysis indicates that USdeployment of space weapons willencourage and demand the develop-ment and deployment of spaceweapons by others. Others can andwill respond to space weapons inasymmetric ways—including thedeployment of space mines in theirvicinity and the use of short rangemissiles to lift ton-class pelletpayloads against LEO weapons. Fur-thermore, such responses wouldinevitably threaten and legitimizecounters to US non-weapon LEO



satellites essential to our entire mili-tary capability.

It is therefore essential to judgethe utility and necessity of spaceweapons. Of course, any proposedaugmentation of US military capabil-ity must compete with other meansfor accomplishing the task. Capabili-ties unique to space weapons useresources, which must be taken intoaccount.

Net judgments on space weaponsutility:

• For offensive counterspace—denymilitary space to others

– Jam uplinks or downlinks (fromground or space)

– Attack ground stations essentialto satellite capability

– Obscure line of sight by screens inspace

• For defensive counterspace—pre-serve US military space capability

– Attack ground systems whichmight be disabling satellites

– Interdict ASAT in powered flight

– Deter by promise of retaliation—not against satellites but againstmilitary and political assets

• For destructive antisatellite (ASAT)

– The most prompt means is proba-bly microsatellite as space mine,orbiting Earth within 10-100m ofits quarry

– Short-range missiles lobbing tonpayloads of coarse sand to orbitalaltitude at the right time

– Homing kill vehicles as direct-ascent ASAT

The United States can do it best, butothers will soon do it well enough.

• Global and prompt force projection

– Kinetic-energy (KE) weapons onICBMs or shorter-range missiles

– Advanced conventional weaponson ICBMs (CAV?) with observa-tion or designation from space,ground, or UAV

• Non-space weapons will providemore capability and sooner thanspace weapons

• Destructive ASAT and space-ASATweapons are a serious threat tooverall US military capability and itsdependence on space.

Countering satellite vulnerability: Ageneral approach to reducing satellitevulnerability is to reduce our depen-dence on satellites while maintainingthe benefits of satellites at reasonablecost. This can be achieved by supple-menting satellite capabilities inwartime by theater resources:

• High-power pseudolites (on theground and on UAVs) in the theaterof operations so that the adversarywould obtain no benefit in theaterconflict by destroying GPS satellites.

• UAV and rocket capabilities forimagery. At altitudes of 20-30 km, a20-cm aperture would have thesame resolution as a 2-m diametermirror at a range of 300 km. Suchplatforms can provide near-constant presence, as well.

A primary means of reducing vul-nerability is to reduce the threat—byagreements not to damage or destroynon-weapon satellites. This should bebacked up by US developments tointercept or counter such weapons orASAT used in violation of such anagreement.

We have found general accep-tance of this (conditional) conclusion:

If space weapons and destructive

ASAT could be avoided by the United

States giving up such capability, it

would be in our national security

interest to do so.

Asserting a “might makes right”rule in space and elsewhere leads,again, to the asymmetric use of force,and this might be the destruction ofvaluable satellites in peacetime ratherthan holding them at risk for futuredestruction.

Nothing is forever—perhaps noteven the regime we favor—so anaggressive campaign to prevent thedeployment of weapons by othersmight best be implemented as a UScommitment:

not to be the first to test or deploy

space weapons or to further test

destructive anti-satellite weapons.

This should be supported by a USinitiative to codify such a rule—firstby parallel unilateral declarationsand then by a treaty. Such acampaign would legitimize the use offorce against actions which wouldimperil satellites of any state.

Notes

† [email protected]. Work done with BruceM. DeBlois, Jeremy C. Marwell, andScott H. Kemp, of the Council on For-eign Relations. This paper waspresented at the Pugwash workshop,Preserving the Non-weaponisation ofSpace, 22-24 May 2003, Castellón de laPlana, Spain, and distributed as a back-ground document at the 53rd PugwashConference, 17-21 July 2003, Halifax,Canada.

1 “Space Weapons, Earth Wars,” byRobert Preston, et al, RAND MR1209,June 2002.

2 Rumsfeld, D.H. et al. “Report of theCommission to Assess United StatesNational Security Space Managementand Organization,” January 11, 2001.

3 Bethe, H.A., and Garwin, R.L., “Space-based Ballistic-Missile Defense,” Scien-tific American, Volume 252, No. 4,October 1984. (Figure on p. 44).



The issue of climate change has sur-faced relatively recently on the scaleof environmental concerns, yet inter-national responses to it have beennotably swift and tightly targeted. Injust over a decade and a half, climatechange has garnered internationalattention and the internationalresponse to this global problem hasshifted from contentious debate onits presumed-dubious scientificgroundings, to virtually global accep-tance of the reality of the problemand the severity of its predictedeffects. This progress has been quiteremarkable given the breadth andcomplexity of the problem, in social,economic, political, and scientificterms. However, while theexpediency of the international cli-mate change negotiation processdeserves guarded praise, the exclusivenature of the process, from a genderperspective, raises considerable causefor concern.

Despite the overt United Nationscommitment requiring all UNprocesses to abide by the principlesfor mainstreaming a gender perspec-tive, the international climate changenegotiation process has remained incontravention of these principles byassuming gender-neutrality and byfailing to engage in required gender-analysis. I will argue that this failurehas not only resulted in the processcoming up short on gender equityprinciples, but also that this has had,and will continue to have, injuriouseffects on the process in terms of effi-ciency and effectiveness1. The inter-

national climate change process willbe unable to achieve truly globallegitimacy or relevance until it adoptsthe principles of gender equity at allstages of the process, from scientificresearch, through analysis, agendaformation, negotiation and decision-making, regime implementation, andfinally in further development andevaluation.

Setting the boundaries throughdefinition

In order to effectively engage in thisdebate, it will be useful to clarify afew concepts at the outset. First ofall, ‘gender’ is a concept, distinctfrom ‘sex’, that “refers to the way inwhich, in any particular society, indi-viduals are socially constructed tobehave and experience themselves as‘female’ or ‘male’” (Jacobson 2002).This is changeable over time andthere are wide variations of genderexperiences within and between cul-tures, which depend on factors suchas age, class, and ethnicity (Mertus2000, 18). Furthermore, “genderalways carries with it some form ofrelational content”, whichcontributes to a person’s genderedidentity (Jacobson 2002). Thus, theuse of a gender perspective in theanalysis of any issue “recognizes,understands, and utilizes the knowl-edge of gender differences inplanning, implementing and evaluat-ing programs and working relation-ships” (Hanley, quoted in Mertus2000, 15).

According to the UN’s Beijing

Declaration and the Platform for

Action, there is a stated need tomainstream a gender perspectivethroughout all UN activity areas(UN 1996). Furthermore, the UN hasacknowledged that women’s right toparticipate in decision-making consti-tutes their basic human right as wellas their right and responsibility ascitizens (Gierycz in Skjelsbaek &Smith 2001, 18-19). In July 1997,the Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) defined the mainstream-ing of a gender perspective as:

The process of assessing the implica-

tions for women and men of any

planned action, including legislation,

policies or programmes, in all areas

and at all levels and as a strategy for

making women’s as well as men’s

concerns and experiences an integral

dimension of the design, implementa-

tion, monitoring and evaluation of

policies and programmes in all politi-

cal, economic and societal spheres so

that women and men benefit equally

and inequality is not perpetuated.

(Gierycz in Skjelsbaek & Smith 2001,19)

These principles collectively chal-lenge the assumption of gender-neu-trality, rendering this assumption ille-gitimate and ignorant not only ofaccepted UN policy but also blatantlyignorant of concern for genderequity.

Let us now also open up some ofthe conceptual definitions surround-ing climate change and allow theclarification of what I refer to as the“international climate change negoti-ation process”. While it is not practi-cal in this context to engage in alengthy scientific explanation of the

From Beijing to Kyoto: Gendering theinternational climate change negotiation processChristie E. Dennison, University of Bradford, UK



processes that cause and result in cli-mate change, it is feasible to begin byacknowledging that:

…scientists have known for many

decades that an increase in the atmos-

pheric concentration of carbon diox-

ide (CO2) and other gases which

absorb infra-red radiation should

warm the earth’s surface, changing

climates in various ways. Measure-

ments started in 1957 showed unam-

biguously that atmospheric concen-

trations of CO2 were rising steadily

due to human activities, primarily

fossil fuel burning and deforestation.

(Grubb et al 1993, 61)

If it may be agreed that this ismore or less the scientific processcausing climate change, then thehuman process of international meet-ings and negotiation to obtain agree-ment on how to slow or alter thisprocess, or at least to mitigate itseffects, can be referred to as the inter-national climate change negotiationprocess.

The general objectives of thisprocess were summed up in the UNFramework Convention on ClimateChange (UN FCCC). Article 2(Objective) states:

The ultimate objective of this Con-

vention…is to achieve…stabilization

of greenhouse gas concentrations in

the atmosphere at a level that would

prevent dangerous anthropogenic

interference with the climate system.

Such a level should be achieved

within a time frame sufficient to

allow ecosystems to adapt naturally

to climate change, to ensure that food

production is not threatened and to

enable economic development to pro-

ceed in a sustainable manner.

(Grubb et al 1993, 63)

The UN FCCC remained thefocal point of the international cli-mate change negotiation processthroughout the 1990s and has nowsurvived into the 2000s, with themost current major development inthe process being the agreement in1997, and ongoing ratification, of theKyoto Protocol (Grubb et al 2001,36-37).

Very briefly, the Kyoto Protocol,which is the culminating product ofthe Kyoto conference, i.e. “thebiggest and most high-profile eventon the international environmentsince the Rio Earth Summit”, sets outlegally binding (pending ratification)commitments by industrialised coun-tries to limit their greenhouse gasemissions (Grubb et al 2001, 61).The commitments were made accord-ing to agreed implementation timescales in conjunction with “a com-plex package” of “global ‘soft’ com-mitments, related processes on tech-nology transfer and financialmechanisms, policies and measures,minimization of adverse impacts,sinks, and compliancemechanisms…designed to gain andsustain global participation” (Grubb2001, xli). In short, Kyoto is theworld’s comprehensive—albeitimperfect—agreement guiding inter-national policy and practice on thecontrol and mitigation of climatechange.

Given this definitional introduc-tion to two seemingly distinct “issueareas”, it will now be useful to drawsome links between gender issues andclimate change, and to establish thefoundation for a gender-basedcritique of the international climatechange negotiation process.

Foundations for fair criticism

As I have begun to show, the formalprinciples guiding internationalaction on both climate change andgender equity are grounded in devel-opment initiatives of the UnitedNations. The UN FCCC is actuallyone of several agreements emergingfrom the UN Conference on Environ-ment and Development (UNCED),which itself was the product of a longpreparatory history of meetings anddiscussions.2 Similarly, much of theformal international work on genderequity has taken shape in the UN,beginning with the creation of theUN Commission on the Status ofWomen (CSW) in 1947, further tak-ing shape through UNIFEM and theUN Conferences on Women inCopenhagen 1980, Nairobi 1985,Beijing 1995, Windhoek 2000, andalso with Security Council Resolution1325 (Gierycz in Skjelsbaek & Smith2001, 15). Underpinning both ofthese development initiatives are con-cerns for achieving greater global

equity and efficiency in development,in the interests of women and men,and the common future they share onEarth. As such, progress in the areasof both gender and environmentalissues was intended to crosscut allissue areas of the UN, and to avoidbecoming mainstreamed as an after-thought to other processes (Gieryczin Skjelsbaek & Smith 2001, 19;Greene 2001, 390).

Given these parallel beginnings, itis increasingly evident that gender,environmental, and developmentconcerns should be considered inconcert with one another, as comple-mentarities, and certainly not as com-peting interests. Moreover, based onthe common goals of achieving effi-



ciency and equity, it would appearthat the two issue areas stand to gainfrom being mutually supportive, andcontrastingly, that it would be oflesser value to consider one to theexclusion of the other. Ironically,while the formal UN-based women’smovement has developed and main-tained an interest in the inclusion ofenvironmental issues throughout itsdevelopment3, the UN-based envi-ronmental movement, andspecifically the international climatechange negotiation process, hasessentially ignored gender issues byassuming gender-neutrality4.

Before moving on to a discussionof how this exclusion came to be, andhow the process may be redeemed,allow me first to explain briefly whygender issues should indeed be madecentral to the development of theinternational climate change negotia-tion process.

Making the case for genderinclusiveness

Climate change is often viewed as ascientific process, making it difficultto understand and often even moredifficult to explain to the wider pub-lic (Villagrasa 2002, 41). This is fur-ther confounded by the belief thatmost of the effects of climate changewill occur only in the future, compli-cating the generation of immediatepublic concern (Villagrasa 2002, 41).Fortunately, however, the very real,very human aspects of climatechange, including its anthropogeniccauses and the severe effects it willlikely have on human life are increas-ingly being acknowledged.5 Conse-quently, there is also growing aware-ness of the differential ways in whichwomen and men are slated to experi-

ence climate change. Thesedifferences occur principally in theareas of responsibility, vulnerability,adaptability, and mitigation (Skutsch2002).

Responsibility

Evidently, both sexes are implicatedin the human responsibility for cli-mate change based on their participa-tion in the global economy (Skutsch2002, 32).6 However, women’s andmen’s participation in the globaleconomy, defined in this case as theiruse of products and services owing tothe emission of greenhouse gases, isneither the same, nor equivalent, on aglobal scale (Skutsch 2002, 33). Forexample, if we consider car use andownership, although the sexual divi-sion has become less extreme in thepast few decades in the Westernworld, “it is evident that cars are stillmore used by men than by women,with the side-effect that women areoften disproportionately dependenton public transport” (Skutsch 2002,33). This is only one of thousands ofexamples of women’s and men’s dif-ferential involvement in the globaleconomy contributing to climatechange. The point here is not toaccrue blame on one sex or the other,but rather to emphasize the fact thatsince women and men have differen-tial responsibilities for contributingto climate change, it is thus only logi-cal to incorporate a gender perspec-tive when conducting research onhuman responsibility for climatechange.7

Vulnerability

It is with regard to vulnerability thatthe majority of women’s research ongender differences and climate

change has been conducted. This isbecause it is relatively frequentlyacknowledged that “the effects ofclimate change are very likely to begendered…because of the strong rela-tionship between poverty and vulner-ability to environmental change, andthe stark fact that women as a groupare poorer and less powerful thanmen” (Nelson et al 2002, 51). Whilea statement as broad as this shouldnot be accepted without qualificationand acknowledgement of the signifi-cant gains women have made to chal-lenge their assumed vulnerability8, itis clear that climate change will havethe most dramatic and likely detri-mental effects on the most vulnerablesegments of society (IPCC 2001), andthis does, for a variety of reasons9,often include women (Nelson et al

2002, 52).

Adaptability and Mitigation

Regarding adaptability and mitiga-tion, women have been shown to beboth capable of, and especially adeptat, adapting to climate change(Masika 2002, 6), as well as beingwilling to play a key role in develop-ing and implementing mitigationstrategies (Skutsch 2002, 35). How-ever, in both cases, women are muchmore likely to achieve this if grantedthe opportunity and agency necessaryto become involved in the process(Skutsch 2002, 35). This would,however, involve the granting ofspace for the voices of women tospeak on behalf of women. This issuebrings us neatly back to the lack ofgender analysis and gender perspec-tive in the international climatechange negotiation process.

Based on the evidence presentedin the preceding paragraphs, it is irre-



sponsible to deny that climate changeis a gendered concept. After all,under the assumption of the genderneutrality of both the problem andthe process, it is not that the aboveissues disappear, but rather that theyremain suppressed and ignored. Itwould seem logical, therefore, if ourgoal is to achieve maximal efficiency,for our response to climate change toaptly emerge from a gender analysisand incorporate a gender perspectiveat all stages of the process, from sci-entific research, through regime for-mation and mitigation-strategyimplementation. Yet the internationalclimate change negotiation processfails to incorporate a gender perspec-tive in an integrated and meaningfulway. I maintain that the consequenceof this neglect is a lack of efficiencyand equity in the process, given that agender-neutral process and gender-neutral mitigation strategies will failto address the differentiated concernsand needs of half of the human popu-lation.

I will now turn my attention to anexamination of the development ofthe process, in order to illustrate howit evolved to the exclusion of women,before proceeding to recommenda-tions on how the process might bereorganised in such a way as toinclude a gender perspective.

How the process proceeded toexclusion

As I have noted, the international cli-mate change negotiation process hasits roots in UN initiatives, not theleast of which was the formation ofthe Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-mate Change (IPCC) in 1988, underthe auspices of the UN EnvironmentProgram (UNEP) and the World

Meteorological Organisation(WMO) (Grubb et al 2001, 4). TheIPCC provides “authoritative assess-ments to governments of the state ofknowledge concerning climatechange” and it is these reports thatprovide the “scientific underpinningfor the diplomatic processes of theUN FCCC” (Grubb et al 2001, 4).The IPCC has evolved into “what isprobably the most extensive andcarefully constructed intergovern-mental advisory process ever knownin international relations” (Grubb et

al 2001, 4). Its first assessment reportjump-started the UN FCCC and itssecond assessment report “marked acrucial stage in the progress of globalaction to combat climatechange…set[ting] the context for thenegotiation of the Kyoto Protocol”(Grubb et al 2001, 4). And yet, thismost influential UN-based body hastaken an almost exclusively gender-neutral stance in its research andreports. Hence, the international cli-mate change negotiation process, inits assumption of gender-neutrality,started on the course of regime for-mation as a process exclusive of gen-der concerns, and continued in thatvein despite strong statements fromthe UN requiring mainstreaming of agender-perspective.

Still, the process cannot be let offthe hook quite so easily. There wereintervening moments and factorsthroughout the process that shouldhave reeled it back into the realm ofgender equality. The first of these wasAgenda 21, the ‘comprehensive’international programme of actionfor achieving sustainabledevelopment in the 21st Century(Grubb et al 1993, 97). Section III,Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 emphasises

the need for the active involvement ofwomen in decision-making andplainly acknowledges the need toforcibly eliminate gender discrimina-tion (UNCED 1992). Secondly therewas the Beijing Platform for Action

emerging from the UN Conferenceon Women in 1995, whichpropounded in no uncertain termsthe continuing efforts to eliminategender discrimination and furtherentrenched efforts to adopt a genderperspective cognisant of women’sidentity and agency across all UNactivity (United Nations 1996).

However, notwithstanding theseintervening and purportedly vitaldocuments, and despite a strongmove by women away from viewingwomen as the vulnerable victims ofthis global phenomenon, neither theUN FCCC nor the Kyoto Protocolmake any mention of gender orwomen’s issues relative to globalenvironmental change (Skutsch 2001,30). Equipped with all the necessarybases for designing a gender-inclusiveprocess of international negotiationon climate change, the agents of thisprocess still failed to do so.10

Getting back on track: mechanismsto promote gender inclusiveness

One foremost consideration to retainis that a numerical representation ofwomen does not necessarily result inthe theoretical representation of femi-nist goals, i.e. gender equity. There-fore, while the number of womenparticipating in climate change nego-tiations should increase at all levels—in government, business, and NGOcommunities—and throughout theprocess of regime formation, this willnot necessarily guarantee an accept-able representation of women’s inter-



ests (Villagrasa 2002, 41). In order toachieve adequate representation,women must be acting as women, onbehalf of other women, and inwomen’s interests.

At the current point in the climatechange regime formation process,one strategy that would serve toquickly integrate a gender perspectivewould be the design of gender-sensi-tive climate change mitigation strate-gies. Without requiring a total revi-sion of the process, gender-sensitivestrategies could be taken into accountwithin the existing mechanismsdevised to mitigate climate change,such as the Global EnvironmentFacility (GEF) and the Clean Devel-opment Mechanism (CDM) (Denton2002, 16). Projects falling under thediscretion of these mechanismsshould presume the inclusion of themain stakeholders at all stages ofproject development anyway, thusproviding a perfect opportunity toachieve a high measure of gender-sensitivity (Denton 2002, 16).11 Sincethere is “enough evidence to showthat women are at the centre of sus-tainable development, and thatensuring gender equalities in all sec-tors would mean that society as awhole would benefit” (Denton 2002,17), it seems logical to incorporate agender perspective at the stage of mit-igation design, given that it is too lateto achieve the ideal incorporation ofsuch a perspective at all stages of theprocess.

A second method which mayprove effective has been put forth byDelia Villagrasa, who suggests thatdeveloping a mentoring process mayhelp to effectively integrate newcom-ers, theoretically both women andmen as required, into the process. As

negotiations on climate change andthe implementation of agreementsbecome increasingly complex, Villa-grasa suggests that it has becomemore and more difficult to invite instakeholders who have been previ-ously disengaged from the process(Villagrasa 2002, 43). A mentorshipsystem could help identify the miss-ing links and build competence in thisarea, thus ensuring the continuity ofthe process as well as incorporating agreater range of valuable interests. Ifdesigned according to gender-equityprinciples, this plan could stand toimprove not only equity, but also theoverall efficiency of the process as itreaches crucial stages of implementa-tion, enforcement, and furtherdevelopment.

Thirdly, data collected to studythe impacts of climate change onhuman populations should be disag-gregated by sex in order to show thedifferent experiences of women andmen relative to climate change, aswell as to climate change mitigationstrategies. If we do not know howwomen and men are differentlyaffected by climate change, then howcan we effectively plan gender-equi-table mitigation and adaptationstrategies? Sex disaggregated data hasproven vital to the analysis of conflicton men and women; it stands, simi-larly, to illuminate the internationalclimate change negotiation process(UNIFEM 2003).

Recommendations for improvingthe equity and efficiency of the inter-national climate change negotiationprocess will only increase in numberas more and more stakeholders areempowered to become involved inthe process. One key point to berecalled during the consideration of

gender perspectives is that assump-tions of essentialism and universalismin feminism have become outdated asthe field takes on a more post-mod-ern approach. Avoiding universalismis especially worthy of concern withregard to the climate change process,in view of the differentiated experi-ences, goals, and mitigation mecha-nisms of women in the global Northand South, especially when it comesto questions relating to development,industrialisation, and theenvironment (Dankelman 2002;Masika 2002, 4; Littig 2002, 121).12

The costs of gender-blindness, andthe benefits of gender-equity

One further issue may need to beproblematised before proceeding to aconclusion that recommends genderinclusion in the ongoing internationalprocess of climate changenegotiation. Building on the notionof improving equity and efficiency ininternational systems, it may actuallybe premature to be contemplatinggender equity in environmental crisis,given the unresolved issues ofpoverty, inequality, and developmentin the context of a globalising, liber-alising world. After all, we havenever entirely made up for the lost‘development decade’ of the 1980s,nor have we achieved the goals weestablished for developing sustain-ably in the 1990s. Neither can we saywith any confidence that the 20th

Century featured the attainment ofgender equality, despite whateveradvances were made.

However, I do not consider thisnecessarily to be cause for pause inthe current climate change negotia-tion process. It may be that the miti-gation of environmental degradation



and the expansion of gender equalitycould be catalytic elements in agreater equation involving social andeconomic development as well.13

This has been proven to be the casein certain, though rare, ‘post-conflictmoments’ (Cockburn 2001), wherethe reorganisation of social order fol-lowing the social upheavalexperienced during conflict has actu-ally had positive, equality-orientedbenefits for women.14

What may be enlightening in thiscontext is the reconsideration, or aslight reinterpretation, of the ‘noregrets’ principle. Rather than simplyhaving a situation in whichgreenhouse gas emissions are reducedto the point of negative net costs andthe generation of direct or indirectbenefits are considerable enough tooutweigh and offset the costs ofimplementing the options, perhapswe could also envision a situationwhere the direct and indirect benefitsof achieving gender equity (ie. effi-ciency and equity) outweigh the costsof implementing gender equitablepolicies. It is by thinking in theseterms that we will begin to fully com-prehend the potential gains associ-ated with incorporating a gender per-spective.

Conclusion

I have begun to establish the regret-table consequences associated withmaking the faulty assumption of gen-der-neutrality in a process as anthro-pocentric as the international climatechange negotiation process. By exam-ining the links between environmen-tal, development and genderconcerns, I have been able to demon-strate how the process has remainedlacking in this area, and have

suggested that until the process main-streams a gender perspective at alllevels of regime formation and imple-mentation—as should all UN-basedactivities—it will lack the gender-sen-sitivity required to achieve trulyglobal relevance and legitimacy.Finally, out of interest and respect forthe continued development of theprocess, I have highlighted a coupleof suggestions that may serve as astarting point for the integration ofgender equity. These recommenda-tions may be necessary, but they arecertainly not sufficient to achievegender equity. They are, however, astarting point, and a start is most cer-tainly hurriedly welcomed, lest wereach a point where regret becomesthe dominant feeling associated withthe international climate changenegotiation process.

Works Cited and References

Boyd, Emily (2002). “The Noel Kempffproject in Bolivia: gender, power, anddecision-making in climate mitigation”.Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2,pp. 70-77.

Braidotti, Rosi, Ewa Charkiewicz, SabineHunter and Saskia Wieringa (1994).Women, the Environment and Sustain-able Development: Towards a Theoreti-cal Synthesis. London: Zed Books inassociation with INSTRAW.

Cannon, Terry (2002). “Gender and cli-mate hazards in Bangladesh”. Genderand Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 45-50.

Cockburn, Cynthia (2001). “The Gen-dered Dynamics of Armed Conflict andPolitical Violence”. Caroline O.N. Moser& Fiona C. Clark (eds). Victims, Perpe-trators or Actors? Gender, Armed Con-flict and Political Violence. London: ZedBooks, pp. 13-29.

Dankelman, Irene (2002). “Climatechange: learning from gender analysisand women’s experiences of organisingfor sustainable development”. Gender

and Development Vol 10, no 2, pp. 21-29.

Denton, Fatma (2002). “Climate changevulnerability, impacts and adaptation:why does gender matter?”. Gender andDevelopment Vol 10 no 2, pp. 10-20.

Gierycz, Dorota (2001). “Women, Peaceand the United Nations: Beyond Beijing”in Inger Skjelsbaek and Dan Smith. Gen-der, Peace & Conflict. London: Sage Pub-lications in association with PeaceResearch Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

Greene, Owen (2001). “EnvironmentalIssues” in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds) The

Globalisation of World Politics: an intro-duction to international relations. SecondEdition, Oxford: Oxford UP, pp. 387-412.

Grubb, Michael, Matthias Koch, KoyThomson, Abby Munson and FrancisSullivan (1993). The ‘Earth Summit’Agreements: A Guide and Assessment.London: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, Energy and Environmental Pro-gramme.

Grubb, Michael with Christiaan Vrolijkand Duncan Brack (2001). The KyotoProtocol: A Guide and Assessment. Lon-don: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs, Energy and Environmental Pro-gramme.

Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange (IPCC) (2001). “Summary forPolicymakers. Climate Change 2001:Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability”.Report of Working Group II.www.ipcc.ch (April 2002).

Jacobson, Ruth (2002). Seminar Notes.Conflict and Development in Latin Amer-ica and Africa. University of Bradford, 25November 2002.

Littig, Beate (2002). “The case for gen-der-sensitive socio-ecological research”.Work, employment and society Vol 16 no1, pp. 111-132.

Masika, Rachel (2002). “Editorial”. Gen-der and Development Vol 10 no 2, pp. 9.

Mertus, Julie A. (2000). War’s Offensiveon Women: The HumanitarianChallenge. Bloomfield, Connecticut:Kumarian Press.

Nelson, Valerie, Kate Meadows, TerryCannon, John Morton, and Adrienne



Martin (2002). “Uncertain predictions,invisible impacts, and the need to main-stream gender in climate change adapta-tions”. Gender and Development Vol 10,no 2, pp. 51-59.

Rodda, Annabel (1991). Women and theEnvironment. Women and World Devel-opment Series. London: Zed Books.

Roy, Marlene and Henry David Venema(2002). “Reducing risk and vulnerabilityto climate change in India: the capabili-ties approach”. Gender and DevelopmentVol 10, no 2, pp. 78-83.

Skutsch, Margaret M. (2002). “Proto-cols, treaties, and action: the ‘climatechange process’ viewed through genderspectacles”. Gender and DevelopmentVol 10, no 2, pp. 30-39.

United Nations (1996). The Beijing Dec-laration and the Platform for Action.Fourth World Conference on Women,A/CONF.177/20. New York: UnitedNations.

United Nations Conference on Environ-ment and Development (UNCED)(1992). Agenda 21. Geneva: UNCED.

United Nations Development Fund forWomen (UNIFEM) (2002). Agenda 21:An easy reference to the specific recom-mendations on women. Women, Environ-ment, Development Series. New York:UNIFEM.

United Nations Development Fund forWomen (UNIFEM) (2003). “Women,Peace and Security: Progress on UN Secu-rity Council Resolution 1325”. NewYork: UNIFEM.

Villagrasa, Delia (2002). “Kyoto Protocolnegotiations: reflections on the role ofwomen”. Gender and Development Vol10 no 2, pp. 40-44.

Young, Oran R. & Marc A. Levy (1999).“The Effectiveness of International Envi-ronmental Regimes”. Oran Young (Ed)The Effectiveness of International Envi-ronmental Regimes: causal connectionsand behavioural mechanisms. London:MIT Press, pp. 1-32

Notes

1 My definition of effectiveness is drawnpartially from the conglomerate defini-tion explained in Oran R. Young andMarc A. Levy (1999) “The Effective-ness of International EnvironmentalRegimes” pp. 1-32 in O. Young (ed)The Effectiveness of International Envi-ronmental Regimes: causal connectionsand behavioural mechanisms London:MIT Press. I incorporate theireconomic, normative, and politicalapproaches, but add an additionalapproach based on gender equity andapplicability.

2 The UN General Assembly initiated thisseries of meetings and discussions in1989 when, following on from theStockholm Conference of 1972, it man-dated the ‘Earth Summit’ to be held inRio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. For aconcise introductory synopsis on thehistorical process of climate changeregime formation see Owen Greene(2001) “Environmental Issues” in J.Baylis and S. Smith (eds) The Globalisa-tion of World Politics: an introductionto international relations Second Edi-tion, Oxford: Oxford UP, pp. 387-412.

3 For example, among others, see RosiBraidotti et al (1994) Women, the Envi-ronment and Sustainable Development:Towards a Theoretical Synthesis Lon-don: Zed Books in association withINSTRAW, and Annabel Rodda (1991)Women and the Environment Womenand World Development Series, Lon-don: Zed Books.

4 See Margaret Skutsch (2002) “Proto-cols, treaties, and action: the ‘climatechange process’ viewed through genderspectacles” in Gender andDevelopment Vol 10, no 2, pp. 30-39.The most relevant exception to this isthe inclusion of women as one of nine‘major groups’ deemed to have specialinterests and connections to the imple-mentation of sustainable developmentinitiatives, acknowledged in Agenda 21.See Chapter 24 of Agenda 21 for detailsof how UNCED perceived the inclusionof a gender perspective with regard tosustainable development.

5 In my view, this recognition of thepotential and actual effect of climatechange on human beings should beenough of an indicator that genderissues need to be addressed within theprocess, given that the occasions arerare indeed that women and men expe-rience major events in the exact sameways (take conflict and/or violence as acase in point).

6 Although there is an ongoing debate onwhat causes climate change, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) and the majority of scientists areof the conviction that human activitiesproducing carbon dioxide and othergreenhouse gases are responsible for amajor share of the measured and forth-coming change in the Earth’s climate.See Margaret Skutsch (2002) “Proto-cols, treaties, and action: the ‘climatechange process’ viewed through genderspectacles” in Gender andDevelopment Vol 10, no 2, pp. 30-39.

7 I fully acknowledge differences inresponsibility for climate change occur-ring along divisions in humanity otherthan gender divisions, such as differ-ences in human responsibility in devel-oped and developing countries, forexample, or between urban and ruraldwellers. I confine myself to the discus-sion of gender differences here only dueto a lack of space in the limitations ofthis paper.

8 On women’s efforts to defy victimhood,see, for example, Irene Dankelman(2002) “Climate change: learning fromgender analysis and women’s experi-ences of organising for sustainabledevelopment” and Delia Villagrasa(2002) “Kyoto Protocol negotiations:reflections on the role of women” bothin Gender and Development Vol 10 no2, pp. 21-29 and pp. 40-44,respectively.

9 For example, Fatma Denton refers towomen’s differential responsibilities inthe division of labour, and specificallyto women’s involvement in agricultureand their dependence on biomassenergy, making them “key stakeholdersin effective environmentalmanagement” and consequently also



“particularly vulnerable to the risksposed by environmental depletion”. SeeFatma Denton (2002) “Climate changevulnerability, impacts and adaptation:why does gender matter?” Gender andDevelopment Vol 10 no 2, pp. 10-20.

10 Unfortunately, the confines of thispaper do not give me license to explorethe reasons for this failure, though thereare many and they are compelling. Imust now move expeditiously on to aconsideration of how this process mightrecover from its weaknesses by workingto promote women’s agency and clear-ing the space required to allow genderinclusiveness, on the road to realisinggreater overall equity and efficiency.

11 As a comparative example, one mightconsider the design of gender-sensitivefree trade adaptation mechanisms,some of which were recommended by

feminist groups during the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement(NAFTA) integration process. Similarlyto the climate change process, theNAFTA integration process wasdeemed to be a gender-neutral process.However, when it was found that gen-der-neutrality was a faulty assumption,and that job losses and employmentretraining programs continued to falldisproportionately to the disadvantageof women, some elements of the processwere re-worked in order to incorporatea gender perspective into the process.

12 For case studies illustrating some ofthese concerns, please see Terry Cannon“Gender and climate hazards inBangladesh”, Emily Boyd “The NoelKempff project in Bolivia: gender,power, and decision-making in climatemitigation”, and Marlene Roy andHenry David Venema “Reducing the

risk and vulnerability to climate changein India: the capabilities approach”, allof which are presented in Gender andDevelopment Vol 10 no 2, 2002, pp.45-50, pp. 70-77, and pp. 78-83,respectively.

13 For a slightly lengthier consideration ofthis possibility see Nelson et al (2002)“Uncertain predictions, invisibleimpacts, and the need to mainstreamgender in climate change adaptations”Gender and Development Vol 10, no 2,pp. 51-59.

14 For example, women who have movedinto traditionally male roles (such asworking outside the home to supportthe family while the usual male bread-winner serves as a combatant), havesometimes been able to retain some ofthis additional responsiblity and equityeven after the conflict ends.

Jo Rotblat and members of ISYP.


Sweden, Tel. (++46-8) 55 50 30 15, Fax:(++46-8) 55 50 34,E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Carin Atterling Wedar, Lector, Theo-logical Faculty, University of Gothenburg;Stockholm Office: Theological Seminary, Universityof Gothenburg, Danska vagen 20,Gothenburg, Sweden E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. John Avery, Associate Professor ofTheoretical Chemistry, H.C. Ørsted Insti-tute, University of Copenhagen, DenmarkOffice: H.C. Ørsted Institute, Universityof Copenhagen, Universitetsparken 5, DK2100 Copenhagen Ø, Denmark, Tel.:(++45-35) 320288, Fax: (++45-35)320299, E-mail: [email protected]

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UK, Tel.: (++44-20) 7955 6073, Fax:(++44-20) 7955 6781, E-mail: [email protected]

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Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, Washington, DC, USA;Member, Pugwash Executive Committee *Office: Pugwash Conferences, 11Dupont Circle, NW, Suite 900, Washing-ton, DC 20036, Tel.: (++1-202) 478-3440, Fax: (++1-202) 238-9604, E-mail:[email protected]

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Gen. (ret.) Mansour Abo Rashid, Chair-man, Amman Center for Peace andDevelopment, Amman, Jordan*Office: Amman Center for Peace andDevelopment, P.O. Box 3435, Amman,Jordan, Tel.: (++962-6) 565-4651, Fax:(++962-6) 565-4652, Mobile: (++962-79)552-9411, E-mail: [email protected]

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Ms. Ruth S. Adams, San Diego, CA, for-mer Program Director, The John D. andCatherine T. MacArthur Foundation,USA*Home: 9753 Keeneland Row, La Jolla,CA 92037, Tel.: (++1-858) 678-0397,Summer Tel.: (++1-970) 927-3380,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Haitham M.A. Al-Shaibani, former:Dean of the Military Engineering College(1994-99); Head of the Department ofHealth Physics, Iraqi Atomic EnergyOrganization (1981-91); Contact: Tel.: (++964-1) 774-0843,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Gunnar Arbman, Director ofResearch, Swedish Defence ResearchAgency (FOI), Stockholm, Sweden*Office: FOI, SE-172 90 Stockholm,



Participants



416) 255-3930, Fax: (++1-416) 252-8291, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Giovanni Brenciaglia, formerly Man-ager of Nuclear Fuel & Reactor Physics,Ontario Hydro, Toronto, Canada; *Home: 1123 Wolf Bay Rd., RR#4Huntsville, Ontario, Canada P1H 2J6,Tel.: (++1-705) 788-1211, Fax: (++1-705)789-2553, E-mail: [email protected]

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Dr. Adele Buckley, Vice President, Tech-nology & Research, Ontario Centre forEnvironmental Technology Advancement(OCETA), Toronto, Ontario, Canada;Deputy Chair, Canadian Pugwash GroupOffice: OCETA, 63 Polson St., 2nd floor,Toronto, ON M5A 1A4, Canada, Tel.:(++1-416) 778-5281, Fax: (++1-416)778-5624, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Wajahat Bukhari, Assitant Editor,Daily Times, Lahore, PakistanOffice: Daily Times, 41-N, IndustrialArea, Gulberg II, Lahore, Pakistan, Tel.:(++92-42) 587-88614-19, Fax: (++92-42)587-8620, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Martin Butcher, Director of SecurityPrograms, Physicians for Social Responsi-bility (PSR), Washington, DC, USA *Office: PSR, 1875 Connecticut AvenueNW, Suite 1012, Washington DC, USA,Tel.: (++1-202) 667-4260, Fax: (++1-202)667-4201, E-mail: [email protected]

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Prof. Francesco Calogero, Member, Pug-wash Council; Professor of TheoreticalPhysics, University of Rome “LaSapienza”, Rome, Italy*Office: Rome Pugwash Office, via della

Lungara 10, I-00165 Rome, Italy, Tel.:(**39-06) 687-2606, Fax: (**39-06)687-8376, E-mail:[email protected],[email protected]

Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne, Member, Pug-wash Council ; Senior Lecturer, Disarma-ment and Arms Control, Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, France*Home: 29 Avenue Danton, 43300Langeac, France, Tel.: (++33-6) 71 89 0656, Fax: (++33-4) 71 77 24 57, E-mail:[email protected]

Ms. Theodora Carroll, Consultant, AdAstra Environmental Consulting Services,Squamish, BC, Canada*Office/Home: Ad Astra EnvironmentalConsulting Services, Box 241, 1026Edgewater Crescent, Squamish V0N3G0, BC, Canada, Tel./Fax: (++1-604)898-5658, E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Chen Huaifan, Deputy Chief,Research Division, Chinese People’sAssociation for Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD), Beijing, ChinaOffice: CPAPD, 15 Wanshou Road, P. O.Box 188, 100036, Beijing, China, Tel.:(++86-10) 68214433 (x8587), Fax:(++86-10) 68273675, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Chen Jifeng, Member, PugwashCouncil; Convener, Pugwash Group ofChina; Vice President, China Arms Con-trol and Disarmament Association; Exec-utive Vice-President, China Associationfor Promotion of International Scienceand Peace; Adviser, Chinese People’sAssociation for Peace and Disarmament(CPAPD) *Office: CPAPD, PO Box 188, 15 Wan-shou Rd., Beijing, China 100036, Tel.:(++86-10) 6827-1736 or 6821-4433 (ext.8586), Fax: (++86-10) 6827-3675,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary-General, Pugwash Conferences on Sci-ence and World Affairs; Member, Pug-wash Executive Committee; Professor ofMathematical Physics, University ofMilan, Italy; Director, Program on Disar-mament and International Security, Lan-dau Network—Centro Volta, Como,Italy*Office: Department of Physics, Univer-sity of Milan, Via Celoria 16, 20133

Milan, Italy, Tel.: (**39-02) 5031 7277,Fax: (**39-02) 5031 7480, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Lars van Dassen, Director, SwedishNuclear Non-Proliferation AssistanceProgramme (SNNAP), Office of Non-Proliferation, Swedish Nuclear PowerInspectorate (SKI), Stockholm, Sweden*Office: SKI, SE-106 58 Stockholm, Swe-den, Tel.: (++46-8) 698 84 38, Fax:(++46-8) 661 90 86, E-mail:[email protected]

Ms. Bev Tolletson Delong, Chairperson,Canadian Network to Abolish NuclearWeapons; President, Lawyers for SocialResponsibility (Canada)*Home: 5120 Carney Rd., NW, Calgary,AB, Canada T2L 1G2, Tel.: (++1-403)282-8260, Fax: (++1-403) 289-4272,E-mail: [email protected]

Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka),immediate past Under-Secretary-Generalfor Disarmament Affairs, United Nations,New York, NY, USA, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Nola Dippenaar, Professor, Dept. ofPhysiology, School of Medicine, Facultyof Health Sciences, University of Pretoria,Pretoria, South Africa; Vice-Chair, SouthAfrican Pugwash Group *Office: Dept. of Physiology, Universityof Pretoria, PO Box 2034, Pretoria 0001,South Africa, Tel. (++27-12) 319 2150,Fax: (++27-12) 321 1679, Cell.: (++27-82) 9000 970, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Walter Dorn, Associate Professor,Department of Politics and Economics,Royal Military College of Canada,Kingston, Ontario, Canada; *Office: Department of Politics and Eco-nomics, Royal Military College ofCanada, P.O. Box 17000, Stn Forces,Kingston, ON K7K 7B4, Canada, Tel.:(++1-613) 541-6000 x6742, Fax: (++1-613) 5416733, E-mail: [email protected](or) [email protected]

Dr. Lynn Eden, Member, Pugwash Coun-cil; Associate Director forResearch/Senior Research Scholar, Centerfor International Security and Coopera-tion (CISAC), Institute for InternationalStudies, Stanford University, Stanford,California; USA, Co-Chair U.S. PugwashGroup



*Office: ISAC, 94305-6165, Tel.: (++1-650) 725 5369, Fax: (++1-650) 7245683, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Karl-Erik Eriksson, Professor (part-time), Department of EngineeringSciences, Karlstad University, Karlstad,SwedenOffice: Department of Engineering Sci-ences, Karlstad University, SE 65188Karlstad, Sweden, Tel.: (++46-54) 700-2166/1234, Fax: (++46-54) 700-1156,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Stale Eskeland, Professor of Crimi-nal Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Nor-way*Institute: Institute of Public and Interna-tional Law, P.B. 6706, St. Olavs Plass,0166 Oslo, Norway, Tel.: (+47-22)859443, Fax: (++47-22) 859655, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Esmat Ezz, Professor, Military Med-ical Academy, Cairo, Egypt*Home: 43 Misr Helwan Road, Maadi11431, Cairo, Egypt, Tel.: (++20-2) 358-5899, Mobile: (++20-1) 2395-1351, Fax:(++20-2) 340-7915, E-mail: [email protected] (and) [email protected]

Ms. Maha Fattah, Deputy Chief Editorfor International Affairs, Akhbar el yomPublishing House, Cairo, EgyptOffice: Akhbar el yom Publishing House,6 Sahafa St., Boulac, Cairo, Egypt, Tel.:(++20-2) 578-2900, Fax: (++20-2) 578-2520; E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Eric T. Ferguson, Secretary of Pug-wash Netherlands; Consultant on Energyand Development, MacFergus bv, Eind-hoven, Netherlands *Office/Home: van Reenenweg 3, NL-3702 SB Zeist, Netherlands, Tel.: (++31-30) 267-3638, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. John Finney, Professor of Physics,Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, Univer-sity College London, UK*Office: Dept. of Physics and Astronomy,University College London, Gower Street,London WC1E 6BT, UK, Tel.: (++44-20) 7679-7850, Fax: (++44-20)7679-1360, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Larry J. Fisk, Professor Emeritus ofPolitical, Peace and Conflict Studies,Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax,Canada*Home: Alt. #2, 1640-20th Ave. N:W.

Calgary , AB Canada T2M IG8, Tel.:(++1-403) 210 2184 E-mail: [email protected]

Lic. Orlando Fundora Lopez, President ofthe Cuban Movement for Peace and Peo-ple’s Sovereignty, Havana, Cuba; *Office: Cuban Movement for Peace andSovereignty of People, Línea #556,Vedado, Havana 10400, Cuba, Tel.:(++537) 320-490, Fax: (++537) 333860/321 492, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Bas de Gaay Fortman, Professor ofPolitical Economy of Human Rights, Fac-ulty of Law, Utrecht University, andEmeritus Professor of Political Economy,Institute of Social Studies, The Hague,The Netherlands; *Office: Netherlands Institute of HumanRights, Faculty of Law, Utrecht Univer-sity, Janskerhhof 3, 3512 BK Utrecht, TheNetherlands, Tel.: (++31-30) 253-8117,Fax: (++31-30) 253-7168, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Evangelos Georgiou, Ass. Professor,Medical Physics Department, Athens Uni-versity, Athens, GreeceOffice: Medical Physics Dept., AthensUniversity Medical School, 75 MikrasAsias Str., Athens 11527, Greece, Tel.:(++210) 746-2368, Fax: (++210) 746-2369, E-mail: [email protected];[email protected]

Ms. Ann Gertler, Member, CanadianPugwash Group Executive; Advisor tothe International Peace Bureau *Home: 482 Strathcona, Westmount, QCH3Y 2X1, Canada, Tel.: (++1-514) 933-7913, Fax: (++1-514) 933-1702, E-mail:[email protected]

Ing. Jorge Eduardo Gil, Engineer, Renew-able Energy Projects, Electromechanical& Civil Installations, San Carlos de Bar-iloche, Argentina; *Home/Office: Casilla de Correos 1916,(R8400AMC) San Carlos de Bariloche,Provincia de Rio Negro, Argentina, Tel.:(++54-2944) 424 587, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Alexander Ginzburg, Deputy Direc-tor, A.M. Obuklov Institute of Atmos-pheric Physics, Russian Academy of Sci-ences; Professor of Climate Change,International University in Moscow,Russia; *Office: Institute of Atmospheric Physics,

3, Pyzhevsky per., Moscow 109017, Rus-sia, Tel.: (++7-095) 951-0710, Fax: (++7-095) 953-1652, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Galia Golan-Gild, Professor of Gov-ernment, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC),Herzlia, Israel; *Office: IDC, POB 167, Herzlia, Israel,Tel.: (+972-9) 952-7399, Fax: (++972-9)956-8605, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Franklyn Griffiths, Ignatieff ChairEmeritus of Peace and Conflict Studies,University of Toronto, Canada*Home: 360 Brunswick Ave., Toronto,Ontario, DCanada M5R 2Y9, Tel.: (++1-410) 925-4293, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Eric Guichard, Head, “Réseaux,Savoirs & Territoires” Research Group,Ecole Normale Superieure, Paris, France; Secretary, French Pugwash Group*Office: INRIA / ENS, 45 rue d’Ulm,75005 Paris, France, Tel.: (++33-1)44.32.30.04, E-mail: [email protected]

Mrs. Regina Hagen, Coordinator, Inter-national Network of Engineers and Scien-tists Against Proliferation (INESAP),Darmstadt, Germany*Office: INESAP, c/o IANUS, DarmstadtUniversity of Technology, Hochschulstr.4a, D-64289 Darmstadt, Germany, Tel.:(++49-6151) 16 44 68, Fax: (++49-6151)16 60 39, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Karen Hallberg, Research Fellow,National Council of Science and Technol-ogy, Argentina; *Office: Centro Atomico Bariloche, 8400Bariloche, Argentina, Tel.: (++54-2944)445170, Fax: (++54-2944) 445299,E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Tom Børsen Hansen, Assistant Pro-fessor, Centre for Science Education, Fac-ulty of Science, University ofCopenhagen, Denmark:*Office: Centre for Science Education,Faculty of Science, University of Copen-hagen, Denmark, Tel.: (++45-35) 32 0473, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. John (Jack) Harris, Member, BritishPugwash Council *Home: Church Farm House, 28 HoptonRoad, Cam, Dursley, Glos GL11 5PB,UK, Tel./Fax: (++44-1453) 543165,E-mail: [email protected]



Prof. Christopher R. (Kit) Hill, ProfessorEmeritus, Institute of Cancer Research,Royal Marsden Hospital, Surrey, UK;Secretary, British Pugwash Group Office: Institute of Cancer Research,Royal Marsden Hospital, Sutton, SurreySM2 5PT, UK

Prof. Robert Hinde, former Royal SocietyResearch Professor (now retired) *Office: St. John’s College, CambridgeCB2 1TP, UK, Tel.: (++44-1223) 339 356,Fax: (++44-1223) 337 720, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. John Holdren, Teresa & John HeinzProfessor of Environmental Policy &Director, Program in Science, Technology,& Public Policy, Center for Science &International Affairs (CSIA), John F.Kennedy School of Government, and Pro-fessor of Environmental Science & PublicPolicy, Dept. of Earth and Planetary Sci-ences, Harvard University, Cambridge,Massachusetts, USA; *Office: CSIA, JFK School of Gov’t, 79JFK St., Cambridge, MA 02138, Tel.:(++1-617) 495-1464, Fax: (++1-617)495-8963, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Member, Pug-wash Council; Professor, Department ofPhysics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islam-abad, Pakistan*Office: Fax: (++92-51) 282 4257,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Sean Howard, ConsultantResearcher/Editor, Disarmament Diplo-macy (since 1996), Canada*Home/Office: 2081 Main-à-Dieu, NovaScotia, Canada B1C 1W5, Tel./Fax: (++1-902) 733-2918, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Jo Husbands, Director, Committee onInternational Security and Arms Control(CISAC), National Academy of Sciences(NAS), Washington, D.C., USA *Office: CISAC/NAS, 500 5th Street NW,Washington, DC 20001, USA, Tel.: (++1-202) 334-2811, Fax: (++1-202) 334-1730, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Rebecca Johnson, Executive Director,The Acronym Institute for DisarmamentDiplomacy, London, UK; Board Member,Educational Foundation for Nuclear Sci-ence (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists);Publisher, Disarmament Diplomacy

*Office: The Acronym Institute for Disar-mament Diplomacy, 24 Colvestone Cres-cent, London E8 2LH, England, Tel.:(++44-20) 7503 8857, E-mail:[email protected],www.acronym.org.uk

Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said,Member, Pugwash Council; Head of Mil-itary Studies Unit and Technology Advi-sor, Al-Ahram Center for Political andStrategic Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation,Cairo, Egypt; Professor of MissileMechanics of Flight, Military TechnicalCollege (MTC), Cairo, Egypt*Office: Al-Ahram Center for Politicaland Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Founda-tion, Al-Galaa St., Cairo, Egypt, Tel.:(++20-2) 578-6114, Fax: (++20-2) 578-6037, E-mail: [email protected];[email protected]

Dr. Ayman Khalil, Governing Board,Center for Research on Arms Controland Security (CRACS), Amman, Jordan*Office: CRACS, P.O.Box 141939,Amman—Jordan, Tel (+962-79) 556-9317, Fax (+962-6) 581-8062, E-mail:[email protected]

Gen. Kim Jae Myong, Advisor, MilitaryOperations Research Society, Seoul,Korea; *Office: Military Operations ResearchSociety, P.O. Box 250, Chongryang-Ri,Tongdaemun-Ku, Seoul, Korea, Tel.: (++-2) 416-0581, Fax: (++-2) 412-6897,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Berma Klein Goldewijk, Director,Cedar International, Center for Dignityand Rights, The Hague, The Netherlands *Office: Cedar International, Centre forDignity and Rights, TMC Asser Institutefor International Law, R.J. Schimmelpen-nincklaan 20-22, 2517 JN The Hague,The Netherlands, Tel.: (++ 31-70) 310 9171, Fax: (++ 31-70) 310 91 75, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Lydie Koch-Miramond, ScientificAdvisor, French Atomic Energy Commis-sion (CEA), Direction des Sciences de laMatiere, Paris, France; Chair, EuroscienceWorking Group: Ethics in Science (2000-) *Office: CEA, Tel.: (++33-1)69.08.76.91, Fax: (++33-1) 69.08.65.77,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Janusz Komender, Member, PolishAcademy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland Institution: Polish Academy of Sciences,00-901 Warsaw, Pl. Oefilad 1 PKIN,Poland, Tel.: (++48-22) 620-3332, Fax:(++48-22) 620-3803

Prof. Michiji Konuma, Professor Emeri-tus of Physics, Keio University; Japan*Office: Musashi Institute of Technology,Yokohama 224-0015, Japan, Tel.: (++81-45) 910-2500, Fax: (++81-45) 910-2600,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Peter H. Langille, Senior ResearchAssociate & Human Security Fellow,Peace and Conflict Studies, UN PeaceOperations,Victoria, BC, Canada*Office: Centre for Global Studies, Uni-versity of 472-4830 E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Bob Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor,Non-Proliferation, Arms Control andDisarmament (IDA), Department of For-eign Affairs and International Trade,Canada*Office: IDA, Dept. of Foreign Affairs &International Trade, Lester B. PearsonBuilding, 125 Sussex Drive, Ottawa,Ontario K1A 0G2, Canada, Tel.: (++1-613) 944-1003, Fax: (++1-613) 944-3105, E-mail: [email protected]

Mrs. Christine Lindhard Ramirez, Prac-ticing Therapist, Madrid, Spain*Home/Office: P.O. Box 2, 28792Miraflores de la Sierra (Madrid), Spain,Tel./Fax: (++34-91) 844-4695, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Lee Lorch, Department of Mathe-matics and Statistics, York University,Toronto, Canada*Office: Dept. of Mathematics & Statis-tics, York University, 4700 Keele Street,Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3, Canada, Tel.:(++1-416) 736-5250, Fax: (++1-416)736-5757, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Morten Bremer Maerli, Researcher,Norwegian Institute of InternationalAffairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway*Office: NUPI, P.O. Box 8159 Dep., N-0033 Oslo, Norway, Tel.: (++47) 22 0565 03, Fax: (++47) 22 17 70 15, E-mail:[email protected]



Dr .Miguel Marin-Bosch, Member, Pug-wash Council; Professor, UniversidadIberoamericana, México, D. F., Mexico*Office: Universidad Iberoamericana,Prol. Paseo de la Reforma 880, Lomas deSanta Fe, México, D. F. 01210 Mexico,Tel.:. 59507678, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Omar Masera, Professor of Ecology,Instituto de Ecología, NationalAutonomous University of Mexico(UNAM), Campus Morelia, Michoacan,Mexico; Advisor to Secretary of Environ-ment and Natural Resources]*Office: Instituto de Ecología, UNAM,A.P. 152, Patzcuaro 61609, Michoacan,Mexico, Tel./Fax: (++52-434) 23216,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Jiri Matousek, Professor of Toxicol-ogy, Masaryk University Brno, Faculty ofScience, Research Centre forEnvironmental Chemistry and Ecotoxi-cology, Brno, Czech RepublicOffice: Masaryk University Brno, Facultyof Science, Research Centre for Environ-mental Chemistry and Ecotoxicology,Kamenice 3, CZ-25 00 Brno, CzechRepublic, Tel.: (++420-5) 4712-1411,Fax: (++420-5) 4712-1431, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. (R.) Ian McAllister, Professor ofEconomics and International Develop-ment Studies, Department of Economics,Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Sco-tia, Canada*Institution: Department of Economics,Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Sco-tia, B3H 3J5, Tel.: (++902) 494 -6993,Fax: (++902) 494-6917 E-maol: [email protected]

Prof. Anne McLaren, Principal ResearchAssociate, Wellcome Trust/CancerResearch UK, *Institute: Tel.: (++44-1223) 334 088,E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. André L. Mechelynck, retired Engi-neer, now Consultant in Energy Matters,Huldenberg, Belgium*Office/Home: Koxberg 25, B-3040Huldenberg, Belgium, Tel.: (++32-2) 6874212, Cellular: (++32-475) 87.79.41,Fax: (++32-2) 687 3157, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Peter Meincke, President Emeritus,Universtity of Prince Edward Island,Charlottetown PE C1A 4P3, CanadaHome: 1236 River Road RR#3,Manotick Ontario Canada K4M 1B4,Tel./Fax: (++1-613) 692 2785, Cell: (++1-613) 866 1582, E-mail:[email protected]://www.upei.ca/~meincke

Prof. Asoka Mendis, Research professor,Department of Electrical & ComputerEngineering, University of California SanDiego, La Jolla, CA, USA*Institute: Department of Electrical &Computer Engineering, University of Cal-ifornia San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093-0407, USA, Tel.: (++1-858) 534-2719,Fax: (++1-858) 822-3214, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Lucius (D.L.O.) Mendis, TechnicalAdvisor, Ministry of Irrigation and WaterManagement, Colombo, Sri LankaOffice Ministry of Irrigation and WaterManagement, Sri Lanka T B JayahMawatha, Colombo 10, Sri Lanka,Tel./Fax: (++94-1) 593210; E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Steven Miller, Director, InternationalSecurity Program, Center for Science &International Affairs (CSIA), HarvardUniversity, Cambridge, Massachusetts,USA*Office: CSIA, Harvard University, Cam-bridge, Massachusetts, Tel.: (++1-617)495 1411, Fax: (++1-617) 495 8963,E-mail: steven_miller @harvard.edu

Dr. Robert Mtonga, General Practictionerto Lusaka Hospitals, ZambiaOffice: University of Zambia, P.O. Box50110, Lusaka, Zambia, Tel.: (++260)9784 2922, Fax: (++260-1) 250-753,E-mail: [email protected] (and)[email protected];[email protected]

Prof. Marie Muller, Chair, PugwashCouncil; Dean, Faculty of Humanities,University of Pretoria, South Africa*Office: University of Pretoria, Pretoria0002, Republic of South Africa, Tel.:(++27-12) 420-2318, Fax: (++27-12) 4204501, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Maciej Nalecz retired Director,Institute of Biocybernetics and Biomed-ical Engineering, PAS (1975-94), Warsaw,Poland

*Office: International Center of Biocyber-netics, ul. Ksiecia Trojdena 4, 02-109Warsaw, Poland, Tel.: (++48-22) 658-2877, Fax: (++48-22) 658-2872, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Giuseppe Nardulli, Professor ofTheoretical Physics, University of Bari,Italy*Office: Physics Department, Universityof Bari, Via E. Orabona 4, 70126 Bari,Italy, Tel.: (++39-080) 544-3206,Fax: (++39-080) 544-2470, E-mail:[email protected]

Ms. Binalakshmi Nepram, School ofInternational Studies, Jawaharlal NehruUniversity, New Delhi, IndiaOffice: School of International Studies,Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi110067, India, Tel.: (++98-91) 210-264(mobile), Fax: (++91-11) 2619-6117,E-mail: [email protected] /[email protected]..

Dr. Götz Neuneck, Member, PugwashCouncil Senior Fellow, IFSH, Hamburg,Germany*Office: IFSH, Falkenstein 1, D-22587Hamburg, Germany, Tel.: (++49-40)866077-21, Fax: (++49-40) 866-3615,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Elaine Newman, Professor, Dept. ofBiology, Concordia University, Montreal,Quebec, Canada*Office: Dept. of Biology, Concordia Uni-versity, 1455 de Maisonneuve West,Montreal, H3G 1M8 Quebec, Canada,Tel.: (++1-514) 848 3410,Cell: (++1-514)572-4307, Fax: (++1-514) 848 2881,Email: [email protected]

Prof. Jiri Niederle, President, Council forForeign Affairs of the Academy of Sci-ences of the Czech Republic *Institute:ASCR, Narodni Street 3, 117 20 Prague1, Czech Republic, Tel.: (++420-224) 240532, Fax: (++420-224) 240 608, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Centerfor Political and International Studies(CPIS), Moscow, Russia*Office: Center for Political and Interna-tional Studies, Prospect Mira 36,Moscow 129010, Russia, Tel.: (++7-095)280-3441, Fax: (++7-095) 135-5279, E-mail: [email protected]



Mr. Niu Qiang, Secretary General, Chi-nese People’s Association for Peace andDisarmament (CPAPD), Beijing, China*Office: CPAPD, PO Box 188, 15 Wan-shou Rd., Beijing, China 100036, Tel.:(++86-10) 6827-1736, Fax: (++86-10)6827-3675, E-mail: [email protected](and) [email protected]

Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff, Professor, Dept.of Microbiology and Genetics, DarmstadtUniversity of Technology, Darmstadt,Germany*Office: Dept. of Microbiology andGenetics, Darmstadt University of Tech-nology, Schnittspahnstr. 10, D-64287Darmstadt, Germany, Tel.: (++49-6151)163955, Fax: (++49-6151) 162956,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Hitoshi Ohnishi, Vice President,and Professor of International Relationsin the School of Law, Tohoku University,Sendai, Japan*Office: School of Law, Tohoku Univer-sity,Kawauchi, Aoba-ku, Sendai 980-8577, Japan; E-mail: [email protected]

Gen. Pan Zhenqiang, Professor, Instituteof Strategic Studies, National DefenseUniversity, PLA, China*Office: Institute of Strategic Studies,National Defense University, PLA, China,No. 14, Building 281, A-3 Hongshankou,Tel/Fax: (++86-10) 8283-1159, E-mail:[email protected]

Shri Ashok Parthasarathi, Professor, Cen-tre for Studies in Science Policy, School ofSocial Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-versity (JNU), New Delhi, IndiaOffice: Centre for Studies in Science Pol-icy, School of Social Sciences-1, JNU,New Delhi-110067, Tel.: (++91-11)2617-9906, Fax: (++91-11) 2619-5777;E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Derek Paul, retired Professor ofPhysics, University of Toronto, Canada*Home: 122 Hilton Avenue, Toronto,Ontario, Canada M5R 3E7, Tel.: (++1-416)-532 6440;Fax: (++1-416)-5328009. Email: [email protected]

Prof. Amnon Pazy, Professor of Mathe-matics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,Israel*Office: Dept. of Mathematics, HebrewUniversity, Jerusalem 91904, Israel, Tel.:(++972-2) 658-5127, Fax: (++972-2)563-0702, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Annaswamy N. Prasad,Commissioner, UNMOVIC, UnitedNations, New York*Home: 114/74, 6th Main Road, 5thBlock, Jayanagar, Bangalore-560 041,India, Tel.: (++91-80) 665-1106, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Jan Prawitz, Visiting Scholar,Swedish Institute for InternationalAffairs, Stockholm, SwedenOffice: P.O. Box 1253, SE-111 82 Stock-holm, Sweden, Tel. (++46-8) 23 40 60,Fax. (++46-8) 20 10 49, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Gwyn Prins, Alliance Professor,London School of Economics and Politi-cal Sciences, UK*Office: LSE, Room V912, London, UK,Tel.: (++44-20) 7852 3678, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Victor Rabinowitch, Consultant inScience & International Affairs, Develop-ment, Philanthropy, Washington, DC,USA*Home: Tenley Hill, #507, Washington,DC 20016, Tel.: (++1-202) 363-2414,Fax: (++1-202) 363-0565, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. J. Martin Ramirez, Professor of Psy-chiatry, and Head, Psychobiology Depart-ment, & Institute for Biofunctional Stud-ies, Universidad Complutense, Madrid,SpainOffice: Psychobiology Department, &Institute for Biofunctional Studies, Uni-versidad Complutense Madrid, Spain,Tel./Fax: (++34-91) 8444-695, Fax:(++34-91) 394-31 89, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Robert W. Reford, Writer; Co-founder, Reford-McCandlessInternational, Canada*Home/Office: Reford-McCandless, R.R.#1, 4978 Crescent Beach Road, La Have,Nova Scotia, Canada, B0R 1C0, Tel.:(++1-902) 688-1161, Fax: (++1-902)688-1149, E-mail: [email protected]

Mrs. Stephanie McCandless Reford,President, Co-founder, Reford-McCandless International, Canada*Home/Office: Reford-McCandless, R.R.#1, 4978 Crescent Beach Road, La Have,Nova Scotia, Canada, B0R 1C0, Tel.:

(++1-902) 688-1161, Fax: (++1-902)688-1149, E-mail: [email protected]

Hon. John B. Rhinelander, Senior Coun-sel, Shaw Pittman, Washington, DC, USA*Office: Shaw Pittman, 2300 N St. NW,Washington, DC 20037-1128, USA, Tel:(++1-202) 663-8048, Fax: (++1-202)663-8007, E-mail: [email protected]

Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., The Senateof Canada, Ottawa, Ontario*Office: University of Alberta, Edmon-ton, Alberta, Canada, Tel.: (++1-780)466-8072, Fax (++1-780) 469-4732,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Jorge Rodríguez Grillo, Doctor inSociological Sciences; Cuban Movementfor Peace and Sovereignty of Peoples,Cuba*Home: Edif. 8 apto.202, Ciudad CamiloCienfuegos, Habana del Este, Havana,Cuba, Tel.: (++537) 952123 / 320506,Fax: (++537) 333860, E-mail:[email protected]

Sir Joseph Rotblat, Emeritus Professor ofPhysics, University of London, UKOffice: Pugwash Conferences on Scienceand World Affairs, Flat A Museum Man-sions, 63A Great Russell Street, LondonNC1B 3BJ, England, Tel.: (++44-20)7405 6661, Fax: (++44-20) 7831 5651.E-mail: [email protected]

Acad. Yuri Ryzhov, President, Interna-tional Engineering University, Moscow,Russia*Institute: 6 Leninsky pr., Moscow, Rus-sia, Tel.: (++7-095) 236-5066 / 9761,Fax: (++7-095) 236-1469, E-mail:[email protected]

Ms. Ritva Saario, Lawyer and Researcherin Humanitarian Law, University ofHelsinki, Finland*Home: Pohj. Hesperiankatu 13 B 25,FIN-00260 Helsinki, Finland, Tel.:(++358-9) 454 3638, Mobile: (++358-40)523 1369, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Walter Scheuer, former SeniorResearcher/Head of Department (1953-1989), Argentine Atomic Energy Com-mission*Home: Av. E. Bustillo 22800, San Carlos



de Bariloche (Rio Negro), Argentina,Tel./Fax: (++54-42944) 448 294, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Douglas Scott, President, The Mark-land Group, Ancaster, ON, Canada *Home/Office: The Markland Group,203-150 Wilson Street, Ancaster, ON,Canada L9G 4E7, Tel.: (++1-905) 648-3306, Fax: (++1-905) 648-2563, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Behzad Shahandeh, Full Professor,Faculty of Law and Political Science,Tehran University, Tehran, IranOffice: Faculty of Law and Political Sci-ence, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran,Tel.: (++982-1) 877 3894, Fax: (++982-1)896-9565, E-mail: [email protected]

Amb. Mohamed Shaker, Chairman,Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs(ECFA), Cairo Office: ECFA, 120 Moh’e El-din AbuElezz Mohandesean, Cairo Tel.: (++20-2)337-8242, Fax: (++20-2) 760-3552,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Erika Simpson, Associate Professorand Visiting Research Fellow, Liu Insti-tute, University of British Columbia,B.C., Canada *Home: 4634 Vantreight Drive, Victoria,BC, Canada V8N, Tel.: (++1-250) 383-3297

Mr. Alan Slavin, Professor of Physics,Trent University, Peterborough ON,Canada *Office: Trent University, PeterboroughON K9J 7B8 , Canada, Tel.: (++1-705)748-1011 (x1289), Fax: (++1-705) 748-1652,E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Hussein Solomon, Associate, Dept.of Political Sciences, Univ. of Pretoria,Pretoria, Republic of South Africa Office: , Department of Political Sciences,University of Pretoria, Pretoria 0002,Republic of South Africa, Tel.: (++27 12)420-4339, Fax: (++27 12) 420 3886,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Fernando de Souza Barros, Profes-sor Emeritus, Physics Institute, FederalUniversity of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil*Office: Physics Institute, UFRJ, CaixaPostal 68528, 21941-972 Rio de Janeiro,Brazil, Tel.: see below, Fax: (++55-21)2562-7368, E-mail: [email protected];[email protected]

Prof. Metta Spencer, Emeritus Professor,University of Toronto, Toronto, ON,Canada*Home: 155 Marlee Ave., Apt. 201,Toronto, ON, Canada M6B 4B5, Tel.:(++1-416) 789-2294, Fax: (++1-416)789-4508, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Malur Srinivasan, Member, NationalSecurity Advisory Board; SeniorAdviser/Consultant, Tamilnadu, India*Home/Office: Sunningdale, Kota GiriRoad, Ootacamund-643002, Tamilnadu,India, Tel.: (++91-423) 2443 216, Fax:(++91-423) 2442 572, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Jean-Pierre Stroot (Belgium/Switzerland), retired Physicist ; Geneva Office: GIPRI, rue de la Voie-Creuse 16,1202 Geneva, Switzerland, Tel. (**41-22)919 79 40, Fax: (**41-22) 919 79 43;E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh(Germany/South Korea), SeniorResearcher, Free University of Berlin,Berlin, GermanyOffice: Department of Political Science,Freie Universität Berlin, Room 117a,Ihnestrasse 22, D-14195 Berlin,Germany, Tel.: (++49-30) 8385-5402,Fax: (++49-30) 8385-5049, E-mail:[email protected]; [email protected]

Dr. Olga Sukovic, Scientific Adviser, Insti-tute of International Politics andEconomics, Belgrade, YugoslaviaOffice: Institute of International Politicsand Economics, Makedonska 25,Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Tel.: (++381-11)3221-433, E-mail: [email protected] [email protected]

Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki, Senior ResearchScientist, Central Research Institute ofElectric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Tokyo;Professor, Keio University GraduateSchool of Media and Governance; Co-Founder, Peace Pledge, Japan*Office: CRIEPI, 1-6-1, Ohtemachi,Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-8126, Japan,Tel.: (++81-3) 3201-6601, Fax: (++81-3)3287-2805, E-mail:[email protected];[email protected]

Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, President, Pug-wash Conferences on Science and WorldAffairs, and Member, Pugwash Executive

Committee; UNESCO Chair in Ecotech-nology ; Chairman, MS SwaminathanResearch Foundation, Chennai, India*Office: , MS Swaminathan ResearchFoundation, 3rd Cross Street, TaramaniInstitutional Area, Chennai-600 113,India, Tel.: (++91-44) 254 2790 / 1698,Fax: (++91-44) 254 1319, E-mail:[email protected]

Ms. Mariko Taniuchi, Journalist, Tokyo,Japan*Home: 2-6-21 Horinouchi, #B-104, Sug-inami-ku, Tokyo, Japan 166-0013,Tel./Fax: (++81-3) 3316 8320, e-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Murray Thomson, Member CAN,Network to abolish nuclear weapons,Canada*Home: 554 Orkney Priv., Ottawa, ONK2C 3M7, Tel.: (++1-613) 224-8155,Fax: (++1-613) 563-0017, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Gérard Toulouse, Director ofResearch (CNRS), Department ofPhysics, Ecole Normale Supérieure(ENS), Paris, France*Office: ENS, Dept. of Physics, 24 rueLhomond, F-75231 Paris cedex 5,France, Tel.: (++33-1) 44 32 34 87, Fax:(++33-1) 43 36 76 66, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Tran Ha Anh, retired (since1/04/2003) from National Assembly ofVietnam*Institution: National Assembly of Viet-nam, 35 Ngo Quyen, Ha Noi, Vietnam,Email: [email protected]

Mr. Anthony Turton, Head, AfricanWater Issues Research Unit (AWIRU),Center for International Political Studies(CIPS), University of Pretoria, Pretoria,South Africa *Office: AWIRU, CIPS, Pretoria Univer-sity, Pretoria 0001, South Africa, Tel.:(++27-12) 420-4486, Fax: (++27-12)420-3886, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Vo Hong Anh, Senior Researcher,Professor of Theoretical Physics, Vietnam*Office: Vietnam National AtomicEnergy Commission, Tel.: (++84-4) 942-3479, Fax: (84-4) 942-4133, Email:[email protected]



Prof. Radovan Vukadinovic, Director,Graduate Program in International Rela-tions, Faculty of Political Science, Zagreb,Croatia*Institute: Graduate Program in Interna-tional Relations, Faculty of Political Sci-ence, Lepusiceva 6, Zagreb, Croatia, Tel.:(++385-1) 464-7545, Fax: (++385-1) 4655316, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Peter Walker, Coordinator, PeaceOperations Summer Institute (POSI),Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada*Office: POSI, Acadia University,Wolfville, NS, Tel.: (++1-902) 542-0077,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Michael D. Wallace, Department ofPolitical Science, University of BritishColumbia, Vancouver, Canada *Institution:Department of Political Sci-ence, University of British Columbia,C472-1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, BC,Canada V6T 1Z1, Tel.: (++1-604) 822-4550, Fax: (++1-604) 822-5540, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Mel Watkins, Professor Emeritus ofEconomics and Political Science, Univer-sity of Toronto, Canada*Home: 186 Baillie Ave., Woodlawn,ON, Canada K0A 3M0, Tel.: (++1-613)832-9349, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Christopher Watson, Senior Consul-tant; Emeritus Fellow, Merton College,Oxford, UK*Home/Office: 15 Hurst Rise Road,Oxford OX2 9HE, UK, Tel.: (++44-1865)420661, Fax: (++44-1865) 420661,E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Zhang Jia, Officer of American Pro-grams, China Reform Forum, Beijing,China*Office: China Reform Forum, No. 35,Baofang Hutong, Dongcheng District,Beijing, China, Tel.: (++86-10) 6523-3432-808, Fax: (++86-10) 6512-8410,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Aharon Zohar, Consultant, Regionaland Environmental Planning, Carmei-Yosef, Israel*Office: Tel.: (++972-8) 928-7157, Fax:(++972-8) 928-6087, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Matinuzzaman (Matin) Zuberi,retired Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru Uni-versity (JNU), New Delhi, India*Home: XC-3 Sah Vikas Apartments, 68I.P. Extension, Patparganj, Delhi 110091, India, Tel.: (++91-11) 2242-4963,Fax: (++91-11) 2246 0485, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Bob van der Zwaan, Researcher, Har-vard University, Cambridge, MA, USA;Researcher, Energy Research Center ofthe Netherlands (ECN), Amsterdam,The Netherlands*Office: ECN-Policy Studies, POB 37154,1030 AD Amsterdam, The Netherlands,Tel.: (++31-224) 56 4442, Fax: (++31-204) 922 812, E-mail: [email protected]

S T U D E N T / Y O U N G P A R T I C I P A N T S

Ms. Sarahh Bokhari (Pakistan), Journal-ist and free-lance Research Scholar,Imprint, Toronto, Canada *Home: 22 Earlton Road, Scarborough,M1T 2Rs, Canada, Tel.: (++1-416) 6099330, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Hugo Daniel Estrella, Deputy Gen-eral Co-ordinator, Human Rights Pro-grams, Córdoba State Government,Códoba, ArgentinaInstitution: Centro de Asistencia a la Vic-tima del Delito, Pje. Santa Catalina 66,Córdoba, Argentina, Tel.: (++54-351)434-1500, (++54-351) 434- 1501, e-mail:[email protected]ù;[email protected]

Ms. Sonika Gupta, Research Officer andPhD Candidate in Chinese Studies, Cen-ter for East Asian Studies, SIS, J. NehruUniversity, New Delhi, India, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Julian Hamfjord (Norway), Student,Dept. of Medicine, University of London,King’s College, UK*Home: Skaaneveien 9, 3180 Nykirke,Norway, Tel.: (++47-330) 21844, E-mail:[email protected],[email protected]

Ms. Elena Krivosheina, PhD Student,Russian Academy of Public Administra-tion under the President of the RussianFederationInstitution: Russian Academy of Public

Administration under the President of theRussian Federation, Tel.: (++7-095) 436-0007; E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Magdalena Kropiwnicka(Poland/Italy), MA student in interna-tional affairs, St. John’s College, RomeCampus, Italy; Consultant UN FAO (asof 7 July 2003), Rome*Home: Via Ugo Ojetti 41, 00136 Rome,Italy, E-mail: [email protected](and) [email protected]

Akira Kurosaki, Research Associate,International Peace Research Institute,Meiji Gakuin University (PRIME),Tokyo, Japan Office: Meiji Gakuin University, 1-2-37Shirokanedai, Minatoku, Tokyo 108-8636 Japan, Tel.: (++81-3) 5421-5652,Fax: (++81-3) 5421-5653, E-mail:[email protected]

Ms. Karolin Lundström, PhD student insociology, University of Uppsala, Upp-sala, Sweden*Institution: Department of Sociology,Thunbergsvägen 3, Box 821, 751 08Uppsala, Sweden, Tel.: (++46-18) 471 1184, Fax: (++46-18) 471 11 70, E-mail:[email protected] (and)[email protected]

Mr. William Marshall, PhD Student,Department of Physics, University ofOxford, UKOffice: Dept. of Physics, Univ. of Oxford,Clarendon Lab, Parks Road, OxfordOX1 3PU, UK, Tel.: (++44-7968)122770, Fax: (++44-1865) 272400,E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Irna van der Molen, MA PublicAdministration with a specialization inInternational Relations, PhD in IrrigationManagement in Sri Lanka; Lecturer,Technology and Development Group,University of Twente, The NetherlandsE-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Miquel Munoz (Spain), Student,Energy and Environmental Studies,Boston University, Cambridge, MA, andUniversitat Autonoma de Barcelona,Spain*Home: 4 William Street, Cambridge,MA 02139, USA, E-mail: [email protected]



Mr. Nagappan Parasuraman (India), PhDStudent in Sociology (MS fromAnnamalai University), SwaminathanResearch Foundation/Madras University,E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Juan Pablo Pardo-Guerra,Undergraduate Student in Physics, Uni-versidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico,Mexico City, MexicoInstitution: Facultad de Ciencias, Univer-sidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico,Mexico City, Mexico, E-mail:[email protected];[email protected]

Ms. Joelien Pretorius (South Africa), PhDstudent, Centre for International Studies,Cambridge University, UK *Office: Centre for International Studies,Cambridge University, FitzwilliamHouse, 32 Trumpington Street,Cambridge CB2 1QY, UK, Tel.: (++44-1223) 7413-11/12, Fax: (+44-1223)7413-13, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Moritz Riede, PhD Student in SolarCell Research, Fraunhofer Institute forSolar Energy Systems, Freiburg, Germany*Office: Fraunhofer Institute for SolarEnergy Systems, Heidenhofstr. 2,Freiburg, Germany, Tel.: (++49-173) 464-2787, Fax: (++49-821) 486-3380, E-mail:[email protected];[email protected]

Ms. Gina van Schalkwyk, Researcher,South African Institute of InternationalAffairs (SAIIA), Univ. of the Witwater-srand, Braamfontein, Johannesburg,South Africa*Office: South African Institute of Inter-national Affairs, Jan Smuts House, Univ.of the Witwatersrand, Braamfontein,Johannesburg, South Africa. Tel.: (++27-11) 339-2021, Fax: (++27-11) 339-2154,E-mail: [email protected];[email protected]

Mr. Robert Schingler, Researcher, NASAAmes, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Sebastian Straube, 3rd-year Studentin Physiology, St. Peter’s College, Univer-sity of Oxford, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Pablo Suarez (Argentina), PhD Stu-dent in Geography (climate change, deci-sion-making, environmental justice) andResearch Assistant, Boston University,Boston, Massachusetts

*Office: Boston University, Dept. ofGeography, 675 Commonwealth Ave.,Boston, MA 02215, USA, Tel.: (++1-617)783-3046, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. George T. Whitesides, ProjectDirector, Permission to Dream Institu-tion, Venice, CA, USA*Office: Permission to Dream Institu-tion, 254 Horizon Ave., Venice, CA90291, Tel.: (++1-626) 833-5869, Fax:(++1-413) 604-0142, E-mail:[email protected]

C A N A D I A N S T U D E N T /Y O U N G P A R T I C I P A N T S

Ms. Jessy Cowan, 4th-year Student inMath and Physics, Queen’s University,Kingston, Ontario, Canada*Home: 89 Princess Street, apt. 204,Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3E4,Tel.: (++1-613) 548-3643, Fax: (++1-613)924-1814, E-mail: [email protected](and) [email protected]

Ms. Christie Dennison (Canada),student/MA candidate in conflict resolu-tion, Dept. of Peace Studies, University ofBradford, West Yorkshire, UKInstitution: University of Bradford, Rich-mond Road, Bradford, West YorkshireBD7 1DP, UK, Tel.: (++44-1274) 236994,E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Brandon Gallant, undergraduate stu-dent in international politics and the evo-lution of world order, University ofWaterloo and Group of 78, Ontario,CanadaInstitution: University of Waterloo, 200University Ave., W. Waterloo, Ontario,Canada N2L 3G1, Tel.: (++1-519) 888-4567; E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Moira Goodfellow, Intern, PearsonPeacekeeping Centre, Cornwallis Park,Clementsport, NS, Canada*Office: PO Box 100, Clementsport,Nova Scotia, Canada, B0S 1E0, Tel.:(++1-902) 638-8611 (x135), Fax: ++1-(902) 638-3310, E-mail:[email protected];[email protected]

Hannah Hickey, graduate student in cli-mate modeling, University of Victoria,School of Earth and Ocean Sciences(SEOS), Victoria, BC, Canada

*Institution: University of Victoria,SEOS, Ian Stewart Complex, P.O. Box3055, Victoria, BC, V8W 3P6, Canada,Tel.: (++1-250) 472-4003, Fax: (++1-250)472-4004, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Katrina Hurley, Emergency MedicineResident and Secretary-Treasurer, Physi-cians for Global Survival (Canada), Hali-fax, Nova Scotia, Canada*Institution: Department of EmergencyMedicine, Dalhousie University, 351Bethune, VG Site, QEII Health SciencesCentre, 1278 Tower Road, Halifax, NS,Canada B3H 2Y9, , Tel.: (++1-902) 494-3199, Fax: (++1-902) 473-3617, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Blair MacPherson, graduate of Aca-dia University, incumbent Law student,Ontario, Canada*Home: 158 Heathwood Hts. Dr.,Aurora, Ontario, Canada L4G 4V9,E-mail: [email protected]

Ms. Joann Macrae, Dalhousie University,Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada*Home: 1275 Hollis St., Apt # 2, HalifaxNS B3J 1T7, Canada, Tel.: (++1-902)422-4592, E-mail: [email protected]

Mr. Alex Mazer, Student in Political The-ory, University of Toronto, Ontario,Canada*Home: 276 Clinton St., Toronto ONM6G 2Y6, Canada, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. David Sandomierski 74 Gypsy Rose-way, Willowdale ON M2N 5Y9, Canada,E-mail: [email protected]


Amb. (ret.) Ochieng Adala, of the AfricaPeace Forum (APFO) in Nairobi, Kenya,is former Permanent Representative ofKenya to the United Nations in NewYork, former Deputy Secretary/Directorfor Political Affairs, Ministry of ForeignAffairs and International Cooperation,and former Ambassador of Kenya to theArab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom ofMorocco, Algeria and Tunisia; APFO,P.O. Box 76621, Tel.: (++254-2)574092/6, Fax: (++254-2) 561357,E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell is Executive Directorof Pugwash Conferences on Science andWorld Affairs, former Associate Execu-tive Officer at the American Academy ofArts and Sciences in Cambridge, and for-mer Staff Aide at the National SecurityCouncil in Washington, DC; PugwashConferences, Tel.: (++1-202) 478-3440,Email: [email protected]

Prof. Francesco Calogero is professor oftheoretical physics at the University ofRome “La Sapienza”, Chair of the Pug-wash Council, former Secretary-Generalof Pugwash (1989-1997), and a formermember of the Governing Board of SIPRI(1982-1992); Pugwash Conferences, viadella Lungara 10, I-00165 Roma, Italy,Tel. (++39-06) 687-2606, Fax: (++39-06)687-8376, E-mail: [email protected] (and) [email protected] (please use BOTH)

Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne is a Lecturer inDisarmament and Arms Control issues atthe Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, formerHead of TDB at the Organization for theProhibition of Chemical Weapons in TheHague, former Staff in the StrategicAffairs Department of the Ministry ofDefense, and former Negotiator, Chemi-cal Weapons Convention; 29 AvenueDanton, 43300 Langeac, France,Tel./Fax: (++33-4) 71 77 24 57, E-mail:[email protected]

Mr. Chen Jifeng is Convener of the Pug-wash Group of China, Vice President ofthe China Arms Control and Disarma-ment Association, and Executive VicePresident of the China Association forPromotion of International Science andPeace. He was formerly Secretary Generalof the Chinese People’s Association forPeace and Disarmament (CPAPD) in Bei-jing, and Council Member of the Chinese

Association for International Understand-ing; CPAPD, PO Box 188, 15 WanshouRd., Beijing, China 100036, Tel.: (++86-10) 6827-1736 or 6821-4433 (ext.8586), Fax: (++86-10) 6827-3675,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino is Professorof Mathematical Physics at the Universityof Milan in Italy, Secretary General of theUnion of Italian Scientists for Disarma-ment (USPID), and Director of the Pro-gram on Disarmament and InternationalSecurity, Landau Network—CentroVolta, Como; Department of Physics,University of Milan, Via Celoria 16,20133 Milan, Italy, Tel.: (**39-02) 50317277, Fax: (**39-02) 5031 7480, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Lynn Eden is Senior Research Scholarat the Center for International Securityand Cooperation (CISAC) at StanfordUniversity in California, and co-chair ofthe US Pugwash Committee; CISAC,Encina Hall, 2nd floor, Stanford Univer-sity, Stanford, California 94305-6165,Tel. : (++1-650) 725 5369, Fax : (++1-650) 724 5683, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Karen Hallberg, a physicist, is cur-rently Research Fellow at the NationalCouncil of Science and Technology, andProfessor at the Balseiro Institute, in Bar-iloche, Argentina, as well as a Member ofthe Board of the Argentine Physics Asso-ciation; Centro Atomico Bariloche, 8400Bariloche, Argentina, Tel.: (++54-2944)445170, Fax: (++54-2944) 445299,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy is Professor ofNuclear Physics at Quaid-e-Azam Univer-sity in Islamabad, Chairman of MashalBooks, an independent maker of docu-mentary films for popularising science inPakistan, and an activist for peace andsocial reform; E-mail: [email protected]

Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said isHead of the Military Studies Unit andTechnology Advisor at the Al-AhramCenter for Political and Strategic Studies,Al-Ahram Foundation in Cairo, Egypt;Professor of Missile Mechanics of Flightat the Military Technical College (MTC)in Cairo; Member of the Committee ofStrategic Planning of the Egyptian Coun-

cil of Space Science and Technology; Al-Ahram Center for Political and StrategicStudies, Al-Galaa St., Cairo, Egypt, Tel.:(++20-2) 770-5630, Fax: (++20-2) 578-6037, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Martin Kaplan, an American living inSwitzerland, is a former director ofresearch at the World Health Organiza-tion and former Secretary-General ofPugwash (1976-88); Pugwash GenevaOffice, The WMO/OMM Building, 7 bisAvenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva,Switzerland, Tel. (++41-22) 730-8620,Fax: (++41-22) 730-8625, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. Saideh Lotfian is Associate Profes-sor of Political Science at the Faculty ofLaw and Political Science at the Univer-sity of Tehran, Deputy Director of theCenter for Middle East Strategic Studiesin Tehran, and Director of the MiddleEast Program at the Center for StrategicResearch; Faculty of Law & PoliticalScience, University of Tehran, EnghelabAve., Tehran, Iran, Tel.: (++98-21) 611-2546, Fax: (++98-21) 896-9565, E-mail:[email protected]

Ambassador Miguel Marin-Bosch is aprofessor at the Universidad Iberoameri-cana in Mexico, and a former DeputyForeign Minister and Ambassador to theConference on Disarmament for the gov-ernment of Mexico; UniversidadIberoamericana, Paseo de la Reforma880, Lomas de Santa Fe, Mexico, DF01210, Mexico; Tel. (++59-507.678),E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Anne McLaren is PrincipalResearch Associate at WellcomeTrust/Cancer Research UK, Institute ofCell and Developmental Biology; a Mem-ber of the British Pugwash Group; Mem-ber of the European Commission’s LifeSciences Group and European Group onEthics; and former Foreign Secretary ofthe Royal Society; Tel.: (++44-1223) 334088, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Steven Miller is director of the Inter-national Security Program of the BelferCenter for Science and InternationalAffairs at Harvard University’s KennedySchool of Government, editor-in-chief ofthe quarterly International Security, andco-chair of the US Pugwash Committee.Formerly, he was a senior research fellow

Pugwash Council for the 2002–2007 Quinquennium

at the Stockholm International PeaceResearch Institute (SIPRI), and taughtdefense and arms control studies in thepolitical science department at the Massa-chusetts Institute of Technology; CSIA,J.F.Kennedy School of Government, Har-vard University, 79 JFK Street,Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, Tel.(++1-617) 495-1411, Fax: (++1-617)495-8963, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Marie Muller is Dean of the Facultyof Humanities, and Director of the Cen-tre for International Political Studies, atthe University of Pretoria. She is also aCouncil Member of the Academy of Sci-ence of South Africa, and Chair of thePugwash South Africa Group; Universityof Pretoria, Pretoria 0002, Republic ofSouth Africa, Tel.: (++27-12) 420-2318,Fax: (++27-12) 420 4501, E-mail:[email protected]

Dr. Götz Neuneck is a physicist workingon international security issues. He is cur-rently Senior Fellow at the Institute forPeace Research and Security Policy(IFSH) in Hamburg; Member of theCouncil of the German Physical Society(DPG), and Deputy Chairman of theWorking Group “Physics and Disarma-ment” in the DPG; IFSH, Falkenstein 1,D-22587 Hamburg, Germany, Tel.:(++49-40) 866077-21, Fax: (++49-40)866-3615, E-mail: [email protected]

Dr. Alexander Nikitin is Director of theCenter for Political and InternationalStudies (CPIS); Vice Chairman of theRussian Pugwash Committee of Scientistsfor Disarmament and International Secu-rity; Professor at Moscow State Institutefor International Relations; First Vice-President of the Russian Political ScienceAssociation; and Board Member of theRussian Academy of Political Sciences;CPIS, Prospect Mira 36, Moscow, Russ-ian Federation 129010, Tel. (++7-095)280-3441, Fax: (++7-095) 280-0245,E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Hitoshi Ohnishi is Professor ofInternational Relations and DeputyPresident at Tohoku University in Sendai,Japan; former President of the PeaceStudies Association of Japan; and formerCouncil Member of the Japanese PoliticalScience Association; School of Law,Tohoku University, Kawauchi, Aoba-ku,Sendai 980-8576, Japan, E-mail:[email protected]

Gen. Pan Zhenqiang is Professor at theInstitute of Strategic Studies at theNational Defense University, PLA, China,a retired Major General in the ChinesePeople’s Army, and former Director of theInstitute of Strategic Studies; Institute ofStrategic Studies, National Defense Uni-versity, PLA, China, Tel/Fax: (++86-10)8283-1159, E-mail: [email protected]

Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., is a mem-ber of The Senate of Canada; former Vis-iting Professor at the University ofAlberta in Edmonton; Chairman of theCanadian Pugwash Group; Chairman ofthe Middle Powers Initiative; and formerCanadian Ambassador for Disarmament;University of Alberta, Edmonton,Alberta, Canada, Tel.: (++1-780) 466-8072, Fax (++1-780) 469-4732, E-mail:[email protected] (or) [email protected]

Prof. Sir Joseph Rotblat is emeritus pro-fessor of physics at the University of Lon-don, emeritus President of Pugwash, anda recipient of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize;8 Asmara Road, London NW2 3ST, UK,Tel. (++44-20) 7405-6661, Fax: (++44-20) 7831-5651, E-mail: [email protected] (*)

Acad. Yuri Ryzhov is President of theInternational Engineering University inMoscow; Chair of the Russian PugwashGroup; Academician of the RussianAcademy of Sciences; former Member ofthe Presidential Council of the RussianFederation; and former AmbassadorExtraordinary and Plenipotentiary ofRussia to France; 6 Leninsky pr.,Moscow, Russia, Tel.: ++7-095) 236-5066 / 9761, Fax: (++7-095) 236-1469,E-mail: [email protected]

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM,VrC, VM, a former veteran fighter pilotand Director of Operations of the IndianAir Force, is currently Director of theCentre for Strategic and InternationalStudies; he was Director of the Institutefor Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)in New Delhi (1987-2001); he has pub-lished extensively on strategic and secu-rity issues; 18/803, Heritage City,Mehrauli Road, Gurgaon-122002, India,Tel.: (++91-124) 891-7701, E-mail:[email protected] (or) [email protected]

Prof. Ivo Slaus, a Member of the Croat-ian Parliament, is Chairman of the Parlia-mentary Subcommittee on Science,

Higher Education & Technology, Presi-dent of Croatian Pugwash, a Member ofthe Club of Rome, a Fellow of the WorldAcademy and Academia Europea, formerProfessor of Physics at Rudjer BoskovicInstitute, and former Foreign Secretary ofthe Croatian Academy of Sciences &Arts; Rudjer Boskovic Institute, Bijenicka54, P.O. Box 1016, 10000 Zagreb, Croa-tia, Tel.:(++385-1) 46 80 202, Fax:(++385-1) 46 80 239, E-mail: [email protected]

Prof. Fernando de Souza Barros is Profes-sor Emeritus at the Physics Institute of theFederal University of Rio de Janeiro inBrazil; Physics Institute, UFRJ, Tel. :(++55-21) 2562-7337, Fax : (++55-21)2562-7368, E-mail : [email protected]

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, a SouthKorean political scientist, is a seniorresearcher in the Department of PoliticalScience at the Free University of Berlin inGermany and President of the KoreanPugwash Group. He was formerly thedirector of the Korean InternationalPeace Research Institute (KIPRI)in Seoul,and a member of the Advisory Councilon Peaceful and Democratic Unificationof Korea; Schlieperstr. 12, D-13507Berlin, Germany, Tel.: (++49-30) 433-8574, Fax: (++49-30) 433-2896, E-mail:[email protected]

Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, a renownedagriculture scientist. Considered the sci-entific leader of the Green Revolution, hisapproach in pioneering “ever-green revo-lution” is at the heart of what is nowcalled sustainable agriculture. He is a pastrecipient of the World Food Prize, theHonda Award, the Ramon MagsaysayAward, the UNESCO Gandhi Prize, andthe Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disar-mament and Development. He chairedthe International Commission on Peaceand Food, and is UNESCO Chair inEcotechnology, and Chairman of the MSSwaminathan Research Foundation inChennai, India; MS SwaminathanResearch Foundation, 3rd Cross Street,Taramani Institutional Area, Chennai-600 113, India, Tel.: (++91-44) 254 2790/ 1698, Fax: (++91-44) 254 1319, E-mail:[email protected]

Calendar of Future Pugwash Meetings

6-9 February 2004 South African Pugwash Group: Planning meeting on proposedCape Town, South Africa project, Threats without Enemies: Health Issues of the 21st Century

(with support of International Pugwash)

20-22 February 2004 Indian Pugwash Society Meeting on South Asian Security: New Delhi, India The Role of Confidence-building Measures (with the support of

International Pugwash)

4-7 March 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 291: 11th Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East:Amman, Jordan Prospects for the Peace Process

1-4 April 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 292: 2nd Pugwash Workshop on The Impact of Havana, Cuba Agricultural Biotechnology on Environmental and Food Security

13-16 April 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 293: 3rd Pugwash Workshop on East Asian Security:Beijing, China From Confrontation to Dialogue: Prospect of a New Security Framework in

North East Asia

22-24 April 2004 Conference on Ensuring Security in Space: Enhancing StakeholderWashington, DC Cooperation (jointly organized by the Center For Defense Information,

The Monterey Institute of International Studies, and the PugwashConferences on Science and World Affairs)

1-2 May 2004 Pugwash Meeting no. 294: 21st Workshop of the Pugwash Study GroupOegstgeest, Netherlands on the Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions

2-4 July 2004 Pugwash workshop on Elimination of Fissile Materials Moscow, Russia and Cuts in Nuclear Arsenals

17-19 September 2004 2nd Pugwash workshop on Science, Ethics and SocietyAjaccio, Corsica, France

4-9 October 2004 54th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs: Bridging a Seoul, South Korea Divided World Through International Cooperation and Disarmament

27-31 July 2005 55th Pugwash Conference on Science and World AffairsHiroshima, Japan

Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs

President Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Secretary-General Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Executive Director Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Pugwash Council

Chair Professor Marie Muller

Members Ambassador Ochieng Adala

Professor Fernando de Souza Barros

Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Professor Francesco Calogero

Dr. Pierre Canonne

Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Dr. Lynn Eden

Professor Karen Hallberg

Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy

Mr. Chen Jifeng

Maj. Gen. Mohamed Kadry Said

Dr. Martin M. Kaplan

Prof. Saideh Lotfian

Amb. Miguel Marin-Bosch

Pugwash Executive Committee

Chairman Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino

Members Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell

Prof. Saideh Lotfian

Professor Marie Muller

Professor Anne McLaren

Dr. Steven Miller

Dr. Götz Neuneck

Dr. Alexander Nikitin

Professor Hitoshi Ohnishi

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang

Senator Douglas Roche

Professor Joseph Rotblat

Academician Yuri Ryzhov

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh

Professor Ivo Slaus

Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh

Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang

For biodata and addresses, see page 123.

Geneva Office16 rue de la Voie-Creuse1211 Geneva, SwitzerlandPhone: **41-22-919-7920Fax: **41-22-919-7925E-mail: [email protected]

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Rome OfficeAccademia Nazionale de Linceivia della Lungara, 101-00165 Rome, ItalyPhone: **39-06-6872606Fax: **39-06-6878376E-mail: [email protected]