1_ 15 - NATO

15

BELQIUti

liATO SECRET

17th AUf,lJ.st 1961

3rJçrnency l;JO}l sure ~ ...... ~~ 1_ Theoo aim nt Lrapid de;?~o~nt ta Emorgoncy De:f"ence

Planning pooit1ons, and Intens1f1ed tra1n1ng ot M-day :forooo.

2. Theno neaourea ooom :fena1blo and have no oajor

non-military iop11on.tiona; ovon ropld execution 0f the othol'

:reeoI:tnondationo (000 0010\1) r;ould only 1mprove tJLe etate of'

:t'oreao clowly.

M'DB ~grm AO..q§.~ 3. lncrogS9 mo.nn1.JlS.: An il.crc:"1tJQ of noarly } .... 400 !:lem :for

1962. \7h1le naklng good shortngea in regul~8 and speclnliotG ..

This dOGe not take 1:1to aCCOUl'it t.i'1C ::>algiun pl'ln to reduae

national forces in tavour of 1. \Tû l'oreeEr wh1ch \7ould meet

about 50:< of tho re~lUlred Increasoe Hom~var, the Delgian plans do not Include an increaae in manpower, which tlould be

dirf'lcu1t to achlove tor regollaro nBd techniclans 0\711'16 to

clv1lill11. compet1 t1on. The al tOl""l'lUtlve oolu\1on - eX':".(;;ldlng 8Or.1puloorJ oerv1ce trom 12 to le JJ10ntilo s le IlOt plaI1I10C: and \lou1d be d1fflcu1 t poli tioally ..

4. ?JXpoditjt~qu1pmcmt proL:rQmf1A: Costly in t1r.lO- ..s money", Certain mechanisatlon re".lilirements have not 1)~ detinad and are not completely covered by Del.glan pl;}.mJ.1as.

(a.s. Brmoured personnel carriern and 11ght tanko). PaH.

~1aatlon ot the tllO U-D3y divisions (mili tary p14anoo

for ~~ aooepted two JOus delay) completlon ot: 'fOU an4 atta1J2ment o"r 30 deys re80Me8 (tormoI'~ g1ven t1l1 end 1964), \'fould mean an 1mmed1o.te expenditure of about $100 a1111on.

This comparee vi th the present 7.a:r~ equlp.118nt expondl ture o-r

about i20 mUllon (lO/~ ot the Arfq 'budgot j •

5. No meaaurea ure requ1red b~ SACStJR sinee the !elg1an

Naval J'orees 8es1gne4 to tzATO are under the operatlonal commaD5

ot CI;iCUf.\N. They perroN pal't ot the overall m1ne-aeep1ng ta_ and thUG cannot be re1ated dil'ectly to the Berlin crials. Onder present plana, 1962 ~orce go0.10 1'1111 be achie"N4e

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

15

BELQIULi

l!ATO SECRET

17th AUf,lJ.st 1961

3rJgrnency r;lO}l sure ~ ...... ~~ I_ These aim at Lrapid de;?~o~nt to Emorgency De:f"ence

Planning poolt1ons, and intens1f1ed tra1n1ng ot M-day :rorcoo. 2. Thene neaourea Geom :feasible and have no oajor

non-military iop11on.tlona; evon ropld execution vf the athol' :recoc;nondutiono (000 0010\1) r;ould only 1mprove tJLe state of'

:forceo clowly.

WDB ~grm AO..q§.~ 3. lncroQS9 mo.nn1.JlS.: An Il.crc':"ltJO of nearly } .... 400 !:len :for

1962, while naklng good shortages in regul~8 and spec1nliotn .. This doee not take 1:1to aCCOUl'lt t.i'1C ::>algiun pl'ln to reduae

national forces In tavour of I. \TO :forccEr wh1ch \7ould meet

about 50:< of tho re~lUlred Increasoe Hom~var, tho Belgian plans do not 1nclude an increaae in manpower, which \7ould be

d1rf'1cu1t to ach10ve tor regollaro nBd technicians 0\711'16 to civilian cornpeti tion. The 3.1 to l""l'lUt1ve oolu\1on - QX':".(;;ldlng

8Or.1puloorJ oerv1ce from 12 to 1e JJ10ntilo s 18 not plaI1I10c1 and

\lou1d be d1fflcu1 t poli tioally ..

4. ?JXpoditjt~qu1pmcmt proL:rQJ¥1A: Costly in t1r.l(}- ..s money", Certain mechanisat10n re".lilirements have not 1)~ detined and are not completely covered by Belgian pl;}.mJ.1as.

(e.g. armoured personnel carriero and light tanka). PaH. ~1aatlon ot the two Y-D3y divisions (m1li tary p14anoo

tor ~~ aooepted two lOa-s delay) completion ot: '1'OM an4 atta1J2ment o"r 30 days re80Me8 (tormoI'~ given till end 1964), would mean an immediate expend1ture of about $100 a1111on. This comparee wi til the present 7.a:r~ equlp.118nt expend 1 ture o-r

about i20 mUllon (lO/~ of the Arfq 'budgot j •

5. No measures nre required b~ SACStJR since the Belg1an

Naval i'orcas assigned to nATO are under the operational commaD5

ot CI;iCUf.\N. They perrON pal't ot the overall mine-aeep1ng _ale and thus cannot be re1ated dil'ectly to the BerUn cria1s.

Under present plana, 1902 ~orce go0.10 1'1111 be achie"N4e



-2-

III Nr forçe

EmQrf~nCY meo.g:ù !'1til 6. Complote .},1r ForcQ. :2~: Dy end 1962 the det'1e1ency

iD 0:;.1/ 1.',- . t ',,:lÜC:l ,:'hould 1)0 C1.lcily ro:1odlable.

7 II> l>';1;eÙY ::.11' lt'orçe QupnlJ ~~-l9~9J.'Cl~: '~'ho coat important iL tllQ 10\'1 love:;' ol' Gtoc~:s 01' 2.7:Y' .... oc.:ruti3 l"jl' (;F lu,--,. :i:~ot

uaei'ully rO;:iCùi..lble, us the CF lüu alrcrurt ure echeduled to be

wi tlldrawn f'ron ocrvlce in 1963 and adÜ.l. t1or;al rocketc wou1d not bo nvallablc borore mid-1962.

8. Jxpeditp cOQplçtiol} of b11qterql 04C1LUWiÇ 9L\\tom1S( ir ... i'or·;a ti9:!1B#!<iZ~r.1qnt wi th ~f!...V.l.~.,.;t..1.~: ,;ince i\.utumn 1960,

ever~:'~L<; ;L1,;:-, bccm reldy fo:.~ tllv otoc]~pill:<: oi' ,: tomle WQU.i,.)ons

:for tlL; ::. tri ka e ~uadr',)n in :Jolei l,.:.i:l: QC tio!'! <l:J:;:;cr:d.c on t!lC U. 3.

Long teEJIl--UJjl~

9. HardenJ..ng: Usefulness queotlon:lble, and <:.1chiovencnt by

end 1962 doubttul.

10. 1tQmp1et1oP-2.t_ê.tq.ç,;:{il: On1y deficiencico rolc.to tu the

CF lOU und Hunter ~ircra:ft, both of' wlüch ure L'c11Oduleù to be

w1 thdl'mm in 1;;G3. \dcU t10nal otoc>:c~ \/0:.11':':' l10t 00 ava11able

'be1"o%'6 mld-19h2. !wdl tlonnl. f'undü re,nürell to reach a ~

luvül lI. .QQrIml.~Q~' forcq;;; ~Plgnttgj 12:4 ; , .. )-'-; llili1iéJU

&îtflotl~_f2l:.,_~.Q..J. c _

a) Gu RF84F aircraf't: onl;; likel;v' ::;ourCOG oxternal. a1d.

b) Fl ve CF10C a1rcra:rt: obsolete aireraf't, ~1111 be

replucod by Fl~ aircra:ft a:J :t'rom 1963.

c) One I!llto En: poroonnol now traini!!,f; in the U.S.

Equipmont to bo Pl'0Vldoc1 under extel'nal uid and

de11v8r,y plCU~6d ~or A,turnn 1962. Location ~r the porwnnont t~ite8 in Gorr.1i.my . .l8 yet unsolved.


-2-

I I I Air fOrce

EmQrf~nCY meo.Q:llr1til 6. Complote .\,1r Forco. :2~: Dy end 1962 the det'1e1ency

10 0:;.1/ 1.'.- 't ',,:litc:! .:·hould 1)0 cacily ro:1odlable.

7 II> l>';1ItledY ::.11" It'oNe QupnlJ ~~-l9~9J.'Cl~: '~'ho moot important iL tllQ low lovel of Gtoc~:s 01' 2.7:Y' .... oc.:rutG l"jl' (;F lu,-". :i:~ot

usefully rO;:iCdi..lble, us the OF lUu alrcrurt are echeduled to be

wi tlldrawn i'ron oCl"vlce in 1963 and adt:l.l. t1or;al rocketc would not be available before mid-1962.

8. Jxpeditp cOQplQtioU of b11qterql 04C1LU?1?i9 9L\\tom1sc ir ... fot';a ti9:!·iB.£<iZ~r.1qnt wi til ~f!...V.l.~.,.;t..1.~: ,;ince /\.Utumn 1960,

ever~:'~i:~<; ;L1,;:-, bccm reldy fo:.' tllv otoc]~pill:<: oi' ;.:, tomlc WQU.i,.)ons

:for tlL; ::. trike e ~uadr',)n in :JelCi 1 . .:.i:l: QC tio!'! <l:J:;:;cr:d.c on t!lC U. 3.

Long te£JIl--UJjl~ 9. Har4enJ..ng: Usefulness queotlon:lble, and c.lchiovencnt by

end 1962 doubtful.

10. 1tQmplet1on-2.t_~t<2.<e,;:{il: Only deficiencico rolClto to the

OF IOU and Hunter ~ircra:ft, both of' which are L'c11Oduleu to be

wi thdl'mm in 1;;G3. \dcU tional otoc>:c~ \/0:.11.:.:. 210t bo available 'be 1"0 %'6 mld-19h2. fwd1 t1onnl. :funGu re.H.tlrell to reach a ~

luvul ll. .QQrIml.~Q~' forcg;;; ~PlgWt9j 'w;; ; , .. )-'-; llili1i<lU

&ltflotl~_f2l:.,_~.Q..J. c _

a) G1x RF84F aircraft: onl;; likel;v' ::;ourCOG external. aid.

b) P1 ve CF10C aircraft: obsolete aircraft, ~111l be

replucod by Fl~ aircraft a:J :from 1963. c) One I!llto En: poroonnol now trainil1,£; in the U.S.

Equipmont to be Pl'0Vldoc1 under external aid and delivery plCU~6d ~or A,turnn 1962. Location ~r the porwnnont t~ite8 in Gorr.1i.my ,.l8 yet unsolved.



17th AUgust 1961

CANADA

Hevlcw pl3.nr~l.: .. g f·;)r rapid deploJ.1le!lt to ~'urope or the

Gtr::\t~2.1c Re;'3erve - 'llhicl1 will brlr4:!: tb.cJunadian contribution te: O!}O :Di visiQ:~ - a:,:!d to 1Lt~ ... !.olfy tr·,üning. ~~o major

non-û111.i. t.J.r.:,' irr:p11cations.

2. tJechaniflst10n of the Brigade w111 ly:cd aOO'Jt 235 co~bnt veh1cles. The decision to order the n(';:VJ Gan.o.da-lJrç,.:l..leod

Bobcat has been taken, but the delivery c~ot 1)0 eX!,locted

be:f'ore 1964.

II .. ~

T rr --_.

3. Cc.~li':ldiun Havnl uni tr aSD1::"11ad t.o l'ifl ... TC are :111 tP1('er

Air -;force

~~ teœ meapures

5. Hardsm1n,g: a1rcra:ft are ta be the end of 1963.

or doubttul accaptabili ty, as exls'.:.ing

replaoed by OFI04 a1rcrùf't, plrumod for


17th August 1961

CANADA

Hevlcw pl3.nr~l.: .. g f';)r rapid deploJ.1le!lt to ~'urope or the

Gtr::\t~2.1c Re;'3erve - which will brlr4:!: tb.cJunadian contribution tc: O!}O :Di visiQ:~ - a:::!d to 1Lt~ ... !.olfy tr·Jj.ning. ~~o major

non-illl1.i. t.J.r.;,' irr:p11cations.

2. tJechaniflst10n of the Brigade w111 l¥:cd aOO'Jt 235 co~bnt vehicles. The decision to order the n(';:VJ Gan.o.da-lJI'(,,:lJeod

Bobcat has been taken, but the delivery c~ot 1)0 eX!,locted

be:f'ore 1964.

II .. ~

T rr ___ I

3. Cc.~li':ldiun Havnl uni tr aSD1::"11ad t.o l'ifl ... TC are :111 tP1('er

Air -;force

~~ term measures

5. Hardsm1n,g: aircraft are to be the end of 1963.

or doubtful accaptabili ty, as exls'.:.ing

replaoed by OFI04 a1rcruf't, plrumod for



I.L .. , , . ?C::tE'i' ï,~ttî i~v /l'lst. 1961. -- --

1. ..... lDor ... e iIlAWlill8.

~- nu11d up re"e.:-V'd' $"'oka. ;H!'tio'Il.J.l'll "~,,,,,,,,,,,.

G. L:tene1f,y tI'wl:ÛAg.

2. ~..2.di: Tb • .f1r~ t t-wo me"4Uree, eY8r'1 if il.'llDEtd1a.tel;r

t~ell, would not giTfi' imaedi::.t. r'J.;::!ul te. Thore W'/:.L1 i be

cons!d9r~~lQ i'1no.'il)t ... l '.I.n:l pro1.1.1otiClYI ?roblI!tGo~ .:'he th1.rd

med.&U:1'G ~ 'he .. pplied 11ïlMMii;,tely wi thel! t majo~' nnn~·!':tH t J:':'''

1.pl1oe. tions •

Loue tarm meaauf'8

). ?e!sonne!, The Ar..1'y IItren.;th ht.i.& tinal17 to be inore .• eacl

by ove:' 5~"', ..•. t present th~ L.nil.9h ~~overnm&n.t le planning te

raduce ti:e lengfb of miH t;,'!'y ~erv1.cê te 1~ !'I:{:.-:-.t.!"' fi , d th 1.. COQ

penei. .. tinô' l:'::hë .. l'p 1nore.is.a in !'~~ula.ra. Tt aeems d,)l,l"t'tful ','{};e't ,.~r

both reaul ta can "e obt?ln&1, .... !':'-'n:r e!lSe ;~~er .t.b~ costa -

~lre&4y •• "'1'8rolv 111:J1ted ~. w'::':'lld in"Hd.$" coft8i,dl'll!" .. bl)'.

4c :9.uiJ2!!l~n.!1 :"T~lilent. e~;.j,i~".;r,;mt iz inMequ::.te ,.nJ. b",dly nëade

:ilod 8rni ai. t ie ~l. ('hs :;;;';':.11 ~>h .;,; .• t>·~o ri ti -e a 3xpe~ t LI l'ûee i YQ the major

part of re,pla.cem'mt froID e.1tsrn.J.l ~id, but OH ;:>realitll"t 1acUoaUone

th18 19 onr-optisiaUo. If tuDde •• re "'v ... i1 , ... bl. , 141 '\lQ,tion of

nation,:l ~,roour.m.nt would tet.ke •• vero'à.l ye .. rübttfor. aip11'lc:.a.nt

15,ro.eœents were 8.8D_

). :iearl1' al1 the D~Bh N!f.-.y 111 aeslgned to 8AcmR. 'fil ......

aer10ua mamû,ug aJMl u~1n1ng derlo1enc1 •• , pa.rt1oulC"1,. iD. .. Id ..

fOl'Cea- ::'re .. nt pl&111l for .hip repl;,;,cftrJent will not. p!'On4e ... ~1l.M

moderaiaatiou in the l1e~ fu"ture. lJ'he blee.eurea 8U~tocl __ 8<~cmm

lar~el.1 rel..il.te W az\ 1Acreü.". in m.t.ruliAg . ..nà, 1ntenaify1ag tJut

tr ... in1ng prllgl'dJ''1m8. .1 thougt~ Ul-.jOl" ~lior, .... t1on ~)t the manDins

51 matlon i~ unl1ke17, SOIllO ,i)rOfts'T9t';S oa.n Ull~.':lUhtedly be mad. b7 tlAe

::a.u1sh 'JO'·HH'n:t\r:ll1.'t in thfls8 à.irrJoti':mô.


I.L .. , , . ?C::tE'i' I,~th i~v Il'lst. 1961. -- --

1. ..... lDor ... e QlAWlil18.

~- nu11d up re"e.:-V'd' $"'oita. ;H!'tiO'll.J.l'l, "~,,,,,,,,,,,.

G. L;tene1f,y tI'wl:liAg.

2. ~..2.di: 'l'be .f1r~ t t.wo me',<Rlree, eY8r'1 if il.'llDEtd1a.tel;r

t~ell, would not giTfi' imaedi::.t. r'J.;::!ul t.. There W'/:.1,1 i bv

cons!d9r~~lQ i'1no.,jl)t ... l '.I.n:l pro1.1.1otiClYI ?roblI!tGo~ .:'he third

med.&u;t'G ~ be .. pplied 11ilMMii.:.tely wi thel! t majo~' nnn~·!':tH t J:':'''

i.pUoe. tiona.

LODC tarm meaauf'8

3. ?e!sonne!, The AT.!.1'y IIl;:ren,;th ht.i.& ttnal17 to be inore .• eacl

by ove:' 5~"', ..•. t present th~ L'nil.9h ~~overnm&n.t ie planning tc

raduce ti:e length 01" miHt;,,!,Y ~erv1.ce to 1~ !'I:{:·-:-.t.!"'fI, dth 1.. COQ

penei. .. tin;- l:'::hF' .. l'p 1nore.is,a in !'~~ula.ra. It aeems d,)t,l-t'tful '.'{};et ,.~r

both reaul t8 can "e obt?ln&1, .... !':'-'n:r e!lSe ;~~er .t.b~ costa -

~lre&4y •• "'1'8roly 11I:Jited ~. w·::.:.tld in"Hd.$" coft8i,dl'll!" .. bl),.

4c :9.uiJ2!!l~n.!1 :"T~lilent. e~;.j,i~".;r,;mt iz inMequ::.te ,loU.!. b",dly neade

::Iod erni ai. t io ~l. 'i'hlt :;~:.li ~>h .;,; .• t>·~o r1 ti -e a 3Xpe~ t b 'i'Gce i YO the major

part ot re,pla.cem'mt from e.1tsrn.J.l ~id, but OH ;:-rearall"t 1acUoa"tione

this 19 onr-optisiaUo. If fund ••• re ",..,. .. i1, ... bl., 141 ,\lo.tion ot nation,;l ~'roour.m.nt would t<:t.ke •• ver;a.l ye .. rubtlfor. aip11'lc:.a.nt

15,ro.ements were 8e8D_

5. :{ea rl1' all tne D~Bh N!f.'YY 111 assigned to 8AcmR. 'Ill ......

aer10ua mamnug aJMl u~1n1ng derlo1enc1 •• , pa.rt1oulC"1,. 1za wild ..

fOl'Cea. ::'re"nt pl&111l for .hip repl;,;,cftrJent will not. p!'On4e ... ~1l.M

moderaiaatiou in the l1e~ fu"ture. lJ'he blee.eurea 8U~tocl __ 8<~cmm

lar~el.1 rel.il.te 'to az\ 1Acre<.i.". in m.t.ruliAg . ..na, 1ntenaify1ag tJut

tr ... in1ng ,Pr1lgl'dJ''1m8. .1 though Ul-.jOl" ~lior, ... t1on ~)t the manDins

&1 matlon i~ unl1ke17, SOIllO ,i)rOfts'T9t';S oa.n Ull~.':lUhtedly be mad. b7 tJAe

::a.u1sh 'JO'·HH'n:t\r:ll1.'t in thfls8 d.irrJoti,:;nso



-2-

III. AlI' h~.

".rG!901 meaeuree

6. IIlore~." ·,ir Force rnanning: Undor 110. recrult1ns .oh __ ,

p::oare". i.e ù-lread,. being rnsdll \:7 the Dan1ah Gov.rnment. lut 'b7

7. ;'::'::J~~-!. U;i r,~~;r.;,:,~ ~OC, ~_:..:~,,-!~!:Ove IlUPW' Thare le .:;,

lack of' ",41"'''' ~1'1,!.'t~ f(l!"'\11 'iT'f''' ,,-r e()tJb~, .. ",1ro:r..lt~ The

~1fricnlt~.~e !!UIM!"to bf\ or~~n1fF;.Urm,~1 :.'Athl!'ll" t~.a:?l !1r.t:,\no1,al,

1U\<l thQ ,,1 tuat1()11 nho\11c\ 'h~ oo ... ~t'totod. '!'hlt rn~Jol' doat'-e'.~12()1 ••

in atook ~e iD 20œ1t lW!IUnl UOlle i4M dt'O, 't&ft.~11 \ whicn ~!Jf)'lld

lny.;)l ... ~ expencü t'ure of "bout Kr., 21 million \.1. Q., doublln~

th. pr ... t Ur Poroe ~ulpl1Gnt _peIl4.1 tur.).

l'!!!..,~_!~.!.·.!.~J"..!.!

do- !~h.!.!!~..E!!~fftl!~~'1C!!~_for_.!!nti_12€l; :'hls l .. rJ~.ly lm~li.e.

the ~ulal tl"ü ot 21 'bomber ~;U'1k. t..il'Craft; th.sc OcJ.t~ only

ooa6 lrom aid.

9. ~!."1y1 PQ •• iol1i'ty of oallp14nio!'\ by 8M 1962, d.ou'-'tful,.

__ lt.pèle ell!t.i:i ~~e W81:l1à: 'be ft~edM.

10. ~~l.â.l" .c&.ali.b\~l tZ.t 'rlli .. u('JU.lcl De r .. pld1:r aohi.vild -

c.r"ain1:r 01' 1962 -. if 'Poli t10al OODtH tians il'lrr.n1 t.


-2-

III. Ail' h~.

"erG!901 mea.urea

6. IIlore~." ·,ir Force rnanning: Undor 110. recrult1ns eoh __ ,

p::oare". i.s u.lread,. being rnsdll \:7 tho Danish Gov.rnment. laat 'b7

7. ;'::'::J~~-!. U;i r,~:.!:..~rn,:,~ ~oc, ~_:..:~,,-!~£Ove IlUPW' There ie .:;,

lack of' ",41"'''' ~1'1,!.'t~ f(l!"'\11 'iT'f''' ,,-r e()tJb~," "'1ro:r..lt~ The

~1fricnlt~.~e !!tflMl"to bf\ or~~n1fF;.Urm,~1 :.'Athl!'ll" t~.a:?l !1r.l:,\no1,al,

1U\<l thQ ,,1 tuati()11 nhot11c\ 'h~ oo ... ~t'totod. '!'hit rn~Jol' doat'-e'.~12()1e.

in "took ~e in 20129 lW!IUnl '\tone i4nd dt'O, 't&ft.~11 \ whicn ~!Jf)'lld

iny.;)l ... ~ expencl1 tU!'8 ot "bout Kr., 21 million \.1. e., doublln~

the pr ... t Ur Poroe ~ulpl1Gnt _peIl4.1 ture).

l'!!!..,~_!~.!.e'!'~J""!'!

d.. !~h.!.!!~..E!!~fftl!~~'1C!!~_for_.!!nti_12€l; :'hlta l .. rJ~.ly lm~li.e.

the ~ulal tl"u ot' 21 bomber ~;U'1ke t..il'Craft; these OcJ.t~ only

ooa6 lrom aid.

9. ~!."1y1 PQ.eiol1i'iy of oallp14niol"l by 8M 1962, d.ou,-,tful,.

__ , •• pele ell!t ... ~~e .81:110. 'be ft~edM.

10. ~~l.a..r .c&.ali.b\~l tl.t 'rlli .. uO'U.lcl 'be r .. pld1:r aohi8v{l(l -

cer"a1n1:r by 1962 -. if 'Pol1 t10al OODtH tions il'lrr.n1 t.



1. Arml.

II. !!!%.

BA'l'O ~'BCILf'fl' I1th Auspat, 1961.

rBAICR

lmerseDOY .e&~

Rep&!!:!!.~ 3 to 4 ~t~alol1Jl tro. Aler1al r.patriatlola

to Burope, reo'l"ga.n1sation and r.tr:dJrl.ng will t!1ke 8 10na

Ume. '!'he short t.m 'Value of thia 1Il.&aUn 1. thu •• &1IIl7

payohologioal.

Log ~l!~!!l!!!.~ 2. a) P.r.onDe!1 no 1nor .... 1. aaked, after r.p~triatlola

of mu ta from ·,Igeria tbere will 1). aurplus man:power

and at pre ...... 110 addi tional ma.npower 1. avail .... 'b1 ••

b) !w1P .. t. .. .ajor .ttort 18 req1l1red W briBe

rapa'iriatecl cllnel0 •• IIp to Europe •• t&D4&J'cl. aa4

to ooaplet .... haal.atlola of all clln.lon.. Prenoh

plamling lnolude. a hiSh prlorl 'Il' for ell n.lona in

Ge:rmarq, reaoh1Dg the requlred m.ua'ber of &l'D)ured.

peraonnel oarrler. b7 the enel of 1962. While the

A.1gel'i.ln probla.A peralat.,thaae :ne.laur,,. will be

tln&ftcl&117 41ttlcult.

l. UD4er th. prooe4ure of C-II(55)82, th. lreaoll Go .. ernmeJlt,

'b7 a IlOt. ot 6th JIa:roh, 1959, witlutm troll LClmi'. 00.'. tll.

hell.1l .... 1 Poro.. .&NU'Itec1 tOI' ... 18D111eD'i ta the Jre41 terraae ...

'l'h.re Mlna 110 Pranoh .a-nl l'oroe. oo..ttted te SAOIUa, h. theM

tora •• ea DO ........ nt ot th. altaatlon .. reCU'd. th. ~

BaY,J ln the pre •• nt Dot ••

4. The ~ori V. of l'reaah _"41 toro •• ~ .armark'" te IA.CLJJrf ..... CI.C& ... , tr.a -hot AG re.ppralaal. h .. Men r.oe1 TM. ,.... Ne.·

ait.1l9nt to .lJ..TO ot Frenoh .. 41~r&A.~ ~ toro •• , wou1' '- a '. OODY1Dolnc 4..aza.tratloa o~ eo114ari '17 Wlcl.r til. pre.ent 01~'L ...... . Th. Prenoh rep17 te AllQ(61) BO •• ao far ... to etat. that th.

1Iecl1 "ft' ...... te ..... will 00-0»8"_ wi th IATO tOH_ oa th. cnatltnM

of hoitUl1 U .. .


I. Arm,.

II. !!!%.

BA'l'O ~'BCILf'fl' 11th Augpat: 1961.

'BAICR

Bmerg!DOY .e&~

Rep&!!:!!.~ 3 to 4 ~t~a1ol1Jl tro. Aler1a. r.patriat1011

to Burope, reo'l"ga.n1sation and r.tr:dJrl.ng will t!1ke 8 10na

time. '!'he short term Talue of thia 1Il.&aUn 1. thus .&11117

payohologioal.

Loy '!£l!~!!l!!!.~ 2. a) P.r.onn_!1 no inor .... i. aaked, after r.p~triat1ol1

of um. ta from ·,lgeria tbare will 1). aurpluB man:power

anel at pre ...... 110 adelitional manpower i. avail .... 'b1 ••

b) !w1-.. t. .. .ajor .ttort i8 required w briBe

repa'iriatecl clineio •• liP to Europe •• t&D4&J'cl. aa4

to oaaplet .... haalsatioll of all din.ion.. Prenoh

plamdng inolude. a high priorit7 for eli n.iona in

Ge:rmazq, reaoh1Dg the requ1red m.ua'ber of &l'D)ured.

peraonnel oarrier. by- the enel of 1962. While the

A.1gel'i.ln probla.A peraiat.,thaae :ne;l.aur,,. will be

fln&ftci&117 difticult.

l. UDder the prooe4ure of C-II(55)82, the Preaoh Go .. ernmeJlt,

'b7 aut. ot 6th JIaroh, 1959, witlulHW troll LClmi'. 00.'. the

hell.h .... 1 Poro.. .&NU'Itec1 for ... i8DllleD'i to the Jre41 terraaeaa.

'!'h.re Hina 110 Prenoh •• -nl I'oroe. oo.-itt.el to BAOIlm, h. theM

tore •• ea DO ........ at ot the aitaation .. reCU'd. the ~

BaY,J in the pre.ent Dot ••

4. The ~ori V. of Preaoh ""41 toro •• ~ earmark .... IA.CLJJrf

..... CI.C& ... , tr.a -hot DO reappraIaal. h .. Hen r.oe1 Teel. ,.... rea.·

a! t.uellt to .1;..'1'0 of Frenoh .. 41 ~r&A.~ ra...-l toro •• , wou1t '- a '. OODY1Dolq 4 .... tratloa o~ eoli4arit7 Wlder til. pre.ent 01~'L ...... .

Th. Prenoh rep17 to AllQ(61) so •• eo tar ... to etate that the

Jlecl1 taft ...... ta ... e. will 00-0»8"_ witll IATO tOH_ 08 the cnatltnM

of hoitUll U .. .



-2-

III~ Air Poro.

~.rl!nol meaeur •• 5. a) R.patrlaUoa ot •• v.ral eg,uadrona of alroratt.

de';'>lind.at on the Al .. ~1_ .1 tuatioa.

D) AF •• ta ~e dej.>lormen" ot nuol.1i.r o&pable U~5.

uni,s for the puriod of t~naion: dependent on

bilaterliÙ. ne~ti~ticni: tetwe.n I<\r-;.;.uo'o; ~d the U.:J.

0:1 >~I\:l::liedy •• ir ~'or:)6 su ppl,i:....!Îe,fici <:1l2J.1!.1 :';&'1.PJl à.nd t.o. :C';r;)l1oh iu;d;ho:cj .. ti~. do 'not 4~~~() i~ tbeil' ;a ~ata::'ç)n'"

of o.$.t'ioierloiet3_ 'i'here .ee:n~ to lJe nl.:l.jor Cl91'101811.1 ••

as regards tra,amenta t:lon bombe o.1.4d F It)J 8.1rorati

epar... The tiret of the.. oan be re t!.cI11T proTide4

from 11. A. l'.; the lI~con.d. re~lUl t from p:roduotio.n ancl

proou1'elllel'lt cUfficul ti.a rC1.ther iih8l1 fro1.l l!lok of

funds.

Log " • .1$ m.&8U!:!,!.

6. a) j1oree •• Although thera 1. 8. _all over~11 aUZ'pluB

te li -1'0 re~UiI'erC3ntG torec~st Dl' end 1962, thora will

be ~. shortage of Itrike alrordoft (wllich oan be alleviated

b3 t:.n asrcelllun~ J;Qi-r.una m.\Qleaz- w ... .PQn.), a iihQr~ .....

cor J'IV',l':'J"11 ,,--.ri ,~il'('l"·",:rt (':(·"'_.~l"I.tlat,fIKl 'h: fHt.1.,'iI"il1i~,c lD'

iJ.1rcr .... tt in 1161''Iri',,.) au.cl u. WtJf.lkucBS in dispersion

c&::;>ab111 ti88, due to ~1'3a~ u.iroral"t 1nstea.d of 11ght

we1ght airora.:ft.

b) RardeniDsl CoapletioD 1»7 .D4 1"2 &D4 u •• rulne •• atter

1962, 4011ltttul.

e) hplpcl thora 1. & ..,8%7 _al1 def1.1eno7 t'rom require

men~a b~ end 1962. w~oh oould ba correoted by repatrlatlDC

personnel trom AIger1a. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE

-2-

III~ Air roroe

~erl!nol meaeur •• 5. a) Repatriation of •••• ral eg,uadrona of alroratt.

de.;.>lindent Oll the Al .. ~1_ .i ttlattoa.

D) Ave. to ~e dej.>lormen" of nuoleli.r o&pable U~5.

uni,s for the puriod of t~naion: dependent on

bilaterliLl ne~ti~ticni: tetwe.n I<"r-;.;.no'o; ~d the U.:J.

0:1 >~I\:l::liedy •• ir ~'or:)6 au ppi.,):....!ie,fici <:1l2J.1!.1 :';&.1.PJl a.nd t.oe

:C';r;)l1oh iu;d;ho:cj .. ti~. do 'not 4~~~() i~ tbeil' ;a ~ata::.<;)n'"

of o.$.i'ioierloiet3_ 'i'here .ee:n~ to lJe nl.:l.jor Cl91'101811e1e.

as regards tra,gmenta t:lon bombs o.1.4d FIt);) 8.1roratt

spar... The !iret of thee. oan be re t!.cI11,. proTide4

from 11. A.!'.; the lI~con.d. re~lUl t from p:roduotio.n ancl

proou1'elllellt cUfficul U.s rC1.ther iih8l1 fro", l!lok of

funds.

Loy " • .1$ me&8U!:!!.

6. a) j1oroe •• Although thera is 8. _all over~11 aUZ'pluB

to J.{ -1'0 re~UiI'erC3ntG torec~st D1' end 1962, there will

be ~. shortagE: of Strike a1rordoft (which oan be al1eviated

b¥ t:.n asrcelllun~ J;Qi-r;,llUS m.\Qleaz- w ... .PQn.), a iihQr~ .....

Co! nv,l':'J"11 A¥r( ,~il'('l"·",:rt (':(·"'_'~l"I.tlat,fIKl 'h: fHt.1"'iI"il1i~'C lDP'

iJ.1rcr .... tt in 1161''V"l'''') au£l u. wtJf.!kucBa in dispersion

ca.::;>ab111 tie", due to ~1'3a~ airoral"t instead of light

we1ght airora.ft.

b) RardeniDsl Coapl.tioD 1»7 eu 1"2 aDd u •• rulna •• atter

1962, 4011ltttul.

oJ hp1p11 !here 1. & ..,8%7 _all def1e1eno7 from require

men~a b~ end 1962. w~oh could ba correoted by repatriatlac

personnel trom Algeria. DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE


II • li!!.Yil.

Germany

4 . No special mea'B~"

t he Ger man Navy (all IGaLIneQ \Iql~a4 _ 6I\C3D _ Nal:oU

8ACIUR).

5 . The:t'e. 1-& • IIIIIjIol!' _..,~. ~"1f'1114 ,.,

~~,. P .'*'l\Ibe<!t,.

..

._Wi U6'2 - , __ ~ aa4 UllliJ.r

. "


-2-

8. Çorrect ;quipDl~nt and aupply dtt:rl.9j.cncieg: Ma30r de:f"ic1ency only in one item - 1 t ohould be pOGsib1o to expedite de1ivery or most or tlw missing itemo, which are already on o~der.

~. Completion or lUlQ, 11.\.\::( ;md sp;gciql 0' :!d1.IDÏ tio.D .Q12r ggQ .r:...~~: u) llIi~: 72 ni tef: plnn.r:fJd - 12 l'recl!:.':,lbly cOr.lpleted by

Oll.d l~}Gl/begir..n1r-G 1962 - 15 add~tio;l.al cites expecteà tü 00 com~lüted by enù 1962F~cgirm11~ 1963. This '.10'..l16. allO',-f the installation or 3 batallionc by end 1961 o..':ld il total 01' 7 1)att.a11ons by end 1962.

b) il.Wm:: SL; ui t~G ~,> .JJL.'1.od - 15 :t;;rcl:run::i.J::y cOi::.Qloted by end 1962 - 5 addi tiono..l Ei teu C):pcc teC: to ~oc cot1:;leted by end 19G3. 'l'hie '\iOW.U allo\ï tl'~ 1~tallation of' 4 battal.iona by end 1962 und a. total of 5 battaliow3 by erJ.d 1963.

c) ,Fp~cin! lliiirnun:i tipll.Ji~: total plw:ü~od: 64 (t'or H:iJti:: tr .. o ::;pcc.l.a:ï.. dvpote fU'(; illcludc,] in the NlKE ci tee <..;Ji'.; ure no idcluùed l.n 'Lhe prc;:-:~i.~':; :!t). 0n1;:/ thrae de~'";atf: ~;; e:z:peete:l to be cO!:ll'lsted b:1 end 1~61 and a rurthez- J.? depotr. by end 19G2.

::'r, SS3IDC i.uüi:;:cl;;r tL.at thit.i worl: C.ül 1;{:; L,!'ed,tly acceleratod.

10. Acqelerated vaininr; oJ_.'Ür ForS$L_}'V1J..1.~: TIlie pr0CeSG io û.lready proceedir!.G rapidl;;; by C!:è. 1962 the };)of.3.!.tlon will be fairly &utiafactory.

11. Manning. There will be a det'1cieney of" 19.934 • by and 1962. r:ational plane 1)L'QY1de tor an 1noreaae of' 3,800 men in 1961 and ab~.Jut 3,OUO in 1962. Tbere 1e thUEl c aerious personn<.;l pl'Oblem.


-2-

8. Qorrect ;quipDl~nt and supply dt}:rl.9j.cncieg: Ma30r de:f"ic1ency only in one item - 1 t ohould be pO(jsiblo to expedite delivery of most or tlw missing 1temo, which are already on o~der.

~. Completion of lUKE, 11.\.\::( ;md sp;gciql a' :!d1.IDi tio.D .Q12r ggQ .r:...~~: u) llIi~: 72 ni tef: plnn.r:fJd - 12 l'recl!:.':,lbly cOr.lpleted by

Oll.d l~}Gl/begir..n1r-G 1962 - 15 add~tio;l.al oites expectea to 00 com~luted by end 1962F~cgirm11~ 1963. This Ylo'..llci allo',-! the installation of 3 batallionc by end 1961 o..':ld il total 01' 7 1)att.a11ons by end 1962.

b) il.Wm:: 3L ui t~£> ~,> .JJL.'1.od - 15 :t?re[rL1.n::~:;'J::y cOi::.Qloted by end 1962 - 5 adell tiono..l Ei teu C):pcc toe: to ~oc cot1:;leted by end 19G3. 'l'his ,\iOW.U allO\1 tl'~ 1~tallation of' 4 battal.iona by end 1962 una a. total Qf 5 battaliow3 by erJ.d 1963.

c) ,Fp~cin! lliiimun:i tiPll.Ji~: total plw:u~od: 64 (t'or H:iJti:: tr .. o ::;pcc.l.a:i.. dvpote fU'(; iEcludc,j in the HIKE ci tea <..;J1'.; are no idcluded l.n 'LIle prc;:-:~i.~':; :!t). 0n1;:/ three de~'";atf: ~;; e:zpeete:l to be cO!:ll'lsted b:1 end 1~61 and a £urthez- J.? depotr. by end 19G2.

::'r, SS3IDC Lu)~i:;:cl;j that thit.i worl: c .• tl 1;(:; L,!'13d,tly acceleratod.

10. Acqeleruted vainin& 0%_1'4£ ForS$L_}'V1J..1.~: TIlie process io u.lready proceedinG rapidl;;; by c!:d 1962 the :Dof.3.!.tlon will be fairly &atiafactory.

11. Manning. There will be a det'1cieney of" 19.934 • by ond 1962. r:ational plane 1)L'Qy1de tor an 1noreaae or 3,800 men in 1961 and ab~.Jut 3,OUO in 1962. There is thuEl c serious personn<.;l pl'Oblem.



l. ~.

n. !!!I..

ORRECE

j~.r6!AO.Y m • ..aurea

1. a.. Iner ...... mW'ming.

b~ H.aed7 equi~nt ~nd eupp17 d.!lo1$uoi •••

o. lu'tQl1Ii1t'.v ~.l'ain1n6"

2. <";:>~~làontB: '';''be firs't ~.we mefi.S1J.:r.S ca.u lia UO{Hlid.ered. only

as long t.riIl me.".8Ul'eS (.ea nu:.t point;. 11'he th1!'à meéUJU1'.

lIeera" fOia.aible wi thout major non-rn1li -t,.:rl' imp11o .... t.ii>ne.

}~p5 tor~ mea~

) • .?.!!!2..~: 'rhe GreeK .~u~h\)ri tiea plat';. te maint.A.in \lr..ent

mNUling levals (7~ for M-D~' foroe.,) but reiter~t. in 'ihl.

1~ reply t,j .i'oRQ that the;; are prepared te g1Te oTerr1diftg

prlority 't,a ruann1ng- eG.l1i~lent aO lIoon as i·t il) d.elivered through

4. 19,uiiffieJ'lt; The J ... ·.,.k Amy i5 cOI,,~)l(!telT dep.m~ent ou

c.:... ~,-;:n~l ~id ':0:[, ilGp~()ving the 1~pl(,;",,·.;:;)le equi:r;:ment t,d lU.a.tloll

: obaolete eqlJi f'o"Y\Emt &.''lll cnu:.':1del' .... blf! ahorti...gee in 'l'OiE &Dt

reaerTe. ). Por thie the pl'"sent 1ewl of 1.1.14 ebou14 M 1llorea.aed

two or tbreefold. The seoond reoomDendation o~n on17 usetul17

&:9ply., ftot to Oreeo., 'bu" ta lt. more prosper"". allie ••

5. .\11 NATO naval toroell are aseig.'lt.d. te> SACEUR. 'l'he meUUNII

suggested by SACmJR, ganel'·.l l'..lther than apeoifle, relate te

inoreaaed mar~lnG ofax1eting unit., repalr1ng def1e1enol •• ta equ1pmellt rànd 1ntendfying training. The ourrant reorsat •• "10.

a.hem. in the Gre.k lfavy 1a 1.pl'OTing the 1HIlrd. ... of WI1_ ....

certaln cl.gree, but lack of modern equlpm.nt, e.peoial17 el_Voue,

r.stricts tr~inlng. The Gr.ck Nav.y i. eniire17 depeQÀent upoa K.J.P.

for equlpment, and th. po.ltion .. ~ future dellv.ries 1. DOt at

the moment cleare

III. Air Pero •.

lia_l'pno, Il.&IIU~

6. laoNg" aann1y' Pre.ent manning leVQ19 "re 7~ otfl. .. n

and 8<>:' :100 f.. Abo\lt 1,4)0 adcl1 'iiOftliol peuolUlel are requlrecl .... et


I. ~.

n. !!!I..

GRREe)

j~.r6!AO.Y m • ..aurea

1. a.. Incr ...... mW'ming.

b~ H.-edT equi~nt ~nd eupp17 d.£lo1$uoi •••

o. lU'tQl1Ii1t'.v ~.l'ain1n6"

2. <";:>~~liontB: '';''be first ~.we mefi.S1J.:r.S oa.n lia UO{Hlid.ered. only

as long t.riIl me.".8Ul'eS (.ea uu:.t point;. 11'he tb1!'ri meaeu1'e

aeeta" fOia.aible without major non-rn1li -t,.:rl' imp11o .... t.ivne.

}~p5 tor~ mea~

3 • .?.!!!2..~: '£he GreeK .~u~h\)ri tiea plat';. to maint.A.in \)r..ent

mNUling levels (7~ for M-D~' foroe,,) but reiter~t. in 'ihi.

1~ replY' t,j .i'oRQ that they are prepared to g1Te oTerr1diftg

priority 't,o manning- eG.l1i~lent aO soon as i·t is d.elivered through

4. 19,uiiD!eJ'lt; The J ... ·.,.k Army is cOI"~)l(!telT dep.m~ent Oll

c.:... ~,-;:n~l ~id ':0£ ilGP~()ving the 1~pl(,;",,·.;:;)le equi:r;:ment Hi i.u.a.tioll

: obaolete eqlJi f'o""Emt &.''lll cnu:.':1del' .... blf! ahorti...gee in 'l'02E &Dt

reserYe. ). Por thie the pl'"sent lewl of a.i4 ebou14 M 1llorea.aed

two or tbreefold. The seoond reoommendation o~n on17 usetul17

&:9ply., ftot to Greeoe, 'bu." to it. more prosper"". allle ••

5. All NATO naval toroes are aseig.'lt.d. to SACER. 'rhe meUUNII

suggested by SACmJR, ganel'·.l rather than apeoifle, relate to

inoreased mar~inG of existing unit., repairing def1a1enai •• 1a

equipmellt rand intensifying training. The ourrant reorsaat •• "io.

80heme in the Greek Navy 1s i.pl'OTing the 1HIlrd. ... of WI1_ ....

certain degree, but lack of modern equipment, e.peoial17 el .. U-Oal.,

restricts tr~ining. The Greek Nav.y i. entire17 depeQdent upoa •• J.P.

tor equipment, and the po.lt10n .. ~ future deliveries i. DOt at

the moment clear.

III. Air Pe1"O •.

liael'pnOl lle&IIU~

6. Iureg" aann1y' Pre.ent manning leVQ19 .. re 7~ otfl. .. n

and 8<>:' :reo f.. Abo\lt 1,4)0 adcl1 'iiOftliol peuolUlel are required ..... t



-2- .;: .'1'0 S~CRE'l'

ACR toroe programme for 1962. ilea.wrea to Impro.e reorult1:ant

haTe been talten, lNt '\111. will be requlred tor trd,lll1ng_

1. ~emad~ suppl, dofioi.noie. (aajor deflcienoiea in Slde

winder miadle u.nd a,iroraft engino apue :varJliàl)' 'l'he Graek

,i%' Force i8 almoet entirely de!,endf)llt ... ·n aid for 1 ta o~lulpaent

,md the solution for tbfs -vroblom reiJta with lie 1"'. "'. and. maSSA.

8. 'l'rainiy; Tha 7G<.i.r1.v average tlyir1g tae per pilot 1.

18~ hours~ which sbould be inoreamed to 240 hours. Tbe annua1

Ilddi t10Dal cost \'lou1d b~ about 136 million Dr. (19,~ of the

eurrent Jir Forae budzet).

Long terni mealNrae

9. 4irordtt, A4d1tlonal alror~ft are fequired to reaoh

ACE roree prosr_e for eDA 1962. ImproTement depeDd.. en'\1re17

upon a14.

10. Hardeningl Bot m~t.rlally tsaalbl. before the end nt 1962.


-2- .;: .'1'0 S~CRE'l'

ACR toroe programme for 1962. iIIea.wre. to impro.e reoruitl:ant

haTe been talten, Nt ,\111. will be required tor trd,lll1ng_

1. ~emad¥ BURpl, dotioi.nole. (aajor deficienoies in Side

winder miadle u.nd a.iroraft engino apue :varJliAl). 'I'he Greek

,ir Force i8 almost entirely dek'endf)llt l·n aid for 1 ts o~lulpaent

,md the solution for toie -vroblom reate with lIeli."'. and. IDISSA.

8. '!'rainiy; The 7G<.I.r1.v average tlyirtg time per pilot 1.

18~ hours~ which should be inoreased to 240 hours. Tbe annual

Ilddi tiona1 cost \'lou1d b~ about 136 million Dr. (19,~ of the

eurrent lir Foroe budzet).

Long term mealNrae

9. 4irordtt, A4dltlonal alror~ft are tequired to reaoh

ACE foree prosr_e for e. 1962. ImproTement depeDd.. en,\1re17

upon ald..

10. Hardening' Bot m~t.rlally te&albl. before the end of 1962.



u. lim

18th August 1961

1. o.. Tà:e e!!ler~erlcy action ta remedy c~u1:Dr.\cnt 0.e~ieiencies.

b. Immedio.tely intensi:f'y training of M-day forces.

2. The firet measure will &.t'ter a lead time of Ci fe .. months

have major production and tinancial implications for a period

of yOilr'S. T110 ;:;accnd rJc .... u·.ll'e iJoe~:lG :ros:.o1ble and \'li1l not have

r:njor non-mil 1 t:J.r;: i1"l::!licat1on~.

3. }"'(n'iPn:.~92: No ornercency mc;asures in tho field ot

person~(;l arc !nontioncd. (s'\.r::·~e: :1.:O·'71 h,:':e QecGptcd the It~11an

point of view that equipment improvement abOUld have priority

over manning). The increaee r4queated in the "Programme

Plann1ng Guidance" for and 1962 (over 10'/~ of present M-dCiy

strength, even OD reduoed standards), though physieall;l

11oiJs1ble, l'uns counter tu thin preL3cn~~ Italian policy.

4. 19u1pmen~z Though mout of ~le progressive inoro~se

in tu-a Itc::.lian dc:1'cnce budget io ull.;>cû.tod to /..r.:ly cq...:.ip'JC::'lt

i:1proyenOl1t,::;, the equi:>ment ul 'tuuti'?il i::: ~till ?rGc)r':'o·.-:'~o

Replao~w~l,t aùd ûlecho..."li:::lt1t::>Il '}I~·,.·\.")·l Il :f"uY'thor effort \vhich

oan only bo loot wi th considerablo extornal aid, which

accordino to the latent alü:;??!lor.t lL.:t;:; i;:; nv!. fortrJ.cc::1ing in

eufficient qu~titieG.

5. AJ.l Italian Naval ~orcea are aODigned to G\.j!::UR, who

has pr::>pooed no spccifie meaSUrC[3 in tho present study. In

genaral the numbcr of uni t3 now o.VL' llubla and thOD8 planned

for 1962 mcet quantitatlvely th,; force aoal. though there are

eei."tain defio1cncico in etando..rç.;;;. Achlevament et the maritime

aiDCra:f't and hùlicopter progro.:fl:lce depends on ai4.

III. Air Forc, EmergencY mea§9reg

6. mt:âtI4m:f;;:~n~~iQil=tfllt:::srtl)-Solution depends on authoriaat1on b7 the U.S. or

speoial ammunit10n storn:ge.


n. lim

18th August 1961

1. 0.. Ta:e e!!ler~erlcy action to remedy c~u1:Dr.\cnt 0.e~iciencies.

b. Immediately intensify tra1ning of II-day forces.

2. The first measure w1ll at'ter a lead t1me of a few months

have major production and financial implications for a period

of YOilr'S. 'l11O ;:;occnd rJc .... u·.ll'e iJoe~:lG :roSl.o1ble and \1ill not have

r:njor non-mill t:J.r;: i1"l::!licat1on~.

3. }"'(n'iPn:.~92: No ornercency measures in tho field ot

person~(;l nrc !nontioncd. (s'\.r::·~e: :1.:O·'71 h,:':e QCCGptcd the It~11an

point of view that equ1pment improvement sbOUld have priority

over manning). The increase r4queated in the "Programme

Plann1ng Guidance" for and 1962 (over 10'/~ of present M-day

strength, even OD reduced standards), though physieall;{

1">oiJs1ble, runs counter to thin preL3cn~~ Italian policy.

4. 19u1pmen~z Though most of ~le progressive incro~se

in tu-a Itc:.lian dc;1'cnce budget is ull.;)catod to /..r.:lY cq...:.ip'JC::'lt

i:1p!'OYenOl1tr:;, the equi:>ment u.i'tauti'')il i;:, ~till ?rGc)r':'o·.-:.~o

Replao~w~l,t c:iiid >Ilccho..."li!::lt1t::>Il '}I~·,.·\.")·l 11 :f"uY'thor effort \vhich

oan only bo loot with considerablo extornal aid, which

accordino to the latont ahi:J?llor.t lL.:t;:; i::; nvt. fortrJ.cc::1ing in

sufficient qu~titieG.

5. AJ.l Italian Naval ~orcea are aODigned to G\.j!::UR, who

has pr::>pooed no spccific meaSUrC[3 in tho present study. In

general the number ot uni t3 now o.vL'llubla and thODe planned

for 1962 meet quantitatlvely til.; force aoal, though there are

eeA"tain defic1cncico in etando..re.;;;. Achievement et the maritime

aiDCra:f't and hullcopter progro.:rl:lce depends on ai4.

III. Air Forc. Emergency meal9£eg

6. mt:atI4m:f;;:~n~~iQil=tfllt:::srtl)-Solution depends on authorisation b7 the U.S. or

speoial ammunition storn:ge.



-2-

7. 8hor1!age of aircratt on hand: Tlùb arises :from a ;;h:'l't'1r:~)f' r::.y-:.r-J l'urt::: ,xvi oel:\yG .ln :';ircrh'1ul.. Ito.ly

Mould. bc 8cle ta 1mprove the ci tt.'.':tti~r" f'9irly '1uickIy.

tJopn: ter:!' ffiQQ.~\l~~Jl

8. Manning: 2,800 addi tional personnel are reçtuired by end 1962. Improvements are bein~ ~ade :for technical ~Grsormol, but Vlill not fully satiof'y the rC(luire;nent.

9. IIa.rdQn~ng: The modi:f"ication of" exioting aircraf"t .C!"';;. !-:1(: J .~C8;':..::':-'~{·J aom:;trtJ.c tion couùl wi th Ji1'ficul ty be

ac'lioved "be:f"'-J-:-c th(~ e- ,J ')f 1962 t '=':: \7hlC::l tl c Lie .:ircraft

will bB replaced by FI04G. !Jtili t.y thr~ref'')re r:ue~~tion.,ble.

10. 1.!.G!!1ï)!<1j.8h!_ui..r..9..:r_~: DGll ver:" of G9I airaraft, and conncQuently activation of tllC lightueight Reacc squadron,

le delayed. Italy anould be able to recti~7 thia.


-2-

7. Shortage of aircraft on hand: Tlub arises :from a ;;h:'l't'1r:~)f' f:.y-:.r-J l'urt::: ,xvi cel:lYG .in :Jircrh'1ul.. Italy

Mould. be 8"ble to improve the ci tt.'.':tti~r" f9irly '1uickly.

tJopn: tor:!' ffiQQ.~\l~~Jl

8. Manning: 2,800 additional personnel are reCluired by end 1962. Improvements are bein~ ~ade :for technical ~Grsormol, but Vlill not fully satiof'y the rC(luire;nent.

9. IIa.rdQn~ng: The modi:f"ication of" exioting aircraf"t .cr;;. !-:1(: J .~C8;':..::':-'~{·J aom:;trtJ.c t10n cou1.11 wi til Ji1'ficul ty be

aC;.ioved "bef"-j-:-c th(~ e- ,J ')f 1962 t I):: \7hlC::l t:l c Lie .:ircraft

will bB replaced by FIQ4G. !Jtili toy thr~ref'')re r:ue~~tion,'ble.

10. 1.!.G!!1i)!<1j.8h!_ui..r..9..:r_~: DGll ver:¥ of G9l aircraft, and conncQuently uctivation of tlle lightweight Reece squadron,

1c delayed. Italy Should be able to recti~7 this.



II. ~

l[h .. 'l"J ~J t'~CRdl~

17th Auguot 1961

1. ;';Jvement. of jjctherlnndn 'for;:;eu to G3rDar.y 11'10 003n ----_. __ ._._--_ ... _..... . . -'" .. ,---_.

helc1 Ur> by lJ.C(!Oï:\r1C\d~t1()n dif':fic'll tien. .f\ctiva.tlon of: moth~r

briguQe \"1111 cncountcr n~n:>ow(;r s..~ort.·.iges unlcsC'· tr~incd

rCf'.c>.rvi '-::t: rœc roc, :lleël (rcquested in "Pro~a."llrac 21clnn1ng

Guidanoe" j'or 1965/6G). The other el11cr:~ency me:-;;!,r •• 88em

f'e!:li.::J 1)10.1::' tllo,i iUH1,;)sirablc hon-rdli t9.ry 1mplic;L .tions.

2. d'Of!30f.:Ilf{1: Situation \1111 be .JL4God a1'taf 1964 by an

inerease in Gill tary age classcs.

,. Eg1l1pmen$= For 1"lnancial reasons, rreeent national

plons for moderni slng equlpmant do not meet Sl1APB t s full

requlrements (not yet communicated to eountriee). HO\7ever,

the planncû :i.ncrca::.;e in n8. tional (lefenCf~ ox:!)onùi turea should

lTl~iI!:'6 conoidernb1e improvement pOBoible 1>;)' 19C}!\ .•

4. The 1~etharlal.'~d6 Naval t'Ol"CCS aauigntJd to 1.A'fO Commanc1

are aIl ull(lcr "\C-. ~::T or ::;:rC~IAl~, :frO!ll V;}l-Jffi no aS3eSS~1ent has

yet beol1 recel ved.

nI. Air lorcjl~.

fWrgengy moas'.traD

5. Ronedy Ail' For9~...l2e..~etlc. 1il4lticie~eJl: The major

4eficioncy ia in Sldewinder a:1.981188; addltional tunda

required to reaoh .3o-day level ... est1ma.tc;l at n. 17 m.

but placlng or4era will take 80.. t1me.

6. 15Jpeg,1g: QOmplet1Qn 2' NIg 81tea' These altoa are

lOc'lted in Germany, and the problem le related to the

construction problem as a whole in Ger;~.

l8,ng Hm meaSUNI

7. Har4eniMz Coapl.etlon by end 1962, and ueet\ll.Deaa

af'terwarda, doubtf"ul.


II. ~

l[h .. 'l"J ~J t'~CRdl~

17th Auguot 1961

1. :';)vement. of jjctherlnndn 'for;:;eu to G3rDClr.y h'10 oo3n ----_. __ ._._--_ ... _..... . . -'.' ... _--_.

held uT> by lJ.C(!or:rr.1c\d~t1()n dif':fic'll tien. .f\ct:'vn.tion of: moth~r

briguQe \"1111 encounter n~n:>ow(;r s..~ort.·.iges unlcsC'· tr~incd

rCf'.crvi'-::t: tcrc roc,:llea (requested in "Pro~a."llrac 21clnn1ng

Guidanoe" 'i"or 1965/6G). The other el11cr:~ency me:-;;!,!" •• 88em

f'e£li.::J1)lo."I:!. tllo,i i·t,!Hl'3sirablc hon-rdli t9.ry 1mplic;L.tiona.

2. d'Of!30f.:Ilf{1: Situation \1i11 be .JL4God a1'taf 1964 by an

increase in military age classos.

,. Eg1l1pmen$: For 1"lnancia1 reasons, rreeent national

plons for moderni sing equipment do not meet SlIAPB t s full

requirements (not yet communicated to countries). HO\7ever,

the planned :i.ncrca::.;c in n8. tiona1 (lefenCf~ ox:!)oni.li turea should

lTl~iI!:'6 conoidernb1e improvement pOBoible 1>;), 19C}!\ .•

4. The 1~etharlal.'~d6 Naval t'Ol"CCS aauignt)Q to 1.A'fO Command

are all UDder "\C-. ~::T or ::;:rC~IA!~, :frO!ll V;lUffi no aS3ess~1ent has

yet be on rGcei ved.

Ill. Air lorcjl~. fWrgengy mta S'.lr91

5. ReMedy Ail' For9~...l2e..~stlc. 1il4lticie~eJl: The major

deficiency is in Sidewinder Ili981188; addltional tunds

required to reach .3o-day level .. e estimate;} at n. 17 m.

but placing orders will take some time.

6. 15Jpeg,ig: gOmplet1Qn 2t NIKE 81tea' These sltos are

lOc'lted in Germany, nnd the problem is related to t.M

construction problem as a whole in Ger;~.

l8,ng HEm measurel

7. HarAeningz Completion by end 1962, and ueet\ll.Deaa

af'terwards, doubtf"ul.



1. arIll.

II. !!!Z.

BATO BICRET 18th AuIN.t, 1261.

HORWAT

Eaerl!U.1 •• -.ur .. 1. &. lnoreaa. lIlumins.

b. Burt .erpnoy action to r .. ~ equi:s-ent aa4

auPp17 d.tiotenoie ••

o. Iauudiat.17 inton.itT training ot II-Da7 foroe ••

2. Co_enta. Th. tir.t Wo .e .. ur •• OAll unl7 give apJll'Ml&bl.

reault. on the longer term ~d at ooD.ld.rabl. coat.. ~ third

Il •• aur ••• ema to be teaeible wi thout major non-mil! tAr,.. implloations.

Long term .e&aure.

3. Peno •• l, Th. pro .. nt II-Da)- .trenstla .hou14 O'YOn tually ....

near17 4oultlod. (Th. ra.t. ot laproT •• nt roquirod has b.en apee4K

up. 90% i. DOW asltecl tor ln 1962, tormer17 tor 1964.) The lulU'

ap-ol ..... will prond.e auttioi.nt oon.oripts, but qualitatiT.

lnorea.e. (r8sulara, sp.Oiallsts) will b. ditt10ult to obtain.

4. Eguipments R.placement ot obsole.o.nt equipment, m.ohani.ation

and bul14 up ot .toOks wll1 requlre • lIajor tinano1al ettort &Dd a

10" le. tiM. 'l'la. lorwpan aathorl tl •• hope te r.o.iTe the 11&302'

part ot the neoe •• &rJ' oqullBe.t t1"Oll ext.rnal a14, but th. kilo ..

cl.liTer" .ohodul.. are below thelr oxpeo~tloft8. Pr .... t oqul~.t oxpoa41~. (5?' ot the ;-.rtq total) ahou14 bo rai.ad te at l.a.t

2~ to g1 T. appnoiabl. rHQl te, even bT eD4 1964.

lIIIHrpDOZ •• aaurea

(all 1'A'l'O DaY&! toroe. are ".!PM to SACEUR)

5. Inoreaalq aama1ng ~ pkaalllS tonard .bip.. !h.r. ia

a •• riou. ahortap of r.pl riZ' a.n4 lone t.. poraonnel 1Jl th •

• rwPIIA '''''' for .bioh th.N 1. no 1 Illate 8Olutl... la an -.rpn07, th. con.ld..rabl. Naouro •• ot vat ... ero_til .......

in IO~ wou14 iaproTe th •• ituatiOIl.

LoDI tUli .-aarJ 6. ..~ has at pment th. "'Hr ot unit. requ1rel te •• t

1962 fora. 8Oal., but thq are tor th • .,.t part ob_l.".. !la.

oon.truotion progr_ Oll )aIADCl wS,ll o01Ul14.rab17 iaPMft· tu

po.l tl0D OTer the peri" 1963-67.


I. anz.

II. !!!Z.

IATO SBCRET 18th Auau..t, 1261.

NORWAY

Eaerl!u.z .eaaur ..

1. &. Inoreaa. lIlumins.

b. Start .erpnoy action to r .. ~ equi:s-ent aa4

auPp17 d.tiotenoie ••

o. Iauudiat.17 inten.itl' training ot II-Da7 foroe ••

2. Co_ental Th. tir.t Wo .e .. ur •• OAll unl7 give apJll'Ml&bl.

reault. on the lonser term ~d at ooDald.rabl. coat.. ~ third

1I •• aur ••• ema to be teaeible wi thout major non-mili tar,.. implloations.

Long term .e&aure.

3. PeHOa.l, Th. pro .. nt 11-»&7 .trenstll .hould O'YOn wally ....

near17 doubled. (Th. ra.t. ot laproT •• nt required haa b.en apee4K

up. 90% i. DOW aaltecl tor ln 1962, tormer17 tor 1964.) The lulU'

ap-ol ..... will provide suttioi.nt oon.oripts, but qualitatiT.

increa.e. (r8sulara, sp.oialists) will b. ditticult to obtain.

4. Eguipments R.placement ot obaol •• o.nt equipment, meohani.ation

and bul1d up ot .toOka wll1 requlre • major tinanoial ettort aDd a

10" le. tiM. 'I'll. lorwpan -.athort tl •• hope to r.o.iTe the 11&302'

part ot the neoe •• &r7 oqullBe.t t1"Oll ext.rnal ald, but tho kIIown

d..liTer" .chedul.. are below thelr oxpeo~ttOft8. Pr .... t equl~.t oxpoa41~. (5?' ot the ;-.rtq total) ahould be rai.ed to at l.a.t

2~ to g1 T. approoiabl. rHQl to, even b7 eD4 1964.

lIIIHrpDOZ •• aaurea

(all JATO Dayal toroe. are ... ip04 to SACEUR)

5. Inoreaalq aama1ng ~ pkaalllS torward .hip.. !h.r. ia

a •• riou. nortap of r.pl liZ' a.n4 lone t.. poraonnel ill th •

• rwPIIA '''''' tor whioh th.N 1. no 1 Illato solutt... III an

-.rpn07, the con.td.rabl. Naouro •• ot vat ... eroutil .......

in IO~ .ou14 iaproYe tho .ituatiOIl.

Loy tUli .aaarJ 6. ..~ haa at pment tho ",Hr ot un! t. requlrel to •• t

1962 toro. 8Oal., but thq are tor tho .,.t part olt.l..... file

oon.truotion progr_ Oil )aIADCl wS,ll o01Ul14.ralt17 tap","· tu po.l tl0D OYer the period 1963-67.



-2- }lATO SRORM'

III. ,tir Foroe

!MrPDol ..... lIUre.

7. R_!9.:.~r Foro.! ~P-p~det1c1enC!!!!. r The .pare part. situation as a whol. 18 .... riou., lIMSSA DOt yet haYlng a4equate17

replac9d lnll1.u"",l a.1d. S0me Improve'::l8nt cou],,! undo·lb"t'!d.ly be

etfaohd in t~w n'è::l.r future, w1thout graV3 non-m111t:.tr;y ooue-

éplenoee.

~n~_~~~-E1~~~

8. No!!e.

9. Xuclaar c~12a~i11 t~~ l·:vL":ec~-.I.r! iorces h~ve no nuclea:t>

capability. ri tne politio.J,l oLJpOsition can be cveroome, ~

rapid improvement in the effeotiTeneaa of th~ Borweg1~ Air

Porc~ oould undoubted17 be ~h1eTed.


-2- }lATa SRORM'

III. ,\1r Foroe

!MrPDol ..... lIUre.

7. R_!9.:.~r Foro.! ~P-p~det1clenC!!!!. r The .pare part. situation as a whole 18 .... rieu., liMSSA not yet haYing a4equate17

replac9d lnll1.u"",l a,ld. Slime imprOVe'::l8nt cOlli,! undo'lbt'!d.ly be

c>tfaohd in t~w n'C::l.r future, without graV3 non-m111t:.tr;y ooue-

'plenoee.

~n~_~~~-E1~~~

8. No!!e.

9. Xuclaar c~12a~i11 t~~ l·:vL":ec~-.I.r! iorces h~ve no nuclea:t>

capability. It tne politio.J,l oLJpOsition can be everoome, ~

rapid improvement in the effeotiTeneaa of th~ Borweg1~ Air

Porc~ could undoubted17 be ~hleTed.



• •

" . "."

• •

• •

..... ~ be & OlIaIlP _t_1Il "pcIWI •• 11atoA ill 121& ~ .. C!I6lfll .. 4at4t 11 ru 81~ .. N OOl"l'tIooelhlll&l$Oll

Ia to1'I\O -111M ~_~ 81_4 'e in 18 Nq~.o b J 1IG;11O"I" 4IIftd_lu of lIdO f'o II.. at.v tbolla2l' NmI4lAbU w1 toW Al'IIIt' ai"~!10 fIISI1~ ... NQIl8l1to

2. .. 1Do_ -1Ikljr.. ~ e~n' u4 .. ",. 4IIt101IIIO Co ~ tNs"t,na •

"'"' "" • ___ be 0 0IIlJ' &0 lOll" ... __ M <_ a .,SA.). th1r4 _ .-u S"euft\6 ft ~ 11 'lII!P'Ueauo "

S. t .. A1frq 1& COJqp~ * all 110 IIIIIIl>van. in '1.'OMl aJIIIl to

,..1Mo oz " •• 1IIW:h 111 ~ to _, ..,. .......... '" ft#'~ ~ l'I"eont Of a4 DllO'IIlIt

""".r\>l4t. UOD. .. ~ QplJ , to ,.' 110 it. IIOJ'G Q aUla •


III. Air Force l~QDPX mç::lqur,)p

7. Inclj:Fu'iO tPfWg1W/' r;:~4.:1'O i~~ .\ ~;I'1ou;\ def.LCloncy

ln por.i.J, .. m .. '.al - ;.l'bOut 3.2·jJ at üüù. l)Gl and a 1"urthor

thl0, but ,.-111 n:.t ~H'l.VO OUJf.;taJltial rOQultu beroN en4

19tï2. ~'r~-...ird.l4L 1jI'iJGc"-:t€:i GOI'lo.1:, :?roblo!'.JO (l,la to the 1011

·b.:..~io J.r.c.tl'\.i.Ction of reorui1.G.

8. Eomea.t flUŒ;24,y ~.!.qWqc~: ()crioue clat" ... clcnc1ee oxiat, oi' f"'...tel, a::mluni t1on, bomb~ anù drop tan!co. 'l'Iarke7 ie ()nt::"r~l;:," ù~pendent on oxtAr.nal nid to ~6d:1 tble

o1t.ln.t.lon. Tho tlOtlcianolec ln a :rmn1tlon could be ~Uy

oorrectad by tr;:U1Er(ora t'rom othOl' oou."'ltriea "i th stocks o~ 90 dayc or âbovo.

itOM .Wail PUWUftI

9. About 60 nddltio;·-.'.ll nll'Or:lf't ara requ1red ta hlnl

en4 l~Gl goals; and 1962 go:ll.n 0l"8 35 aireNtt 1eSG but 1:~~::1·_~è.Q :a."~pL_~o_cnt of oboo1ote u1rcrort ~jy FlOOD ~e Tllo:.~o .. ül'Cl'.:l..L·t C;lll o.a.1y co:)O thl'O-.i.~ a.iÙt; ,~ ..... ;d rap1d do11 V';YPJ'

nt" 25 ~1,i~m would pr..)vidc nn 1IDedi.te inarollDe iJa .~ngt.hfo)

10. HardeIl~.: COmplet1011 by end 1962 materla1~ ftl"Y

~:-cUlt.

DECLASSIFIED - PUBLIC DISCLOSURE / DÉCLASSIFIÉ - MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE III. A1£ Force

l~QDPX mQ::lqur,)£i

-,. InclJ:Fu'iO tPi:i.Cg1 W/& r;:~4.:1'O i~~ .\ ~;I'1ou;\ del'.LClODCY

1n por.i.J •. m .. '.al - ;J.1:;;Out 3.2·jJ at o~Ji1 l)Gl and a 1"urthor

th10, but ,;-111 n:.t ~H'l.VO OUJf.;taJltial rOQultu betore en4

19(i2. ~'r~ ..... ird.l4L ]jI'UGc"-:t€:i DOI'lo.1:, :?roblo!'.JO u.la to tho low ·b.:..~io J.r.c.tl'\.i.Ction of reoruitG.

8. Eomea.t flUm;24,y ~.!.qWqc~: t)criouG clot" ... c.icnc1ee Gxiat, 01' f"'...t61, a::mluni t1on, bomb~ anU drop tan!to. 'l'Iarke7

ic ()nt::'r~l;:," t1~pendent on oxtAr.nal aid to ~6d:1 tble

o1t.ln.t.lon. Tho tlOtlclanolec in a :rmn1tlon could be ~Uy

oorrectad by tr;."ll1ErCOra {'rom othOl' oou."'ltriea w1 th stocks o~

90 dayc or abovo.

itOM .Wail PUWUftI

9. About 60 ndditio;·-.'.ll nil'Or:lf't arc requ1red to hlnl

en4 l~Gl goals; and 1962 go:ll.n 0l"8 35 a1rcraft !eSG but 1:~~::1·_~c.Q :a."~pL_~o_cnt of obsolote u1rcrort ~jy FlOOD ~e Tllo:.~o .... ll'Cl'.:l..L·t can o.a.1y co:)O thl'O-.i.~ a.iUt; ,~ ..... ;d rapid doli v';YPJ'

o'f 25 ~1,i~m would pr..)vidc nIl 1IDed1.te increase iJa .~ngt.hfo)

10. HardeIl~.: COmpletion by end 1962 materla11¥ wry ~:-cUlt.



n. NaU

Ii','I'O pEcgrr l7th August 1961

1.. a. Increaee mann1ng or 7 Brigades now in Gel'Jl8lS7.

b. .;Ja:)l-:)y two ad.d1 t10ntll brigad.es ta Gerr.l~.

o. strenctllen log1etlc support -ror' U.K. und Canad1an Drig...ldlJ.

d. Pr;}pa:ra U-da;:l rC3crvo u."'li ta for raj?~d deplo7Qent to 051";:;31\1.

2. Implemantat10n dc:~j.:::ndG on the .1lrltlca Govorument giv'ing overrj.cUnJ J)r1oI'ity to the HN'::'() aroa and Wlce:pt1!'"J

tll3.t the actual cO:''''ltr1butiol1 in Gcrm:my c~ot be cOllf..'!idercd

equ1valent to t..~a thrce d1vio.i':>~·,3 l'a'luired.

LoDS teA Mflmtrog 3. l:U.e·~n;}gJ.: If' the re'·luired 'J.IDr.>O\TC)1- tOI' the tiNt

th.r&0 ~aCO;T'lendnt1o:;1G c:mnot oe tr~:l!l~U-~H'!'~d :rt-o~ O'L"ler un1 te,

1nlI>13œntat1on of" th'3 requ1red lleasnres .. il1 bo " longthy

J;::'')~e~n, ever- i". the unlt'kely c:')~,ti:';·,:(mcy 0:r the gO'frornment reedoptlng aon$CMpt1on (purJ.1amentGry ë,rocodurc, training, JlecruJ. tweu t. v1' ra6'1llnrc). :,Ji tht)lJt. "onno~lptlon 1 t aeems

·wîlikely that the addltioDal 30,000 man requir~d (aooord1ng to SHi\PB) onn be obt'Üned.

4. A, .. AAplQgM: A:nrs e'1u1:g:1ent Û9:r~9ionc1~ are ooglig1ble, lJut eq,11ppl!'1g two add1t!onal brigados. the nechanlsaUon or ~~ee àlv1c1onn ,~ld the connt~nt proccs~ or replao1ng obsolescent equi~ment w1ll mean a Major effort in tbe equlpment field. In :?art1cular fult'll1Dent o~ tl. Jleq\ÙN-

ment for :tul.l-tr~1cked armourod p::r: )n:~l oars would. take Elevera]. 7onrs; te!.1l)Ol'arl1y this re.~L41Nment 18 partly mot b7 whaeled ar:lou,red oars.

4. The :.lS~orlty of Royal Navy :t..:>rceo aes1gne4 ta NATO oo:~e undel' the operat1onal. oor:n:1wd o't 3ACLAli! anc1 CINCliAN,

t'rom \fhom DO &esesement has ~t been reoe1Tod. SACZ'ùR haB

l'eQ,uested tt..:3 corJlll1tment of éiOr.10 oxistin:,; sh1pa - preswnab1.y

destro.Yera - ta Al11&d Commo.nd :;:adi t~l'rD.fjean as a short term moasure. ln v1ew of o.xlet1p.g corJmi t,ments thla JISy pNaent some dlf'tlcmlt.y.


n. NaU

Ii/,'I'O PEcgrr 17th August 1961

1.. a. Increase manning or 7 Brigades now in Gel'Jl8lS7.

b. .;Ja:)l-:)y two ad.d1 t10ntll brigad.es to Gerr.l~.

o. strencthen loslatio support -roJ!' U.K. and Canad1an Drig...ldlJ.

d. Pr:}pa:ra U-c.1a;:l rC3crvo u."'li to for raj?~d deplo7Qent to Ger;:;an..l.

2. Implemantat10n dc:~j.:::ndG on the .1lrltlca Govorument

giv'ing overrj.cUnJ J)r1oI'ity to the HN'::'D aroa and Wlce:pt1!'"J

tll3.t the actual cO:''''ltr1butiol1 in Gcrm:my c~ot be cOllf..'!idercd

equivalent to t..~a three d1vio.i':>~·,3 l's'lulred.

LeDR term Mflmtrog 3. l:U.e·~n;l£J.: If' tho re'·luired 'J.IDr.>OWC)1- tOI' tho tiNt

th.r&e ~aco;T'lendnt1o:;1G c:mnot os tr~:l!l~U-~H'!'~d :rt-o~ O'L"ler un1 te,

1nlI>13~Iltat1on of" th'3 requ1red lleasnres .. ill bo " lengthy

J;::'')~e~n, ever- i". tho nnlt'kely c:')~'ti:';·,:(mcy 0:r tho gO'frornment readopting aon$CMpt1on (purJ.1amentGry c,rocodurc, training, !'ecru). tweu t. v1' ra6'1llnrc}. :,Ji tht)lJt. "onno~lptlon 1 t seems

·wl1ikely that the addltioDal 30,000 man requir~d (aooording to SHi\PB) oan be obt'l1ned.

4. A, .. AAplQgM: A:nrs e'1111:g:1ent U9:r~9ionc1~ are ooglig1ble, lJut eq,11ppi!'1g two additional brigados. the nechanlsaUon or ~~ee alv1cionn ,~ld the connt~nt proccs~ or replao1ng obsolescent equi~ment w1ll mean a Major effort in tbe equ1pment field. In :?articular fult'll1Dent o~ tlle JleqU1N-

mant for :tul.l-tr~1cked armourod p::r: )n:~l oars would. take several 7onrs; te!.1l)Ol'arl1y this re.~L41Nment 1s partly mot b7 wheeled ar:lollred oars.

4. The :.lS~orlty of Royal Navy :t..:>rceo aes1gne4 to nATO oo:~e under tho operational. oor:1!:1wd o't 3ACLAli! anc1 CINCHAN,

f'rom whom DO assessment has ~t been reoeived. SACZ'IJR haD

"quested trw corJlll1tment of CiOr.1Q oxistin:,; ships - preswnab1.y

destro.Yera - to Allied Commo.nd :;:adi t~l'rD.fjean as a short term moasure. In view of o.xlet1p.g corJmi tments thla JISy pNaent some dlf'tlcmlt.y.



-2-

III. Air Forçe

Emergency measures

5. ieta1n1ng in Germany 3 flghtar winge: le alredy agreed upon by the United Kinedom.

6.

Il \.TO,

on the

and in

DoploYl!l8nt Of modium bomber aircratt 2P the Contlnell..: This refera to 3 Valiant squadrons Elssigned to

ut present stationed in ~le U.K. Tbair deployment Continent would involve so~;}e increase in costs,

foreign currency.

7. strep,gthenine o( 10Slst1c suppOt~1 There are no major supply deficiencies but logistic support lines are long. Improvement in air transport detacbmenta and othe!' log1st1c reintorce;.lCnts would be effective, and

anould not present great ditt1culty.

8. Increaae Dumbor of 11ght bOlbers aBsisne~ to NATOI A1ready under consideration bl' the U.K. Government •

• Long term measurea _ ..

9. MaIUJ.1.ng: About 450 addi t10nal mon are required to raach fUll otandard, which Should present llttle d1ff'iculty.

10. U'r2Aplngl The a1rcra1't at present on the Cont1nent poe.ss a zero launch1ng capab11i ty and 1 t 1 s doubttul whether they ooul4 be aodlf'le4 to do so. Harden1ng for U.K. t'orees alr.f1elds 18 thUB not 1mmedlately ueetul.


-2-

III. Air FOrce

Emergency measures

5. ieta1n1ng in Germany 3 fighter wings: Ie alredy agreed upon by the United Kinedom.

6.

II \'TO,

on the

and in

DoploYl!l8nt of modium bomber aircraft 2P the Contlooll..: This refers to 3 Valiant squadrons assigned to

ut present stationed in ~le U.K. Their deployment Continent would involve so~;}e increase in costs,

foreign currency.

7. strepgthenine Of 10g1st1c sUppO£~1 There are no major supply deficiencies but logistic support lines are long. Improvement in air transport detachments and other log1st1c reintorce;.lCnts would be effective, and

Should not present great ditt1culty.

8. Increase Dumber of l1ght bombers aBsisne~ to NATOI Already under consideration bl' the U.K. Government •

• Long term measures _ ..

9. MaIUJ.1.ng: About 450 adell tional mon are required to reach fUll otandard, which Should present little d1ff'iculty.

10. U'r2Aplngl The a1rcra1't at present on the Cont1nent poe_ss a zero launching capability and 1 tis doubttul whether they oould be aodlf'ied to do so. Hardening for U.K. forces air.fields is thus not 1mmediately useful.



cosme TOP SBCRft

BBLGIUK v

(No B..al foro •• requlred b7 SACEUR)

Inor.a •• aannlng ot J:J:fq a.a4 A.tr 1"oroe.

ReY1 .. and up-date plans tOI' d.plo,ment of 2 di~.ionB ta EDP positions.

Rem.dT Air Fora. suppl7 d.tioienoie •• Expedite oompl.tion of bilateral exohange of atomio information agr .... nt

with th. United Stat •• , and th.n oomplet. training ot strik •• qu.tron.

hp.di t. Artq r.-equipmenll prosram.

Immediatel7 int.neifT training ot V-D~ toroe. and mobilization inor ... nt ••

CABADA .J Rni. .. &D4. up-dat. plan. tOI' rapi4 deploJ1llent ot Wo-third.

Intant17 DiYi.ion ta Burope.

Immediat.l7 int.n.it7 trainiag ot X-Da, tore.. and mobilisation

inoremet ••

Inor .... Aza'T, IaT7 and Air J'oro. manning.

!uild up r ••• rYe etoOk., partioular17 ammunition.

Reae47 Air Foro. .upply ,.tioi.noi •••

Imae4iatel7 int.nait,r train1nB of X-Day foro •• and mobilisation inor __ t ••

FUBC. J

(la,",l toro •• pr •• entl7 ri thAran ho. IATO oolllll1 ••• t)

li.paViau thr •• to tour din.iona hoII Al,.ria. Agr .... Bt ta the d.pl07Jllent ot llUel •• -oapa'bl. U.I. p1ù for th. 4uZ'ation

ot the p.riot ot ten.ion ... te reoommit Baya! fo~ •• ta SACIUI .-al' .trena-'h.n our 0"1'-&11 pou UOD.

R • ..., A1~ "20. 8aPP17 ,.tiel.noi ••• x...4i.'.7 iaten.it.J tl'aiaiac ot K-Ja.J foree. anA mobili.ation

inor •• nta.


COSMIC TOP SBCRft

BKLGIUK v

(No BaYal toro •• required b, SACEUR)

Inor.a •• aanning ot J:J:fq a.a4 Air 1"oroe.

Revi .. and up-date plans tor d.plo,ment ot 2 di~.ionB to EDP positions.

Rem.4T Air Foro. auppl, d.tioienoie •• Expedite oompletion ot bilateral exohange ot atomio information agr .... nt

with the United Stat •• , and th.n oomplet. training ot Strike .qu.tron.

hp.di t. Artq r.-equipmenll prosram.

Immediatel, int.neitT training ot V-D~ torose and mobilization inor ... nt ••

CABADA .J Rni. .. &D4. up-dat. plan. tor rapi4 deploJ1llent ot two-third.

Intant17 DiYi.ion to Burope.

Immediat.l, int.n.it, trainiag ot X-Da, tore.. and mobilisation

inoremet ••

Inor .... Aza'T, IaT7 and Air J'oro. manning.

!uild up r ••• rYe stoOk., partioularl, ammunition.

Reae47 Air Foro. .upply ,.tioi.noi •••

Imae4iatel, int.nait" train1nB ot X-Day toro •• and mobilisation inor __ t ••

ftdC. J

(la'Pol toro •• pr •• entl, w:l. thdran boo. JATO oolllll1 ••• t)

a.paVia. thr •• to tour din.iona hell Alpria. Agr .... Dt to the d.pl07Jllsnt ot JIU.l •• -oapa'bl. U.I. p1u tor the 4uZ'ation

ot the p.riod ot ten.ion ... to reoommit Dayal fo~ •• to SACIUI .-alt .t"nath.n our 0"1'-&11 po 111 Uon.

a • ..., A1~ "20 • .upp1, ,.tiel.noi •••

x...4i.'.7 taten.it.J tl'aiaiac ot K-Ja.J tore •• anA mobili.atioD

inor •• nta.



OOSJIIC TOP DOIft

nDIRAL RBPUBLIO 0' GBiMAIY

ConTert utatlng MAT.ADOll tra.lning UD1 t to operatlonal .tatua.

Iaorease raaDDing of ulaURa diT1.1on8.

hpedl_ traiDing, aann1nB and .qulpping of rema1n1ng 4 4iTi.10 •••

ixpedlte oompl.tion ot Rapi4 Fir. MUltiple Launoh tao!lit!ea for

"",0 (2) u. s. Maoe Squa4ron. a t Sem 'baoh and Hahn.

Rxped1 t. tr,,'1n1ng and ... 1pm.nt to AC:i ot Aireraft S~uadron ••

:ae_dT Array and Air Poroe equiprnent and aupply defi.leu8lee ae far

a. po •• ible.

Immed1at.17 int.nalty training ot M-Day for •• a and mob111.~tlon

inor.menta.

aUBe. V In.r .... aann1na of &11 •• nio •••

Reme47 equlpment and auPpl7 deti.1enoi •• (all servioes).

Imm.d1at.ly inten.!fy tra1n1ng of M-D~ toro •• an~ mobilis~ti~n

inor.ment ••


OOSJIIC TOP DOIft

nDIRAL RBPUBLIO Oll' GBiJ4AIY

ConTert exi.tlng MAT.ADOll tra.lning UD1 t to operatlonal .tatu ••

Iaorease maDDing of al.till« dirt.1ona.

hpedl_ traiDing, aann1nB and .quipping of remaining 4 41.,1.10 •••

ixpedlte oompl.tion ot Rapi4 Fir. MUltiple Launoh fao1lit!a. tor

two (2) U. s. Maoe Squairon. at Sam 'baoh and Hahn.

Rxpedi t. "r",ining and ... ipm.nt to AC:i ot Aireraft S~uadron ••

:aemedT Array and Air Poroe equipment and supply deti.len8iea aa tar

a. po •• ible.

Immedia t.17 int.naity training ot M-Day for ••• and mob111.~tlon

1nor.ment ••

<lUBe. V In.r .... aannina of &11 •• nio •••

Reme47 equipment and auPpl7 def1.ienoi •• (all servioes).

Imm.diat.ly inten.1fy tra1n1ng ot M-D~ toro •• an~ mobilis~ti~n

inorement ••



l:'iU,J J Expe.t1 ~e COQipleUoa .,t bUatoral ~.n~ \lf1 th the iJ:l1 'Lecl Ztat ••

for $peclal 4mmUAl\loD 3to~e

T_. er;l.I'~nCl' &o'loD to l'Oti.dJ' .U'mI" equ1pmrlnt def'l~loacle ;".

Irr~ell .. t.17 1ntensif7 \r~in1Q6 of .. ~ torcQ. and UQul11zltion tnareaoat ..

aem.~ Air JOrc.~ppl1 ~erici.no1 •••

Iner ..... NaYj l '&n1\1na M~ 'brin& YG08el. to C"'.&01:7 À 8\.'U.

Iaon.... l.rD:I .aDDS".

~"ar' ~dtltlO7 actioD to .... q oqd .. _t Mil MlPpl,J- cletioleoel •••

Jaleü.'el7 ln'eaaUJ' \rala1ac ot ___ tone .... 4 IIOb111&&'10. la_.ente.

jIë Sg;1'jliRLAli JS ~

(10 Javal"tDree. rGq~lr.4 bT alC~~) .x1-\o.11'. plannod 12l0YOfS,ent ot one oombat ez"O'-P to '"'l'rAaIV ..,. eçpl .. ellt

taü. 1d." ~eld ~.,. .. , ot a441Und el.eDt. la ... t ... o..,~. Ao\lftM 'rh1f4 Bna-te a...,. to eoç1 •• 2DI ~ D1Yl ....

ReYln Md up4&" pl.a tOI' ... pl4 4eplo,..' ot l't.IS-Sac ... ., 6I'OUDd

.ai, ... ........., Det.ra .. Pl .. ,..ltlon .. B&pecU" _U,oa ... naeq ..., aa4 Ur 11'01''' 10p.tle cletlcieul •••

'nngt J 1 ••••• ... at., ot al1 _m .. .. ...... -..,...t. ail ... ., .. n ...... (.u 1IN'Yl ... )

I8aeU.~ 1_tend,., vainS .. ot K-:Ja.r t .... uA IIODlli .....

bal'..ent. ••

• ••


l:'iU,J J Expe.t1 ~e COQipleUoa .,t bUateral ~.n~ wi til the iJ:ll, 'Leel Ztat ••

for $peclal 4mmUAl'loD 3to~e

T •• er;l.I'~nCl' ao'loD to I'Oti.d¥ .\l'mJ" equ1pmrlnt def'l~loacle ;".

Irr~ell .. t.17 1ntensif7 \r~in1Q6 of .. ~ torcQ. and uoul11zltion 1nareaoat ..

aem.~ Air JOrc.~ppl1 ~erici.no1 ••• Incr ..... Nay¥ I 'annina M~ 'brinG "08el. to C,,'o&01:7 A. 8\.'WI.

laOft.... I.rD:I .aDoS". ~"ar' ~dtltlO7 actioo to .... q oqd .. _t Mil MlPplJ- cletiol __ •••

_841.'-17 In'eaaUJ' vala1ac ot ___ tone .... 4 IIOb111&&'10D l.a_.ente.

me Sg;1'jliRLAli JS ~

(10 Javal"tDree. rGq~lr.4 by alC~~)

.X1-lo.a,. planned 12l0YOfS,ent of one oombat ez"O'-P to '"'l'rAaIV ..,. 8Qpl .. ellt

taU. 1d." ~eld ~.,. .. , ot a441UMd e1.eot. 1a ....... o..,~.

Ao\lftM 'rh.1f4 Bna-te a...,. to ~.te 2DI ~ DiYl ....

ReYln IM4 up4&" pl..a tor .. pi4 4eplo,..' ot l'e.IS-Sac ... ., 6I'OUDd

.al' ... ........., Det.ra .. P1 .. ,..ltlon .. B&pecU .... \i,oa ... naeq ..., aa4 AU 11'01''' 10p.tle cletlcieul •••

'nngt J I ••••• ... at., ot all _m .... ••• ., -..,...t. a4 ... ., .. n_ .... (.u 1IN'Yl ... )

I8aeU.~ l_tend,., vainS" ot K-:Ja.r t .... u4 IIODill ..... iaal'..ent. ••

• ••



1

U1lI~:D KIIGDOK V

-.-InereaBe m41lUling ot 7 Brigades now in Germ&n7

_-Depl07 t.o addi tional Br1gade 8 ta Germ&rq'

w~IC TOP SECUT

-Strengthen lopetie supper" tor œ and Canadian ltigadee.

----Prepare M-D~ reserve unite tor rapid deploJmant ta Gera~.

Depley addit10nal light bomber aireratt to the Continent.

Inoreas. commitment ot erlating hull. to Allied Forcee Med1terranean.

'} -'- Exped1 te aotion to remecq j,raq equipment detio1eno1e ••

---InIM3d1a.tely intena1t7 training of K-Dq toroes and mobilisation

incre:msnt8.


I

U1lI~:D KINGDOM V

-.-IncreaBe m41lUling ot 7 Brigades now in Germ&n7

_-DeploT two addi tional Brigade 8 to Germ&rq'

W Sl¥:iI C TOP SECUT

-Strengthen logistic supper" tor m and Canadian ltigades.

----Prepare M-D~ reserve units tor rapid deploJmant to Gera~.

Deplcy additional light bomber aircraft to the Continent.

Increase commitment of enailing hull. to Allied Forces Mediterranean.

'} -'- Expedi to aotion to remecq j,raq equipment defioienoiea.

---InIM3d1a.tely 1ntenait7 training of lA-Dq foroes and mobilisation

increments.



Documents

1_ 15 - NATO