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HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGYIN
FRANCE
Christian NADALPresidentEDF INA
cnadal@edfina.com
• 19 plants - 58 Units
• Installed capacity:
Total = 110 GW
Nuclear = 63 GW (57%)
• Net Electric generation:
Total = 549 TWh
Nuclear = 429 TWh (78%)
Nuclear Energy in France Today
Sources: EIA, 2004 - IAEA,2006 - EDF
Source: International Energy Agency, 2004
• Around 40% of total primary energy supply in 2006 (117 Mtep)
• Low Carbon Intensity: 0.26 Metric ton/Thousand $2000 (US = 0.55) and less than 80 Metric tons of CO2 per GWh of electricity in 2004
Nuclear share in generation mix
Renewable share in generation mix
CO2 intensity of power generation (t CO2/GWh)
(t CO2/GWh)
Nuclear Energy in France Today
THE PIONEERS
THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
1945 1973 199019851960 1974
THE TRANSITION PHASE
ENERGY
• France has no Natural Resources
• Independence is key issue for French Politicians since WW I– e.g. Oil Sector Reorganization Act – 1928
• Stability of Supply
– Nuclear is no exception
Nuclear Energy
Uranium fission resultsin
multiple neutron emission(F. Joliot & al 1939)
Chain Reaction possible
Pre WW II
Nuclear Energy• Pre WW II (Cont’d)
– Patents describe main Features of a Nuclear Reactor
– Young scientists hired for designing/building a nuclear reactor (F. Perrin – 1940)
– Secure Heavy Water supply
THE PIONEERS
BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE
1945 - 1973
THE PIONEERS
KEY DECISIONS
• End of WW II sees French economy left in shambles
• Priority is rebuilding French Infrastructure– Crediting French Historical Tradition
• Strong Government involvement• Centralized decisions
• Create two Government-owned entities– CEA (Commissariat a l’Energie Atomique 10/18
1945)– EDF (Electricite de France 03/29 1946)
CEA and EDF
CEA EDF
R&D Science Industry Defense
Radiation Protection Standards
Raw Material Supply Prospection Mining
Design, Build industrial Scale Nuclear Units
Advise French Government for International Agreements
MonopoliesGeneration
TransmissionDistributionImports & Exports
Design Build Generating Units Operate
POLICY
• Need Long-Term Vision• Dictated by French Situation
– Uranium Enrichment not Practicable• Industrial Capability not adequate• Funding unreasonable
Natural Uranium is the only solution
• Confirmed by International Environment– Mc Mahon Act (08/01 1946)
POLICY
• Consequence is Plutonium– Defense
– Civilian use
• Evaluate consequences of Strategic Orientations– Fuel Reprocessing– Interest for LMFBRs
POLICY
Practical Implemention
Quinquennial Planning
– General Trend constant• Natural Uranium
» Plutonium Separation as an objective» LMFBRs contemplated as early as 1953
– Periodic Reassessment
POLICY
Practical Implementation
Quinquennial Planning
– Marginal modifications tolerated• Scheduling• Technical
– Moderator type (Heavy Water [EL] or Graphite [G])– Output
No Standardization
The Chinon site(mid 60s)
The Gravelines site
(early 80s)
EDF’s APPROACH• Long-term priority is cost-effectiveness
CONTROL PROCESS
LEAD CONTRACTORA.I. (1954)
ENGINEERING CAPABILITY
• General orientations
MASSIVE DEPLOYMENT
(PRICE PERMITTING)1955
PAY OVERHEADS FOR
FIRST UNITS
BASELOAD BASELOAD ENTIRELYENTIRELY
WITH WITH NUCLEAR UNITSNUCLEAR UNITS
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The 50s open new perspectives
– Atoms for Peace
– Geneva Conferences• 1953• 1958
– EURATOM Treaty (03/25 1957)
– Open door for evaluating US technologies
KEY MILESTONES
• G1 (2 MWe – GG) 1956-1968• G2 (40 MWe – GG) 1959-1980• G3 (40 MWe – GG) 1960-1984• Chinon 1 (70e MW - GG) 1963-1973• Chinon 2 (180 MWe - GG)1965-1985• Chinon 3 (360 MWe - GG)1967-1990• SL1 (390 MWe – GG) 1969-1990• SL2 (450 MWe – GG) 1971-1992• Bugey 1 (540 MWe – GG) 1972-1994• Brennilis (70 MWe – HW) 1967-1985
THE TRANSITION PHASE
TIME FOR DIFFICULT DECISIONS
1960 - 1974
THE PIONEERS
THE TRANSITION PHASE
THE NEW CONTEXTThe 60s confirm need for change
• Development of Uranium Enrichment techniques is first step for contemplating LWRs (1967)
• EURATOM treaty gives opportunity for testing US LWRs– CHOOZ (beginning of construction - 1962)– TIHANGE (1967)
• Gas-Graphite technology limited to # 700 MWe
• LMFBR technology (longer term)– RAPSODIE (beginning of construction - 1961)– PHENIX (beginning of construction- 1967)
STRATEGIC APPROACH
• The PEON(1) Committee– Reevaluate available options and propose
graded approach crediting • Security of Supply• Political Independence• Economic Independence (Hard Currency)
– Instability of Fossil Fuel markets
• French Economy Capabilities– Budget– Industry– Cost-effectiveness
(1) Committe advising the French Government for Nuclear
STRATEGIC APPROACH• Most Significant Conclusions
– Keep all options open for further decision
– Access to Plutonium remains an objective• Fast breeders development needed
– Light Water Technology consistent with strategic issues
• BWRs, PWRs potential candidates• Costs will govern decisions
– Develop technologies for Front/Backend of the Fuel Cycle
MILESTONES
– 12/1967 – Authorization for two Gas-Cooled Reactors (GCRs) at Fessenheim (FSH)
– 07/1968 – Appropriateness of GCRs at FSH questioned
– 05/1969 – PEON Committee recommends• Development of FBRs (Beyond PHENIX)• Order for 4 to 5 LWRs before 1975• Decisions on GCRs and Heavy Water Reactors
before 12/1970• Purchase licenses from US vendors
MILESTONES
– 11/1969: French Government decides for Light Water Reactors (LWRs)
• De facto stop for Natural Uranium GCRs• Nuclear Leadership transfered to EDF
– 1970: 2 PWRs at FSH – 1971: 1 PWR at Bugey (BGY)– 1972: EDF decides for 2nd PWR at BGY, instead of
BWR• Cost was decisive
– 08/1975: French Government decides for PWRs• Cost is the most important parameter for decision
THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE
THE PWR CONSTRUCTION
PROGRAM
1973 – 1990
THE PIONEERS
THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE
THE TRANSITION PHASE
TIME FOR DECISIONS• 1973
– Oil share in energy consumption is 69%– OIl prices triple (unacceptably high)
• 1974– Decision to develop a Nuclear Program
• Political Majority is pro-Nuclear• Political Minority Reluctant
– Objective is 30% Nuclear of primary energy supply by 1990
• 1975– 08/06 French Government choose PWRs
36 U + SPX (LMFBR)
6 U
4 U
12 U
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
800019
77
197
8
197
9
198
0
198
1
198
2
198
3
198
4
198
5
198
6
198
7
198
8
199
0
199
1
199
2
199
3
199
6
199
7
199
9
Net
In
stal
led
Cap
aci
ty (
MW
) l
FRENCH PWR PROGRAM
TRENDS AND FLUCTUATIONS
• Before 1981– 42 units decided by the French government– Superphenix– All orders confirmed except 1 (900 MWe)
• After 1981– Program Reevaluation
• Political Reasons (e.g. Plogoff canceled)• Economics: Consumption Growth less than anticipated
– Orders on a Need to Basis• Last 3 1400 MWe units delayed by EDF
FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM
WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?
• Main reason is Political– Government
• Controlled CEA and EDF– Enforced key Decisions
• Made all decisions• Kept program on track• Provided help for enforcing decisions (at sites)• Industrial Policy (Infrastructure)
– French Society• Favored the Nuclear option
– Though opposition did exist
WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?• Second reason is
technicalStandardized Program
(series)
• Engineering and Construction cost
• Construction time
• Operating and maintenance cost
• Safety
Creusot Workshop in the 70s
Gravelines Site
Paluel Site
Fleet Standardization
32 3-Loop 900 MWe
20 4-Loop 1300 MWe
4 4-Loop 1450 MWe
Chooz Site
WHY WAS IT A SUCCESS?• Third reason is EDF policy
– Strong involvement in local development
• Relationship with local authorities (information + development)
• Contracts with small businesses
– Public acceptance• ‘Open door’ policy / transparency• Relations with opinion leaders
and scientistsGravelines, France
– Maintaining Infrastructure Capability• Maintenance policy
COMMENTS
• French Government didn’t provide subsidies or tax credits
– Program mostly financed by debt– ‘Advised’ EDF towards loans in $
• Huge financial impact
– Authorized retail prices didn’t reflect real program costs (increases moderate)
LOOKING AT THE FUTURE
THE REP 2000 PROGRAM
1985 – 2007
GEN IV
THE PIONEERS
THE INDUSTRIAL PHASE
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
THE TRANSITION PHASE
The CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT (1986)
• Huge impact on the european public– Poor Communication by most organizations– Increased NIMBY, BANANA
• Need to factor Severe Accidents into Design• Realization that nuclear issues are
transnational
PROGRAM SHAPING
• Discussions with several Countries
– Agreement with Germany (Political)• Design Approach (EPR)• Regulatory Approach
– Agreements with Belgium, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy (others later)
• International Programs (LWRs)• Common Utility Requirements (EUR)
NUCLEAR WASTES
– Waste issue is key for nuclear– Approach must credit former decisions– Outcomes are
• 12/30/1991 Law (1st Bataille Act)– Defines R&D orientations
– Defines Administrative Measures
• 06/28/2006 Law (2nd Bataille Act)– Confirms R&D orientations
– Sets Deadlines
» Technical Feasibility of Contemplated Solutions
» Site Selection
» Facility Commissioning
GEN IV
– Objectives well in-line with France’s strategy– France decides to join GIF (2000)– French proposals reflect constant strategy
• Fuel cycle closure (Gas-Cooled Fast Reactors)• Waste management (Molten Salt Reactor)
– Former President Chirac decides GEN IV Reactor connected to the grid by 2020
• Only available technology is LMFBR• Renewed interests in LMFBRs
– Agreements underway for• Delineating R&D program• Recreating industrial infrastructure
CONCLUSION
Nuclear Program was a success• Expertise existed• National Commitment
– Long-term Strategy
• Capability to build on experience– Stick to fundamentals– Accept failures in the approach(Gas-Cooled
Reactors)– Endorse alternatives when needed– No stone unturned
» Frontend / Backend of the Fuel Cycle
CONCLUSION• Program was a success (Cont’d)
– Public support• But Chernobyl modified perspective
– Support for operating plants remained strong
– Less support for new constructions
– EDF policy with small business and local communities
• EDF’s Industrial Policy– Applied research on anticipated technologies– Lead contractor / Vendors– Standardization
CONCLUSION
• Program remains a success– Financial performance / largest shareholder
company in Europe
CONCLUSION• Program remains a success (Cont’d)
– Stable electricity prices over long time period
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