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Social Psychology Lecture 3: The Presence of Others
We have said that social psychology deals with the effects of others on our behavior, whether
those others are actually present or imagined. Today we are going to be talking about how our behavior
is influenced when others are present.
At the end of the last century, Triplett noted that bicycle racers were faster when competing
against each other than when racing against the clock. Triplett was talking about the effect on us ofcoactors; that is, others present who are doing the same thing. If others are present but just watching, we
call them an audience. So research in this area concerns both audience and coaction effects.
Following Triplett's observation, many studies confirmed that the presence of coactors or an
audience improved performance: people were faster, more accurate, etc. if others were present or
coacting.
However, other studies reported that people did worse when others were present, whether coacting
or merely observing. How could these discrepancies be accounted for?
This conflict in the data was resolved by Philip Zimbardo. He concluded that there was an
important difference between those studies that found improved performance with an audience and those
that found reduced performance. He pointed out that when subjects were performing a task that was
well-practiced, then performance improved with an audience or coactors. But when the task was novel,or not well-learned, then an audience reduced performance.
But why did the presence of an audience make performance better in one case and worse in the
other?
Zimbardo's hypothesis was based on the fact that in any situation, a number of responses are
available. The response that is most likely to occur is called the dominant response. Other responses that
occur less frequently are called non-dominant responses. The strength of the dominant response depends
partly on the motivation level of the subject. When motivation or drive level goes up, the probability of
the dominant response also goes up.
Zimbardo argued that an audience raises the motivation of the performer, thus increasing the
probability of the dominant response. When a behavior is well-learned, the dominant response in a
performance is the correct one. Therefore an audience will increase the probability of the correctresponse in a well-learned task, thus improving performance.
When the behavior being performed is not well learned, the dominant responses in the situation
are usually incorrect. With an audience, the dominant incorrect responses are made more likely by the
increased motivation level and performance suffers.
It appears that the primary motivation aroused by an audience is evaluation anxiety: The dread of
being judged or evaluated by others. Thus the role of the audience is to create or increase evaluation
anxiety.
Audience and coaction studies suggest that the presence of others, whether as an audience or as
coactors, may change the quality of our performance. It makes it better if we are adept at what we are
doing, and worse if we are not. The presence of others may determine not only how well we do
something, but what we actually do.We all know that when others are present we often behave differently. Sometimes we may behave
better than if we were alone in the same situation. At other times, for example in the case of mob action,
we may behave in a way that we never would if alone. Why does the presence of others have this effect
on us?
We can begin to answer that question by looking first at the two very broad functions that others
may play. First there is the normative function. The role of others in setting norms or standards of
conduct. This is easy to see among adolescents, who adhere to peer-group norms in dress, language,
music, attitudes towards parents, school, authority figures, and so on. We look to others for standards in
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our own behavior because we want to belong, and we conform to those standards because we fear
rejection or ostracism by others as our punishment for non-compliance.
Early studies on conformity were conducted by Solomon Asch. His subjects were seated at a table
with a number of others. Asch would show them a standard vertical line, and then three other
comparison lines. Each subject in turn was asked to indicate which of the comparison lines was the same
length as the standard. But only one of the people at the table was a real subject; the others were
confederates of the experimenter, and the session was always arranged so that the subject was the last to
give his answer.
For the first few trials there was unanimous agreement about the correct answer. But the subject
suddenly found that the others began to agree on what he thought was clearly a wrong answer. Now,
after all the others have spoken it is the subject's turn. What should he do?
Asch found that about 75% of all subjects yielded on at least one trials. This appears to be due to
the normative function of the group: The subject feared rejection and ridicule from the others, and so
ignored the evidence of his senses to repeat the group's response.
this was in a situation in which all the other "subjects" were in agreement on the wrong answer. If
only one other individual agrees with the subject, the amount of conformity is greatly reduced.
There is a second important function that others may serve, and this is called the comparative
function. The comparative function of the group is to provide information about reality; to allow the
individual to test his own idea of what is true and real by checking his perceptions against those of
others.
Most of us spend most of our time in situations where we are pretty sure how to interpret what is
going on around us, and how we should respond. But sometimes a situation is confusing or ambiguous,
and we are not sure what to do. When this happens, one of the first things we do is check what others are
doing, and how they are interpreting the situation. Providing the information which will help us interpret
an ambiguous situation is the comparative function of the group.
An example of the comparative function comes from a variation of Asch's the line-judgement
study. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) arranged their study so that each subject was seated in a separate
cubicle where they could neither see nor hear the others. Each subject made his response by pressing a
button in front of him. Lights in front of him also indicated the responses of the other subjects, but notwhich subject had made which response. The peurpose of this arrangement was to eliminate pressures
aon the subject to conform with wrong answers. If nobody knows which choice a particular subject
made, there could be no reason for the subject to go along with a wrong answer solely to avoid ridicule
or rejection.
What was interesting about the results of this study was that many subjects still went along with
the wrong answets of the rest of the group on a number of trials. The reason seems to be that the subject
went along primarily on trials where the correct answer was not clear, or when he doubted his own
choice because of the unanimity of the group. So he went along not because he was afraid not to, but
because he thoight the others just might be right, and he wasn't sure of his own answer.
In the Asch situation, we are looking at the function of the group in a somewhat artificial setting.
But there are many examples of the comarative function working in situations that are very real andimportant. Let's look at one particular area in which that appears to be true: Bystander intervention.
Research in this area began in the 1960's after a young woman named Kitty Genovese was
murdered outside her apartment building in New York City. She was stabbed repeatedly and left for
dead by her assailant in an attack that lasted 30 minutes. It was a terrible and appalling crime, even for
New York City. But it was not the crime itself that made headlines all over North America, but the fact
that 38 people witnessed the crime from the apartment windows and did nothing at all. They knew what
was happening, yet not one went to her aid, or even called the police.
Newspapers were filled with enraged or sorrowful editorials and letters condemning the witnesses,
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and suggesting that it was the city that had desensitized and depersonalized them so that they no longer
cared about their fellow citizens.
All this aroused the concern and curiosity of social psychologists, who also wondered how so
many people could have stood by and done nothing while another human being was being brutally
murdered.
When the witnesses were interviewed, they turned out to be ordinary people. Many were
extremely distraught about the death. Why had they done nothing? For most of them, one reason for not
intervening personally during the attack was the fear of personal injury. But why hadn't they called the
police? Well, as they had looked out on the crime scene, they saw that many others had seen it as well,
and they all assumed that the police had already been called by someone else, so it wasn't necessary for
them to do so. In other words, it seemed that the very presence of so many witnesses was in part
responsible for the lack of action by any one of them.
When psychologists looked at laboratory analogues of this situation, they discovered that reacting
to an emergency requires two major decisions. The first is whether or not the situation really is an
emergency requiring action, the second decision is what to do if it is an emergency.
In making both of these decisions, the individual is very much influenced by the presence and
behavior of others.
The first decision is whether the situation is an emergency. This was easy in the Kitty Genovese
case, but it is not always so clear. Is that man lying in the doorway the victim of a heart attack or
seizure, or just a drunk sleeping off his latest binge? Is that couple fighting a rape attempt or just a
family squabble? There are many situations like this that might be interpreted in different ways. The
problem for the bystander is to decide which interpretation is the right one. In making this decision the
bystander relies heavily on the behavior of those around him. If nobody seems to think the situation is
important, then the witness may decide that it is not an emergency and go on his way. He might not have
reached that decision if he were alone. Part of the problem is that many of the others present are going
through the same process: looking around them to see how others are reacting before deciding what, if
anything, to do. Since everybody is looking at others, and nobody is reacting, the witnesses each come
to the conclusion that this is not an emergency. This process is often called collective ignorance.
In a study by **Latane and Darley (1968), subjects participating in an experiment were told thatthey had to complete a short questionnaire. While they were doing this, either alone or with others,
smoke began to seep into the room. The experimenters were interested how many of the subjects would
report the smoke, and how long it would take them to do so.
They found that subjects waiting alone were most likely to report the smoke, and to do so most
rapidly. As the number of others in the room increased, the probability that any one subject would
reporta the smoke declined, and the time necessary for a report to be made increased.
So in deciding whether an ambiguous situation is an emergency, we rely on the behavior of those
around us: If they are going the same, then collective ignorance results, and everybody decides it is not
an emergency.
If we do decide it's an emergency, then we must decide what to do. Here again the presence and
behavior of others is important.There are a couple of considerations the individual uses in deciding what, if anything to do in an
emergency. First, is there anything he can do. If he feels that the situation could be handled only by
someone with special skills, then he may not take action, especially if others are present who might be
better equipped to handle the situation.
More generally, the mere presence of others may lead the observer to decide that since there are so
many others present, the responsibility for taking action (or the blame for not taking action) is not his
alone, but shared by everyone else. This is the notion of diffusion of responsibility. The presence of
others leads a bystander not to take action because it is not his exclusive responsibility to do so.
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This effect of others is nicely illustrated in a study by Darley and Latane (1968), in which subjects
were asked to participate in a group discussion. To make sure that discussion was frank and open, each
person would be in a different room, communicating with the others over an intercom. In fact, however,
there was only one real subject, and the remaining individuals in the group were prerecorded tapes.
At the beginning of the study, each person was asked to say something about himself. The subject
heard one of the others mention that he occasionally had seizures. After the introductions, the discussion
began. After a few minutes the subject heard one of the others calling for help, in the grip of a seizure.
What would he do?
As you might expect, the most rapid responses came from subjects who thought that nobody else
could hear the calls. As the number of others believed to be listening increased, the probability that the
subject would take action declined.
What we are seeing here is the effect of diffusion of responsibility. Since others were present,
perhaps with specialized skills, the subject does not take action, even though he is well aware that it is
an emergency in which action is required.
In the case of bystander intervention, the effect of others tends to be detrimental. But there are
situations in which the presence and actions of others actually increase the likelihood that an an
individual will take action.
Several studies have showm for example, that seeing someone else helping in an emergency
increases that probability that the individual himself will help in a similar emergency.
In one experiment, a female confederate of the experimenter parked her car on the side of the road
with its hood up, indicating that she needed help, and the number of passing drivers that offered help
was tabulated. This condition was compared with a second in which a another disabled car was parked
some distance down the road from the the confederate's car. Beside this second car another was parked,
and its driver was assisting. This second condition therefore involved a helping model. The authors
found that the the proportion of passing cars that stopped to help, was higher when the helping model
was present than when it was not. So sometimes the behavior of others can be a positive influence ond
our own behavior.
Of course the cases we have discussed today do not exhaust the role of others in influencing or
determining our behavior. In almost every interaction with others our behavior is influenced in someway, however subtle, by what those others do and say. The research in this area is quite large, and it's a
pity we have so little time to examine it.
Next time we will talk about a particularly dramatic influence of others.
References
Darley, J. & Latane, B. Bystander intervention in emergencies: Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 377-383.
Latane, B. and Darley, J. Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 10, 215-221.
Deutsch, M. & Gerard, H. G. A study of normative and informational social influence upon individual
judgement. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1955, 51, 629-636.