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Kritik – Nuclearism Page 1 of 34Josh Ridenour

KRITIK – NUCLEARISMF/W – REPS KEY............................................................................................................................................................3

1. Language is Key: discourse legitimizes the system; continued blame shift ignores our own co-responsibility........................................................................................................................................................................32. Metaphors frame the discussion for a solution to a problem; metaphors are driving strategy in “proliferation”........................................................................................................................................................................43. Metaphors are K2 structuring and supporting the understanding of a problem.........................................4

LINKS...............................................................................................................................................................................5A. “Proliferation”...................................................................................................................................................5

1. “Proliferation” is the guiding principle of the international security environment; “proliferation,” “stability,” and “balance” are the key metaphors.............................................................................................................52. Anti-nuclear nuclearism prioritizes nonproliferation; a focus on other's weapons rather than the 99% the US has; efforts toward “global nuclear disarmament” are just to prevent claims of hypocrisy from sticking.....5

B. “Arms Control”.................................................................................................................................................61. Arms Control is the policy of legitimizing and sustaining a system of hierarchy in which the US remains the dominant power..............................................................................................................................................6

INTERNALS....................................................................................................................................................................7A. Examples............................................................................................................................................................7

1. There is a general perception that nuclear weapons are only safe in the hands of Western powers, that third world nations would be unfit for possession; in fact, third world nations have been used to justify possession........................................................................................................................................................................72. Racialism and legitimization of Western dominance over non-parties to the NPT is growing..................73. Krauthammer gives a great example of the “proliferation” problem; advocates denial, forcible disarmament, and defense.....................................................................................................................................................84. Bush's focus on the “proliferation” problem led to a “new world order” where the UN regulates conventional weapons as well..............................................................................................................................................9

IMPACTS.......................................................................................................................................................................11A. No Solvency......................................................................................................................................................11

1. “Proliferation”'s focus on technology denial, and the artificial intrinsicness assigned to the weapons themselves dooms the strategy to failure......................................................................................................112. The “proliferation” metaphor itself ignores the root causes of weapons units and technologies spreading; the fault is with the policy strategy of “proliferation” as opposed by “disarmament”.......................................123. Current metaphor of “proliferation” is driving strategies that fail to account for the nature of security and complexity in the international security environment; we are doomed to failure........................................134. “Proliferation” focuses on spread, but neglects the structural nature of proliferation and the inherent factors that drive it....................................................................................................................................................13

B. Case TURN.......................................................................................................................................................141. Focus on “stability” and “balance” actually promotes the spread of nuclear weapons; additionally, it consigns us to an eternal status quo; in this vein, high levels of proliferation would actually be more stable...........142. The nuclearism and racism of weapons possession actually spurs proliferation (CASE TURN); without addressing nuclearism, the proliferation agenda cannot be solved (SOLVENCY STRIKE).......................153. US nuclear policy is a hypocritical double-standard that drives proliferation (Ex. India nuke deal).......154. US nonproliferation programs ironically increase the threat of proliferation; a fundamental shift is necessary to solve the problem of proliferation............................................................................................................165. Current nonproliferation efforts actually increase the incentive to proliferate.........................................17

C. Racism..............................................................................................................................................................181. Nuclear dominance = Orientalism; Western discourse on nonproliferation is a form of nuclear racism.182. The nonproliferation regime is racist; the backlash against “rogue” states does not match the reaction to Western powers.............................................................................................................................................18


D. Oppression.......................................................................................................................................................191. “Stability” serves to ignore the oppressed and preserve the status quo of dominance over those who do not support the agenda (Ex. Ukraine and Yugoslavia)........................................................................................192. Anti-nuclear nuclearism justifies invasion, military strike and economic sanction against countries that pursue capabilities far behind the US' own; additionally, the CTBT has been symbolically violated by the US while it is explicitly designed to prevent the nuclearization of any other country........................................................20

E. Self-Fulfilling Prophecy..................................................................................................................................211. The ambiguity of the threat means the situation is constantly threat-generating; ultimately, the enemy is demonized and rejected as less than human.................................................................................................212. Preemptive strategy makes a never-ending war, shifting itself to persist in a variety of security threats 21

ALTERNATIVE............................................................................................................................................................221. Alt Solvency – The critique solves the maskedness of the metaphor; we must deconstruct from a focus on “proliferation” to “disarmament”.................................................................................................................22

A2 SECTION.................................................................................................................................................................23A. A2 Common Objections for Others' Nuclearization....................................................................................23

1. A2 “No Deterrence For Them” - o_0 you've got it backwards, doc.........................................................232. A2 “They don't have the money!” - Aha...haha...ha. -_- And we totally do? riiigghhttt..........................253. A2 “They can't secure it” - So...shouldn't we help them? It's not like our stuff is secure either..............264. A2 “They're irrational/unstable” - 2 counter-arguments: (1) democracy – fail; (2) officials – we haz our own problems, you hypocrite, you.......................................................................................................................275. A2 “Irrational” - Racists; no, really, you discriminate on 3 levels: criminalization, sexist overtones, and parent-child bigotry; westerners use symbolic forces of domestic hierarchy to subject others to their will29

B. A2 “Why Do They Want?”.............................................................................................................................311. The drive for nuclear weapons can be seen through a lens of economic need; North Korea can use its “attention” and nuclear capabilities as a bargaining chip for foreign aid.....................................................31


F/W – REPS KEY

1. Language is Key: discourse legitimizes the system; continued blame shift ignores our own co-responsibility

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [JCKR]“Noam Chomsky (1 982) has suggested that the arms race between the superpowers was not really "about" the US.-Soviet rivalry at all but was a convenient way to assure the subjugation of smaller countries in the Third World under the guise of superpower competition. One does not have to swallow whole the simple reductionism of this argument to

accept that there is obviously some connection between the nuclear stockpiles of some developed nations on the one hand and the political clientship and economic underdevelopment of Third World nations on the other. Just as some nations have

abundant access to capital while others do not, so some nations are allowed plentiful supplies of the ultimate weapon while others are prevented by elaborate treaties and international police activities from obtaining it. Without devising rigidly deterministic models connecting economic power and nuclear weapons-models that such states as Japan and Germany obviously would not fit-one can at least sketch the broad contours of this generalization: the nuclear underdevelopment of the developing world is one fragment in a wider and systematic pattern of global disempowerment that ensures the

subordination of the south. The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if they were equally beneficial to all the nations of the globe. And, ironically, the discourse on nonproliferation presents these subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world. This is another case of blaming the victim. The discourse on nuclear proliferation is structured around a rigid segregation of "their" problems from "ours." In fact, however, we are linked to

developing nations by a world system, and many of the problems that, we claim, render these nations ineligible to own nuclear weapons have a lot to do with the West and the system it dominates. For example, the regional conflict between India and Pakistan is, in part at least, a direct consequence of the divide-and-rule policies adopted by the British raj; and the dispute over Kashmir, identified by Western commentators as a possible flash point for nuclear war, has its origins not so much in ancient hatreds as in Britain's decision in 1846 to install a Hindu maharajah as leader of a Muslim territory (Burns 1998). The hostility between Arabs and Israelis has been exacerbated by British, French, and American intervention in the Middle East dating back to the Balfour Declaration of 1917. More recently, as Steven Green points out, "Congress has voted over $36.5 billion in economic and military aid to Israel, including rockets, planes, and other technology which has directly advanced Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities. It is precisely this nuclear arsenal, which the U.S. Congress has been so instrumental in building up, that is driving the Arab state to attain countervailing strategic weapons of various kinds" (1990). Finally, the precariousness of many Third World regimes is not at all unconnected with the activities of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the CIA, and various multinational corporations based in the West. And if U.S. sanctions against India and Pakistan after their 1998 tests destabilize these countries, Western commentators will doubtless point to this instability as a further reason

why they cannot be trusted with the bomb. "Our" coresponsibility for "their" problems and the origin of some of those problems in a continuing system of global domination which benefits the West is an integral part of ordinary political discourse in the Third World itself; it is, however, denied by an orientalist discourse that disavows that we and the Other are ultimately one.”


2. Metaphors frame the discussion for a solution to a problem; metaphors are driving strategy in “proliferation”

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“The discussion in this paper has examined the way in which international security, and international security policy, are constituted in the terms of an assembly of metaphors. An image, comprising a series of metaphors, provides the conceptual frame for a problem, and therefore structures the policy agenda by privileging a particular set of solutions which can be proposed and implemented. In particular, the image highlights certain aspects of a given problem, while downplaying others and hiding still more. The policy solutions which will be advanced will, not surprisingly, focus upon the features highlighted by the image, and ignore those downplayed and hidden. I have shown how in the aftermath of the Cold War, and in the context of the Gulf War, an image of a problem of PROLIFERATION was developed, which comprised three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance'. The entailments of these metaphors provide an image of an autonomous, technical, apolitical process, which if left unchecked spreads its

technological offspring outwards from its source, resulting in excessive and destabilising accumulations elsewhere. This image is reflected in, and is driving the further development of, the instruments of control—the policy being applied to the problem defined by PROLIFERATION. ” 3. Metaphors are K2 structuring and supporting the understanding of a problem

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“ Paul Chilton has provided a useful example of the role of metaphor in shaping understandings in international relations, particularly concerning

the Cold War discourses around nuclear weapons and the relationship of 'the West' to 'the Soviet Union'. In doing so, he illustrates how the metaphor naturalises a policy, and the apparent interests underlying it —in this case, the central security policy of Cold War Europe. Chilton works with the example of a fairly common speech from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, John Nott. Nott used a metaphor of 'a dying giant' to argue that there is a possibility of the Soviet Union attacking Western Europe in order to defend the 'peace through strength' policy of then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and her American mentor Ronald Reagan. As Chilton notes, "What Nott wants to do, it seems, is to assert the likelihood of Russia attacking Europe." On the basis of such an assertion, 'proven' through the analogical reasoning of metaphor, the government can

justify a policy of military hostility, to insure against the lashing out of a dying giant.35 Chilton argues that policy makers address problems by means of what I have called 'images'36—that is, the student or policy maker constructs a metaphorical image of problem, an issue or even other actors.37 This image relates the thing being imagined to another, in terms of which the first is understood. These images comprise metaphors, which are used to structure and support our understanding of a problem, and therefore our response to the problem. In Chilton's example, the key relationship is the support the image and its metaphors provide for pre-existing policy. His political concern is with the bellicose nuclear strategy pursued by the Western Alliance, and the consequent danger of nuclear 'war' that the governments foist on the people of Europe and North America through the metaphors supporting the image of the Soviet Union. However, the general relationships between the image of a policy problem, the condition of the problem itself and the policy solution

to that problem allow the ideas he develops to be given wider scope than Chilton provides. The metaphors entailed by a given image do more than simply support a policy choice, they structure the way in which the image holder can think about a problem, and so shape that choice in the first place. ”


LINKS

A. “Proliferation”

1. “Proliferation” is the guiding principle of the international security environment; “proliferation,” “stability,” and “balance” are the key metaphors

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“ The international security environment is thus being reimagined. The image which guided international security policy and scholarship during the Cold War has given way to a new image centred on 'proliferation'. This image is informing both policy

and academic debate, and is found reflected in the instruments and institutions of international arms control and security, as well as in the written record of the academy. What are the implications of this image? How can we understand the way in which this image informs policy, reshaping instruments, institutions and even interests? The images of security comprise a number of metaphors, which shape our thinking about problems and solutions—in the present case, the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability' and its related metaphor 'balance'. In order to consider the role that image plays in international

security, it is necessary to appreciate the way in which metaphors constitute our understandings, and thereby inform the conception we hold of a policy problem, and the solutions we develop to address those problems. ” 2. Anti-nuclear nuclearism prioritizes nonproliferation; a focus on other's weapons rather than the 99% the US has; efforts toward “global nuclear disarmament” are just to prevent claims of hypocrisy from sticking

Darwin Bond-Graham [Ph.D., sociology, University of California-Santa Barbara; Board member of the Los Alamos Study Group, a disarmament, energy, and economic development organization based in Albuquerque, New Mexico] and Will Parrish [Youth Empowerment Director at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation], “Military: Anti-nuclear Nuclearism,” Foreign Policy In Focus, January 12, 2009 http://www.fpif.org/articles/anti-nuclear_nuclearism [JCKR]“As a policy, anti-nuclear nuclearism is designed to ensure U.S. nuclear and military dominance by rhetorically calling for what has long been derided as a naïve ideal: global nuclear disarmament. Unlike past forms of nuclearism, it de-emphasizes the offensive nature

of the U.S. arsenal. Instead of promoting the U.S. stockpile as a strategic deterrence or umbrella for U.S. and allied forces, it prioritizes an aggressive diplomatic and military campaign of nonproliferation. Nonproliferation efforts are aimed entirely at other states, especially non-nuclear nations with suspected weapons programs, or states that can be coerced and attacked under the pretense that they possess nuclear weapons or a

development program (e.g. Iraq in 2003). Effectively pursuing this kind of belligerent nonproliferation regime requires half-steps toward cutting the U.S. arsenal further, and at least rhetorically recommitting the United States to international treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It requires a fig leaf that the United States isn’t developing new nuclear weapons, and that it is slowly disarming

and de-emphasizing its nuclear arsenal. By these means the United States has tried to avoid the charge of hypocrisy, even though it has designed and built newly modified weapons with qualitatively new capacities over the last decade and a half. Meanwhile, U.S. leaders have allowed for and even promoted a mass proliferation of nuclear energy and material, albeit

under the firm control of the nuclear weapons states, with the United States at the top of this pile. Many disarmament proponents were elated last year when four extremely prominent cold warriors — George P. Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn — announced in a series of op-eds their commitment to "a world free of nuclear weapons." Strange bedfellows indeed for the cause. Yet the fine print of their plan, published by the Hoover Institute and others since then, represents the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform to a tee. It’s a conspicuous yet merely rhetorical commitment to a world without nuclear weapons. These four elder statesmen have said what many U.S. elites have rarely uttered: that abolition is both possible and desirable. However, the anti-nuclear posture in their policy proposal comes to bear only on preventing non-nuclear states from going nuclear, or else preventing international criminal conspiracies from proliferating weapons technologies and nuclear materials for use as

instruments of non-state terror. In other words, it’s about other people's nuclear weapons, not the 99% of materials and arms possessed by the United States and other established nuclear powers. This position emphasizes an anti-nuclear politics entirely for what it means for the rest of the world — securing nuclear materials and preventing other states from going nuclear or further developing their existing arsenals. U.S. responsibility to disarm remains in the distant future, unaddressed as a present imperative.”

http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/6731276.html


B. “Arms Control”

1. Arms Control is the policy of legitimizing and sustaining a system of hierarchy in which the US remains the dominant power

Darwin Bondgraham[PhD, Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara; Board Member, Los Alamos Study Group: Disarmament, Energy, and Economic Development Organization] “New Book – Beyond Arms Control: Challenges and Choices for Nuclear Disarmament” Self-Published, A[ril 3, 2010 http://darwinbondgraham.blogspot.com/2010/04/new-book-beyond-arms-control-challenges.html [JCKR]“"Arms control" is an academic and policy field invented during the C old War to ideologically legitimate American empire as it is manifested through the vastly superior armaments of the US warfare state which no other nation's war-making capabilities can remotely compare to. Arms controllers have spent decades justifying why the United States possesses nuclear weapons and other especially destructive

implements of war (landmines, bio-weapons, depleted uranium, etc.), while explaining why other nations, particularly non-white, Islamic, and formerly colonized nations should never aspire to these kinds of killing systems. In the 1990s stateside peace and disarmament activism was professionalized with serious infusions of foundation money, and the end of the Cold War simultaneously brought about a demobilization of mass movements that until then had sought to check the reckless qualitative and quantitative expansion of nuclear and other arms. Around this time dozens of think tanks and centers sprang up at prestigious universities and freestanding organizations established themselves inside the D.C. beltway, all to employ a cottage industry of "experts" who would advise the state on how to control world armaments after the Reagan era race against the Soviets. Surviving antinuclear and antiwar NGOs changed with the times. The result was that many activists began to adopt the language and rationale of the formerly elitist and state employed arms controllers; they began to speak to the state, to advise its bureaucrats, generals,

and politicians in their uses and abuses of power, to assist them in legitimating the project of American imperial expansion after the fall of the Soviet "evil empire." Because it was created and developed as an organ of the imperial state, arms control as a paradigm can never be used to pursue democratic, self-determined development of nations. Its entire purpose for being is to maintain the military (and thus

economic and political) hierarchy of nations with the USA at the top.”

http://darwinbondgraham.blogspot.com/2010/04/new-book-beyond-arms-control-challenges.html


INTERNALS

A. Examples

1. There is a general perception that nuclear weapons are only safe in the hands of Western powers, that third world nations would be unfit for possession; in fact, third world nations have been used to justify possession

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology and Science & Technology Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [Brackets in Original] [JCKR]“There is a common perception in the West that nuclear weapons are most dangerous when they are in the hands of Third World leaders. I first became interested in this perception while interviewing nuclear weapons designers for an ethnographic study of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)- one of three laboratories where U.S. nuclear weapons are designed (Gusterson 1996). I made a point of

asking each scientist if he or she thought nuclear weapons would be used in my lifetime. Almost all said that they thought it unlikely that the United States or the Russians would initiate the use of nuclear weapons, but most thought that nuclear weapons would probably be used- y a Third World country. The laboratory took a similar position as an institution. For example, using terminology with distinctly colonial overtones to

argue for continued weapons research after the end of the Cold War, an official laboratory pamphlet said, Political, diplomatic, and military experts believe that wars of the future will most likely be "tribal conflicts" between neighboring Third World countries or between ethnic groups in the same country. While the Cold War may be over, these small disputes may be more dangerous than a war between the superpowers, because smaller nations with deep-seated grievances against each other may lack the restraint that has been exercised by the US and the USSR. The existence of such potential

conflicts and the continued danger of nuclear holocaust underscore the need for continued weapons research. [LLNL 1990: I] It is not only nuclear weapons scientists who believe that nuclear weapons are much safer in the hands of the established nuclear powers than in those of Third World countries. There has long been a widespread perception among U.S. defense intellectuals, politicians, and pundits-

leaders of opinion on nuclear weapons-that, while we can live with the nuclear weapons of the five official nuclear nations for the indefinite future, the proliferation of nuclear weapons to nuclear-threshold states in the Third World, especially the Islamic world, would be enormously dangerous. This orthodoxy is so much a part of our collective common sense that, like all common sense, it can usually be stated as simple fact without fear of

contradiction (Geertz 1983). It is widespread in the media and in learned journals,' and it is shared by liberals as well as conservatives. For example, just as Kenneth Adelman, a senior official in the Reagan administration, has said that "the real danger comes from some miserable Third World country which decides to use these weapons either out of desperation or incivility" (1988), at the same time Hans Bethe-a physicist revered by many for his work on behalf of disarmament over many decades-has said, "There have to be nuclear weapons in the hands of more responsible countries to deter such use" by Third World nations (Bernard 1994, quoted in Shroyer 1998124).”

2. Racialism and legitimization of Western dominance over non-parties to the NPT is growing

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [JCKR]“The Non-Proliferation Treaty embodied a bargain between the five countries that had nuclear weapons in 1970 and those countries that did not. According to the bargain, the five official nuclear states (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China)3 promised to assist other signatories to the treaty in acquiring nuclear energy technology as long as they did not use that technology to produce nuclear weapons, submitting to international inspections when necessary to prove their compliance. Further, in Article 6 of the treaty, the five nuclear powers agreed to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" (Blacker and Duffy 1976:395). One hundred eighty-seven countries

have signed the treaty, but Israel, India, and Pakistan have refused, saying it enshrines a system of global "nuclear apartheid." Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty divided the countries of the world into nuclear and nonnuclear by means of a purely temporal metric4-designating only those who

had tested nuclear weapons by 1970 as nuclear powers-the treaty has become the legal anchor for a global nuclear regime that is increasingly legitimated in Western public discourse in racialized terms. In view of recent developments in global politics-the collapse of the Soviet threat and the recent war against Iraq, a nuclear-threshold nation in the Third World-the importance of this discourse in organizing Western geopolitical understandings is only growing. It has become an increasingly important way of legitimating U.S. Military programs in the post-Cold War world since the early 1990s, when U.S. military leaders introduced the term rogue states into the American lexicon of fear, identifying a new source of danger just as the Soviet threat was declining (Klare 1995).”


3. Krauthammer gives a great example of the “proliferation” problem; advocates denial, forcible disarmament, and defense

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [Brackets & Ellipses in Original] [JCKR]One noted, and useful, example of the rethinking of international security was provided by Charles Krauthammer, in the journal of record of the US foreign policy elite, Foreign Affairs, in early 1991. He was responding directly to the collapse of the 'bipolar' image of the Cold War: "Ever since it became

clear that an exhausted Soviet Union was calling off the Cold War, the quest has been on for a new American role in the world. Roles, however, are not invented in the abstract; they are a response to a perceived world structure."1 The structure Krauthammer perceived following bipolarity was a "Unipolar Moment". In

addition to redefining international security in terms of unipolarity, Krauthammer also gave an early statement of the 'proliferation' problem as

it would come to be understood: The post-Cold War era is thus perhaps better called the era of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery will constitute the greatest single threat to world security for the rest of our lives. That is what makes a new international order not an imperial dream or a Wilsonian fantasy but a matter of the sheerest prudence. It is slowly dawning on the West that there is a need to establish some new regime to police these weapons and those who brandish them.2 Krauthammer's article appeared as a US-led coalition was using Iraq as a test range for its vast assortment of weapons of all kinds of destruction. The aftermath of this war in the Gulf saw 'the West' pick up the pace

of their realisation that longer term action was needed to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, the massive conventional army which Iraq deployed (admittedly to little effect) was seen to tie conventional weapons to this new security agenda. 'Proliferation' thus came to be seen as a wide ranging problem, encompassing not only the spread of nuclear weapons, but of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the diffusion of conventional arms. Not only did Krauthammer sound the warning on

proliferation, he also set out the elements of a response to this new threat: [A]ny solution will have to include three elements: denying, disarming, and defending. First, we will have to develop a new regime, similar to COCOM (Coordinating Committee on

Export Controls) to deny yet more high technology to such states. Second, those states that acquire such weapons anyway will have to submit to strict outside control or risk being physically disarmed. A final element must be the development of antiballistic missile and air defense systems to defend against those weapons that do escape Western control or preemption.3 The three elements of Krauthammer's response correspond well with the policy developments in the subsequent four years: 1. The first line of attack is a regime based on technology denial. Indeed, the COCOM formally concluded its work in March 1994, and its members are engaged in establishing a non-proliferation export control regime which would include also the states of central and eastern Europe. More generally, regimes of technology denial are the foundation of the non-proliferation effort. Consider the communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, announcing an Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", 9 June 1994: 3. Current international efforts focus on the prevention of WMD and missile proliferation through a range of international treaties and regimes.4 .... 4. The aforementioned treaties are complemented on the supply side by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. These regimes should be reinforced through the broadest possible adherence to them and enhancement of their effectiveness.5 Once the successor to COCOM is in place—assuming it maintains a version of COCOM's munitions and dual-use technologies lists—there will be in place technology denial regimes for the three weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological), missile delivery systems and conventional arms. With the exception of missile systems, there will also be some form of international mechanism addressing each of these as well, as the United Nations has created a Register of Conventional Arms. 2. Krauthammer's second suggestion was for tight international supervision or the threat of forcible disarmament. On 9 April 1991 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 687 which outlined the forcible disarmament of Iraq. It mandated a Special Commission (UNSCOM) which, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would oversee the declaration and destruction of the Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons holdings and production capabilities, as well as their missile technology.6 Similarly, through May and June of 1994, North Korea was threatened with international sanction, and possible military conflict with the South and the United States, should they not allow international inspection of their nuclear facilities. 3. The final element of a security policy to counter proliferation, which Krauthammer outlined, was the development of military capabilities to defend against what has come to be called 'the post-proliferation environment'. The recent US threats of violence in the case of North Korea are one example of such a military response forming part of the reaction to the problem of 'proliferation'. A second is found in the NATO declaration, quoted above: 12. Recent events in Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated that WMD proliferation can occur despite international non-proliferation norms and agreements. As a defensive Alliance, NATO must therefore address the military capabilities needed to discourage WMD proliferation and use, and if necessary, to protect NATO territory, populations and forces. 13. NATO will therefore: . . . . - seek, if necessary, to improve defence capabilities of NATO and its members to protect NATO territory, populations and forces against WMD use, based on assessments of threats (including non-State actors), Allied military

doctrine and planning, and Allied military capabilities.7 It would seem, then, that it has dawned on the West that proliferation is a serious security problem—indeed, in January 1992, an unprecedented Summit meeting of the UN Security Council declared proliferation a threat to international peace and security. Such a determination opens the way for multilateral military action to respond to proliferation, under the terms of the United Nations' Charter. ”


4. Bush's focus on the “proliferation” problem led to a “new world order” where the UN regulates conventional weapons as well

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [Brackets & Ellipses in Original] [JCKR]“In November 1990 the central combatants had gathered in Paris to mark formally the end of the Cold War, and to herald an era of peace. By the end of the February following, the Gulf War had convinced the leading policy-makers of the need to rethink international order and international security a little more clearly than just hoping for peace. The Gulf War had seemed to promise a United Nations which could function as an organ of international collective security—providing all ignored the driving role of the United

States in shepherding UN actions in the Gulf. Thus, in his address to Congress following the conclusion of the Gulf War, George Bush called for a UN-centred 'new world order': Until now, the world we've known had been a world divided—a world of barbed wire and concrete block,

conflict and Cold War. Now, we can see a new world coming into view, a world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order: in the words of Winston Churchill, a world order in which "the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong ...."; a world where the United Nations—freed from Cold War stalemate—is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders; a world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among nations.8 Bush's new world order was to be one of liberal democracy and human rights within a functioning United Nations, but "The victory over Iraq was not waged as a 'war to end all wars.' Even

the new world order cannot guarantee an era of perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our mission."9 What posed the threat to enduring peace in this new world order? On 8 February, while the fighting was still ongoing, the Canadian government made a proposal which provided one answer, an answer echoing the alarm sounded by Krauthammer in Foreign Affairs: Canada has long been a leading proponent of measures to deal effectively with the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction, and has advocated restraint and effective controls on the export of conventional weapons. The current Gulf crisis, with its use of missile technology and threatened use of chemical and biological weapons, highlights these concerns; we must seize the opportunity to address them positively and effectively. Canada proposes a gathering of world leaders under United Nations auspices to issue

a statement of global, political will, condemning the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as well as massive build-ups of conventional weapons; and, endorsing a comprehensive programme of action to address these concerns. Under this programme of action, individual proliferation concerns will be addressed in those multilateral forums set up to deal with them. Individual programmes of action on proliferation issues will be carried out so that by 1995, a subsequent conference might celebrate completion of the comprehensive network of specific non-proliferation regimes.10 In this proposal, Canada gathered together all of the technological elements which would come to compose the new 'Proliferation' agenda: weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—which are chemical, biological and nuclear weapons—their delivery systems—particularly missile technology—and massive build-ups of

conventional weapons. For the first time, proliferation would now refer to the full range of weapons and related technologies, not just to nuclear weapons, or even weapons of mass destruction. The proposal for a world summit was not well received, but the rest of the policy agenda Canada outlined was picked up by others. Over the course of the next three years, in various fora, the foreign affairs and international security community of the leading states reiterated the problem, gradually refining the terms of the image it provided. An important feature of the Canadian proposal was the inclusion of conventional weapons in a non-

proliferation agenda. Canada had called for the creation of a Register of Conventional Arms at the United Nations, a proposal that had been made previously, but met with little success.11 With the example of the Iraqi arsenal, the idea of at least tracking conventional weapons transfers gained credence. In

April, at a meeting of the European Council, Prime Minister John Major announced that the United Kingdom would take the lead on creating the Arms Register, and won the backing of his European partners. Even France agreed, in a broad package of non-

proliferation measures it released 31 May—a package which included France's accession to the NPT. Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu also announced Japanese support for the Register in April, and further declared that Japan would join the UK to sponsor a resolution creating such a Register at the UN General

Assembly that fall. The inclusion of conventional arms in the proliferation agenda had been spurred, quite clearly, by the large Iraqi conventional arsenal. In his 6 March address to Congress, President Bush had promised an initiative to address the problem of conventional arms building in the Middle East. He delivered on this promise in a speech to the US Air Force Academy 29 May: Nowhere are the dangers of weapons proliferation more urgent than in the Middle East. After consulting with governments in the region and elsewhere about how to slow and

then reverse the buildup of unnecessary and destabilizing weapons, I am today proposing a Middle East arms control initiative. It features supplier guidelines on conventional arms exports; barriers to exports that contribute to weapons of mass destruction; a freeze now, and later a ban on surface-to-surface missiles in the region; and a ban on production of nuclear weapons material. Halting the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in the Middle East, while supporting the

legitimate needs of every state to defend itself, will require the cooperation of many states , in the region and around the world.12 In the accompanying fact sheet released by the White House, the connection between Bush's proposal and the more general problems of proliferation, addressed particularly in the prior actions by the UK and Canada, was drawn explicitly: "Since proliferation is a global problem, it must find a global solution. At the same time, the current situation in the Middle East poses unique dangers and opportunities. Thus, the president's proposal will concentrate on the Middle East as its starting point, while complementing other initiatives such as those taken by

Prime Ministers John Major and [Canada's] Brian Mulroney."13 There are two important aspects of the language Bush adopted to address the problem

in his speech to the Air Force Academy. The first is that Bush uses the term 'proliferation' to refer to all forms of weapons: "the

proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons". During the Cold War, 'proliferation' was used exclusively to discuss weapons of


mass destruction, and primarily to refer to the spread of nuclear weapons. A key feature of the way in which proliferation is being constructed as a post-Cold War security

problem is the broad technological sweep of the concept. The move to join conventional weapons to unconventional in a proliferation control agenda poses a particular problem, however. As Bush notes, states are considered to have a right to arms in support of the "legitimate needs of every state to defend itself."14 If conventional arms are to be controlled along side WMD, a means to distinguish the legitimate from the illegitimate needs to be devised. This is the second important aspect of Bush's language. The President equates problematic arms building—what was termed in the Canadian proposal "massive build-ups"—with "destabilizing" accumulations. In other words, while states have a right to conventional arms, they do not have a right to acquire conventional arms in such a way that they are destabilising. Thus, in this address, Bush provides the two metaphorical pillars of the new security image: proliferation and stability. Since this speech, the discourse and practice of states has refined this image and drawn it to the centre of international security policy in the post-Cold War world. In July of 1991, this broad proliferation agenda

was advanced beyond the Middle East by the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Five met to "review issues related to conventional arms transfers and to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". They noted with concern the dangers associated with the excessive buildup of military capabilities, and confirmed they would not transfer conventional weapons in circumstances which would undermine stability. They also noted the threats to peace and stability posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and missiles, and undertook to seek effective measures of non-proliferation and arms control in a fair, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced manner on a global as well as a regional basis.15 The statement of the Five echoed closely Bush's May speech, accepting as problematic the full range of military technology,16 while broadening the geographic concern. The statement also followed Bush's lead in focussing on 'stability' as the marker of problematic transfers. This definition of the proliferation problem—encompassing the full range of military technologies, and concerned with preventing the 'destabilising' effects of conventional arms procurement—was echoed in the resolution the Japanese and British introduced at the fall session of the UNGA. By Resolution 46/36L of 9 December 1991 the UNGA created "a universal and non-discriminatory Register of Conventional Arms, to include data on international arms transfers as well as information provided by Member States on military holdings, procurement through national production and relevant policies...."17 The first preambular paragraph of that Resolution reads in part: "Realizing that excessive and destabilizing arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international security ...."18 This text reaffirms the image put forward by the P-5 of 'excessive' and 'destabilising' arms build-ups as problematic. It also links this image directly to 'international security'. Finally, despite the fact that Resolution 46/36L is designed to address the problem of conventional arms, the relationship to weapons of mass destruction is not forgotten. In the final preambular paragraph, the Resolution reads: "Recognizing also the importance of the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction." The problem of proliferation was also being addressed by the leading Western military organisation, the North Atlantic Alliance, while the UNGA deliberations were ongoing. At its Summit in Rome, in November 1991, the North Atlantic Council released a Declaration, which addressed the problems of proliferation directly: The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery undermines international security. Transfers of conventional armaments beyond legitimate defensive needs to regions of tension make the peaceful settlement of disputes less likely. We support the establishment by the United Nations of a universal non-discriminatory register of conventional arms transfers. We support steps undertaken to address other aspects of proliferation and other initiatives designed to build confidence and underpin international security.19 The "Rome Declaration" clearly joins the full range of military technology together as "aspects of proliferation", and indicates that proliferation is a threat to international security. At the same Summit, the Council adopted a new Strategic Concept, a revision of the basic document of NATO strategy. The Strategic Concept notes that the Alliance has an interest in Middle Eastern stability, a stability which can be threatened by the "build-up of military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles." More generally, the Strategic Concept outlines the new strategic environment facing the Alliance after the end of the Cold War: Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and

sabotage.20 While the Gulf War provided an important impetus for this growing concern with proliferation, so too did the condition of the states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the then Soviet Union. All these states were possessed of large arsenals, some also with a military productive capacity. In addition, the USSR had a large supply of nuclear weapons, material and expertise, and in late 1991 it was unclear how long these could be kept under central control. On 20 December, the members of NATO met for the first time with the members of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation, in a "process of regular diplomatic liaison ... to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe", termed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).21 In its inaugural declaration, the NACC tackled the problem of proliferation, particularly nuclear proliferation arising from its members' holdings, and in doing so reinforced the emergent image of proliferation and stability: "We all recognise the need ... to refrain from any steps that could lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and to take firm measures to prevent the unauthorised export of nuclear or other destabilizing military technologies."22 By the end of 1991, the image of proliferation as an important security problem confronting states as they build the new world order had been enunciated by a variety of actors in a range of fora. Subsequently, the importance of this problem as it had come to be defined grew, and various practical measures were marshalled to address it. In July 1992, the G-7 included a discussion of proliferation in their Political Declaration: "The end of the East- West confrontation provides a historic opportunity, but also underlines the urgent need to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and missiles capable of delivering them." The G-7 also pointed to the particular practical measures which were needed to confront this problem. The first was strengthening and extending the NPT at the review and extension conference in 1995. The nuclear non-proliferation regime also needed to be bolstered by making a concerted effort to contain the nuclear technology of the former Soviet Union and by strengthening the IAEA, whose limits had been revealed by Iraq. The G-7 also recognised the need to strengthen control on missile proliferation, specifically the MTCR, and to control conventional weapons proliferation.23 The G-7 statement hinted at the first line of response to proliferation: gathering instruments aimed at controlling the various technologies now considered to be a proliferation concern under the rubric of non-proliferation. The United States furthered this approach the week after the G-7 Summit, announcing a 'Non-Proliferation Initiative'. In practical terms, the initiative refocussed extant practice on 'proliferation'. In Arms Control Today, Spurgeon Keeney notes this feature of the initiative with dismay: President Bush's long-awaited 'nonproliferation initiative', which commits the United States to take a leading role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, is remarkable for the absence of initiatives. The statement, basically a list of past accomplishments and ongoing activities, was aptly described by a senior government official as the conversion of 'practice into policy.' Unfortunately, the president has sacrificed a major opportunity for launching imaginative new proposals to entrenched bureaucratic interests mired in Cold War thinking.24 While Keeney laments the lack of initiative, the refocussing of policy instruments is exactly what we should expect from an exercise in reimagining. The understanding of the security environment is being altered, and so what used to be 'nuclear non-proliferation' instruments, and 'arms control' instruments and even 'export control' instruments, are now all seen as aspects of the controls for a single problem: proliferation.”


IMPACTS

A. No Solvency

1. “Proliferation”'s focus on technology denial, and the artificial intrinsicness assigned to the weapons themselves dooms the strategy to failure

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“ The first entailment is the image of a spread outward from a point, or source. Cell division begins with a single, or source cell, and spreads outward from there — in the case of a cancer, both to produce a single tumour and to create a number of separate tumours throughout the host body. Similarly, the 'problem' of proliferation is one of a source or sources 'proliferating', that is reproducing itself by supplying the necessary technology to a new site of technological application. This image

highlights the transmission process from source to recipient, and entails policy designed to cut off the supply, restricting the technology to its source. Hence, the dominant response to nuclear proliferation is the creation of supplier groups, the Zangger Committee and the NSG, which seeks to 'control' the spread of nuclear technology. In other words, they attempt to provide "the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly" transfer, and prevent the spread of nuclear technology resulting in the "cancer" of weapons' proliferation. The image is repeated even in the more extreme proposals for policy. For example, former Prime Minster Trudeau proposed a scheme to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament for preventing weapons' spread. This scheme included two measures currently under consideration at the Conference on Disarmament, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and a Cutoff of Fissile Material Production. Trudeau's plan was known as the 'suffocation proposal'—firmly in keeping with the biological referent of proliferation. To stop, rather than control, reproduction by organisms, you need to 'suffocate' the

progenitors. The second entailment of the 'proliferation' metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons spread is an extreme technological bias. Biological proliferation is an internally driven phenomenon, and so the image of 'Proliferation' applied to the development of nuclear

technology highlights the autonomous spread of that technology, and its problematic weapons variant. As Frank Barnaby writes in a recent work, "A country with a nuclear power programme will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and will accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons."50 In fact, the text from which this is drawn presents an interesting example of the

autonomy of the 'proliferation' metaphor. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread : Nuclear-weapon proliferation in the 1990s. Notice that the weapons themselves spread, they are not spread by an external agent of some form —say a human being or human institution. Under most circumstances such a title would be unnoticed, for as Lakoff and Johnson argue, the metaphors are so deeply engrained in our conceptual system that they

are not recognised as being metaphorical. This image, by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of a process of spread, downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread, but are spread —and in fact are spread largely by the western states. Secondly, the image downplays, to the point of hiding, any of the political, social, economic and structural factors which tend to drive states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat,

naturalising the 'security dilemma' to the point that it is considered as an automatic dynamic. The image of PROLIFERATION thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy, by casting the problem as a technical, apolitical one. The Non-Proliferation Treaty controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls on the supply—that is the

outward flow—of this same technology. The goal, in both cases, is to stem or, at least slow, the outward movement of material and its

attendant techniques. Such a policy is almost doomed to fail, however, for it downplays and hides the very concerns which motivate the agents of the process. Iraq was driven to acquire nuclear weapons, even in the face of NPT commitments, and so employed technology which is considered so outdated that it is no longer tightly controlled. This simply does not fit with the NPT-NSG-Zangger Committee approach. In addition, in order to gain the necessary material, the Iraqis needed access to external technology. Such technology was acquired by human agents acting for the Iraqi state and was acquired from other agents,

who had their own motivational interests to provide the necessary technology. The technology does not 'spread' through some autonomous process akin to that causing a zygote to become a person, but rather they are spread, and so the agents involved are able to sidestep the technologically focussed control efforts. ”


2. The “proliferation” metaphor itself ignores the root causes of weapons units and technologies spreading; the fault is with the policy strategy of “proliferation” as opposed by “disarmament”

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [Brackets Added] [JCKR]“ The image of PROLIFERATION knits together the metaphors of 'proliferation', 'stability' and 'balance' to shape the policy responses of the international community. The metaphors have certain entailments, which serve to highlight, downplay and hide aspects of the security

environment. Thus, the policy responses which are being developed address primarily those aspects highlighted, while ignoring those downplayed and hidden. The image is of an autonomously driven process of spread, outward from a particular source or sources. It is an apolitical image, which strongly highlights technology, capability and gross accounts of number. As such, it is an image that masks the political interests of those supporting the present structure of proliferation control—a structure which strongly reflects this image and its entailments. To begin with, the control efforts are classified by the technology of concern. Thus there are global instruments for controlling the spread of nuclear weapons, of chemical and biological weapons, and a register of conventional arms. There is no global instrument for the control of the spread of missile technology, but the MTCR addresses this technology as a discrete problem, and is considering evolving into a global regime. There is thus little or no recognition in the practical response to PROLIFERATION that the spread of these technologies might all be part of a common 'security' problem. The security concerns which might drive states to acquire one or more of these technologies are hidden by the PROLIFERATION image. This division of the problem into discrete technologies persists, despite the fact that the connection among the various technologies of concern manifests itself in a number of ways. I will mention only two by way of illustration. The first is the common reference to biological weapons as "the poor man's atomic bomb". The implication of this phrase is that a state prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons—in this case for reasons of cost—could turn to biological weapons to serve the same purposes. The second example is of the links being drawn in the Middle East between Arab states' potential chemical arms, and Israel's nuclear arsenal. The Arab states are balking at ratifying the CWC until the Israeli nuclear arms are at least placed on the negotiating table. Conversely, supporters of the Israeli position can cite the Arab states' overwhelming conventional superiority as a justification for Israel's nuclear arms. The common approach to 'controlling' proliferation across the technologies of concern is the limitation and even denial of the supply of technology. Each of the technologies of concern is addressed by at least one suppliers group, and the major Western suppliers maintain export controls to implement the groups' lists. Such an approach is clearly informed by the entailments of the PROLIFERATION image. Supplier controls respond to the 'spread outward from a source' entailment of 'proliferation'. They also reflect the ways in which both the metaphors of 'proliferation' and 'stability' highlight technology, by focussing solely on its nature and movement. In addition, these groups reflect the various entailments of 'stability' and 'balance' outlined above. They seek to prevent "excessive and destabilizing accumulations" of technologies through the

application of their controls. Lost entirely in these practices are considerations of the political and economic underpinnings of security. These aspects are hidden by the image, and so are not addressed by the policy responses. The relationship between these political interests, the policy responses and the metaphors of the PROLIFERATION image would form the subject of another paper, at the very least. However, it is not responsible to ignore entirely this relationship, and so I will provide an example by way of illustration. India stands as a leading opponent of the present approach to proliferation control, with its roots in technological denial. India represents a different set of interests from those of the northern states most concerned with PROLIFERATION as presently understood and practiced. For India, access to technology is vital, and the principle of discrimination between the have and have not states—enshrined most notably in the NPT, but seen throughout the non-proliferation measures for denying technologies' spread—is absolutely unacceptable. As such, the Indians reject the image of PROLIFERATION, and call rather for DISARMAMENT. This view is reflected in the following passage, quoted from a paper by the Indian Ambassador to Japan, who was previously the Indian representative on the Conference on Disarmament: It would be futile to pretend that 1995 is 1970, that nothing has changed and nothing requires to be changed in the 1995 NPT. It would be a cruel joke on the coming generation to say that they will be safer with an indefinite extension of the 1970 NPT. 1995 presents an opportunity; there is great scope for non governmental agencies, intellectuals and academics, who believe in nuclear disarmament to work towards changing this mindset and spur governments in nuclear weapon countries to look at reality, to accept that there are shortcomings in the NPT and that nations, both within and outside the NPT have genuine concerns which need to be addressed in order to make the NPT universal, non discriminatory and a true instrument for nuclear disarmament. [Emphasis added.]66 There are three noteworthy elements of this plea for change. The first is that Ambassador Shah recognises the importance of changing the mindset toward the problem in order to effect change in the policy responses to that problem. This feature of his remarks relates to the second. Ambassador Shah casts his justification for alterations in the NPT as reflecting a changed reality—thereby attacking the naturalisation of the features of the world which are highlighted by the PROLIFERATION image, as reflected in the NPT. Finally, Ambassador Shah calls for the

new NPT to be an instrument of 'nuclear disarmament', not non-proliferation. In other words, he recognises that there is a policy problem to be addressed, but it is not a PROLIFERATION problem—that is, a spread of weapons technology from those who have to those who do not presently have. Rather, the problem needs to be imagined as a (DIS)ARMAMENT problem—the possession of nuclear and other arms, regardless of who has them.

For the countries of the north, the indefinite extension of an unamended NPT is considered essential. The NPT is seen as the linchpin of the proliferation control effort,

without which the entire edifice might fall. What Ambassador Shah's comments demonstrate, reflecting the position taken in India, is the way in which that effort, tied so closely to the entailments of the PROLIFERATION image, serves only a particular set of interests by highlighting only specific features of 'reality'. From where he sits, 'reality' provides Ambassador Shah with a different approach to the problem of nuclear (and other mass destruction) weapons, an approach better captured through an image of (DIS)ARMAMENT than one of PROLIFERATION.”


3. Current metaphor of “proliferation” is driving strategies that fail to account for the nature of security and complexity in the international security environment; we are doomed to failure

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“There are two classes of conclusion I can draw from this discussion, those relating to policy and those to theory. I would suggest two conclusions concerning the present

policies of proliferation control. The first is that the image of PROLIFERATION is giving rise to a policy agenda dominated by strategies of technology denial. Such strategies reflect the technological bias and the 'outward from a source' entailments of proliferation. However, they

are profoundly problematic in the contemporary international system. Technology denial is serving to deepen the already wide gap between North and South. It ignores entirely the needs of economic development—needs which are at least as

great a security concern as is the spreading of weapons technology. In addition, the strategy is unsustainable. Because the PROLIFERATION image is

of an autonomous process, it takes no account of the political and economic interests driving the supply of military technology. These interests are presently being felt in the United States, for example, in opposition to any extension of export controls—despite the United States long being the leader of the

supplier control groups.67 The second policy conclusion is related to the first. The metaphors of 'stability' and 'balance' are similarly ill-suited to the contemporary security environment. Even if we accept that they provided useful conceptual frames to understand the

superpower relationship in the Cold War, they are not appropriate to the regional security arenas of the post-Cold War. The entailments of 'stability' in particular can not account for the variety and complexity of the Middle East, South Asia or the North Pacific, to mention the regions of contemporary concern. Regional security, and security policy, must then be 'reimagined' on bases other than those provided by 'stability' and 'balance', and hence by PROLIFERATION.”

4. “Proliferation” focuses on spread, but neglects the structural nature of proliferation and the inherent factors that drive it

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“In a similar way, the characterisation of the problem of 'proliferation' highlights certain characteristics of the phenomenon, while downplaying and hiding others. That image contains three key metaphors: 'proliferation', 'stability' and balance'. As such, the image highlights the source ) spread ) recipient nature of the process of arms production and distribution. At the same time, it downplays the structural nature of the arms production and transfer system which bind the suppliers and recipients to each other and it hides the fact that weapons and related technologies are procured for a variety of factors related to external military threat, internal regime support and economic development.42 I will address these features of the problem in more detail below. What is important at this point is to see

that the image and the metaphors it entails privilege a certain set of policy responses —those which address the 'spread' of technology

highlighted by the image—while denying place to others—policy, for instance, which would seek to address the problems of economic development which may spur the creation of an arms industry.”


B. Case TURN

1. Focus on “stability” and “balance” actually promotes the spread of nuclear weapons; additionally, it consigns us to an eternal status quo; in this vein, high levels of proliferation would actually be more stable

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [Brackets Added] [JCKR]“ There is a third, and rather ironic, entailment to the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors—they can lead to the promotion of the spread of nuclear weapons to a greater number of states. The logic of the 'balance' between the superpowers, it has been

argued, is that mutual assured destruction with nuclear weapons introduces a caution conducive to 'stability'. If the metaphors of the Cold War are adopted to imagine the new international security environment, there seems little way to escape the conclusions of this argument, that nuclear weapons can be stabilisers. Indeed, it has led John Mearsheimer to argue: If complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe proves unavoidable, the West faces the question of how to maintain peace in a multipolar Europe. Three policy prescriptions are in order. First, the United States should encourage the limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. The best hope for avoiding war in post-Cold War Europe is nuclear deterrence; hence some nuclear proliferation is necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals from Central Europe. [Emphasis added.]62 As part of the 'managed proliferation' of nuclear weapons in Europe, Mearsheimer suggests provision of nuclear arms to Germany. On this and on other points Mearsheimer's argument has been widely, and justifiably, attacked. But what is interesting about it is the way in which it makes the entailments of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors so clear. What is important is to assure that the numbers of weapons are distributed so that the balance among them is stable — regardless of who holds the weapons. The problems of history and politics which would be raised by German nuclear weapons are blithely ignored, because the metaphors informing Mearsheimer's conceptualisation hide them entirely. Most of us are sufficiently sensitive to these problems that

Mearsheimer's argument is jarringly uncomfortable. However, the problem persists in all uses of the PROLIFERATION image, and yet it is only when the problems are as dramatic as in this case that the implications of the image are widely rejected. In the title of his article, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", Mearsheimer also indicates the final entailment of the 'stability' and 'balance' metaphors—they are inherently conservative. It is not an accident that it was a conservative alliance facing a revolutionary challenge that formulated the practice we now call the balance of power. Nor is it an accident that the changes in Eastern Europe, while welcomed in the West on democratic grounds, were feared for their capability to introduce 'instability'.63 When a 'balance' is 'stable', an asymmetrical alteration to either

side introduces instability. Thus once a stable balance is achieved, the metaphor highlights the importance of the maintenance of the status quo . The conservative bias of the metaphors is problematic, even within the limited confines of a proliferation problem. The goal of policy makers seems clearly to be the reduction of weapons and their related technologies—at least in the arsenals of others! The image, however, which is informing the policy response to the problem, provides no support for reduction once a stable balance is achieved. There can be no guarantee that any reduction in arsenals, even a 'symmetrical' reduction, would produce a similarly stable balance at the lower levels of arms.

Indeed, building on the received wisdom of the Cold War, there might even be a case to be made for high levels of arms, as a 'balance' at high levels is more resistant to small changes—that is, it is more 'stable'. ”


2. The nuclearism and racism of weapons possession actually spurs proliferation (CASE TURN); without addressing nuclearism, the proliferation agenda cannot be solved (SOLVENCY STRIKE)

Prerna Lal[MA, International Relations, San Francisco State University; JD Expected, George Washington University] “North Korea Is Not a Threat—Unveiling Hegemonic Discourses” Self-Published, April 2009 http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/ [JCKR]“Tied to the race war schema, is the discourse of nuclearism, which refers to the ideology that nuclear weapons are instruments of peace. Nukespeak in the form of MAD or the hype over so-called precision weapons by our leaders has had trickle-down effects to the point of achieving a mental-wipe or historical amnesia of the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This discourse effectively represents a war on history and subjugation of

knowledges about the horrors of nuclear war and fallout. Closely related to nuclearism is the issue of whiteness around nuclear weapons, the paternalistic presupposition that Western powers are the responsible and rightful leaders on the issue, the racist ideology that nuclear weapons in the hands of an Islamic country or “terrorist” spells end to world peace or catastrophe while it is perfectly alright for France, Britain, the United States, Russia, China and now India, to have nuclear weapons. The epistemological assumptions of nuclearism are dangerous, besides being racist and morally repulsive. The formation of a “nuclear club” and an exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons makes them a forbidden fruit and an issue of prestige, thereby encouraging proliferation. Indeed, discourse around the North Korea and Iran nuclear buildup denotes that these countries see a successful completion of the fuel

cycle or the launching of a rocket as an issue of great prestige. There is absolutely nothing prestigious about owning weapons of mass destruction, weapons that can end civilization. However, countries like North Korea and Iran can be forgiven for their nuclearist mentality; after all, it is an implication of the discourse that has been perpetuated by the West, a discourse that has

become common knowledge and culture. Nuclearism must be addressed and put on the table to move past the current impasse over nuclear negotiations and the non-proliferation regime. Without denouncing nuclear weapons and facing our moral conscience as the only nation to have ever used nuclear weapons, we cannot hope to avert nuclear proliferation and prevent ‘rogue states’ from going that route.”3. US nuclear policy is a hypocritical double-standard that drives proliferation (Ex. India nuke deal)

Gordon Edwards[PhD, Mathematics, Queen's University; President, Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility; Former Consultant, Auditor General of Canada] “Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Is a Hypocritical Charade: US-India Reach “Deal” On Nuclear Weapons” Centre for Research on Globalization, September 6, 2008 http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10089 [Brackets Added] [JCKR]“Many independent observers fear that this [the US-India nuclear] "deal" will deal a mortal blow to the Non-Proliferation

Treaty (NPT) because it rewards a known proliferator (India) -- one of the few countries in the world that refuses to sign the NPT -- and it is "spearheaded" by the USA, which has an enormous arsenal of nuclear weapons and is showing no inclination to live up to its obligations under Article VI of the NPT to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. "US President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Saturday welcomed the "historic achievement" of approval of a landmark civil nuclear cooperation deal between the two countries, the White House said. 'The two leaders congratulated each other on the consensus reached at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in Vienna and expressed appreciation for the joint efforts made there to move forward with civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India,' spokesman Gordon Johndroe said of a phone call between Bush and Singh. 'This is a historic achievement that strengthens global nonproliferation principals while assisting India to meet its energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner," Johndroe said. In Vienna earlier Saturday, the United States secured the approval of nuclear supplier nations for proposals to lift a 34-year-old embargo on nuclear trade with India. On the third consecutive day of crunch talks, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the export and sale of nuclear technology, reached consensus on a one-off waiver of its rules for India, which refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 'The United States thanks the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation to welcome India into the global nonproliferation community,' Johndroe said. 'We especially appreciate the role Germany played as chair to move this process forward.'" (AP, September 6, 2008)

In fact, under the influence of the USA, NATO maintains that nuclear weapons are necessary for defense and insists that it will; be the first to use nuclear weapons if there is a conventional conflict which they cannot win with conventional weapons. If this is so, then how can one argue that other nations cannot also have nuclear weapons "as necessary for defense?" Thus the idea of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is seen as a hypocritical charade based on an increasingly obnoxious double-standard : "Do as we say, not as we do." If there is to be any hope of a secure and sustainable planet, there has to be a mass movement calling for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons everywhere. Even" nuclear hawks" like Kissinger and Schultz in the USA, and highly placed officials in other nuclear weapons states suchas Britain, and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, El-Baradei, have spoken out strongly in recent times for the absolute necessity of reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to ZERO. It is not because of these men that we should call for abolition of weapons, it is simply an indication of how inescapable the logic has become. We literally have to choose between the Human Race and the Nuclear Arms Race. We cannot hold on to both.”

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=10089

http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/


4. US nonproliferation programs ironically increase the threat of proliferation; a fundamental shift is necessary to solve the problem of proliferation

Daniel Ellsberg[PhD, Economics, Harvard University; Strategic Analyst, RAND Corporation; Former Consultant, Defense Department & the White House] “Ending Nuclear Terrorism: By America and Others” (At the Nuclear Precipice: Catastrophe or Transformation?) Ed. Richard Falk[Professor Emeritus, International Law, Princeton University] and David Krieger[Founder, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation; PhD, Political Science, University of Hawaii; JD, Santa Barbara College of Law], 2009, http://www.ellsberg.net/archive/ending-nuclear-terrorism-by-america-and-others [JCKR]“Long after the ending of the Cold War, the chance that some nuclear weapons will kill masses of innocent humans somewhere, before very long, may well be higher than it was before the fall of the Berlin Wall. One phase of the Nuclear Age, the period of superpower arms race and confrontation, has indeed come to a close (though the possibility of all-

out, omnicidal exchange of alert forces triggered by a false alarm remains, inexcusably, well above zero). But another dangerous phase now looms, the era of nuclear proliferation and with it, an increased likelihood of regional nuclear wars, accidents, and nuclear terrorism. And the latter prospect is posed not just by “rogue” states or sub-state terrorists but by the United States, which has both led by

example for sixty years of making nuclear first-use threats that amount to terrorism and may well be the first or among the first to carry out such threats. Averting catastrophe—not only the spread of weapons but their lethal use—will require major shifts in attitude and policy in every one of the nuclear weapon states, declared and undeclared. But such change is undoubtedly most needed, and must come first, in the United States

and Russia. Despite important and creditable moves, both unilateral and negotiated, since 1991 to reverse their bilateral arms race, and piecemeal measures to restrain

proliferation, none of their initiatives and proposals has shown a decisive shift away from cold war notions of the broad functions of and requirements for nuclear weapons in “superpower” arsenals. Neither country has adopted—even as a goal—a nuclear

posture that is remotely appropriate, let alone adequate, to discourage proliferation effectively. On the contrary, as in the past, their joint declaratory position against proliferation is at odds with their operational doctrines and nuclear weapons programs which continue, on balance, to stimulate the spread and possible use of nuclear weapons. And that is true of all the declared nuclear powers, which

not coincidentally make up the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. With each month and year that these states maintain large nuclear arsenals, postpone ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and sustain nuclear policies that suggest that such weapons convey major-power status and

are useful for political and military purposes, other nations can only conclude that acquiring and in some circumstances using nuclear weapons may well be in their national interest. U.S. Nuclear Policies Encouraging Proliferation Looking specifically at the United S tates, a whole set of policies persist that have long tended to encourage proliferation. These have included long- term selective blindness and tolerance for some covert nuclear weapons programs, Israel’s in particular, but also in India, South Africa, Pakistan, and in earlier periods, Iran and Iraq. Moreover, the United States maintains a massive nuclear arsenal after the end of the Cold War, resists radical cuts, and insists on its right, and that of its NATO allies, to threaten or implement initiation of nuclear attack (“first-use”) against non-nuclear challenges. Beyond this, US policies continue to endorse the notion that the relative size of nuclear arsenals is an essential badge of status. Just like their predecessors—and with the support of most elite opinion-makers and mainstream arms control analysts—the Clinton and the two Bush administrations have declared themselves resolved to maintain nuclear superpower standing, insisting on a US arsenal that will remain for the foreseeable future an order of magnitude larger than all others apart from Russia, and that is projected to remain “Number One” in the world indefinitely. The need for US nuclear “superiority” goes unquestioned, while these same administrations along with members of Congress and editorial-writers lecture potential “rogues” among the

non-nuclear-weapon states on the anachronism of their fantasy that having some nuclear weapons rather than none will confer on them any prestige, status or influence. All these expressions of nuclear policy—what we do, and what we say to ourselves, as opposed to what we say others should do—especially in the absence now of

any serious military threats to US national security, can only encourage potential nuclear states to regard nuclear weapons in the same way that the United States and its major allies, along with Russia, evidently do: as having vital, multiple, legitimate uses, as well as being unparalleled symbols of sovereignty, status, and power . Perhaps most dangerously, such potential proliferators are led by past and present American doctrine and behavior to consider—among the possible, acceptable and valuable uses of nuclear weapons—the issuance and possible execution of nuclear first-use threats: i.e., the “option” of threatening to initiate nuclear attacks, and if necessary of carrying out such threats.”

http://www.ellsberg.net/archive/ending-nuclear-terrorism-by-america-and-others

http://www.ellsberg.net/archive/ending-nuclear-terrorism-by-america-and-others


5. Current nonproliferation efforts actually increase the incentive to proliferate

Wade L Huntley[Senior Lecturer, National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School; Director, Simons Centre for Disarmament and Nonproliferation Research, University of British Columbia, Canada; PhD, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; Former Director, Global Peace and Security Program, Nautilus Institute] “Nuclear Nonproliferation: Time for New Thinking?” International Studies Association, p. 36, February/March 2007 http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/2/2/pages179229/p179229-1.php [JCKR]“The Bush Administration’s alternative nonproliferation paradigm posits no such aims. Instead, it is a paradigm of negation: it effectively disowns the disarmament goals enshrined in the NPT and denies the continuing political relevance of the “bargain” between the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” to the political and social dimensions of motivations to acquire nuclear weapons – the “demand side” of proliferation. Defenders of this position contend it simply reflects reality: “rogue” states’ desires for nuclear weapons are driven more by proximate regional circumstances than distant US policy decisions. This point is valid, up to a point: for both North Korea and Iran, as described earlier, motivations to acquire

nuclear weapons are principally driven by some combination of regional security circumstances and internal regime legitimation needs. But this is not the end of the story. For both North Korea and Iran, US nuclear weapons policies represent direct and proximate threats to national security, and even national survival. Hence, increasing US reliance on nuclear deterrence and coercion directly reinforces perceptions in these countries of the political value of nuclear weapons as symbols and as threat-making security devices, as well as through the medium of impinging global nuclear non-possession and non-use norms. “

http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/2/2/pages179229/p179229-1.php


C. Racism

1. Nuclear dominance = Orientalism; Western discourse on nonproliferation is a form of nuclear racism

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [JCKR]“Thus in Western discourse nuclear weapons are represented so that "theirs" are a problem whereas "ours" are not. During the Cold War the Western discourse on the dangers of "nuclear proliferation" defined the term in such a way as to sever the two senses of the wordproliferation. This usage split off the "vertical" proliferation of the superpower arsenals (the development of new and improved weapons designs and the numerical expansion of the stockpiles) from the "horizontal" proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries, presenting only the latter as the "proliferation problem." Following the end of the Cold War, the American and Russian arsenals are being cut to a few thousand weapons on each side.5 However, the United States and Russia have turned back appeals from various nonaligned nations, especially India, for the nuclear powers to open discussions on a global convention abolishing nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty notwithstanding, the Clinton administration has declared that nuclear weapons will play a role in the defense of the United States for the indefinite future. Meanwhile, in a controversial move, the Clinton administration has broken with the policy of previous administrations in basically formalizing a policy of using nuclear weapons against nonnuclear states to deter

chemical and biological weapons (Panofsky 1998; Sloyan 1998). The dominant discourse that stabilizes this system of nuclear apartheid in

Western ideology is a specialized variant within a broader system of colonial and postcolonial discourse that takes as its essentialist premise a profound Otherness separating Third World from Western countries. This inscription of Third World (especially Asian and Middle Eastern)

nations as ineradicably different from our own has , in a different context, been labeled "Orientalism" by Edward Said (1978).

Said argues that orientalist discourse constructs the world in terms of a series of binary oppositions that produce the Orient as the mirror image of the West: where "we" are rational and disciplined, "they" are impulsive and emotional; where "we" are modem and flexible, "they" are slaves to ancient passions and routines; where "we" are honest and compassionate, "they" are treacherous and uncultivated. While the blatantly racist orientalism of the high colonial period has softened, more subtle orientalist ideologies endure in contemporary politics. They can be found, as Akhil Gupta (1998) has argued, in discourses of economic development that represent Third World nations as child nations lagging behind Western nations in a uniform cycle of development or, as Lutz and Collins (1993) suggest, in the imagery of popular magazines, such as National Geographic. I want to suggest here that another variant of contemporary orientalist ideology is also to be found in U.S. national security discourse. Following Anthony Giddens (1979), I define ideology as a way of constructing political ideas, institutions, and behavior which ( I ) makes the political structures and institutions created by dominant social groups, classes, and nations appear to be naturally given and inescapable rather than socially constructed; (2) presents the interests of elites as if they were universally shared; (3) obscures the connections between different social and political antagonisms so as to inhibit

massive, binary confrontations (i.e., revolutionary situations); and (4) legitimates domination. The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is

ideological in all four of these senses: (1) it makes the simultaneous ownership of nuclear weapons by the major powers and the absence of nuclear weapons in Third World countries seem natural and reasonable while problematizing attempts by such countries as India, Pakistan, and Iraq to acquire these weapons; (2) it presents the security needs of the established nuclear powers as if they were everybody's; (3) it effaces the continuity between Third World countries' nuclear deprivation and other systematic patterns of deprivation in the underdeveloped world in order to inhibit a massive north-south confrontation; and (4) it legitimates the nuclear monopoly of the recognized nuclear powers.”2. The nonproliferation regime is racist; the backlash against “rogue” states does not match the reaction to Western powers

Prerna Lal[MA, International Relations, San Francisco State University; JD Expected, George Washington University] “North Korea Is Not a Threat—Unveiling Hegemonic Discourses” Self-Published, April 2009 http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/ [JCKR]“While this is not a clash of civilizations, it is certainly a race war in that the entire discourse revolves around preventing certain kinds of people from acquiring and using nuclear weapons. Would the U nited States use the same tactics in France? Or even India? No, in fact it looked the other way on outrageous French nuclear testing in the Pacific and supports India’s nuclear program despite the fact that it is not a signatory of the NPT! Ronnie Lipschutz has some fine lines for us in On Security: To be sure, the United States and Russia do not launch missiles against each other because both know the result would be annihilation. But the same is true for France and Britain, or China and Israel. It was the existence of the Other that gave deterrence its power; it is the disappearance of the Other that has vanquished that power. Where Russia is now concerned, we are, paradoxically, not secure, because we see no need to be secured. In other words, as Ole Waever might put it, where there is no constructed threat, there is no security problem. France is fully capable of doing great damage to the United States, but that capability has no meaning in terms of U.S. Security. On the other hand, see the Iran nuclear

‘crisis’ as an example. The United States has demonized Ahmadinejad at every opportunity and conjured him up as an Islamic fundamentalist and nationalist who will defy non-proliferation at all costs. On the other hand, Ahmadinejad cheekily asked the United

States to join the rest of civilization in worshipping God. That is the discourse of race war but it is concealed by juridical discourse—the hegemonic discourse. To borrow from Michael Foucault, the United States is using the juridical schema of nuclear non-proliferation to conceal the war-repression schema. North Korea is the historical Other, the terrorist, the threat against whom the world must be protected in the juridical schema. Yet, under the war-repression schema, North Korea is a sovereign nation with the right to develop nuclear and communications technology. And this latest action is really nothing more than a plea for economic help.”



D. Oppression

1. “Stability” serves to ignore the oppressed and preserve the status quo of dominance over those who do not support the agenda (Ex. Ukraine and Yugoslavia)

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“There is, of course, a more politically problematic result of the conservative entailment of 'stability' and 'balance'. The emphasis on 'stability' hides the struggles of the oppressed, and the security concerns of any other than the regime controlling the state. Change introduces the possibility of upsetting a balance, and as stability is so highly valued, change of any kind is to be opposed. It is for this reason that we should not be surprised that The Balance of Power was devised by the defenders of the monarchical order in face of the Napoleonic challenge. The conservative nature of the stress on stability can be seen in the reaction of the West in general, and the United States in particular, to the changes in Eastern

Europe. Consider the example of the ill-received speech US President Bush gave in the Ukraine, in August 1991, as reported by

the Loas Angeles Times: "Freedom is not the same as independence," Bush told Zayets and the rest of Ukraine's legislature on Aug. 1. "Americans will not support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism. They will not aid those who promote a

suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred." Shorn of rhetorical niceties, the American position seemed to be: Moscow and Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev know best. Although the legislature here was dominated by Communists still opposed at that time to secession, Bush's speech "went down about as well as cod-liver oil," one Kiev-based diplomat remarked.64 Bush's so-called 'Chicken Kiev' speech reflected the bias towards the known, towards the status quo . This bias was further revealed in the policy the US was simultaneously pursuing towards changes in Yugoslavia. A US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State justified the continuing US policy of supporting the Yugoslav union, in terms which draw the links between this conservative thinking and the emphasis on stability: Many have asked why we chose to include unity among the goals we supported in Yugoslavia. From the beginning, our fundamental policy objective in Yugoslavia has been democracy, not unity. But when the Yugoslav crisis began, we decided to state our support for both unity and democracy because we believed that unity offered the best prospects for democracy and stability throughout Yugoslavia. Given Yugoslavia's crazy-quilt ethnic makeup and history of deep-seated ethnic disputes, we believed that the only alternative to some form of democratic unity was violence,

suffering, and long-term instability.65 As both the USSR and the Yugoslavian federations fell apart, the US position was to fight to maintain the status quo , in the interests of 'stability '. This conclusion, that security in the present international system is politically conservative, is not a new one. Indeed, the chapters of this volume are, in many ways, predicated on the recognition of the problems posed by

the narrow and conservative nature of international security as it commonly understood. What I have hoped to show is that this bias is an entailment of the metaphorical images we use to construct the problems in the first place. As such it serves to naturalise a particular set of relations of power and interest, privileging those who are able to set the metaphorical agenda, and to render invisible the political basis of their claims. ”


2. Anti-nuclear nuclearism justifies invasion, military strike and economic sanction against countries that pursue capabilities far behind the US' own; additionally, the CTBT has been symbolically violated by the US while it is explicitly designed to prevent the nuclearization of any other country

Darwin Bond-Graham [Ph.D., sociology, University of California-Santa Barbara; Board member of the Los Alamos Study Group, a disarmament, energy, and economic development organization based in Albuquerque, New Mexico] and Will Parrish [Youth Empowerment Director at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation], “Military: Anti-nuclear Nuclearism,” Foreign Policy In Focus, January 12, 2009 http://www.fpif.org/articles/anti-nuclear_nuclearism [JCKR]“Concerns about the nuclear programs of other states — mostly Islamic, East and South Asian nations (i.e., Iran, North Korea, etc.) — conveniently work to reinforce existing power relations embodied in U.S. military supremacy and neocolonial relationships of technological inequality and dependence. By invoking their commitment to a "world free of nuclear weapons," the ideologues behind the anti-nuclear nuclearist platform justify invasions, military strikes, economic sanctions, and perhaps even the use of nuclear weapons themselves against the "rogue states" and "terrorists" whose possession of weapons technologies vastly less advanced than those perpetually stockpiled by the United States is deemed by the anti-

nuclear nuclearists the first and foremost problem of the nuclear age. Unfortunately the Obama administration is likely to pursue this Orwellian policy

of anti-nuclear nuclearism rather than taking a new, saner direction. A strong early indication of this trajectory is his selection of many Clinton

administration advisers and officials as national security officials in his Cabinet. The Clinton administration fought hard for the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, which would commit the United States to cease all nuclear explosions. But, in true anti-nuclear

nuclearist fashion, it also gave the United States nuclear weapons labs the Stockpile Stewardship Program, by which they could

move forward with a massive scientific effort to develop the knowledge and scientific expertise for virtual weapons design and testing via a multi-billion dollar infrastructure of supercomputers, laser, and flash X-ray facilities that brazenly give the United States an exclusive route around the CTBT. Meanwhile, the United States has further violated the spirit of the treaty by detonating an average of 10 so-called "sub-critical" nuclear bombs every year at the Nevada Test Site since 1997: explosions involving as many as 3.3 pounds of plutonium that

stop just short of splitting the atom. Because non-nuclear states aren’t able to go nuclear without actual testing, the ostensibly anti-nuclear CTBT would lock in less technologically advanced states into a nuclear status quo. By conducting nuclear tests, the non-nuclear nations would justify

sanctions under the treaty and presumably trigger military action by the United States. Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright said as much in

her testimony before Congress in 1999: Since America has no need and does not plan to conduct nuclear explosive tests, the essence of the debate over the CTBT should be clear. It is not about preventing America from conducting tests; it is about preventing and dissuading others from doing so. It's about establishing the principle on a global basis that it is not smart, not safe, not right, and not legal to conduct explosive tests in order to develop or modernize nuclear weapons.”

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/100799albright1.htm


E. Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

1. The ambiguity of the threat means the situation is constantly threat-generating; ultimately, the enemy is demonized and rejected as less than human

Brian Massumi[Professor, Critical Empiricism, European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland; Professor, Department of Communication Sciences, University of Montreal; Director, PhD Program, University of Montreal; PhD, French Literature, Yale University] “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption” Journal of Theory & Event, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2007 (DOI: 10.1353/tae.2007.0066) [JCKR]“Preemption shares many characteristics with deterrence. Like deterrence, it operates in the present on a future threat. It also does this in such as way as to make that present

futurity the motor of its process. The process, however, is qualitatively different. For one thing, the epistemology is unabashedly one of uncertainty,

and not due to a simple lack of knowledge. There is uncertainty because the threat has not only not yet fully formed but, according to Bush's

opening definition of preemption, it has not yet even emerged. In other words, the threat is still indeterminately in potential. This is an ontological premise: the nature of threat cannot be specified. It might in some circumstances involve weapons of mass destruction, but in others it

will not. It might come in the form of strange white power, or then again it might be an improvised explosive device. The enemy is also unspecifiable. It might come from without, or rise up unexpectedly from within. You might expect the enemy to be a member of a certain ethnic or religious group, an Arab or a Moslem, but you can never be sure. It might turn out be a white Briton wearing sneakers, or a Puerto Rican from the heartland of America (to mention just

two well-known cases, those of John Reid and Jose Padilla). It might be an anonymous member of a cell, or the supreme leader of a "rogue" state. The lack of knowledge about the nature of the threat can never be overcome. It is part of what defines the objective conditions of the situation: threat has become proteiform and it tends to proliferate unpredictably. The situation is objectively one in which the only certainty is that threat will emerge where it is least expected. This is because what is ever- present is not a particular threat or set of

threats, but the potential for still more threats to emerge without warning. The global situation is not so much threatening as threat generating: threat-o-genic. It is the world's capacity to produce new threats at any and every moment that defines this situation. We are in a world that has passed from what "the Architect" called the "known unknown" (uncertainty that can be analyzed and identified) to the "unknown unknown" (objective uncertainty). Objective uncertainty is as directly an ontological category as an epistemological one. The threat is known to have the ontological status of indeterminate

potentiality. The unknown unknown is unexpungeable because its potentiality belongs to the objective conditions of life today. Consequently, no amount of effort to understand will ever bring a definitive answer. Thinking about it will only reopen the same uncomprehending question: "why do they hate us so"? This question, asked over and over again by the US media since 9-11, expresses the

impossibility of basing a contemporary logic of conflict on a psychological premise. The nature and motives of the adversary strike us as purely incomprehensible. The only hypothesis left is that they are just plain "evil," capable of the worst "crimes against humanity." They are simply "inhuman." The only way to identify the enemy collectively is as an "axis of evil." That characterization does not add

new knowledge. It is the moral equivalent of ignorance. Its function is to concentrate "humanity" entirely on one side in order to legitimate acts on "our" side that would be considered crimes against humanity were the enemy given the benefit of being considered human (torture, targeting civilian populations, contraventions of human rights and the laws of war). The ostensibly moral judgment of "evil" functions very pragmatically as a device for giving oneself unlimited tactical options freed from moral constraint. This is the only sense in which something like deterrence continues to function: moral judgment is used in such a way as to deter any properly moral or ethical logic from becoming operative. The operative logic will function on an entirely different plane.”

2. Preemptive strategy makes a never-ending war, shifting itself to persist in a variety of security threats

Brian Massumi[Professor, Critical Empiricism, European Graduate School, Saas-Fee, Switzerland; Professor, Department of Communication Sciences, University of Montreal; Director, PhD Program, University of Montreal; PhD, French Literature, Yale University] “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Preemption” Journal of Theory & Event, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2007 (DOI: 10.1353/tae.2007.0066) [JCKR]“Preemption's operational parameters mean that is never univocal. It operates in the element of vagueness and objective uncertainty. Due to its proliferative nature, it cannot be monolithic. Its logic cannot close in around its self-causing as the logic deterrence does. It includes an essential openness in its productive

logic.9 It incites its adversary to take emergent form. It then strives to become as proteiform as its ever-emergent adversary can be. It is as shape-shifting as it is self-driving. It infiltrates across boundaries, sweeping up existing formations in its own transversal movement. Faced with gravity-bound formations too inertial for it to sweep up and carry off with its own operative logic, it contents itself with opening windows of opportunity

to pass through. This is the case with the domestic legal and juridical structure in the US. It can't sweep that away. But it can build into that structure escape holes for itself. These take the form of formal provisions vastly expanding the power of the executive, in the person of the president in his role as commander-in-chief, to declare states of exception which suspend the normal legal course in order

to enable a continued flow of preemptive action.10 Preemption stands for conflict unlimited: the potential for peace amended to become a perpetual state of

undeclared war. This is the "permanent state of emergency" so presciently described by Walter Benjamin. In current Bush


administration parlance, it has come to be called "Long War" replacing the Cold War: a preemptive war with an in-built tendency to be never-ending.”


ALTERNATIVE

1. Alt Solvency – The critique solves the maskedness of the metaphor; we must deconstruct from a focus on “proliferation” to “disarmament”

David Mutimer[ Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies , Geneva, Switzerland; Assistant Professor, Political Science, York University; PhD, Political Science, York University] “Reimagining Ssecurity: The Metaphors of Proliferation” Centre for International and Strategic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 25, August 1994 [JCKR]“These conclusions hold two implications for 'critical' security studies. First of all, the exploration of the metaphors underlying policy will form an important part of a general project of critique, understood as revealing the power relations hidden by security relations. Those power relations are masked by the metaphorical understandings of the images of security, and so to reveal them, the images must themselves be revealed. Secondly, the impulse to critique is rooted in a political stance opposed to the dominant powers, and thus supporting the struggles of the oppressed. In order to create alternative security policies from the perspective of the oppressed, the present argument suggests the need first to construct images of security problems which privilege their interests, rather than those of the dominant powers—(DIS)ARMAMENT rather than PROLIFERATION, for example.”

2. Brink – Anti-nuclear imperialism is here and now; the Obama administration places it as official state policyDarwin Bondgraham[PhD, Sociology, University of California, Santa Barbara; Board Member, Los Alamos Study Group: Disarmament, Energy, and Economic Development Organization] “Anti-Nuclear Imperialism: The New Face of Nuclear Armed Empire is Quickly Taking Shape” Self-Published, September 2009 http://darwinbondgraham.blogspot.com/2009/09/anti-nuclear-imperialism-new-face-of.html [JCKR]“Anti-nuclear imperialism is a possible solution to the core contradiction of empire in the nuclear age: the need to maintain and threaten use of nuclear weapons (ultimate power), but the simultaneous and opposite need to prevent rivals from attaining parity, and lesser states from acquiring this form of power themselves, and finally to prevent the possibility of nuclear attack by a non-state agent, a terrifying asymmetrical threat. Anti-nuclear imperialism begins with

the use of strong, moralizing disarmament rhetoric by leaders of the imperial power. Based on this, the imperial state then must take steps to create at least the perception among as many states as possible that it is restraining its own nuclear arsenal and working with the other great powers to dismantle weapons systems, all ostensibly moving toward disarmament. This in turn is meant to facilitate and legitimate any and all means to prevent most other states from acquiring nuclear weapons or even the capability to produce

nuclear weapons. By de-emphasizing nuclear arms, these strategists hope to actually boost the overall military superiority of the US, far above and beyond its current powers, which ironically have become constrained in some ways by its continuing possession of these weapons in the post-Cold

War era. The end goal is to maintain a balance of power under US hegemony and to tighten the ring of control around nuclear technologies and fissile materials. This strategy is now in full effect against Iran. Dennis Ross, the Obama administration's “special adviser” for the Persian Gulf, has described the current posture toward Iran as “engagement with pressure,” where by US diplomatic entreaties are designed entirely to strengthen the hand of the US for future economic sanctions and eventual military action. At the center of Washington and Teran's disagreement is the geopolitical question of the region's immense petroleum reserves, who will control them, who will profit from them. Iran's steady acquisition of an independent uranium enrichment infrastructure with other developments such as the refinement of long range ballistic missiles has slowly turned the Islamic Republic into a virtual nuclear weapons state. “Engagement with pressure” has one simple addmitted goal. According to Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, two former national security council staffers who have spoken to Ross and other Obama administration officials at length about their Iran strategy the White House is hoping to legitimate aggressive military actions to maintain the nuclear status quo. As Ross explained to them recently: “if Iran continued to expand its nuclear fuel program, at some point in the next couple of years President Bush’s successor would need to order

military strikes against Iranian nuclear targets. Citing past “diplomacy” would be necessary for that president to claim any military action was legitimate.” Sam Nunn has laid these plans out clearly in various speeches, and through the George W. Bush years his NTI organization incubated the ideology and practice of anti-nuclear imperialism. The election of Obama portends the adoption of anti-nuclear imperialism as the official state policy. Nuclear disarmament, which Nunn identifies as a “distant mountaintop,” is the rhetorical goal that must be committed to by US leaders if intrusive and ultimately belligerent actions are to be justified under the pre-text of thwarting “nuclear threats” to “civilization.” The concrete and immediate steps that receive the bulk of attention and resources under this strategy will involve aggressive actions to prevent any game changing developments such as the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran which could challenge US and European control over the indispensable hydrocarbon reserves of the Persian Gulf region, to say nothing of the ongoing status quo in Palestine where a nuclear armed Israel, backed by the US, and with the complicity of most Arab monarchies, ignores the majority of world opinion with indifference.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/opinion/24leverett.html?pagewanted=all

http://darwinbondgraham.blogspot.com/2009/09/anti-nuclear-imperialism-new-face-of.html


A2 SECTION

A. A2 Common Objections for Others' Nuclearization

1. A2 “No Deterrence For Them” - o_0 you've got it backwards, doc

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [Brackets & Ellipses in Original] [JCKR]“During the Cold War Americans were told that nuclear deterrence prevented the smoldering enmity between the superpowers from bursting into the full flame of war, saving millions of lives by making conventional war too dangerous. When the practice of deterrence was challenged by the antinuclear movement of the 1980s, Pentagon officials and defense intellectuals warned us that nuclear disarmament would just make the world

safe for conventional war.' Surely, then, we should want countries such as Pakistan, India, Iraq, and Israel also to enjoy the stabilizing benefits of nuclear weapons. This is, in fact, precisely the argument made by the father of the Pakistani bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan. He said at apress conference in 1998, alluding to the fact that Pakistan had a nuclear capability for many years before its actual nuclear tests, "The nuclear weapon is a peace guarantor. It

gave peace to Europe, it gave peace to us. . . . I believe my work has saved this country for the last twenty years from many wars" (NNI-News 1998). Western security specialists and media pundits have argued, on the other hand, that deterrence as practiced by the superpowers during the Cold War may not work in Third World settings because Third World adversaries tend to share common borders and because they lack the resources to develop secure second-strike capabilities. On closer examination these arguments, plausible enough at first, turn out to be deeply problematic, especially in their silences about the risks of deterrence as practiced by the

superpowers. I shall take them in turn. First, there is the argument that deterrence may not work for countries, such as India and Pakistan, that share a common border and can therefore attack one another very quickly.10A s one commentator put it, In the heating conflict between India and Pakistan, one of the many dangers to be reckoned with is there would be no time for caution. While it would have taken more than a half-hour for a Soviet-based nuclear missile to reach the United States-time at least for America to double-check its computer screen or use the hotline-the striking distance between India and Pakistan is no more than five

minutes. That is not enough time to confirm a threat or even think twice before giving the order to return fire, and perhaps mistakenly incinerate an entire nation. [Lev 1998:A19]

This formulation focuses only on the difference in missile flight times while ignoring other countervailing differences in missile configurations that would make deterrence in South Asia look more stable than deterrence as practiced by the superpowers. Such a view overlooks the fact that the missiles deployed by the two superpowers were, by the end of the

Cold War, MIRVed and extraordinarily accurate. MIRVed missiles-those equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles-carry several

warheads, each capable of striking a different target. The MX, for example, was designed to carry ten warheads, each capable of landing within 100 feet of a separate target. The unprecedented accuracy of the MX, together with the fact that one MX missile could-in theory at least-destroy ten Soviet missiles, made it, as some

arms controllers worried at the time, a destabilizing weapon that, together with its Russian counterparts, put each superpower in a "use-it-or-lose-it" situation

whereby it would have to launch its missiles immediately if it believed itself under attack. Thus, once one adds accuracy and MIRVing to the strategic equation, the putative contrast between stable deterrence in the West and unstable deterrence in South Asia looks upside down, even if one were to grant the difference in flight times between the Cold War superpowers and between the main adversaries in South Asia. But there is no reason to grant the alleged difference in flight times. Lev says that it would have taken "more than half an hour" for American and Russian missiles to reach their targets during the Cold War (1998:A19). While this was more or less true for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), it was not true for the submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)

the superpowers moved in against each other's coasts; these were about ten minutes of flight time from their targets. Nor was it true of the American Jupiter missiles stationed in Turkey, right up against the Soviet border, in the early 1960s. Nor was it true of the Pershing 11s deployed in Germany in the 1980s. When the

antinuclear movement claimed that it was destabilizing to move the Pershings to within less than ten minutes of flight time of Moscow, the U.S. government insisted that anything that strengthened NATO's attack capability strengthened nuclear deterrence. Here again one sees a double standard in the arguments made to legitimate "our" nuclear weapons. Finally, even if we were to accept that the superpowers would have half-anhour's warning against five minutes for countries in South Asia, to think that this matters is to be incited to a discourse based on the absurd premise that there is any meaningful difference between half an hour and five minutes for acountry that believes itself under nuclear attack (see Foucault 1980a: ch. 1). While half an hour does leave more time to verify warnings of an attack, would any sane national leadership feel any safer irrevocably launching nuclear weapons against an adversary in half an hour

rather than five minutes? In either case, the time frame for decision making is too compressed. In other words, the argument about missile flight times, quite

apart from the fact that it misrepresents the realities of deterrence between the superpowers, is a red herring. What really matters is not the geographical proximity of the adversarial nations but, rather, their confidence that each could survive an attack by the other with some sort of retaliatory capability. Many analysts have argued that newly nuclear nations with small arsenals would lack a secure second-strike capability. Their nuclear weapons would therefore invite rather than deter a preemptive or preventive attack, especially in acrisis. Thus the New York Times editorialized that "unlike the superpowers, India and Pakistan will have small, poorly protected nuclear stocks. No nation in that situation can be sure that its weapons could survive a nuclear attack" (1998: 14). Similarly, British defense analyst Jonathan Power has written that "superpower theorists have long argued that stability is not possible unless there is an assured second-strike capability. . . . Neither India and [sic]Pakistan have the capability, as the superpowers did, to develop and build such a second-strike capability" (1997:29). This argument has been rebutted by Kenneth Waltz (1982, 1995a, 1995b), a leading political scientist seen as a maverick for his views on nuclear proliferation. Waltz, refusing the binary distinction at the heart of the dominant discourse, suggests that horizontal nuclear proliferation could bring about what he calls "nuclear peace" in troubled regions of the globe just as, in his view, it stabilized the superpower relationship. Waltz argues that, although the numbers of weapons are different, the general mathematical principle of deterrence-the appalling asymmetry of risk and reward-remains the same and may even, perversely, work more effectively in new nuclear nations. Waltz points out that it would take very few surviving nuclear weapons to inflict "unacceptable damage" on a Third World adversary: "Do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten? When these are the pertinent questions, we stop thinking about running risks and start thinking about how to avoid then]" (1 995x8). Waltz argues that, while a first strike would be fraught with terrifying uncertainties in any circumstances, the discussion of building secure retaliatory capabilities in the


West has tended, ethnocentrically, to focus on the strategies the superpowers employed to do so: building vast arsenals at huge expense on land, at sea, and in the air. But Third World countries have cheaper, more low-tech options at their disposal too: "Nuclear warheads can be fairly small and light, and they are easy to hide and to move. People worry about terrorists stealing nuclear warheads because various states have so many of them. Everybody seems to believe that terrorists are capable of hiding bombs. Why should states be unable to do what terrorist gangs are thought to be capable of?" (Waltz 1995a: 19). Waltz (1982, 1995a) also points out that Third World states could easily and cheaply confuse adversaries by deploying dummy nuclear weapons, and he reminds readers that the current nuclear powers (with the exception of the United States) all passed through

and survived phases in their own nuclear infancy when their nuclear arsenals were similarly small and vulnerable. The discourse on proliferation assumes that the superpowers' massive interlocking arsenals of highly accurate MIRVed missiles deployed on hair-trigger alert and designed with first-strike capability backed by global satellite capability was stable and that the small, crude arsenals of new nuclear nations would be unstable, but one could quite plausibly argue the reverse. Indeed, as mentioned above, by the 1980s a number of analysts in the West were concerned that the MIRVing of missiles and the accuracy of new guidance systems were generating increasing pressure to strike first in a crisis. Although the strategic logic might be a little different, they saw temptations to preempt at the high end of the nuclear social system as well as at the low end (Aldridge 1983; Gray and Payne 1980; Scheer 1982). There were also concerns (explored in more detail below) that the complex computerized early-warning systems with which each superpower protected its weapons were generating false alarms that might lead to accidental war (Blair 1993; Sagan 1993). Thus one could argue-as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1986) and a number of others have-that deterrence between the United States and Russia would be safer and more stable if each side replaced

their current massive strategic arsenals with a small force of about one hundred nuclear weapons-about the size India's nuclear stockpile is believed to be, as it happens. Further, Bruce Blair (Blair, Feiveson, and von Hippel 1997), a former missile control officer turned strategic analyst, and Stansfield Turner ( 1997), a former CIA director, have suggested that the readiness posture of American and Russian nuclear forces makes them an accident waiting to happen. The United States and Russia, they argue, would be safer if they stored their warheads separate from their delivery vehicles-as, it so happens, India and Pakistan do." In the words of Scott Sagan, a political scientist and former Pentagon official concerned about U.S. nuclear weapons safety, The United States should not try to make new nuclear

nations become like the superpowers during the Cold War, with large arsenals ready to launch at a moment's notice for the sake of deterrence; instead, for the sake of safety. the United States and Russia should try to become more like some of the nascent nuclear states, maintaining very small nuclear capabilities. with weapons components separated and located apart from the delivery systems, and with civilian organizations controlling the warheads. [Sagan 1995:90-91]12 Given, as I have shown, that the crisis stability of large nuclear arsenals can also be questioned and that it is not immediately self-evident why the leader of, say, India today should feel any more confident that he would not lose a city or two in a preemptive strike on Pakistan than his U.S. counterpart would in attacking Russia, I want to suggest that an argument that appears on the surface to be about numbers and configurations of weapons is really, when one looks more closely, about the psychology and culture of people. Put simply, the dominant discourse assumes that leaders in the Third World make decisions differently than their counterparts in the West: that they are more likely to take risks, gambling millions of lives, or to make rash and irresponsible calculations.”


2. A2 “They don't have the money!” - Aha...haha...ha. -_- And we totally do? riiigghhttt

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [Brackets in Original] [JCKR]“It is often said that it is inappropriate for Third World countries to squander money on nuclear (or conventional) weapons when they have such pressing problems of poverty, hunger, and homelessness on which the money might more appropriately be spent.

Western disapprobation of Third World military spending was particularly marked when India conducted its "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974. At the time one Washington official, condemning India for having the wrong priorities, was quoted as saying, "I don't see how this is going to grow more rice" (New York Times 1974x8). The next day the New York Times picked up the theme in its editorial page: The more appropriate reaction [to the nuclear test] would be one of despair that such great talent and resources have been squandered on the vanity of power, while 600 million Indians slip deeper into poverty. The sixth member of the nuclear club may be passing the begging bowl before the year is out because Indian science and technology so far have failed to solve the country's fundamental problems of food and population. [New York Times 1974bl] Similar comments were made after India's nuclear tests of 1998. Mary McGrory, for example, wrote in her column in the Wushington Post that "two large, poor countries in desperate need of schools, hospitals, and education are strewing billions of dollars for nuclear development" (1998b:Cl); and Rupert Cornwell, writing in the British Independent, said that "a country as poor as India should not be wasting resources on weapons that might only tempt a

preemptive strike by an adversary; it is economic lunacy" (1998:9). Such statements are not necessarily wrong, but, read with a critical eye, they have a recursive effect that potentially undermines the rationale for military programs in the West as well. First, one can interrogate denunciations of profligate military spending in the Third World by pointing out that Western countries, despite their own extravagant levels of military spending,

have by no means solved their own social and economic problems. The United States, for example, which allots 4 percent of its GNP (over $250 billion per year) to military

spending against India's 2.8 percent (Gokhale 1996), financed the arms race of the 1980s by accumulating deb t -its own way of passing the begging

bowl-at a rate of over $200 billion each year. Meanwhile in America advocates for the homeless estimate that 2 million Americans have nowhere to live,' and another 36 million Americans live below the official poverty line (Mattern 1998). The infant mortality rate is lower for black children in Botswana than for those in the United

States (Edelman 1991). As any observant pedestrian in the urban United States knows, it is not only Indians who need to beg. Second, American taxpayers have consistently been told that nuclear weapons are a bargain compared with the cost of conventional weapons. They give

"more bang for the buck." If this is true for "us," then surely it is also true for "them": if a developing nation has security concerns, then a nuclear

weapon ought to be the cheapest way to take care of them (Rathjens 1982:267). Third, critics of U.S. military spending have been told for years that military spending stimulates economic development and produces such beneficial economic spin-offs that it almost pays for itself. If military Keynesianism works for "us," it is hard to see why it should not also work for "them." And indeed, "Indian decision-makers have perceived high investments in nuclear research as a means to generate significant long-term industrial benefits in electronics, mining, metallurgy and other non-nuclear sectors of the economy" (Potter 1982: 157). In other words, "they" may use the same legitimating arguments as "we" do on

behalf of nuclear weapons. The arguments we use to defend our weapons could as easily be used to defend theirs. We can only argue otherwise by using a double standard.”


3. A2 “They can't secure it” - So...shouldn't we help them? It's not like our stuff is secure either

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [Brackets Added] [JCKR]“The third argument against horizontal proliferation is that Third World nations may lack the technical maturity to be trusted with nuclear weapons. Brito and Intriligator, for example, tell us that "the new nuclear nations are likely to be less sophisticated technically and thus less

able to develop safeguards against accident or unauthorized action" (1982:137). And the Washington Post quotes an unnamed Western diplomat stationed in Pakistan who, worrying that India and Pakistan lack the technology to detect an incoming attack on their weapons, said, the United States has

"expensive space-based surveillance that could pick up the launches, but Pakistan and India have no warning systems. I don't know what their doctrine will be. Launch when the wind blows'?" (Anderson 1998:Al). In terms of safety technologies, U.S. weapons scientists have over the years developed Insensitive High Explosive (IHE), which will not detonate if a weapon is-as has happened with U.S. nuclear weapons-accidentally dropped. U.S. weapons scientists have also developed Permissive Action Links (PALS), electronic devices that block the arming of nuclear weapons until the correct code is entered so that the weapons cannot be

used if stolen and will not go off if there is an accident during routine transportation or storage of the weapons. Obviously the United States could, if it were deeply concerned about safety problems in new nuclear nations, share such safety technologies, as it offered to do with the Soviets during the Cold War.'? It has chosen not to share its safety technologies with such nations as India and Pakistan partly out of concern that it would then be perceived

as rewarding proliferation. Quite aside from the question of whether the United States itself could discreetly do more to improve the safety of nuclear arsenals in new nuclear nations, if one reviews the U.S. nuclear safety record, the comforting dichotomy between a high-tech, safe "us" and the low-tech, unsafe "them" begins to look distinctly dubious . First, the United States has not always made use of the safety technologies at its disposal. Over the protests of some weapons designers, for example, the Navy decided not to incorporate state-of-the-art safety technologies into one of its newest weapons: the Trident 11. The Trident 11 does not contain Insensitive High Explosive because IHE is heavier than ordinary high explosive and would, therefore, have reduced the number of warheads each missile could carry. The Trident I1 designers also decided to use 1.1 class propellant fuel rather than the less combustible, hence safer, 1.3 class fuel, because the former would give the missile a longer range. After the Trident I1 was deployed, a highlevel review panel appointed by President Bush recommended recalling and redesigning it for safety reasons, but the panel was overruled partly because of the expense this would have involved (Drell, Foster, and Townes 1991; Smith 1990). Second, turning to the surveillance and early-warning systems that the United States has but threshold nuclear nations lack, one finds that these systems bring with them special problems as well as benefits. For example, it was the high-technology Aegis radar system, misread by a navy operator, that was directly responsible for the tragically mistaken U.S. decision to shoot down an Iranian commercial jetliner on July 3, 1988, a blunder that cost innocent lives and could have triggered a war. Similarly, and potentially more seriously, At 8:50 a.m., on November 9, 1979, the operational duty officers at NORAD-as well as in the SAC command post, at the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC), and the alternate National Military Command Center (ANMCC) at Fort Richie, Maryland-were suddenly confronted with a realistic display of a Soviet nuclear attack apparently designed to decapitate the American command system and destroy U.S. nuclear forces: a large number of Soviet missiles appeared to have been launched, both SLBMs and ICBMs, in a full-scale attack on the United States. [Sagan 1993:228-2291 American interceptor planes were scrambled, the presidential "doomsday plane" took off (without the president) to coordinate a possible nuclear war, and air traffic controllers were told to bring down commercial planes before U.S. military commanders found that a training tape had mistakenly been inserted into the system (Sagan 1993:230). More seriously still, on October 28, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis when the United States was at a high level of alert and had its nuclear weapons cocked at the ready, another accident with a training tape caused U.S. radar operators to believe that a missile had been launched at Florida from Cuba. When there was no nuclear detonation, they realized they had mistaken a satellite for a missile (Sagan 1993: 130-1 3 1). Also during the Cuban Missile Crisis, at a time when sentries at U.S. military bases had been told to be alert to Soviet saboteurs, a bear climbing a fence at a base in Duluth was mistaken for a saboteur, and the alarm set off throughout the region was, in Wisconsin, mistaken for the nuclear war alarm. An officer had to drive onto the runway to block the nuclear-armed F-106As, already taxiing, from taking off (Sagan 1993: 1,99). Looking next at the U.S.

safety record in transporting and handling nuclear weapons, again there is more cause for relief than for complacency. There have, for example, been at least twenty-four occasions when U.S. aircraft have accidentally released nuclear weapons and at least eight incidents in which U.S. Nuclear weapons were involved in plane crashes or fires (Sagan 1993: 185; Williams and Cantelon 1988:239-245). In 1980, during routine maintenance of a Titan I1 missile in Arkansas, an accident with a wrench caused a conventional explosion that sent the nuclear warhead 600 feet through the air (Barasch 1983:42). In another incident an H-bomb was accidentally dropped over North Carolina; only one safety switch worked, preventing the bomb from detonating (Barasch 1983:41). In 1966 two U.S. planes collided over Palomares, Spain, and four nuclear weapons fell to the ground, causing a conventional explosion that contaminated a large, populated area with plutonium. One hydrogen bomb was lost for three months. In 1968 a U.S. plane carrying four H-bombs caught fire over Greenland. The crew ejected, and

there was a conventional explosion that scattered plutonium over a wide area (Sagan 1993: 156-203). None of these accidents produced nuclear explosions, but recent safety studies have concluded that this must partly be attributed to good luck. These studies revealed that the design of the W-79 nuclear artillery shell contained a previously unsuspected design flaw that could lead to an unintended nuclear explosion in certain circumstances. In consequence the artillery shells had to be secretly withdrawn from Europe in 1989 (Sagan 1993: 184; Smith 1990). In other words, the U.S. nuclear arsenal has its own safety problems related to its dependence on highly computerized warning and detection systems, its Cold War practice of patrolling oceans and skies with live nuclear weapons, and

its large stockpile size. Even where U.S. scientists have developed special safety technologies, they are not always used. The presumption that Third World countries lack the technical competence to be trusted with nuclear weapons fits our stereotypes about these countries'

backwardness, but it distracts us from asking whether we ourselves have the technical infallibility the weapons ideally require.”


4. A2 “They're irrational/unstable” - 2 counter-arguments: (1) democracy – fail; (2) officials – we haz our own problems, you hypocrite, you

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [Brackets & Ellipses in Original] [JCKR]


“The fourth argument concerns the supposed political instability or irrationality of Third World countries. Security specialists and media pundits worry that Third World dictators free from democratic constraints are more likely to develop and use nuclear weapons, that military officers in such countries will be more likely to take possession of the weapons or use them on their own initiative, or that Third World countries are more vulnerable to the kinds of ancient

hatred and religious fanaticism that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons in anger. These concerns bring us to the heart of orientalist ideology. The presumed contrast between the West, where leaders are disciplined by democracy, and the Third World, where they are not, is nicely laid out by nonproliferation expert William Potter: Adverse domestic opinion may also serve as a constraint on the

acquisition of nuclear weapons by some nations. Japan, West Germany, Sweden, and Canada are examples of democracies where public opposition could have a decided effect on nuclear weapons decisions. . . . The fear of adverse public opinion, on the other hand, might be expected to be marginal for many developing nations without a strong democratic tradition. [Potter 1982: 143]14 This contrast does not hold up so well under examination. In 1983 Western European leaders ignored huge grassroots protests against the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II missiles. President Reagan, likewise, pressed ahead vigorously with nuclear weapons testing and deployment in the face of one million people-probably the largest American

protest ever-at the UN Disarmament Rally in New York on June 12, 1982, despite opinion polls that consistently showed strong support for a bilateral nuclear weapons freeze (McCrea and Markle 1989: l l l). And the governments of Britain, France, and Israel, not to mention the United States, all made their initial decisions to acquire nuclear weapons without any public debate or knowledge.I5 Ironically, of all the countries that have nuclear weapons, only in India was the question of whether or not to cross the nuclear threshold an election issue, with the Bharatiya Janata Party campaigning for office successfully in 1998 on a

pledge to conduct nuclear tests. Pakistan also had a period of public debate before conducting its first nuclear test. Far from being constrained by public opinion on nuclear weapons, the Western democracies have felt quite free to ignore it.I6 Yet the idea that Western democracies live with their nuclear arms half tied behind their backs recurs over and over in the discourse on nuclear proliferation. By contrast, Third World countries are often represented in the discourse on proliferation as countries lacking impulse control and led by fanatical, brutal, or narcissistic leaders who might misuse nuclear weapons. Defense Secretary William Cohen, for example, referred to India and Pakistan as countries "engaging in chauvinistic chest-pounding about their nuclear manhood" (Abrams 1998). Richard Perle, a leading arms control official in the Reagan administration, said, Nuclear weapons, once thought of as the "great equalizer," must now be seen differently. They are one thing in the hands of governments animated by rational policies to protect national interests and a normal regard for human life. They are quite another in the hands of a brutal megalomaniac like Saddam who wouldn't blink at the mass destruction of his "enemies.". . . The most formidable threat to our well-being would be a Saddam in possession of true weapons of mass destruction. . . .In any contest in which one side is bound by the norms of civilized behavior and the other is not, history is, alas, on the side of the barbarians. [1990:A8IL7] "nuclear weapons in the arsenals of unstable Third World regimes are a clear and present danger to all humanity. . . . Dictators threatened with attack along their borders or revolutions from within may not pause before pressing the button. The scenarios are terrifying" (1982:ix). It is often also assumed in the discourse on proliferation that Third World nuclear weapons exist to serve the ends of despotic vanity or religious fanaticism and may be used without restraint. In the public discussion of India's nuclear tests in 1998, for example, it was a recurrent theme that India conducted its nuclear tests out of a narcissistic desire for self-aggrandizement rather than for legitimate national security reasons. This image persists in spite of the fact that India, with a declared nuclear power (China) on one border and an undeclared nuclear power (Pakistan) on the other, might be thought to have reasons every bit as compelling as those of the five official nuclear powers to test nuclear weapons. Strategic analyst Michael Krepon said on The News Hour rvith Jim Lehrer, "These tests weren't done for security purposes. . . . They were done for reasons of domestic politics and national pride. . . . We have street demonstrations to protest nuclear weapons. They have them to celebrate them" (1998). Meanwhile, in an article entitled "Nuclear Fear and Narcissism Shake South Asia," a New York Times reporter, speaking of India as if it were a spoiled child, wrote that India, "tired of what it considers to be its own second-class status in world affairs . . . has gotten the attention it wanted" (Weisman 1998:16). Similarly, Senator Richard Lugar (Republican, Indiana) said that India tested in part because "there was a lot of indifference, under-appreciation of India. . . .We were not spending quality time in the Administration or Congress on India" (Congressional Quarterly Weekly 1998: 1367-1 368). And when Edward Teller, the so-called father of the hydrogen bomb, was asked if India and Pakistan were following his motto that "knowledge is good," he replied, "These explosions have not been performed for knowledge. It

may be to impress people. It may be a form of boasting" (Mayer 1998:B 1). The Western discourse on nuclear proliferation is also permeated by a recurrent anxiety that Third World nations will use nuclear weapons to pursue religious squabbles and crusades. Commentators particularly fear an "Islamic bomb" and a Muslim holy war. Said (1978:287) identified the fear of a Muslim holy war as one of the cornerstones of orientalist ideology. Senator Edward Kennedy worries about a scenario in which "Libya, determined to acquire nuclear weapons, receives a gift of the Bomb from Pakistan as an act of Islamic solidarity" (1 982:ix). Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan warns that "you could have an Islamic bomb in no time, and God have mercy on us" (Associated Press 1998). Mary McGrory fears that "nothing is more important than keeping the 'Islamic bomb' out of the hands of Iran. Let it be introduced into the Middle East and you can kiss the world we know goodbye" (1998a:A3). The San Francisco Examiner quotes an analyst who explained Saddam Hussein's willingness to forego $100 billion in oil revenues rather than end his nuclear weapons program by saying, "The single most important reason is Saddam's vision of his role in history as a saviour of the Arab world. He is comparing himself with Saladin" (Kempster 1998:A17). Finally, syndicated columnist Morton Kondracke speculates about a despot "like the Shah of Iran" who "secretly builds an arsenal to increase his prestige": Then he is overthrown by a religious fanatic resembling the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who then uses some of the Shah's bombs to intimidate or destroy neighboring countries. And other bombs he passes on to terrorists that will use them to wage holy wars. Be glad that it didn't happen in real life. But something like it

could. [I9831 The Western discourse on proliferation also stresses the supposedly ancient quality of feuds and hatreds in South Asia and the Middle East. As British journalist Nigel Calder puts it, "In that troubled part of the world, where modern technology serves ancient bitterness and nuclear explosions seem like a just expression of the wrath of God, imagining sequences of events that could lead to a regional nuclear conflict is not difficult" (1979:83). Explaining why Pakistan named its new missile the Ghauri, Senator Moynihan said, "Ghauri was a Muslim prince who invaded India in the twelfth century. These things don't go away" (1998). "Nuclear missiles named for ancient warriors will probably be deployed by two nations with a history of warfare, religious strife, and a simmering border dispute," said an ABC News reporter (Wouters 1998). In this vein it was widely reported in the U.S. media that the Indian Prithvi missile was named after an ancient warrior-king and that India's Agni missile was named for the god of fire (e.g., Marquand 1998). This widely circulated claim is particularly striking because, while it resonates with our stereotypes of Hindus enslaved to religion and tradition, it is quite untrue. The word Prithvi means "world" or "earth," and Agni means fire itself and does not refer to a god. The Indians are naming their missiles after elements, not after warriors or gods (Ghosh 1998). Of course, if Western commentators were looking for a country that names its nuclear weapons after ancient gods and dead warriors, they need have looked no further than the United States, with its Jupiter, Thor, Poseidon, Atlas, Polaris, Minuteman, and Pershing

missiles. After dictators and religious fanatics, the Western imagination is most afraid of Third World military officers.


The academics Brito and Intriligator, for example, tell us that Third World governments might acquire nuclear weapons "mainly for

deterrence purposes but might not be able to control such weapons once they were available. . . . Unilateral initiatives by junior officers could lead to these weapons going off' (Brito and Intriligator 1982:140). One finds the same presumption in the writings of Nigel

Calder, who also worries about Third World military officers: "An American or Russian general in Europe is not going to let off the first nuclear weapon on his own initiative, even in the heat of battle, but will the same discipline apply to . . . a Pakistani general who has a private nuclear theory about how to liberate Kashmir?" (1979:77). Oliver North notwithstanding, it is taken as so obvious it does not need explaining that Third World junior officers, unlike our own, are prone to take dangerous unilateral initiatives. Calder's passage only makes sense if one accepts the contrast it states as unquestionably natural. It is the kind of ideological statement that the French theorist Roland Barthes characterized as "falsely obvious" (1972:ll). As

Edward Said says, once a group has been orientalized, "virtually anything can be written or said about it, without challenge or demurral" (1978:287). This presumption that the Third World body politic cannot control its military loins is, I believe, a coded or metaphorical way of discussing a more general lack of control over impulses, a pervasive lack of discipline, assumed to afflict people of color. But what if one tries to turn these contrasts inside out, asking whether the historical behavior of the Western nuclear powers might also give rise to concerns about undemocratic nuclear bullying, religious fanaticism, and unilateral initiatives by military officers? Because of its contradictions, gaps, and silences, the discourse on proliferation can always be read backward so that our gaze is

directed not toward the Other but toward the author. Then the flaws and double standards of the discourse are illuminated. Thus, instead of asking whether Third World countries can be trusted with nuclear weapons, one can ask, how safe are the official nuclear powers from coups d'etat, renegade officers, or reckless

leaders? Pursuing this line of inquiry, one notices that France came perilously close to revolution as recently as 1968 and that in 196 1 a group of renegade French military officers took control of a nuclear weapon at France's nuclear test site in the Sahara Desert (Aeppel 1987; Spector 1990: 18). Britain, struggling to repress IRA bombing campaigns, has been engaged in low-level civil war for most of the time it has possessed nuclear weapons. The United States has, since it acquired nuclear weapons, seen one president (Kennedy) assassinated and another president (Reagan) wounded by a

gunman. There have been problems with the U.S. military also. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, a group of military officers at Malmstrom Air Force Base rigged their missiles so that they could launch their nuclear weapons independently of the national command and control structure and outside of normal procedures requiring multiple officers to enable a launch (Sagan

1993:81-91, 1995:78-79). In January 1963 a U.S. Air Force officer admitted to having tampered with the safety devices on a bomber's nuclear weapons, illegally disabling them (Sagan 1993: 189). During the 1950s, although this conflicted with presidential policy, "preventive nuclear attacks [against the Soviets] were clearly imagined, actively planned and vigorously advocated by senior U.S. military leaders" (Sagan 1995:62). One of these leaders was General Curtis LeMay, who, by 1954,

had "begun raising the ante with the Soviet Union on his own, covertly and extralegally" (Rhodes 1995:564), by sending U.S. reconnaissance flights over the USSR - technically an act of war-despite President Truman's orders not to do so. And General Horace Wade had the following to say about a successor to Lemay as head of the Strategic Air Command, General Thomas Power, in the early 1960s: "He was . . . a hard, cruel individual . . . I would like to say this. I used to worry about General Power. I used to worry that General Power was not stable. I used to worry about the fact that he had control over so many weapons and weapons systems and could, under certain conditions, launch the force" (U.S. Air Force 1978:307-309, quoted in Sagan 1993: 150). Although the United States is not a theocracy, the American people have their own sense of manifest destiny and divine calling that is not always so different from that of the Islamic fundamentalists whose nuclear ambitions they so fear. Major General Orvil Anderson was a military officer who, in distinctly Manichean terms, publicly advocated a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union (and lost his job for it). He said, "Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia's A-bomb nests in a week. . . . And when I went up to Christ-I think I could explain to him that I had saved Civilization" (Stevens 1958, quoted in Sagan 1995: n. 25). Nor is Anderson's sense that the use of nuclear weapons would be sanctioned by God unique: in the course of my own research I have interviewed American nuclear weapons scientists who believe that Christ would have pushed the button to bomb Hiroshima and that nuclear weapons are part of God's plan to end the world as a prelude to the Day of Judgment and the Second Coming (Gusterson 1996, 1997; see also

Mojtabai 1986). One can easily imagine the Western media's response if Indian or Pakistani generals or weapons scientists were to say such things! Finally, U.S. leaders have sometimes treated nuclear weapons not as the ultimate weapons of self-defense and last resort but as weapons that can be used to threaten adversaries in the pursuit of America's interests and values abroad. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (during

which President Kennedy put the chance of nuclear war "somewhere between one out of three and even") is only the best known of these gam bles (Sagan

1993:54). Other examples include the following: President Eisenhower threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Chinese, who did not then possess nuclear weapons of their own, in Korea in 1953 and in Quemoy-Matsu in 1954-55; Truman and Eisenhower sent military signals that the use of nuclear weapons was a possibility during the first Berlin Crisis, in 1949, and the second Quemoy-Matsu crisis, in 1958; and Henry Kissinger repeatedly conveyed President Nixon's threats of nuclear escalation to the North Vietnamese between 1969 and 1972 (Bundy 1988:238-239, 266-270, 277-283, 384;

Cheng 1988; Ellsberg 1981:~-vi). During the Vietnam War, Barry Goldwater ran for president as the Republican nominee advocating consideration of the use of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons to defoliate the jungles of Vietnam.”


5. A2 “Irrational” - Racists; no, really, you discriminate on 3 levels: criminalization, sexist overtones, and parent-child bigotry; westerners use symbolic forces of domestic hierarchy to subject others to their will

Hugh Gusterson[Professor, Anthropology & Sociology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University] “Nuclear Weapons and the Other in the Western Imagination” Journal of Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 111-143, 1999 [Brackets & Ellipses in Original] [JCKR]


“These falsely obvious arguments about the political unreliability of Third World nuclear powers are, I have been arguing,

part of a broader orientalist rhetoric that seeks to bury disturbing similarities between "us" and "them" in a discourse that systematically produces the Third World as Other. In the process of producing the Third World, we also produce ourselves, for the Orient, one of the West's "deepest and most recurring images of the other," is essential in defining the West "as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (Said 1978: 1-2). The particular images and metaphors that recur in the discourse on proliferation represent Third World nations as criminals, women, and children. But these recurrent images and metaphors, all of which pertain in some way to disorder, can also be read as telling hints about the facets of our own psychology and culture which we find especially troubling in regard to our custodianship over nuclear weapons. The metaphors and images are part of the ideological armor the West wears in the nuclear age, but they are also clues that suggest buried, denied, and troubling parts of ourselves that have mysteriously surfaced in our distorted representations of the Other. As Akhil Gupta has argued in his analysis of a different orientalist discourse, the discourse on development, "within development discourse . . . lies its shadowy double . . . a virtual presence, inappropriate objects that serve

to open up the 'developed world' itself as an inappropriate object" (1998:4). In the era of so-called rogue states, one recurrent theme in this system of representations is that of the thief, liar, and criminal: the very attempt to come into possession of nuclear weapons is often cast in terms

of racketeering and crime. After the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, one newspaper headline read, "G-8 Nations Move to Punish Nuclear Outlaws" (Reid 1998:1), thereby characterizing the two countries as criminals even though neither had signed-and hence violated-either the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. When British customs officers intercepted a shipment of krytrons destined for Iraq's nuclear weapons program, one newspaper account said that Saddam Hussein was "caught red-handed trying to steal atomic detonators" (Perlmutter 1990, emphasis added)-a curious choice of words given that Iraq had paid good money to buy the krytrons from the company EG&G. (In fact, if any nation can be accused of theft here, surely it is the United States, which took $650 million from Pakistan for a shipment of F-16s, cancelled the shipment when the Bush

administration determined that Pakistan was seeking to acquire nuclear weapons, but never refunded the money.) According to an article in the New York Times, "it required more than three decades, a global network of theft and espionage, and uncounted millions for Pakistan, one of the world's poorest countries, to explode that bomb" (Weiner 1998:6). Meanwhile the same paper's editorial page lamented that "for years Pakistan has lied to the U.S. about not having a nuclear weapons program" and insisted that the United States "punish Pakistan's perfidy on the Bomb" (New, York Tinles 1987a:A34, 1987b:A34). And Representative Stephen Solarz (Democrat, New York) warns that the bomb will give Pakistan "the nuclear equivalent of a Saturday Night Special" (Smith 1988:38). The image of the Saturday night special assimilates Pakistan symbolically to the disorderly

underworld of ghetto hoodlums who rob corner stores and fight gang wars. U.S. Nuclear weapons are, presumably, more like the "legitimate" weapons carried by the police to maintain order and keep the peace.'* Reacting angrily to this system of representations, the scientist in charge of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, said, "Anything which we do is claimed by the West as stolen and we are never given credit except for the things like heroin. . . . You think that we people who also got education are stupid, ignorant. Things which you could do fifty years ago, don't you think that we cannot do them now"

(NNI-News 1998). Third World nations acquiring nuclear weapons are also described in terms of passions escaping control. In Western discourse the passionate, or instinctual, has long been identified with women and animals and implicitly contrasted with male human rationality (Haraway 1990; Merchant 1980; Rosaldo 1974). Thus certain recurrent figures of speech in the Western discourse on proliferation cast proliferant nations in the Third World in imagery that carries a subtle feminine or subhuman connotation. Whereas the United States is spoken of as having "vital interests" and "legitimate security needs," Third World nations have "passions," "longings," and "yearnings" for nuclear weapons which must be controlled and contained by the strong male and adult hand of America. Pakistan has "an evident ardor for the Bomb," says a New York Tinzes editorial (1987a:A34). Peter Rosenfeld, writing in the Washington Post, worries that the United States cannot forever "stifle [Pakistan's] nuclear longings" ( 1 987:A27). Representative Ed Markey (Democrat, Massachusetts), agreeing, warns in a letter to the Washington Post that America's weakness in its relationship with Pakistan means that the

Pakistanis "can feed nuclear passions at home and still receive massive military aid from America" ( 1 987:A22). The image is of the unfaithful wife sponging o f f her cuckolded husband. But throwing the woman out may cause even more disorder: the Washington Post editorial page, having described Pakistan's nuclear weapons program-in an allusion to the ultimate symbol of Muslim femininity-as concealed "behind a veil of

secrecy," goes on to warn that there are "advantages to. . . having Pakistan stay in a close and constraining security relationship with the United States rather than be cast out by an aid cutoff into a loneliness in which its passion could only grow" ( 1 987:A22). Thus, even though American intelligence had by 1986 concluded that the Pakistani uranium-enrichment plant at Kahuta "had gone all the way" (Smith 1988:104), and even though the president can no longer, as he is required by law, "certify Pakistan's nuclear purity" (Molander 1986), the disobedient, emotive femininity of Pakistan is likely to be less disruptive i f it is kept within the bounds of its uneasy relationship with the United States. Third World nations are also often portrayed as children, and the United States, as a parental figure. The message is succinctly conveyed by one newspaper headline: "India, Pakistan Told to Put Weapons Away" (Marshall 1998a). Ben Sanders praises the Non-Proliferation T r eaty as a means to "protect the atomically innocent" (1990:25). But what about when innocence is lost? Steve Chapman, speaking of India and Pakistan, argues that "it's fine to counsel teenagers against having sex. But once they have produced a baby, another approach is in order" (1998:21). New York Times editorials speak of U.S. "scoldings" of Pakistan and "U.S. demands for good Pakistani behavior from now on" (1987a:A34). Some commentators fear that the U.S. parental style is too permissive and will encourage misbehavior by Pakistan's naughty siblings: "those who advocated an aid cutoff said the time had come for the United States to set an example for other would-be nuclear nations" (Smith 1988:106). Warning that American parental credibility is on the line, the New York

Times says that "all manner of reason and arguments have been tried with Pakistani leaders. It's time for stronger steps" (1 987a:A34). These metaphorical


representations of threshold nuclear nations as criminals, women, and children assimilate the relationship between the West and the Third World to other hierarchies of dominance within Western culture. They use the symbolic force of domestic hierarchies-police over criminals, men over women, and adults over children-to buttress and construct the global hierarchy of nations, telling us that, like women, children, and criminals, Third World nations have their proper place. The sense in the West that Third World nations have their proper place at the bottom of a global order in which nuclear weapons are the status symbols of the powerful alone-that nuclear proliferation is transgressing important symbolic hierarchies-is nicely conveyed by the condescending reactions in the Western media to India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests of 1998. Here many commentators sounded like secretaries of exclusive members- only clubs blackballing applications from the nouveau riche. "With scant regard for the admonitions of other members of the [nuclear] group, India has abruptly and loudly elbowed itself from the bottom into the top tier of this privileged elite," said one commentator (Smith 1998:A12). Putting the upstarts back in their place, U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright said that it was "clear that what the Indians and Pakistanis did

was unacceptable and that they are not now members of the nuclear club" (Marshall 1998b:A12). The same sentiment was expressed in stronger terms on the op-ed page of the New York Times by former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane, whose characterization of India draws on classic

orientalist imagery to make its point that the Indians are not "our" kind of people: "We must make clear to the Indian government that it is today what it was two weeks ago, an arrogant, overreaching cabal that, by its devotion to the caste system, the political and economic

disenfranchisement of its people and its religious intolerance, is unworthy of membership in any club" (1998:13). Mary McGrory, an alleged liberal,

writing for the Washington Post op-ed page, expressed the same reaction against people rising above their proper station in life. In a comment extraordinary for its simple erasure of the great literary and cultural achievements made by persons of the Indian subcontinent over many centuries, she

said, "People who cannot read, write or feed their children are forgetting these lamentable circumstances in the ghastly glory of being able to burn the planet or their enemies to a crisp" (1998b:Cl).”


B. A2 “Why Do They Want?”

1. The drive for nuclear weapons can be seen through a lens of economic need; North Korea can use its “attention” and nuclear capabilities as a bargaining chip for foreign aid

Prerna Lal[MA, International Relations, San Francisco State University; JD Expected, George Washington University] “North Korea Is Not a Threat—Unveiling Hegemonic Discourses” Self-Published, April 2009 http://prernalal.com/2009/04/north-korea-is-not-a-threat-unveiling-hegemonic-discourses/ [Ellipses in Original] [JCKR]“Truth be told, much of the world is suffering from the dire effects of an international economic system that does not benefit them. All the signs of desperation are present. They come from the rallies andburning of effigies around the world. The violent protests against NATO and the G-20 summit. The high prices of food. They come as small requests from students on whether anyone is listening. And even the scapegoating of the Other (be it gays, Muslims, liberals, undocumented immigrants) is really an ignorant response to our unwanted troubles, thoughts and desires.

The problem is not North Korea or Kim Jung II. The problem is an international system of haves and have-nots, where people without institutional power vie for attention. In this scenario, a nuclear missile from an impoverished, wretched country helps garner more attention than protests, rallies and suicide. How else can North Korea hope to get the help that it desperately needs? Foolcracy is hits the nail on what might

happen next: What else of those “consequences” besides the expected veto of proposed UN sanctions? It probably means that a deal will be made with North Korea for food and other essentials. In return, North Korea will “give up” part of its nuclear or rocket program and…then, in a couple of years, they will go back to the same game of spitting in the face of the world in exchange for food and other essentials. In other words, its a bit like a dysfunctional family that likes to play with guns. The Obama Administration has scrambled to battle anti-Americanism with new euphemisms. It is not the ‘global war on terror’ but a ‘global contingency operation.’ Not likely to catch on anytime soon. The people living in dire states and conditions, ravaged by war, poverty and hardship, know precisely what it is–an attack on their existence predicated by the United States and its allies. We have seen and read the master narrative before of demonizing a country, bringing about regime change and killing, colonizing and repressing more peoples while doing it. By unearthing these counter-discourses, we can hope to move towards a ‘solution’ to the North Korea issue.

Again, the ‘problem-solution’ is not the missiles, but the manner in which North Korea is seeking help and attention. Finding common ground requires discovering and deconstructing the cultural and discursive constructs. However, the window of opportunity is quite small, as seen by positions and interests of the parties involved. I don’t doubt though, that North Korea will cease to be an entity sometime in the near future and become into Korea again.”
