Versoza v. Republic and Sison

Republic of the PhilippinesCourt of Appeals

Manila

SPECIAL SEVENTH DIVISION

IN RE: APPLICATION FORREGISTRATION OF TITLE,

SPS. ROLAND0 and FLORDELIZA VERZOSA, Applicants-Appellees,

versus

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Public Oppositor-Appellant,

WILFREDO SISON, Private Oppositor-Appellant.

CA-G.R. CV NO. 90581

Members:

*PERLAS-BERNABE, J., Acting Chairperson,**PUNZALAN-CASTILLO, and ROSARIO, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 31, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISIONROSARIO, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 5 November 2007 of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in LRC

Case No. N-4025, ordering the registration of title applied for by the

spouses Verzosa over an 11,573-square meter parcel of land

* Acting Chairperson, per Office Order No. 517-09-CMV dated March 23, 2009.** Acting Senior Member, per Office Order No. 515-09-CMV dated March 20, 2009.1 Record, p. 343.

CA-G.R. CV NO. 90581Decision 2

adjoining the Lingayen Gulf.

In 2003, the spouses Rolando and Flordeliza Verzosa acquired

an 11,573-square meter parcel of land situated in Barangay

Pangapisan North, Lingayen, Pangasinan by purchase from the

following persons: 9,222 square meters from Baldomero Sison;2 and

the other portions from several other persons,3 who all acquired their

portions from Baldomero Sison.4 Subsequently, the spouses Verzosa

developed the subject property into a beach resort:, the El Puerto

Marina Beach Resort and Spa.

On 15 August 2005, the spouses Verzosa applied for

registration of title over the subject property.5 According to a survey

commissioned by the spouses Verzosa, the land is bounded on the

northwest by a 20-meter “Salvage Zone;” on the northeast by a 6-

meter road; on the south by land belonging to Anastacia Sison; and

on the southwest by land belonging to Wilfredo Sison.

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the

Solicitor General, opposed the application on the grounds that: (1) the

subject property is public land incapable of private appropriation; and

(2) the applicant spouses have not been in possession of the subject

2 Exhibits “GG” and “JJ”.3 Exhibits “U”, “AA” and “P”.4 Exhibits “X”, “DD” and “S”.5 Record., p. 1.


property since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

Adjacent owner, Wifredo Sison, also opposed the application,

echoing the Republic’s stand that the subject property is foreshore

land incapable of private appropriation. In addition, Wilfredo pointed

out that the land applied for included a portion of public land already

adjudicated to him by way of lease by the DENR.

After due publication, mailing, posting of notices, and

presentation of evidence, the trial court decided in favor of the

spouses Verzosa and granted the registration prayed for.

Hence, this appeal by both Oppositors, with the Republic

raising the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE QUESTIONED PARCEL OF LAND IS REGISTRABLE DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF DOUBT(S) ON RECORD THAT IT IS A FORESHORE LAND, THUS, PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.

II.

THE LAND REGISTRATION COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN GRANTING THE INSTANT APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE, APPLICANTS-APPELLEES FAILING TO PROVE BY THE QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE MANDATED BY LAW OF THE REQUIRED PERIOD OF OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT


OF AN OWNER OVER THE SUBJECT LAND.6

Similarly, Wilfredo Sison assigns the following errors to the trial

court:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS A PUBLIC LAND.

II.

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT APPELLEES-APPLICANTS WERE NOT IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT LAND, UNDER A BONA FIDE CLAIM OF ACQUISITION OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER AS REQUIRED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 48(b) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 4 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1073.

III.

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT APPELLEES-APPLICANTS SPOUSES VERZOSA ARE ENTITLED TO THE REGISTRATION OF THE LAND IDENTIFIED AS PLAN PSU-01-008997.7

For their part, the spouses Verzosa deny that the subject

property is foreshore land, as defined by jurisprudence, because it is

6 Rollo, p. 96.7 Id., at pp. 41-42.


far from the seashore and is not alternately wet and dry , depending

on the flow of the tides. Moreover, the spouses Verzosa rely on the

strength of a Certification8 dated 17 May 2001 of the previous CENR

officer of Dagupan City, to the effect that:

“This area is located along the beach of Lingayen but far from the foreshore area and it is not within timberland or public forest per L.C. Map No. 698 certified on November 21, 1927, it appears that there is no timberland or forestland within the Municipality of Lingayen.

xxx xxx xxx.” (emphasis supplied)

However, in their Appellees' Brief, even while claiming that the

subject property is not public land, they admit that the subject

property is the product of accretion by the action of the sea. Thus:

“3.42. It is not disputed that the Property is a product of accretion. It is land formed by the gradual flow of the sea. xxx.

3.43. Based on the Application, the property is immediately bound ed on the south by Lot 519 owned by Anastacia Sison. Comparing this to the land plotted in Cad 373-D, Lot 519 is actually bounded on the North by a parcel of land denominated as a twenty (20)-meter wide Salvage Zone. Thus, at the time that Cad 373-D was plotted, a portion of the Property already existed but was merely denominated as a Salvage Zone. And as the years passed, the accretion grew until in 2005, the Property was already 11,573 square meters.”9

8 Exhibit “B-1”.9 Rollo, pp. 200-201.


The theory of the spouses Verzosa being that accreted land is

not necessarily foreshore land, and since, according to the spouses

Verzosa, only foreshore land is incapable of private appropriation, the

subject property – while admittedly a product of accretion by sea

action – may be registered under the Torrens system in their names.

The spouses Verzosa are mistaken. The appeal of the

Oppositors is meritorious.

In view of the spouses Verzosa’s admission that the subject

property is a product of accretion by the sea, the Certification issued

by the CENR Officer that the subject property is neither timberland

nor forestland loses its strength and significance. Both foreshore

lands and lands accreted by sea action are classified as land of the

public domain incapable of private acquisition and registration. The

difference between the two lies in their definition and mode of

exploitation by private individuals. In any event, the spouses Verzosa

may not register the disputed land, whether as foreshore land or land

accreted from the sea.

First, as to definition, foreshore lands are restrictively defined

as that part of the land adjacent to the sea, which is alternately

covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides.

Foreshore land was first defined in the 1953 case of Hacut vs.


Director of Lands10 as –

"that part of the land immediately in front of the shore; the part which is between high and low water marks, and alternately covered with water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. It is indicated by a middle line between the highest and lowest tides."

This definition was upheld by the Supreme Court in the 1965

cases of Ponce vs. Gomez11 and Ponce vs. City of Cebu,12 where

foreshore land was defined as –

“that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides."

In 1984, in Republic vs. Court of Appeals,13 the Supreme Court

restated the definition of foreshore land as –

"…that part of [the land] which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides x x x"

"The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.”

From the definition given by the Supreme Court over the years,

it is clear that foreshore land is only that portion of the shore that is

covered and uncovered by the action of the tides. On the other hand,

land accreted by sea action could encompass a bigger area, 10 6724-R, 49 O.G. No. 5, p. 1863 [1953].11 L-21870, 3 February 1965.12 L-22669, 3 February 1965.13 131 SCRA 532, 539 [1984].


including its own foreshore land.

Thus, while it might be true, as argued by the spouses Verzosa,

that their hotel and resort could not have been built on foreshore land

because it is never submerged under water or subjected to the action

of the tides, the subject property nevertheless pertains to the public

domain as accreted land.

Second, as to mode of acquisition or utilization, foreshore land

is incapable of acquisition, except through reclamation by the

National Government,14 through the Public Estates Authority,15 the

intention of the law being to limit the use of foreshore land to public

use.

Nevertheless, a private entity who owns the property adjacent

to foreshore land – otherwise known as the littoral owner – has the

preference to lease foreshore land from the government under

paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1,16 which reads:

32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining foreshore lands or lands covered with water bordering upon shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature, provided that he applies therefore within sixty (60) days from the date he receives a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his

14 PD No. 3 and 3-A.15 PD No. 1084.16 Dated 30 April 1936.


preferential right.

The reason for giving a preferential right to lease foreshore land

to the littoral owner was stated in SIAIN Enterprises vs. F.F. Cruz &

Co., Inc.,17 citing Santulan vs. Executive Secretary,18 as follows:

“Now, then, is there any justification for giving to the littoral owner the preferential right to lease the foreshore land abutting on his land?

That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain, such lands, when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast guard service,” shall be declared by the Government “to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.”

In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral (riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.

The reason for the preferential right is the same as the justification for giving accretions to the riparian owner for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters. So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession.”

In this case, since the spouses Verzosa are not littoral owners,

17 G.R. No. 146616, 31 August 2006.18 80 SCRA 548, 556 (1977).


they may not benefit from the preference to lease foreshore land from

the government, under paragraph 32 of Lands Administrative Order

No. 7-1, given to owners of land adjacent to foreshore land.

In contrast, Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters19 allows a

littoral owner the right to acquire accretions from the sea but only

upon declaration by the government that the same is no longer

necessary for public use. Thus –

"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."

In the light of the aforecited vintage but still valid law,

unequivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this

controversy, the same being an accretion on the shores of the

Lingayen Gulf.

As part of the public domain, the subject property is intended

for public uses, and so long as the land in litigation belongs to the

national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of

being appropriated by any private person, except through express

authorization granted in due form by a competent authority. Only the

executive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and 19 Enacted on 3 August 1866.


the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action

of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for

the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast guard

services.20

In any event, even if the executive or legislative department

were to declare the disputed land as qualified to become private

property, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, only

the littoral owner may benefit from such a declaration. Since the

spouses Verzosa are not littoral owners – or owners of property

adjacent to the accretion – they will never be qualified to own the

same and have the same registered in their names.

In sum, the spouses Verzosa have no right over the subject

property – whether of lease or ownership – because they are not

littoral owners, or owners of property adjacent thereto. This holds true

regardless of whether the same is foreshore land or accreted land.

The trial court clearly erred in granting the registration applied for.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and

SET ASIDE, and the application for registration filed by the spouses

Rolando M. Verzosa and Flordeliza B. Verzosa over the parcel of

land designated as Psu-01-008997, situated in Barangay Pangapisan

North, Lingayen, Pangasinan, is DISMISSED.

20 Heirs of Navarro vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68166, 12 February 1997.


SO ORDERED.

RICARDO R. ROSARIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE Associate Justice

MARIFLOR PUNZALAN-CASTILLO Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABEAssociate Justice

Acting Chairperson, Special Seventh Division

RRR/acn(em)

Documents

Versoza v. Republic and Sison