GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE CHALLENGES IN THE 1990'S

by General Alfred M. GrayCommandant of the Marine Corps

"The Corps must be 'fighting smart' if it is to meet the combined challengeof an austere fiscal environment and an increasingly lethal expeditionary environment."

- A. M. Gray, CMC

General Gray, who served a tour as anintelligence officer, understands the value anduses of intelligence. General Gray is an articu-late proponent of intelligence in the JCS forum.He has been kind enough to provide us with hisviews on global intelligence issues from hisperspective as a member of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff and as Commandant of the U.S. MarineCorps. General Gray states how he is posturingthe Marine Corps and what requirements heenvisions for intelligence in the era of "revolu-tionary war."

General Gray is an Honorary Life Mem-ber of NMIA.

As the Joint Chiefs of Staff observe the dramaticchanges taking place in Eastern Europe and the SovietUnion on the one hand, and the increasingly volatile andlethal Third World on the other, it is immediately apparentthat the 1990's will be a period of global and sweepingchallenge to both intelligence professionals and the pol-icy-makers and tactical commanders they support. Whenwe add to this equation the severely constrained fiscalenvironment, forcing all of us to do more and more withless and less, these challenges verge on being over-whelming.

Our ability to gauge events and their implicationsin Eastern Europe; our ability to estimate and forecastThird World change in all dimensions (socio-economicand ideo-cultural as well as the more traditional political-military); our ability to develop indications and warnings ofemerging threats in the Third World; our ability to provideintelligence for countemarcotics and counter-terroristprograms; and our ability to protect national securitysecrets through both offensive and defensive counterin-telligence; these will define and guide the national strat-

egy, national defense posture, and national military forcestructure and systems acquisition in the 1990's.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and theService Chiefs will require the absolute best intelligenceavailable if they are to make prudent decisions aboutfiscal, system, and operational matters. To the extent thatintelligence fails or proves inadequate, our national de-fense programs suffer, both through the expenditure ofmillions of dollars on inappropriate capabilities, andthrough a lack of readiness to deal with unanticipated orunderestimated threats. We need to strike a betterbalance between our capabilities and actual require-ments. We simply cannot afford to equip and train for thewrong war.

The U.S. Marine Corps, as the nation's "force ofchoice" for expeditionary operations, must be extremelyconcerned and vocal about global intelligence challengesin the 1990's. The Marine Corps is also a microcosm ofthe Department of Defense as a whole. A Marine AirGround Task Force (MAGTF) is self-contained and sup-

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ported, must be able to work with all other Services andcivilian agencies overseas, in all operational plans world-wide, and must have constant near-real-time access tonational, theater, and in-country intelligence. Our Corpsis particularly well-suited to respond to these challenges,but to be most effective, we must obtain more balancedintelligence coverage of the Third World.

Since WWII there have been over 200 situationsrequiring the use of U.S. forces; roughly 85% requiredemployment of the Marines, and virtually all were in theThird World. Prior to WWII and the establishment of a bi-polarworid, there is an even richer history of Marine Corpsemployment in expeditionary and constabulary opera-tions throughout the Third World.

... we must obtain more balanced intelli-gence coverage of the Third World...

As nuclear/conventional threats stabilize, a multi-polar world is forming, characterized by shared globalconcerns as well as competing interest in regions contain-ing powerful Third World nations. This environment offersboth opportunity and challenge for policy-makers con-cerned with the protection of U.S. interests.

The east-west factor will not be the central focusof our contingency planning in the 1990's. This repre-sents afundamental challenge to the intelligence commu-nity, because the emerging threats in the Third Worldrequire a distinctly different approach to intelligence thandoes the relatively static threat posed by the nuclear andconventional forces of the Soviet Union and its allies.

In recognition of this challenge, we are doingwhat we can to improve tailored intelligence for MarineCorps' need at both the strategic and tactical levels.

- At Headquarter Marine Corps, we have com-bined our Intelligence Division and C4 Divisions to formthe Command, Control, Communications, Computer,Intelligence and Interoperability (C412) Department undera Major General, Assistant Chief of Staff. This depart-ment will ensure execution of my C412 plans and policieswhich are best exemplified by recent guidance to MarineCorps general officers: "If you can't manage informationand data, you can't command."

- At Quantico, we are creating and bringing up tospeed a service-level intelligence centerwithin the MarineCorps Combat Development Command. I have taskedthat activity with becoming, as quickly as possible, amodel all-source fusion center. With assistance from the

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General Defense Intelligence Program, we expect thismodest initiative to become a lead site for "state of theshelf" intelligence analysis tools, and serve as a catalystfor combat development activities involving force struc-turing, doctrine, equipment requirements, and the trainingand education of ourwarriors. The Intelligence Centerwillalso serve as a gateway to the various reservoirs of bothclassified and open source knowledge about the worldwherein our MAGTF's are most likely to be employed.

- In the Fleet Marine forces we have formed theSurveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Groups(SRIG). This internal initiative brings together under onecommander the resources necessary to meet the opera-tional and tactical commander's needs, and significantlyfacilitates the integration of command & control, commu-nication, computing, and intelligence resources at thetactical level.

Our understanding of the difference between theconventional and the emerging threat is illustrated below:

Conventional Threat

GovernmentalConventional/NuclearStatic Orders of BattleLinearRules of Engagement (ROE)Known DoctrineStrategic WarningKnown Intelligence Assets

Emerging Threat

Non-GovernmentalNon-ConventionalDynamic or RandomNon-linearNo constraints (ROE)Unknown doctrineNo established I&W netUnlimited 5th column

This radical difference between conventionalthreats and emerging threats poses a strategic challengethat must be met with a strategic response. A fundamen-tal element of our success in developing a strategicresponse will be our ability to agree on a broader contin-uum of civilian and military programs requiring in-depthsustained intelligence support. In dealing with"low inten-sity conflict" it is imperative that the importance of intelli-gence to all activities, including overt civilian and militaryprograms, be validated, and resources applied accord-ingly.

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Our information programs cannot succeed if in-telligence does not help us understand the importantcultural perspectives and the reactions of foreign groupsto our themes and actions.

In brief, we believe that the very powerful repeti-tive technical collection capabilities we have developedagainst the more conventional military and industrialtargets in 'denied areas" will no longer suffice as thecenterpiece of our national intelligence structure.

We must develop reliable capabilities which af-ford us both warning and - perhaps more importantly -understanding of emerging threats such as are predomi-nant in the increasingly lethal and volatile Third World. Iam greatly encouraged by the increasing emphasis withinthe U.S. intelligence community on establishing a long-term foundation for analysis of all important aspects of theThird World as well as indications and warnings of lowintensity conflict.

understanding of Third World intentions and non-conven-tional threats (e.g. bio-chemical terrorism).

It means we must apply technology in waysresponsive to our most immediate and frequent threats,and must balance our use of technology with the in-telligence cycle:

o Capabilities must be integrated both verticallyand horizontally - Inter-agency policies and practicesmust be developed which permit the fusion of Infor-mation at every hierarchical level, beginning with theCountry Team. At the same time, we should developmeans of avoiding redundant processing of the sameinformation by every agency and service;

o Information technology must be managedand exploited as an intelligence multiplier, dramati-cally improving the processing of collected intelligence aswell as the exploitation of untapped open sources.

Implicit in this changing threat is the requirementto train and educate all of our Marines, especially ourintelligence specialists, to respond to these non-tradi-tional challenges. Intelligence professionals must alsotake the lead in developing useful intelligence productsthat help orient the intelligence consumer to the need formore and better Third world intelligence so that intelli-gence priorities and corresponding resource allocationsare appropriately balanced.

In this era of fiscal austerity, we must apply thebusiness concept of 'return on investment" to our deci-sion-making regarding intelligence in support of nationalsecurity. This will help us develop a better balancebetween collection and processing, between emphasison nuclear/conventional versus emerging threats, andbetween satisfaction of national and tactical (CountryTeam) requirements.

What does this mean from the Marine Corps'point of view?

First, as noted above, it means we must recog-nize the needs of civilian agencies and military theatercommanders coping with "low intensity conflict" (or, mypreferred term, revolutionary warfare). If threat is a factorin determining national investments in security assis-tance and foreign aid, then a more aggressive program ofThird World intelligence analysis and forecasting isneeded if we are to justify long overdue and underfundedpeaceful preventive measures in this vital area of concernand potential.

It means we must do much more in fundingclandestine HUMINT able to meet our needs for in-depth

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Externally, much more could be done to leverageinformation technology, especially against existing opensources of information such as Third World print and voicemedia. Our Intelligence Center at Quantico has workedclosely with others in the intelligence community to under-stand where we can do better in this area. Severalinitiatives the Marine Corps would support but can notunilaterally fund include:

o Establishment of a separate Open SourceCommittee co-equal to other national-level disciplinarycommittees; this is essential if community programs toapply information technology to open source exploitationare to be cost-effective and mutually reinforcing;

o Global program of selected digitization ofnewspapers and journals with initial emphasis on thirdWorld countries with narcotics and terrorist targets;

o Establishment of a central repository of gov-ernment owned open source data bases such asdeveloped by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service(FBIS) and the Joint Publications Research Service(JPRS);

o National program to digitize selected bio-graphic and other hard-copy records pertaining to theThird World;

o Expansion of the Defense Gateway Informa-tion System (DGIS) to include management of the latterthree initiatives; and

o Coordinated community-wide developmentof generic functional requirements and a common

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software/system solution for an intelligence analysts'workstation with a single user interface and access tomultiple remote databases at all security levels.

We must begin the difficult task of developing acomprehensive database and advanced language andarea specialist cadres for all Third World countries. TheMarine Corps is prepared to take the lead in this area. Wesee the Defense Advanced Language and Area StudiesProgram as a primary means to develop Third Worldexpertise.

... We must devote...energy...and...creativityto the challenge of understanding indica-tions and warning for revolutionary warfare.

We must devote the same energy, and muchmore creativity, to the challenge of understanding indica-tions and warning for revolutionary warfare. I include insuch warfare terrorism as it might manifest itself throughdomestic economic sabotage and information technology"viruses", as well as the narcotics threat.

In keeping with our commitment to the fightagainst illegal drugs, and the ease with which threattargets move back and forth over "the water's edge", wemust provide strong support to law enforcement agenciesas they seek to develop their "strategic" intelligencecapabilities and related secure communications andmethods of operations. This is a two-way street. Nationalagencies must develop legal, automated means of receiv-ing and exploiting raw information collected by law en-forcement officials overseas.

The complexity of the operational environment inthe Third World is illustrated by the specific Marine AirGround Task Force (MAGTF) missions listed below, allpart of "low intensity conflict":

Low Intensity Conflict Missions

Stability Operations(Civil-Military Operations)

00

00000

Presence/Amphibious OpsHumanitarian Assistance

- Deliberate Ops- Disaster Relief- Civic Action

Mobile Training TeamsInternal Security SupportPeacekeeping OpsCounternarcotics OpsCounterinsurgency Ops

Limited Objective Operations(Short of General War)

o Peacetime Contingencies- Non-combatant Evacuation- Amphibious Raid- Seizure of Advanced Bases

o Counterterrorism Ops

The increasing sophistication of Third Worldopponents such as are represented by narco-revolution-aries and terrorists, presents us with particularly difficultchallenges.

Let me illustrate one specific challenge - theSIGINT threat. Using "state of the art" commerciallyavailable equipment, they frequently outpace or avoidentirely the capabilities developed by the governmentthrough its lengthy procurement process. Below areseveral of the military and commercial technologies whichwould confront the Marine Corps in various contingencyscenarios:

SIGINT CHARACTERISTICSOF SELECTED THIRD WORLD THREATS

o Low Probability of Intercept/Low Probability ofDetection (LPI/LPD) signals- Frequency agile radios- Direct sequence spread spectrum

radios- Burst communication

o Citizen-band and Marine-band radioso Use of higher frequencies (communications &

radars)o Use of telephones (especially cellular tele-

phone), land lines, and packet radio sys-tems for voice & data

o Secure voice systems and other encryptiondevices

o Extremely wide variety and complexity of po-tential targets, creating a "needle in thehaystack" problem

Be assured, our SIGINT/EW planners are ad-dressing this problem in close coordination with nationaland law enforcement agencies. Still, the complexity of theproblem is obvious.

In closing, I would make three key points:

Revolutionary warfare Is just that - revolu-tionary. It does not respond to negotiation or reason aswe understand the terms. When revolutionaries "negoti-ate" they do so to buy time and improve their position. In-telligence in the 1990's must be able to document revolu-tionary deception in terms stark enough to support the

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employment of force where appropriate;

"Low intensity conflict" Is neither "low,""limited" nor necessarily "conflict." It covers every-thing from nation-building to a Marine Corps specialty,"creating the maximum amount of violence in the smallestpossible space." Intelligence in the 1990's must supportthe full spectrum of responses. including overt civilian andmilitary programs overseas, as well as law enforcementagencies at home. Intelligence must be able to tell us,down to individual personalities and neighborhoods,"who," "where," and "how much" of "what" is needed, andwhether what has been applied has been effective. If itdoesn't know, it must have assets able to obtain andreport the information within six hours of demand.

Crises and expeditionary operations in theThird World are by their nature "come as you are"

affairs. We will not have the time to "surge" our intelli-gence (including mapping, charting, and geodesy). Norwill we have the time to train, equip, and organize ourforces for radically new threats which have not beenforecast. We must do our homework today in order to betruly prepared - mentally, physically, and emotionally.Only an investment in people - advanced language andarea specialists able to help us understand the ThirdWorld - will lead to the appropriate and cost-effective de-velopment of expeditionary forces trained, equipped, andorganized for dealing with the emerging threats and op-portunities in the Third World.

Your Marine Corps will be the first to fight; I giveyou my assurance we are also going to be fighting smart."

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COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE INTELLIGENCE SELECTED READINGS--BOOK

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