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Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain by John W. YoltonReview by: Arnold KoslowIsis, Vol. 77, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 115-116Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/232515 .
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REVIEWS ON PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-ISIS 77: 1 : 286 (1986) REVIEWS ON PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-ISIS 77: 1 : 286 (1986)
scholars for being too tied to present fash- ion. Here I think he fails to recognize his own historical context. When most North American newspapers regularly carry as- trology charts and religious zealots are popping up all over the globe, Kant's life- long effort to combat our predisposition for fanaticism takes on an unforced relevance.
PATRICIA KITCHER
John W. Yolton. Thinking Matter: Materi- alism in Eighteenth-Century Britain. xiv + 238 pp., bibl., index. Minneapolis: Univer- sity of Minnesota Press, 1983.
This is a valuable study, finely con- structed and richly textured. John W. Yol- ton unravels yet interconnects some of the most difficult strains of British eighteenth- century thought. The entering wedge into this host of problems is John Locke's spec- ulation on whether matter can think. Al- though Locke did not believe that thought was a property of matter, he did suggest that for all we know about substances, God could have superadded the power of thought to matter rather than conjoin to it an immaterial substance that thinks. Yol- ton's study is largely organized around British reactions, direct and indirect, to that seemingly passing remark in Locke's Essay. There is no space to indicate how lucidly this rich and convoluted material is laid out. Not only are the views in major books as well as minor pamphlets and re- views presented, but Yolton also enunci- ates certain widely shared principles that run through and shape the controversies. One such principle is that "no thing can be or act where it is not"-applicable, as it was thought, not only to the behavior of bodies but to cognitive situations as well. In Yolton's apt phrase: no cognition at a distance. The inclusion of these principles enriches the work immensely. Even when a minor figure is considered whose historical influence is not great, or a major figure (like Joseph Priestley) proposes a view of matter (based partly on Rudjer Boscovic) that does not quite catch fire, we see these epi- sodes not merely as indicating some path not taken (however interesting) but as also revealing how deep the shared principles run. There is much that goes on in this work that is intellectually exciting.
The first chapter ("Locke's Suggestion") makes it clear that the supposition of su- peraddition was not limited to questions of cognition. Even so seemingly different an
scholars for being too tied to present fash- ion. Here I think he fails to recognize his own historical context. When most North American newspapers regularly carry as- trology charts and religious zealots are popping up all over the globe, Kant's life- long effort to combat our predisposition for fanaticism takes on an unforced relevance.
PATRICIA KITCHER
John W. Yolton. Thinking Matter: Materi- alism in Eighteenth-Century Britain. xiv + 238 pp., bibl., index. Minneapolis: Univer- sity of Minnesota Press, 1983.
This is a valuable study, finely con- structed and richly textured. John W. Yol- ton unravels yet interconnects some of the most difficult strains of British eighteenth- century thought. The entering wedge into this host of problems is John Locke's spec- ulation on whether matter can think. Al- though Locke did not believe that thought was a property of matter, he did suggest that for all we know about substances, God could have superadded the power of thought to matter rather than conjoin to it an immaterial substance that thinks. Yol- ton's study is largely organized around British reactions, direct and indirect, to that seemingly passing remark in Locke's Essay. There is no space to indicate how lucidly this rich and convoluted material is laid out. Not only are the views in major books as well as minor pamphlets and re- views presented, but Yolton also enunci- ates certain widely shared principles that run through and shape the controversies. One such principle is that "no thing can be or act where it is not"-applicable, as it was thought, not only to the behavior of bodies but to cognitive situations as well. In Yolton's apt phrase: no cognition at a distance. The inclusion of these principles enriches the work immensely. Even when a minor figure is considered whose historical influence is not great, or a major figure (like Joseph Priestley) proposes a view of matter (based partly on Rudjer Boscovic) that does not quite catch fire, we see these epi- sodes not merely as indicating some path not taken (however interesting) but as also revealing how deep the shared principles run. There is much that goes on in this work that is intellectually exciting.
The first chapter ("Locke's Suggestion") makes it clear that the supposition of su- peraddition was not limited to questions of cognition. Even so seemingly different an
issue as whether gravity is a property be- longing to matter is involved. Yolton, in passing, discusses the views of P. B. Ger- dil, a follower of Nicolas de Malebranche, concerning whether active properties like attraction and thought could be properties of matter. To think of gravity as essential to matter, would, in Gerdil's view, be an in- stance of the kind of superaddition of prop- erties raised by Locke. It is clear, even from this passing observation, that more is at stake in the question whether gravity is essential to matter than the problem of oc- cult qualities.
The second chapter ("The Automatical Man") contains an account of automata as then conceived-automatical pigeons and flies-as well as the possibility of a man- machine, involving a conception of human nature as no longer a spiritual substance, but a material one having the properties of volition and thought. There was a real fear, according to Yolton, that the suggestion of Locke, unless combated, would lead to ma- terialism-the "hideous hypothesis" (of Benedict de Spinoza). That hypothesis is the subject of Yolton's third chapter, on David Hume. It is too subtle to be summa- rized. Suffice it to say that in addition to the challenges Hume raised to both materi- alist and immaterialist notions of sub- stance, and the view he held about visual and tactual impressions and ideas as them- selves extended, the reader will find a Hu- mean gloss on the idea of "conjoining things with matter" that avoids having to think of conjunction as spatial and instead regards conjunction as a matter of coexis- tence. The taste of the fig is conjoined with its shape, but there is no local (spatial) con- junction. Finally there is the Humean re- jection of the principle that nothing can be or act where it is not.
The fourth chapter ("Space and Exten- sion") is a wonderful account of the variety of attempts to explain the spatial allusion in the principle. Yolton considers the parallel problems raised for bodies and for minds- for example, are the latter extended? do they have parts? Here one is reminded of some of Newton's unpublished dicta, such as "No being exists or can exist unless it is related to Space in some way," and his claim that all moments of duration are dif- fused throughout all spaces and that, simi- larly, one can without contradiction think that the Mind "according to its kind, can be diffused through space without any thought of its parts."
issue as whether gravity is a property be- longing to matter is involved. Yolton, in passing, discusses the views of P. B. Ger- dil, a follower of Nicolas de Malebranche, concerning whether active properties like attraction and thought could be properties of matter. To think of gravity as essential to matter, would, in Gerdil's view, be an in- stance of the kind of superaddition of prop- erties raised by Locke. It is clear, even from this passing observation, that more is at stake in the question whether gravity is essential to matter than the problem of oc- cult qualities.
The second chapter ("The Automatical Man") contains an account of automata as then conceived-automatical pigeons and flies-as well as the possibility of a man- machine, involving a conception of human nature as no longer a spiritual substance, but a material one having the properties of volition and thought. There was a real fear, according to Yolton, that the suggestion of Locke, unless combated, would lead to ma- terialism-the "hideous hypothesis" (of Benedict de Spinoza). That hypothesis is the subject of Yolton's third chapter, on David Hume. It is too subtle to be summa- rized. Suffice it to say that in addition to the challenges Hume raised to both materi- alist and immaterialist notions of sub- stance, and the view he held about visual and tactual impressions and ideas as them- selves extended, the reader will find a Hu- mean gloss on the idea of "conjoining things with matter" that avoids having to think of conjunction as spatial and instead regards conjunction as a matter of coexis- tence. The taste of the fig is conjoined with its shape, but there is no local (spatial) con- junction. Finally there is the Humean re- jection of the principle that nothing can be or act where it is not.
The fourth chapter ("Space and Exten- sion") is a wonderful account of the variety of attempts to explain the spatial allusion in the principle. Yolton considers the parallel problems raised for bodies and for minds- for example, are the latter extended? do they have parts? Here one is reminded of some of Newton's unpublished dicta, such as "No being exists or can exist unless it is related to Space in some way," and his claim that all moments of duration are dif- fused throughout all spaces and that, simi- larly, one can without contradiction think that the Mind "according to its kind, can be diffused through space without any thought of its parts."
115 115
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REVIEWS ON PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-ISIS 77: 1: 286 (1986) REVIEWS ON PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-ISIS 77: 1: 286 (1986) REVIEWS ON PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-ISIS 77: 1: 286 (1986)
The remaining chapters ("Matter: Inert or Active," "Priestley's Materialism," "The Concepts of Action," "The Physiol- ogy of Thinking and Acting" and a conclu- sion are all very rewarding. On these issues, the reader should also consult J. E. McGuire and Martin Tamny's study of Newton's unpublished Trinity notebook, Certain Philosophical Questions (which ap- peared after the present volume).
This is a remarkable study that lays bare broad themes, some still with us, in an exact and intellectually exciting manner.
ARNOLD KOSLOW
Clark Zumbach. The Transcendent Sci- ence: Kant's Conception of Biological Methodology. (Nijhoff International Philos- ophy Series, 15.) xii + 165 pp., index. The Hague/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nij- hoff, 1984. (Distributed in the U.S. by Kluwer Academic Publishers, Hingham, Mass.) DM 85; ?21.75.
Kant's Critique of Judgement is perhaps the least read of the philosopher's major works, yet it contains one of the boldest assertions in the history of biological thought: the claim that living organisms would never be fully explained in mechani- cal terms. "It is absurd," Kant wrote, "even to hope that another Newton may some day arise to make intelligible to us the genesis of even a blade of grass from natu- ral laws that no purpose has ordered" (Sec. 75). In 1868, however, Ernst Haeckel an- nounced that this impossible "Newton of the grassblade" had in fact appeared in the person of Charles Darwin, whose theory of evolution seemed to dispose of the problem of teleology once and for all. With few ex- ceptions, Haeckel's view has been shared by biologists and philosophers of science ever since.
Clark Zumbach's The Transcendent Sci- ence takes issue with this received view, arguing that Kant's biological philosophy has been largely misunderstood. Beginning with preliminary chapters on "teleologic phenomena" and "the Kantian endeavor," Zumbach proceeds to discuss Kant's views on purposiveness ("design in nature") and the role of mechanism ("the mechanism of nature") and concludes with a chapter on "the autonomy of biology." Throughout, he ably explains the intricacies of the argu- ment of the third Critique and persuasively
The remaining chapters ("Matter: Inert or Active," "Priestley's Materialism," "The Concepts of Action," "The Physiol- ogy of Thinking and Acting" and a conclu- sion are all very rewarding. On these issues, the reader should also consult J. E. McGuire and Martin Tamny's study of Newton's unpublished Trinity notebook, Certain Philosophical Questions (which ap- peared after the present volume).
This is a remarkable study that lays bare broad themes, some still with us, in an exact and intellectually exciting manner.
ARNOLD KOSLOW
Clark Zumbach. The Transcendent Sci- ence: Kant's Conception of Biological Methodology. (Nijhoff International Philos- ophy Series, 15.) xii + 165 pp., index. The Hague/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nij- hoff, 1984. (Distributed in the U.S. by Kluwer Academic Publishers, Hingham, Mass.) DM 85; ?21.75.
Kant's Critique of Judgement is perhaps the least read of the philosopher's major works, yet it contains one of the boldest assertions in the history of biological thought: the claim that living organisms would never be fully explained in mechani- cal terms. "It is absurd," Kant wrote, "even to hope that another Newton may some day arise to make intelligible to us the genesis of even a blade of grass from natu- ral laws that no purpose has ordered" (Sec. 75). In 1868, however, Ernst Haeckel an- nounced that this impossible "Newton of the grassblade" had in fact appeared in the person of Charles Darwin, whose theory of evolution seemed to dispose of the problem of teleology once and for all. With few ex- ceptions, Haeckel's view has been shared by biologists and philosophers of science ever since.
Clark Zumbach's The Transcendent Sci- ence takes issue with this received view, arguing that Kant's biological philosophy has been largely misunderstood. Beginning with preliminary chapters on "teleologic phenomena" and "the Kantian endeavor," Zumbach proceeds to discuss Kant's views on purposiveness ("design in nature") and the role of mechanism ("the mechanism of nature") and concludes with a chapter on "the autonomy of biology." Throughout, he ably explains the intricacies of the argu- ment of the third Critique and persuasively
The remaining chapters ("Matter: Inert or Active," "Priestley's Materialism," "The Concepts of Action," "The Physiol- ogy of Thinking and Acting" and a conclu- sion are all very rewarding. On these issues, the reader should also consult J. E. McGuire and Martin Tamny's study of Newton's unpublished Trinity notebook, Certain Philosophical Questions (which ap- peared after the present volume).
This is a remarkable study that lays bare broad themes, some still with us, in an exact and intellectually exciting manner.
ARNOLD KOSLOW
Clark Zumbach. The Transcendent Sci- ence: Kant's Conception of Biological Methodology. (Nijhoff International Philos- ophy Series, 15.) xii + 165 pp., index. The Hague/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nij- hoff, 1984. (Distributed in the U.S. by Kluwer Academic Publishers, Hingham, Mass.) DM 85; ?21.75.
Kant's Critique of Judgement is perhaps the least read of the philosopher's major works, yet it contains one of the boldest assertions in the history of biological thought: the claim that living organisms would never be fully explained in mechani- cal terms. "It is absurd," Kant wrote, "even to hope that another Newton may some day arise to make intelligible to us the genesis of even a blade of grass from natu- ral laws that no purpose has ordered" (Sec. 75). In 1868, however, Ernst Haeckel an- nounced that this impossible "Newton of the grassblade" had in fact appeared in the person of Charles Darwin, whose theory of evolution seemed to dispose of the problem of teleology once and for all. With few ex- ceptions, Haeckel's view has been shared by biologists and philosophers of science ever since.
Clark Zumbach's The Transcendent Sci- ence takes issue with this received view, arguing that Kant's biological philosophy has been largely misunderstood. Beginning with preliminary chapters on "teleologic phenomena" and "the Kantian endeavor," Zumbach proceeds to discuss Kant's views on purposiveness ("design in nature") and the role of mechanism ("the mechanism of nature") and concludes with a chapter on "the autonomy of biology." Throughout, he ably explains the intricacies of the argu- ment of the third Critique and persuasively
sets forth the case for Kant's teleological perspective on living nature.
One of the most salutary features of The Transcendent Science is Zumbach's con- cern to cut through common misconcep- tions of Kant's views on mechanism and teleology. Unlike many English scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, Kant did not believe that te- leological phenomena implied the existence of a supreme Designer, a hypothesis he rec- ognized to be incompatible with natural philosophy. Nor did his teleological per- spective imply any sympathy for vitalism, which he regarded as merely a variant of mechanism. Instead, Zumbach argues, Kant regarded the teleological principle as a "maxim of judgment" that expresses our understanding that certain things are alive. Kant's view has often been misunderstood to imply that teleology is an illusion pro- jected onto a mechanical nature by the human mind. Yet while Kant acknowl- edged the necessity of the mechanical per- spective in biology, he insisted that it was demonstrably unable to account for our recognition of living organisms as "epige- netic wholes." According to Zumbach, Kant's biological philosophy is a dialectical one that upholds the necessity of mecha- nism while guaranteeing the autonomy of biology in accordance with the teleological judgment.
Zumbach's book is not without serious flaws: it is often redundant, and the author has a disturbing tendency to belabor the obvious. The writing is often prolix and awkward and makes frequent use of collo- quialisms. Nonetheless, The Transcendent Science is to be commended for demon- strating the cogency and continuing rele- vance of Kant's biological philosophy.
NEIL M. RIBE
* Scientific Realism
Paul M. Churchland; Clifford A. Hooker (Editors). Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. With a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. viii + 352 pp., illus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. $45 (cloth); $18.95 (paper).
Within the last few years Bas van Fraas- sen has clearly emerged as the most influ- ential and provocative philosopher of science in America. Since his method of in-
sets forth the case for Kant's teleological perspective on living nature.
One of the most salutary features of The Transcendent Science is Zumbach's con- cern to cut through common misconcep- tions of Kant's views on mechanism and teleology. Unlike many English scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, Kant did not believe that te- leological phenomena implied the existence of a supreme Designer, a hypothesis he rec- ognized to be incompatible with natural philosophy. Nor did his teleological per- spective imply any sympathy for vitalism, which he regarded as merely a variant of mechanism. Instead, Zumbach argues, Kant regarded the teleological principle as a "maxim of judgment" that expresses our understanding that certain things are alive. Kant's view has often been misunderstood to imply that teleology is an illusion pro- jected onto a mechanical nature by the human mind. Yet while Kant acknowl- edged the necessity of the mechanical per- spective in biology, he insisted that it was demonstrably unable to account for our recognition of living organisms as "epige- netic wholes." According to Zumbach, Kant's biological philosophy is a dialectical one that upholds the necessity of mecha- nism while guaranteeing the autonomy of biology in accordance with the teleological judgment.
Zumbach's book is not without serious flaws: it is often redundant, and the author has a disturbing tendency to belabor the obvious. The writing is often prolix and awkward and makes frequent use of collo- quialisms. Nonetheless, The Transcendent Science is to be commended for demon- strating the cogency and continuing rele- vance of Kant's biological philosophy.
NEIL M. RIBE
* Scientific Realism
Paul M. Churchland; Clifford A. Hooker (Editors). Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. With a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. viii + 352 pp., illus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. $45 (cloth); $18.95 (paper).
Within the last few years Bas van Fraas- sen has clearly emerged as the most influ- ential and provocative philosopher of science in America. Since his method of in-
sets forth the case for Kant's teleological perspective on living nature.
One of the most salutary features of The Transcendent Science is Zumbach's con- cern to cut through common misconcep- tions of Kant's views on mechanism and teleology. Unlike many English scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, Kant did not believe that te- leological phenomena implied the existence of a supreme Designer, a hypothesis he rec- ognized to be incompatible with natural philosophy. Nor did his teleological per- spective imply any sympathy for vitalism, which he regarded as merely a variant of mechanism. Instead, Zumbach argues, Kant regarded the teleological principle as a "maxim of judgment" that expresses our understanding that certain things are alive. Kant's view has often been misunderstood to imply that teleology is an illusion pro- jected onto a mechanical nature by the human mind. Yet while Kant acknowl- edged the necessity of the mechanical per- spective in biology, he insisted that it was demonstrably unable to account for our recognition of living organisms as "epige- netic wholes." According to Zumbach, Kant's biological philosophy is a dialectical one that upholds the necessity of mecha- nism while guaranteeing the autonomy of biology in accordance with the teleological judgment.
Zumbach's book is not without serious flaws: it is often redundant, and the author has a disturbing tendency to belabor the obvious. The writing is often prolix and awkward and makes frequent use of collo- quialisms. Nonetheless, The Transcendent Science is to be commended for demon- strating the cogency and continuing rele- vance of Kant's biological philosophy.
NEIL M. RIBE
* Scientific Realism
Paul M. Churchland; Clifford A. Hooker (Editors). Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism. With a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen. viii + 352 pp., illus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. $45 (cloth); $18.95 (paper).
Within the last few years Bas van Fraas- sen has clearly emerged as the most influ- ential and provocative philosopher of science in America. Since his method of in-
116 116 116
This content downloaded from 62.122.79.23 on Fri, 9 May 2014 17:11:19 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
