Yolton Locke's Man

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Locke's ManAuthor(s): John W. YoltonSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 62, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), pp. 665-683Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654333

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L o c k e ' s M a n

John W. Yolton

Muchattentionhasbeenpaidto Locke's discussionof personal dentity,his

conceptof person,thedistinctionbetweenman andperson.In fact, in that dis-

cussion there arefourtermsorconcepts:man,self, person,andagent.Aroundthose termsanumberof themes,aspectsof Locke'sthought,areclustered, ome

moredirectlyrelatedto those terms,othersmoretangentialbutstill importantfor ourunderstanding f the thoughtof Locke. If possible, some sortingoutof

those fourtermscould be helpfulin reachinganappreciation f the natureand

functionof man nLocke's account.If we can determinewho theagentof action

is, findthe locusof agencyinacting,thesourceof thepower, hatnaturemaybe

explicated.Therearesome similaritiesbetweenthebody-mindrelationandthe

man-person elation, imilaritieswhichmayraise somequestionof materialism.

I think we can say thatLocke's man is not born a person, that the man canbecome aperson,developinto one. Theboy,thechild,growsintoa manthrough

education,acquiring henecessaryattributes f virtueandrationality.There s a

roughanalogbetweentheeducationof a childandtheemergenceof personhoodfrom a man.Also in Locke's discussion of manthere s a firmsuggestionof an

underlyingconstitution rom which theproperties ome as theircausalsource,

anintriguingparallelbetween the constitutionof manandthecorpusculartruc-

tureof body.I propose in this paperto explore these various topics, trustingthat the

natureof man,of a humanbeing in Locke's account,may become a little bitmore clear.Personhas perhapsreceived too much attention; t is man's turn

now.

1. Action andAgency

Man is a biological organism."Sameman"designates"aparticipation f

the samecontinuedLife, by constantlyfleeting particlesof Matter[biological

matter],n successionvitallyunited o the sameorganizedBody."'Wemightsay

1Essay, 2.27.6. See also ?8. References to the Essay concerning Human Understanding

are given in this form, the numbers referring to book, chapter, and/or section.

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Copyright2001 byJournal f theHistoryof Ideas.Inc.



John W. Yolton

manconsists of two materialities, orporealparticlesanda biologicalbody,but

Locke says elsewhere thatby the term"man"we mean"acorporeal,rational

Creature."2 he term"rational" learly adds a non-corporealproperty o the

corporeal,biological body.Since Lockecharacterized"person" s havingrea-

son, "rational" ddedto "man"ndicatesthat man andpersonarenotseparatedordistinct;samereference or "I"butdifferentcontributionso thecombination

of manandperson.Personaddssomething mportantoman:rationalitys added

tocorporeality.Theproperties f a person-intelligence, rationality, onscious-

ness-are not identified with or reducedto neurobiologicalpropertiesnor to

materialparticles.Severalquestionscan beraised:howdomanandpersonworktogether,how

does agency pertain o theman-person,what is the locus of agency?Tosay,"I

did it,"e.g., repaymentof a debt, is to say I performed hat actionin a certain

way,with armorhandsorby instructingmybanker, tc. Actionsrequireabody,aphysicalbody.As actor,I amboth a personanda man.Thus,I amtheagentof

my actions. We need to ask whether heagencypertains o the unitof manand

person,orare thereaspectsof agencyascribed o theman,othersascribed o the

person?Agency involves power,on Locke's account.If we consult the main

chapterof theEssay where Locke discusses agency andaction(2.21), we find

thatthe majorityof actions locate the power of acting and deciding with the

man.Onesection at leastlocates thatpowerwiththeperson:Libertybelongs"to

the Personhavingthe Powerof doing, or forbearing o do."3Severalsections

give the mind some powerrelevantto acting.Otherpassagesjust referto "theagent."Frequently eferences o man andagentoccurin thesamepassage.

Essay2.21.8 creditsthe manwiththepowerto thinkandto move, thinking

andmoving beingthetwocategoriesof action.A man s freewhenhe canmove

according o thepreferenceof his mind.Section 15characterizesibertyas "the

powera Manhas to do or forbeardoing any particularAction"(see also ??47,

52). Thenext section(?16) speaksof freedom,suggestingthat t canbe "attrib-

utedto thePower,that s in aMan,to produce,orforbearproducing heMotion

in partsof his Body,by choice or preference."Section 18 refersto "different

Powers n theMind,or in theMan,to do severalactions";andsection 19 assertsagainthat "it is the Man that does the Action."Thediscussionof freedomand

libertycites severalspecificactionsperformedby a man,e.g., walking,standing

still, falling from a precipice(?24), andfalling into the water(?9). Latersec-

tions ascribe o amanuneasiness,thespur o act.Manysectionsrefer o manas

free or constrained e.g., ??8, 9, 11, 12, 21-25, 28, 30, 34).

2Ibid., 3.11.16. Earlyin the Essay, Locke describes "the whole Man"as consisting of

"Mindas well asBody"

(2.1.11).3 Ibid., 2.21.10. Fora useful detailed discussionof this chapterof the Essay, see Gideon

Yaffe,LibertyWorthhe Name (Princeton,2000).

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Locke's Man

Somepassagesmix man andperson,as in 2.21.10: "Again,supposea Man

be carried,whilstfastasleep,into a Room,where s aPersonhe longs to see and

speak with." Is a sleeping man not a person?In 2.27.15 Locke speaksof the

personattheresurrection utgoes on to ask whether t wouldbe the sameman.

Section 22 of this same chapteropens with the question:"Butis not a ManDrunkand Soberthe same Person?"Manypassagesjust referto the agentof

action: he"Power n any Agentto do orforbearanyparticular ction" 2.21.8);

"anAgent capableof Volition" 2.21.13);"whateverAgenthasapowerto think

on its own actions"(2.21.15); "it is theAgent thathas power,or is able to"act

(2.21.19). This lastpassage,as I notedabove,has themandoingthe actionbut

thepowerbelongsto theagent.Is theagent,then,different romthe man?That

sectionactuallyoffersathree-folddistribution: But t is theMindthatoperates,andexerts thesePowers [of choosing andthinking]; t is theMan thatdoes the

Action [of singinganddancing], t is theAgentthathaspower,or is able todo"(2.21.19).4"Operating," exerting," nd"doing"areall powerterms,designat-

ing activecontributions o theresult.Inotherwords,(1) thepowerof themind

formspreferences,makes achoice, (2) the mandancesandsingsbecause(3) the

manas agentpossesses thepowerof acting.Threedifferentpowers: hoseof the

mind,theman,andtheagent.Agency-powermaybethesameasman-power. f

we canthinkof aninactiveman,a manforthemomentnotdoing anything, uch

a manat thatmoment wouldnot be anagent;although, f he was forbearing o

do,I guesshewouldbeanagent.Locke'sexampleof a manasleepwhilecarried

intoanother oomwould be anexampleof a manwho,atthat ime,wouldnotbeanagent.Thechange na manfrompassiveto activemarksachangefrombeinga mantobeinganagent(andperhapsaperson).Agencydependsupontheman:

he is anagentbecause he is a man.

The headingsin the tableof contentsfor sections 14-21 read"Libertybe-

longs not to the Will....But to theAgentor Man."The "or" n this last phrase

maybe ambiguous,meaningtheagent s theman,orthatthetwo differ.Earlier

chaptersrefer to the free agent (1.3.14) and to sensible or voluntaryagents

(2.20.14). Latersectionsin 2.21 havethe agentexercisingthepowerit (he)has

(??29, 72; see 2.27.29). The agent is free (?50) and has the libertyto act inconsequenceof thoughts(?71). Section 13 of 2.27 even has "consciousnessof

pastaction"annexedto an individualagent,and4.21.1 ascribesrationalityand

volition to agents,in his quick descriptionof ethics,"thatwhicha Manhimself

oughtto do, as a rationalandvoluntaryAgent."

4 This sectionbeginswith sayingsome actualthought"maybe theoccasionof Volition,of

exercisingthepowera Man has to chuse."The"choice of theMind[maybe] the causeof actual

thinkingon this orthat

thing."In a similar

way,"the actual

singingof sucha Tune,maybe the

occasion of dancingsuch a Dance,andthe actualdancingof sucha Dance[maybe] theoccasion

of such a Tune."

667



John W. Yolton

What hisbriefexamination f passagesaboutagencyreveals s howimpor-tantthe notion of powerwas for Locke. Both the physicaland social domains

arepervadedby powers,activepowers.5Godtoo is anagent,a wise andunder-

standingagentwith powers (4.3.28, 4.20.15). Wherethereis agency,thereis

power, hepowertoproducephysicalchanges nobjectsand n senseorgans, hepowerto move one's own limbs, to act in accordancewith one's preferences.The power or ability to act morally,to repaydebts, to tell the truth,to help

others, nvolves the mind as well as the body.Suchactionsinvolve intentions,

knowledge,a sense of responsibility, ndrespectfor others.Theknowledgerel-

evant to moralactions s theknowledgeof the laws of nature, hemoral aws on

whichsociety is foundedand which areto governouractions.

We can also say thatthesepassagesconfirm thatit is one "entity" hat has

the power,decides, andacts. Whetherwe speakof the man,the personor the

agent,thereference s the same. We cannotsay the referent s a substance,al-thoughperhapsthe physical body might count as a materialsubstance,even

thoughon Locke's account we have no knowledge of body as the traditional

substance.Certainly t is clear that"person"does not referto a substance,ma-

terialorimmaterial.E. J. Lowe hasrecently suggestedthatwe take thereferent

to be a psychological substance,meaning, I guess, thatwe are dealing with

propertiese.g.,rationality,ntention, onsciousness)whichbelongtosomething,to a consciousbeing.6But if thecore, as it were,of the man-person,of the unit

that is man,personandagent, is the humanbody with its biology andneuro-

physiology,thenmind andconsciousnessbecome propertiesof thatbody.Butthose propertiesdo not become physical (neural)properties.Man, a human,

startsout as anembryo,becomes an infant,an adultand anold man.Manalso

becomesaperson,whencertainconditionsaremet.

The term "person"requentlyhas a moral tone in Locke's accountof per-sonal identity,but it may be too strongto say thatis its only feature.It mighteven be possible to distinguish"self" from "person," he lattercarryingthe

moralconnotation, he formerreferring o self-identity.The agentof actionis

theman,theself. Actions arenot restrictedo moralactions,dancingorsinging,

fencingor talkingareactionsof the agentas muchas aretruth-telling,helping

5Fora summary tatementof thepervasiveroleof powersin the physicalworld,see 3.2.2

and3.2.3. Locke talks there of "natural ubstances."The bulkof the long chapteron power is

devoted to thepowerswe have as agents.6 E. J. Lowe, Subjectsof Experience(New York,1996), 32-35. MarcParmentierhas sug-

gested that the conceptof personis a new categoryfor Locke.The traditionaldoctrineof sub-

stance identified two kinds, material and immaterial.But humans, individualmen embodyboth material and immaterialproperties,extension andthought,so they do not fit into either

one of the traditionalcategories.Parmentier efers to "unelocalisationconcomitantedes es-

prits et des corps."Following his remark,we might suggest thatextension and thoughtare

propertiesof theperson,theperson,we might say,playsthe roleof substance MarcParmentier,Introductiona I'Essai sur l'entendementhumainde Locke [Paris, 1999], 183, see also 271,

273).

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Locke's Man

others,honoringparents.It is these latter,moralactions,that enableLocke to

give his moststriking chilling)exampleof apersonbecomingaman,orsinkingeven lower:thoseagentsin Locke's Two Treatisesof Governmentwho violate

the lawof nature,herebybecoming ike andcanbe treated s wildsavagebeasts.

The locus of actionin theircase was still withthemselves,perhapswe can saytheirselves, buttheydid notbehaveas persons.

2. SecularSelf, Moral Self

Is theresome textualbasis for a distinctionbetweenself andperson?Or is

"self"justanother erm,alongwith"man,""person," nd"agent,"orspecify-

ingandreferringothesubjectwhothinksandacts?There s a differenceof tone

atleastbetweenspeakingof "myself "and"myperson."Wemaybeself-confi-

dent,buthardlyperson-confident.We can be self-ishbutnotperson-ish.To sayI amconcerned ormy personsoundsrather ormal.Itwouldbemorenatural o

be concerned ormy self, even formy body(my arms, egs, fingers).Wemightask "whowas thepersonat thedoor,"although t is more natural o simplyask

"whowas at thedoor?"We wouldnot ask "Whowas the self atthe door?"

Are theselinguisticconventionsreflected nLocke'suse of"self " and"per-son"?Of these two terms,"self" seems to be the morebasic. If we surveythe

sectionsin 2.27, we find (A) a numberof sectionswhere consciousnessdeter-

mines the self. (B) There arealso two sections thatmix self andpersonin the

discussion.(C)Thereare several sectionsthatapplyto the self thetalkof beingconcerned. tis tempting o suggestthat he(A) sectionspresentwhatwe mightcall the "secular elf,"in oppositionto personas the"moralself."

2.1. On Being Self to Self. The first section in which this curiousphrase

appears s in 2.27.9, thedefinitionof "person" s a "thinkingntelligentBeing,thathas reasonandreflection,and canconsider t self as it self."Consciousness

is the meansforsuchconsideration. pecifically, nsensingandperceiving,"ev-

eryone is tohimself,thatwhich he callsself."Theidentityof thepersonrestson

the samenessof self: "And as far as this consciousnesscan be extendedback-

wardsto any pastAction orThought,so far reachesthe identityof thatPerson;it is the sameself now as it was then;and'tis by thesameself withthis one that

now reflectson it, thatthatActionwasdone."Lockeemploystheterm"Being"

as a way to avoid "substance."He also uses the phrase"thinking hing"in a

similarway.Thatthinkingthingis, he seems to say,a self; over time, via con-

sciousness, it is "thesame to it self." When consciousness is interruptedby

forgetfulness,we lose "sightof ourpastselves"(?10).The curiousphrase"per-

sonal self "occurs nsection 10.Same consciousnessovertime revealsthesame

personalself. The linkbetween consciousnessandself is explicitlystated nthe

Tableof Contents or2.27.17, "Selfdependson Consciousness,"and in section23, "Consciousnessalone makesself."

669



John W Yolton

Section 10endedwithhisremark hat hesameconsciousnessunites"those

distantActions intothe samePerson,whateverSubstancescontributedo their

Production." t is not same substance which accountsfor the person,but the

sameness of consciousness. Section 11 then offers evidence for thatremark.

"That his is so, we have some kindof Evidencein ourvery Bodies, all whoseParticles,whilst vitally united to this samethinkingconscious self, so that we

feel whenthey aretouch'dand areaffectedby,andconsciousof good or harm

thathappensto them, are a partof our selves: i.e. of our thinkingconscious

self" The referentof "this" n the first clause of this sentence is not entirelyclear.If thereference s to thefirst clause of the final sentenceof section 10,the

consciousness thatunites actions and constitutesthe personis said to depend

uponthebody.Thatdependencewould seemto showthat tis notconsciousness

alone thatmakes the person;at least not consciousness acting apart rom the

body.What s touchedandaffectedare,I think,theparticlesor moreprecisely,thepartsof ourbody.If the"this"atthebeginningof this sentencerefersto the

last clause of section 10, "whateverSubstancescontributed o theirProduc-

tion," s thebodyoffered as a "substance"which contributes o theproductionof action?We seem tohavehere anotherndicationof Locke'srecognitionof the

role of the body (of nervesandbrain),in sensing andperceiving.Section 25

confirmsthe relationbetween self andbody:"Thusany partof ourBodies vi-

tallyunited othat,which is consciousinus, makesa partof our selves."Corpo-realparticlesare"vitallyunited" o the thinkingconscious self. The natureof

thatvital union is left obscure.I take Locke to be saying simply that becausethere s a vital linkbetweenthoseparticlesandourbeingawareof beingtouched

and affected(afterour body partshave been affected),we recognize thatthe

bodyis ourbody,partof ourself. Thephrase,"consciousself "goes alongwith

"personal elf,"giving again priority o theself.

Section 13 raises the questionof why "one intellectual[i.e., immaterial]

Substancemay not have represented o it, as done by it self" some actions it

neverdid.Section 14 says againthat f ourconsciousnessfails to includesome

pastaction,an action nfact doneby others,we wouldnot be one self withthose

others.Section21 repeats hepointthat t is consciousness"alonewhich makeswhatwe call self."Section 23 insists that"self s notdeterminedby Identityor

Diversityof Substance," nly by identityof consciousness.Section24 speaksof

a "man'sself,"a phrasethat also occursin section25.7

2.2. Person and Self. We saw above that 2.27.9 includes in its accountof

what"person" tands or thefactthatthethinkingbeingcan"consider t self as

it self."Section17contains hatcuriousexampleof afingerbeingcut off: should

consciousness"goalongwiththe littlefinger,and eavetherestof theBody,'tis

7

See also 2.21.50 (playingthe fool can "drawShame and Misery upon a Man's self');3.3.9 (we can consider "aMan'sself'); and4.11.2 (we can only be certainof the existence of

God and of "aMan'sself'); cf. Locke, Some ThoughtsconcerningEducation, ?175.

670



evidentthe littleFingerwould be thePerson."Under hatcondition, heself then

"wouldhave nothingto do with the rest of the Body."Self andpersongo to-

gether.Section26 thenannounces hat"Person,as I takeit, is thenamefor this

self."The nextsentencereservesthe term"person"orthe use of others,a kind

of third-personuse: "Where-evera Manfinds, what he calls himself, thereIthinkanothermay say is the same Person."I am not sure what to make of

"person" eingthename for "self."Wehave to be carefulnot to maketoo much

of thispassingremark."Man"s also saidto be a name n severalotherpassages

(2.28.15; 2.32.25); 2.27.7 raises thepossibilitythatperson,man,and substance

are "threeNames standingfor threedifferentIdeas."Nevertheless, the term

personas thenameof the self does raiseseveralquestions.Is therea suggestionthat"person"s only a name,thatit does not markor standfor a sortor kind,

that t is not anontologicalcategory? ndistinguishingperson romman, s more

impliedthanthat"person"s only a name?If person s more thana name,whatcan we say aboutpersons?

While discussing trueand false ideas, Locke remarksthatwhen we ask

"what s it"of some"newThingof a kind" hatwe donotrecognize,we meanby

thatquestion"nothingbut the Name"(2.32.7).8If I ask,"what s it that s self to

it self,"the answer n termsof thispassagewouldbe "person," name.Butthat

name would apply,I takeit, to anyonewho is conscious of self, who is self to

self. Does thatgeneralapplication ndicatethat"person"designatesa class or

kind?If thesuggestionsof Lowe andParmentier retakenseriously, hatperson

(for Lowe) is a psychological substanceor (for Parmentier)person is a newcategoryreplacing,as I wouldsay, the traditional ubstancedoctrine, henper-son may after all be more basic than self. The problemfor bothDescartesand

Locke was howtocharacterize he unionof mind andbodyin man.Suchaunion

fell outside the usualtwo-substancedoctrine.The notionof anincompletesub-

stancemayhavebeen Descartes'sattempt o finda differentcategoryfor man.

Similarly,butperhaps or differentreasons(ourlack of any knowledgeabout

substance),Locke may have employed the term"person"as a substitutecat-

egory.

It has been the term"person"which framedthe debatesaroundLocke'sdiscussionfromhisdaytothepresent. n thatway, "person"s themorefamiliar

term,not self. Thetwo termshavealmostequaloccurrences n 2.27. Itmaynot

be too important o decide which of those termsis more basic, especially if

Locke ascribesmostof the sameproperties r features o both.Thereare several

definitionswhichmayhelpus decidewhether here s a distinctionbetweenself

andperson.

8 Cf. Some Thoughts,?120: "Whenany new thing comes in theirway, Childrenusually

ask,the commonQuestionof a Stranger:What s it?Whereby heyordinarilymean

nothingbut

the Name; and thereforeto tell them how it is call'd, is usually the properAnswer to that

Demand."

Locke's Man 671



John W. Yolton

Definition 1: "This being premised to find wherein personal Identity

consists, we mustconsider what Person standsfor;which, I think, s a

thinking ntelligentBeing, thathas reason andreflection,and cancon-

sider it self as it self, the same thinkingthing in differenttimes and

places;whichit does only by thatconsciousness,which is inseparablefromthinking,andas it seems to me essentialto it...."(2.27.9)

No moralovertoneshere, ustthespecificationof intelligence,reason,reflection

andtheconsideringof selfby self. The formation f, ortherealizationbythe self

of its self, is what aperson s on this definition.Theseconddefinitionof personis themore familiar.

Definition2: "Itis a ForensickTermappropriatingActions andtheir

Merit;and so belongs only to intelligent Agentscapableof a Law andHappinessandMisery.Thispersonalityextendsit self beyond presentExistenceto whatis past,only by consciousness,wherebyit becomes

concernedandaccountable,owns and mputes o itself pastActions...."

(2.27.26)

Thedifferencebetweenthesetwo definitionsmightbe characterized s the

differencebetween a cognitiveconsciousnessandanaffectiveoreven a moral

consciousness.9The intelligentbeing of definitionI considershimself to be a

self, not aperson. Consciousness constitutesa self, butin so doing, a personisalso formed.The seconddefinitionrefersto the ascription self-ascription?)of

responsibility orthe actions of thatself. So we cansaythat"person" ames the

self of both definitions. That name embracesboth a secularanda moral self.

The newcategorysuggestedby Parmentierhusplaysa substantiveor(better)a

subjectrole. Inthatway "person"wouldbe themore fundamentalerm.

2.3. Self-Concern.The linkbetweenself intheseconddefinitionandperson

becomes moreexplicitinseveralsectionswheretheimportantanguageof "con-

cern" s appliedto the self. The term"concern"plays a centralrole in the ac-

count of personas a moralagent." So self andperson nthesepassagesbecomeclosely connected,perhapseven interchangeable.Writing n the first person,

9 See Parmentier, 83. This way of characterizinghe differencein consciousness is sug-

gested to me by a remarkParmentiermakes late in his book:"Pourdefinirun sujectmoralla

consciousness ne doit cependantpas etre seulementune conscience cognitive mais ouvrirun

champd' 'interessement'(concernment)."10The role of concernin his accountof personal dentityis announcedas earlyas 2.1.11:

"For if we take wholly away all Consciousnessof our Actions and Sensations,especially of

PleasureandPain,and theconcernment hataccompanies t, it will be hard o know whereinto

place personalidentity."The same section speaksseveraltimes of concernfor

"Happiness,or

Misery"when dealing with the question of whetherthe waking Socrates is the same as the

sleeping Socrates.See also 2.1.12.

672



Locke's Man

Locke says that "Had I the same consciousness, that I saw the Ark and Noah's

Flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last Winter, or as that I write

now, I could no more doubt that I, that write this now, that saw the Thames

overflow'd last Winter, and that view'd the Flood at the general Deluge, was the

same self, place that self in what Substance you please, than that I that writethis am the same my self now whilst I write" (? 16). He goes on to stress the fact

that "as to this point of being the same self it matters not whether this present

self be made up of the same or other Substances, I being as much concern'd, and

asjustly accountable for any Action was done a thousand Years since, appropri-

ated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am that I did the last moment."

Section 17 is even more forthright in employing the affective language for the

self. It captures all of the properties that characterize the person: consciousness

"makes the same Person," thereby constituting what he calls the "inseparable

Self"; the person attributes its actions to "it Self, and owns all the Actions."Section 25 reiterates the concern for self: "This every intelligent Being, sensible

of Happiness or Misery, must grant that there is something that is himself, that

he is concerned for, and would have happy...." Section 26 picks up this associa-

tion of happiness and misery with the self and applies it to the person.

3. Physical Man, Rational Man, Moral Man

My suggested thesis that the term "self" designates a "secular self," as

opposed to or distinguished from "person" as a moral self, does not have anysystematic supportfrom Locke's usage in these passages, but the two definitions

of "person" do establish a dual function for consciousness: a cognitive and a

moral or affective constituting of self and person. The cognitive constituting is a

necessary condition for the moral or affective self or person. We may have a

choice between speaking of two aspects of self or treating these aspects as self

and person. In the first choice, personal identity spans both aspects, so we could

distinguish a secular from a moral self. In the alternative, the term "person"

identifies the moral, affective aspect. On this alternative we can cite two features

of the self that are different from person. (1) The self and the body, even body

parts, have a clear attachment." (2) The self also seems to be more basic than

person in a temporal sense: the person grows out of the self, the self can be called

a person (its name is "person") when certain conditions are met in character-

" Locke expresses this attachment n several ways. We saw above that in 2.27.11, he

speaksof theparticlesof thebody being"vitallyunited"with the"thinking onsciousself."We

also saw that in 2.27.25, he speaksof "any partof our Bodies vitally unitedto thatwhich is

consciousin us." Suchbody partsarethereby"apartof ourselves."In2.27.27, he tells us that

we areignorantof the "nature f thatthinkingthingin us"whichwe taketo be ourselves. He

goes on to say our lack of knowledge aboutthe self includes not knowing if it is "tied to asystem of animalspirits."So the self is the thinkingthing, the body and its partsareunitedto

the self, andthe self is tied to the physiology.The relation of "tiedto" is left unexplained.

673



formation.When a self earnsthe name of "person,"hatis a markof its moral

maturity.Whenwe ask how we shouldunderstandLocke'sdistinctionbetween

manandperson,I suggest we can say "person"s to be takenas adding,or at

least as stressing,the forensic, law-abidingfeaturesto the self, creatingwhat

Lockecalls "moralman,"a self concernedforhappinessandvirtue n this lifeandultimatelysalvation n thenext (3.11.16).12

Locke'sdiscussionof action andthe variouspowersinvolvedindicates hat

someactionsaremoralactions,othersarevariousphysicalactions.Whatmakes

any actionmyactionis the consciousnessI have of doing those things.In this

way,whether t be anactof singingordancing,of walkingby theThameswhen

it was frozen,of experimentingwith differenthandsin water,choppingan al-

mond,or whether t is actionssuchasrepayingadebt,honoringparents,helping

others,consciousness formsa self or a person.My attempt o saythefirstgroup

of actionsbelongs to the self while the second belongs to the persondoes notquitefit thetexts,although hereareonly a few passagesthatspeakof the self in

those forensictones usuallyreservedfor person.Keepingin mind the 3.11.16

passagejust cited, we may have some basis for speakingof a continuum rom

man n aphysicalsense,to manas rational perhaps heself ), to moralman(the

person).Each temalongthis linepossesses physicalpowers,powersof thinkingandacting,andmoralpowers.Themature ndividual, heunit of man, self, and

person, s the locusof all thesepowers. Agency is located nthisunit,the manas

agentof thoughtandaction is bothself andperson.

4. Definitionsof Man

Inlocatingthesourceof agencyin the unitof man, self, andperson,Locke

takesaccountof theroleof man(especiallyphysicalman)andperson n action.

Bodily motion andconscious intentionsare oint components n all humanac-

tion.His reference o theparticlesof matterandbody-partsbeingvitallyunited

with, even partsof, the conscious self is an emphaticrecognitionof the dual

involvementof bodyand mind in action.Locke does notgive us anydetailson

how thephysiology of thebody,the systemof animalspirits, s tiedto the self,but he makes use of the physiology in explainingsome sensoryexperiences.Mostoften,he confesses ignoranceof theway in whichsensation s causedby

physicaleventsoutsideand nside thebody.Butheassignsthatvitalunionwhich

particlesof matterhave with the self also to thebody:"theIdentityof thesame

Man consists ... in nothingbut a participation f the same continuedLife, by

constantly leetingParticlesof Matter, n successionvitally unitedto the same

organizedBody"(2.27.6; cf. 2.27.8). Thevitalunionof materialparticleswith

12

See 3.11.16: "Andtherefore,whethera Child or Changelingbea Man in a

physicalSense, may amongstthe Naturalistsbe as disputableas it will, it concernsnot at all the moral

Man, as I may call him...."

674 John W.Yolton



the body is presumably of a different sort from the vital union of those particles

with the conscious self. "Union" and "partof " are left unanalyzed.

In the 2.27.8 passage Locke identifies the 2.27.6 remark as a definition,

adding that "the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our Mouths is

the Sign, is nothing but of an Animal of such a certainForm [i.e., shape]"(2.27.8).When he says that "ingenuous observation puts it past doubt" that the word

"man" is a sign of animal with a specific shape, he seems to be reporting on

common usage among his contemporaries.'3Definition for Locke was not a mat-

ter of giving the genus and differentia. Rather,it is the enumeration of the simple

ideas comprising some complex idea (3.3.10). This is, he thought, the best way

to make "anotherunderstand by Words. what Idea the term defined stands for."

In the example from 2.27.8 the idea of man contains the ideas of animal and a

specific shape. He cites other definitions in 3.3.10, but there is no indication as

to whether he accepts either of them. Notice the way he starts the first definition:

Definition 1: "if it should be said, that Man was a solid extended Sub-

stance, having Life, Sense, spontaneous Motion, and the Faculty of

Reasoning," the meaning of that word would be understood.

Definition 2: Man is "a rational Animal; which by the several defini-

tions of Animal, Vivens, and Corpus, resolves it self into those enumer-

ated Ideas."

He repeats definition 1 in 3.6.3 with some variation: "Forthough, perhaps, vol-

untary Motion, with Sense and Reason, join'd to a Body of a certain shape, be

the complex Idea, to which I, and others, annex the name Man." The "perhaps"

leaves it open as to Locke's acceptance of this definition. In that passage, he is

concerned to deny that that definition would be, or would give us, the real es-

sence of man. It would only be the nominal essence.4 The same point about

essence is made in 3.11.16, where he cites anotherdefinition of man, one related

to morality: "when we say that Man is subject to Law: We mean nothing by

Man, but a corporeal rational Creature." With this definition in the context ofmoral discourse shape is irrelevant: "For were there a Monkey, or any other

Creature to be found, that had Reason, to such a degree, as to be able to under-

stand general Signs, and to deduce Consequences about general Ideas, he would

no doubt be subject to Law." Section 20 of this same chapter says that if shape

is taken as the mark for "Creatures of our kind," then the definition of man (of

the same man) as an idea "made up of Animalitn and Rationality, united in the

'3 In the seventeenthcentury"ingenuous"was often confused with "ingenious" Oxford

EnglishDictionary);Locke must mean the latter,hence "skillful"or "careful"observationof

wordusage.14Cf. 3.11.20 and 3.6.21, 22.

Locke's Man 675



sameSubject"wouldnot serveas well as does thedefinition n termsof shapefor the class or kind "man."So perhapsdifferentdefinitionsarerequired or

differentpurposesandfunctions.15

5. TheFundamentalConstitutionof Man

Kinds, sorts,or classes, as far as ourknowledgeextends,referonly to our

generalabstractdeas."Essential" nlyrelates othe ideaswe form.WhenLocke

says in 3.6.4, "'Tisnecessaryfor me to be as I am;GODandNaturehas made

me so,"hegoes on to say,"there s nothingIhave,is essentialto me."This latter

clause can be interpretedntwo ways:(a)essentialrelatesonly toclasses, not to

individuals,or (b) none of my propertiesrevealthe realessence of man. Since

the example here is of a particularndividual,the first interpretation pplies.

Thepropertiesof anyindividualmancould revealsomeof thepropertiesof theclass of men,butas thesecondinterpretationemindsus, Lockedidnot believe

ourknowledgereachesto realessences.Therealessenceof bodiesorof man, f

there are suchessences, do not show upin our observations or we cannotsay

theydo).WhetherLockethought herewere realkinds n naturemaybe unclear

fromhis extendeddiscussionof essence,but it does seemthathe entertainedhe

possibilityof therebeingan internal tructure f physicalbodiesfromwhichwe

could have a deductivescienceof nature.16Perhaps hecorpuscular tructure f

mattermay have been what he had in mind. His extendedexposition of this

notionof anapriorideductivescienceof nature ervesto contrast twithexperi-mental and observational cience, theonly science opento man'sfaculties and

knowledge.Theimportant uestion s did Lockebelievetherewererealessences

in natureand realnecessaryconnections?He certainlyrejectedthe traditional

notionof realessence,butacase canbe madeforsayinghe accepted hecorpus-

culartheoryas a replacement orthetraditionalheory.He didcharacterizehe

corpuscular heoryas the mostprobable, o he left theway openforsome other

candidate o fill therole of the sourceof theobservedpropertiesof body.'7But

his acceptanceof a foundationalstructureof matterwhich is responsiblefor

properties hatwe discoverby experienceand observationseems clear,eventhoughsucha structurewas beyondourexperience.

15 Essay 4.3.23 characterizesman as an "inconsiderable,mean, and impotentCreature,"

one of the lowest of all "IntellectualBeings"on the scale of Being.16 See, e.g., Essay 2.31.6,11; 2.32.24; 3.6.3; 4.3.16; 4.3.29; 4.6.11.

17 Essay, 4.3.16: "thecorpuscularianHypothesis... is thoughtto go farthest n an intelli-

gible Explicationof the Qualitiesof Bodies" (Essay, 4.3.16), and "theWeaknessof humane

Understanding s scarce able to substituteanother,which will afford us a fuller and clearer

discoveryof the necessaryConnexions,and Co-existence,of the Powers,which are to be ob-

served unitedin severalsorts of them."In SomeThoughtsconcerningEducation,?193, Locke

suggeststhat naturalphilosophyshould be studiedfor the

hypothesesadvanced,rather han"to

understand he Terms and Ways of Talkingof the several sects," adding that "the Modern

Corpuscularians alk, in most Things, more intelligiblythanthe Peripateticks."

676 John W. Yolton



Locke's Man

What is fascinatingabouthis discussion of man is his ratherclear albeit

brief statementof such a structure or man, notjust for man'sbody.Real es-

sence in man,he says, would be the "Sourceof all thoseOperations,whichare

to be found in anyIndividualof that Sort....The foundationof all thoseQuali-

ties,which are heIngredients f ourcomplexldea" 3.6.3).Presumably, source"means"cause."Whatthe operationsare which are causedby the sourceis not

clear. The operationshe refersto maybe some of thepowersmentioned n the

nextpassage.The"qualities" re,I assume, hosereferredo in thedefinitionsof

man: solid substance, ife, sensation,andreasoning.The sourceor foundation

would be quitedifferent romthe qualitiesandoperationswe experienceand

observe.

Locke thenturnsto the knowledgewe wouldhave, were realessence (the

source)available o us. Ourknowledgeof manwould be of thekindthatAngels

orGod have:"Andhadwe sucha Knowledgeof thatConstitutionofMan,fromwhich the Facultiesof Moving, Sensation,and Reasoning,andother Powers

flow; andon whichhis so regular hapedepends .. we shouldhaveaquiteother

Idea of his Essence, than what now is contained n ourDefinitionof thatSpe-

cies, be it what it will" (3.6.3). Real essence would replacenominalessence,

certainknowledge would replace experienceandobservation.We learnfrom

this remark hatthe source also causesthe facultiesandpowerswe have,facul-

ties of moving,sensing,andreasoning.Suchknowledgewouldchangeour dea

of man,even the idea of a particular,ndividualman"wouldbe as far different

fromwhat it now is, as is his, who knows all theSpringsandWheels,andothercontrivanceswithin,of thefamous Clock atStrasbourg, romthatwhich a gaz-

ing Country-manhas of it, who barelysees the motionof the Hand,andhears

theClock strike,andobservesonly some of the outwardappearances"cf. Es-

say 3.6.9). Weonly have the appearances o workwith, our idea of man,of a

humanbeing, is only based on ourexperienceoron ouraccepteddefinitions.

Thesepassagesseem to be in Locke's own voice. Wecannotsay withcer-

taintywhat he mayhaveimagined he constitutionof manto be, butit wouldbe

difficult for it not to be physicalor biological, perhapsboth.18Locke seems to

have taken he notion of properties"flowingfrom"ahidden, heoreticsourceas"deducible from" such a source;at least, he stressedthis featurein orderto

highlighthis insistenceon anexperimental cience.But"flowfrom"also marks

a causalrelation.If we keep in mindhis clear ascriptionof a "vital union"of

particlesof matterwith bothbody andself, it looks as if he may have had in

18 Today,we would say thatthe knowledgeof the humangenome would yield a detailed

knowledgeof the sources and causes of manyfeaturesof humans.An articlein TheNew York

Times for 11 February2001 about the humangenome projectspeaksof "theset of DNA-en-

coded instructions hatspecify a person."WithLocke's distinctionbetween man andperson,

perhapswe should

saythe DNA instructions

pecifya man.Such

knowledgederivedfromthat

biologicalsourcemaybe thesort of knowledgeLockewas suggesting,althoughhardlya deduc-

tive knowledge.

677



John W Yolton

mindthecorpuscular tructure f matteras the constitution orbodyand man,

even formoralman. He doesnotidentifythecorpuscular tructure s the source

of intelligenceorreason,but thattheorydoes assigna causalrole to corpusclesfor sensationand the origin of ideas, perhapsalso for the shape of physical

objects.He doesnot mentionanyotherfundamental tructureorthepropertiesof man.Thus,theconstitutionof man, self, andpersonmaybe the sameas the

constitutionof man'sbody.Thentheproblem s toexplainthecausal"flowingfrom"relation or thepsychologicalor mentalpropertiesof moralman,self or

person.Locke does notofferanyexplanationor illustration.'9

5.1. TheConstitutionof Children.The "flow from"metaphoralso occurs

in a differentcontext whenLockediscusses the importanceof forminga goodcharacter n children.There,he refersto "Actions,whichnaturally low from a

well-formedMind."20hatsame treatisecontainsmanyreferences o theconsti-

tutionof children,of theirbodies and theirminds.2'This useof "constitution"sclearlydifferent romthatterm n theEssaypassagesabouta deductivescience

of nature.There s aninterestingproblem,perhapsatension,betweenthese two

uses of the notionof a constitution rom which specific properties low. If we

identify the references to an underlyingconstitution n the Essay as the real

essence constitutionandthe SomeThoughtsconstitutionas the constitutionof

character,one difference s thatthe lattercanbe formedandinfluencedby the

guidanceof parentsand tutor.The role of education s in largepartto builda

goodcharacter,oprovide orsuchqualitiesascivility,modesty,andmanyother

virtues.Theformingof agoodcharacter as to recognizesome "nativePropen-sities,"some"tempers rtraits" uch as "FierceorMild,BoldorBashful,Com-

passionateorCruel,OpenorReserv'd.""Whether hesenativepropensitiesare

causedby some feature of the real essence constitution,on the basis of what

LockewritesinSomeThoughtswe cannotsay.Therearea few nativepropensi-ties cited in the Essay, "Principlesof Action ... lodged in Men's Appetites"

(1.3.13), "tendenciesmprinted n theMinds of Men," endencieswhich"from

the very first instances of Sense andPerception .. aregrateful,andothersun-

welcome; some thingsthatthey inclineto, andothersthattheyfly" (1.3.3). He

does notsuggestthatthese tendenciesor traits"flowfrom" heunderlyingcon-stitutionof man.There s not,of course,a detailedorclearlydeveloped heoryof

19When he discusses the chain of being, Locke appliesthe notionof internalconstitution

to other memberson thechain. He raises thequestionof whether he "internalConstitutionand

Frame"of the various creatureson the scale or chain are specifically different,different in

kind,remarkinghat it is impossibleforus to say (3.6.22). But he does say "we haveReasonto

think,that where the Faculties,or outwardFrameso muchdiffers,the internalConstitution s

notexactlythe same." So thenotionof an internalconstitutionof thebeingsorcreatureson the

scale is clearly entertained.20

See, e.g., Some ThoughtsconcerningEducation.?66.21 Ibid., ??101, 102, 122, 126.22Ibid., ?102.

678



Locke's Man

whatfeaturesof man do flow from,arecausedby the realessence constitution.

Nevertheless,we canfill in somedetailsof a generalconceptof man,of a human

being.We knowfrom theearlybooks of theEssaythat hephysicalorganism, ven

pre-natally, xperiencessome sensationsof warmthandlight;after birthspe-cific ideas aregraduallyacquired.Thereare no nativeor innate ruthsbut,as we

just saw, thereis a practical nnateprincipleor tendencyto seek pleasureand

avoidpain.Wecanalso saythatdespiteLocke'suse of thewhitesheetorblank

tabletmetaphor, he organismhas a numberof faculties,at least the necessary

equipmentfor the functions of sensation, memory and reason. From Some

Thoughtswe learnthatthe child has, is bornwith, certaintraitswhich parentsand thetutormustacknowledgeand work within leadingthechild to becomea

rational,moralperson.Then from the brief passage in Essay 3.6.3, we know

thatLocke at least entertained he notionof an underlyingstructureprobablycorpuscular)whichcauses some of thesequalitiesor traitsof man.

5.2. RationalCreatures.Besides themanyvirtuescitedby Locke as impor-tantfor the child to acquire,rationality s perhapsof even greater mportance.After his detailedrecommendationson how to develop a strongand healthy

body, "Thenext and principleBusiness is, to set the Mind right, that on all

occasions it maybe disposedto consentto nothingbutwhatmaybe suitable o

theDignityandExcellencyof a rationalCreature."23ockeremarks,we all do

wantto be "thoughtRationalCreatures."24o we must treatchildrenas rational

creatures n order thatthey will come to see the value of rationality.' Lockeexplainsthattreatingchildren hatway involves makingthem"sensibleby the

Mildnessof yourCarriage, ndtheComposure ven inyourCorrection f them,

thatwhatyoudo is reasonablenyou,and usefulandnecessary orthem."26 he

faculty of reason,the operationof reasoning,andbeing rationalall appear n

Locke's definitionsof man andperson.Whetherwe believe physicalmanforLocke includesrationality thechild

has tobecomerational),or whetherwe thinkLockelimitedrationalityo the self

or person, what "flows from" the foundationof man, the innerconstitution,

includes thatproperty.Withthe distinctionhe suggestsin one passagebetweenphysical andmoralman,shape maybe thedefiningfeatureof theformer,ratio-

nality and otherpropertiescharacterize he latter.Whateverpropertiesare in-

cluded nthe definitionof manareonlythose we decideto includeor thatwe find

23Ibid., ?3124 Ibid., ?41. In the first edition of the Essay, Locke refersto "the Idea of ourselves,as

understanding, ationalCreatures"4.3.18); subsequenteditions replaced"rationalCreatures"

with "rationalBeings." Costes's Frenchtranslation,from a lateredition, preservesthe first

editionphrase:"l'id6e de Nous-memes comme le Creature ntelligent& Raissonnable."25

Ibid., ?81.26 Ibid.Civilized nations,Locke says laterin this work,are"groundeduponPrinciplesof

Reason"(?186).

679



John W Yolton

atwork n our anguage.None of thesegoes beyondwhat s discoveredby expe-rience andobservation,but all of thesewould havesome relation o theconstitu-

tion of man. Withphysicalbodies, bothprimaryandsecondaryqualitieshave

some relationto the corpuscular tructure,but the perceiveror observerplays

some role as well in theirappearance.There s no suchdistinctionof qualities nLocke's account of man, unless we take the physical man as "primary" nd

rational,moralmanas "secondary" r derivative.The "flowfrom"relationap-

plies to thepropertiesof both theprimaryandsecondaryman.The basicunitis

physicalman.Itis clearthat hepropertiesof thepersonandmoralmanare also

contributionsby the man himself, so theremay be a double causality in the

origin of person-qualities.Theremay be some questionaboutthe strengthof

Locke's acceptanceof the notion of a constitutionon which all propertiesde-

pend.Still, thoseremarks n Essay 3.6.3 are ratherunambiguous, f lackingin

detail.Lockedoes notprovideuswith evena hintabout hepossibleconstitutionof man, if indeed it differs from the constitutionof bodies. But it does seem

reasonablefor us to suggest that the constitutionof the propertiesof rational

man(thesecondary enseof "man")wouldconsistof theparticlesof the matter

of the physicalbody and,perhaps, he workingsof the biological mechanism.

Howto fit intosuch anotionthe role of theman n theconstitutionof theperson,is notclear,butI thinkwe findinLocke'sSomeThoughtsheways in which the

childacquires,under hecare of parentsandtheguidanceof thetutor, hequali-ties of a rationalperson.

5.3. Definitionand Theory.Whatwe includein ourideas of physical ob-jects, e.g., iron, gold, lead, is constrainedby the qualitieswe find coexisting

together nthoseobjects.Ourmoral deas,whatLockecalls "mixedmodes,"are

less tied to whatwe discover in humanaction,althoughthose ideas arefairlyfixedby thesocietywe areborn nto andbythelanguageof thatsociety. Strictly,to use Locke's terminologymixed-modeideas arearchetypes, hey determine

whatcountsasparricide, evenge, voting,bidding.Wheredoes the definitionof

manbelong,to mixedmodes orto physicalobjects?It seems morelike a mixed

mode:dependinguponourinterest,manis definedin termsof shape(physical

man)orin termsof rationality moralman).Life, sense, andperhaps olid sub-stancemaybe included n the definitionof physicalman;rationality,oncern or

happinessandmisery,acceptanceof responsibility or one's actionscharacter-

ize moralman,orperhaps he self orperson.The reference to the constitutionof man from which all those properties

flow complicatesthequestionof the definitionof man ust a bit.Thesimilarity

withphysicalsubstances,a fundamental onstitutiondetermining he observed

qualities, might suggest thatdefining man is similarto defining gold or iron:

make carefulobservationsof thequalitiesandcharacteristicshatwe find coex-

istingtogether.Whatwe include in our definitionof gold dependsuponouruseandinterestin thatmaterial,but whateverqualitieswe select must in fact be

680



foundto go together.Whatwe meanby "gold"cannot ncludepropertieswhich

experienceandexperiment annot ind.Experience nlargesourknowledgeand

understandingf gold orof anyothernatural ubstance. ndefiningmantoo we

cannotimputeproperties hatthose we taketo be humanbeings do not have.

Withphysicalman,we referto thebodyandits innerworkings; hatman s likeanyotheranimalorbiologicalcreature: norganization f partswith a common

life (Essay 3.6.5). A specific shapewith sense organsarealso foundin animals

and nmanby experienceandobservation.Wedo notnormally hinkof humans

as afunctioningbiologicalbody,althoughof coursewe recognizethat heyhave

such a body,a body necessaryfor action.As an anthropologistor sociologist,we can observepeoplein society, notingbehavior, peech,accomplishments.To

impute raits o thosewe observewhich cannotbe found sjustas improper s it

is to ascribeproperties o materialbodies thatwe do not find.Defining manin

Locke's projectis not, I think,an anthropological ask. It is more a matterofunpacking he term"man"as used in the languageandpracticesof society.At

the sametime, this enumerationof the ideas contained n the complex idea of

man is joined with the theoryof a foundationor constitution or the observed

features.Thattheoryis not partof the idea of man, it is a featureof Locke's

accountwhichis addedto theenumeration.

6. Man as Proprietor

Inwritingaboutman,person,andself, Lockewas notonly offeringdefini-tions based on the currentuses of those termsin his society. He also reveals

some of his beliefs aboutman.The reference o a constitution romwhichflows

all the observedfeatures andqualitiesof a manor person,is one such belief.

Otherbeliefs (perhaps hey may be stipulativedefinitions)areprovided n his

discussionof personal dentity,e.g., "person"s a forensicterm, t is the nameof

the self. There is anotherbelief aboutman and personheld by Locke which

reveals thespecialrelationhe wantsto establishbetweenthosetwo:"everyMan

has aProperty in his own Person."'7 This curious notion of owning one's person

receives a moreinterestingexpression n a latersectionof TwoTreatises:"Man(by beingMasterof himself andProprietorof his ownPerson,andtheActions

or Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Plpertl" (?44).

The term "himself"refers to the man,the little word"it"refersto the person.

The man is the ownerof his person,thepersonactsandlabors.As theownerof

his person,the man(all men) in the stateof naturehave the freedom"to order

theirActions,anddisposeof theirPossessions andPersonas theythinkfit,"so

long as they do so "withinthe bounds of the Law of Nature" ?4). Section 6

27TwoTreatises,II, ?27. Cf. section 173:"by PropertyI must be understoodhere, as in

otherplaces, to mean thatPropertywhich Men have in theirPersonas well as Goods."

Locke's Man 681



John W Yolton

pointsout that hedisposalof hispersondoes notincludesuicide,theproprietor-

shipof his person s qualifiedby thelaw of natureandthe banon takinghis own

life. The term"proprietor"s definedin theOxfordEnglishDictionaryas,"One

whoholdssomethingas property; ne who hasthe exclusive rightor title to the

use ordisposalof a thing,"citing examplesfrom 1639and 1645.28The term "proprietor"s frequentlyfound in a political context, as "the

LordsProprietors f Carolina" n the FundamentalConstitutionsof Carolina

(1669),withwhichLocke wasassociated.Thetermoccursfrequentlyn Locke's

critiqueof RobertFilmer, n the first of Locke's Two Treatises e.g., ??16, 23,

39, 74, 92). Essay 2.12.5 explainsthe complex idea of theftas "theconcealed

changeof the possession of any thing,withoutthe consentof the Proprietor."Section 120 of the second of TwoTreatisesexplainsthatwhen a manincorpo-rateshimself "intoany Commonwealth,he, by his unitinghimself thereunto,

annexedalso, andsubmitsto theCommunity hosePossessions, whichhe has,orshallacquire."Man in thispassageis describedas theproprietor f his land,

his landandpossessions come underthejurisdictionof the governmentof the

community. nunitingwith thecommonwealth,hemanalso"uniteshisPerson"

to thecommunity.Theman'spossessions, lands andpersonbecome"subject o

theGovernment ndDominion of thatCommonwealth."

Lockedoes notsayin thepassage nsection44 thatacondition orbeingthe

proprietorof his personis being masterof himself, but thereseems to be an

implicit inkbetweenmasteryandproprietorshipf man'sperson.Tobe master

of one's self is to havereasonas thecontrolof one'sdesiresandpassions: hat sin partwhat it is to be a rationalcreature.Toearntherightto own one's person,

Locke may be suggesting, I must become a rationalcreature.Perhapsbeingrational s beinga person.Locke'sSomeThoughts s amanual,a setof instruc-

tions forparentsandtutorto follow in moldingthechild into a rational,moral

person,wheremasteryof one's self is thegoal. Locke's Conductof the Under-

standingalso speaksof mastery,of theimportance f gettingmasteryoverone's

understanding ndof one's thoughts.29Whathe says in Some Thoughtsabout

the mind of the child thatis "in tune,and well-disposed" o learning, applies

equally to the child. The goal is "to teach the Mind to get the Masteryoveritself" (?75). Learning o gain"aMasteryoverhis [thechild's] inclinations"s

also one of the tasksassignedto the tutor(?45).

GeneralConclusion

Locke'sworkoneducation llustrateshisdevelopmental onceptof man,of

humans.We arein thefirst instancea material,corporeal,biologicalorganism,

28

In his Dictionary,Samuel Johnsongives the definitionas "apossessorin his own right"andthen cites the section 44 passagefrom Locke.

29See Conduct, ?43.

682



the matterof which is composed of corpuscularparticles.The differencebe-

tween this matterand thatof substancessuch as gold or lead is that life and

sense have been added.Locke expressesthis differenceby sayingparticlesof

matterare"vitally"unitedto ourbody.Hedoes not offerany explicationof that

vital union,norof what makes for the difference between vital andnon-vitalunion.But he does make it clearthat the vital unionof particlesof matteralso

includes the self, wherethe self represents he non-corporeal spectof the live

organism.Thedualityof thisvital unionof particles,withthebodyand with the

self, indicatesLocke'srecognitionof thetightrelationbetweenmind andbody.The treatiseoneducationalsoreveals Locke'sfirmconviction n theimpor-

tanceof buildingspecificcharacterraits ntothecombinationof live matterand

mind.But he stresses in thatwork,as we have seen, thatthe child is bornwith

certain empersortraits.Thosenativepropensitiesare oinedby a general ncli-

nationto seek whatgratifiesandavoidwhat is distasteful.Besidesthese inbornfeatures,we arebornwithspecificfacultieswhichareimportantorlaterdevel-

opment.Thatcurioussuggestionof a constitutionof manfromwhich certain

operationsandqualities"flow"addsa furthernativesourceforman.Withthese

variousfeatures,man has a potentialfor growth,a potentialwhich education

(familyandsociety) reinforces,andwhichtherecognitionof a life to come, of

resurrection ndimmortality,makesurgent.What s importantor immortality

is not for Locke a soul; it is theperson,therational,moral,thinkingbeing that

eachof us owns. Wemust actin thispresentworld,theactsthatcountarethose

thatdefine andcharacterize he person,moral acts directedby reasonandthelaws of nature,God's laws.

So of those fourtermswithwhich thisdiscussionbegan-man, self, person,

agent-man turnsout to be the central,basic, andmost important,man who is

self to his self, theagentof action andtheproprietor f his person.3?

RutgersUniversity.

30 have not in this paperbroughtinto the accountof Locke's man the ontologicaland

theologicaldimensions,a most

important spectof man forLocke. Manis the

workmanshipf

God,one amongmanyother creatureson the scale of being. slightlyhigherthanthe beastsand

lower thanangels and otherintelligentspirits.

Locke's Man 683

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Yolton Locke's Man