Tatar Sandinista Politics

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Bradley Tatar teaches cultural anthropology and Spanish at the Korea Advanced Institute of

Science and Technology in Daejeon, South Korea. His research in Nicaragua was aided by sup-port from the Christopher DeCormier Scholarship in Mesoamerican Studies.

LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, Issue 168, Vol. 36 No. 5, September 2009 158-177DOI: 10.1177/0094582X09341981 2009 Latin American Perspectives

State Formation and Social Memoryin Sandinista Politics

by

Bradley Tatar

The 2006 Nicaraguan elections saw a victory for Daniel Ortega, who has con-tinually been identified as an icon of the revolutionary era in which the FrenteSandinista de Liberacin Nacional (FSLN) destroyed the Somoza regime and formeda revolutionary government. Ortegas success can be better understood by viewingthe Nicaraguan Revolution as a state formation process in which popular culture isa field of conflict between social groups. The conflict here is between party militantsand Sandinista supporters who do not enjoy the privileges of membership. Exam-ination of oral histories reveals that the conflict between militants and popular com-

batants began in the Insurrection of Monimb. The FSLN has appropriated and usedthe social memories of the combatants to produce its own history of that insurrection.Social memories reflect concrete processes of political subordination that result in the

production of a dominant political language.

Keywords: Sandinistas, Insurrection, State formation, Oral history, Popular culture,Social memory

When Daniel Ortega Saavedra was elected president of Nicaragua for thesecond time in 2006, Latin Americas leftist forces were fortified. At the inau-guration ceremony he was flanked by presidents Hugo Chvez of Venezuelaand Evo Morales of Bolivia (La Prensa, January 10, 2007). Chvez presentedhim with a replica of the sword of Simn Bolvar, and Morales proclaimed,Death to U.S. imperialism! Returning to the presidency, Ortega is fulfillinga promise he made in 1990, when a decade of rule by the Sandinista revolu-tionary government was brought to an end. Ceding victory to the U.S.-favoredpresident-elect Violeta Chamorro, Ortega promised to return to power: Thisis the Good Friday of Sandinismo, but we will be resurrected as was Christ(Gorostiaga, 1990).

Nevertheless, it is not clear whether Ortegas new presidency representsa continuation of the Nicaraguan Revolution that brought the Sandinistasto power in 1979. In 1990, many who had supported the Sandinistas duringthe revolution were dissatisfied and considered the Sandinista governmentauthoritarian and unresponsive to the needs of the people (Barnes, 1992;Tinoco, 1998; Vilas, 1990). After 1990, Ortegas political party, the FrenteSandinista de Liberacin Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation FrontFSLN) became an opposition party that led protests against privatization and


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other policies of neoliberal capitalism (OKane, 1996; Quandt, 1996), but manySandinistas felt that Ortegas control of the party stifled democracy (Baltodano,2006; Grigsby, 1999; Lpez Campos, 1999; Meja, 1999; Nez de Escorcia,2000; Ramrez, 1996). Edelberto Torres Rivas (2007) argues that with Ortega asparty secretary the FSLN has been transfigured into a right-wing party and

that Ortega is impersonating his former self. Many social movement activ-ists see the FSLN as shifting from left to right. For example, Nicaraguan femi-nists view Ortegas reelection in 2006 as a devastating blow to womens rights(Lpez Vigil, 2006). Nevertheless, even the Sandinistas who do not like Ortegamay support him in certain situations because they identify with the revolu-tionary past of the FSLN. How has he continued to be a symbol of Nicaraguasrevolution? How did the Sandinista movement change from a popular,democratic, and anti-imperialist revolution (Vilas, 1985) to a bastion of sup-port for a single leader?

Here it is argued that Ortegas long-term political ascendance is the prod-

uct of a process of state formation. The history of the FSLN illustrates twoimportant characteristics of state formation. First, the formation of a govern-ment apparatus involves the creation of social categories and the impositionof those categories on persons and social groups. This imposition is ideo-logical, and it may be resisted. Secondly, because subordinate groups emergeas a result of inequalities of power and concomitant economic inequalities,state formation involves material as well as ideological domination. In theNicaraguan Revolution, the party cadres of the FSLN became a ruling groupcalling itself the Vanguard of Nicaragua. Those who were not members ofthe party were classified as the massesa term denoting the lack of autono-

mous leadership and dependence. However, many persons who were notmembers of the FSLN nevertheless had been participants in the revolution,and these popular combatants and others felt that the revolution was alsotheir accomplishment.1 As the popular combatants became resistant to FSLNrule, it became necessary for the FSLN to create ideological apparatuses ofdomination to overcome that resistance and unify the partys support base.

STATE FORMATION AND THE CLEAVAGE OF THE FSLN

Social scientists have proposed many theories of state formationliberal,liberal democratic, Marxist, and Weberian (Held, 1989). The Marxist theoriesraise critical questions about the role of ideology (Hall, 1996). The centraldebate for Marxists is whether the state is merely an instrument of the rul-ing classes or can exercise power autonomously (Held, 1989: 33). In thisrespect, Gramsci argued that the formation of a state produced conflict not

between economic classes but between the members of the (would-be) rulinggroup and the numerous social groups they aspired to rule (Laclau, 1977: 108).Conceiving of political power as relatively autonomous from economicpower, he portrayed nonclass groupings (religion, ethnicity, gender, national-ity) as being equally significant as classes (Bocock, 1986: 16). The rulers, heargued, were faced with the dual task of unifying themselves and extendingtheir dominion to all the other groups in the society through cultural, eco-nomic, social, and coercive means.


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In essence, Gramscis conception of state formation is of a continuousstruggle among social groups (Hall, 1986; Roseberry, 1994). In this frame-work, the state is not an apparatus or thing but a dynamic field of powerin which social groups encounter each other and engage in struggle (Nugentand Joseph, 1994). These social groups are not formed as economic classes

but constitute themselves in response to the historically constructed formsof domination specific to the society (Bocock, 1986: 88; Laclau, 1977: 108). AsRoseberry (1994: 359) points out, Gramsci always wrote of classes andgroups in the plural and drew our attention to the cultural and ideologicalissues that could either unite or divide them. By defining the state as the cul-tural and social terrain of political conflict, we are using a very broad defini-tion that would not satisfy many political scientists (Hall, 1986: 22). However,it does permit us to examine the social forms of conflict outside of the institu-tions of government that are also part of the state formation process. This isthe realm ofpopular culture, the cultural response of social groups to political

domination (Hall, 1981: 235).The conception of state formation as a division of interests between the rul-

ers and the ruled is useful for understanding qualitative changes in the politi-cal practices of the FSLN as it has changed from a clandestine guerrilla frontto a governing party to an opposition party and finally, in 2007, to a governingparty again. The FSLN has shifted its cultural and ideological emphases in aneffort to win support from the citizenry. In each new period of its historicaltrajectory, it has sought to renegotiate its relationship with social groups in thewider society. Specifically, it has tried to persuade its supporters to acceptsocioeconomic inequalities as a necessary or unavoidable part of its pursuit of

gains on behalf of the underprivileged majority.The FSLN was founded in 1961 by Carlos Fonseca, Toms Borge, and Silvio

Mayorga. Its purpose was to overthrow the Somoza dictatorship and create anew kind of society based on the egalitarian ideals of Augusto C. Sandino andKarl Marx (Escobar, 1984). It was a small clandestine guerrilla front until thelate 1970s, when massive social unrest gripped the country in response toSomozas efforts to retain control. During this period the FSLN was allied withvarious social movements that were agitating against the Somoza regime,among them the Christian base communities, the Association of WomenConfronting the National Problem, the Secondary School Students Movement,and the Students Revolutionary Front.2

On July 19, 1979, Nicaragua and the FSLN celebrated the destruction of therepressive regime. The FSLN formed a new government to create a new statethat would pursue the revolutionary goal of egalitarian social change. For thispurpose, it needed to continue to mobilize active support. In 1980 the newSandinista government mobilized young people all over Nicaragua in theNational Literacy Crusade to teach reading and writing to the poor andunderprivileged (Miller, 1985). Other Nicaraguans joined the mass organiza-tions that were created so that civilians could collaborate with the governmentin pursuit of common goals (Ruchwarger, 1987). The FSLN encouraged peopleto identify with the new state.

However, an ideological contradiction emerged. The FSLN had followedSandinos ideal: Only the workers and peasants will remain in the end, theirorganized force will achieve the triumph (Escobar, 1984: 24). However, many


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of the economic policies of the new government were considered unfavorableby workers and peasants. First, a centralized, state-managed economy wasplanned (Medal Mendieta, 1998; Ryan, 1995). The agricultural estates confis-cated from the Somozas and their associates were to be run as state enter-prises; instead of receiving land to cultivate individually, poor peasants were

directed to work on the state farms as employees (M. Ortega, 1990; Biondi-Morra, 1993). Workers in state-owned manufacturing plants were prohibitedfrom going on strike, and workers employed by private enterprises couldstrike only when the government permitted it (Harris, 1985; Vilas, 1985). TheSandinista government sought to mediate conflicts between workers andcapitalists through the exercise of administrative power (Vilas, 1985; Spalding,1994). It attempted to establish categories of persons (peasant, worker, capital-ist) and regulate the relationships among them (Field, 1995; 1998).

The Sandinista governments attempts to gain popular support tended todivide Nicaraguans who identified themselves as Sandinistas into two camps

(Ramrez, 1996; Tinoco, 1998; Vilas, 1991). Emblematic of this division, DanielOrtega came to symbolize the aspirations of those who supported theSandinista state at all costs and above all criticism (Vilas, 1990). Others criti-cized the Sandinista state and the FSLN as a political party and argued that thestate should serve the needs of the people first and the leaders second (Ramrez,1996). Tinoco (1998: 89) describes how this bitterness and resentment wasdirected against government functionaries and party cadres of the FSLN:

Within this widespread . . . sentiment, the national and intermediate leadershipof the FSLN is located in the group of haves, and the overwhelming mass of

organic [politically organized] Sandinistas who are pauperized obviously arelocated among the have-nots. This has generated a phenomenon of distrust andlack of identification [with the FSLN]. Someone who is poor tends to view theSandinista leader who is not poor (although neither is he rich) as comfortableand much too likely to wind up making agreements with . . . political forces thatdo not favor the mass of poor people.

Tinoco argues that this conflict is indicative not of a class division based ondifferential access to the means of production but of the differential position-ing of status groups with respect to the state and the FSLN party apparatus.The poor Sandinistas are have-nots in terms of lacking power and access to

the state and the attendant economic benefits. After the FSLN lost the 1990elections and became an opposition party, there was continued skepticismabout the FSLN leaders willingness to challenge the structures of inequality.

During the Sandinista period, the political effects of this resentment wereconcrete. First, unequal distribution of the costs of the revolution, especiallythe much resented program called Servicio Militar Patritico (Patriotic MilitaryServiceSMP), caused Ortega and the FSLN to lose the 1990 presidential elec-tion to the U.S.-supported candidate Violeta de Chamorro (Barnes, 1992;Vilas, 1991). Second, when the FSLN orchestrated a co-government withChamorro, Sandinistas directed their resentment toward the FSLN itself. A

group of Sandinista cadres accused Daniel Ortega of steering the FSLNtoward collaboration with capitalist institutions of exploitation (Prevost,1997: 160). In response to this attack, Ortega changed sides, supporting thelabor unions and other organizations critical of the government but without


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modifying his negotiated agreement with the Chamorro administration(Prevost, 1997: 161).

Thus, after 1990 Ortega continued to enjoy a pro-labor, anti-capitalist, andanti-imperialist image. From 1990 to 2007 the FSLN operated as an opposi-tion party with Ortega as its leader. The conflict within the FSLN culminated

in 1994 with the expulsion of FSLN members who had been calling forreforms, who subsequently formed a new political party called Movimientode Renovacin Sandinista (Movement of Sandinista RenovationMRS). Theconflict played out at the party congress, where Ortegas supporters becameknown as danielistas and the MRS Sandinistas were known as renovadores. Thedanielistas claimed to defend an orthodox or anticapitalist form ofSandinismo, and they accused the renovadores of being heterodox, capital-ist and neoliberal (Ramrez, 1996; Jones, 2002; Smith, 1997). As a result of thisconflict, Ortega has positioned himself in the Sandinista popular culture as thedefender of the authentic revolutionary tradition.

Stuart Hall, Ernesto Laclau, and others have argued that the construction ofpopular culture occurs through the dialectic of the states attempt to imposedomination and the subordinate social groups attempts to resist it. Evidenceof attempts to resist FSLN political domination may be found in the oral testi-monies of persons who participated in the insurrection against Somoza. Theseoral testimonies clarify that feelings of resentment among Sandinista popularcombatants had appeared even before the defeat of Somoza. Clearly, they can-not be viewed as unbiased evidence of the past, having been constructed inresponse to the Sandinista state.3 The ways in which Nicaraguans remem-bered the insurrection were colored by their experiences with the FSLN in

power.

HISTORY AS SANDINISTA IDEOLOGICAL APPARATUS

The FSLN has relied on an ideological apparatus of domination the roots ofwhich reach deep into the insurrection against Somoza. Even in 1978, whenthe rebellion was spreading across Nicaragua, the popular combatants wereresisting FSLN rule. This becomes clear when examining the Insurrection ofMonimb, a six-day rebellion of February 2026, 1978. First and foremost, the

combatants of Monimb resisted the idea that they were merely spontaneousmasses, dependent on the FSLN as national vanguard. Discursively, they wereable to portray themselves as members of a politically organized community.This discourse was threatening to the FSLN, and the party intervened to reor-ganize the memories and representations of the insurrection. This interventionwas elaborated around the three Ortega brothers, Daniel, Humberto, andCamilo, who emerged as heroes in the resulting national-popular narrative.

Ideological discourse is crucial to the state formation process, according toLaclau (2005: 8), who argues that discourse is constitutive, not merely reflec-tive, of social relationships. Laclau directs our attention to Althussers theory

of the ideological state apparatus to conceptualize the process by which the statewins the allegiance of individual human beings. Althusser argued that thestate uses symbols and language to create messages to which individualsrespond. Individuals adopt social positions in relation to the state, perceiving


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themselves as subjects who choose these positions autonomously (Laclau,1977: 100). By causing individuals to feel a moral/ethical obligation to supportthe state, ideological discourses function to maintain state power.

Thus state formation is an ideological as well as an economic and materialprocess. It is not important here to use Althussers terminology or accept the

details of his theory. What is crucial is the idea that the ideological dis-course serves to construct the person as apolitical subject (Laclau, 1977: 101).The state tries to impose its ideological domination through the discursiveuse of symbols, ideas, and mythology that produce a unified system of narra-tion,but competing social groups can resist the state, each group with its ownsystem of narration that disarticulates the ideological discourses of theopposing forces (Laclau, 1977: 103). While these ideological discourses donot directly express a pure class interest, they do combine class positioningwith other kinds of identity discourses. An incipient ruling class will create adiscourse to deny all interpellations but one . . . and transform it into a prin-

ciple of the reconstruction of the entire ideological domain.The FSLN created an ideological apparatus that described its origins as a

national-popular revolutionary movement. According to this description, thesocieties of Latin America were deformed by imperialist domination andcould not reach the capitalist level of development. As a result, the peasantand proletarian classes were incapable of autonomous engagement in a revo-lution. A Sandinista bulletin written in January 1978 claimed that only apolitical vanguard could lead the masses to revolution (Boletn Nicaragensede Bibliografa y Documentacin, 1980: 296): The proletariat, weak and lackinga firm class consciousness, could not act independently, much less play the

leading role that historically corresponded to it. The peasantry, at the marginsof the political struggles, did not incorporate its immense reserves of combat,leaving the [revolutionary] movement limited to the urban zones. The solu-tion to this impasse was to be the creation of a popular front; the FSLN soughtto use national identity to bind together social groups previously isolatedfrom one another. The militants believed that their goal was to incorporate theworking class and the peasants into a national struggle that encompassedmuch more than class interests.

However, the FSLN experienced a major setback when its leader CarlosFonseca Amador was killed in action in 1976. It was still a small guerrillaorganization with a few hundred militants, and Fonsecas death resulted in itssplintering into three factions or tendencies that had different ideas aboutstrategy (Gilbert, 1988: 8). The Prolonged Popular War tendency advocatedclose adherence to Che Guevaras foquismo, according to which the guerrillacolumn remains in the countryside and slowly wins the support of the peas-antry. In contrast, the members of the Proletarian tendency believed that it wasnot the peasantry but the proletariat that would lead Nicaragua into revolu-tion. Finally, a third tendency called the Terceristas advocated the inclusion ofall social classes, even the patriotic members of the bourgeoisie. It preachedmass insurrection and believed that it would take place in the cities.

Given the division of the organization into three competing factions, theFSLNs state formation project seemed unlikely to succeed. Furthermore,there was other political opposition to the Somoza regime. The Unin Demo-crtica de Liberacin (Democratic Liberation UnionUDEL) was led by the


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anti-Somoza crusader Pedro Joaqun Chamorro, who also published the newsdaily La Prensa. The Frente Amplio Opositor (Broad Opposition FrontFAO)and the UDEL organized massive workers strikes and boycotts to demand achange of regime (Castillo, 1979). In order to become the single most viablepolitical option, the FSLN was forced to intervene ideologically in the field of

social protest.The opportunity came on January 10, 1978, when the political crisis culmi-

nated in the murder of Chamorro.4 In response, 30,000 people rioted in thestreets of Managua, and peaceful demonstrations took place throughout thecountry. In the city of Masaya, the people of the indigenous Monimb neigh-

borhood reacted against the troops of the National Guard who arrived to sup-press the protest, building barricades to block entry to their neighborhood anddevising homemade weapons. Although the insurrection was crushed, thesix-day battle triggered similar uprisings in other cities.

The Insurrection of Monimb was the first time that popular combatants

had mobilized in large numbers in support of the Sandinista cause (H. Ortega,1984). At this point, Sandinismo became a social movement, and its militarystrategy altered substantially (Booth, 1982: 144). The FSLN began organiz-ing uprisings in other Nicaraguan cities involving poorly armed civilians inmilitary actions with tactical support from a handful of Sandinista militants.Although the ranks of the FSLN swelled rapidly, the majority of combatantscontinued to be people who were not FSLN members but had only receivedthree-hour militia classes (Booth, 1982: 145).

The events at Monimb demonstrated the feasibility of the Tercerista strat-egy of insurrection and resolved the conflict between the three tendencies of

the FSLN.5 The FSLN announced its reunification in 1978 with the creationof a national directorate of nine members, three from each faction. Havingadopted the Insurrection of Monimb as the basis for a historical narrativethat would control and regulate Sandinista political identity, the FSLN founditself required to intervene in the production of memories of the insurrection.

First, it was necessary to write the history of the insurrection in a way thatwould demonstrate that the FSLN as political vanguard was capable of bring-ing the masses into the revolutionary movement. It was therefore incumbentupon the Sandinistas to explain how the revolt had begun without their direc-tion. The Tercerista strategist and military historian Humberto Ortega (1984:33) developed a detailed explanation of the relationship between the FSLNand the Insurrection of Monimb: The vanguard, conscious of its limitations,puts itself at the head of the general decision of the masses. Determination andwillingness that in turn was taken from Monimb, which in their turn theIndians of Monimb had taken from the vanguard. . . . The masses followedfor the first time in organized form in Monimb. He claimed that the FSLNput itself at the head of the Monimb insurrection, assuming the leadershiponce it was in progress. This claim appears credible, since the leaders of theMonimb insurrection were inducted into the FSLN after the insurrection andthe status of militants was bestowed upon them.6

Second, there was a need to justify the ascendance of the Tercerista over theother two factions, and for this the FSLN created a history in which the pro-tagonist was Camilo Ortega. Camilo was captured and killed by the NationalGuard during the insurrection, and in the official FSLN narrative he was


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accepted by the Monimboseos as their leader. The FSLN portrayed him asthe savior of Monimb, a Christlike martyr who died trying to transform theMonimb insurrection from a spontaneous and undisciplined act of resistanceinto a revolutionary war. Credited with reunifying the three tendencies of theFSLN, he received the honorific title The Apostle of Unity (IES, 1982b).

However, as the emissary of the FSLN accepted by the Monimboseos as theirleader, he became the symbol of unity of the FSLN and the Nicaraguan people.A well-known example is Carlos Meja Godoys song Vivirs Monimb,which describes the death of Camilo Ortega in the insurrection as an act ofmartyrdom. When Meja sang, Your pure blood, Camilo, grows in the pita-haya trees and in the smiles of the children of my beloved Nicaragua, heportrayed Camilos death as a redeeming sacrifice of blood similar to Christs.The song also claims that Camilos blood spilled over my country during herviolent birth, clearly an attempt to link the resurrection of the FSLN as a van-guard party with the resurrection of the Nicaraguan nation. The Insurrection

of Monimb is seen as the birth of an indissoluble alliance between a mobilizednation and its vanguard party. The official FSLN narrative of the Insurrectionof Monimb makes Camilo Ortega the leader and hero of the insurrection. TheMonimboseos were acutely aware of the official narrative after the 1979 tri-umph over Somoza; as a result, in 1980 some of the combatants from Monimbexpressed their resistance to FSLN rule by giving testimonies that contra-dicted the FSLNs story of Camilos heroism.

NARRATIVES OF SUBORDINATION

AND RESISTANCE IN MONIMB

The multiple meanings of the Insurrection of Monimb are apparent in theGallery of Heroes and Martyrs in the Masaya City Hall,7 which includes pho-tos and biographical sketches of the people who died in the insurrection andthe personal belongings and homemade weapons of the fallen combatants.In the center of the exhibit is a large section dedicated to Camilo Ortega. Atthe time of my visit in 1997, Nicaraguas president was Arnoldo Alemn, whowas famous for his anti-Sandinista political views and his efforts to destroymonuments and representations of the 1979 Nicaraguan Revolution. When Iasked a visitor to the gallery why Alemn had not dismantled this exhibit, hesaid, The government cannot remove this. This history of the revolution isnot the property of the FSLN; it belongs to the people of Monimb.

This response surprised me, because the exhibit was installed in the years ofthe Sandinista government and portrays the struggle against Somoza as anachievement of the FSLN. Nevertheless, by asserting that the history portrayedin the gallery does not belong exclusively to the FSLN, Monimboseos appro-priate the official party-centered narrative and give it a different meaningthat of the communitys independent and autonomous struggle against theSomoza regime.

The Gallery of Heroes and Martyrs was constructed on the basis of testimo-nies collected by the Sandinista government in 1980. Testimonies about politi-cal conflict are built upon socially constructed claims about truth, claims thatexpress the aspirations, grievances, and goals of social groups (Beverley and


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Zimmerman, 1990). Testimony about historical events is a key practice in pro-ducing social memorythe normalized social practices by which groups ofpeople preserve collective memories of their past (Burke, 1997: 44). Historianswho work with oral testimonies often find evidence that people produce andmaintain histories of their own little collectivities and resist the construction

of more universal historical compositions (Cohen, 1989: 10). Nevertheless,the community-centered meaning of the Gallery of Heroes and Martyrs isimplicit in the official FSLN history that silences it. The procedures by whichsome accounts are accepted as truth and others are marginalized appear assilences in the record of the past, privileging the truth of the dominantsocial group over that of the subordinate social groups (Sider, 1996; Gould,1998; Trouillot, 1997). Johnson and Dawson (1982: 207) argue that the stateapparatus intervenes decisively in the field of social memorythat these arereal processes of domination and subordination. To examine the construc-tion of a social framework within which the public (or a public) perceives that

the truth is being told, it is necessary to go beyond what is said to the socialproduction of testimony . . . the procedures and maneuvers through whichtestimony was solicited, verified, challenged, and equivocated (Lynch andBogen, 1996: 5).

After the Somoza regime fell, the newly installed Sandinista governmentcreated the Instituto para el Estudio del Sandinismo (Institute for the Study ofSandinismoIES), which sent a team of researchers to interview people whohad participated in the Monimb insurrection. The interviews were recordedand transcribed in a volume called Y se arm la runga! (IES, 1982a).8 Althoughthe testimonies have been reduced to fragments and juxtaposed to create a

narrative progression, their content has not been edited. In the introductionto the volume the historians write: These testimonies faithfully describe theemotional, moral, and physical situation of the people of Masaya. . . . At thesame time, they make manifest the [peoples] level of political awareness andtheir capacity for analysis and interpretation of the historical events theyexperienced (IES, 1982a: 19). Thus publication of these testimonies servedthe purpose of making a claim about the political awareness of the peopleor the nation. However, to create a sense of authenticity, the events of theinsurrection are reported in terms of personal narratives that reflect varioussubject positions.

In spite of this heterogeneity, the IES oral histories of the Insurrection ofMonimb were also used in the production of an official history. The direc-tor of the IES was Humberto Ortega himself (Guevara, 2001), and the institutecreated two synthetic accounts of the insurrection (IES, 1982b; 1982c) writtenin the language of what Laclau terms a unified narrative system, which imposesonly one or two possible subject positions. Those persons identified as alliesof the Somoza regime were consistently referred to as beasts (bestias) orscum (esbirros), not merely as insults but as indications of a total absence ofhuman subjectivity. In contrast, the heroes of the Sandinista cause wereassigned subjectivity according to their class origin. For example, the biogra-phy of Sandinista militant Miriam de Asuncin Tinoco Pastrana begins asfollows: The class extraction of Miriam was proletarian, [her father] donRicardo, [an] electrical technician and her mother a seamstress. From her ear-liest infancy, Miriam acquired the foundation of what later developed as her


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revolutionary convictions because of the material conditions of poverty andmisery that were inflicted on the neighborhood where she lived (IES, 1982b:213). The Sandinista martyr Ren Cisneros is introduced as having been bornfrom the womb of the working class (Nez Tllez, 1987: 48) and his com-rade Adolfo Aguirre as of bourgeois origin, but [having] renounced the inter-

ests of his class to make the sacred interests of the workers and peasants hisown (49). In Laclaus terminology, the purpose of this discourse of state for-mation is to constrict the range of possible subject identifications. In his intro-duction to Y se arm la runga!, Daniel Ortega writes: Only in this way can weexplain the Indians tenacious resistance against subjugation, that there would

be real possibilities for them to advance, no longer as an exploited race, butrather as an exploited class to the extent that the economic contradictions per-mit it (IES, 1982a: 15). Les Field (1995) has described in detail how the firstSandinista government forced indigenous artisans in Nicaragua to accept adiscourse that reduced their culture to a matter of class. Thus the states arti-

ficial constriction of discursive subject positions can be seen as truncating orsanitizing the historical narrative by concealing or silencing the heterogeneityof personal subjectivities.

In contrast, the oral testimonies that appear in Y se arm la runga! expressa panoply of subject positions in heterogeneous language that reflects thelocal culture. Although class origins and livelihoods are indicated, they arenot expressed in terms of state-approved categorizations. The people whofigure in the testimonies are often remembered only by their first names orwith epithets such as the drunkard Altamirano (IES, 1982a: 67) or the ladywho sells meat in the marketplace (69). Alan Bolt remembered his earliest

involvement with the FSLN as follows: The solid contact that there was in74 was with the compaero Ramn, I dont remember his last name, I think itwas Gutirrez; he was the logistic support. His mother sold tiste andfresco9 inthe marketplace, and she converted their house into a safe house.10 Thesenarratives are of the type that Lynch and Bogen (1996: 12) call locally organ-ized and biographically relevant. This characteristic of oral testimony allowsthe personal subjectivities of the narrators to intrude into the narratives. As aresult, these testimonies express support for the FSLN and hatred of theSomoza regime, but they also indicate resentment of the FSLN and resistanceto the FSLN state-building project.11

Three main forms of resistance to FSLN rule surface in the testimonies onthe Insurrection of Monimb. First, the Monimboseos disagreed with theidea that the FSLN had inspired their resistance to the Somoza regime. Theyclaimed that their rebelliousness was ancient and predated the FSLNsexistence. For example, according to Daniel Martnez, It was Monimb thatmobilized, that rose up in arms first. Perhaps it is because of our idiosyncrasy,or for our warrior culture that weve had since ancient times, because we didnot come into existence just now with the dictatorship (IES, 1982a: 94).

Secondly, the Monimboseos vehemently disagreed with the FSLNs por-trayal of their rebellion as spontaneous or disorganized. Instead, they empha-sized their civic obligations to the community and their democratic form ofcommunity action. A war council met daily in the Plaza of San Sebastin,apparently formulating decisions only after opinions had been heard. A popu-lar combatant named Armengol Mercado Castillo (IES, 1982a: 120) explained:


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At that time, when we were free, all of the local people would get together, anda compaero would present a fine oratory. The people heard him out, and theylistened carefully. For us, it was a commitment to arrive there [at the Plaza] punc-tually, after work, and nobody had to come around to summon us. There weplanned: We will attack in this manner, and in this location.

The Monimboseos remembered that the insurrection was a time when delib-erations and decision making took place in view of the entire community, atime remembered as when we were free. This phrasing suggests that com-munal decision making occurred because the neighborhood was freed fromrule by the Somoza regime but not yet subjugated to the Sandinista regimethat was soon to follow.

Finally, the Monimboseos objected to the idea that the FSLN had led theirinsurrection. On March 2, 1978, participants in the Monimb insurrection senta letter to the archbishop of Nicaragua, quickly reprinted in La Prensa, assert-ing that there do not exist nor have there existed professional agitators in ourcase; and . . . no political current has participated directly in our confrontation[with the Somoza regime] (CRISOL, 1979: 41). The testimonies given in 1980were colored by the resentment that the popular combatants already felttoward the Sandinista militants. For example, Mercado (IES, 1982a: 118) criti-cized the FSLNs attempt to intervene in the insurrection:

When we began . . . when the revolution began, here we were killing ourselvesin Monimb, throwing bombs, the soldiers machine-gunning us, and the bour-geois people were having their grand banquets, sipping their whisky. Thats whyI began to hate them, because they did not contribute as much as we did in the

revolution. They had their own way of thinking. There were some who playedtwo roles: with the Sandinistas and with Somoza.

Here the leaders of the FSLN are portrayed as unscrupulous rich persons whoused the poor as cannon fodder. In particular, the popular combatants objectedto the idea that Camilo Ortega had been a leader of their insurrection. However,these discourses of resistance to FSLN rule did not ultimately coalesce to

become a unified system of narration capable of disarticulating the FSLNs his-torical narrative. Instead, they remained embedded within the FSLNs domi-nant narrative, which appropriated the narratives of resistance. This is most

evident in the case of the story of Camilo Ortega, an official FSLN narrativethat was resisted when testimonies were recorded in 1980. However, the FSLNwas able to appropriate these discourses of resistance and reincorporate theminto the narrative of Camilo Ortegas heroism. This act of appropriation indi-cates a process of ideological domination in which the popular combatantswere ultimately unable to contest the political dominance of party militants.

THE APOSTLE OF UNITY

Rebellion broke out in Monimb on February 20, 1978. A mass was cele-brated on that day, the fortieth day after Chamorros death, and a plaza wasrenamed in his honor (IES, 1982c: 61). When the National Guard arrived tosuppress the demonstrations, the Monimboseos declared the neighborhoodfree territory and formed militias to patrol the streets and repel attacks


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(CRISOL, 1979; IES, 1982a: 8992). The FSLN tried to establish contact withthe rebels by sending the Sandinista militants Camilo Ortega and HilarioSnchez (IES, 1982a; 1982b: 161, 190). However, distrust of outsiders ledsome Monimboseos to reject them. The militants were apprehended by aMonimboseo patrol on suspicion of being plainclothes agents of the

Somoza regime because they were carrying guns and money. In the officialFSLN accounts, Ortega and his companions were able to calm the crowd (IES,1982c: 66). Other eyewitnesses reported that the militants were treated asinterlopers and interrogated roughly. The latter narratives express theMonimboseos suspicion of the FSLN and its attempt to gain command ofthe insurrection, which had been autonomously carried out by the people ofMonimb.

A main point of disagreement in the testimonies is the number of FSLNmilitants encountered by the Monimboseos on the evening of February 25.Some Monimboseos reported that the group of Sandinista emissaries included

not only Ortega and Snchez (whose nom de guerre was Claudio) but alsoMoiss Rivera. A Monimboseo identified as Federico Mndez Palacios testi-fied that when patrolling the highway he had discovered three men whoseidentity he was to learn much later: There was Camilo seated on the groundand reclining against a wall, reading a book; the other, Hilario Snchez,Claudio, was reclining against the wire [fence], with one knee in the air. Therewas also another, I dont remember him clearly, but I believe that he wasMoiss (IES, 1982a: 129).

Mndezs report differs slightly from an account provided by MartnGarca:12 When the [National] Guard managed to enter Monimb, it was also

when the first members of the FSLN appeared, Camilo Ortega, Moiss Rivera,Arnoldo Quant, and Claudio. They were taken prisoner. Although they identi-fied themselves as members of the FSLN, the people did not believe them

because there had been many infiltrators(IES, 1982a: 131).Snchez gave his own testimony in 1980: We came to Monimb to direct

the insurrection after a fashion, to give it a direction, and greater content (IES,1982a: 133). Those who resented this presumption by the FSLN reported thatCamilo behaved in an arrogant manner when the Monimboseos questionedhim. Mndez (IES, 1982a: 131) explained:

I questioned one of them, Camilo, because he looked so serious and obstinate,and I had to say: this guy is [a member of the National] Guard, he doesntrespond to questions, we ask and he says nothing.13 Because the only one ofthem who talked was Claudio. The people said, These are [National] Guardsmen,we have to take them prisoner.

Another Monimboseo who feared that the strangers were in fact Somocistaspies was a shoemaker named Justo Gonzlez Gmez. He reported that whenCamilo Ortega did finally speak, he said, It amazes me a great deal to see acommunity so combative but so disorganized. This community has enor-

mous courage and combat-readiness but lacks organization (IES, 1982a:131).14 The bemused and condescending tone of this remark was not lost onthe Monimboseos. It expresses the Sandinistas Leninist distinction betweencommunity consciousness and revolutionary consciousness and emphasizesthat Camilo was a professional revolutionary who did not share the cultural


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outlook of the Monimboseos. Although the Monimboseos finally deter-mined that the strangers were in fact Sandinista militants, some were notimpressed. For example, Gonzlez agreed that the Sandinistas were set free

but reiterated the suspicion the community felt toward the outsiders: Here,everyone in the neighborhood said, If unknown people come and you dont

know who they are, you have to throw bombs at them and finish them off,otherwise they may kill us (IES, 1982a: 131).

Thus this set of testimonies advances the claim that Camilo Ortega wascaptured by the Monimboseos, who almost killed him. This claim expressesthe idea that the FSLN was trying to exploit the Monimb insurrection forpolitical purposes. These narratives highlight the social class difference

between the FSLN militants and the Monimboseos in order to claim that theNicaraguan Revolution was the achievement of the popular combatants, notof the professional revolutionaries.

In contrast, other testimonies from 1980 advance the opposite claimthat

Camilo unified the FSLN and the Monimboseos. In these narratives, Camilowas never captured, manhandled, or treated with suspicion. It would be awk-ward to admit that the younger brother of Daniel and Humberto Ortega was

beaten by the Monimboseos. Camilo is absent from the event as rememberedby Jos Poveda, head of the Monimboseo militia that discovered the FSLNmilitants. In Povedas version, only two members of the FSLN, Hilario Snchezand Moiss Rivera, were taken prisoner (IES, 1982a: 133136).15 This is a storycorroborated by Hilario Snchez himself (IES, 1982a: 133). This version appearsin the official history of the insurrection (IES, 1982c: 6668). Thus Povedas andSnchezs testimonies were given privileged status in the official history, which

claims that although the Monimboseos were suspicious, Snchez and Riverasoon calmed them and won their respect because they spoke with the voice ofthe vanguard [demonstrating] maturity and self-control (IES, 1982c: 66).

The accounts of the Insurrection of Monimb of popular combatants andFSLN militants clearly differ and in fact contradict each other. These storiesare indicative of a social conflict between the two groups. During the finaloffensive, the militias of popular combatants bitterly resented the FSLN mili-tants, who had better weapons and enjoyed other privileges (Nez Tllez,1987: 50). After the overthrow of the Somoza regime, the militants continuedto enjoy privileges as members of the FSLN, newly installed in power. Thiswas considered unfair by the popular combatants, who had borne many of thecosts of the revolution.

Whether Camilo Ortega was accepted or rejected by the Monimboseos, itis well documented that on February 26 he was discovered hiding in a safehouse in Los Sabogales, near Monimb, where he was captured and killed bySomozas National Guard. Although he did not live to see the July 19 triumph,he is remembered as the Apostle of Unity who unified the FSLNs three fac-tions and unified the people of Nicaragua with their vanguard party.

APPROPRIATION OF DISSIDENT NARRATIVES

The stories told in 1980 about the Insurrection of Monimb indicate a stateformation process in which a new ruling class (the militants of the FSLN)


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struggled to dominate subordinate classes, particularly popular combatants.During the 11 years in which the FSLN ruled Nicaragua, it employed the nar-rative of the Monimb insurrection to marginalize the discontent of the popu-lar combatants, some of whom had difficulty obtaining employment, housing,or other necessities during the period. Divided between haves and have-nots,

the FSLN used the narrative to communicate the unity of Nicaragua and theFSLN. Monimboseos who were dissatisfied with the FSLN expressed theirambivalence by telling their own versions of the insurrection. However, thesedissident oral narratives of the Insurrection of Monimb did not coalesce intoa single system of narration. Thus we can identify an official narrative andinstances in which it is contradicted by dissident social memory but not acoherent unofficial narrative.

In the effort to win acceptance of its dominant position, the rulers of a statemust accommodate and allow partial expression of the culture and values ofoppositional groups. Therefore the relationships of social subordination are

negotiated through shifting alliances and conflicts that obligate the ruling classto incorporate and transform dissident values and beliefs (Bennett, 1986: xv).This became more important after the FSLN lost power in 1990, when theparty sought the support of the popular combatants in an effort to return topower. In order to marginalize the combatants discontent and win theirsupport, it became necessary for the FSLN to appropriate their stories andreincorporate them into the partys official narrative.

Consequently, 22 years after the oral histories of the Monimb insurrec-tion were recorded, a new narrative appeared. This narrative was publishedin Visin Sandinista, a journal on the official FSLN web site (FSLN, 2002).16

The new narrative preserves the idea that Camilo Ortega was the savior ofMonimb and of the Nicaraguan people, but it claims that he and MoissRivera were captured and interrogated by the Monimboseos on the night ofFebruary 25. Thus the article directly contradicts the testimony of Jos Povedaand Hilario Snchez (IES, 1982a: 133136) as well as the official history (IES,1982c: 6668). This is an appropriation of the stories that were told in 1980 toresist or contradict the official FSLN history of the insurrection.

Interestingly, the Visin Sandinista article was based on testimonies notincluded in the earlier compilation. In the new version, the Monimboseosnow freely admit that Camilo and Moiss were beaten. If we had knownwho they were, we never would have handled them so roughly, explainedFernando Lpez. I personally struck one of them so that they would tell uswho they were . . . but we could not extract a word from them (FSLN, 2002).One woman wept, saying that she had heard Camilo say, I love the struggle,I have come to join your fight (FSLN, 2002). When someone in the crowdfinally corroborated Camilos assertion that he was a Sandinista, not an agentof Somoza, he was set free.

Following the release of the prisoners, the Monimboseos did not ulti-mately reject Camilo but accepted him as their true leader: Camilo remainedin Monimb, organizing the insurrection of the indgenas, establishing himselfin a safe house located near the crossroads known as Los Sabogales (FSLN,2002). In contrast with the original FSLN history, in this version he is capturedand not recognized; the Monimboseos did not realize that he was their leaderuntil they had already mistreated him. Therefore this revised story creates a


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more powerful representation of his martyrdom. The Monimb rebels sinof failing to recognize their savior is forgiven when they finally recognize himand accept his leadership. This clearly represents an attempt by the FSLN toconvince the popular combatants of the need for reconciliation. The messageis that in spite of conflicts between the vanguard of FSLN militants and the

rank and file, there is hope for resolution if the rank and file will simply rec-ognize their leaders.

The revised story of Camilo illustrates how popular discourses of resistancemay be appropriated by a political class with aspirations to rule. WhenVisin Sandinista published the revised story of Camilos encounter with theMonimboseos in 2002, the FSLN was an opposition party seeking to returnto power through elections. It needed the support and votes of the popularcombatants. Yet, the FSLN was internally divided between haves and thehave-nots because the party militants were perceived by rank-and-fileSandinistas as enjoying more wealth and privileges (Tinoco, 1998: 89). In order

to address this discontent, the militants tried to renegotiate their relationshipwith the rank and file by using the anti-FSLN discourses of the popular com-

batants in the Monimb insurrection. These stories gave voice to long-standingdissatisfactions. However, appropriated into the Visin Sandinista version,they reasserted the irrevocability of the relationship between the vanguardparty and the people. Inevitably, according to this story, the popular combat-ants had to see the error of their recalcitrance and accept the authority andleadership of the FSLN.

CONCLUSION

The oral histories of the Insurrection of Monimb illustrate the usefulnessof a Gramscian theory of popular culture in studying state formation proc-esses. Ideology binds social groups together or divides them as they contendfor power and for autonomy. It is important because classes can only com-pete at the ideological level if there is a common framework of meaningshared by all forces in struggle (Laclau, 1977: 161). Indeed, Gramscis notionof hegemony may be described as the struggle to create a language of conten-tion (Roseberry, 1994).

In the Nicaraguan Revolution, social memory has been a crucial site ofstruggle for the formation of a political language. The Sandinista popularcombatants seem to have failed to create a unified system of narration capableof disarticulating the official FSLN discourse. Did they also fail to achievepolitical influence within the FSLN? Roseberry (1994: 360) reminds us thatGramsci does not assume that subaltern groups are captured or immobilized

by some sort of ideological consensus. In the absence of an alternative formof political language, the popular combatants have been forced to frame theirdemands in terms of the official FSLN categories.

The deciphering of the oral histories of the revolution is useful for demys-tifying the perennial power and authority of Daniel Ortega. During myresearch in Masaya in 1997 and 1998, I often heard from the rank-and-fileSandinistas that they felt abandoned by the FSLN. Many complained ofself-serving party militants who did not attend to the needs of the people. My


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question to them was always, Why dont you abandon the FSLN and supportanother political party like the MRS?17 At the time, I could not understandtheir answer: Its just Sergio Ramrez and a few intellectuals, a small groupthat wont be supported by most Sandinistas. In contrast to the Sandinistamilitants who left the FSLN to found the MRS, the rank-and-file Sandinistas

cannot easily leave the FSLN for a new Sandinista party because the FSLN iscentral to the social memory of the revolution. The issue acquired new rele-vance in 2006 when the popular MRS candidate Herty Lewites challengedOrtegas lead in the polls, but Ortega and the FSLN ultimately won the elec-tion. While commentators cite many reasons for this (Perales, 2006; Rocha,2006; Torres Rivas, 2007), one of them is that Ortega continues to be identifiedwith the Sandinista revolutionary tradition. In this sense, the oral histories ofthe insurrection illustrate the concrete processes of domination and resistanceto his rule inscribed in social memory. Thus reencountering the past revealshow political rule is contested and renegotiated in the present.

NOTES

1. Many who had been too young to participate in the insurrection nevertheless workedunder the Sandinista government as literacy or medical brigade volunteers or as soldiers fight-ing the incursions of the Contras. They also felt that they had invested much of their lives in therevolution and considered it their own.

2. Along with a number of prominent intellectual and cultural figures calling themselves theGroup of 12, the FSLN was supported by a number of protest organizations organized underthe umbrella group known as the Movimiento del Pueblo Unido (Booth, 1982: 102113).

3. Johnson and Dawson (1982: 241243) argue that in providing oral testimonies, interview-ees reflect on their political relationships in the present.

4. Some critics of the FSLN have accused the Sandinistas of murdering Chamorro becauseof the political opportunity it afforded. However, his widow, Violeta Chamorro (1996), an FSLNadversary, has given an account of her husbands murder in which she accuses certain associatesof Somoza.

5. Humberto Ortega (1984) explained how the insurrection stimulated the three factions toreunite around the Tercerista strategy. This interview was originally published in 1989 inNarahuac, but it has been republished many times by the FSLN: as a political pamphlet (H. Ortega,1981), in a history textbook (H. Ortega, 1980), and as hypertext displayed on the partys web sitefrom 2002 until 2005 (H. Ortega, 2002). This suggests that it was not a casual statement but anofficial narrative.

6. Although Asuncin Armengol Ortiz organized and led the February 1978 Insurrection ofMonimb, he did this independently of the FSLN. In March 1978 he became an FSLN com-mander: The first military experience in which he [Armengol] participated directly with theVanguard was in March, when he became part of a hand-picked combat unit that he himselftrained and organized (IES, 1982b: 161).

7. The gallery can now be visited via the Internet, thanks to manfut.org, which has postedimages of the exhibit together with narratives: http://www.manfut.org/museos/masaya.html.In fact, the web site has posted a large number of exhibits and photo galleries pertaining toNicaraguan history, all of which can be accessed at http://www.manfut.org/museos/index.html.

8. An English translation of selected passages from this volume can be read on the web site

of Revista Envo, http://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/2722. However, for the purpose of consistencyall of the quotations in this article are my own translations from the original Spanish.9. Tiste is a beverage containing powdered maize and other grains mixed with sugar and

cocoa. Fresco (refresco) is fruit juice sweetened with added sugar.10. In the period of the Somoza dictatorship, Sandinistas used the term casa de seguridad to

refer to a house where revolutionary activities could be clandestinely practiced.


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11. Ortegas introduction to Y se arm la runga! indicates that he may not have been aware of theheterogeneity of these narratives. In it he claims that the testimonies produce a narrative in threescenes, representing the total unity of the FSLN and the Monimboseos: In the first scene is thevanguard risen from the masses, using the armed struggle as the principal way to organize andmobilize the nation in the city, in the countryside and in the wilderness. Later and without any plan-ning or coordination . . . the Monimb uprising. And finally, definitively, the unity of Monimb-

FSLN, Masaya-FSLN: nation-vanguard, which makes possible the participation of the people ofMasaya in the final offensive and the defeat of Somocista tyranny and of Yankee imperialism.

12. Garcas account is prominently displayed in the Gallery of Heroes and Martyrs of Masayabut anonymously.

13. The phrasing Mndez used was Ese maje es guardia, no le contesta a uno, le pregunta-mos y no habla nada. The word maje is a slang term which means something like dude,imparting a more vulgar connotation than chap or fellow. The term is common in Costa Rica

but not in Nicaragua, so its appearance in this Monimboseos testimony is unusual.14. The words that Gonzlez attributed to Camilo Ortega were Me asombra mucho ver un

pueblo tan combativo pero sin organizacin. Este pueblo tiene un coraje y una combatividadenorme, pero le falta la organizacin. I have here translated pueblo as community, in thesense of a village or town, although it also shows the attitude of the FSLN toward the Nicaraguan

people as a whole.15. Poveda suggests that the two captives were not treated gently: When we arrived, they

were questioning them. They had one below, the other on top of the curb [of the street]. WhenI interviewed him on December 18, 1998, he told me that Camilo Ortega was not captured by theMonimboseos at any point during the insurrection. At the time, I had not yet read Y se arm larunga! so I did not ask him why some testimonies contradicted his claim.

16. The official web site of the FSLN existed for many years as http://fsln-nicaragua.org andincluded important party documents such as statutes, historical materials, biographies ofSandinista martyrs, and proceedings of party congresses. The site disappeared in 2007 withoutany warning and in 2008 was mysteriously replaced by a new site providing some brief texts inEnglish and in German.

17. See Steven Kent Smiths (1997) account of the origins of the MRS. Additional, up-to-dateinformation in English is available through the articles published on the web site of Revista Envo,http://www.envio.org.ni/.

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Tatar Sandinista Politics