Statcon Cases Fulltext 3rd Batch

8/9/2019 Statcon Cases Fulltext 3rd Batch

1/54

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of theCommission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th ndorsement, dated !anuary "#,"$$%, denying his claim for reimbursement under &ection #$$ of the 'evised AdministrativeCode ('AC), as amended, in the total amount of *,+ ".**.

etitioner is a -irector of the ational /ureau of nvestigation ( / ). 0e 1as hospitali2ed forcholecystitis from March %#, "$$* to April 7, "$$*, on account of 1hich he incurred medical andhospitali2ation e3penses, the total amount of 1hich he is claiming from the COA.

On May "", "$$*, in a memorandum to the / -irector, Alfredo &. 4im (-irector 4im, forbrevity), he re5uested reimbursement for his e3penses on the ground that he is entitled to thebenefits under &ection #$$ 1 of the 'AC, the pertinent provisions of 1hich read6

&ec. #$$. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty . 8hen a person in the service of the national governmentof a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so in9ured in theperformance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or 1ound,the proper 0ead of -epartment may direct that absence during any period ofdisability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than si3months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authori2e the payment ofthe medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees

of the in9ured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged firstagainst vacation leave, if any there be.

333 333 333

n case of sickness caused by or connected directly 1ith the performance ofsome act in the line of duty, the -epartment head may in his discretion authori2ethe payment of the necessary hospital fees.

1 | P a g edarkmattersolutions


2/54

-irector 4im then for1arded petitioner:s claim, in a "st ndorsement dated !une %%, "$$*, to the&ecretary of !ustice, along 1ith the comment, bearing the same date, of ;erarda ;alang, Chief,4inding petitioner:s illness to beservice?connected, the Committee on hysical


3/54

!ustice in deciding the matter. 4astly, the COA contends that employment?related sickness,in9ury or death is ade5uately covered by the inal rovisions) of the Administrative Code of "$+7 1hich reads6

&ec. %7. Repealing Clause . All la1s, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent 1ith this Code are hereby repealed or modifiedaccordingly.

Bhe 5uestion that should be asked is6 8hat is the nature of this repealing clauseE t is certainlynot an e3press repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that areintended to be repealed. 'ather, it is an e3ample of a general repealing provision, as stated inOpinion o. 7 , &. "$$". t is a clause 1hich predicates the intended repeal under the conditionthat substantial conflict must be found in e3isting and prior acts. Bhe failure to add a specific

repealing clause indicates that the intent 1as not to repeal any e3isting la1, unless anirreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy e3ist in the terms of the ne1 and old la1s. ! Bhislatter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.

'epeal by implication proceeds on the premise that 1here a statute of later date clearly revealsan intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the sub9ect, that intentionmust be given effect. " 0ence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear sho1ing onthe part of the la1maker that the intent in enacting the ne1 la1 1as to abrogate the old one.Bhe intention to repeal must be clear and manifest 8 other1ise, at least, as a general rule, thelater act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and 1illcontinue so far as the t1o acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. 9

Bhere are t1o categories of repeal by implication. Bhe first is 1here provisions in the t1o actson the same sub9ect matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the e3tent of theconflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. Bhe second is if the later act covers the1hole sub9ect of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it 1ill operate to repealthe earlier la1. 10



4/54

mplied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place 1hen the t1o statutes cover the samesub9ect matter they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible 1ith each other that theycannot be reconciled or harmoni2ed and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one la1cannot be enforced 1ithout nullifying the other. 11

Comparing the t1o Codes, it is apparent that the ne1 Code does not cover nor attempt to coverthe entire sub9ect matter of the old Code. Bhere are several matters treated in the old Code1hich are not found in the ne1 Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave la1,the public bonding la1, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under &ection #$$,and still others.

Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the t1o Codes on the matter ofthe sub9ect claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. n fact, there can be no such conflict becausethe provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not beenrestated in the Administrative Code of "$+7. 0o1ever, the COA 1ould have @s consider that thefact that &ection #$$ 1as not restated in the Administrative Code of "$+7 meant that the samesection had been repealed. t further maintained that to allo1 the particular provisions notrestated in the ne1 Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself. Bhe COA anchoredthis argument on the 1hereas clause of the "$+7 Code, 1hich states6

80


5/54

According to Opinion o. 7 , &. "$$" of the &ecretary of !ustice, 1hat appears clear is theintent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organi2ation andprocedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the governmentstructure since the enactment of the 'AC decades of years ago. Bhe COA challenges the1eight that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body

1hich had been entrusted 1ith the implementation of this particular provision has alreadyrendered its decision. Bhe COA relied on the rule in administrative la1 enunciated in the case of Sison vs . Pangramuyen 1" that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, theCourt 1ould be loathe to substitute its o1n 9udgment for that of the administrative agencyentrusted 1ith the enforcement and implementation of the la1. Bhis 1ill not hold 1ater. Bhisprinciple is sub9ect to limitations. Administrative decisions may be revie1ed by the courts upon asho1ing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 t has been held thatOpinions of the &ecretary and @ndersecretary of !ustice are material in the construction ofstatutes in pari materia . 19

4astly, it is a 1ell?settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication arenot favored. 20 Bhe presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature ispresumed to kno1 the e3isting la1s on the sub9ect and not to have enacted inconsistent orconflicting statutes. 21

Bhis Court, in a case, e3plains the principle in detail as follo1s6 ='epeals by implication are notfavored, and 1ill not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As la1sare presumed to be passed 1ith deliberation 1ith full kno1ledge of all e3isting ones on thesub9ect, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it 1as not intended to interfere1ith or abrogate any former la1 relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy bet1een thet1o is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flo1ing necessarily from the

language used, unless the later act fully embraces the sub9ect matter of the earlier, or unless thereason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure rene1ed. 0ence, every effort must be used tomake all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act1ill not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22

'egarding respondent:s contention that recovery under this sub9ect section shall bar therecovery of benefits under the


6/54

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 Se#$ember 28, 199

SOCORRO D. RAMIRE%, petitioner,vs.&ONORA'(E COURT O) APPEA(S, *+ ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

-APUNAN, J.:

A civil case damages 1as filed by petitioner &ocorro -. 'amire2 in the 'egional Brial Court ofFue2on City alleging that the private respondent,


7/54

babalik sa :yo, nag?aaply ka sa &tates, nag?aaply ka sa revie1 mo, kungkakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akinmakakahingi.

C0@C0 0indi M:am. Gasi ang ano ko talaga noon i?cocontinue ko up to "*6**

p.m.


8/54

iscal Accusses &ocorro -. 'amire2 of Diolationof 'epublic Act o. %**, committed as follo1s6

Bhat on or about the %%nd day of >ebruary, "$++, in asay City Metro Manila,hilippines, and 1ithin the 9urisdiction of this honorable court, the above?named

accused, &ocorro -. 'amire2 not being authori2ed by


9/54

punished by '.A. %** refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than aparticipant to the communication. 4

>rom the trial court:s Order, the private respondent filed a etition for 'evie1 on Certiorari 1iththis Court, 1hich forth1ith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a 'esolution (by the >irst

-ivision) of !une "$, "$+$.

On >ebruary $, "$$*, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed -ecision declaringthe trial court:s order of May , "$+$ null and void, and holding that6

HBIhe allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under &ection " of'.A. %**. n thus 5uashing the information based on the ground that the factsalleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent 9udge acted in grave abuseof discretion correctible by certiorari .

Conse5uently, on >ebruary %", "$$*, petitioner filed a Motion for 'econsideration 1hichrespondent Court of Appeals denied in its 'esolution ! dated !une "$, "$$*. 0ence, the instantpetition.

etitioner vigorously argues, as her =main and principal issue= " that the applicable provision of'epublic Act %** does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties tothe conversation. &he contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthori2ed taping of aprivate conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 n relation tothis, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the

nformation, other1ise the facts charged 1ould not constitute a violation of '.A. %**. 9 >inally,petitioner agues that '.A. %** penali2es the taping of a =private communication,= not a =private

conversation= and that conse5uently, her act of secretly taping her conversation 1ith privaterespondent 1as not illegal under the said act. 10

8e disagree.

>irst, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. 8here thelanguage of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the la1 is applied according to its e3pressterms, and interpretation 1ould be resorted to only 1here a literal interpretation 1ould be eitherimpossible 11 or absurb or 1ould lead to an in9ustice. 12

&ection " of '.A. %** entitled, = An Act to rohibit and enali2ed 8ire Bapping and Other

'elated Diolations of rivate Communication and Other urposes,= provides6

&ec. ". t shall be unla1full for any person, not being authori2ed by all the partiesto any private communication or spoken 1ord, to tap any 1ire or cable, or byusing any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or recordsuch communication or spoken 1ord by using a device commonly kno1n as adictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or 1alkie?talkie or tape recorder, orho1ever other1ise described.



10/54

Bhe aforestated provision clearly and une5uivocally makes it illegal for any person, notauthori2ed by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record suchcommunication by means of a tape recorder. Bhe la1 makes no distinction as to 1hether theparty sought to be penali2ed by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from thoseinvolved in the private communication. Bhe statute:s intent to penali2e all persons unauthori2ed

to make such recording is underscored by the use of the 5ualifier =any=. Conse5uently, asrespondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, =even a (person) privy to a communication1ho records his private conversation 1ith another 1ithout the kno1ledge of the latter (1ill)5ualify as a violator= 13 under this provision of '.A. %**.

A perusal of the &enate Congressional 'ecords, moreover, supports the respondent court:sconclusion that in enacting '.A. %** our la1makers indeed contemplated to make illegal,unauthori2ed tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by theparties themselves or by third persons. Bhus6

333 333 333

&enator BaJada6 Bhat 5ualified only =overhear=.

&enator adilla6 &o that 1hen it is intercepted or recorded, the element ofsecrecy 1ould not appear to be material. o1, suppose, Kour 0onor, therecording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved notcriminal cases that 1ould be mentioned under section but 1ould cover, fore3ample civil cases or special proceedings 1hereby a recording is made notnecessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to sho1 the intentof the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even

subse5uent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention.&uppose there is such a recording, 1ould you say, Kour 0onor, that the intentionis to cover it 1ithin the purvie1 of this bill or outsideE

&enator BaJada6 Bhat is covered by the purvie1 of this bill, Kour 0onor.

&enator adilla6


11/54

&enator adilla6 Bhis might reduce the utility of recorders.

&enator BaJada6 8ell no. >or e3ample, 1as to say that in meetings of the boardof directors 1here a tape recording is taken, there is no ob9ection to this if all theparties kno1. t is but fair that the people 1hose remarks and observations are

being made should kno1 that the observations are being recorded.

&enator adilla6 o1, can understand.

&enator BaJada6 Bhat is 1hy 1hen 1e take statements of persons, 1e say6= lease be informed that 1hatever you say here may be used against you.= Bhatis fairness and that is 1hat 1e demand. o1, in spite of that 1arning, he makesdamaging statements against his o1n interest, 1ell, he cannot complain anymore. But if you are going to take a recording of the o&servations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is &eing taped or recorded, without himknowing that what is &eing recorded may &e used against him, think it is unfair .

333 333 333

(Congression 'ecord, Dol. , o. ", p. + , March "%, "$# )

&enator -iokno6 -o you understand, Mr. &enator, that under &ection " of the billas no1 1orded, if a party secretly records a pu&lic speech , he 1ould bepenali2ed under &ection "E /ecause the speech is public, but the recording isdone secretly.

&enator BaJada6 8ell, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. t isthe communication &etween one person and another person ( not &etween aspeaker and a pu&lic .

333 333 333

(Congressional 'ecord, Dol. , o. , p. #%#, March "%, "$# )

333 333 333

Bhe unambiguity of the e3press 1ords of the provision, taken together 1ith the above?5uoted

deliberations from the Congressional 'ecord, therefore plainly supports the vie1 held by therespondent court that the provision seeks to penali2e even those privy to the privatecommunications. 8here the la1 makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

&econd, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. Bhesubstance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. 8hat '.A. %**penali2es are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communicationsby means of the devices enumerated therein. Bhe mere allegation that an individual made a



12/54

secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder 1ould suffice toconstitute an offense under &ection " of '.A. %**. As the &olicitor ;eneral pointed out in hisCOMM< B before the respondent court6 = o1here (in the said la1) is it re5uired that beforeone can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as 1ell as its communicationto a third person should be professed.= 14

>inally, petitioner:s contention that the phrase =private communication= in &ection " of '.A. %**does not include =private conversations= narro1s the ordinary meaning of the 1ord=communication= to a point of absurdity. Bhe 1ord communicate comes from the latin 1ordcommunicare , meaning =to share or to impart.= n its ordinary signification, communicationconnotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act ofsharing or imparting, as in a conversation , 1 or signifies the =process by 1hich meanings orthoughts are shared bet1een individuals through a common system of symbols (as languagesigns or gestures)= 1! Bhese definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non?verbal, 1rittenor e3pressive communications of =meanings or thoughts= 1hich are likely to include theemotionally?charged e3change, on >ebruary %%, "$++, bet1een petitioner and privaterespondent, in the privacy of the latter:s office. Any doubts about the legislative body:s meaningof the phrase =private communication= are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms=conversation= and =communication= 1ere interchangeably used by &enator BaJada in hisree conversations are often characteri2ed by e3aggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and

the e3pression of anti?social desires of vie1s not intended to be taken seriously.Bhe right to the privacy of communication , among others, has e3pressly beenassured by our Constitution. eedless to state here, the framers of ourConstitution must have recogni2ed the nature of conversations bet1eenindividuals and the significance of man:s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of hisintellect. Bhey must have kno1n that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of lifeare to be found in the unaudited, and free e3change of communication bet1eenindividuals free from every un9ustifiable intrusion by 1hatever means. 1"

n)aanan vs . ntermediate Appellate Court , 18 a case 1hich dealt 1ith the issue of telephone1iretapping, 1e held that the use of a telephone e3tension for the purpose of overhearing aprivate conversation 1ithout authori2ation did not violate '.A. %** because a telephonee3tension devise 1as neither among those =device(s) or arrangement(s)= enumerated therein, 19

follo1ing the principle that =penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.= 20 Bhe instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstancespointing to a violation of '.A. %** suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself e3plicitlymentions the unauthori2ed =recording= of private communications 1ith the use of tape?recordersas among the acts punishable.



13/54

80or private respondent melda 4. &ala2ar, it 1ould seem that her close association 1ith -elfin&aldivar 1ould mean the loss of her 9ob. n May "$+%, private respondent 1as employed by;lobe?Mackay Cable and 'adio Corporation (;MC') as general systems analyst. Alsoemployed by petitioner as manager for technical operations: support 1as -elfin &aldivar 1ith1hom private respondent 1as allegedly very close.

&ometime in "$+ , petitioner ;MC', prompted by reports that company e5uipment and spareparts 1orth thousands of dollars under the custody of &aldivar 1ere missing, caused theinvestigation of the latter:s activities. Bhe report dated &eptember % , "$+ prepared by thecompany:s internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that &aldivar had entered into apartnership styled Concave Commercial and ndustrial Company 1ith 'ichard A. Kambao,o1ner and manager of


14/54

Conse5uently, in a letter dated October +, "$+ , petitioner company placed private respondent&ala2ar under preventive suspension for one (") month, effective October $, "$+ , thus givingher thirty ( *) days 1ithin 1hich to, e3plain her side. /ut instead of submitting an e3planationsthree ( ) days later or on October "%, "$+ private respondent filed a complaint againstpetitioner for illegal suspension, 1hich she subse5uently amended to include illegal dismissal,

vacation and sick leave benefits, " th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in1riting that effective ovember +, "$+ , she 1as considered dismissed =in vie1 of (her) inabilityto refute and disprove these findings. 2

After due hearing, the 4abor Arbiter in a decision dated !uly "#, "$+ , ordered petitionercompany to reinstate private respondent to her former or e5uivalent position and to pay her fullback1ages and other benefits she 1ould have received 1ere it not for the illegal dismissal.

etitioner 1as also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of *,***.**. 3

On appeal, public respondent ational 4abor 'elations, Commission in the 5uestionedresolution dated -ecember %$, "$+7 affirmed the aforesaid decision 1ith respect to thereinstatement of private respondent but limited the back1ages to a period of t1o (%) years anddeleted the a1ard for moral damages. 4

0ence, this petition assailing the 4abor Bribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretionin holding that the suspension and subse5uent dismissal of private respondent 1ere illegal andin ordering her reinstatement 1ith t1o (%) years: back1ages.

On the matter of preventive suspension, 1e find for petitioner ;MC'.

Bhe inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, 1hich pointed to -elfin &aldivar:s acts in conflict 1ith

his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action onany employee closely, associated 1ith &aldivar. Bhe suspension of &ala2ar 1as further impelledby th.e discovery of the missing >edders airconditioning unit inside the apartment privaterespondent shared 1ith &aldivar. @nder such circumstances, preventive suspension 1as theproper remedial recourse available to the company pending &ala2ar:s investigation. /y itself,preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has ad9udged the employee guilty ofthe charges she 1as asked to ans1er and e3plain. &uch disciplinary measure is resorted to forthe protection of the company:s property pending investigation any alleged malfeasance ormisfeasance committed by the employee.

Bhus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner ;MC' had violated &ala2ar:s right to due

process 1hen she 1as promptly suspended. f at all, the fault, lay 1ith private respondent 1henshe ignored petitioner:s memorandum of October +, "$+ =giving her ample opportunity topresent (her) side to the Management.= nstead, she 1ent directly to the 4abor -epartment andfiled her complaint for illegal suspension 1ithout giving her employer a chance to evaluate herside of the controversy.

/ut 1hile 1e agree 1ith the propriety of &ala2ar:s preventive suspension, 1e hold that hereventual separation from employment 1as not for cause.



15/54

8hat is the remedy in la1 to rectify an unla1ful dismissal so as to =make 1hole= the victim 1hohas not merely lost her 9ob 1hich, under settled !urisprudence, is a property right of 1hich aperson is not to be deprived 1ithout due process, but also the compensation that should haveaccrued to her during the period 1hen she 1as unemployedE

Art. %7$ of the 4abor Code, as amended, provides6

Security of %enure . n cases of regular employment, the employer shall notterminate the services of an employee e3cept for a 9ust cause or 1hen authori2edby this Bitle. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall &e entitledto reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full &ackwages , inclusive of allo1ances, and to his other benefits or their monetarye5uivalent computed from the time his compensation 1as 1ithheld from him upto the time of his actual reinstatement. ! (


16/54

t shall guarantee the rights of all 1orkers to self?organi2ation, collectivebargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the rightto strike in accordance 1ith la1. Bhey shall be entitled to security of tenure ,humane conditions of 1ork, and a living 1age. Bhey shall also participate inpolicy and decision?making processes affecting their rights and benefits is may

be provided by la1. 10

(


17/54

Bo go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to sho1 an authori2ed, much less alegal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitledto reinstatement, but ay 1ell, to full back1ages.= 14

Bhe intendment of the la1 in prescribing the t1in remedies of reinstatement and payment of

back1ages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her 9ob, for the dictionary meaning of the 1ord =reinstate= is =to restore to a state, conditionepositions etc. from 1hich one had been removed= 1 and in the latter, to give her back theincome lost during the period of unemployment. /oth remedies, looking to the past, 1ouldperforce make her =1hole.=

&adly, the avo1ed intent of the la1 has at times been th1arted 1hen reinstatement has notbeen forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.

Over time, the follo1ing reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatementunder the facts of the case and the la1 applicable thereto that reinstatement can no longer beeffected in vie1 of the long passage of time (%% years of litigation) or because of the realities ofthe situation 1! or that it 1ould be =inimical to the employer:s interest = 1" or that reinstatementmay no longer be feasible 18 or, that it 1ill not serve the best interests of the parties involved 19 or that the company 1ould be pre9udiced by the 1orkers: continued employment 20 or that it 1illnot serve any prudent purpose as 1hen supervening facts have transpired 1hich makee3ecution on that score un9ust or ine5uitable 21 or, to an increasing e3tent, due to the resultantatmosphere of =antipathy and antagonism= or =strained relations= or =irretrievable estrangement=bet1een the employer and the employee. 22

n lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of back1ages and

separation pay23

or solely separation pay.24

n the case at bar, the la1 is on the side of private respondent. n the first place the 1ording ofthe 4abor Code is clear and unambiguous6 =An employee 1ho is un9ustly dismissed from 1orkshall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full back1ages. . . .= 2 @nder the principlesofstatutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given itsliteral meaning and applied 1ithout attempted interpretation. Bhis plain?meaning rule or ver&alegis derived from the ma3im inde animi sermo est (speech is the inde3 of intention) rests onthe valid presumption that the 1ords employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly e3pressits intent or 1ill and preclude the court from construing it differently. 2! Bhe legislature ispresumed to kno1 the meaning of the 1ords, to6have used 1ords advisedly, and to have

e3pressed its intent by the use of such 1ords as are found in the statute. 2" .er&a legis non estrecedendum , or from the 1ords of a statute there should be no departure. either does theprovision admit of any 5ualification. f in the 1isdom of the Court, there may be a ground orgrounds for non?application of the above?cited provision, this should be by 1ay of e3ception,such as 1hen the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations bet1eenthe employer and the employee.



18/54

n such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position 1here heen9oys the trust and confidence of his employer and that it is likely that if reinstated, anatmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiencyand productivity of the employee concerned.

A fe1 e3amples, 1ill suffice to illustrate the Court:s application of the above principles6 1herethe employee is a Dice? resident for Marketing and as such, en9oys the full trust and confidenceof top management 28 or is the Officer? n?Charge of the e3tension office of the bank 1here he1orks 29 or is an organi2er of a union 1ho 1as in a position to sabotage the union:s efforts toorgani2e the 1orkers in commercial and industrial establishments 30 or is a 1arehouseman of anon?profit organi2ation 1hose primary purpose is to facilitate and ma3imi2e voluntary gifts. byforeign individuals and organi2ations to the hilippines 31 or is a manager of its


19/54

n the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of &ala2ar on loss of confidence. As1e have held countless times, 1hile loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground forterminations it must rest an some basis 1hich must be convincingly established. 3 An employee1ho not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. etitioner:s allegation that since&ala2ar and &aldivar lived together in the same apartment, it =presumed reasonably that

complainant:s sympathy 1ould be 1ith &aldivar= and its averment that &aldivar:s investigationalthough unverified, 1as probably true, do not pass this Court:s test. 3! 8hile 1e should notcondone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should 1e dismiss him on the basis ofsuspicion derived from speculative inferences.

Bo rely on the Maramara report as a basis for &ala2ar:s dismissal 1ould be most ine5uitousbecause the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend:s alleged thievery andanomalous transactions as technical operations: support manager. &aid report merelyinsinuated that in vie1 of &ala2ar:s special relationship 1ith &aldivar, &ala2ar might have haddirect kno1ledge of &aldivar:s 5uestionable activities. -irect evidence implicating privaterespondent is 1anting from the records.

t is also 1orth emphasi2ing that the Maramara report came out after &aldivar had alreadyresigned from ;MC' on May ", "$+ . &ince &aldivar did not have the opportunity to refutemanagement:s findings, the report remained obviously one?sided. &ince the main evidenceobtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of &aldivar, 1ithout his havinghad a chance to voice his side in vie1 of his prior resignation, stringent e3amination shouldhave been carried out to ascertain 1hether or not there e3isted independent legal grounds tohold &alatar ans1erable as 1ell and, thereby, 9ustify her dismissal. >inding none, from therecords, 1e find her to have been unla1fully dismissed.

80


20/54

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 10944 No ember ", 1994

)E(ICITO 'AS'ACIO, petitioner,vs.

O))ICE O) T&E SECRETAR , DEPARTMENT O) JUSTICE, )RAN-(IN DRI(ON + c*#*c $ * Secre$*r o5 J6 $ ce, respondent.

Amparita S Sta $aria for petitioner

MENDO%A, J.:

Bhis case presents for determination the scope of the &tate:s liability under 'ep. Act o. 7 *$,1hich among other things provides compensation for persons 1ho are un9ustly accused,convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are ac5uitted and ordered released.

etitioner >elicito /asbacio and his son?in?la1, 8ilfredo /alderrama, 1ere convicted offrustrated murder and of t1o counts of frustrated murder for the killing of >ederico /oyon andthe 1ounding of the latter:s 1ife >lorida and his son Birso, at alo, Calanuga, 'apu?'apu, Albay,on the night of !une %#, "$++. Bhe motive for the killing 1as apparently a land dispute bet1eenthe /oyons and petitioner. etitioner and his son?in?la1 1ere sentenced to imprisonment andordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.

etitioner and his son?in?la1 appealed. Only petitioner:s appeal proceeded to 9udgment,

ho1ever, as the appeal of the other accused 1as dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On !une %%, "$$% the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ac5uitting petitioner on the groundthat the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy bet1een him and his son?in?la1. 0e had beenpointed to by a daughter of >ederico /oyon as the companion of /alderrama 1hen the latterbarged into their hut and 1ithout 1arning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled thatbecause petitioner did nothing more, petitioner:s presence at the scene of the crime 1asinsufficient to sho1 conspiracy.



21/54

/ased on his ac5uittal, petitioner filed a claim under 'ep. Act o. 7 *$, sec. (a), 1hichprovides for the payment of compensation to =any person 1ho 1as un9ustly accused, convicted,imprisoned but subse5uently released by virtue of a 9udgment of ac5uittal.= 1 Bhe claim 1as filed1ith the /oard of Claims of the -epartment of !ustice, but the claim 1as denied on the groundthat 1hile petitioner:s presence at the scene of the killing 1as not sufficient to find him guilty

beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there 1as bad blood bet1een him and thedeceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son?in?la1,there 1as basis for finding that he 1as =probably guilty.=

On appeal, respondent &ecretary of !ustice affirmed the /oard:s ruling. &aid the &ecretary of!ustice in his resolution dated March "", "$$ 6

t is believed therefore that the phrase =any person . . . un9ustly accused,convicted and imprisoned= in &ection (a) of '.A. o. 7 *$ refers to an individual1ho 1as 1rongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, therebymaking him =a victim of un9ust imprisonment.= n the instant case, ho1ever,ClaimantLAppellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a reading of thedecision of his ac5uittal sho1s that his e3culpation is not based on hisinnocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.

etitioner brought this petition for revie1 on certiorari . either 'ule nor 'ep. Act o. 7 *$,ho1ever, provides for revie1 by certiorari of the decisions of the &ecretary of !ustice.

onetheless, in vie1 of the importance of the 5uestion tendered, the Court resolved to treat thepetition as a special civil action for certiorari under 'ule # .

etitioner 5uestions the basis of the respondent:s ruling that to be able to recover under sec.

(a) of the la1 the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of 1hich he1as convicted in the trial court. Bhrough counsel he contends that the language of sec. (a) isclear and does not call for interpretation. Bhe =mere fact that the claimant 1as imprisoned for acrime 1hich he 1as subse5uently ac5uitted of is already un9ust in itself,= he contends. Bo denyhis claim because he 1as not declared innocent 1ould be to say that his imprisonment for t1oyears 1hile his appeal 1as pending 1as 9ustified. etitioner argues that there is only onere5uirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. f theprosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent standsand, therefore, there is no reason for re5uiring that he be declared innocent of the crime beforehe can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

etitioner:s contention has no merit. t 1ould re5uire that every time an accused is ac5uitted onappeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he 1as =un9ustly convicted= by thetrial court. &uch a reading of sec. (a) is contrary to petitioner:s professed canon of constructionthat 1hen the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning. t leavesout of the provision in 5uestion the 5ualifying 1ord =un9ustly= so that the provision 1ould simplyread6 =Bhe follo1ing may file claims for compensation before the /oard6 (a) any person 1ho 1asaccused, convicted, imprisoned but subse5uently released by virtue of a 9udgment of ac5uittal.=



22/54

/ut sec. (a) re5uires that the claimant be = unjustly accused, convicted HandI imprisoned.= Bhefact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is ac5uitted is not itself proof that theprevious conviction 1as =un9ust.= An accused may be ac5uitted for a number of reasons and hisconviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. >or e3ample, he may beac5uitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in

1hich case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because 1hile the evidenceagainst him does not satisfy the 5uantum of proof re5uired for conviction, it may nonetheless besufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 n one case the accused, an alien, 1asac5uitted of statutory rape 1ith homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offendedparties 1ho consented to have se3 1ith him. onetheless the accused 1as ordered to paymoral and e3emplary damages and ordered deported. 3 n such a case to pay the accusedcompensation for having been =un9ustly convicted= by the trial court 1ould be utterly inconsistent1ith his liability to the complainant. Ket to follo1 petitioner:s theory such an accused 1ould beentitled to compensation under sec. (a).

Bhe truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence ofinnocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution.

f =accusation is not synonymous 1ith guilt,= 4 so is the presumption of innocence not a proofthereof. t is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order to place onthe prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. t is5uite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has been =un9ustlyconvicted.= As this Court held in a case6

Bhough 1e are ac5uitting the appellant for the crime of rape 1ith homicide, 1eemphasi2e that 1e are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. t is only theconstitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to build

an airtight case for conviction 1hich saved him, not that the facts of unla1fulconduct do not e3ist.

Bo say then that an accused has been =un9ustly convicted= has to do 1ith the manner of hisconviction rather than 1ith his innocence. An accused may on appeal be ac5uitted because hedid not commit the crime, but that doesnot necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an =un9ustconviction.= f his conviction 1as due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence theconviction 1hile erroneous is not un9ust. Bhat is 1hy it is not, on the other hand, correct to sayas does respondent, that under the la1 liability for compensation depends entirely on theinnocence of the accused.

Bhe phrase =un9ustly convicted= has the same meaning as =kno1ingly rendering an un9ust 9udgment= in art. %* of the 'evised enal Code. 8hat this Court held in n re Rafael C . Climaco ! applies6

n order that a 9udge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an un9ust 9udgment, it must be sho1n beyond doubt that the 9udgment is un9ust as it is



23/54

contrary to law or is not supported &y the evidence , and the same 1as made 1ithconscious and deliberate intent to do an in9ustice . . . .

Bo hold a 9udge liable for the rendition of manifestly un9ust 9udgment by reason ofine3cusable negligence or ignorance, it must be sho1n, according to ;roi2ard,

that although he has acted 1ithout malice, he failed to observe in theperformance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care 1hich the la1 isentitled to e3act in the rendering of any public service. egligence and ignoranceare ine3cusable if they imply a manifest in9ustice 1hich cannot be e3plained by areasonable interpretation. ne3cusable mistake only e3ists in the legal concept1hen it implies a manifest in9ustice, that is to say, such in9ustice 1hich cannot bee3plained by a reasonable interpretation, even though there is amisunderstanding or error of the la1 applied, yet in the contrary it results,logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable manner, in thenotorious violation of the legal precept.

ndeed, sec. (a) does not refer solely to an un9ust conviction as a result of 1hich the accused isun9ustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an un9ust accusation. Bhe accused must have been=un9ustly accused, in conse5uence of 1hich he is un9ustly convicted and then imprisoned. t isimportant to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been1rongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also 1rongful. Conversely, if theprosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the re5uired5uantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily un9ust.

Bhe reason is that under 'ule ""%, sec. , the 5uestion for the prosecutor in filing a case incourt is not 1hether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only 1hether =there is

reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is pro&a&lyguilty thereof.= 0ence, an accusation 1hich is based on =probable guilt= is not an un9ustaccusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an un9ust

9udgment but only an erroneous one. Bhe remedy for such error is appeal.

n the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to sho1 that petitioner:s conviction by the trialcourt 1as 1rongful or that it 1as the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence.Bo the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co?accused 1ere inleague, because petitioner is the father?in?la1 of 8ilfredo /alderrama and it 1as petitioner 1hobore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. ot only that. etitioner and his coaccusedarrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their 1ay into it.

Bhe Court of Appeals ruled there 1as no conspiracy only because there 1as no proof that hedid or say anything on the occasion. &aid the appellate court.

/oth eye1itness testimonies fail to sho1 the appellant >elicito /asbacio to havecommitted any act at all. /oth fail to sho1 >elicito /asbacio as having saidanything at all. /oth fail to sho1 >elicito /asbacio as having committed anythingin furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against the



24/54

defendants. t seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on 1hich to conclude thatconspiracy e3isted bet1een actual killer 8ilfredo /alderrama and >elicito/asbacio to commit murder and t1o frustrated murders on that night of !une %#,"$++. t may be asked6 1here 1as the coming together of the t1o defendants toan agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated murder on t1o

countsE 8here 1as /asbacio:s contribution to the commission of the saidcrimesE /asbacio 1as as the record sho1s nothing but part of the darkshado1s of that night. . . .

One may take issue 1ith this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be sho1n by concert ofaction and other circumstances. 8hy 1as petitioner 1ith his son?in?la1E 8hy did theyapparently flee togetherE And 1hat about the fact that there 1as bad blood bet1een petitionerand the victim >ederico /oyonE Bhese 5uestions may no longer be passed upon in vie1 of theac5uittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been un9ustlyaccused, convicted and imprisoned before he 1as released because of his ac5uittal on appeal.8e hold that in vie1 of these circumstances respondent &ecretary of !ustice and the /oard ofClaims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallo1ing petitioner:s claim forcompensation under 'ep. Act o. 7 *$.

80


25/54

CRU%, J.:

Bhe sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent ational 4abor'elations Commission dated October *, "$$%, dismissing the petitioner:s appeal from adecision of the hilippine Overseas


26/54

n addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escro1 the sum of %**,*** 1ith the hilippineational /ank in compliance 1ith &ection "7, 'ule , /ook of the same 'ule, =to primarily

ans1er for valid and legal claims of recruited 1orkers as a result of recruitment violations ormoney claims.=

'e5uired to comment, the &olicitor ;eneral sustains the appeal bond re5uirement but suggestthat the rules cited by the 4'C are applicable only to decisions of the 4abor Arbiters and not of the O


27/54

(reorgani2ing O


28/54

further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to theinterest of labor.

80


29/54

case docketed as &pecial roceeding o. " + of the then Court of >irstnstance (no1 'egional Brial Court) of ampanga and Angeles City.

On !uly $, "$+*, the respondent court issued an order taking cogni2ance of thesaid petition and stating inter alia that6

. . . the Court forbids the payment of any debts, and the delivery of any property o1ing and belonging to said respondents?debtorsfrom other persons, or, to any other persons for the use andbenefit of the same respondents?debtors andLor the transfer of anyproperty by and for the said respondents?debtors to another, uponpetitioners: putting up a bond by 1ay of certified and reputablesureties. (Anne3 ", Comment).

Counsel for the petitioners?creditors informed respondent sheriff Angeles City ofthe aforesaid order (Anne3 %, &id ) and on March %#, "$+", also communicated1ith counsel for the petitioner herein regarding same order, apprising the latterthat =the personal and real property 1hich have been levied upon andLorattached should be preserved till the final determination of the petitionaforementioned.= (Anne3 , &id ).

On April "%, "$+ , petitioners?creditors filed second urgent motion for issuance of insolvency order and resolution of the case, alleging among other things, that in

ovember, "$+%, they filed an urgent motion to issue insolvency order on-ecember %, "$+%, they presented a motion to prohibit the city sheriff of AngelesCity from disposing the personal and real properties of the insolvent debtors,

Carlos ;atmaytan and Beresita ;atmaytan on !anuary "+, "$+ , they ( sic )appealed in the /ulletin Boday issue of even date a ne1s item to the effect that'adiola?Boshiba hil. nc. has already shut do1n its factory, sometime in March"$+ , through their representative, they caused to be investigated the realproperties in the names of Carlos ;atmaytan and Beresita ;atmaytan and they1ere surprised to find out that some of the aforesaid properties 1ere alreadytransferred to 'adiola?Boshiba hil. nc. and that in vie1 of such development, itis their submission that 1ithout an insolvency order and a resolution of the case1hich 1as ripe for resolution as early as March , "$+%, the rights and interest ofpetitioners?creditors 1ould be in9ured and 9eopardi2ed. (Anne3 =C=).

On April " , "$+ , petitioner filed an opposition to the said motion vis-a-vis theprayer that the insolvency order (1hich has not been rendered yet by the court)be annotated on the transfer certificates of title already issued in its name (Anne3=-=).

On April %%, "$+ , 9udgment 1as rendered declaring the insolvency ofrespondents?debtors Carlos ;atmaytan and Beresita ;atmaytan.



30/54

On April %+, "$+ , petitioner filed a supplemental opposition to the same secondurgent motion and motion to direct respondent sheriff to issue a final certificate of sale for the properties covered by BCB os. "+$* and * * in its favor (Anne3=ebruary , "$+ , acting upon petitioner:s motion claiming that o1nership ofcertain real properties of the insolvents had passed to it by virtue of foreclosureproceedings conducted in Civil Case o. $ # of the former Court of >irst

nstance of 'i2al, /ranch , asig, Metro Manila, 1hich properties 1ere notredeemed 1ithin the period of redemption, respondent court issued an orderdisposing, thus6

80irst nstanceof 'i2al, /ranch , asig, Metro Manila, issued a 1rit of preliminary attachmenton >ebruary " , "$+* upon application of the petitioner, as plaintiff, 1hich put upa bond of *,***.**. On March , "$+*, 6** .M., levy on attachment 1asdone in favor of petitioner on the real properties registered in the names of



31/54

spouses Carlos ;atmaytan and Beresita ;atmaytan under BCB os. "+$* and* * of the 'egistry of -eeds of Angeles City, per


32/54

0ence, the instant petition. 0erein petitioner raised t1o issues

". 80O'C< B0< 4 < O> - &C'irst nstance of Angeles City, &pecial roceeding o. " +,1as commenced only on !uly %, "$+*, or more than four ( ) months after the issuance of thesaid attachment. @nder the circumstances, petitioner contends that its lien on the sub9ectproperties overrode the insolvency proceeding and 1as not dissolved thereby.

rivate respondents, on the other hand, relying on &ection 7$ of the said la1, 1hich reads6



33/54

&ec. 7$. 8hen an attachment has been made and is not dissolved before thecommencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertakinggiven by the defendant, if the claim upon 1hich the attachment suit 1ascommenced is proved against the estate of the debtor, the plaintiff may prove thelegal costs and disbursements of the suit, and of the keeping of the property, and

the amount thereof shall be a preferred debt.

and the fact that petitioner and its counsel have full kno1ledge of the proceedings in theinsolvent case, argue that the subse5uent Certificate of &ale on August , "$+", issued in favorof petitioner over the sub9ect properties, 1as issued in bad faith, in violation of the la1 and is note5uitable for the creditors of the insolvent debtors and pursuant to the above 5uoted &ection7$, petitioner should not be entitled to the transfer of the sub9ect properties in its name.

etitioner:s contention is impressed 1ith merit. Bhe provision of the above?5uoted &ection %, of the nsolvency 4a1 is very clear that attachments dissolved are those levied 1ithin one (")month ne3t preceding the commencement of the insolvency proceedings and 9udgmentsvacated and set aside are 9udgments entered in any action, including 9udgment entered bydefault or consent of the debtor, 1here the action 1as filed 1ithin thirty ( *) days immediatelyprior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings. n short, there is a cut off period one (") month in attachment cases and thirty ( *) days in 9udgments entered in actionscommenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. &ection 7$, on the other hand, relied upon byprivate respondents, provides for the right of the plaintiff if the attachment is not dissolvedbefore the commencement of proceedings in insolvency, or is dissolved by an undertaking givenby the defendant, if the claim upon 1hich the attachment suit 1as commenced is proved againstthe estate of the debtor. Bherefore, there is no conflict bet1een the t1o provisions.

/ut even granting that such conflict e3ists, it may be stated that in construing a statute, courtsshould adopt a construction that 1ill give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Bhisrule is e3pressed in the ma3im, ut ma0is valeat 0uam pereat or that construction is to be sought1hich gives effect to the 1hole of the statute its every 1ord. 0ence, 1here a statute issusceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable andbeneficial construction as 1ill render the provision thereof operative and effective andharmonious 1ith each other (!avellana vs. Bayo, # &C'A "* % H"$#%I &tatutory Construction by'uben


34/54

>inally, petitioner correctly argued that the properties in 5uestion 1ere never placed under the 9urisdiction of respondent insolvency court so as to be made available for the payment of claimfiled against the ;atmaytans in the insolvency proceedings.

0ence, the denial by respondent insolvency court to give due course to the attachment and

e3ecution of Civil Case o. $ # of the C> of 'i2al constitutes a free2ing of the disposition ofsub9ect properties by the former 1hich 1ere not 1ithin its 9urisdiction undeniably, a grave abuseof discretion amounting to 1ant of 9urisdiction, correctable by certiorari .

80


35/54

corporations 1ith original charters, as 1ell as the personnel of all localgovernment units. Bhe benefits authori2ed under this Act shall apply to allregular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, 1hohave rendered at least a total of t1o (%) consecutive years of government serviceas of the date of separation. @niformed personnel of the Armed >orces of the

hilippines including those of the C? are e3cluded from the coverage of this Act.

etitioner 4ydia Chua believing that she is 5ualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filedan application on * !anuary "$+$ 1ith respondent ational rrigation Administration ( A)1hich, ho1ever, denied the same instead, she 1as offered separation benefits e5uivalent toone half ("L%) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from "$+*. A recourse bypetitioner to the Civil &ervice Commission yielded negative results. 1 0er letter forreconsideration dated % April "$+$ pleaded thus6

333 333 333

8ith due respect, think the interpretation of the 0onorable Commissioner of 'A##+ does not conform 1ith the beneficent purpose of the la1. Bhe la1 merelyre5uires that a government employee 1hether regular, temporary, emergency, orcasual, should have t1o consecutive years of government service in order to beentitled to its benefits. more than meet the re5uirement. ersons 1ho are notentitled are consultants, e3perts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, thela1 provides that the -epartment of /udget and Management 1ill shoulder acertain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations.Moreover, personnel of these A special pro9ects art entitled to the regular

benefits, such ( sic ) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. Bhere is noreason 1hy 1e should not be entitled to 'A ##+ .

333 333 333 2

-enying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil &ervice Commission (C&C) emphasi2ed6

333 333 333

8e regret to inform you that your re5uest cannot be granted. Bhe provision of&ection ." of !oint -/M?C&C Circular 4etter o. +$?" does not only re5uire an

applicant to have t1o years of satisfactory service on the date ofseparationLretirement but further re5uires said applicant to be on a casual,emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of -ecember %, "$++,the date of enactment of '.A. ##+ . Bhe la1 does not contemplate contractualemployees in the coverage.



36/54

nasmuch as your employment as of -ecember ", "$++, the date of yourseparation from the service, is co?terminous 1ith the A pro9ect 1hich iscontractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.

333 333 333 3

n vie1 of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by 1ay of a special civil action for certiorari ,insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under 'epublic Act o. ##+ . 0erarguments6

t is submitted that '.A. ##+ , as 1ell as &ection ." of the !oint -/M?C&CCircular 4etter o. +$?" re5uires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency,temporary or regular employment status. 4ike1ise, the provisions of &ection %(sic ) of the !oint -/M?C&C Circular 4etter o. ++?", implementing guidelines of'.A. o. ##+ , provides6

=%.


37/54

/ased on the above e3clusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one ofthem. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of A entitled to all the regular benefitsprovided for by the Civil &ervice Commission. &he held a permanent status as

ersonnel Assistant A, a position 1hich belongs to the Administrative &ervice. . . .f casuals and emergency employees 1ere given the benefit of '.A. ##+ 1ith

more reason that this petitioner 1ho 1as holding a permanent status asersonnel Assistant A and has rendered almost " years of faithful, continuous

service in the government should be similarly re1arded by the beneficient ( sic )purpose of the la1. 4

Bhe A and the Civil &ervice Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner:s e3clusion fromthe benefits of 'epublic Act o. ##+ , because6

". etitioner:s employment is co?terminous 1ith the pro9ect per appointment papers kept by the Administrative &ervice in the head office of A (the service record 1as issued by the8atershed Management and


38/54

8ho are regular employees7 Bhe 4abor Code in Art. %+* ( .-. o. $%, as amended) deems anemployment regular 1here the employee has been engaged to perform activities 1hich areusually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. o e5uivalentdefinition can be found in .-. o. +*7 (promulgated on # October "$7 , 1hich superseded theCivil &ervice Act of "$# '.A. o. %%#*) or in the Administrative Code of "$+7 (


39/54

(#) ersonnel of government?o1ned or controlled corporations, 1hetherperforming governmental or proprietary functions, 1ho do not fall under the non?career service and

(7) ermanent laborers, 1hether skilled, semi?skilled, or unskilled. 9

Bhe !on-Career Service , on the other hand, is characteri2ed by6

. . . (") entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitnessutili2ed for the career service and (%) tenure 1hich is limited to a period specifiedby la1, or 1hich is coterminous 1ith that of the appointing authority or sub9ect tohis pleasure, or 1hich is limited to the duration of a particular pro9ect for 1hichpurpose employment 1as made.

ncluded in the non-career service are6

". elective officials and their personal or confidential staff

%. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank 1ho hold their positions at thepleasure of the resident and their personal confidential staff(s)

. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards 1ith fi3ed terms of officeand their personal or confidential staff

. contractual personnel or those 1hose employment in the government is inaccordance 1ith a special contract to undertake a specific 1ork or 9ob re5uiringspecial or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to beaccomplished 1ithin a specific period, 1hich in no case shall e3ceed one yearand performs or accomplishes the specific 1ork or 9ob, under his o1nresponsibility 1ith a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.

. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10

Bhere is another type of non-career employee 6

Casual 1here and 1hen employment is not permanent but occasional,unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. 'illoro2a, "*% hil. 7*

Manuel v. . . ;ocheco 4umber Co., $# hil. $ )

Consider petitioner:s record of service6

&ervice 1ith the government commenced on % -ecember "$7 designated as alaborer holding emergency status 1ith the A @pper ampanga 'iver

ro9ect, ' ' -ivision. 11 >rom % March "$7 to " August "$7 , she 1as aresearch aide 1ith temporary status on the same pro9ect. On " &eptember "$7



40/54

to " -ecember "$7#, she 1as 1ith the A?>


41/54

. Bhe services for the three ( ) years period prior to retirementare continuous and fulfill the service re5uirement for retirement.

8hat substantial differences e3ist, if any, bet1een casual, emergency, seasonal, pro9ect, co?terminous or contractual personnelE All are tenurial employees 1ith no fi3ed term, non?career,

and temporary. Bhe "% May "$+$ C&C letter of denial13

characteri2ed herein petitioner:semployment as co-terminous 1ith the ! A project 1hich in turn 1as contractual in nature. BheO&; says petitioner:s status is co-terminous with the Project . C&C Memorandum Circular o."", series of "$$" ( April "$$") characteri2es the status of a co-terminous employee

( ) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person 1hose entrance in theservice is characteri2ed by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that1hich is sub9ect to his pleasure or co?e3istent 1ith his tenure.

Bhe foregoing status (co?terminous) may be further classified into the follo1ing6

a) co-terminous with the project 8hen the appointment is co?e3istent 1ith the duration of a particular pro9ect for 1hich purposeemployment 1as made or sub9ect to the availability of funds forthe same

b) co-terminous with the appointing authority 1hen appointmentis co?e3istent 1ith the tenure of the appointing authority.

c) co-terminous with the incum&ent 1hen appointment is co?e3istent 1ith the appointee, in that after the resignation,

separation or termination of the services of the incumbent theposition shall be deemed automatically abolished and

d) co-terminous with a specific period , e.g. =co?terminous for aperiod of years= the appointment is for a specific period andupon e3piration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.

t is stressed, ho1ever, that in the last t1o classifications (c) and (d), 1hat istermed co?terminous is the position, and not the appointee?employee. >urther, in(c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbencyin (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.

A co-terminous employee is a non?career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.8e see no solid reason 1hy the latter are e3tended benefits under the including those of the C? . tcan be argued that, e pressio unius est e clusio alterius . Bhe legislature 1ould not have madea specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and confine



42/54

its terms and benefits to those e3pressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso ha&endusest A person, ob9ect or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omittedintentionally. 1 Ket adherence to these legal ma3ims can result in incongruities and in a violationof the e5ual protection clause of the Constitution.

Bhe case of "egurin, et al . v . !*RC, et al .,1!

comes to mind 1here, 1orkers belonging to a 1orkpool, hired and re?hired continuously from one pro9ect to another 1ere considered non?pro9ect?regular and permanent employees.

etitioner 4ydia Chua 1as hired and re?hired in four ( ) successive pro9ects during a span offifteen (" ) years. Although no proof of the e3istence of a 1ork pool can be assumed, herservice record cannot be disregarded.

Art. , &ec. " of the "$+7 Constitution guarantees6 = o person shall be deprived of life, liberty,or property 1ithout due process of la1, nor shall any person be denied the e5ual protection ofthe la1s.=

. . . n "elwa vs . Salas , 4?%# "", Oct. %$, "$##, 8e ruled that the e5ualprotection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and doesnot bar a reasonable classification of the sub9ect of legislation, and aclassification is reasonable 1here (") it is based on substantial distinctions 1hichmake real differences (%) these are germane to the purpose of the la1 ( ) theclassification applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions1hich are substantially identical to those of the present ( ) the classificationapplies only to those 1ho belong to the same class. 1"

Applying the criteria set forth above, the


43/54

because the greater includes the lesser, e3pressed in the Ma3im, in eo plus sit,simper inest et minus . 18

-uring the sponsorship speech of Congressman -ragon (re6


44/54

removal of e3cess personnel but the positions remain, and future appointments can be madethereto.

Co?terminous or pro9ect personnel, on the other hand, 1ho have rendered years of continuousservice should be included in the coverage of the


45/54

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellant!"s#GUILLERMO MANANTAN, $efen$ant appellee#

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

REGALA, J.:

This is an appeal of the Solicito% &ene%al f%o' the o%$e% of the Cou%t of Fi%st Instance of Pan(asinan$is'issin( the info%'ation a(ainst the $efen$ant#

The %eco%$s sho) that the state'ent of the case an$ the facts! as %ecite$ in the b%ief of plaintiff appellant!is co'plete an$ accu%ate# The sa'e is! conse*uentl+! he%e a$opte$! to )it,

In an info%'ation file$ b+ the P%o"incial Fiscal of Pan(asinan in the Cou%t of Fi%st Instance ofthat P%o"ince! $efen$ant &uille%'o Manantan )as cha%(e$ )ith a "iolation Section -. of theRe"ise$ Election Co$e# A p%eli'ina%+ in"esti(ation con$ucte$ b+ sai$ cou%t %esulte$ in thefin$in( a p%obable cause that the c%i'e cha%(e$ as co''itte$ b+ $efen$ant# The%eafte%! the t%ialsta%te$ upon $efen$ant/s plea of not (uilt+! the $efense 'o"e$ to $is'iss the info%'ation on the(%oun$ that as 0ustice of the peace the $efen$ant is one of the office%s enu'e%ate$ in Section -. of the Re"ise$ Election Co$e# The lo)e% cou%t $enie$ the 'otion to $is'iss hol$in( that a 0ustice ofthe peace is )ithin the pu%"ie) Section -.# A secon$ 'otion )as file$ b+ $efense counsel )hocite$ in suppo%t the%eof the $ecision of the Cou%t of Appeals in People "s# Maca%ae(! 1CA R#

No# 2-324 R! -. Off# &a5#! pp# 2674 738 )he%e it )as hel$ that a 0ustice of the peace is e9clu$e$

f%o' the p%ohibition of Section -. of the Re"ise$ Election Co$e# Actin( on this secon$ 'otion to$is'iss! the ans)e% of the p%osecution! the %epl+ of the $efense! an$ the opposition of the

p%osecution! the lo)e% cou%t $is'isse$ the info%'ation a(ainst the accuse$ upon the autho%it+ ofthe %ulin( in the case cite$ b+ the $efense#

Both pa%ties a%e sub'ittin( this case upon the $ete%'ination of this sin(le *uestion of la), Is a 0ustice the peace inclu$e$ in the p%ohibition of Section -. of the Re"ise$ Election Co$e:



46/54

Section -. of the sai$ Co$e %ea$s,

No 0ustice! 0u$(e! fiscal! t%easu%e%! o% assesso% of an+ p%o"ince! no office% o% e'plo+ee of theA%'+! no 'e'be% of the national! p%o"incial! cit+! 'unicipal o% %u%al police fo%ce an$ noclassifie$ ci"il se%"ice office% o% e'plo+ee shall ai$ an+ can$i$ate! o% e9e%t an+ influence in an+

'anne% in a election o% ta;e pa%t the%ein! e9cept to "ote! if entitle$ the%eto! o% to p%ese%"e public peace! if he is a peace office%#

Defen$ant appellee a%(ues that a 0ustice of the peace is not co'p%ehen$e$ a'on( the office%s enu'e%ate$in Section -. of the Re"ise$ Election Co$e# He sub'its the afo%ecite$ section )as ta;en f%o' Section ..

Documents

Statcon Cases Fulltext 3rd Batch