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STAT CON
*Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
1. Socorro Ramirez vs. Hon. court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia
G.R. No. 93833, September 25, 1995
The verbatim transcript produced by the petitioner in support of the civil case for damages she filed against Ester S. Garcia. As a result, Garcia filed a criminal case before RTC of Pasay for violation of RA 4200.
-upon arraignment, MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION (granted)
-Review on Certiorari (CA assailed the RTC’s ruling):
Judge acted in “grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari”
-petition (SC)
Issues:
1.WON R.A. 4200 applies to tapping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.
2. WON the substance must be alleged in the information. WON RA 4200 applies to private conversation
Held:
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
Section 1 of RA 4200 entitled “An act to Prohibit and Oenalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described
-it makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
- qualifier “any” underscores the intent of the statue to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording. (SUPPORTS THE VIEW HELD BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, penalize even those privy to the private communication)
-nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
-the mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 42400.
-finally, the petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of RA 4200 does not include “private conversation” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word ‘communication’ to a point of absurdity. It came from the Latin word “communicare” meaning 'to share or to impart’. Broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of 'meanings or thoughts’ which are likely to include emotionally charge exchange between the petitioner and private respondent.
2. Plain Meaning or Verba Legis
2.1 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. National Labor Relations Commision and Imelda Salazar
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992
Held:
Art. 279 of the Labor Code
“Security of Tenure” - …… An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement….
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2.Security of Tenure - shall not terminate an employee except for a just cause
Sec. 3 Rinstatement - unjustly dismissed shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages.
->index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention)
->verba legis non es recendum.
->no ground for the non-application of the law to the case at bar for it dies not clearly include in the exceptions mentioned in the statute.
*When the lanaguage of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.
2.2. Felecito Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
G.R. No. 109445, November 7, 1994
Issue:
WON the term “unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment acquittal” refer to all kinds of accustion and conviction.
Held:
petitioner’s contention has no merit. RA 7309, Sec.3 (a) which provides for the payment of compensation (from Board of Claims of the DOJ) to “any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.”
But sec.3 requires that the claimant be “unjustly accused”
-an accused maybe acquitted for a number of reasons. The evidence against him might not have satisfied the quantum of proof required for conviction.
- any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
*In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.
3.1. JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Ulpianio L. Delos Santos
Issue:
WON petitioner was still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC after having posted a total bond of 150,000 and place in escrow the amount of 200,000 as required by the POEA Rules.
Held:
Yes, the POEA Rules are clear. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.Under the petitioner’s interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it had posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would under a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VIII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
PETITION DISMISSED.
3.2. Radiola Toshiba Philippines, Inc. va. The Intermediate Appellate Court
Issue: WON the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
Held: on this issue, Section 32of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended)
Petitioner’s contention is impressed with merit. There seems no conflict between the two provisions as their language speaks clearly.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it maybe stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if it all possible.
The rule is expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valen quam pereat (that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statue -its every word.)
-hence, where a statue is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction asa will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
4. A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statue was enacted should be rejected.
4.1. Manuel T.De Guia vs. COMELEC
This is a petition for ceriorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent COMELEC of its resolution 2383, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportinmen, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sanguniang Bayan……
Prays for the reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paranaque and all other municipalities in Metro Manila. He claims that:
Par C of Sec.3 - does not specify when the members of their Sanguniang Bayan will be elected by ditrict.
And consequently lean on Par D - to support his view that SB should continue to be lected at large in May 11, 1992 elections.
Issue:
The proper interpretation of Sec.3 of RA No. 7166, Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms for May 11, 1992 elections
Held:
We realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. The framers themselves admitted that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations.
However, no law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.
- If the statute needs construction, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act.
- Statutes should be construed:
1. In the light of the object to be achieved
2. The evil and mischief to be suppressed
->herein, the reason for the promulgation RA7166 is shown in the explanatory note of S.B. No. 1861 which stated that it specifically seeks to reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein the members of SP,SP, and SB be elected NOT at large, but by district.
*Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
4.2. Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, Et Al.
Issue:
WON petitioners have right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, WON their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
Held:
we rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.
The statute is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase
`Applicant-pantentees
`His widow
`Or other legal heirs.
Elena, being the daughter of Encisos, is a legal heir. Her act of buying the land from her parents does not disqualify her from being a legal heir mentioned in Sec. 119. Ube lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction would contravene the very purpose of the statute which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state had gratuitously given him.
There is no gainsaying that allowing Elena and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. THE MAXIM.
*When the reason of law ceases, the law itself ceases.
4.3. B/Gen. Jose Commendador, Et al. Vs. B/Gen. Demetri Camera, Et Al.
->petitionersare officers of the AFP facing prosecutions for their alleged participations in the failed coup d'etat that took place on 12/1-9/1989.
-> manifested that they we exercising their right to RAISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
Held:
cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. Ratio legis est anima.
Applying these rules; we hole that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in PD. 39 (by Marcos) became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. As result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 Com Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to P.C.
-even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been CAST OUT under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the “iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.”
* Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
5.1. Lydia O. Chua vs. Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation Administration
CSC letter of denial contends that petitioner'semolyment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head of NIA.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s status as co-terminious employee is excluded from the benefits of RA No. 6683
Held:
The statute was enacted pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy. it provides for benefits forf early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminus or contractual personnel?
-All are tenurial employeer with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary.
-A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under Early Retirement Law but the former are not.
-Law specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including of the PC-INP.
->expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
->casus omissus pro omisso habendus est.
->ex necessitate legis.
->in eo plus sit, sunperinest et minus
-No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application which create gaps in the law.
:One of the rules of Stat Con used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.
-every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose.
PETITION GRANTED.
5.2 City of Manila and City Treasurer vs. Judge Amador E. Gomez of the CFI of Manila and ESSO Philippines
An ordinance imposing an additional annual realty tax of ½% to 1-½% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila.
Issue: The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax.
Held: we hold the doctrine of implications in Stat Con sustains the City of Manila’s contention. As provided in Sec.3 of Real Property Tax Code (city council may by ordinance impose a realty tax of not less than ½ of 1% but not more than 2%), the obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporation.
->“that which is plainly implied in the language of the statue is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.”
*Casus Omisus: The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
6.1. Peopleof the Philippinesvs. Guillermo Manatan
Issue: WON justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Held: Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Sec.54. Submits that the aforecited section was taken from Sec.449 of the Revised Administrative Code(Persons prohibited from influencing elections)
-When therefore, Sec.54 of the REC omitted the words “justice of the peace”, the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
-It is to be noted that under Sec.449, the word “judge” was modified or qualified by the phrases “of the First Instance, and justice of the peace.” while under Section 54 on the REC, no such modification exists and as intended to comprehend all kinds of judges.
-The rule of casus ommisus has no applicability to the case at bar.
:it can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
-defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that said rule, being restrictive in nature, and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statues should be strictly interpreted against the state.
:the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from certainty that a person, thing, or object has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.
-herein, there has been no such omission; there has only been a substitution of terms.
*Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.
7.1 J.M. tuasonand Co. Inc., Et Al. vs. Hon. Hermino C. Mariano, Manueka Aquial, Maria Aquial, Spouses Jose M. Cordovo and Saturnina C. Cordovo
`Complaint in forma pauperis in the CFI of Rizal, Pasig.
`Prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Rizal which `the acquired by their father by means of a Spanish Title issued to him on May 10, 1877.
Petition for certiorari
Issue: WON OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefromcan be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova.
Held: The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencia in 3 cases invalidating OCT No. 735 is annexed to the complain of the Aquials, and which they cited to support their action.
On appeal to this court, the decision was REVERSED.
-the ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applies in various cases, wherein the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld.
-considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
: it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordovo cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
->“It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, and consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants: interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
*When the law does not distinguish, courts should notdistinguis. The rule, foundedon logic, is a corollary ofthe principle that general words and phrases of a statuteshould ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.
8.1. PhilippineBritish Assurance Co., Inc. vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appelate Court
The writ of execution returned unsatisfied
:Sycwin’s petition that the surety (herein petetioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. GRANTED
:review on certiorari
Held:
Rule 57:
Under section 5 and 12 - provided that the counterbond is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment” that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.
Under Section 17 - when “the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part,” it is only then that “payment of the judgment shall become charged on suchcounterbond.”
->it is well-recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
:corollary of the principle that
1.general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.
2. Where the law does not make any exception, courts may nor except something therefrom, unless there is a compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
-> the rule therefore, is that the counter bond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provision of Section 5, Rule 57 of theRukes of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal.
8.2. Juan Pilar vs. COMELEC
Issue: WON the petitioner can be considered a candidate despite thewithdrawal of his certificate of candidacy.
Held: Sec.14 of RA No. 7166 that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contribution and expenditures.
-In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualificationas to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
-Sec. 13 Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.”
-Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word “shall.” : as a general rule, the use of the word in a statue implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty.
-particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning where public interest is involved.
8.3.People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista and Guildo S. Tugonon
->private respondent filed a petition for probation (granted by the RTC)
Issue: WON the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.
Held: The court holds that it did.
P.D. No. 968 previously allowed such kind of probation.
However, when it was amended by PD No. 1990 which took precisely took effect to put a stop to the practice of appealingfrom judgment of conviction even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for probation only if the accused fails in his bid.
-Private respondent argues,however, that a distinction should be drawn betweenmeritorious (like his appeal) and unmeritorious appeal.
:But the law does not make any distinction and neither should the court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only given probation.
*EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATUE
When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
8.4.Cecilio De Villa vs. Court Appeals
->the petitioner argues thatthe check in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and therefore not covered by the law.
BP Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law):
For checks either drawn and issued in the Philippines, though payable outside thereof are WITHIN the coverage of this law.
Held: It will be noted that law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case.
:hence, the cardinal principle that where the law does not distinguish…… Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception…..
*General Terms maybe restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
9.1. Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro M. Jimenez as Auditor General
Issue: WON the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof.
Held: The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in the law refs only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that “general terms must be restricted by specific words, with the result that general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose.”
-The rule however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
-In the case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.
:thus 'fertilizer’ and 'poultry feed’ do not fall under category of food or food products because they are used in the farming and poultry, respectively.
-since the law does not distinguish between “stabilizer and flavors” used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense.
->the rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with the, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely.
:it is intended merely as an AID in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rule of construction.
*Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is where generalwords follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular, and specific meaning, such general wordsare not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
10.1. Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
Issue: WON private respondent maybe investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG for violation of RA Nos. 3019 and1379
Held: According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former Pres. Marcos. They cite the PCGG’s jurisdiction over
Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of ill-gotten wealth was done during the administration of President Marcos.
However, what has to be inquired into is whether the private respondent acted as a “subordinate” of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of EO No.1 (law creating PCGG), when he unlawfully acquired the properties.
:whereas clause of EO No.1 include the close associates both here and abroad.
-applying the rule: the term “subordinate” used in E.O. No. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres.Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family memeber, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
->The PCGG therefore is enjoined from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent.
Posted 3 years ago
STAT CON
*Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
1. Socorro Ramirez vs. Hon. court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia
G.R. No. 93833, September 25, 1995
The verbatim transcript produced by the petitioner in support of the civil case for damages she filed against Ester S. Garcia. As a result, Garcia filed a criminal case before RTC of Pasay for violation of RA 4200.
-upon arraignment, MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION (granted)
-Review on Certiorari (CA assailed the RTC’s ruling):
Judge acted in “grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari”
-petition (SC)
Issues:
1.WON R.A. 4200 applies to tapping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.
2. WON the substance must be alleged in the information. WON RA 4200 applies to private conversation
Held:
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice.
Section 1 of RA 4200 entitled “An act to Prohibit and Oenalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described
-it makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.
- qualifier “any” underscores the intent of the statue to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording. (SUPPORTS THE VIEW HELD BY THE RESPONDENT COURT, penalize even those privy to the private communication)
-nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute.
-the mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 42400.
-finally, the petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of RA 4200 does not include “private conversation” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word ‘communication’ to a point of absurdity. It came from the Latin word “communicare” meaning 'to share or to impart’. Broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of 'meanings or thoughts’ which are likely to include emotionally charge exchange between the petitioner and private respondent.
2. Plain Meaning or Verba Legis
2.1 Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Communications vs. National Labor Relations Commision and Imelda Salazar
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992
Held:
Art. 279 of the Labor Code
“Security of Tenure” - …… An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement….
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:
Sec. 2.Security of Tenure - shall not terminate an employee except for a just cause
Sec. 3 Rinstatement - unjustly dismissed shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages.
->index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention)
->verba legis non es recendum.
->no ground for the non-application of the law to the case at bar for it dies not clearly include in the exceptions mentioned in the statute.
*When the lanaguage of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.
2.2. Felecito Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
G.R. No. 109445, November 7, 1994
Issue:
WON the term “unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment acquittal” refer to all kinds of accustion and conviction.
Held:
petitioner’s contention has no merit. RA 7309, Sec.3 (a) which provides for the payment of compensation (from Board of Claims of the DOJ) to “any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.”
But sec.3 requires that the claimant be “unjustly accused”
-an accused maybe acquitted for a number of reasons. The evidence against him might not have satisfied the quantum of proof required for conviction.
- any conviction even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
*In interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.
3.1. JMM Promotions and Management, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission and Ulpianio L. Delos Santos
Issue:
WON petitioner was still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC after having posted a total bond of 150,000 and place in escrow the amount of 200,000 as required by the POEA Rules.
Held:
Yes, the POEA Rules are clear. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.Under the petitioner’s interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow money it had posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and Section 17.
The rule is that a construction that would under a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and escrow agreement under Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6, Rule V, Book VIII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of the POEA.
PETITION DISMISSED.
3.2. Radiola Toshiba Philippines, Inc. va. The Intermediate Appellate Court
Issue: WON the levy on attachment in favor of the petitioner is dissolved by the insolvency proceedings against respondent spouses commenced four months after said attachment.
Held: on this issue, Section 32of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956, as amended)
Petitioner’s contention is impressed with merit. There seems no conflict between the two provisions as their language speaks clearly.
But even granting that such conflict exists, it maybe stated that in construing a statute, courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if it all possible.
The rule is expressed in the maxim, ut res magis valen quam pereat (that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statue -its every word.)
-hence, where a statue is susceptible of more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction asa will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other.
4. A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statue was enacted should be rejected.
4.1. Manuel T.De Guia vs. COMELEC
This is a petition for ceriorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by respondent COMELEC of its resolution 2383, adopting rules and guidelines in the apportinmen, by district, of the number of elective members of the Sanguniang Bayan……
Prays for the reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it affects the municipality of Paranaque and all other municipalities in Metro Manila. He claims that:
Par C of Sec.3 - does not specify when the members of their Sanguniang Bayan will be elected by ditrict.
And consequently lean on Par D - to support his view that SB should continue to be lected at large in May 11, 1992 elections.
Issue:
The proper interpretation of Sec.3 of RA No. 7166, Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms for May 11, 1992 elections
Held:
We realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the law. The framers themselves admitted that said provisions were susceptible of varied interpretations.
However, no law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile.
- If the statute needs construction, the most dominant in that process is the purpose of the act.
- Statutes should be construed:
1. In the light of the object to be achieved
2. The evil and mischief to be suppressed
->herein, the reason for the promulgation RA7166 is shown in the explanatory note of S.B. No. 1861 which stated that it specifically seeks to reduce the number of positions to be voted for by providing therein the members of SP,SP, and SB be elected NOT at large, but by district.
*Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.
4.2. Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, Et Al.
Issue:
WON petitioners have right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, WON their right to repurchase had already prescribed.
Held:
we rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property and their right to do so subsists.
The statute is explicit that only three classes of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase
`Applicant-pantentees
`His widow
`Or other legal heirs.
Elena, being the daughter of Encisos, is a legal heir. Her act of buying the land from her parents does not disqualify her from being a legal heir mentioned in Sec. 119. Ube lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction would contravene the very purpose of the statute which is to give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that the state had gratuitously given him.
There is no gainsaying that allowing Elena and her husband to repurchase the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. THE MAXIM.
*When the reason of law ceases, the law itself ceases.
4.3. B/Gen. Jose Commendador, Et al. Vs. B/Gen. Demetri Camera, Et Al.
->petitionersare officers of the AFP facing prosecutions for their alleged participations in the failed coup d'etat that took place on 12/1-9/1989.
-> manifested that they we exercising their right to RAISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
Held:
cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. Ratio legis est anima.
Applying these rules; we hole that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in PD. 39 (by Marcos) became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 2045. As result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 Com Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to P.C.
-even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been CAST OUT under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the “iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.”
* Doctrine of necessary implications. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
5.1. Lydia O. Chua vs. Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation Administration
CSC letter of denial contends that petitioner'semolyment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head of NIA.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s status as co-terminious employee is excluded from the benefits of RA No. 6683
Held:
The statute was enacted pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy. it provides for benefits forf early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminus or contractual personnel?
-All are tenurial employeer with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary.
-A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under Early Retirement Law but the former are not.
-Law specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including of the PC-INP.
->expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
->casus omissus pro omisso habendus est.
->ex necessitate legis.
->in eo plus sit, sunperinest et minus
-No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application which create gaps in the law.
:One of the rules of Stat Con used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.
-every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose.
PETITION GRANTED.
5.2 City of Manila and City Treasurer vs. Judge Amador E. Gomez of the CFI of Manila and ESSO Philippines
An ordinance imposing an additional annual realty tax of ½% to 1-½% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila.
Issue: The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax.
Held: we hold the doctrine of implications in Stat Con sustains the City of Manila’s contention. As provided in Sec.3 of Real Property Tax Code (city council may by ordinance impose a realty tax of not less than ½ of 1% but not more than 2%), the obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporation.
->“that which is plainly implied in the language of the statue is as much a part of it as that which is expressed.”
*Casus Omisus: The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
6.1. Peopleof the Philippinesvs. Guillermo Manatan
Issue: WON justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Held: Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the officers enumerated in Sec.54. Submits that the aforecited section was taken from Sec.449 of the Revised Administrative Code(Persons prohibited from influencing elections)
-When therefore, Sec.54 of the REC omitted the words “justice of the peace”, the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
-It is to be noted that under Sec.449, the word “judge” was modified or qualified by the phrases “of the First Instance, and justice of the peace.” while under Section 54 on the REC, no such modification exists and as intended to comprehend all kinds of judges.
-The rule of casus ommisus has no applicability to the case at bar.
:it can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.
-defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that said rule, being restrictive in nature, and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statues should be strictly interpreted against the state.
:the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from certainty that a person, thing, or object has been omitted from a legislative enumeration.
-herein, there has been no such omission; there has only been a substitution of terms.
*Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.
7.1 J.M. tuasonand Co. Inc., Et Al. vs. Hon. Hermino C. Mariano, Manueka Aquial, Maria Aquial, Spouses Jose M. Cordovo and Saturnina C. Cordovo
`Complaint in forma pauperis in the CFI of Rizal, Pasig.
`Prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Rizal which `the acquired by their father by means of a Spanish Title issued to him on May 10, 1877.
Petition for certiorari
Issue: WON OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefromcan be questioned at this late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova.
Held: The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencia in 3 cases invalidating OCT No. 735 is annexed to the complain of the Aquials, and which they cited to support their action.
On appeal to this court, the decision was REVERSED.
-the ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applies in various cases, wherein the validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was once more upheld.
-considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
: it becomes evident that respondents Aquial and Cordovo cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
->“It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, and consuming the court’s time and energies at the expense of other litigants: interest rei publicae ut finis sit litium.
*When the law does not distinguish, courts should notdistinguis. The rule, foundedon logic, is a corollary ofthe principle that general words and phrases of a statuteshould ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.
8.1. PhilippineBritish Assurance Co., Inc. vs. The Honorable Intermediate Appelate Court
The writ of execution returned unsatisfied
:Sycwin’s petition that the surety (herein petetioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. GRANTED
:review on certiorari
Held:
Rule 57:
Under section 5 and 12 - provided that the counterbond is intended to secure the payment of "any judgment” that the attaching creditor may recover in the action.
Under Section 17 - when “the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part,” it is only then that “payment of the judgment shall become charged on suchcounterbond.”
->it is well-recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
:corollary of the principle that
1.general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance.
2. Where the law does not make any exception, courts may nor except something therefrom, unless there is a compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it.
-> the rule therefore, is that the counter bond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provision of Section 5, Rule 57 of theRukes of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution of a judgment pending appeal.
8.2. Juan Pilar vs. COMELEC
Issue: WON the petitioner can be considered a candidate despite thewithdrawal of his certificate of candidacy.
Held: Sec.14 of RA No. 7166 that “every candidate” has the obligation to file his statement of contribution and expenditures.
-In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualificationas to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
-Sec. 13 Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to “all candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy.”
-Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word “shall.” : as a general rule, the use of the word in a statue implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty.
-particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning where public interest is involved.
8.3.People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista and Guildo S. Tugonon
->private respondent filed a petition for probation (granted by the RTC)
Issue: WON the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent’s application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.
Held: The court holds that it did.
P.D. No. 968 previously allowed such kind of probation.
However, when it was amended by PD No. 1990 which took precisely took effect to put a stop to the practice of appealingfrom judgment of conviction even if the sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for probation only if the accused fails in his bid.
-Private respondent argues,however, that a distinction should be drawn betweenmeritorious (like his appeal) and unmeritorious appeal.
:But the law does not make any distinction and neither should the court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only given probation.
*EXCEPTIONS IN THE STATUE
When the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it.
8.4.Cecilio De Villa vs. Court Appeals
->the petitioner argues thatthe check in question was drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, and therefore not covered by the law.
BP Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law):
For checks either drawn and issued in the Philippines, though payable outside thereof are WITHIN the coverage of this law.
Held: It will be noted that law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case.
:hence, the cardinal principle that where the law does not distinguish…… Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception…..
*General Terms maybe restricted by specific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose. The rule is applicable only to cases wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
9.1. Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs. Hon. Pedro M. Jimenez as Auditor General
Issue: WON the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law so as to entitle it to refund under section 2 thereof.
Held: The ruling of the Auditor General that the term “stabilizer and flavors” as used in the law refs only to those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that “general terms must be restricted by specific words, with the result that general language will be limited by the specific language which indicates the statute’s object and purpose.”
-The rule however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class.
-In the case at bar, it is true that the term “stabilizer and flavors” is preceded by a number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification.
:thus 'fertilizer’ and 'poultry feed’ do not fall under category of food or food products because they are used in the farming and poultry, respectively.
-since the law does not distinguish between “stabilizer and flavors” used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense.
->the rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with the, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely.
:it is intended merely as an AID in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rule of construction.
*Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is where generalwords follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular, and specific meaning, such general wordsare not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
10.1. Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson
Issue: WON private respondent maybe investigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG for violation of RA Nos. 3019 and1379
Held: According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a “subordinate” of former Pres. Marcos. They cite the PCGG’s jurisdiction over
Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of ill-gotten wealth was done during the administration of President Marcos.
However, what has to be inquired into is whether the private respondent acted as a “subordinate” of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of EO No.1 (law creating PCGG), when he unlawfully acquired the properties.
:whereas clause of EO No.1 include the close associates both here and abroad.
-applying the rule: the term “subordinate” used in E.O. No. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with former Pres.Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family memeber, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
->The PCGG therefore is enjoined from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent.
Posted 3 years ago
