Statcon Reviewer.docx

8/10/2019 Statcon Reviewer.docx

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I. Memorize Verbatim, Definition

Verba Legis - plain- meaning rule when the statute is plain and unambiguous, it warrants an ordinary meaning

Basis: Index amini sermo est (speech is the index of the intention) Presumptions:

a. words correctly express intentionb. the statute says what it means and means what is says there - SIR

Stare Decisis -- Stand by decisions - when the SC has laid down a principle applicable tocertain set of facts, it shall adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases wherethe facts are substantially the same

Reason: For certainty and stability in the legal system. Rule: Article 8 of the Civil code - judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws

or the constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the philippines. - SIR

Ratio Legis - Spirit rather than the letter of statute determines construction - SIR

Index Animi Sermo Est - speech is the index of the mind or speech is the index ofintention

The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used wordsadvisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in thestatute.

Ejusdem Generis - of the same kind or specie The general rule is that where a general word of phrase follows an enumeration of

particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the

general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, thingsor cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.( Agpalo, 308-9 )

Requisites: ( Um, easier to memorize it this way, I guess. Ignore if otherwise. )1. a statute contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by

a general word or phrase;2. the particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;3. the enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not

merely by examples; and4. there is no indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases

a broader meaning( Agpalo, 313-4 )

Expresio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius - expression of the one is exclusion of the other It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,

thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. ( Agpalo, 318 )

Noscitur A Sociis - associated words Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of

various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by


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considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.( Agpalo, 302 )

Casus Omissus [Pro Omisso Habendus Est] - an omitted case A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been

omitted intentionally. ( Agpalo, 336 )

Ubi Lex Non Distinguit, Nec Nos Distinguere Debemus - Where the law does notdistinguish, the court should not distinguish. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and

phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and generalsignificance. ( Agpalo, 289-290 )

Strictissimi Juris - Follow the law strictly.

Dura Lex Sed Lex - The law may be harsh, but it is still the law. A statute, being the will of the legislature, should be applied in exactly the way the

legislature has expressed itself clearly in the law. ( Agpalo, 208 )

Reddendo Singula Singulis - Referring to each; or referring each phrase or expression toits appropriate object, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should betaken distributively. ( Agpalo, 339 )

II. Memorize the statutes that are -CHECK PDF NI SIR

A. Strictly construed 1. Penal in nature 2. Authorizing expropriation

3. Granting privileges

4. Ground for removal of officials 5. Naturalization 6. Imposing taxes 7. Granting tax exemptions 8. Authorizing suits against government (SIR)

B. Liberally construed 1. Social legislation 2. Election laws 3. Veteran and Pension laws 4. Amnesty proclamation

5. Adoption laws 6. Rules of court (SIR)

C. Mandatory 1. Conferring power 2. Granting benefits 3. Prescribing time to take action or appeal 4. Prescribing qualifications for office


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5. Prescribing jurisdictional requirements 6. Concerning public auction (SIR)

D. Directory 1. Prescribing manner of judicial action 2. Requiring rendition of decision within prescribed period (SIR)

E. Prospective 1. Penal laws 2. Substantive in nature 3. Affecting vested rights 4. Affecting obligations of contract 5. Repealing and Amendatory acts (SIR)

F. Retrospective 1. Penal laws (when favorable to the accused)

2. Procedural laws 3. Curative statutes 4. Police power legislations 5. Statutes relating to appeals (SIR)

III. Cases

1. Agencia Exquisite v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Under the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, it behoves that the Court to

apply its previous ruling in Lhuillier to the case under consideration.Once a case hasbeen decided one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue, asin the present case, should be decided in the same manner.

o lending investors are not pawnshops for the purpose of imposing the 5%percentage tax. -SIR

2. Celestial Nickel v. MicroasiaIn the interpretation of ambiguous provisions, history of enactment of laws

may be used as an extrinsic aids. Based on the grant of implied power to terminatemining contracts under previous laws or issuances ( PD463, EO221, EO279) thePhilippine Mining Act should be construed as continuation of legislative intent toauthorize the DENR secretary to cancel mineral agreements on account of violationsof the terms and conditions thereof.

3. Garcia v. SSSa. the liability imposed under SSS law does not preclude liability for unremitted amount.Relevant section 28(f) is Sec 22(a) of the same law, which provides that every employer isrequired to deduct and remit such contributions b. (kulang) - SIR

4. Pagcor v. Phil E-gaming


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vested in the Sangguniang Bayan. Therefore, she cannot issue the said permit inasmuch asthere was no ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the same. Canetthen sued Decena on the ground that he should be given a permit based on the 1998resolution allowing him to operate a cockpit as by virtue of local municipal tax ordinanceswhich generally provide for the issuance of a mayors permit for the operation ofbusinesses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Decena can be compelled to issue a permit sans a municipalordinance which would empower her to do so.

HELD: No. To compel Decena to issue the mayors permit would not only be a violation ofthe explicit provisions of Section 447 of the Local Government Code of 1991, but would alsobe an undue encroachment on Decenas administrative prerogatives. Further, the 1998resolution allowing Canet to operate cockpits cannot be implemented without an ordinanceallowing the operation of a cockpit (ordinance vs resolution). The tax ordinances Canetmentioned contain general provisions for the issuance of business permits but do notcontain specific provisions prescribing the reasonable fees to be paid in the operation of

cockpits and other gamefowl activities.

9. Davao Oriental Electric Coop v. Prov Davao Oriental FIRB Resolution is crystal clear in stating that tax exemption privileges are restored

effective July 1, 1987. The language of the law is plain and unambiguous. When thelanguage of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must me take to meanexactly what is says.

o President Cory Aquino encouraged electric cooperatives through FIRBREsolution which granted a tax exemption.

o Davao Electric construed the tax exemption as retroactive, to include its realproperty taxes since 1984. -SIR

10. Perfecto v. Meer Collection of income tax from salaries of judicial officers is diminution of their salaries

in violation of the constitutional provision. Reason behind the exemption is to preserve the independence of the judiciary,

which is of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxingtheir salaries. - SIR

11. Endencia v. David Interpretation of the Constitution and the statutes is the exclusive jurisdiction of

judiciary In enacting laws, legislative may not provide therein that it be interpreted in such a

way that it may not violate Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of thecourts in their tasks of interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretationprovided in said statute runs counter to previous interpretation already given in acase by the supreme court. -SIR

12. Free Farmers vs. CA


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The literal import, if given effect, will defeat the purpose of Act which is to grantlaborers share in sugar produce legislative meaning is to give laborers share for aslong as sugar is produced and planters receive increased participation

Thus, legislative intent is to make Act operative irrespective of whether there exists amilling agreement between central and sugar planters. (kulang) - SIR

13. Manila Prince Hotel v. GSISFACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, MPH and Malaysian FirmRenong Berhad. MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share.RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yetto be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the FilipinoFirst policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution**, but GSISrefused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the saleto RB.

RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that: 1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law

because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under nationalpatrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence beproclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This isin light of the Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. TheConstitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it isdeemed written in every statute and contract. Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary

meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refersnot only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very wellused the term natural resources , but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It alsorefers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not onlyour lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty ofour people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore mute witnessto the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence isimpressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle forsovereignty, independence and nationhood.

Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to

individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The termqualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who canmake a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence andefficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment toFilipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such anindiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good.


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In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has tobe made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former.

14. Marcelo v. Cruz

Defendant Fernando Cruz sold his property with an area of 13,856 square meters todefendant Servando Flores pursuant to a deed of sale ( Kasulatan ng Bilihan) datedNovember 3, 1968 (Exh. C) which sale, includes the encroached portion (7,540 squaremeters of plaintiffs property) Defendant Fernando Cruz heretofore purchased the saidproperty from Engracia dela Cruz and Vicente Marta and Florentino all surnamedSarmiento, pursuant to a Kasulatan ng Partisyon sa Labas ng Hukuman at BilihangPatulayan dated November 19, 1960 (Exh. D) covering an area of 6,000 squaremeters. The Tax Declaration No. 4482 (Exh. E) covering the property in the name of JorgeSarmiento and Engracia Cruz covered an area of 6,800 [3] square meters. As soon as the

said property was sold to Fernando Cruz, the adjoining property described and classified as parang with an area of 7,856 square meters was declared by said Fernando Cruz in hisname which circumstance, increased his landholding to 13,856 square meters (Exh.F). The said property was subsequently sold by defendant Fernando Cruz to defendantServando Flores.

Held: We think that this contention is based on a misconception of the scope and effect ofthe provisions of this article of the Code in its application to ordinary prescription. It isevident that by a titulo verdadero y valido in this connection we are not to understand atitulo que por si solo tiene fuerza de transferir el dominio sin necesidad de la prescricion (atitle which of itself is sufficient to transfer the ownership without the necessity of the lapse ofthe prescription period); and we accept the opinion of a learned Spanish law writer whoholds that the titulo verdadero y valido as used in this article of the code prescribes a titulocolorado and not merely putativo; a titulo colorado being one which a person has whenhe buys a thing, in good faith, from one whom he believes to be the owner, and a tituloputativo being one which is supposed to have preceded the acquisition of a thing, althoughin fact it did not, as might happen when one is in possession of a thing in the belief that ithad been bequeathed to him. (Viso Derecho Civil, Parte Segunda, p. 541) [20] The records of the case amply supports the holding of the appellate court that therequirements for ordinary prescription hereinabove described have indeed been duly met; itexplained: In the instant case, appellant Servando Flores took possession of the controverted portionin good faith and with just title. This is so because the said portion of 7,540 square meters

was an integral part of that bigger tract of land which he bought from Fernando Cruz underpublic document (Exh. I) As explicitly mentioned in the document of sale (Exh. I) executedin 1968, the disputed portion referred to as parang was included in the sale to appellantFlores. Parenthetically, at the time of the sale, the whole area consisting of the riceland andpasture land was already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Fernando Cruz (Exh.F) and further surveyed in his favor (Exhs. 3&4). Hence, appellant Flores possession of theentire parcel which includes the portion sought to be recovered by appellees was not only inthe concept of an owner but also public, peaceful and uninterrupted. While it is true that the
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possession of the entire area by his predecessor-in-interest (Fernando Cruz) may not havebeen peaceful as it was indeed characterized with violence which resulted in the death ofJose Marcelo, this cannot be said of appellant Flores possession of the property, in respect of which no evidence to the contrary appears on record. [21] This Court finds no cogent reasons to reverse the above findings of the appellate court andthus gives its affirmance to the assailed decision. WHEREFORE , the petitioner for review on certiorari is DENIED. No costs.

15. Chua v. CSCFACTS: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntaryseparation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due toreorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 ofthe Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of theprogram, filed an application with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one

half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980, or almostfifteen (15) years in four (4) successive governmental projects. A recourse by petitioner tothe Civil Service Commission yielded negative results, citing that her position is coterminouswith the NIA project which is contractual in nature and thus excluded by the enumerationsunder Sec.3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1, i.e. casual, emergency,temporary or regular employment. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court by way of aspecial civil action for certiorari .

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic ActNo. 6683.

HELD: YES. Petition was granted. RATIO: Petitioner was established to be a coterminous employee, a non-career civilservant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no solid reasonwhy the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not.It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement toregular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from thebenefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can beargued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in this case isthe doct r ine of necessary imp licat ion which holds that what is implied in a statute isas much a part thereof as that which is expressed . [T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC ofpetitioners application for early retir ement benefits under R.A. No. 6683 is unreasonable,

unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirementwithin a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. In the interest ofsubstantial justice, her application must be granted; after all she served the government notonly for two (2) years the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15)years in four (4) successive governmental projects.
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16. Batungbakal v. NDCFACTS: On February 14, 1939, Batungbakal was appointed as a cash and propertyexaminer by the Auditor General in National Development Company. On August 24, 1945,Batungbakal was reassigned as a property examiner in the same company. However, onDecember 31, 1946, he was suspended from the office by the Investigation Committee. Andon April 17, 1947, Batungbakal has received a notice for dismissal. It was stated in the saidnotice that according to the findings of the Investigation Committee, Batungbakal has beenfound to have committed gross negligence in the performance of his duty to the detriment ofthe company.

In 1948, Honorable e La Costa, the chairman of Investigation Committee passed tothe office of the President through the Department of Secretary the results of theirinvestigation. It was found out that Batungbakal has not committed gross negligence in theperformance of his duty, therefore, it was requested that Batungbakal shall be given remedythrough reinstatement to his office, as well as to pay back his salaries from the dismissal upto the reinstatement.

However, it is obviously not feasible since the former position of Batungbakal wasalready occupied by the present incumbent, and to dismiss the present is to remove him

without cause. On the basis of the facts above recited, Batungbakal apparently dissatisfied if notdisgusted with the treatment accorded him, filed this case in the Court of First Instance ofManila against the NDC and Manuel Agregado as Auditor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not Batungbakal has the rights to reinstatement and to back salaries.

HELD: Having proven that the plaintiff had been suspended and dismissed without cause,contrary to the express provision of the Constitution, his reinstatement becomes a plainministerial duty of the Auditor General, a duty whose performance may be controlled andenjoined by mandamus. There is no room for discretion. The Auditor General is not beingdirected to perform an act which he may or may not execute according to his discretion. Heis being asked and enjoined to redress a grievance, to right a wrong done. And the paymentof the back salary is merely incidental to and follows reinstatement, this, aside from theparallel and analogy which may be found in section 260, paragraph 1, Revised

Administrative Code which provides for the payment of back salary upon reinstatement. According to Article 12, section 4 of the Constitution, No officer or employee in the

civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.Batungbakal would receive a remedy of reinstatement to the office since his right wasviolated on the part of NDC. And the present incumbent being made to leave the post togive way to the plaintiffs superior right might be considered as a cause of dismissal.

17. Salvacion v. Central Bank

FACTS : Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rapeand serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him severaldollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able toescape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with theChina Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank CircularNo. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other


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order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrativebody whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the SupremeCourt.

ISSUE : Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic ActNo. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Actbe made applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD : NO.The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to beINAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents arehereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to releaseto petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgmentand award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded toshow that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law

for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good whenenacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice andinequality such as the case before us.

18. Quimpo v. MendozaFACTS: Quimpo, an owner of a building in CDO, was assessed P20k for 1969, P400annual realty tax payable in 4 equal installments. Quimpo was able to pay the first 3monthly installments but was not able to pay the last installment.

On August the following year, he wanted to pay P124.00 (P100 tax due + P24penalty) to Mendoza, the City Treasurer of CDO, but Mendoza required him to pay P196(P100 + P96 penalty based on City Charter of CDO). Quimpo consigned P124 with Clerk ofCourt then instituted mandamus with damages against Mendoza in CFI

CFI: dismissed based on Padilla v. City of Pasay and City Treasurer 1. Pay P96 penalty = 2% of original tax which is P400 2. no authority to entertain suit for failure of Quimpo to comply with provisions of Charter ofCDO on payment of tax ISSUE WON the basis for computing the tax penalty should be the tax payable for the saidyear or only the installment unpaid HELD Only base deficiency on unpaid installment Ratio. We rule for the petitioner, following the general rule in the interpretation of taxstatutes that such statutes are construed most strongly against the government and in favorof the taxpayer. Moreover, simple logic, fairness and reason cannot countenance anexaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done in compliance with the law. Since petitioner is

allowed by law to pay his real estate tax in four equal installments due and payable on fourspecified dates and having paid the first three (3) installments faithfully and religiously, it ismanifest injustice, sheer arbitrariness and abuse of power to penalize him for doing sowhen he fails to pay the fourth and last installment. Reasoning. Padilla v. City of Pasay not applicable to the case as the said case was decidedbefore RA 5447 took effect in January 1, 1969.

Where a statute which requires that the annual realty tax on lands or buildings bepaid on or before the specified date, subject to penalty of a percentage of the whole amount


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of tax in case of delayed payment, is amended by authorizing payment of the tax in fourequal installments to become due on or before specified dates. The penalty provision of theearlier statute is modified by implication that the penalty for late payment of an installmentunder the later law will be collected and computed only on the installment that became dueand unpaid, and not on the whole amount of annual tax as provided in the old statute.Legislative intent to change the basis is clear when the later law allowed payment in fourinstallments.

19. Ochate v. DelingFACTS Ochate is the incumbent municipal Mayor of Clarin, Misamis Occidentak, while Pand Deling are the incumbent Provincial Governor of the Province and Vice-Mayor of thesaid municipality, respectively.In an administrative complaint, Ochate was charged before the Provincial Board of: (1)organizing, participating, and tolerating illegal cockfights and other forms of gambling; (2)committing grave public scandals and acts unbecoming of a public official; (3) misconduct inoffice (in slapping his wife and daughter inside the municipal building in front of manypeople); (4) neglect of duty; and (5) oppression. On the same date that the priginal

administrative charges was filed, the Governor suspended Ochate from office, directing thelatter to turn over the same to Deling, the Vice-Mayor. Ochate questions the legality of the administrative charges and of the order of suspension.Hence, this action. Under Sec.2188, Revised Administrative Code, the authority of the Provincial Governor toreceive and investigate complaints against municipal officials rests on 2 grounds: (1.) neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of office, and(2.) conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. Pending action by the Provincial Board, the Provincial Government may suspend the officerconcerned if in his opinion the charge is one affecting the official integrity of the officercharged.

ISSUE Are the administrative charges above-stated grounds for the valid suspension ofOchate

HELD No. Acts charged affect only his character as a private individual. Ochate's actscannot be safely said or considered to be related to the performance of his official dutiesand he does not have to be a Mayor to commit the offenses charged. Misconduct in Officeis misconduct such as affects the performance of his duties as an officer and not such asonly affects his character as a private individual.In the instant case, the records fail toindicate that Ochate was motivated by any official considerations when he committed theacts complained of. It appears that the acts complained of were done for more personalreason.The charges do not constitute misconduct or maladministration of office. As such,the order of suspension was not founded on legal grounds.

20. Ebarle v. SucalditoFACTS: Ebarle, the petitioner, was then provincial governor of Zamboanga and a candidatefor re-election in 1971 local elections. The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines filedcomplaints with the city fiscal against the petitioner for violations of RA 3019 (Anti-GraftLaw) and Articles 171, 182,183, 213, and 318 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitionerfiled petitions for prohibition and certiorari in CFI but they were dismissed. He petitioned tothe Supreme Court and alleged that the City Fiscal and Anti-Graft League failed to comply


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with the provisions of EO 264, which outlined the procedure how complainants charging thegovernment officials and employees with the commission of irregularities should be guided.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 264 is exclusively applicable to administrative charges and notto criminal complaints

HELD: Petition dismissed. The title of the EO 264 is of Commission of Irregularities. Itspeaks of commission of irregularities and not criminal offenses. Had the order intended tomake it applicable thereto, it could have been referred to the more specific terms likeaccused, convicted, and the like.

21. Salvacion v. Central Bank (eto yung kinwento mo bm)FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rapeand serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him severaldollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able toescape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,exemplary and attorneys fee s amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the ChinaBanking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No.960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order orprocess of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative bodywhatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic ActNo. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Actbe made applicable to a foreign transient? HELD: NO. The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to beINAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents arehereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to releaseto petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgmentand award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded toshow that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present;and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of lawfor being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good whenenacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice andinequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the OffshoreBanking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw depositsfrom foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However,

the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of depositencouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said lawsbecause such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintainhis deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or atransient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: In fine, t he application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.


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960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of anycourt, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, isapplicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by aforeign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Codewhich provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it ispresumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.

NOTES: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and luredpetitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, GregBartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able torape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989.On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, GregBartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recoveredfrom Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.)Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.)

Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear)used in seducing the complainant.

22. Nera v. Garcia

Facts:

Nera served as clerk in the Maternity and Childrens Hospital, a government institutionunder the supervision of the Bureau of Hospitals and the Department of Health. He alsoserved as manager and cashier of the Maternity Employers Cooperative Association, In c.Having hold of the positions, the fund of the associatin is supposedly under his control. OnMay 11, 1956, he was charged before the Court of First Instance of Manila withmalversation for allegedly misappropriating a certain amount of money which belongs to theassociation. After a few months, a certain Simplicio Balcos, filed an administrative complaintcase against Nera. Nera was suspended as clerk of the said hospital, as approved byrespondent Garcia, Secretary of Health. The petitioner asked PCAC to intervene on hisbehalf. PCAC recommended respondents to lift the suspension of the petitioner.Respondents did not grant the lifting of suspension. The petitioner asked for reconsiderationbut was still denied. The CFI ruled in favour of the petitioner. As a result, respondents filedan appeal to the decision of the CFI. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for prohibition,certiorari, and mandamus to restrain respondents from proceeding with the administrativecase until the termination of the criminal case and annul the suspension and to compelrespondents to lift the suspension.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner was illegally suspended thus, he must be reinstated in officeand pay back his salary

Held:


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Held: No. In approving Section 23 of R.A. No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as ablanket tax exemption to all telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strictconstruction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved infavor of municipal corporations in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxingpowers, we hold that section 23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amendedpetitioners franchi se so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchisetaxes. The tax exemption must be expressed in the statute in clear language that leaves no doubtof the intention of the legislature to grant such exemption. And, even if it is granted, theexemption must be interpreted in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favorof the taxing authority. Mutatis mutandis also applies to this case: When exemption is claimed, it must be shownindubitably to exist. At the outset, every presumption is against it. A well-founded doubt isfatal to the claim. It is only when the terms of the concession are too explicit to admit fairlyof any other construction that the proposition can be supported.

24. Republic v. CA

FACTS: Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14 April 1985 in Manila, andgave birth to a son a year after. Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibilityon the early stages of the marriage, observed from his tendency to spend time with hisfriends and squandering his money with them, from his dependency from his parents, andhis dishonesty on matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of his job in 1986,Roridel became the sole breadwinner thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her

job in Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her and their child a week later.The couple is separated-in-fact for more than three years.

On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of hermarriage to Reynaldo Molina. Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that oftwo of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital andMedical Center. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriagevoid. The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals deniedthe appeals and affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present reco urse.

ISSUE: Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be construed as psychologicalincapacity

HELD: The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code Revision Committeeintended to liberalize the application of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights,

and holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct onthe part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or herpersonal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul forthe attainment of the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct, observed andconsidered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the veryobjectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the marriage.

25. Asian Transmission v. CA


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paramount consideration. Moreover, Sec. 11, Rule IV, Book III of the Omnibus Rules toImplement the Labor Code provides that "Nothing in the law or the rules shall justify anemployer in withdrawing or reducing any benefits, supplements or payments for unworkedregular holidays as provided in existing individual or collective agreement or employerpractice or policy. From the pertinent provisions of the CBA entered into by the parties,petitioner had obligated itself to pay for the legal holidays as required by law.

26. Ortiz v. ComelecGR No. 78957, June 28, 1988 Facts: The petitioner was appointed as COMELEC Commissioner by then PresidentMarcos for a term expiring on May 17, 1992. Following the installation of the Aquinogovernment, the petitioner submitted a "courtesy resignation" which was accepted byPresident Aquino. The petitioner requested for payment of retirement benefits by invokingRA 1568, as amended by RA 3595 and re-enacted by RA 6118, which was denied by therespondent on the ground that he is "not entitled to retirement benefits under RA 1568, asamended" without specifying the reason therefore

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to retirement benefits as provided by RA1568 and re-enacted by RA 6118.

Decision: YES. RA 6118 as a retirement law is remedial in character which should beliberally construed and administered in favor of the persons intended to benefit thereby.This is, as it should be, because the liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarianpurposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of governmentemployees may be enhanced.

27. Gonzales v. Gonzales (divorce case to dura lex sed lex-roby)

28. Parayno v. Jovellanos(under Expresso unius in Agpalo) The court held that since the ordinance made a distinction between gasoline servicestation and gasoline filling station, the maxim ejusdem generis does not apply and what isapplicable is the maxim expression unius exclusion exclusion alterius. we ho ld that thezoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear distinction between gasolineservice station and gasoline filling station Pertinent provisions: Sec 21. Filling station. A retail station servicing automobiles andother motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only. Sec 42. Service station. A building and itspremises where gasoline oil, greases, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied

and dispensed at retail and where, inaddition, the following services may be rendered andsales and no other. Hence, because of the distinct and definite meaningsalluded to the twoterms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could not insist that gasoline service stationunder Sec 44 necessarily included gasoline filling station under Sec21. Indeed, activitiesundertaken in a gas service station did not automatically embrace tose in a gas fillingstation.

29. Mutuc v. Comelec


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FACTS : Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970). Hiscandidacy was given due course by the COMELEC but he was prohibited from playing hiscampaign jingle on his mobile units because this is an apparent violation of COMELECsband to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propagandagadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods ormaterials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like , whether ofdomestic or foreign origin. It was COMELECs contention that the jingle proposed to beused by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangiblepropaganda material (falling under and the likes category), under the above COMELECstatute subject to confiscation.

HELD: By virtue of Ejusdem Generis , general words following any enumeration must be ofthe same class as those specifically referred to. It did contend, however, that one of itsprovisions referred to above makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propagandagadgets, mention being made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials,wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the wordsand the like. For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify such an

order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit our approval under thewell-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumerationbeing applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. Itis quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets ofthe kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidateresponsible for its distribution.

4.Memorize

Implications Rule:

a. What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which isexpressed - Agpalo

1. doctrine of necessary implication2. illegality of Act is implied from prohibition

b. DITO DIN - c1. remedy implied from a right


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2. grant of jurisdiction3. grant of power includes incidental power

c. and also all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly andlogically inferred from its terms

1. what is implied should not be against the law2. what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly3. there should be no penalty for compliance with the law

Doctrine of Necessary Implication presumption - every statute enjoys presumption of validity reasons

legislative - has decided law to be constitutional executive - is convinced of the validity of the law Note: recognition of tedious process of enacting a law

power to declare - Art VIII, sec. 4 (2) - SC en banc

Rules on Constitutional Construction

1. Constitution is construed in its entirety2. Provisions of the Constitution are self-executing3. Strict interpretation of prohibitory provisions4. Liberal construction of One-Subject-One-Title Rule5. Special provision prevails of general one6. Suprema Lex7. Interpret language used in ordinary sense

Requisites of Judicial Inquiry 1. There must be an actual case or controversy.2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of

the case

Effects of unconstitutional statute under the Orthodox and Modern theories

ORTHODOX total nullity stricken from the statute books confers no rights, imposes no duties, affords no protection, creates no office

MODERN

deemed inexistent not stricken from the statute books does not annul/repeal statute and the court simply ignores it existence of statute prior to its unconstitutionality is an operative act and has

consequences which could not justly be ignored (DAP case)

Intrinsic aids those found in printed page of statute itself


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Kind Definition Value

Title Expresses subject matter Great weight

Sub-title

Subordinate title

Great weight

Preamble States objective of enactment Low degree

Context Words or phrases used Great weight

Punctuation Comma, semi-colon, period Low degree

Headnotes Prefixed to sections/chapters Low degree

Extrinsic aids

those extraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page

Kind Value Reason

Legislative History (antecedents ofthe statute)

Great weight Best means to ascertainlegislative intent

Executive Construction (byadministrative bodies)

Great respect Expertise and experience

Contemporary Circumstances(conditions during enactment)

Strongest in law Made by three branches ofgovt

Policy of law (what the lawencourages)

Great weight It embodies legislative intent

Judicial Construction (stare decisis) Great weight Part of Legal System (Art. 4,New Civil Code)

Legislative Interpretation(prescribes rules of construction)

Respectfulconsideration

But cannot prevail over courtsprerogative to decide

Dictionaries (List of words with theirmeanings)

Great weight Use of definition is presumed

Foreign Decisions (Construction byforeign courts)

Great weight Adoption of foreign decisionsis presumed

Similarities and distinction between interpretation and construction

Interpretation Construction


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purpose ascertain legislative intent same

applicabi l i ty when ambiguity exists same

manner discover true meaning draw conclusions

reference limited to written text transcends text ofstatute

type of aid intrinsic extrinsic

Instances when ambiguity exists (ambiguity exists when the language of the statute): a. Admits two or more meaningsb. Capable of being understood in more than 1 meaningc. Refers to two or more things at the same timed. Susceptible to more than 1 interpretatione. Literal interpretation will result to absurd consequencesf. Statute is in conflict with the Constitutiong. Statute defeats the policy of the legislature

Documents

Statcon Reviewer.docx