G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991CECILIO S. DE VILLAvs.CAFACTS:On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the RTC Branch 145, Makati with violation of BatasPambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner allegedly issued a check payable to private respondent, Roberto Lorayez, in the total amount of U.S. $2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00 knowing that at the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with draweebank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment. The check was dishonored by the drawee bank upon presentmentfor the reason insufficient funds. Petitioner failed to pay respondent despite receipt of notice of such dishonor.Petitioner moved to dismiss the information maintaining that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged since thecheck was payable in dollars (foreign currency) and drawn against a foreign bank.The RTC denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequentlydenied by the RTC.The petitioner filed a petition forcertiorari with the CA seeking to declare the nullity of RTC orders. The Court of Appealsdismissed the petition. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. Thus, petitioner filed petition withSC.ISSUE:1. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction over the case in question.2. Whether or not a check drawn against the dollar account with a foreign bank is covered by BP Blg. 22RULING:The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.I. WON RTC has jurisdictionThe RTC has jurisdiction over the case.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of commencement of the action.The Rules of Court provide that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of themunicipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients thereof took place.The court also stated that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the information.In this particular case, the information filed against petitioner specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati,and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the RTC of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdictionover the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates acriminal action.Moreover, in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines, the court held that the determinative factor in determining venue isthe place of the issuance of the check.

Bustamante vs NLRC, 265 SCRA 61 G.R. No.11165 March 15, 1996 FACTS:This is a petition for certiorari seeking to reverse the NLRC Resolution of May 3, 1993setting aside earlier resolution dated March 8, 1993 and deleting the award of backwages in favor of petitioners.Osmalik Bustamante and three others were employed as laborers and harvesters while Lamaranwas employed as a laborer and sprayer in respondent company’s plantation. They all signed contracts of employment for a period of six months from January 2, 1960 to July 2, 1990 but started working sometimein September 1989. Before the contracts expire in July 2,1990, their

employments were terminated on June25, 1990 on the ground of poor performance on account of age, not one of them was allegedly below fortyyears old. ISSUE Whether or not petitioners are entitled to backwages after a finding by theNLRC that they had become regular employees . HELD Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, “All doubts in theimplementation and interpretation of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall beresolved in favor of the labor”. Judgment rendered ordering the Government Service Insurance System topay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00)

Bello v. CAGR L-38161, 29 March 1974 (56 SCRA 509)

En Banc, Teehankee (p): 10 concurring.

Facts: On 25 August 1970, spouses Juan and Filomena Bello were charged for estafa before the City Court of Pasay for allegedly having misappropriated a lady’s ring with a value of P1,000.00 received by them from Atty. Prudencio de Guzman for sale on commission basis. After trial, they were convicted. Petitioners filed their notice of appeal of the adverse judgment to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of  Pasay City, but the prosecution filed a “petition to dismiss appeal” on the ground that since the case was within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the CFI and the trial in the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals as provided by section 87 of the Judiciary Act, Republic Act 296, as amended.  The CFI per its order of 29 October 1971 did find that the appeal should have been taken directly to the Court of Appeals but ordered the dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city court “for execution of judgment.”  Thereafter, the City court denied petitioners’ motion “for having been erroneously addressed to this court” instead of to the CFI ignoring petitioners’ predicament that the CFI had already turned them down and ordered the dismissal of their appeal without notice to them and that as a consequence it was poised to execute its judgment of conviction against them.

Petitioners spouses then filed on 14 January 1972 their petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals against the People and City Court. The Solicitor General did not interpose any objection whichever viewpoint is adopted by the Honorable Court in resolving the two apparently conflicting or clashing principles of law, i.e..  finality of judicial decision or equity in judicial decision. The Court of Appeals, however, dismissed the petition on 17 December 1973, after finding that the city court’s judgment was directly appealable to it. Although recognizing that the CFI instead of dismissing appeal, could have in the exercise of its inherent powers directed appeal to be endorsed to the Court of Appeals, it held that since petitioners did not implead the CFI as principal party respondent it could not grant any relief at all even on the assumption that petitioners can be said to

deserve some equities. With their motion for reconsideration denied, petitioners filed the petition for review.

Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the Court of First Instance is indispensable and the procedural infirmity of misdirecting the appeal to Court of First Instance are fatal to the appellees’ cause

Held: The construction of statutes is always cautioned against narrowly interpreting a statute as to defeat the purpose of the legislator and it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity” and therefore a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. Thus, in the construction of its own Rules of Court, the Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the void by holding that Courts of First Instance are equally bound as the higher courts not to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them to the proper appellate court.

The formal impleading of the CFI which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not indispensable and could be “overlooked in the interest of speedy adjudication. The Court of Appeals ‘ act of dismissing the petition and denying the relief sought of endorsing the appeal to the proper court simply because of the non-impleader of the CFI as a nominal party was tantamount to sacrificing substance to form and to subordinating substantial justice to a mere matter of procedural technicality. The procedural infirmity of petitioners misdirecting their appeal to the CFI rather than to the Court of Appeals, which they had timely sought to correct in the CFI itself by asking that court to certify the appeal to the Court of Appeals as the proper court, should not be over-magnified as to totally deprive them of their substantial right of appeal and leave them without any remedy.

The Supreme Court set aside the CA decision dismissing the petition and in lieu thereof, judgment was rendered granting the petition for prohibition against City court, enjoining it from executing its judgment of conviction against petitioners-accused and further commanding said city court to elevate petitioners’ appeal from its judgment to the CA for the latter’s disposition on the merits; without costs.

Ty v. First National SuretyGR L-16138, 29 April 1961 (1 SCRA 1324)

En Banc, Labrador (p): 8 concurring

Facts: At different times within a period of two months prior to 24 December 1953, Diosdado C. Ty, employed as operator mechanic foreman in the Broadway Cotton Factory insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among which being the 8 above-named defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. Plaintiff’s beneficiary was his employer, Broadway Cotton Factory, which paid the insurance premiums. On 24 December 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object. He was brought to the Manila Central University

hospital, and after receiving first-aid, he went to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment of his injuries (fractures in index, middle, fourth, and fifth fingers of left hand).  From 26 December 1953 to 8 February 1954, he underwent medical treatment in the hospital. The above-described physical injuries have caused temporary total disability of plaintiff’s left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the above-named defendants to recover indemnity. Defendants rejected plaintiff’s claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy.

Plaintiff sued the defendants in the Municipality Court of this City, which dismissed his complaints. Thereafter, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of First Instance Manila, presided by Judge Gregorio S. Narvasa, which absolved the defendants from the complaints. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether Diosdado Ty is entitled to indemnity under the insurance policy for the disability of his left hand.

Held: The agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted. In the case at bar, due to the clarity of the stipulation, distinction between “temporary disability” and “total disability” need not be made in relation to one’s occupation means that the condition of the insurance is such that common prudence requires him to desist from transacting his business or renders him incapable of working. While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the policies were issued, it can not go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of which define partial disability as loss of either hand by a amputation through the bones of the wrist.” There was no such amputation in the case at bar.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant.

De la Cruz v. Capital InsuranceGR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)

En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring

Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy. In connection with the celebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-professional boxer, participated in a boxing contest. In the course of his bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same height, weight and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The insured died with the cause of death reported as hemorrhage intracranial, left. The insurer refused to pay

the proceeds of the policy on the ground that the death of the insured in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by the insurance.

Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and beneficiary under the policy, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of indemnity under the insurance policy.  Denied, De la Cruz instituted the action in the CFI Pangasinan (Civ. Case No. U-265)) for specific performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. After due hearing, the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff; ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintiff for the death of the latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney’s fees. Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.

Held: The terms “accident” and “accidental” have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. The terms mean that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured’s voluntary act, which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the protection of policies insuring against the death or injury from accident. In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and would not have died. Further, death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract (What was included was death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs against appellant.

 Co v. RepublicGR L-12150, 26 May 1960 (108 Phil 775)

First Dvision, Bautista Angelo (p): 6 concurring

Facts: Petitioner was born in Abra and his parents are both Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go, the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued. He speaks and writes English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and finished his primary studies in the “Colegio” in Bangued, both schools being recognized by the government. He has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad. He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition is granted he would serve the government either in the military or civil department. He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store in Bangued. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which he claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00 in his tobacco business. With respect to the store of which he claims to be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a salesman therein. He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father which he claims to have invested in his tobacco business.

Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. After hearing, the court ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner after the lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in RA 503. The government appealed the decision of the trial court, raising the facts that did not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, although when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered “democracy.; that he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return, when asked why he did not file his income tax returns; and that he presented his alien certificate of registration, but not the alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.

Issue: Whether petitioner failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen.

Held: The scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not necessarily include the constitution, which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the principles underlying our constitution. Further, Philippine law requires that an alien to conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living. In the present case, in so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to

those principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law; the belief in democracy or in a democratic form of government is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our constitution. Further, petitioner failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Actl; and further failed to file his income tax return despite his fixed salary of P1,440.00 a year and his profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return.

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed decision, hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization, without pronouncement as to costs.

 Velasco vs. RepublicFACTS:This is apetition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila which, after trial, was denied for failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the law.Petitioner has appealed. Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and Miguela Tiuwho became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that he continuously resided in thePhilippines; that he has finished his elementary, high school and collegiate studies in thePhilippines; that he is presently employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with amonthly salary of P150.00; that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog; that he is aCatholic by faith; and has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; that hedoes not own any real property but has cash savings amounting to P3,500.00 at the RepublicSavings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern University, P2,000.00 sharesof stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he has mingled socially withthe Filipinos; that he has shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos;and that he desires to become a Filipino citizen because he considered the Philippines as hiscountry and the Filipinos as his countrymen. ISSUE : Whether or not the petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen. HELD : No. It was found out that hisqualifications as to moral character were attested bySantiago Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, ahousekeeper, who admitted that she is the prospective mother-in-law of petitioner and suchtestimony is biased. The limited character witnesses indicates that petitioner has a limited circle of Filipino friends. His present income is only P150.00 a month which is neither lucrative nor substantial to meet the requirements of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must alucrative income or occupation.Decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant

Lee Cho (@ Sem Lee) v. RepublicGR L-12408, 28 December 1959 (106 Phil 775)

En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 9 concurring

Facts: On 22 September 1907, petitioner was born in Amoy, China, of Chinese parents.  He came to the Philippines sometime in February 1921 and was given the corresponding alien certificate of residence and registration.  He settled in Cebu City (where he as continuously resided up to the present time).  Petitioner studied 1st to 7th grade in Cebu Chinese High School, a private institution recognized by the government.  He speaks and writes English and the Cebu dialect.  He, having associated with some Filipinos, engaged in the corn business in Cebu City (1921-WWII) and in the lumber business (1946-present).  He invested P5,000.00 capital in the business and at present the actual worth of his share is about P20,000.00.  Petitioner is receiving a monthly salary of P400.00 and realizes a profit share worth P10,000.00 every year.  He has no tax liability to the government.  He possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications prescribed by law. As to his family, he married one Sy Siok Bin on 8 December 1929 with whom he had 13 children, all born in the Cebu City.  All these children had been issued the corresponding alien certificate of registration, with the exception of Lourdes Lee who married a naturalized Filipino citizen named Lim Kee Guan.  With the exception of William Lee who is not of school age, Angelita who reached 5th grade and Lourdes who stopped in 3rd year high school, the other children are at present studying in private schools and colleges recognized by the government.

Lee Cho filed a petitioner for naturalization before the Court of First Iinstance of Cebu.  On 30 August 1956, the court rendered decision finding petitioner qualified to be a Filipino citizen.  On 2 October 1957, however, the government filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence which if presented may affect the qualification of petitioner, and finding the same well founded, the court entertained the motion.  After hearing, the court again rendered decision reaffirming its holding that petitioner is qualified to become a Filipino citizen.  The government interposed an appeal.

Issue: Whether petitioner was able to comply with the requirements for naturalization.

Held: The provisions of the Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled. In the present case, the petitioner has not filed any declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools recognized by the government. Angelita Lee has only reached grade five and no explanation was given why no secondary education was afforded her.  Lourdes Lee has studied only as far as 3rd year high school and then allegedly stopped allegedly because of poor health. Lourdes admitted in open court, however, that she continued her studies in a Chinese school, which employs strictly Chinese curriculum, despite her illness. This circumstance betrays the sincerity of petitioner to become a Filipino citizen for if his motive were proper he should not

have tolerated such deviation from the educational requirement of the law. The petitioner, thus, has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen.

The Supreme Court ruled that appealed decision is reversed, with costs against petitioner.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of ManilaGR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil

First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring.

Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of taking, that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the dead.

The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.

Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila

Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.

The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood uses the latter. Where a emetery is open to the public, it is a public

use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are held in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the traffic situation.

The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of the lower court, with costs against the appellant.

Villanueva v. Comelec (Resolution)GR L-54718, 4 December 1985

En Bank, Teehankee (p): 9 concurring, 2 on leave

Facts: On 4 January 1980, the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his sworn certificate of candidacy as independent for the office of vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon in the 30 January 1980 local elections. Later that day, however, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy “for personal reasons.” His unsworn withdrawal had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. Later on 25 January 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza’s withdrawal, filed his own sworn “Certificate of Candidacy in substitution” of Mendoza’s for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452 votes. The Municipal Board of Canvassers, however, disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer’s opinion that petitioner’s name does not appear in the certified list of candidates. The canvassers accordingly proclaimed respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed candidate and as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores.

On 21 February 1980, Comelec denied the petition of Villanueva, stating that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not under oath as required by Section 27 of the 1978

Election Code, and that his withdrawal was not made after the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy, as contemplated by Section 28, but on the same day.

Issue: Whether the informal withdrawal of Mendoza invalidates the election of Villanueva as vice mayor.

Held: Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza’s withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec. Further, the will of the electorate should be respected, it should not be defeated through the invocation of formal or technical defects. The will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate or candidacy. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza’s failure to observe the requirement should be considered a harmless irregularity. The bona fides of petitioner Villanueva as a substitute candidate cannot be successfully assailed. The votes cast in his favor must be counted.

The Supreme Court resolved to reconsider and sets aside the questioned Resolutions of Comelec and annuls the proclamation of Lirio as elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon and instead declares petitioner as the duly elected vice-mayor of said municipality and entitled forthwith to assume said office, take the oath of office and discharge its functions. The resolution is made immediately executory.

In RE Tampoy: Diosdada Alberastine, petitionerGR L-14322, 25 February 1960 (107 Phil 100)En Banc, Bautista Angelo (p): 10 concurring

Facts: On 19 November 1939, Petronila Tampoy, a widow and without children, requested with Bonifacio Minoza to read a testament and explain its contents to her in her house in San Miguel street, municipality of Argao, province of Cebu in 19 November 1939, which he did in the presence of tree instrumental witnesses, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pena, and Simeona Omboy. After confirming the contents of the testament, she requested Bonifacio Minoza to write her name at the foot of the testament in the second page, which he did, and after which she stamped her thumbmark between her name and surname in the presence of all three instrumental witnesses. Bonifacio Minoza also signed at the foot of the testament, in the second page, in the presence of the testator and all three abovenamed witnesses. However, the testator, just like Bonifacio Minoza, did not sign on the left margin or any part of the first page of the testament, composed of

two pages. All the three instrumental witnesses signed at the foot of the acknowledgment written in the second page of the testament, and the left margin of the first and second page, in the presence of the testator, Bonifacio Minoza, Atty. Kintanar, and the others. The testament was executed freely and spontaneously, without having been threatened, forced and intimidated, and not having exercised on her (the testator) undue influence, being the same in full use of her mental faculties and enjoying good health.  On 22 February 1957, the testator died in here house in Argao.

On 7 March 1957, or two weeks after, the heir found in the testament, Carman Aberastine died, leaving her mother, the petitioner Diosdada Alberastine. After trial on the probate o a document purportedly to be the last and testament of Petronila Rampoy, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin of the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court because it involves purely a question of law.

Issue: Whether the absence of the testator’s thumbmark in the first page is fatal to render the will void

Held: Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. In the present case, the contention that the petition for probate is unopposed, and that the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the true and voluntary will of the deceased, cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Since the will suffers the fatal defect, as it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, the same fails to comply with the law and therefore cannot be admitted to probate.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed order, without pronouncement as to costs.

 San Miguel vs Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 G.R. No. L-49774, February 24, 1981 FACTS :This isa complaint filed on January 3, 1977 by Cagayan Coca-Cola Free WorkersUnion against San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant) for the alleged failure or refusalof the latter to include in the computation of 13th- month pay such items as sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials. ISSUE:Whether or not

in the computation of the 13th-month pay under Presidential Decree851, payments for sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on rest days andspecial holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials should be considered. HELD :Citing certain provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines specificallyArt. 87 onovertime work performed beyond 8 hours a day is paid as additional compensation equivalent to aregular wage plus 25% hereof and Art 93 on work performed on any special holiday as anadditional compensation of at least 30% of the regular wage of the employee, clearly, additionalcompensation is categorically excluded from the definition of basic salary under theSupplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851. Therefore, additional compensation shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th- month pay : Molina vs Rafferty, 38 Phil 167 G.R. No. L-11988,April4,1918 FACTS :Plaintiff Molinacontends that the fish produced by him are to be regarded as an"agricultural product" within the meaning of that term as used in paragraph (c) of section 41 of Act No. 2339 (now section 1460 of the Administrative Code of 1917), in forced when the disputed taxwas levied, and that he is therefore exempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339, as amended: “(c) Agricultural products when sold by the producer or owner of the land where grown, whether in their original state or not. (Act No. 2339, sec. 41.)” ISSUE :Whether or notfish in general constitute an agricultural products, and thereforeexempt from the percentage tax on merchants' sales established by section 40 of Act No. 2339, asamended. HELD :The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislatureshould be sought in the words employed to express it, and that when found it should be made togovern, . . . what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what thecircumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to beredressed; . . . . And where the law has contemporaneously been put into operation, is entitled togreat respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative purpose, and is not lightlyto be overruled, although it is not conclusive. (Cooley on Taxation [Vol. 1] 3d. Ed., p. 450.).Therefore, fish produced in ponds are agricultural products and thus, exempted from taxation whensold by the producer or he owner of the land. Administrative conclusion of tax law should befollowed unless clearly erroneous. Judgment affirmed

Madrigal vs. Rafferty FACTS :Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno legally contracted marriage prior toJanuary 1, 1914 under the provisions of law concerning conjugal partnerships (sociedad degananciales). On February 25, 1915, Vicente Madrigal filed sworn declaration on the prescribedform with the Collector of Internal Revenue, showing, as his total net income for the year 1914, thesum of P296,302.73. Subsequently Madrigal submitted the claim that the said P296,302.73 did notrepresent his income for the year 1914, but was in fact the income of the conjugal partnershipexisting between himself and his wife Susana Paterno, and that in computing and assessing theadditional income tax provided by the Act of Congress of October 3, 1913, the income declared byVicente Madrigal should be divided into two equal parts, one-half to be considered the income of Vicente Madrigal and the other half of Susana Paterno. The

general question had in the meantime been submitted to the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands who in an opinion dated March17, 1915, held with the petitioner Madrigal. The revenue officers forwarded the correspondencewith the opinion of the Attorney-General to Washington for a decision by the United StatesTreasury Department. The United States Commissioner of Internal Revenue reversed the opinionof the Attorney-General, and thus decided against the claim of Madrigal. ISSUE :Whether or notthe additional income tax should be divided into two equal parts because of the conjugal partnership existing between Vicente Madrigal and Susana Paterno. HELD: “The counter contentions of appellees are that the taxes imposed by the Income TaxLaw are taxes upon income tax and not upon capital and property; that the fact that Madrigal was amarried man, and his marriage contracted under the provisions governing the conjugal partnership,has no bearing on income considered as income, and that the distinction must be drawn betweenthe ordinary form of commercial partnership and the conjugal partnership of spouses resultingfrom the relation of marriage.” The income of husband and wife should be taken as a whole for the purpose of the normal taxregardless as to whether from separate estates or not. Jjudgment affirmed ,costs against appellants : PLDT vs Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 G.R. No. L-3222, January 21, 1952 FACTS :PLDT filed complaint against CIR for collecting P 3, 977.22 representingfranchise tax. The CFI of Manila absolved CIR from said complaint. The petitioner filed case before the Supreme Court arguing that PLDT should not be obliged to pay franchise tax onuncollected fees due from regular customers because such earnings were not representative of gross receipts as what CIR construed it to be. PLDT further contended that CIR’s prolonged practice of non-collection of franchise tax on items of the same nature as those questioned in thecase was an administrative construction of great weight

 ISSUE :Whether or notthe principle of executive construction is properly applied for in theinstant case. HELD : No. Said principle is not absolute and may be overcome by strong reasons to thecontrary. If through a misapprehension of law, an officer has erroneously executed it for a long time, theerror may be rectified when the true construction is ascertained. The CIR’s construction is in accordancewith the Constitution because a person may have earned his salary but may not have collected the same.Thus, the uncollected “ gross receipts” which should be construed as meaning the same thing as “grossearnings” should be subject to franchise tax. Judgment affirmed with modifications.

  Phil Global Communication vs Relova, 145 SCRA 587 GR No. L-60548, November 10, 1986 FACTS : This is a petition for review on certiorari where the Philippine GlobalCommunications Inc. seeks to set aside decision dated April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner withoutauthority to establish, maintain and operate, apart from its single principal station in Makati, anyother branch or station within the Phils. On May 10, 1976 petitioner filed application with the Board of Communications anapplication for authority to establish a branch station in Cebu City for the purpose of renderinginternational telecommunication services from Cebu to any point outside Phils.This was opposedby the private respondents. On March 24, 1977, BOC issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-13designating Metropolitan Manila area as the sole gateway, point of entrance into and exit from) for communications in the Phils. And defining what constitutes domestic record operations.I was onJan. 16, 1979 that BOC granted petitioner provisional authority to establish a station in Cebu Citysubject to condition that as soon as domestic carriers shall have upgraded their facilities, applicantshall ceases its operation and interface with domestic carriers. On May 24, 1979, BOC grantedpetitioner the final authority to establish a branch/station in Cebu City subject to prior approval,anywhere in the PHils. Private respondents filed petition for declaratory judgment on the proper construction of petitioner’s franchise, RA 4617. Petitioners sought dismissal of petition . Motion wasdenied. Petitioner assailed the order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Court held that the suitfor declaratory relief fell within the competence of the Judiciary and did not require prior action bythe administrative agency concerned under the concept of primary jurisdiction. Partiesthen agreed to submit the case for decision on the bases of their respective pleadings andmemoranda . Court rendered judgment on April 27, 1982 declaring petitioner without authority toestablish, maintain and operate any other branch or station within the Philippines. ISSUE : (1) Whether or notpetitioner is authorized under its legislative franchise, RA 4617,to establish stations or substations in places or points outside Metropolitan Manila. HELD : It is stressed that the principle of contemporaneous construction of a statute by theexecutive officers of the government, BOC in his case, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to greatrespect. Therefore, the Bureau of Communications made final the provisional authority granted to applicantor Phil Global Communications, Inc. to establish branch stations in ay point within the country for thepurpose of receiving and transmitting messages to countries outside the Philippines where it is authorizedto render international communications services in accordance with its legislative franchise, RA 4617 andMemorandum Circular No. 77-13. The decision appealed from is reversed

PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor RelationsGR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring

Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore, respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining the valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director.

Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine Blooming Mills

Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1 May  1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1974,. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen,” a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be cited to support it.” There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.” Since then, such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions.  As was emphasized by Chief Justice Castro, “the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given controlling weight.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner PAFLU.

Iloilo Palay…

Facts:

On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and

Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of

595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate,

pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted

said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the

needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn

Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering

that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to

RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no

law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited

by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to

private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited

from doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or

imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency

and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru

any government agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national

emergency is repealed by RA 3452

Held:

No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.

Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof

inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This

repealing clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the

act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended

repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.

Such being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict

construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific

repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on

irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old

laws. Here there is no inconsistency.

While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach

are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same

being applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes

importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity

as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are

therefore not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.