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Seven Dynamic Forces for War and Peace

Seven Dynamic Forces for War and Peace The history of the world is marked by explosion and degeneration separated by varying periods of history of more

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  • Seven Dynamic Forces for War and Peace
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  • The history of the world is marked by explosion and degeneration separated by varying periods of history of more or less peace and human progress. Boundary lines between these periods of history, however, are not always clear cut.
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  • If we were to examine the history of modern Western Civilization for instance, that is the period since the Renaissance, we would see three great periods of new ideas and rising forces, each of which culminated in long wars, tumults, and world disorder.
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  • The first was the Thirty Years war which was ended by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 The second was the forty years of war that followed in the wake of the American and French Revolutions, and that ended with the Congress of Vienna in 1815.
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  • The third, the world wide conflicts beginning with the first world war, and which by the way we are still dealing with at this moment.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Ideologies - This includes religious faith, social, economic, political, artistic, and scientific ideas. Economic Forces - Economic determinism, while not an absolute in history, does have an impact. People need food to live. They want, what most of us I think, want, to live above the bare subsistence level- this creates economic forces and pressures.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Nationalism - It grows out of language, religion, folklore, traditions, literature, art, music, beliefs, habits, modes of expression, hates, fears, ideals, and loyalties. It expresses itself in patriotism which is itself built from the fundamentals of love of family, love of country, pride in racial accomplishments. Look - we fight for hearth and home - we fight for the flag.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Militarism - Man is a combative animal, that is most of us are - by this I mean competitive aggressive. We love to compete, and we learn to hate quite easily. Humans are also egoistic and in the mass we become even more egoistic. Our beliefs in superiority are quickly transformed into arrogance. And it is this arrogance which is one of the stimulants of aggression.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Imperialism - One of the larger moving forces in all history is imperialism and means nothing less than the movement of races over their racial borders. It is part cause and part effect. It comes from excessive nationalism, militarism, thirst for power, and economic pressures. They all feed on one another.
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  • Imperialism Imperialism can be placed in to three categories. The first - is the variety where expansion, settlement and development takes place in sparsely populated areas; The second - into areas of what the conquering nation terms uncivilized races incapable of self-government; The third - sheer conquest of civilized people. The last two embody one purpose - and that is to secure superior living conditions by exploiting other people and their resources.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Extreme Nationalism threatens peace - it contains ambition for power and glory. The quest for dignity, honor and aggrandizement. To gain a place in the sun is an inspiring call. Indeed, Nationalism can easily expand into dangerous forms - greed in exploitation of the resources and foreign trade of other peoples and in aggression which quickly turns into imperialism.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Fear, Hate, Revenge - These play a large part in the causes of war. The greatest of these is fear. Hate and revenge more often than not spring from Fear. Fear of invasion, starvation, blockade in war, economic disadvantage; age old hates from wrong. from rivalries, from oppression; yearnings for revenge for past injustices, past defeats all of these press towards violence. These lie deep in the recesses of the racial consciousness. Wrongs often live on for centuries in the minds of a people. There are traditional age old hates which are burned into their souls.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are The Will to Peace - Against all of the forces which we have listed stands the Will to Peace. War kills or maims the best of the race. It brings the deepest of all grieves to every home. It brings poverty and moral degeneration. It brings these to victor and vanquished alike.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Imperialism - One of the larger moving forces in all history is imperialism and means nothing less than the movement of races over their racial borders. It is part cause and part effect. It comes from excessive nationalism, militarism, thirst for power, and economic pressures. They all feed on one another.
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  • Imperialism Imperialism can be placed in to three categories. The first - is the variety where expansion, settlement and development takes place in sparsely populated areas; The second - into areas of what the conquering nation terms uncivilized races incapable of self-government; The third - sheer conquest of civilized people. The last two embody one purpose - and that is to secure superior living conditions by exploiting other people and their resources.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are Extreme Nationalism threatens peace - it contains ambition for power and glory. The quest for dignity, honor and aggrandizement. To gain a place in the sun is an inspiring call. Indeed, Nationalism can easily expand into dangerous forms - greed in exploitation of the resources and foreign trade of other peoples and in aggression which quickly turns into imperialism.
  • Slide 18
  • The forces that make for war and peace are Fear, Hate, Revenge - These play a large part in the causes of war. The greatest of these is fear. Hate and revenge more often than not spring from Fear. Fear of invasion, starvation, blockade in war, economic disadvantage; age old hates from wrong. from rivalries, from oppression; yearnings for revenge for past injustices, past defeats all of these press towards violence. These lie deep in the recesses of the racial consciousness. Wrongs often live on for centuries in the minds of a people. There are traditional age old hates which are burned into their souls.
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  • The forces that make for war and peace are The Will to Peace - Against all of the forces which we have listed stands the Will to Peace. War kills or maims the best of the race. It brings the deepest of all grieves to every home. It brings poverty and moral degeneration. It brings these to victor and vanquished alike.
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  • HISTORY OF US AIR POWER Historical Applications
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  • WWI, WWII, the Cold War, Korean War, Vietnam, and the Gulf War
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  • Theory, Doctrine, Objective, Strategy History Theory Strategy Simulations & Exercises Doctrine Objective Conflict
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  • World War I World War II Early Cold War Korean War Vietnam Gulf War Overview
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  • Theory City busting Bomb the people break their will Morale is a center of gravity Need air superiority Independent Air Force Industrial web -- bomb means of war Air power commanded by Airmen First Expeditionary Air Force St. Mihiel Need air superiority Independent Air Force Mitchell Douhet Who were the prominent airpower theorists?
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  • American military leaders learned from British combat experience 1914-1917 Billy Mitchell From his friend General Hugh Trenchard, Commander of the British Royal Flying Corps, he learned to think of the airplane as an offensive weapon, best used in giant fleets of bombers striking against the enemys homeland
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  • In September 1918 Mitchell commanded allied group of nearly 1500 airplanes in the first mass use of aircraft for bombing attacks on enemy supply routes and in support of ground troops.
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  • What role did ACTS and AWPD-1 play in forming our initial airpower doctrine? Doctrine Hi-Alt Precision Day Bombing Strategic bombardment Industrial/Economic systems Bomber will always get through The Germany Plan 6,860 bombers 2,160,000 personnel 6 months = victory
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  • What were US objectives in Europe? Objective Grand Allied StrategyGrand Allied Strategy Unconditional surrender Germany first Start in North Africa Strategic bombing Limit Pacific activities Channel invasion
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  • What was the initial European Theater airpower strategy? Strategy Combined Bomber Offensive Americans by day British by night How well did this initial concept work?
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  • AWPD-42 Change in doctrinal thinking Bomber does not always get through Air Superiority is key Doctrine
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  • How did airpower doctrine in the Pacific differ from Europe?
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  • Objectives in the Pacific? Objective Grand Allied StrategyGrand Allied Strategy Germany first, then Japan Unconditional surrender
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  • What airpower strategy was employed? Strategy Island hopping campaign Area bombing Strategic interdiction of Japan Centralized control Atomic bomb
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  • We have grasped the mystery of the atom.... The world has achieved brilliance without wisdom, power without conscience. Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We know more about war than we know about peace, more about killing than we know about living. General Omar Bradley 06 Aug 45 09 Aug 45
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  • From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.
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  • Iron Curtain -- bi-polar worldview US vs USSR Democracy vs Communism WW III Would be fought in Europe Use of nuclear weapons inevitable Theory
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  • Doctrine FM 100-20: Command/Employment of Airpower Based on experiences in North Africa AFs declaration of independence Land and air coequal and interdependent Departure from FM 31-35 Air superiority first requirement Airpower must be commanded by Airmen
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  • Objective What were US post-WWII objectives? Truman Doctrine - Soviet containment NSC-68 - Paul Nitze Marshall Plan - Europes economic recovery Keep the Cold War Cold - prevent WWIII
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  • Strategy Berlin Airlift, Jun 48-Sep 49 Saved Berlin Demonstrated resolve Specific air routes avoided escalation
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  • By July 1, 1948, the Soviet Union had blocked all land and water routes into West Berlin. This is called a blockade. The people of West Berlin could not survive long without food, coal, or other supplies. They would be forced to become part of Communist East Germany.
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  • C-47 planes of the airlift task force at the Wiesbaden air base being loaded with food and supplies for the people of the Russian-blockaded city of Berlin.
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  • Strategy Reconnaissance/Surveillance Cost = 78 Airmen and 10 aircraft Develop nuclear bomber and ICBM force Forward basing
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  • Long logistical lines Lack of heavy airlift NATO v. Warsaw Pact 1,400 bases/31 countries
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  • Theory What were the prevailing theories influencing Korean War doctrine? Conflict = escalation to World War IIIConflict = escalation to World War III Aggression must be checked (credibility) Europe would be the main theaterEurope would be the main theater Korea as possible diversion Limited resources
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  • Doctrine Guiding doctrine was FM 100-20 Force and organization design SAC and strategic bombardment Jet age
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  • Objective What were the US objectives? Jun 50: Status Quo AnteJun 50: Status Quo Ante Repel invaders Restore 38th parallel Oct 50: Unite peninsulaOct 50: Unite peninsula Northeast Asian security Jan 51: Status Quo AnteJan 51: Status Quo Ante Chinese intervention
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  • Red China is not a powerful nation seeking to dominate the world. Frankly, in the opinion of the JCS, this strategy [Gen MacArthurs] would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, with the wrong enemy. Strategy Limited war (Europe was key) Tactical vs strategic airpower Couldnt bomb source (China) Limited targets Modern systems unused B-29s vs B-36 F-51 / Twin Mustang, F-80 F-86 comes on-line later Counterland Operation STRANGLE Offensive counterair MIG Alley
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  • World War II Early Cold War Korean War Summary
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  • The Vietnam War
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  • Theory, Doctrine, Objective, Strategy History Theory Strategy Simulations & Exercises Doctrine Objective Conflict
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  • Overview Vietnam War Theory and Doctrine Objectives Contextual Elements Operational Elements Strategies Lessons Learned
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  • Theory What were the prevailing airpower theories prior to the Vietnam War? Airpower Combined With Nuclear Weapons Appeared to be the Way to Fight Wars Preparation for General War Would Suffice to Win Any Limited War Technological Superiority Will Bend the Enemy to Our Will
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  • Doctrine Aircrew Training Concentrated on Nuclear Weapon Delivery No Provision For non- Nuclear Strategic Bombing How were the prevailing theories translated into doctrine?
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  • Doctrine AFM 1-1 (1964) Focused on Deterrence Nukes could deter all levels of conflict Introduced Flexible Response National leaders decide best use of forces SAC Training Manuals Focused on strategic bombing and nuclear weapons delivery
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  • Johnson Administration Objectives Independent, non-Communist South Vietnam Prevent Chinese and Soviet Participation and Possible Escalation - WWIII Persuade North Vietnamese to Desist by Convincing Them They Could Not Win Not Allow Vietnam War to Eclipse Great Society Programs
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  • What airpower strategy was used to accomplish the Johnson Administration objectives? Strategy
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  • Strategic bombing and interdiction Railroad chokepoints, bridges, roads, ammo depots, petroleum storage, power production Gradual increase in bombing intensity Restrictions on # of sorties, targets, and weapons loads ROLLING THUNDER (Mar 65 Nov 68)
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  • Strategy Failed to Accomplish Objectives Conventional airpower applied in an unconventional war Concentrated on severing north vietnamese support Supply interruptions, destruction of fuel depots, etc., had little impact on Viet Cong Mirror imaging Why is ROLLING THUNDER considered an ineffective campaign?
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  • 1968: Dramatic Year Siege at Khe Sahn Tet Offensive Cronkites view LBJ Withdraws MLK Assassinated RFK Assassinated Nixon Elected
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  • Nixon Administration Objectives Vietnamization-US Withdrawal US Opted for No-Win Situation Peace With Honor--Willing to Exit Without a Total Victory for South Vietnam
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  • What strategies were used to accomplish the Nixon Administration objectives? Strategy
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  • Strategic bombing and interdiction Mined Haiphong Harbor, bombed railroad yards, highways, bridges, POL depots, power plants, war-related resources Electro-optical and laser guided bombs LINEBACKER I (May 72 - Oct 72) Strategy
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  • Strategic Bombing Struck Targets In and Around North Vietnams 10 Major Cities Depleted N.V. Air Defenses SAM Sites, Rail Yards, Supply Depots, Petroleum Storage Facilities, Power Production Plants, Civilian Morale Strategy LINEBACKER II (Dec 18-29, 72)
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  • Why are the LINEBACKER operations considered effective campaigns? Strategy
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  • Accomplished objectives LINEBACKER I Stopped the 1972 Spring Offensive Brought North Vietnam to peace talks LINEBACKER II Returned North Vietnam to peace talks Paved the way for total US withdrawal Conventional Airpower vs Conventional Forces Strategy
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  • SUMMARY Vietnam War Theory and Doctrine Objectives Contextual Elements Operational Elements Strategies Lessons Learned
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  • The Inter-War Years
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  • Small regional conflicts Operation EAGLE CLAW Operation URGENT FURY Operation EL DORADO CANYON Shortfalls / failures in theory and doctrine
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  • The Inter-War Years Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) Directed Services to fight as Joint Team Removed Service Chiefs from combat chain- of-command Joint Chiefs of Staff placed in Advisor roles Air Force coordinates on first Joint Doctrine, but Army Doctrine Took Lead in Determining Role of Airpower FM 100-5 Operations
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  • Theory What were the prevailing airpower theories prior to the Gulf War?
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  • Doctrine How were these theories translated into doctrine? AirLand Battle Doctrine Focused on fighting Soviets in Europe Fulda Gap No provisions for independent air campaign using conventional weapons against non-Soviet enemy Stuck in strategic/tactical stovepipes
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  • 8th GUARDS ARMY Doctrine VII Corps The Fulda Gap
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  • AFM 1-1 (1984) AF has primary responsibility for maintaining US freedom to act throughout the aerospace environment Establish one authority for air defense and airspace control Missions: Strategic Aerospace Offense/Defense, Counterair, Air Interdiction, CAS, Special Ops, Airlift, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Maritime Ops Doctrine
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  • End of the Cold War
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  • The Gulf War
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  • Overview Operation DESERT STORM Contextual & Operational Elements Objectives Strategy Lessons Learned
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  • * Iraqi disposition of forces in Kuwait on 6 August 1990. Regular army divisions were arriving from garrisons in Iraq, freeing Republican Guard units for further employment. 2. Restoration of Kuwaits Legitimate Government 3. Security and Stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 4. Safety and Protection of American Citizens Abroad 1. Immediate, Complete, and Unconditional Withdrawal of Iraqi Forces From Kuwait Objectives
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  • Strategy Leadership System Essentials/ Processes Infrastructure Population Fielded Forces/Agents Strategic Bombing Major shift from AirLand Battle Doctrine Target War-Making Capacity/Enemy Morale Mitchellesque Warfare Target Centers of Gravity Conduct Parallel Warfare
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  • Lessons Learned Doctrine Was Updated (Joint and AF) Integrated Strategic & Tactical Airpower Leveraged Technology (Stealth, PGMs, Space) Major Reorganization (AF Transformation) Airpower Emerges as Go-To Force (Operation DELIBERATE FORCE and ALLIED FORCE, Operation DESERT FOX.) Emergence of Clinton Doctrine
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  • Summary Operation DESERT STORM Inter-War Years Pre-Gulf War Theory and Doctrine Contextual Elements Operational Elements Objectives and Strategy Lessons Learned
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  • The Post-Gulf War World and Airpower Development The Rise of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Persistence as the new paradigm - Autonomy vs. Accountability The Essentiality of Precision - The CNN Effect - Precision makes war affordable The Value of Stealth (?) The Promise of Directed Energy (?)
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  • The Post-Gulf War World and Airpower Development (Contd) Net-centric Warfare - The creation of virtual battlespaces - Bandwidth as King - Intelligence as Queen The Proliferation of Non-State Actors The Threat of Climate Change