Political Violence in Sri Lanka 04-03-09

8/14/2019 Political Violence in Sri Lanka 04-03-09

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Political violence in Sri Lanka

Lionel Bopage

1 February 2009

1. IntroductionThe last six decades have witnessed many violent conflicts

1across the world; only a few of

which have been successfully resolved2. The protracted conflict in Sri Lanka continues to

cause death, destruction and devastation, particularly to those living in the north and the east.

Recent infantile and chauvinist statements of the countrys elite express their belief that the

current phase of political violence is mainly due to the LTTEs terrorist activities and that

once the LTTE is defeated militarily so will the national question (National Post 2008).

History tells a different story. Unless the root causes of the conflict are genuinely addressed,

political violence will continue to grow.

The islands post-1948 political leadership did not come into being as a result of a coherent

anti-colonial struggle that unified its people. The neo-colonial establishment not only carried

forward the policies and practices of the exclusively colonial, mono-cultural and unitary

administration, which were not only incongruent with the culturally and linguistically diverse

nature of its inhabitants, but also their socio-economic, political and cultural expectations.

The post-colonial Sri Lankan state never considered it significant to protect the dignity and

security of marginalised and disadvantaged social groups. Domestic issues were viewed anddealt with in a mindset of a conflict paradigm

3. Peaceful demands for social equity, justice,

security and dignity were continuously disregarded and/or violently suppressed. The indignity

and insecurity caused by such attacks on the physical and psychological integrity of

individuals and communities thus motivated them to take up arms.

This paper looks at aspects of political violence in Sri Lanka such as its complexity, the

radicalisation of youth, responses of the state and the left, current developments, and the need

to view and deal with it on an interactionist paradigm, if an end to this destructive conflict is

genuinely sought.

1 The form of these conflicts vary from secession to re-unification, from autonomy to integration, from socialism to neo-liberalism, from economic to

religious ones

2 Marshall (2008) indicates that 24 conflicts are currently ongoing; four may end soon; ten are at high risk of returning to political violence.

3 What is seen in a conflict and how it is understood depend on the reference model or framework (paradigm) being used. Viewing conflicts in social

behaviour through a positivist paradigmatic model (conflict paradigm) will be di fferent to viewing it using a constructivist paradigmatic model (interactionist

paradigm). One model will assist in understanding what policies and activities have as sisted to bring conflicts to a close, whileother policies and activities

have made some conflicts protracted.


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2.2. Interpretation of historyCurrent tensions between the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities can be traced back to

the fact that Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities have their own positivist interpretations

of their historical roots. A sizable majority of Sinhalese believe their race is of Aryan stock

dating back to the fifth century BC. The Tamils including Malaiyaha Tamils4, are of

Dravidian origin. Some of the Tamils5

claim that they were part of the islands original

inhabitants, a claim strongly disputed by the Sinhalese. Tamil incursions from South India

trace back to the first century A.D., and a Tamil kingdom existed in the North commencing

from the thirteenth century6. The identity of Malaiyaha Tamils is shaped by their social,

economic, political and cultural lives centred primarily on plantations.

Some try to interpret the current violence as inevitably deriving from the ancient primordial

ethnic hatreds of the Mahawamsa nature. The reality, however, was that the wars between

Sinhalese and Tamil kings were launched mainly for expanding their feudal territories.

Another interpretation points to the privileged positions provided to Tamils under colonial

and neo-colonial administrations - that political violence was the eventual outcome of the

Tamils losing those privileged positions. Nevertheless, these are often excuses used to blunt

further analysis of majoritarian power politics. Besides, such approaches unashamedly justify

and unconditionally support a policy of subjugation of opposing groups as adopted by the

current ruling elite.

2.3. Basis of analysisPolitical violence is not unique to Sri Lanka. The causes of political violence have been

broadly categorised as caused by national fragmentation, inequitable development, cultural

clashes and liberation movements (Steinbach 1980). These causes do not exist in isolation,

but interact simultaneously leading to political violence. It is significant to note that in the

post-1948 Sri Lanka, any major organised political violence was absent until 1956. Ethnic

political violence that commenced in 1956 was mainly due to the machinations of modern

democratic electoral politics, deliberately conceived and orchestrated as a means ofcapturing and keeping power in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

4 The so-called Indian or Estate Tamils, workers of Indian origin speaking Tamil who were brought by the British to work in their plantations in 1840s.

5 The so-called Jaffna or Ceylon Tamils

6 According to Professor K M de Silva, beginning in the thirteenth century and until the advent of the Portuguese, a Jaffn a kingdom with shifting boundaries

existed in the Northern Province


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Post-colonial socio-economic and political developments brought about new social forces, but

their expectations remained unfulfilled. Consequently, these forces turned to revolutionary

practices against the elite's stronghold on the levers of political patronage and economics. In

the south these revolutionary practices materialised in the form of class mobilisations. The

attempts in the north and east, however, took the form of nationalist aspirations. These origins

reflect the dual character of the youth movements that later came into being.

The post-1948 political establishment concentrated mainly on short term tactical electoral

gains by engaging in nepotism, family bandyism and class collaboration. Political leaderships

of all ethnicities in Sri Lanka have opportunistically used ethnicity as a bandwagon to

establish, preserve and enhance their political, economic and social power, or to distract the

people from the domestic policy and program failures of the establishment. Nevertheless,

many analysts portray ethnicity as the central theme of the current conflict7. Though ethnicity

is used as a label in the current conflict; politics based on economic manipulations is the root

cause. Ethnic diversity has always existed in the Sri Lankan society and will continue to do

so. Good governance, therefore, means having a society free from violence and based on

equity, participative democracy and pluralism.

3. Anti- capitalist radicalisation and Political ViolenceLack of appropriate political and economic development, equitable distribution of economic

benefits, and lack of equitable opportunities provided the essential ingredients for the

radicalisation of youth in Sri Lanka. Political violence in the island can be traced back to the

feudal age, as manifested in regular invasions by South Indian rulers, wars to expand feudal

territories, and assassinations to transfer royal power, and to the colonial era, as manifested in

the aggression and terror committed by colonialists against indigenous inhabitants.

When the British took control of the whole island in 1815, they introduced capitalist mode of

production based on exports and imports. Capitalism required capital accumulation, wage

labour, huge tracts of land and infrastructure, concentration of power in the hands of a few,

and a base for administrative assistance from the locals (Samaranayake 2008). The

Colebrook-Cameron reforms of 1832 abolished the system of service tenure, established a

unitary administration for the whole country and introduced English as the medium of

instruction.

7 Ethnic conflict may occur between aggregations of people that share a coll ective view of themselves as being distinctively different from other aggregations

of people because of their shared inherent characteristics s uch as their race, religion, language, cultural heritage, clan, or tribal affiliation.


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By the late 19th century, a plantation economy was firmly rooted as the backbone of the

capitalist economy. Land was found by evicting peasants from their land. Yet, their attempts

to convert peasants into wage labour did not succeed. Traditional rural life of peasants was

neglected. Felling natural forests brought with it serious problems of soil erosion, floods,

droughts and other epidemics. By the 1880s, this led to the emergence of a dual agricultural

economy: a highly developed, organized, foreign-owned, capitalistic plantation economy producing

for export in the central highlands, and a tradition-bound, primitive, self sufficing, subsistence

peasant economy producing for domestic consumption in the remainder of the wet and dry zone areas

of the country (Ponnambalam 1981). This uneven capitalist development had long-lasting effects on

rural peasants, who became increasingly impoverished. The eviction of the peasantry from their lands

and the creation of the plantation economy generated issues of landlessness, land fragmentation, and

lack of water for irrigation due to wanton ruining of ancient irrigation systems.

The colonial rulers, however, made privileges available to the English-educated locals, whiletreating the rest as slave labour, thus providing a fertile breeding ground for local

nationalisms. The growing influence of the left in the south and the Jaffna Youth Congress

(JYC)8 in the north delayed the emergence of these radicalisations along ethnic lines but

temporarily. The above represented the origins of the dual anti-capitalist radicalisations of the

youth in Sri Lanka along class and nationalist lines.

3.1. Colonial responsesPre-1948 Sri Lanka did not have an industrial sector except for what was required to maintain

a plantation economy. This policy remained in place till 1959. This situation changed when

the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union helped establish several major industries in Sri

Lanka. The infrastructure that was developed to maintain the plantation economy placed the

local peasantry in double jeopardy as this infrastructure was built by wantonly ruining the

ancient irrigation systems, so essential to maintain their crops.

In a predominantly agricultural economy, approximately half of the gainfully employed

population were non-agricultural (Samaranayake 2008). Free education was introduced in

1945, and the medium of instruction was changed to local languages, which created an

expansion of higher educational opportunities for rural youth. This was welcomed by them as

a means to alleviate their increasing unemployment, as the availability of land and water for

agriculture became more acute.

8 JYC was a dominant political force in the North in 1920s and 1930s and appreciated the harmonious and tolerant relations that existed at the time between

Sinhalese and Tamils, Moors and Burghers (Nesiah 1945)


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The states reaction to any socio-economic demand was often to curtail freedom, weaken

political institutions, and move towards authoritarianism. So, class mobilisation in the south

became totally based on opposition to social exclusion and economic deprivation. By 1948,

the lack of land and water for agriculture had become the main issues confronting the rural

Sinhala youth. The free importation of rice from overseas also undermined the commercial

viability of food crop production based on insecure land tenure9.

The national question, which is the basis for the political violence by Tamils, cannot be

explained just as an ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhala community and the Tamil

community (de Silva 1986). Post 1948 socio-economic and political changes, which were

based on policies and practices implemented to alleviate the problems of the majority and to

distract their attention, had an adverse impact on the Tamil people.

3.2. Role played by IndiaIndian involvement in Sri Lanka has been significant, particularly, when political violence

due to internal conflicts in Sri Lanka occurred, indicating its strategic economic and political

interests and influence in the region. Its involvement bears all the hallmarks of super power

manipulations at the time and its domestic political pressures.

During the JVP led political violence in 1971, India provided moral, financial and military

support to the Sri Lankan state. It had even been prepared to invade Sri Lanka, if the JVP took

power (Samaranayake 2008). India also did not obstruct financial, material and military

support flowing from all the political power blocs to the Sri Lankan state10. However, Indias

role in the case of Tamil political violence was different. It did not wish any active

involvement by external players in South Asia.

Fuelled by its concerns over the balance of power in the region and the pro-US and anti-

Indian stand of the then government, India assisted the Tamil militants by providing them

with training in the early 1980s. Later, India played a role of mediator in the case of Tamil

youth insurrection through the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and sending Indian Peace Keeping

Forces to Sri Lanka. This intervention led to a new wave of political violence in the North byTamil militants and in the South by the JVP.

9 A system of agricultural production where the landowner allows the tenant to use the land for a share of the crop produced.

10 Assistance was obtained from the U.S. and Chinese camps by indicating that the JVP was KGB s ponsored, from the Soviet camp by indicating that the

JVP was CIA sponsored, and from India by indicating t hat the JVP was anti-Indian and PRC sponsored.


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3.3. Class based politics and Identity politicsBoth the JVP and the LTTE have verbally acknowledged their commitment to socialism.

However, they are politically driven by their allegiances to ethnicity, not class. They can be

classified as movements based on rural youth that are driven by bourgeois nationalist

ideology, the JVP representing the Sinhalese side of the coin and the LTTE the Tamil side.

The JVP is supportive of forming a partnership with the capitalist state and disregards the just

and fair demands of the Tamil people. It is supportive of the military, the capitalist state and

its bureaucracy, and the religious hierarchy. The JVPs original aim in the seventies was to

overthrow the Sri Lankan state through an armed insurrection. However, this stance appears

to have changed since the 1990s. Their current aim is to establish government under a

capitalist setup.

The LTTE disregarding the necessity to unite and work with the Sinhala and Muslim people,,

intended forming a partnership with the capitalist state in governing the north east. The

LTTEs alleged aim in the past was to force out the occupational forces of the Sinhala state

from their traditional homeland through a protracted armed struggle, not the overthrowing of

the Sri Lankan state.

In the 1990s the LTTE had become a conventional armed force with the capability to

challenge the forces of the state, and its fighting cadres formed into the many apparatus of a

state. It was able to acquire state of the art equipment, technology and training, introduced a

system of taxation and established a wide Diaspora network to support its many activities and

fronts. The LTTE had the capability to assemble large units and launch surprise attacks to

overrun highly fortified military facilities of the state in the north and east. In the south, it was

able to operate deep penetration units, suicide attacks and bombings to assassinate political

and military leaders. The LTTE vied to become the sole representative of the Tamil people by

physically eliminating all its political rivals.

3.4. Response of the state and counter-responsesPolitical violence has posed a serious challenge to the existing socio-economic order and the

political institutions of the country. Therefore, successive governments have more often ruled

the country under state of emergency. The state has used strategies of brutal counter-violence

to neutralise and discredit its opponents. It has also used state privileges and material

incentives to get groups and factions of its opponents to side with the state. Generally, the

state has made use of supremacist or chauvinist ideologies to divide and distract the people.


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Successive governments have carried out colonisation schemes on a mass scale. Tamil groups

objected to these schemes, as large numbers of Sinhalese are settled in what they consider as

their traditional Tamil areas. The state maintains that Sri Lanka is a single country, its citizens

may freely move into any area as they wish, and relocating some people to more productive

areas is necessary. The Tamil groups respond by stating that they are not opposed to

individual migration but only to large scale government colonization schemes aimed at

changing the ethnic composition of an area.

Following the communal riots of July 1983, the government rushed through legislation to

exclude from the parliament, any party that refused to swear allegiance to the unitary state.

This effectively disenfranchised Tamils in the north east and significantly weakened and

isolated the democratic Tamil opposition. This provided the Tamil militant movement with

fertile ground for new recruitment. In the late 1980s the LTTE emerged as the dominant

Tamil militant group.

The LTTE is characterised as an armed group led by one person, enjoying broad support from

local and Diaspora Tamil communities (Lewer and Williams 2002). It maintains a culture of

martyrdom, and has consistently stood for the right to self-determination, while running a

parallel government. It has consistently demanded that the government offer an alternative to

Tamil Eelam based on Thimpu Principles11

. Successive wars and policies launched against

the LTTE in the past for weakening, or isolating them had always boomeranged by further

strengthening it.

12

However, in the current phase of the war, the state security forces havesignificantly weakened the LTTE.

From the hartal of 1953 to the general strike in 1981, through the satyagraha campaigns in

1956, the general political work in the seventies, protest action against the 1972 Constitution

and election violence since the eighties, repression has been the state response to any demand

for justice and equality13

.

11 The demands of the Tamils are s ummarized in the four Thimpu Principles articulated by Tamil negotiators with the government at the Thimpu talks of

1985: Recognition of the Tamils of Ceylon as a nation; Recognition of the existence of an identified homeland for the Tamils in Ceylon; Recognition of the

right of self-determination of the Tamil nation; and Recognition of the right to citizenship and the fundamental rights of all Tamils in Ceylon

12 The ultimate result of the new military as saults is yet to be seen in light of the recent setbacks of the LTTE.

13 The common features of this repressive poli cy comprised of detention of youth for extended periods of time in jails, maltreatment, torture and death while

in custody, high handed action to disrupt civil activity, prolonged solitary confinement and holding people incommunicado without legal or family access,

enforced disappearances, killing youth in a ratio of one to ten or more to terrorise civilians, aerial bombardment of villages and scorched earth policies.


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4. Radicalisation of YouthLack of appropriate political and economic development, equitable distribution of economic

benefits, and equitable opportunities provided the essential ingredients for young peoples'

radicalisation. The universal franchise and the lowering of the voting age allowed young

people to take part in active electoral politics. Free education was introduced in 1945, and the

medium of instruction was changed to local languages, which created an expansion of higher

educational opportunities. This was seen as a welcome relief to the rural youth, and a

palliative to their high and increasing unemployment.

Lack of opportunities to actively take part in social, economic and political life led to

extremely tense situations, which in turn led to discontent amongst the youth, who started

questioning the existing socio, political and ideological status quo and its value systems. This

objectivity led them to subjectively perceive the necessity for revolutionary change. The

failure of the ruling elite to introduce social, economic and political change and make them

inclusive alienated the majority of young people. All governments regardless of their political

hue failed to see the underlying socio-political, economic and psychological causes of these

revolts. The more repressive the state apparatus became the more the youth rebelled.

Since 1948 Sri Lanka has witnessed three major insurrections involving political violence

mainly by its youth. Many socio-economic and political conditions that underpinned and

contributed to these insurrections reflected the diverse, but significant and unfulfilled

aspirations of the younger generations of Sri Lanka. Since the 1970s, younger generations of

Sinhalese and Tamils from similar socio-economic backgrounds have revolted against the

erosion of their economic, political and cultural rights.

This political violence represented the anti-establishment sentiments of the countrys younger

generations. The JVP militancy predominantly represented the aspirations of the rural young

lower-middle class Sinhala Buddhist constituency (Samaranayake 2008). The Tamil militancy

represented the aspirations of the rural young lower-middle class Tamil constituency from

Hindu and Christian religious backgrounds.

Growth of the JVP and the LTTE underscored the role played by these socio-economic,

political and cultural factors. As political violence became manifested in the north and east,

the responses of the state and the Tamil militants caused an extension of this radicalisation

and alienation within and among the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala communities in Sri Lanka.

Since July 1983 riots, the Tamil militants, in particular the LTTE, came to represent most

Tamils, with the exception of the Malaiyaha Tamils and the Muslims.


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Both the JVP and the LTTE have been the products of the failures of economic and political

development in Sri Lanka (Samaranayake 2008). The state repressed both the JVP and the

LTTE using brutal force. Both fought back separately and uncompromisingly. Later, the JVP

and the LTTE again separately, but simultaneously fought against the establishment and the

presence of Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in the island. The ideologies of both the JVP

and the LTTE are not based on current realities but rather on the commitment to their own

brands of nationalism.

Malaiyaha youth, who had left plantations due to communal violence in the South and settled

down in the LTTE-controlled areas, are at the receiving end of the parties to the conflict. The

coming decades will be critical for Malaiyaha Tamils because without significant government

intervention, the growing number of over-educated and under-employed Malaiyaha Tamil

youths may turn to militant protests and violence, as the JVP and LTTE did before them

(Bass 2001).

Despite their diverse ethnic origins, Islam unites the Muslims in Sri Lanka. Some of the Tamil

leaders branded Muslims as Tamils by ethnic origin, which apparently affected the relations

between them (Ali 2001). Nevertheless, in the eighties some of the Muslim youth joined

hands with Tamil militants. As Muslims opposed the merger of the North and East under the

1987 Indo-Lanka Accord, significant differences surfaced between Tamil militants and

Muslims (Guruge 2006). Later on as the Tamil political violence also turned against the

Muslims, some of the Muslim groups allegedly sided with the government. This situation ledto massacres and eviction of Muslims by the LTTE (Ameerdeen 2006).

14

During the time of the Ceasefire Agreement between the Government and the LTTE in 2002,

a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Muslim

Congress. The LTTE during the peace talks apologised for its acts against the Muslims,

recognised that the Muslims are a separate community with their own identity, and accepted

their right to represent their interests at any future negotiations (The Sunday Times 2002).

Since then, this agreement also collapsed. Muslims now are seeking constitutional safeguards

and power sharing to protect their interests. This situation has radicalised the Muslim youth

who also seems to have taken to political violence.

14 Muslims saw the percentage of Muslim population would drop after the merger from nearly 35 per cent in the East to about 17 per cent in a combined

North and East.


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The JVP had now degenerated into a Sinhala nationalist party that continues to vehemently

oppose any devolution of power.

4.2. Radicalisation in the northSince 1948, the Tamils in the island have been systematically denied their legitimate rights,

mainly relating to equal opportunities in areas of language, education and employment.15

Disenfranchisement of Malaiyaha Tamils and the Sinhala only language policy led Tamil

political parties to demand a federal framework.

The abrogation of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam pact of 1958 and the Dudley-

Chelvanayagam Pact of 1968 created a lot of anger, frustration and disillusionment among

Tamils that eventually led to the birth of separatist militant movements. The Tamil United

Liberation Front (TULF) adopted the Vaddukoddai Resolution in 1976, demanding Tamil

Eelam, which had a massive impact on the political landscape of the island (Nesiah 2001).

The politics of the Tamil youth groups in the 1980s were a mixture of Tamil nationalism and

Marxist ideology. The nationalistic element rested on the historic glories of the Tamil

Kingdom. They wanted to achieve a separate state in their traditional homeland, where

Tamil cultural identity could flourish and western cultural decadence could be negated.

Differences between diverse Tamil political groups were based on different interpretations of

Marxism-Leninism16

, but the idea of achieving a separate state subsumed their commitment to

socialism.

The post-1948 government policies on language, colonisation, university admission, and

employment led to discontent of the Tamil youth. The state used violence to suppress

peaceful protests by the Tamil movements. Their parliamentary representatives could not

achieve any positive outcomes for their constituents. Thus Tamil youth demanded autonomy,

which later on became one of secession. This situation led to cycles of political violence and

counter violence. The LTTE received material, financial and moral support from the Tamil

Diaspora. The LTTE has continued to carry out its violent campaign, though currently it

seems to be on the defensive.

Today the continuation of the conflict has created in the North East of Sri Lanka, the worst

humanitarian disaster only second to the disaster in Darfur in Sudan.

15 It is worth noting that such policies even affected Sinhala speaking Sinhalese in the south and led to discriminatory outcomes against them. However, this

paper does not focus on how such dis criminatory practices affected the Sinhala working people.

16 The EPRLF was more orthodox; the EROS was also M arxist; the PLOTE adhered to a socialist revolution; and the TELO did not adhere to any ideology

except for achieving a separate st ate. The LTTE adhered to socialism combined with Tamil Eelam.


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5. Opportunism of the leftThe ruling elites played the ethnic card to prop up their political fortunes. By turning the class

struggle into one of ethnic hatred, they distracted the people from the economic basis of their

exploitation. The left failed to counter this blatant chauvinism. In their attempts to achieve

parliamentary power they eventually bought into the opportunistic ethnic politics. This led to

the eventual debasement of the traditional left, the JVP and the Tamil left groups.

The traditional left stood for the parity of languages, democracy and equality during the fifties

and stood by the Tamils during anti-Tamil riots in the south. They also supported a federal

setup. However, the turning point came in the 1960s, when the left entered into coalition

politics with the SLFP, opportunistically shifting its position on issues that were relevant to

the youth and ethnic minorities.

In the late 1960s, the UF coalition opposed decentralisation of power to the regions. In 1970

the coalition government introduced a policy of standardisation with a district quota system

which steeply reduced the proportion of Tamil students (as a percentage of total admissions)17

accepted for science, engineering and medical faculties (de Silva 1978). Dr Colvin R de Silva,

who was a leading member of the LSSP, was the architect of the 1972 constitution that

abolished the protections given to minorities under section 29 of the Soulbury Constitution,

provided Buddhism the foremost place, and institutionalised preferential treatment to

Sinhala Buddhists in educational and economic opportunities.

Seeing the new left as its grave-digger, the old left decided to wipe out the JVP at the earliest

opportunity. Having failed to slander the JVP, it launched a covert terror campaign against it.

They used the state apparatus and vigilante groups to repress the JVP. The JVP violently

fought back against this brutal repression.

In addition, the coalition government did not seek to fulfil the unrealized political aspirations

of the Tamil people despite their demand for equal rights. This provided the basis for

alienation between the Sinhala and Tamil people and the systematic harassment of Tamil

youth in the form of arbitrary arrests, and detention without trial. As a result, the Tamil youthmovement gathered momentum introducing new nationalist alternative solutions to the

national question which led to the political violence that can be witnessed even today.

17 This issue is contested by Sinhala nationalists on the basis of proportion of ethnicities in total population, For example, see International Foundation of Sri

Lankans undated, Are the Tamils discriminated in Sri Lanka, United Kingdom


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The left and the working class movement need to take a firm and unambiguous stand and state

that any proposed solution to the national question should guarantee democratic rights of all

the citizens of the island, irrespective of their socio-economic and cultural background.

6. Current SituationSri Lanka has a low per capita income but a high level of literacy, low infant mortality and

relatively high life expectancy. War, unfair economic policies, poverty and unemployment

have seriously dented these indices. The cost of living index and the rate of inflation have

been on the rise. The strength of the JVP has dwindled as a result of its collaborative politics

and the divisions that occurred as a result. The state security forces have almost captured all

the territory previously under the control of the LTTE. This has been a significant military

victory to the state and a significant military setback to the LTTE. It is also a major political

blow to its goal of establishing a separate state.

6.1. Factors contributing to political violenceIn Sri Lanka the emergence of political violence was underpinned by the articulation and

assertion of nationalistic and economic demands for justice by the youth. These demands and

the resultant political violence were of a dual character, one nationalistic and the other class.

One aimed at the capture of state power and the other at autonomy from the existing state.

The economic growth and its unequal distribution in the post-1948 era did not placate these

demands; and did not break down the barriers of ethnicity and class. Their violence was a cry

for economic and cultural parity by the younger generations. The response of the state based

on divide and rule' policies slayed any hopes of fulfilling their aspirations.

Collective political violence is embedded as a characteristic of the class society in Sri Lanka

and used by the state, and groups oppressed by the state as a norm. State and non-state actors

have used political violence including terror to target civilian populations, communities, their

leaders and professionals. Regimes have often authorised killer assassination specialists18

to

silence their opponents, persistently interweaving it with their normal political practices.

Since mid fifties, these killer squads have operated in the shadows committingdisappearances19 and the torture of political enemies of state. This sort of violent behaviour on

18 paramilitary forces, secret police, and thugs

19 In Sri Lanka, it is alleged that commencing with Major General Richard Udugama (cousin of Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranayake) in 1958 in the north,

through to Major General Tissa Weeratunga in 1979 in the north, and General Janaka Perera and Major General Sarath Fonseka in 1989 in the south, and

again in 2000 in the north, to Major General Sarath Fonseka in 2006 in the north have been in charge of such operations.


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the part of states, both domestic and international, has generated other forms of political

violence including terror in countries like Sri Lanka.

6.2. Uneven distribution of wealthDynamics of uneven development created backwardness in the rural areas of Sri Lanka.

Localities where opportunities for secondary and higher education expanded due to welfare

measures of the state ironically brought out a lower and upper middle class generation of

aspirational youth, who were able to articulate their demands. However, the incapacity of the

state to fulfil these aspirations brought about cycles of political violence. Uneven

development engenders violence, and in turn violence disrupts development. To get out of

this vicious cycle it is necessary to develop self-regulatory mechanisms to ensure the just and

equitable treatment of people irrespective of their cultural background.

6.3. Rapid militarisationOne of the priorities of the state has been spending vast sums of money on the war. The

estimated defence expenditure for 2009 is Rs. 177.1 billion, an increase of about seven

percent from the previous years. However, the actual expenditure may exceed the budgeted

expenditure. In 2008, the budgeted expenditure was Rs. 166 billion, but when military

procurements on hire purchase are taken into account the figure becomes more than Rs. 456

million a day, or more than Rs. 8,536 per person. Militarisation has created a war industry on

which the country depends on. Rural villagers receive an income when their young ones join

the forces or receive compensation in case of their death or missing in action. The armed

forces have rapidly expanded. The increasing militarisation of society has significantly

contributed to the increasing political violence and the aggravating trauma related stress in the

society as a whole.

6.4. Who are responsible for instigating political violenceIn 1958, 1961, 1974, 1977 and 1983 Tamils in the south were brutally attacked; some were

tortured; thousands were massacred in cold blood simply because they were Tamils. The state

was complicit in this process. So it is not surprising that the gun, rather than the ballot,

became the tool for many Tamils in their struggle for self-determination. Violent reprisals of

the LTTE have been similarly brutal and inhumane.20

The current conflict has grown in its

20 For example in early 1990, the LTTE massacred hundreds of Muslims in t he Eastern Province. Then they expelled about 80,000 Muslims from the

Northern Province. They were given from two hours to 48 hours to leave. With their departure commenced the ransacking of their possessions. The physical,

economic, social and psychological suffering to which the entire Muslim population in the North was subjected t o continues to this day.


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intensity and ruthlessness. The lives of hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped in the war

torn areas are at risk today. The conduct of a war should not be an excuse to maim, kill and

destroy the internally displaced people and civilians.

6.5. The state and the governmentIt is difficult to project future scenarios as the state or the LTTE has not succeeded in

eliminating one another. As the cycle of violence turns vicious, the state uses intangible,

uniformalised, extra-constitutional and extra-judicial forms of violence in their counter-

violence strategies. As Major General Sarath Fonseka puts it (National Post 2008):

I strongly believe that this country belongs to the Sinhalese but there are minority

communities and we treat them like our people. We being the majority of the country, 75

percent, we will never give in and we have the right to protect this countryWe are also a

strong nation... They can live in this country with us. But they must not try to, under the

pretext of being a minority, demand undue things.

Under the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) stimulating racial intolerance or

violence by words or actions are considered terrorist acts. While journalists like Mr J.S.

Tissainayagam are held for writing articles criticizing the actions of the government, Sinhala

chauvinists are made exempt? Is this a clear indication that the government represents the

interests of only one ethnic group? Controlling the states own bureaucrats from contributing

to anti-Tamil sentiment is essential. The Tamil people are entitled to protection of their

physical security because they are also citizens of Sri Lanka. This protection cannot be taken

for granted as evidenced from what has happened in the past and what is happening now.

6.6. Military solution or political solutionErosion of civil liberties and degeneration of democratic institutions in the last four decades

due to political violence have resulted in more than one hundred thousand dead, mostly

civilians, and hundreds of thousands displaced, who have become refugees in their own land.

There are thousands of war widows, orphans, invalids, and millions of people walking around

with mental scars.

Military defeat of the LTTE will not solely resolve the countrys crisis. Successive

governments have used nationalism to divide and rule the working people. The Tamil people

have been at the receiving end of systematic harassment, intimidation and arbitrary arrests.

Over the past two years, hundreds of people have been abducted and made to disappear. As

the government has no solution to the socio-economic crisis, a military victory over the LTTE

will assist the state to keep control over the working people for some more time. The country


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engaging in dialogue within their community and with other communities. The diaspora needs

to become active drivers of this paradigm shift by changing their role from advocates of

political violence to constructively creating this reality through their interactions with each

other.

If peaceful coexistence through power sharing is not achievable, the current conflict is likely

to continue. Even if the Government and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces manage to weaken,

defeat or eliminate the LTTE militarily without a just political solution based on genuine and

fair power sharing arrangements granting equity and equality to non-Sinhala people of the

island, the secessionist tendencies and movements could re-emerge. The outcome of such a

scenario would be that 'the Government was winning the war while losing peace and the

future'. A way out of this possible adverse outcome is the implementation of a federal

constitutional framework that strengthens democracy and good governance and provides

regional autonomy to the Tamil and Muslim peoples. Such radical political reforms, in the

long term, will rid peoples fears, mistrusts and humiliations of the other, and provide much

needed space to reflect on the way forward.

As the Buddha aptly preached in the Chakkavatti Sihanada Sutra:

... money not being given to the poor, poverty flourished; because poverty flourished, theft

flourished; because theft flourished, weaponry flourished; because weaponry flourished,

murder flourished; because murder flourished, these beings' vitality decreased, as did their

beauty... (Collins S 1998).


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Marshall M G 2008,Major Episodes of Political Violence, 1946-2007, Retrieved 26 Sep 2008

from: http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm.

National Post, 25 September 2008, from:

http://www.nationalpost.com/related/topics/story.html?id=833045

Nesiah D 2006, Towards a North-Eastern Consensus, presented at International Conference

on Reviewing the Past for Reshaping the Future, Revised February 2007, Eastern University,Batticaloa

Nesiah K 1945, The MotherTongue in Education, Ola Books, Colombo; Cited in Nesiah D2001, Tamil Nationalism, Marga Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Newstrack India 6 October 2008, from: http://www.newstrackindia.com/newsdetails/24618

Pape R 2005,Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism, University of Chicago,

Random House

Ponnambalam S 1981,Dependence Economy in Crisis: The Sri Lankan Economy in Crisis,

1948-1980, London; in Samaranayake S V D G 2008, Political Violence in Sri Lanka 1971-1987, Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi

Rajanayagam D H 1994, The Tamil Tigers: Armed Struggle For Identity, Frank SteinerVerlag, Stuttgart

Samaranayake G 1997, Political violence in Sri Lanka: A diagnostic approach, Terrorism andPolitical Violence, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 99 119

Steinbach U 1980, Sources of Third World Conflict, in Third World Conflict and

International Security, Part 1, Adelphi papers, No. 166, p. 21

Swamy M R N 1994, Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas, Konark Publishers, Delhi

Tambiah S J 1986, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy,

University of Chicago Press

The Sunday Times, 14 April 2002, ColomboTilly C 2002, Violence, Terror, and Politics as Usual, An epochal change in the nature ofcollective violence, Boston Review, Vol. 27, Nos. 34


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Summary

Lionel Bopage attributes political violence in Sri Lanka to the use of repressive measures by

Sri Lankas political establishment to deny access to political power to those outside the

establishment. He argues that nationality, language, religion and caste have been manipulated

to establish and maintain political power by the ruling elite. He goes on to argue that the left

failed to counter this blatant chauvinism and instead engaged in opportunistic ethnic politics

of their own to gain parliamentary power. In doing so the left has debased itself.

It is in this context that he traces the insurrection led by the radicalised Southern (Sinhalese)

and Northern (Tamil) youth. He points to the significant fact that political violence was absent

until 1956. He argues that political violence was the result of a deliberate attempt by the

bourgeoisie to capture and keep power. He is critical of Indian involvement in the islands

affairs (particularly in the context of political violence due to internal conflicts); he is of the

view that Indian involvement was driven by its strategic economic and political interests and

not by humanitarian reasons. He cites examples like: Indias assistance to the Sri Lankan state

to combat the 1971 JVP insurrection predominantly by Sinhalese in the south, its arming of

the Tamil militants in the early 1980s and the deployment of its forces in the late 1980s to

suppress the very group that it had armed.

He attributes the Indian intervention to the new wave of political violence in the North by the

Tamil youth and in the South by the Sinhala youth. He acknowledges that the LTTE had by

then become a conventional force and that successive wars launched against the LTTE instead

of weakening it, had only further strengthened it. However, the recent capture of almost all

the territory that was under control of the LTTE is a significant military victory to the state, a

significant military setback to the LTTE, and a major political blow to its separatist goal. He

concludes that if peaceful coexistence through power sharing is not achievable, the current

conflict is likely to continue with the possibility of secessionist tendencies and movements re-

emerging. A way out of this is the implementation of a federal constitutional framework that

strengthens democracy and good governance and provides regional autonomy to the Tamil

and Muslim peoples. Such radical political reforms, in the long term, will rid peoples fears,

mistrusts and humiliations of the other, and provide much needed space to reflect on the way

forward.

Documents

Political Violence in Sri Lanka 04-03-09