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9. Drug policies: Arcane, ineffective and contrary to human rightsprotection*The human rights community has increasingly drawn into its portfolio ofadvocacyandresearchactivitiesthegraveandsystematicinjusticesresultingfromthe implementationofcounternarcotics lawsandstrategies.AlongsideNGOs in North America and Europe, Latin American human rightsorganizations have been at the forefront of this strategic shift. ThismirrorsthemoreprogressivepositionthatanumberofLatinAmericangovernmentshave recently adopted vis‐à‐vis the international system for the control ofnarcotic drugs, which is administered through the offices of the UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC).ThiscontributiontotheCELSannualreportsituatestheimportanceofhumanrights advocacy on drug policy reform in broader historical context. Itexamines the reinforcing harms that result directly from repressive andpunitive drug policies and from the lack of accountability for the negativeimpactsofcounternarcoticsprograms,which‐bythemetricsoftheUNODCitself‐havebeenaresoundingfailure.Inrecognitionoftheunacceptablecostsofthedrugwar,the2019UNGeneralAssembly Special Session on the Drug Problem (UNGASS) was broughtforward three years to April 2016 on the initiative of Colombia, GuatemalaandMexico.TheUNGASSwasrequestedto:

Conduct an in‐depth review analyzing all available options, includingregulatory ormarketmeasures, in order to establish a newparadigmthatwouldimpedetheflowofresourcestoorganizedcrimegroups.

This was not achieved. Instead, the outcome document reflected a brokenconsensusonglobaldrugpolicyanddeepinternationaldivisionoverstrategyfor addressing the drug trade and drug related harms. The period until the2019 UN high level session must therefore be one of sustained advocacyaroundtheurgencyofdrugpolicyreform.Thoseinvolvedinthedrugtradeasconsumers,producersortraffickersrarelyelicitpublicsympathy.Theyareeasilywrittenoffasdeservingoftheviolence,                                                       * This chapter was written by Julia Buxton (PhD, Acting Dean, Professor of Comparative Politics, School of Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest). 

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illness, deprivation and incarceration that is linked to engagement in illegalactivitiesanddangerousbehaviors.Butitisarguedherethatcounternarcoticspoliciesnotonlycreateandexacerbatetheriskstoindividuals,theysnowballthe highly negative impacts of anti‐drug efforts into the wider family,communityandsociety.This inturnunderminesprospectsfordevelopment,security and democracy at local, national and international level. LatinAmericahasbeenaprimarytheatreofcoercivecounternarcoticseffortsandthe region serves as a cogent example of the corrosive effects on thecredibility, legitimacy and accountability of public institutions, includingcriminal justice systems and the police, of punitive enforcement anddraconiancriminalizationstrategies.One does not have to be involved in the drug economy to be deleteriouslyaffectedbyviolentandmilitarizedeffortstoforciblysuppressthedrugtrade.From a rights perspective, it is a matter of grave concern that anti‐drugstrategiesenablethestatetorenegeonbasicobligationstocitizens–usuallythe most vulnerable and marginalized in society – including through thedenialoftreatment,services,andaccesstojustice.Thattheimplementationofcounter narcotics policies reinforces racial, gendered and socio‐economicinequality,aswellasimposingdisproportionatelyhighenforcementcostsoncountriesoftheGlobalSouthunderscorestheurgencyofpolicychange.Thiscritiqueisframedaroundfourkeycharacteristicsofthismostuniqueofinternational public policy areas. The arcane nature of the drug controlframeworkisaddressedfirst,withinstitutionalpathdependencehighlightedasakey factorexplaining the failuresofdrugpolicyandalso thechallengesfacingthereformlobby.UsingUNODCmetrics,therecordoftheinternationalcontrolframeworkisthenassessedandfoundtobedeeplyproblematic.Theflaws underpinning guiding principles are outlined as an explanation as towhycurrentapproachescannotsucceed,beforetheremarkably isolatedand‘silo’natureofdrugpolicyactorsandinstitutionswithinthewiderUNsystemisconsidered.1.1TheHistoricalContextof‘Narcotic’DrugControlThe assumptions and principles of drug policy are now over a century old.This isquiteextraordinary. Innootherareaof government intervention forthe ‘public good’ – from education to public health, from housing to publictransport,isstrategyandpolicyembeddedinnineteenthcenturyapproaches.

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Contemporary drug policy is primarily framed by a landmark meetingconvened in 1909 at the initiative of the US government. Held in Shanghai,China,thisbroughtthe‘greatpowers’ofthedaytogethertoconsidercontrolsontheimportandexportofopium.Atthatpointopium,alongsidesubstancessuchasotheropiumpoppyplantderivatives(morphineandheroin)aswellascocaine and cannabis were freely traded commodities shipped from ruraleconomies in theGlobalSouth torefinement,manufactureandconsumptionhubsintheindustrializingNorth.These ‘narcotics’ had historically occupied a pivotal position in earlyinternationaltradingsystems,withopiuminparticularunderwritingsomeofthe costs of Spanish, Dutch and in particular British imperialism in LatinAmerica and South Asia. The value of these substances in the nineteenthcentury lay in their medicinal use in an age of rapid industrialization andurbanization, and before the advent of a professionalized health service.Widelyavailableandroutinelydispensedtochildrenaswellasadults,opium,cocaine and cannabis based products were marketed by the emergingpharmaceutical sector as tinctures, lozenges, syrups and injecting solutionsandpurportedtocurearangeofinfectiousdiseaseandillness.However,theUSfederalgovernmentwashostiletoatrade,whichunliketheEuropean powers, the country had no vested interest in. There was also astronglymoraldimensiontotheUSposition,informedbythepuritanideologyof the American prohibition movement. Emerging in the 1860s as a moreradical element of the European temperance movement, US prohibitionorganizations viewed the use of intoxicating substances as immoral and‘foreign’. Moreover, in an age of the ‘white man’s burden’ and an assumedresponsibility to Christianize Asia, the McKinley and successor Rooseveltadministrationsworkedwith the crumbling Chinese Empire to establish aninternationalsystemofopiumexportandimportregulations.The resulting 1912 International Opium Convention of The Hague was thefirstinternationaldrugtreaty.Itlaidthefoundationsforaseismicshiftintheresponsibilities of the state, which was now required to regulate personalbehaviorbycontrollingdomesticmanufactureandconsumptionofdangeroussubstances.The1912Conventionwastheworld’sfirstinternationalmodelofregulatory collaboration, with thirteen drug treaties following through to1990.Thesegraduallyexpanded therangeandnumberof substancesunderthecontrolregimeandthepolicingandreportingrequirementsofsignatory

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states. As such, the 1909 Shanghai conference set the intellectual andinstitutionaldirectionofthedrugcontrolsystemandapproachesthatoperatetoday. To put it another way, we respond to the complex, transnationalchallenges of intravenous drug use (IDU) related HIV/AIDS, internet‐baseddrug sales and drug funded international organized crime through aframeworkdevisedbyimperialpowersatatimewhenwomencouldnotvoteor wear trousers, when nose size was seen to determine intelligence, andwhenaddictionwasunderstoodasaproblemof‘godlessness’.The1961SingleConvention, themost importantaccord in the internationaltreaty framework, elaborates theseprinciplesasoperationalandbindingonsignatorystatesinordertoprotectthe“healthandwellbeingofmankind.”Inits language (which strongly emphasizes the ‘evil’ of drugs), the 1961Conventionreflectsanimportantshift in internationaldrugcontrolaftertheSecondWorldWar.Positionedasaglobalpower following thedefeatof theAxis countries in 1945, the US was able to impose a more restrictiveinternational control framework and more draconian responses to controlviolations.Theevolutionofthetreatyframeworkwasunderpinnedbyanexpansionandincreasedspecializationofdrugcontrolagenciesandinstitutions,bothwithintheUnitedNationsandalsoatnational level.Thisre‐orientationsteeredtheinternationalsystemawayfromtheearlier,pre‐warmodelofregulation–asoverseen by the League of Nations and advocated by European powers,towardtheUSpreferenceforprohibition.Signatory states assumed the “duty to not permit possession” of drugscontrolledunderthe1961treaty(Article33)andto“adoptmeasuresaswillensure that […] possession […] shall be a punishable offence” (Article 36).Indicativeofthetrendofdeepeningtheexistingmodel,the1988ConventionAgainst Illicit Traffic inNarcoticDrugs andPsychotropic Substances set outthat:

Eachpartyshalladoptsuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoestablishacriminaloffenceunderitsdomesticlaw[…]thepossession,purchaseorcultivation of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances for personalconsumptionArticle3).

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In relation to trafficking, “Serious offences shall be liable to adequatepunishmentparticularlybyimprisonmentorotherpenaltiesofdeprivationofliberty”(Article36).With regard to the cultivation of narcotic drug crops, concentrated at thattimeinTurkey,ThailandandIndiainthecaseoftheopiumpoppy,andPeruand Bolivia in the case of coca, the 1961 Single Convention established arequirement touproot anddestroy illegally cultivatednarcotic crops in linewiththeambitionthat:

Thequasi‐medicaluseofopiummustbeabolishedwithin15years[…]coca leaf chewingmust be abolishedwithin twenty‐five years […] theuseofcannabisforotherthanmedicalandscientificpurposesmustbediscontinued as soon as possible but in any case within twenty‐fiveyearsfromthecomingintoforceofthisConvention(Article45).

Importantly no compensation was provided to those countries that hadhistorically relied on the cultivation of these crops, despite strong lobbyingfromBoliviaandPeruandtheiremphasisonpreservingindigenousrightstococa cultivation and chewing. In relation to opium poppy, the 1961 SingleConvention acknowledged the crucial role of opioids in pain relief andmedication,butestablishedarestrictiveframeworkofstatecontrolofopiumcultivationbyaselectnumberofcountries,withnon‐cultivatingstatesboundto a complex system of import limitations, checks and requirementsubmissions overseen by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB,Article 21). However, the overall thrust was toward cultivation limitation,withArticle22settingoutthat:

Whenever the prevailing conditions in the country or a territory of aPartyrendertheprohibitionofthecultivationoftheopiumpoppy,thecoca bush or the cannabis plant the most suitable measure, in itsopinion,forprotectingthepublichealthandwelfareandpreventingthediversion of drugs into the illicit traffic, the Party concerned shallprohibit cultivation […] A Party prohibiting cultivation of the opiumpoppy or the cannabis plant shall take appropriatemeasures to seizeany plants illicitly cultivated and to destroy them, except for smallquantitiesrequiredbythePartyforscientificorresearchpurposes.”

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While forging multilateral commitment to a more robust model ofinternational drug control within the new United Nations, the US alsooperated unilaterally and militarily to prevent drugs manufactured in‘producer states’ from being trafficked into its territory. In 1971 a “war ondrugs”wasdeclaredbyPresidentRichardNixon,asecuritizationofweedsandshrubs that rendered Latin America the primary focus of US supplycontainment efforts. Executive measures subsequently introduced byPresident Ronald Reagan’s renewed ‘drug war’ in the mid‐1980s punishedstates deemed non‐compliant with US counter narcotics efforts, includingthrough theannualStateDepartmentcertificationexercise1 thatdeterminedaccesstobilaterallending.The treaty system is historically rooted. This has created a form of pathdependence in that the principles as embodied in the 1912 opium treatyremainaspertinenttodayastheywereoveracenturyago.Theseincludeanemphasis on: supply side containment, with producer countries assumingresponsibility forpreventingthesupplyofdangerousdrugstoconsumers in‘demand’ countries; interdiction and seizure to disrupt the drug market;enforcement of national level anti‐drug legislation through policing,surveillanceandincarceration;and internationalcollaboration toupholdandimplement counter narcotics efforts and consensus around the ideology ofdrugprohibitionandthegoalofaworldfreeofdangerousdrugs.These foundingpreceptsremain thebasis forevaluating theperformanceofstatesandcompliancewiththetreatysystem,includingthroughreportingofinterdiction, seizures, cultivation eradication and arrest rates. Strategy hasalsoremainedremarkablyunchangedregardlessofthemanifoldandcomplexchangesintheinternationaldrugtradeanddrugmarkets–mostparticularlyinthepost‐ColdWareraofglobalization,anddespitetheblurringoverrecentdecades of the delineation between ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ states, adynamiclinkedtotheriseofsyntheticdrugmarketsandhydroponiccannabiscultivation.                                                       1  Approved in 1986 by Congress, the narcotics certification process requires the State Department toannuallyissuealistofmajordrug‐producinganddrug‐transitingcountries.Listedcountriesmustcertifythatthey are fully cooperating with U.S. anti‐narcotics efforts and complying with the UN drug controlconventions or otherwise face sanctions. These include mostly a suspension from U.S. foreign assistanceand/orU.S.oppositiontoloansfrommultilateraldevelopmentbanksforthenon‐complyingcountries.   

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1.2ResultsOrdinarily,thepolicyprocessassumesthatthedesignandimplementationofpolicy interventions is configured, evaluated andmodified aroundverifiableindicators leading to goal achievement – or at least progress toward policyobjectives;thatmetricslinktooutputandnotjustactivities,andthatrelevantstakeholdersareengaged in thepolicyprocess.This isnot thecase fordrugpolicy,whichhasremainedstaticinpolicyandprincipledespiteevidencethattargetsforreducingthemanufacture,traffickingandconsumptionofnarcoticdrugshavebeenrecurrentlymissed,yearafteryear,decadeafterdecade.Morepeopleparticipateindrugmarketexchangesthanatanypreviouspointin the history of the control system. This is despite the high cost ofengagement inthe illegal trade, includingthepossibledeprivationof liberty,the loss of access to employment, children and housing and, in the mostdraconianofcases,capitalpunishmentandthelossoflife.Looking specifically at patterns of consumption, an estimated 247 millionpeopleuseddrugsatleastoncein2014(1in20peopleaged15‐64),partofanupward trend since 2009 when there was an estimated 210 million usersaccording to the annual UNODC produced World Drug Report. In relativeterms, this isasmallpercentageof theglobalpopulationwhencomparedtoarguably more pressing issues of illiteracy (affecting 785 million adults),hunger (925million people), poverty (1 in 5 people) and conflict and statefragility(1.5billionpeople).Butasametricbywhichtheperformanceofthedrug control regime should be judged, and considering annual globalexpendituresoncounternarcoticstotalanestimatedUS$100billionperyear,theconsumptionfiguresaredemonstrativeofinstitutionalfailure.Foraregimecommittedtothehealthandwellbeingofmankind,problematicstatisticsfortheUNODCinclude207,400drug‐relateddeathsin2014(mainlylinked tooverdose), that29milliondrugusers areestimated to suffer fromsomeformofdrugusedisorder,andthatofthe12millionpeoplewhoinjectdrugs 14 percent are livingwithHIV. Not only aremore people consumingillegaldrugs,therangeofsubstancesavailableisnowmorediverse,cheaperandpurerthanhaseverpreviouslybeenthecase.The demography of drug use is also evolving – women and girls are anincreasingly important element of drugmarkets – at both themanufacture

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andconsumptionendsof thechain; individualsarebeing initiated intodruguseatayoungerage,anddataondrug‘careers’demonstratethatconsumersareusingdrugs for a longerperiodof timeandalsoengaging inpatternsofpolydruguse.Thegeographyofdrugmarketshasalsoundergoneredefinition.The Global South – traditionally the hub of drug crop cultivation, drugmanufacture and outward trafficking – now constitutes an ever expandingconsumermarket,whiletheNorthisconverselyassumingamoresignificantrole in narcotic manufacture – specifically in relation to cannabis andsynthetic drugs.With consumption andmanufacture expanding both Southand North of the globe, the overall trend is of a larger, more complex,integrated and sophisticated criminal market valued in the lastcomprehensive estimate by the UNODC (2003) at an estimated US$ 321.6billionperyearor0.9percentofglobalGDP.Crucial to an understanding of the disproportionate impact of drug policystrategyon thepeopleandcountriesof theGlobalSouth, it shouldbenotedthat the orientation of the international system is toward the control ofnaturallyoccurringnarcoticsubstances,whichistosaydrugssuchasopium,cocaineandcannabisthatareplantbased(theopiumpoppy,thecocaleafandthecannabissativaplant).Whilethistypeof‘organic’narcoticsubstancewastraditionallydominantintheillicitmarket,thecontemporaryperiodhasseena boom in chemically manufactured synthetic drugs, referred to asAmphetamineTypeSubstances(ATS),hallucinogensandpsychedelicssuchasamphetamine,methamphetamine,EcstasyMDMA,LSDandalsoaraftofnewpsychoactive substances (NPS or legal highs) that are typically chemicalcopiesofnaturallyoccurringdrugssuchassyntheticcannabinoids,butwhichskirtcontrolsthroughminormolecularmodificationthattakethemoutsideofthe remit of the control framework. According to the UNODC, NPS are:“proliferating at an unprecedented rate, posing a significant risk to publichealthandachallengetodrugpolicy”with102countriesreportingatotalof644NPStotheUNODCbetween2008and2015.  

To underscore the scale of shifts in illicit drugmarkets and the rise of ATSmanufacture and consumption, it is useful to examine the data provided bythe UNODC despite – as discussed below –problems with the reliability ofreporting information provided to international drug control authorities.While cannabis has remained overwhelmingly the most widely consumedcontrolledsubstance,ATSarethesecondmostprevalentcategoryofdrug.Inits2014GlobalSyntheticDrugsAssessmenttheUNODCacknowledgedthat:

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ATSwerefirmlyestablishedonglobal illicitdrugmarketsandthatuselevels often exceeded those of heroin and/or cocaine […] surgingATSseizurespointtoarapidexpansionoftheglobalmarket,withtotalATSseizuresrisingbymorethan80percenttomorethan135tonsin2012.

ThegrowthoftheATSmarket,withkeymanufacturesitesinNorthAmericaandEurope, isdisplacing the traditional importanceofboth thecocaineandopioidsupplychainsalthoughimportantly,theselatterdrugscontinuetobeattheforefrontoferadicationandinterdictionoperations.Thisunderscoresthepathdependentnatureof the controlmodel and its lackof adaptability inadynamic environment.According to figures in the2012WorldDrugReport,those reporting annual cocaine use in the 15‐64 age group was half thenumberreportingATSuse(excludingMDMA)at13.7millionand26.2millionpeoplerespectively.At15.9million,thefiguresforopioidusealsotrailedATS.

In the case of narcotic drug crop cultivation there has been no progress inadvancingthesupplyreductionscheduleof fifteenandtwenty fiveyearssetoutinthe1961SingleConvention.OpiumproductioninAfghanistanincreased43percentin2015duetoanestimated10percentincreaseinthecultivationarea to 201,000 hectares, the highest level in over two decades. Includingestimates for Colombia, Mexico, Guatemala, Pakistan, Laos, Myanmar,ThailandandVietnam,thetotalareaunderopiumpoppycultivationin2015was an estimated 281,100 hectares with 4,770 tons of potential opiumproduction.Cocacultivationhasseenamodestdeclinefrom158,000hectaresin2004to132,300hectaresin2014,ofwhich20,400hectareswasreportedin Bolivia, 69,000 hectares in Colombia and 42,900 hectares in Peru withpotentialmanufactureofpurecocaineestimatedin2014–afullthirtyyearsoverthe1961SingleConventionschedule‐of943tons.Thesefiguresaredeeplyproblematic,notonlybecausetheyunderscoregoalshavenotbeenmet,butbecause theyareunreliableand fail topresenta fullpictureofcounternarcoticspolicyimpacts.Fornearlyhalfacentury,thedrugcontrol regime has focused on a narrow set of indicators to determine theprogressandperformanceofnationalgovernments.This includesillicitdrugprice,purityandavailability;arrestandincarcerationrates;volumeandtypeof drug seizures and eradication rates for drug crop cultivation. However,there are a host of factors that make reporting imprecise, including thedifferentmethodologiesusedbycountries,thedifficultyofobtainingtruthful

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information in a context of punitive enforcement (for example aroundconsumption),thevalidityofextrapolatingdrugmarketsizeandtrendsfromseizure rates; and the hidden nature of cultivation, manufacture andtrafficking. The skewing of the regime to the advantage of theGlobalNorthalsomeansthatwhilewemayhavevast–ifsomewhatmisleadinginformationon raw narcotic cultivation levels, information on synthetic manufacture –including in the Global North, is thin.Moreover, in contrast to other publicpolicy processes, a range of stakeholders are discounted from drug policydesign,monitoringandevaluation,includingforexampledrugusersanddrugcrop cultivators – criminalization serving as a key factor of exclusion. As aresult,theevidencebaseofdrugpolicyinterventionsisweakandconfiguredaroundassumptionsofmotivatingbehaviorsandreasons forengagement inthedrugtrade.OutputsandimpactsdonotformpartoftheUNODCmetricsandasaresult,negativeexternalitiesofcounternarcoticsenforcementarenotcaptured.Forexample, while reported eradication demonstrates progress for theachievementofnationalorUNODCgoalsoncultivationreduction,thehumanimpacts in termsofdisplacementor lossof livelihoodsarenotassessedandcannotthereforebemitigated.Similarly,theimpactsonadependentchildofthe incarceration of a drug using or trafficking parent is not measured inperformance indicators, nor is the violence used by the security sector inaccountingforarrestorseizureratesinanti‐drugoperations.Currentmetricsfurther encourage accelerated enforcement actions in order tomeet annualandhalf yearly reporting requirements.At the same time, andunderscoringthehistoricalrootsofthecontrolmodel,targetfailureisfrequentlyjustified–including by the UNODC itself, through recourse to moral argument – thatdrug control is an inherently good thing whatever the results. This moralpersuasioninturnlegitimizescrudeandindefensiblestrategies.Forexample,theresponseofsomenationalleveldrugagenciesandregionalorganizationstotheongoingpresenceandgrowthofdrugmarketshasbeentostepupthepolicing of drug markets. This has repeatedly been the case in US counternarcotics strategy both domestically and overseas – with particularlydeleterious ramifications for Latin America. More recently, the Philippinesstandsasthemostextremeexampleofthislurchtowardbrutalsuppression.IntheyearfollowingtheelectionofPresidentRodrigoDuterteinMay2016onaplatformofconfrontingviolentcrime,anestimated6,000peoplehavebeenkilled by paramilitaries and vigilantes in the so‐called Oplan Tokhang orPhilippineDrugWar. In January2017,Duterte’s officepublisheda so‐called

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narco‐list of local mayors, police officers and public officials, with Dutertethreatening:

Look for your name in the narco‐list. Son of awhore, if your name isthere,youhaveaproblem.Iwillreallykillyou.

ThepresidenthasexhortedFilipinos:

If youknowofanyaddicts, goaheadandkill themyourself as gettingtheirparentstodoitwouldbetoopainful.

ThePhilippinesisatoneendofthespectrum,butthegovernmentresponseisnot without precedent either in terms of strategy or casualties. But thehistoricalexperiencedemonstratesthatnomatterthebrutality,thedrug‘war’– be it of high or low intensity ‐ cannot succeed. Efforts to suppress drugmarketshavebeenrecurrentlycounterproductive,catalyzingdynamiceffectsof fragmentation, relocation and innovation. To understand why this is thecase,itisusefultoreturntothefoundingprinciplesofthecontrolmodelandtheideologyofprohibition.1.3StrategicFlawsDrug prohibition is based on the postulation that successful eradication ofdrugcropsandinterdictionofdrugtrafficwillelevatethecostofdiminishedsupply, pushing consumers out of the market; and that punitive criminaljustice frameworks will disincentivize participation in the trade, forcingnarcoticdrug crop cultivators anddrugproducers into legal employment.Asecond assumption is the presence, structure and functioning of a capabledeterrentnationstate,predicatedon theWestphaliansystemofa sovereignentity with demarcated borders, territorial integrity and governance of adefined citizenship. Within this conceptualization, there is a neat andunproblematicdistinctionbetweenthegood,rationalandformalstateanditsinstitutionson theonehand– all boundedandoperatingwithin the rule oflaw,andtheviolent,corruptandultimatelyrepressiblecriminaltradeontheother.Neitheroperatingassumptionisvalid.Ashasbeendocumentedby theexperienceofotherprohibitions (sexwork,alcohol, tobacco,coffee)criminalizationgeneratesa lucrative illegaltrade. Inthe case of dependence inducing substances,markets haveproved resilient.

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Thisisduetotheinelasticnatureofdemand,withsomeconsumersaccedingtopayescalatingcosts,whilethevalueaddedbyprohibitiontoillicitnarcoticplant cultivation and drug manufacture incentivizes supply. These factorsoffsetthecostsofpunishmentatalllevelsintheproductionanddistributionchain.Onestepforwardinthedrug‘war’isoffsetbythelogicandinevitabilityoftwosteps back – a successful seizure diminishes supply, in turn elevating priceand increasing the incentives for actors to enter the supply chain. Thepossibility of large rents for thosewilling to engage in criminal supply hasrecurrently fueled violent competition for vacated territory and markets ‐Mexicoservingasaparticularlybloodyexampleofthistypeofincentivization.Thisincludesamongstateactors,withthemilitary,policeandotherelementsof the security sector and criminal justice system susceptible to lucrativecollusionandprotectionrackets.Converselythemilitarizationofenforcementencouraged by bilateral frameworks ranging from Blast Furnace in Bolivia(1986)throughtoPlanColombia(1998),PlanMexico(2007)andtheCentralAmerican Regional Security Initiative (2008) has resulted in human rightsabuses that include execution, torture, arbitrary detention and rape in thecontext of security sector impunity, inadequate civilianoversight of counternarcotics actors and the recruitment of paramilitary forces into dedicatedcounternarcoticsunits.Thelossofmarketshareinaparticulardrug‐ortheelevationofinterdictionrisk–frequentlyreorientscriminalsupplytoadifferentdrugtype.Therearemultiple examples of this dynamic, for example the shift from cannabis tococainesupplybetweenColombiaandtheUSinthe1970sandmorerecentlythe supplanting of opioid markets with methamphetamine in South Asia.Alternatively, if drug trade values are low, criminal organizations diversifyinto other forms of illegal revenue generation such as money laundering,racketeeringandpeopletrafficking.Similarly, the displacement of drug kingpins and ‘decapitation’ of largecriminal organizations, as pursued with vigor by the US during RonaldReagan’s renewed drug war, has not forced drug cartels or their supplynetworks into oblivion. Rather, in what has been referred to as the ‘hydra’syndrome, ‘decapitated’organizationshavesproutedmultiplesmallerheads,boutique cartelitos and new, more agile criminal alliances that reduce the

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threats to their operations and profits by diversifying portfolios andmaintainingflexiblestructures.A further result of drug control ‘success’ is market fragmentation andsubstitution.Thishasbeentheexperienceacrossallaspectsofthesupplyandconsumption chain. For the nine out of ten drug users that the UNODCacknowledgetobenon‐problematic,shortageofapreferreddrugwilltriggershifts intodifferentornewdrug types;demand for cocaine inLondon,NewYorkorRioisnotterminatedbyalargescaleseizure.Consumersinsteadseekoutnewsuppliersormodifydrugpreferencestomatchavailability‐thistrendof shift and substitutionmore recently underpinning the growthof theNPSmarket.TheUKcannabismarketpresentsaninterestingcaseofsubstitution.Following a reduction in imports from traditional supply countries inLebanon,Morocco, IndiaandAfghanistan in the1990s,domesticproductionwiththeuseofhydroponicgrowingkitsaccelerated.NotonlydidUKcounternarcoticsoperationsgenerateanoveldomestic importsubstitutionstrategy,italsostimulatedtheemergenceofahighpotencycannabisor‘skunk’marketbased on the import and cultivation of genetically modified and selectivelybredcannabisstrains.In terms of trafficking, interdiction and seizure similarly fragments andtransformssupplyroutesandoperations.IntheSouthAmericancase,Nixon’s‘Operation Intercept’ that imposed controls and searches of landtransportationbetweenMexicoandtheUSencouragedColombiantraffickerstodiversifydrugtype–awayfrombulkyandsmellycannabisintoanewandat that point relativelyunknowndrug – cocaine; to change transportation –fromlandfreighttoairandshipping;andtoalterroutes–awayfromMexicanentry points into the US detouring instead through the Caribbean and thePacificOcean.Effortstoavoiddetectionandacceleratethemovementofdrugsthroughsupplychainshasconstantlystimulatedinnovationintransportationtechnologies, for example the use of mini submarines, the impregnation oftextilesandfoodstuffswithliquidcocaineandtheuseofmuleswhentherisksofbulktraffickingareseentobehigh.Aswithproblemsof fragmentationandadaptationobservedintheresponseoftheconsumptionandtraffickingaspectsofthetradetoenforcementefforts,drugcropcultivationsimilarlydemonstratesa ‘ballooneffect’. Squeezedrugcrop cultivation in one geographic region of a country and as with thesqueezingofaballoonatoneend,cultivation–liketheairinaballoon–shifts

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to another region. Squeeze a whole cultivating country in its entirety andcultivation relocates across borders and regions. The two approaches havebeen pursued by the international community to meet the cultivationreduction schedules of the 1961 Single Convention: eradication andalternative development (AD). Neither has been successful. The former isassociated with coercion rather than being voluntarily undertaken bycultivatorcommunitiesandhasmostusuallybeenconductedbythesecuritysector(domesticorexternal)orotherstatesponsoredagents.LatinAmericahas extensive experience of militarized eradication exercises, focused inBolivia, Peru and Colombia from the 1980s onwards, while in South Asia,regimes in PDR Laos and Afghanistan have also undertaken coerciveeradicationcampaignsofopiumpoppy.The 1990s marked something of a step change within the control regime.Following a much lauded model of opium poppy cultivation reduction inThailandsponsoredbythelateKingBoumibolandtheThaiRoyalHighlandsProjectinthe1970s,theconceptofalternativedevelopmentwasembracedbytheUnitedNations in the1998ActionPlanon InternationalCooperationonthe Eradication of Illicit Drug Crops and on Alternative Development. ThisdefinedADas:

A process to prevent and eliminate the illicit cultivation of plantscontaining […] through specifically designed rural developmentmeasures in the context of sustained national economic growth andsustainable development efforts […] recognizing the particular socio‐culturalcharacteristicsofthetargetcommunitiesandgroups,withintheframeworkofacomprehensiveandpermanentsolutiontotheproblemofillicitdrugs.

This shift to a more development and participatory approach emphasizednegotiationwithdrugcropcultivatorsineffortstosupportandformalizenon‐drugrelatedeconomicactivities.ThelimitationsofADaremultiple,rangingfromalackofadequatefinancing,underestimation of the complexities of rural development, neglect of thecentral role of cultivation in the livelihoods strategies of cultivatorcommunities and, most fundamentally, the weak evidence base for the ADprogramsthathavebeenundertaken.Akeyassumptionhasrecurrentlybeenthat cultivation is driven by greed and simplistic profit motivations. The

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failure to engagewith the insecurities facing cultivators and the reasons fortheir reliance on narcotic crops has led to inappropriate and usuallyunsustainable programs that serve only to displace and perpetuateengagementinthedrugtrade.The poverty and insecurity of cultivator communities combined with theprofitmadeateachstageofthetransitionfromrawplantmaterialcultivatedin key countries of the Global South to refined end product retailed in theGlobalNorthisakeydynamicunderminingambitionsofreducedcultivationvolumes. As detailed by the Organization of American States in specificrelationtothecocainemarketsoftheAmericas,thebulkofthevalueaddedinthese distribution chains is realized in the Global North, with the USaccounting for 90 percent of the retail income generated by global cocainesaleswhiletheGlobalSouth‘producers’bearenforcementcosts.

The profit generated by criminalization, alongside the dynamic of sustaineddemand, ensures that while there may be progress in reducing cultivationlevelsinonelocalityorcountry,atthegloballevelvolumesremainunchangedor increased due to the dynamics of the ‘balloon effect’. As outlined by oneprominentexpert:

It is less plausible that successes even in a few nations couldsubstantially reduce global production of either opium or coca. Thereasoning is simpleand rests largelyon the fact thatproductioncosts(both cultivation and refining) constitute a trivial share of the retailpriceofdrugs in themajorWesternmarkets […] the costsof the cocaleafthatgoesintoagramofcocaineisusuallylessthan$0.50;theretailpriceofthatsamegramsoldatretailintheWestismorethan$100.25.

The ‘balloon effect’ is evidenced in the Andean coca cultivation regions ofSouthAmerica,ColombiadisplacedPeruandBoliviaas the leadingcocaandcocaine supply source in the1990s following coercive eradication efforts inthelattertwocountriesandasdemonstratedintable8.InturneradicationinColombia in the2000sand2010sshiftedcultivationandproductionbacktoPeru.

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Table2:AndeanCocaCultivationDynamics

Patterns of cultivation displacement within state territories (the mercuryeffect)arepersistent,spanningfromthe1950swiththeemergenceofJalisco,Nayarit and Michoacán as key opium sites in Mexico following eradicationeffortsinSinaloa,tofivedecadeslaterwiththerelocationofcocacultivationfrom Caquetá and Guaviare to Putumayo, Cauca and Viachada followingeradicationoperationsinColombia.Efforts to achieve reductions in the cultivation andproduction of drugs hasled to extraordinary levelsof violence.Thesehavebeenmost acutely felt inthe countriesof theGlobal South,withpopulations exposed to violence andcoercion from state actors and criminal organizations. Mexico is the mostsalient example of the costs inflicted on societies by militarized counternarcoticsenforcementefforts,withasurgein‘drugwardeaths’followingthedeployment of theMexicanmilitary to confront criminal organizations after2007.According to data from theMexicanProsecutorGeneral’sOffice, drugrelatedwar deaths increased from 2,554 in 2007 to 15,273 in 2010with acumulativefigureover120,000by2016.Morebroadlytheconductoferadicationandcounternarcoticsoperationsinacontext of security sector impunity has exposed communities to elevatedlevels of insecurity. An estimated 260,000 households (1.2 million people)faced starvation and death from treatable disease during opium cultivationbansanderadicationexercises inBurma in themid‐2000s. InLaos,externalpressuretoachievezerocultivationby2005ledtoa45percentdecrease in

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cultivationin2003‐2004atthecostofwidespreadhunger.InBolivia, forcederadicationprograms in theearly2000spushed50,000 families into severeeconomicdifficulties,resultinginmalnutritionandrecoursetoillegalincome‐generating activities such as prostitution and migrant labor. Coerciveeradicationcanalsoleadtodisplacement,asinthecasesofColombia,withanestimated fivemillion displaced people (15 percent of the population), andLaoswith65,000displacedhillpeople.Chemicalsprayingofnarcoticplantsandtheforcedrelocationofpopulationshas caused environmental and ecological damage, affecting alternativeagricultures, husbandry, and human health. Underscoring thecounterproductive impacts of these supply containment approaches, threatstolivelihoodshasledcultivatorcommunitiestoforgeallianceswithinsurgent,rebel, or criminal groups for their own protection. This raises importantquestions about the incompatibility of drug policy with developmentobjectives, including the Sustainable Development Goals, and withfundamentalhumanrightsincludingfreedomfromfear,hungerandthethreatofviolence–asdiscussedinthefinalsectionbelow.1.4DrugControlasaSiloAccordingtoPaulHunt,formerSpecialRapporteurontheRighttoHealth:

TheUNdrugcontrolbodiesrarelymentionhumanrights,whiletheUNhumanrightsmechanismsrarelymentiondrugcontrol.Thetwospeakdifferentlanguagesandholddifferentpriorities.

Theextenttowhichthetreatyframeworkanddrugpolicylegitimizeshumanrights abuses in order to achieve prohibition policy objectives is a cause ofcontentious debate. For example, Article 36 of the 1961 Single Conventionallowsthat“alternativestoconviction/punishmentcanbeapplied”inrelationtodrugpossessionoffencesandfurtherthatnationaldruglawsbesubjecttothe “constitutional limitations” ofmember states2. For example in Colombia

                                                       2  These are the cases of Colombia (Constitutional Court Ruling C‐221 on 5 May 1994 and after theconstitutionalreform,thecourtissuedanewrulingC‐491in2012)andArgentina(The"Arriola"RulingoftheSupreme Court of Argentina on 25August 2009). InBrazil, paragraph 4 of article 33 in the 2006 Law onNarcotics allowed for replacing a prison sentence with alternative punishments. It was considered in theSupremeFederalTribunaldecisioninSeptember2010whichruledinfavorofapersonpossessing13.4gofcocaineanddeterminedthatthisprohibitionwasunconstitutional.Therulingestablishedthatapossibilityofsubstitutionshouldbeaddressedonacase‐by‐casebasis. 

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and Argentina, national courts have found aspects of existing national druglawsunconstitutional.Assuch,defendersofthestatusquomaintain,itisnotthepolicythatisproblematicbutratherthepunitivebehaviorofsomenationstates.However, the record of implementation is one of systematic and egregiousrights abuses, with drug control bodies inexplicably exempt frominternational rightsobligations.Thedrug issuehasbeenproblematizedasasecurityissue.This‘securitization’hasinstitutionalizedtheroleofthesecuritysector in the implementation and evaluation of drug policy. It is the police,military, intelligence, customs, criminal justice andpenal systemactors thatdetermine and dominate drug policy, not health, education or developmentactors or, as discussed above, stakeholders in civil society, the drug usercommunityordrugcropcultivators.Thesystemisinherentlyskewedtowardpunitiveenforcement,criminalizationandstigmatizationandthishasinturndisproportionately focused on the most marginalized, vulnerable anddisadvantaged in local communities and global society. The easiest toapprehendarethoseatthebottomendofthechain,thelowhangingfruitthataremost usually engaged in the drug trade due to desperation, the lack ofalternatives or due to pressure. As a result, the impacts of drug policyenforcement serve to reinforce structural inequalities configured aroundgender, race and class. As discussed in research by WOLA and theInternationalDrugsPolicyConsortiumonincarceratedfemaledrugoffendersinSouthAmerica:

Even though they bear the brunt of punitive policies, these womenrarelyposeathreattosociety.Mostarearrestedforlow‐levelyethigh‐risktasks(small‐scaledrugdealingortransportingdrugs);theybecomeinvolvedasaresultofpoverty,orattimesduetocoercionbyapartneror relative. Their incarceration contributes little if anything todismantling illegal drugmarkets or improving public security. To thecontrary, prison tends to worsen the situation, further limiting theirchances of finding decent and legal employment when released fromprison,thusperpetuatingaviciouscycleofpoverty,involvementindrugmarkets,andincarceration.

Forparticipationinanystageoftheillicitdrugchain,thepenaltiesaresevere,but most particularly trafficking following from the 1988 Convention. Aspreviously outlined, this permitsmore strict or severemeasures if deemed

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“desirable or necessary for the prevention or suppression of illicit traffic”(Article24).Followingfromthisconvention,therehasbeenanincreaseinthenumber of countries sanctioning the death penalty for trafficking offences,with a handful of countries: China, Iran, Singapore, Indonesia, Saudi Arabiaand Thailand accounting for the bulk of these executions. As outlined byGallahue:

In1979,itisestimatedthattencountriesprescribedthedeathpenaltyfordrugs.By1985,thatnumberhadrisento22.By2000,thenumberofstates that imposed thedeathpenalty fordrugshadrisen to36.Allofthisoccurredwhilegovernmentsinmostoftheworldwereabolishingthedeathpenaltyforallcrimesatahistoricallyunprecedentedrate.

These draconian approaches to drug control operate in country contexts inwhichaccesstoafairtrialcannotbeguaranteedandwheretheauthoritarianprofile of national government raises concerns as to the use of politicallymotivated drug charges against regime opponents and minority groups.Ultimately,recoursetosuchinhumanemeasureshasnotreducedtheflowofdrugs.Forexample,inthecaseofIran,heroinandamphetamineseizureshavecontinued to increase in linewitha rise in stateexecutions fordrug relatedoffencesatover600peopleperyear.Justasexecutingpeoplefortraffickinghasnotledtoanydiscernibledeclineindrugflows,similarlydraconiansentencingprocessesandincarcerationrateshavenotdiminishedproduction,traffickingoruse.Themostfrequentlycitedexample here is that of the United States, which has the largest prisonpopulationintheworldat698peopleper100,000.Bycomparison,therateinRussia is446per100,000while inChinathe figure is119per100,000.Thecountry’s drug law initiatives of the mid‐1980s lay behind the staggeringescalation of the US federal and state prison population, with theoverwhelming majority of these cases relating to non‐violent possessionoffences.

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Table3:USCombinedStateIncarcerationRate

The high rates of incarceration of African America men for drug relatedoffences is disproportionate both to this groups size within the generalpopulation and drug use levels. African Americans comprise 14 percent ofregulardrugusers,butare37percentofthosearrestedfordrugoffenses.ForAlexander,drug lawsand theirenforcementshouldbeunderstoodasanewincarnationoftheinfamousJimCrowlawsofracializedsocialcontrol.WhilethelifetimelikelihoodofimprisonmentforallmenintheUSisaratioof1:9,forAfricanAmericansandLatinomentherateis1:3and1:6respectively.Bycontrastforwhitementhefigureis1:17.ForallUSwomen,therateis1:56,but as with figures for male incarceration, African American and Latinawomen have a far higher likelihood of imprisonment at 1:18 and 1:45respectivelywith a ratioof 1:111 forwhitewomen.Theworkof thePrisonPolicyInitiativedemonstratesatriplingoffemaleincarcerationratesbetween1980and1990intheUS,inlinewiththenationaltrendofasteepincreaseintheprisonpopulationfordrugrelatedoffences.The targetingof racialminority groups indrugenforcement is certainlynotunique to the US. The work of Release demonstrates that in the UK,enforcement is unfairly focused on Black and Asian communities, despite –and as in the US, drug use rates being lower than in the majority whitecommunity.BlackandAsianpeoplearestoppedandsearchedfordrugsatadisproportionately higher rate than white people (respectively 6.3 percentand 2.5 percent the rate of white people), and again mirroring the USexperience, are subject to harsher penalties or sentencing for drug relatedoffences. In London, black people are charged for possession of cannabis atfive times the rate of white people and Metropolitan police figures for

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2009/10showthat78percentofblackpeoplecaughtinpossessionofcocainewerechargedcomparedto44percentofwhites.Conversely,only22percentofblackpeopleweregivenacautioncomparedwith56percentofwhites.The impacts of racialized drug wars are multiple and reinforcing. Theydelegitimize policing, erode community confidence in state authorities andthey perpetuate patterns of exclusion and stigmatization. As has beenevidenced intheUScase, the incarcerationofone inthreeAfricanAmericanmen has fragmenting social effects on families, depriving households ofbreadwinnersandchildrenoffathers.Thisperpetuatestheinter‐generationaltransmissionofpovertyandmarginalization.Thedetrimentalconsequencesforfamiliesandforchildrenarealsomanifestin the impact of rising female incarceration for drug related offences. AsdiscussedintheWOLAandIDPCresearchonSouthAmerica:

The use of prison as a response to drugs has had a disproportionatelynegative impact on women. In Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica, morethan60percentofthefemaleprisonpopulationisincarceratedfordrug‐related offenses. Many of them have low levels of education, live inpoverty,andaretheprimarycaregiversofdependentpersons—children,young people, the elderly, and the disabled […] The incarceration ofwomen—caregivers in particular—can have devastating consequencesfor their families and communities. In the absence of strong socialprotection networks, their dependents are exposed to situations ofabandonment and marginality. Indeed, women’s incarceration may,paradoxically,increasethelikelihoodofpersonsintheircareconsumingdrugsorbecominginvolvedinillegaltraffickingnetworks.This, inturn,increasesthedemandongovernmentstoprovidesocialservices,anareathatisoftenneglected.

         

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Table4:FemaleIncarcerationintheAmericas

Thegenderedimpactsofdrugpolicyonwomenarefurtherseeninthelackofaccesstotreatmentservicesandintheinappropriatenessofservicesthatmaybeprovided.Thestigmatizationofdruguse,andtheperceptionofdrugusingwomen as ‘fallen’ puts them at risk of losing access to their children andreproductive capacities ‐ including through coerced sterilization, whilewomen’s vulnerability to abusive male partners increases the potential forsexualtransmissionofdrugrelateddiseasefrommaledrugusers.Drugpolicyremains profoundly insensitive to the differential gendered impacts ofimplementation and enforcement, and fails to meaningfully engage withgendermainstreaming or gender rights based approaches as advocated forexample in the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women or the Bangkok Rules for the treatment offemaleoffenders.Thisinturnlinkstothedeeplyproblematicpublichealthimpactsofthedrugpolicyregimeandenforcementas recentlydetailed ina2016Lancetreport.Thishighlightsthatwhilethe1961SingleConventionsetsoutasmotivatedbyconcern for “the health and welfare of mankind”, and with the treaty

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framework committing ratifying states to “take all practicablemeasures forthe prevention of abuse of drugs and for the early identification, treatment,education, after‐care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of the personsinvolved”,policyremainsskewedtowardcriminalizationapproachesintermsofstrategyandfundingfordrugcontrol.The provision of harm reduction services such as access to clean injectingneedles,opioidsubstitutionormaintenancetherapyandtodrugsandservicesto prevent or reverse overdose remains chronically low, underfunded andpolitically contested. This is despite a slew of evidence demonstrating thatthese programs contain the spread of drug injecting related HIV Aids andHepatitisCinfection,thattheydonotencourageinitiationintooranincreaseindruguse, that theyarehighlyeffective inenablingdrugusers to stabilizetheirlives,thattheycanserveasagatewaytootherservices,andthattheyarecost effective. In a 2004 position paper,WHO/UNODC/UNAIDS set out thateverydollarinvestedinharmreduction:

Mayyieldareturnofbetween$4and$7onreduceddrug‐relatedcrime,criminal justice costs and theft alone. When savings related tohealthcareareincluded,totalsavingscanexceedcostsbyaratioof12:1.

Andyetaseriousfundinggappersists.WhileanestimatedUS$2.3billionwasneeded in2015 to implementharm reduction interventions for peoplewhoinject drugs in low andmiddle income countries, where 58 percent of HIVpositive people live, only US$160 million was invested by internationaldonors,amountingto7percentofneed.ThisfigurecompareswiththeannualUS$100billionspendingoncontrolthroughcriminalizationandenforcement.Prisons are a particularly vulnerable site for HIV/AIDS, with prisonpopulationshavingahigherprevalenceratethanthegeneraladultpopulationinmanycountries.InSouthAfricaandtheUS,theprevalencerateis2.5timeshigherthanthenationalpopulation,whileinUkraineandArgentina,theratiois a staggering 15 and 10 times. Given the twin problems of risingincarcerationanddenial/underfundingofharmreductionservices,thisisanalarmingneglectofpublichealthissue.Ratherthanensuringaccesstotreatmentandcare,drugpolicydenieshealthrightsbycreatingbarriers.Thisismostparticularlyrepresentedbythelackofaccess to essential medicines, another facet of drug policy thatdisproportionately impacts low andmiddle income countries. An extremely

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highrateofpeopleworldwidehavenoorinsufficientaccesstotreatmentforpainrelatedtoterminalillnessandpainsuchasthatrelatedtocancerandHIVAids.Access toanduseofpainalleviatingopioidanalgesics suchasmedicalmorphine ‐ as recommended as an essentialmedicine by theWorld HealthOrganizationislimitedby:

Thepersistenceofmyths,restrictiveregulations,insufficientinvestmentinthetrainingofhealthprofessionals—resultinginweakunderstandingofpain reliefanddrugdependence—andrelated failureof supplyanddistributionsystems.

Anestimated5.5million terminal cancerpatientsand1millionpeoplewithend‐stageAIDShavenoaccesstopainrelievingmedicines.Thisiswithinthecontext of generic oralmorphine costing $0.01/mg and yet in 32 of the 54countries inAfricamorphine for pain relief is not available. By contrast, sixhigh income countries account for 79 percent of global medical morphineconsumption.This is integral to the characteristic of international drug control as asuppression regime. The ‘dual use’ dilemma of controlled substances beingbothmedicinesofessentialusebutalsopotentialabusehasmorerecentlyledtoalobbybyChinatotightenthecontrolsonaccesstoketamine,adrugthatisacentralmedicineinhumanandveterinarypracticeinmanycountriesoftheGlobalSouth.In relation to each of the issue areas discussed above, there is ongoing andsystematic violation of substantive human rights. On pain treatment forexample,theUNSpecialRapporteuronTorturesetoutin2009that:

Thedefactodenialofaccesstopainrelief, if itcausesseverepainandsuffering, constitutes cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment orpunishment.

The right to health in international law as set out in the UN Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) is routinely violated by drugcontrol strategies that erode the state’s obligation for the prevention,treatment and control of disease, and in creating conditions that ensuremedicalserviceandmedicalattentionintheeventofsickness.Principlesfortheprovisionofhealthservicesonthebasisofnon‐discriminationandwhich

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arevoluntary,confidentialandnon‐coerciveassetoutinGeneralCommentbythe UN Commission on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights, General Comment(2000)isroutinelyviolatedinrelationtodrugusingpopulations.Notonlyhastheimplementationofdrugpolicysatinasilorelativetohumanrights instruments, the UNODC has similarly been insulated from the bestpracticeandrecommendationsofotherUNand internationalbodiessuchasthe WHO, UNAIDS and most recently, the OHCHR and United NationsDevelopmentProgram,thelatterrecognizingthedevelopmentdimensionsofdrugpolicyinalandmark2015publication.Underresolution28/28of2015,the OHCHR recognised for the first time a link between drug policies andhumanrights.Thedecriminalizationofdrugusewascitedasanecessarystepto reducebarriers tohealth, and to improveHIVprevention.The resolutioncited the lack of consent for addiction and dependency treatments, some ofwhich involved deprivation of liberty and the use of automatic pretrial andarbitrarydetention,andthatdrugrelatedcrimescannotbeconsidered‘mostserious crimes’ justifying the death sentence. The lack of proportionality insentencing for drug related offences was highlighted and impacts on dueprocess. Racial and ethnic discrimination and the gendered impacts of drugpolicy enforcement on women were recognized, as was the violation ofindigenous rights and traditional practices involving the use of controlleddrugs.Running through the raft of international human rights treaties andinstruments, from freedomfromtortureandcruelanddegrading treatment,to cultural and indigenous rights, from the rights of children to the right tohealth and non‐discriminatory practice, we see a constant clash of treatyobligations, with states routinely abrogating their obligations andresponsibilities inorder to fightamulti‐billiondollarglobal trade inweeds,shrubsandchemicals.Conclusion:ProspectsforChangeIn April 2016, the United Nations General Assembly convened a specialsession (UNGASS) to consider the global drug issue. The meeting, broughtforwardthreeyearsfromthescheduledspecialsessionin2019,wasinitiatedby three Latin American countries Colombia, Guatemala and MexicomotivatedbytheperceiveddisproportionalityoffinancialandsocialcostsofcounternarcoticsstrategyontheGlobalSouth.Theforwardingofthemeeting

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further reflected the growing breachwithin the international system.Whileon the one hand, some countries that include Portugal, Uruguay, Bolivia,Switzerlandand theCzechRepublic,alongwithanumberofUSstates,haveembraced liberalization measures that include decriminalization andlegalization of drug use and reduced controls on the cultivation of narcoticdrugs(cocaandcannabis),otherstatesincludingRussia,ChinaandSouthEastAsian states such as Indonesia and more recently the Philippines andCambodia,havebeenmovinginamorerepressivedirection.Latin American countries played an important role in the build up to theUNGASS,withtheresearchproducedbytheOASevidencingtheburdenthatthe international regime imposes on countries of the Global South. Thisreformist position built on three decades of frustrated efforts by LatinAmerican countries to carve a path separate from an interventionist anddraconianUS posture. As early as 1986, theOAS issued the Inter‐AmericanProgramofActionofRiode Janeiroagainst the IllicitUseandProductionofNarcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and Traffic,which set out thatdrug control policies in the region should be consistentwith human rights,culturallyandenvironmentallysensitive,thattheyshouldimprovestandardsoflivingandqualityoflife,andbeincludedinthesocioeconomicdevelopmentpolicies of member states. Following the principles established by the Rioprogramme,the1996OASAnti‐DrugStrategyoftheHemisphereemphasisedthe shared responsibilities between ‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ countries, itstressednationalsovereigntyindrugpolicyandcalledattentiontothesocio‐economic dimensions of the drug trade. In leading the debate on reformoptions, Latin American countries had high expectations of the UNGASS,which was framed by UNODC Executive Director Yury Fedotov as anopportunityforopenandinclusivedialogueonpolicyoptions. Foradvocatesofdrugpolicyreform,theUNGASSdidresultinsomeprogress.Forexample,therewasatacitacceptanceofharmreductionwithrecognitionof “medication‐assisted therapy programmes” and “injecting equipmentprogrammes.”Thesocioeconomicdriversofdrugcropcultivationaswellastraffickingandproductionwereacknowledged,aswastheglobalpaincrisisoflackofaccesstoessentialmedicines.Nevertheless,therewasnoprogressoncondemning – or ending, the use of the death sentence for drug relatedoffences.Cannabislegalizationissueswerebypassedaswastheneedfornewmetrics to evaluate drug policy, while a request for regular reporting onhumanrightsobservanceindrugpolicyimplementationdisappearedfromthe

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UNGASS resolution. Structural problems, including arms trafficking andmoney laundering received negligible attention and criticism of theinstitutions of drug control were bypassed. Moreover, the thrust of theUNGASSwastowardpromotingasocietyfreeofdrugabuseinwhichprogress–nomattertheevidentcost–wasseentohavebeenachieved.Mostsaliently,any discussion of drug treaty reform was skirted, with states insteadmaintaining an uncomfortable and an ultimately unsustainable position of‘flexibility’intreatyimplementation.Whilethetreatieswereseentopresent“sufficientflexibilityforStatespartiesto design and implement national drugpolicies according to their prioritiesand needs” – conceding the right of states to pursue drug policy reformstrategies,theflipsideofthispositionisthatflexibilitysimultaneouslyallowsotherstatestopursuemorerepressiveapproaches.Indicativeofthisdirectionofdrugpolicytravel,initsstatementatthe59thSessionoftheCommissiononNarcoticDrugsViennaonMarch14,2016,theAssociationofSouthEastAsianNations (ASEAN) group set out that that: “We are acutely aware of thedisastrouseffectsofdrugs,notjustonthedrugabuserandthesocietyatlarge,butalsoonnationalsecurityanddevelopment.WearecommittedtosuppressandeliminatethescourgeofdrugstoachievethevisionofDrug‐FreeASEAN.”In October 2016 the ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities AgainstIllicitDrugs2016‐2025wasadoptedbythe5thASEANMinisterialMeetingonDrugMattersinSingapore.ThePlanstressedthat:“theregion’sultimategoalshall be to achieve a ‘Drug‐Free ASEAN’, including through ‘strengtheningnational capacities of law enforcement and regulatory agency personnel.’Duringthisperiod,andassetoutearlierinthisarticle,over6,000peoplehavebeensubject toextrajudicialexecution inthePhilippines,while inCambodiaover1,000peoplewerearrested in the first twoweeksof thegovernment’s2017crackdownonthedrugtrade.Looking forward, the next importantmoment for the UN is 2019when thecurrentPlanofActioncomestoanend.Todatetherehasbeenlittleprogressin the determination of different regional positions going into the event, orhigh level institutional acknowledgement of the fraying consensus arounddrugpolicy.Theinternationalpoliticalcontextisalsoshiftingandthisistothedetrimentofreforminitiatives.LatinAmericacountriesmaynotbepositionedtoplaythe importantrole indrivingreformdebatesas theyhavedoneoverprevious decades. A swing to the right in countries such as Brazil andArgentina,preoccupationwiththehemispherictradeandpoliticalimpactsof

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the Donald Trump may combine to preclude the articulation of a unitedhemisphericlobbyfordrugregimechange.Andinaperiodofnormregressand the rise of populist authoritarian governments the language has onceagain become one ofmorality and conservative values. There are profoundconcernsastoviolationoffundamentalsofhumanrightssuchasfreedomoftorture, rights of asylumand in this landscape, opportunities for promotingrights based approaches in drug policy are diminishing. But for thoseconcernedwith advancing–or at least institutionalizing fundamental rightsandfreedoms,drugpolicyreform,andthe2019UNsessionwillbeafocusforrenewed pressure for change. There is the opportunity to articulate anadvancedandevidencedbasedbodyofrightsbasedrecommendationsandforthesetoaddressthesilonatureofdrugpolicybyconfiguringaroundthe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopment.Ultimatelyourexperienceisthattherecanneverbeabanonillicitdruguse–onlyonsafedruguse,andthatcurrentapproachesdomoreharmthangood.