PIPER ALPHA INCIDENT

PREPARED BY:• KHAIRUL ZAKIRIN BIN BADRUL HAYAD• SAYYID SYAFIQ BIN SYED MOHAMED• YUSRINA BT YUNUS • NUR ALINA BT MEGAT JAMAL

North Sea oil production platform fully managed and operated by Occidental Petroleum (Caledonia) Ltd subsidiaries of Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy)

located at approximately 110 miles from Aberdeen, Scotland.

1988, the oil platform that had once been the world’s single largest oil producer was starting to show its age produced 317, 000 barrels of oil every day.

167 peoples died (2 peoples from the emergency response personnel) = 109 (inhaling smokes)+14 (attempt to escape & burns)

135 bodies recovered, 32 bodies unrecovered. 61 peoples survive (climbing down ropes, hoses or by

jumping from 210ft into the sea)

Official investigation report written by Lord Cullen, it was the failures of company’s management on safety on the Piper Alpha Platform

A lack of physical evidence, based upon eyewitness accounts it was concluded that, a release of light hydrocarbon (condensate such as propane, butane, and pentane) occurred when a pump was restarted after maintenance

The hub of a network of platforms interconnected by oil and gas pipelines

Initial explosion ruptured oil lines on Piper Alpha and the leaks were fed by the still-pressurized inter-platform pipelines

CHRONOLOGY

12.00 Noon

• Pump A’s pressure safety valve was removed for routine maintenance

• Pump fortnightly overhaul was planned but had not started• Open condensate pipe temporarily sealed with disk cover

(flat metal disc called blind flange) – hand-tightened• On-duty engineer fill permit which stated Pump A not ready

and not switched under any circumstances

6.00P.M.

• day shift end, night shift started (62 men)• Engineer neglected to inform on-duty custodian condition of

Pump A• Place permit in control centre and left (permit lost)• Another permit issued for general overhaul of Pump A that

had not yet begun

7.00P.M.

• Diesel pump design to suck in large amount of sea water for fire fighting (automatic control to start)

• At evening, fire-fighting system under manual control

9.45P.M.

• In the day methanol system had problems, methane clathrate (flammable ice) accumulate in gas compression system pipework (cause blockage)

• Pump B (NGL)stop• Entire power supply of offshore construction work depend on

that pump, manager had few minutes to bring pump back

9.52P.M.

• Valve in different location from pump• Permit were stored in different boxes (sort by location)• Metal disc replacing safety valve was several metres from

ground level and obscured by machinery

9.55P.M.

• Pump A switch on• Gas flow into pump, caused overpressure and metal disc did

not withstand• Gas audibly out high pressure,triggering six gas alarm (high

level gas alarm)• Gas ignited and explode,blow through firewall (2.5 × 1.5 metre)

and not designed to withstand explosion• Custodian press emergency stop button, close huge valves in

sea line and ceasing all oil and gas production

Before Disaster

After Disaster

Management and Operation

The management and its structures

The figure shows hierarchy root system failures Main element of the accident sequence is based on the

organizational level Management decision from how the leader doing his planning,

decision and actions influence the occurrences The fault mainly on the company’s management of safety on Piper

Alpha

Objective of the management Piper alpha management structures for action or

decision started from managers One :- Ensuring that all objectives of the

subordinates linked to the organization’s objectives.

Two :- Better communication Three :- coordination and interaction between

superiors and subordinates helps solve problems.

Industrial Processes

Side view

Top view

Module A (wellheads) and reservoir The reservoir were mixtures of crude oil, gas, water

and sand. Then, it will brought to the surface through pumping

the 34 wells connecting reservoir to the platform. Liquid state in the reservoir, but because of high

pressure, by the time they reach surface, they become gas and fluid.

Extraction happens during that time that’s why.

Module B (separation) Separate gas and produce water from the

crude oil

Module C Process gas from module B Remove condensate from gas, increases

pressure of the gas. How:- centrifugal, reciprocating compressors

Module D End of platform. More equipment stored here.

CAUSES OF THE ACCIDENT

Direct Causes

Leaking of methane gas 2 times explosion 1st time was by the malfunctions of pump 2nd time giant fire ball was by the rupture of main

pipeline

Indirect Causes

Misunderstood between management and operator

Lack of equipment information Most people on the rig not aware ignition Inadequate emergency respond plan

Root Causes

Operator Performance • Insufficient training to ensure effective operation of the PTW system • Contractors lack offshore experience • Working Environment • Inadequate flow of labour • Inadequate working programme • Pressure to maintain production at whatever cost

Communication & Information • Lack of feed forward and feedback communication • Inadequate display and access of information • Inadequate emergency control centre • Emergency procedures manual inadequate

Organization & Management • Inadequate methods for setting work priorities • Lack of commitment to safe working environment • Inadequate PTW system and fire safety • Poor organization between operations and maintenance Inadequate shift changeover procedures

Site & Plant Facilities • Operating outside the design envelope • Lack of isolation of gas pipelines from other rigs

Engineering Integrity • Platform not designed to withstand prolonged fire

CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS

DIRECT COST OF THE ACCIDENTS

167 of the people died 165 were the workers

109 by inhaling smoke, 14 while attempting to escape A few died of burns 135 bodies were recovered

2 men from the rescue boat Some of the people that survived suffer injury

because of the fire and explosions

INDIRECT COST OF THE ACCIDENT

According to Cullen’s report, US$ 3.4 billion cost in property damage 100 kg of hydrocarbons loss which containment to

the marine it only insured around US$ 1.4 billion by the Insurers

Lloyd of London Occidental Petroleum, Piper Alpha operating

company also paid millions of compensation to the victim family.

Families suffer emotionally for the losses of their family.

RECOMMENDATION

Management and Human Resources

Any recruitment of new workers shall be exposing to the safety training and emergency response training.

Platform managers must be train on how to respond to emergencies on other platforms and give order to the workmen on the board.

Practice of Permit to Work (PTW) system must be put on high priority with regular audit and review of the system to make sure it is being used and is effective.

All workers must been Training in use of the Short Messaging System (SMS) and training in understanding the risks of the operation

Regular production Quality Assurance audits at the yard, high level of Non-destructive Testing(NDT) inspections of pipe welding and piping pressure testing.

Design and Process Segregation of hazardous areas from control

rooms and accommodations, use of firewalls, blast walls, protected control rooms and muster areas.

Installation of a gas, fire, explosion, and smoke-proof temporary shelter for the crew on offshore installations, for use until evacuation is arranged.

A variety of evacuation and escape systems. Must be more than one route.

Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR) to Prevent smoke ingress.

Provide secondary escape equipments e.g. : ropes, ladders & nets

Heating Venting and Cooling (HVAC) systems be upgraded to prevent ingress of smoke to accommodation modules, pressurizing them and providing air locks to prevent smoke/toxic fumes entering these areas.

Emergency Shutdown Valves (ESD Valves) be located on the deck as well as subsea locations on hydrocarbon risers, with the ESDs on the deck being installed within a blast-proof container

Safety and Health

Provide annual safety training. All new recruitment or existing employee must be exposed on emergency response training either twice or once a year.

Regularly auditing and inspection on safety and health in the working places.

CONCLUSION

Main cause of these fire and explosions was due to lack of communication between shifts.

Any company management will not take any measures in order to save money in the short term which can lead to shortage of manpower, less experienced and overworked operators.

Company should expose their employees to proper safety training and emergency response training.