On the Failure or Success of Experimental Aesthetics (Continued)

Leonardo

On the Failure or Success of Experimental Aesthetics (Continued)Author(s): James J. Gibson and R. W. PickfordSource: Leonardo, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Autumn, 1976), pp. 348-349Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1573409 .

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Leonardo, Vol. 9, pp. 348-352. Pergamon Press 1976. Printed in Great Britain Leonardo, Vol. 9, pp. 348-352. Pergamon Press 1976. Printed in Great Britain

LETTERS LETTERS

Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters for reasons of space. Letters should be written in English or in French.

Readers' comments are welcomed on texts published in Leonardo. The Editors reserve the right to shorten letters for reasons of space. Letters should be written in English or in French.

PERSPECTIVE USING CURVED PROJECTION RAYS AND ITS COMPUTER APPLICATION

In his letter on my article [Leonardo 8, 307 (1975)], Robert Hansen [Leonardo 9, 173 (1976)] has slipped in some personal thoughts and opinions that I respect but which I shall not discuss here. My computer program provides, from a given arbitrary viewpoint and view direction, a perspective drawing of previously defined 3-dimensional forms. A particular perspective drawing is generated by means of a bundle of projection rays whose shape is characterized by an index. The selection of the object to be drawn, the definitions of the viewpoint and of the view direction, as in the case of a camera, and the choice of the index (what kind of rays to use) is made by the program's user. About the so-called 'production of a charming phantom', I feel sorry (and jealous) that Hansen gives credit (even as a joke) to a defenseless machine.

Margaret A. Hagen [1] of the Department of Psychology at Boston University is currently performing confrontation experiments of perspective drawings made with my program against real objects. Viewers are asked to rank drawings based on different indexes on a scale ranging from the most to the least natural and realistic looking ones. Preliminary results indicate that viewers most often rank first the drawings with the index i = 1 and last the drawings in usual perspective (i = 0). Drawings with intermediate values of the index are ranked in between.

Reference 1. M. A. Hagen and H. B. Elliott, An Investigation of the

Relationship between Viewing Condition and Pre- ference for True and Modified Linear Perspective with Adults, Research Rep., Dept. of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, Mass.

Horacio C. Reggini Av. Santa Fe 3069, P14B

Buenos Aires, Argentina

ON THE FAILURE OR SUCCESS OF EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS (cont.)

With regard to the controversy between R. W. Pickford and me [Leonardo 9, 260 (1976)] about experimental aesthetics, that is, the application of orthodox perceptual theory to aesthetics, I can only suggest that the difference between us comes down to this: he is satisfied with what psychology has to say about perception and 1 am not. He seems to believe that perceiving is the mental processing of sensory data and I believe that it is the picking up of available information. He believes that humans construct their perception of the world individually and I believe that humans could all perceive the same world if they tried. He believes that what individuals perceive depends on what each one already knows and I believe that all they can ever know depends on what they perceive.

Pickford believes the reports of observers who say that they 'perceive' railroad tracks as converging in the distance

PERSPECTIVE USING CURVED PROJECTION RAYS AND ITS COMPUTER APPLICATION

In his letter on my article [Leonardo 8, 307 (1975)], Robert Hansen [Leonardo 9, 173 (1976)] has slipped in some personal thoughts and opinions that I respect but which I shall not discuss here. My computer program provides, from a given arbitrary viewpoint and view direction, a perspective drawing of previously defined 3-dimensional forms. A particular perspective drawing is generated by means of a bundle of projection rays whose shape is characterized by an index. The selection of the object to be drawn, the definitions of the viewpoint and of the view direction, as in the case of a camera, and the choice of the index (what kind of rays to use) is made by the program's user. About the so-called 'production of a charming phantom', I feel sorry (and jealous) that Hansen gives credit (even as a joke) to a defenseless machine.

Margaret A. Hagen [1] of the Department of Psychology at Boston University is currently performing confrontation experiments of perspective drawings made with my program against real objects. Viewers are asked to rank drawings based on different indexes on a scale ranging from the most to the least natural and realistic looking ones. Preliminary results indicate that viewers most often rank first the drawings with the index i = 1 and last the drawings in usual perspective (i = 0). Drawings with intermediate values of the index are ranked in between.

Reference 1. M. A. Hagen and H. B. Elliott, An Investigation of the

Relationship between Viewing Condition and Pre- ference for True and Modified Linear Perspective with Adults, Research Rep., Dept. of Psychology, Boston University, Boston, Mass.

Horacio C. Reggini Av. Santa Fe 3069, P14B

Buenos Aires, Argentina

ON THE FAILURE OR SUCCESS OF EXPERIMENTAL AESTHETICS (cont.)

With regard to the controversy between R. W. Pickford and me [Leonardo 9, 260 (1976)] about experimental aesthetics, that is, the application of orthodox perceptual theory to aesthetics, I can only suggest that the difference between us comes down to this: he is satisfied with what psychology has to say about perception and 1 am not. He seems to believe that perceiving is the mental processing of sensory data and I believe that it is the picking up of available information. He believes that humans construct their perception of the world individually and I believe that humans could all perceive the same world if they tried. He believes that what individuals perceive depends on what each one already knows and I believe that all they can ever know depends on what they perceive.

Pickford believes the reports of observers who say that they 'perceive' railroad tracks as converging in the distance

(but not as much as the rules of perspective would predict, strange to say), whereas I do not believe them, as I am convinced that they are simply muddled about the meanings of the words see, perceive and know. I have carried out many experiments on perspective in my time and the one thing I am certain of is that so-called 'seeing in perspective' is a fallacy that leads psychologists, philosophers and artists astray. Pickford is content to accept the doctrine that we see the tracks converging, but know them to be parallel, and, since perceiving is seeing modified by knowing, we perceive them to be somewhere in between. I am not content with this doctrine and I can afford to reject it because the whole problem can be reformulated.

Pickford believes with Herbert Reed that 'art is form inspired by emotion', whereas I believe, to be blunt about it, that the assertion is unintelligible nonsense.

Pickford believes that a series of stimuli 'appropriately placed and timed' might evoke the percept of a boy riding on a donkey, citing television as evidence. I believe that there has to be information in the light about a boy and a donkey before anyone can perceive them, whether the light comes from living surfaces, a translucent screen, or a painted canvas and to speak of the 'stimuli' only confuses the issue. Pickford does not agree with my use of the term 'information' in this connection, although he is right to say that it is not the same usage that is employed in the information theory of computers and pattern recognition. I do not believe that the percept of a boy riding on a donkey is a configuration or gestalt 'that is different from the sum of the stimuli' as he does, for that formula has also failed to work. We cannot get from optical stimuli to optical information by way of Gestalt psychology, but only by way of a new approach to optics.

So, after all, the difference between us is that we have different hypotheses of perception and that explains why he finds experimental aesthetics useful and why I find it useless. The difference is one of epistemology, of whether and how we can know the world around us. This is not just a matter of pedantic philosophy, it is a deep and important problem. I claim that the great majority of writers on sensation and perception mislead us, most of them being much worse in this respect than Pickford. I suggest that this claim does deserve serious attention.

James J. Gibson Dept. of Psychology

Cornell Unviersity Ithaca, NY 14853, U.S.A.

In his letter above [Leonardo 9, 348 (1976)], James J. Gibson says that I am satisfied with what psychology has to say about perception and he is not. I do not think I said that I was satisfied. Sceptical thinkers, like me, are never satisfied. I am particularly not satisfied with what Gibson says.

He continues to say that I 'believe' that individuals construct their own perceptions of the world. I would say that it is not likely that one's perception of the world is constructed by anybody else, but the word 'believe' is out of place in a scientific discussion. He continues to say that he believes that all humans could perceive the same world if they tried.

(but not as much as the rules of perspective would predict, strange to say), whereas I do not believe them, as I am convinced that they are simply muddled about the meanings of the words see, perceive and know. I have carried out many experiments on perspective in my time and the one thing I am certain of is that so-called 'seeing in perspective' is a fallacy that leads psychologists, philosophers and artists astray. Pickford is content to accept the doctrine that we see the tracks converging, but know them to be parallel, and, since perceiving is seeing modified by knowing, we perceive them to be somewhere in between. I am not content with this doctrine and I can afford to reject it because the whole problem can be reformulated.

Pickford believes with Herbert Reed that 'art is form inspired by emotion', whereas I believe, to be blunt about it, that the assertion is unintelligible nonsense.

Pickford believes that a series of stimuli 'appropriately placed and timed' might evoke the percept of a boy riding on a donkey, citing television as evidence. I believe that there has to be information in the light about a boy and a donkey before anyone can perceive them, whether the light comes from living surfaces, a translucent screen, or a painted canvas and to speak of the 'stimuli' only confuses the issue. Pickford does not agree with my use of the term 'information' in this connection, although he is right to say that it is not the same usage that is employed in the information theory of computers and pattern recognition. I do not believe that the percept of a boy riding on a donkey is a configuration or gestalt 'that is different from the sum of the stimuli' as he does, for that formula has also failed to work. We cannot get from optical stimuli to optical information by way of Gestalt psychology, but only by way of a new approach to optics.

So, after all, the difference between us is that we have different hypotheses of perception and that explains why he finds experimental aesthetics useful and why I find it useless. The difference is one of epistemology, of whether and how we can know the world around us. This is not just a matter of pedantic philosophy, it is a deep and important problem. I claim that the great majority of writers on sensation and perception mislead us, most of them being much worse in this respect than Pickford. I suggest that this claim does deserve serious attention.

James J. Gibson Dept. of Psychology

Cornell Unviersity Ithaca, NY 14853, U.S.A.

In his letter above [Leonardo 9, 348 (1976)], James J. Gibson says that I am satisfied with what psychology has to say about perception and he is not. I do not think I said that I was satisfied. Sceptical thinkers, like me, are never satisfied. I am particularly not satisfied with what Gibson says.

He continues to say that I 'believe' that individuals construct their own perceptions of the world. I would say that it is not likely that one's perception of the world is constructed by anybody else, but the word 'believe' is out of place in a scientific discussion. He continues to say that he believes that all humans could perceive the same world if they tried.

348 348



Letters Letters Letters

I ask: 'Do they need to try?' The world seen by humans is more likely to be the same world than a different one for each of them. Is it necessary to follow up this ancient philosophical problem? The same world may be perceived differently.

Gibson then says that I 'believe' that what humans perceive depends on what they already know. Again, the word 'believe' is inappropriate, but it is almost beyond doubt (that is to say, almost fact rather than hypothesis) that knowledge can affect perception in certain ways and under certain conditions. But Gibson says he believes that all humans can ever know depends on what they perceive. Well, knowledge arises through perception and continued perception is influenced by knowledge-or must one pursue another well-known philosophical problem in addition to the one implied by the question whether all humans perceive the same world ?

Further, Gibson says that I believe the reports of observers who say they 'perceive' railroad tracks as converging in the distance, but that he does not, being convinced that the observers are simply muddled about the meanings of certain words. Perhaps it is a question as to who is more muddled. In any case, I think that critical experiments do not depend on what subjects say, but on their choice of certain experimental variables as being the 'same' as or 'different' from what they perceive. I also think that one has to accept their choices, which is basically the same as accepting what they say.

However, Gibson says that 'perceiving is seeing modified by knowing', on the basis of the hypothesis that he is criticizing. This seems to me to be a good example of attri- buting to an opponent something he did not say and then attacking him for saying it, a well-known logical fallacy used by politicians and others. What psychology claims, I think, is that, in perceiving railroad tracks as converging (but less so than the laws of perspective would predict), there is one and only one unitary process of perception. The tracks would appear just as much convergent as perspective would predict but for the influence of distance cues, which are integral to that same perceptual process. Knowledge that the tracks are really parallel would be gained by measuring them. This knowledge certainly might affect perception, but, if it did, it would still be an integral part of the perceptual process. To say that 'perceiving is seeing modified by knowing' is simply not an acceptable statement. There is no seeing apart from perceiving.

In my view, Gibson's rejection of Herbert Read's idea that 'art is form inspired by emotion' merely shows the limitation of his outlook.

Turning to the problem of the boy riding on a donkey, Gibson says he believes, again using that unfortunate word, 'that there has to be information in the light about a boy and a donkey before anyone can perceive them', whatever the light comes from. This concept of 'information' is probably the source of most of the difficulties. I do not necessarily 'disbelieve' in it, as he seems to suggest, but it is not made clear or understandable by anything Gibson has said.

I am very sceptical about his concept of 'information' because it seems to be used by him to explain everything that he thinks is not explained about visual perception (and he may be right that there are many things not explained). He has introduced the concept for the purpose of explaining the unexplained. It is a 'deus ex machina' or, to change the metaphor, an unnecessary 'we-do-not-know-what' that explains everything.

Consequently, the 'deep and important' problem of 'epistemology' resolves itself into two well-known philosophical problems that have been so fully discussed in the past that it is not likely that experimental psychologists would gain anything by re-opening the discussion of them.

Gibson says that his claim deserves serious attention, but I, for one, remain sceptical. In any case, I think the psy-









Gibson says that his claim deserves serious attention, but I, for one, remain sceptical. In any case, I think the psy-









Gibson says that his claim deserves serious attention, but I, for one, remain sceptical. In any case, I think the psychology of art and experimental aesthetics have long enough arms to embrace Gibson, among others.

R. W. Pickford 34 Morven Road, Bearsden

Glasgow G61 3BX, Scotland

chology of art and experimental aesthetics have long enough arms to embrace Gibson, among others.



chology of art and experimental aesthetics have long enough arms to embrace Gibson, among others.



ON KIRILL SOKOLOV'S ANALYSIS OF HIS PICTURES

I read Kirill Sokolov's article [Leonardo 9, 11 (1976)] with much interest and sympathy. Although we seem to live in an era of 'artistic theorizing' rather than of 'creative practice' (each contemporary artist feels obliged to paint or construct according to his own idiosyncratic theoretical approach), the fact that Sokolov strives to formulate his system of painting, after thirty years of artistic experience, is both commend- able and profitable. What is especially appealing in this respect is his adherence (conscious or not) to the Russian tradition. This allegiance is manifest not only in his general desire to rationalize and communicate his own aesthetic philosophy, but also in his particular assertions: his regret that only those who 'move in artistic circles' no longer see the world of objects (because of the conglomeration of traditional associations) is a welcome reinforcement of Robert Falk's notion that the true artist must aspire to abstract, i.e. 'refine', the object in front of him. Further- more, Sokolov's provocative idea of the canvas as an experimental chamber operating with the concentration and dissipation of energy approximates Pavel Filonov's and Nikolai Kulbin's conceptions of painting as an organic, molecular process growing in accordance with its own physical and chemical metamorphoses.

In an age of apparent cultural fragmentation, this justi- fication and support of a definite tradition is exceptional, but it is also troublesome. The artists whom Sokolov admires (Falk, Filonov, Malevitch, Manet, Picasso, Turner) con- stitute a splendid monument to an entire artistic tradition, i.e. to a single stereometric vision; and within that vision it is simple to talk of the 'abstractionism of a Rembrandt and the realism of a Kandinsky'. The predicament of the contemporary artist is no longer identifiable with Vladimir Favorsky's concern that the planimetric image is 'invariably also spatial', for this problem was resolved by the construc- tivists and by the kinetists. The problem now, in a world of 'post-painterly abstraction', to me seems very different. We are in dire and urgent need of a totally new optical radius- such as Mikhail Matiushin and David Shterenberg envisaged in the 1920s; we need an expanded vision. However shocking, however irridescent the discoveries in our present experimental chamber, they are predictable: twice two always makes four. Sokolov's own ideas and practice are an exquisite confirmation of this. Only when our visual capa- cities are forced to develop further will we 'see' again. Then a worthwhile alternative will be provided to the formulae now known too well.

John E. Bowlt Dept. of Slavic Languages

University of Texas, Box 2717 Austin, TX 78712, U.S.A.

ENVIRONMENTAL SCULPTURE IN THE U.S.A. (cont.)

Art Brenner [Leonardo 9, 261 (1976)] is correct in stating that my Note [Leonardo 9, 33 (1976)] left many of the questions I raised unanswered. Since he, too, failed to answer them, a tentative conclusion seems obvious; superb architectural/sculptural collaborations are the rare exception rather than the rule and most of them seem to have occurred in the past. It also grieves me to have focused my praise of aesthetically successful environmental sculpture upon old or deceased artists such as Moore and Picasso. It strikes me as a sad comment upon contemporary culture in the U.S.A. that younger, living artists are either not interested in environmental sculpture as a form of personal art expression or do not possess the abilities that are requisite for making aesthetically viable works of this kind. Or perhaps they feel, as I do, that collaborations between sculptors and architects are usually pre-ordained disasters because, by their very nature, gifted artists (whether sculptors or architects) want







Art Brenner [Leonardo 9, 261 (1976)] is correct in stating that my Note [Leonardo 9, 33 (1976)] left many of the questions I raised unanswered. Since he, too, failed to answer them, a tentative conclusion seems obvious; superb architectural/sculptural collaborations are the rare exception rather than the rule and most of them seem to have occurred in the past. It also grieves me to have focused my praise of aesthetically successful environmental sculpture upon old or deceased artists such as Moore and Picasso. It strikes me as a sad comment upon contemporary culture in the U.S.A. that younger, living artists are either not interested in environmental sculpture as a form of personal art expression or do not possess the abilities that are requisite for making aesthetically viable works of this kind. Or perhaps they feel, as I do, that collaborations between sculptors and architects are usually pre-ordained disasters because, by their very nature, gifted artists (whether sculptors or architects) want







Art Brenner [Leonardo 9, 261 (1976)] is correct in stating that my Note [Leonardo 9, 33 (1976)] left many of the questions I raised unanswered. Since he, too, failed to answer them, a tentative conclusion seems obvious; superb architectural/sculptural collaborations are the rare exception rather than the rule and most of them seem to have occurred in the past. It also grieves me to have focused my praise of aesthetically successful environmental sculpture upon old or deceased artists such as Moore and Picasso. It strikes me as a sad comment upon contemporary culture in the U.S.A. that younger, living artists are either not interested in environmental sculpture as a form of personal art expression or do not possess the abilities that are requisite for making aesthetically viable works of this kind. Or perhaps they feel, as I do, that collaborations between sculptors and architects are usually pre-ordained disasters because, by their very nature, gifted artists (whether sculptors or architects) want their work, not that of a collaborator, to be considered superior.

Brenner is also correct in noting that the finest 'environmental sculptures', probably including some of those cited

their work, not that of a collaborator, to be considered superior.


their work, not that of a collaborator, to be considered superior.


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Documents

On the Failure or Success of Experimental Aesthetics (Continued)