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MONUC and the quest for peace inthe Democratic Republic of Congo:assessment of a peacekeeping missionSadiki KokoPublished online: 24 Jun 2011.

To cite this article: Sadiki Koko (2011) MONUC and the quest for peace in the Democratic Republicof Congo: assessment of a peacekeeping mission, African Security Review, 20:2, 29-41, DOI:10.1080/10246029.2011.594300

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ISSN 1024-6029 print / 2154-0128 online© 2011 Institute for Security StudiesDOI: 10.1080/10246029.2011.594300http://www.informaworld.com

African Security Review 20.2, June 2011, 29–41

Sadiki Koko is a Senior Researcher within the Multilateral Affairs Programme at Babhuti Research Institute (BRI) in Johannesburg, South Africa (cocosadiki@gmail.com)

MONUC and the quest for peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo:assessment of a peacekeeping missionSadiki Koko

Introduction

On 28 May 2010 the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1925

transforming its peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

known as Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo

(MONUC) into a stabilisation mission called Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies

pour la Stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO).

By the time of the handover to MONUSCO on 1 July 2010, MONUC had been

operating in the DRC for eleven years – since 1999 when the mission was fi rst

established. MONUC has been rightly regarded as the largest and the most expensive

peacekeeping operation undertaken by the UN since its inception in 1945 (that was

Keywords Peacekeeping; MONUC; MONUSCO; Democratic Republic of Congo; peacebuilding; civilian protection

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30 African Security Review 20.2 Institute for Security Studies

of course before the UN/African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur, also known

as UNAMID). It has also been credited with among others the apparent return of

normalcy and statehood in the DRC, the completion of the 2003–2006 transition

process, some invaluable contributions toward the reform of the DRC security sector,

and the organisation of free and fair elections.

However, MONUC’s performance in the DRC was not an unqualifi ed success. The

mission had to deal with severe challenges in its commitment towards the return of

peace, security and stability in the DRC. At times, the mission personnel were directly

confronted by ordinary citizens on the ground who felt that MONUC was failing to

accomplish one of its core tasks, namely protecting civilians. This was particularly the

case during the second half of its existence. In late 2009 the government of the DRC

requested MONUC to consider winding down its operations and leaving the country

by 30 June 2010. While the UN Security Council succeeded in persuading the DRC

government to accommodate a transformed mission for a further year (until June 2011),

the UN has admitted to the shortcomings of its mission in the country on a number

of occasions. Among the most serious of these features was its inability to intervene

decisively to prevent and/or to stop the widespread rapes that occurred in the town of

Luvungi in North Kivu province in August and September 2010.

In this paper MONUC’s contribution to the quest for peace in the DRC is assessed.

It is argued that whereas MONUC played a crucial role in establishing relative peace,

security and stability in the DRC during the period of its deployment, the mission

suffered from a number of signifi cant shortcomings which stemmed from factors that

were both internal and external to the mission.

The paper is divided into four sections: a background to the DRC’s second war and

the call for UN intervention; MONUC’s contribution toward the quest for peace in

the DRC; MONUC’s shortcomings; and the implications of the transformation from

MONUC into MONUSCO. In terms of scope, the paper deals with the entire period

of MONUC’s deployment in the DRC from November 1999 to June 2010.

Background to the ‘Second Congo War’ and the call for UN intervention

MONUC’s deployment in the DRC was a direct consequence of the Second Congo

War that started in August 1998. Considered a case of an ‘invasion cum civil war’,1 the

war was an expression of incompatibilities among regional and national actors that

had two years earlier (1996) assembled within the framework of the Alliance des Forces

Démocratiques pour la Libération du Zaïre/Congo (Alliance of Democratic Forces for the

Liberation of Congo, AFDL) to dislodge the Mobutu regime.

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Initially, the instigators of the war, namely the Rwandan government (later on

joined by Uganda and to a lesser extent Burundi) and its protégé, the Rassemblement

Congolais pour la Démocratie (Rally for Congolese Democracy, RCD), had hoped

for a blitzkrieg operation that would last only a few weeks before the Kabila regime

was replaced. However, the ability of the latter to secure military assistance from

Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola not only helped the regime stay in power, but also

led to a mutually debilitating stalemate that – combined with international pressure –

prompted the parties involved in the confl ict to seek an alternative means to resolve

the dispute.

Rwanda, Uganda and to a lesser extent Burundi had in the second half of 1996 come

to represent the ‘frontline’ states of a regional coalition determined to do away with

the Mobutu regime in the DRC. Many regional players considered this regime to be a

source of regional destabilisation and an obstacle to regional and African development.

Apart from these three frontline countries, Angola played a signifi cant role in the

AFDL victory over Mobutu’s forces in the First Congo War (August 1996 to May

1997). The reason for Angola’s signifi cant involvement was its long-held opposition

to the Mobutu regime due to the latter’s long assistance to the União Nacional para a

Indenpendência Total de Angola (Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA)

in its struggle for power in Angola. At national (DRC) level, after minor diffi culties

at the beginning of the operation due to its ostensibly ‘Rwandan’ outlook, the AFDL

quickly turned into the embodiment of the popular ‘vote of no-confi dence’ against the

Mobutu regime.

However, it soon became clear that neither the regional alliance nor the collective sense

of patriotism among Congolese stakeholders would hold for long after Mobutu and

his regime were removed from the scene. At the regional level Laurent Kabila’s ‘most

committed’ allies (Rwanda, Uganda and Angola) were angered by his lack of decisiveness

on the issue of their respective armed ‘oppositions’ which were still operating from the

DRC. This was coupled with Kabila’s pressing need to rebuild a domestic power base

that was increasingly opposed to a foreign presence. At the national level the AFDL

regime on the one hand antagonised the rest of the political and civil society activists

by sidelining them, and on the other developed mutually opposing factions within its

ranks, which contributed to its own demise. The inability of the regime to subsume all

these contradictions provided the long-awaited opportunity for Rwanda and Uganda to

invade the DRC, resulting in the Second Congo War.

Immediately after the war broke out in the country, Laurent-Désiré Kabila called for

UN intervention to resolve the confl ict. To Kabila the war represented a blatant case of

DRC invasion by Rwanda and Uganda. This warranted express condemnation from the

UN and the international community, to be followed by a peacekeeping deployment to

oversee the unconditional withdrawal of the invading contingents.

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32 African Security Review 20.2 Institute for Security Studies

However, Kabila’s ‘aggression theory’ failed to convince major power brokers within

the UN Security Council, and particularly the United States and United Kingdom.

Furthermore, they were not well disposed towards him and his regime because he had

not kept to the agreements reached during the First Congo War. Offi cially most of these

powers based their reservations regarding the DRC claim on the Kabila regime’s refusal

to cooperate over human rights violations that had been perpetrated against Rwandan

Hutu refugees on Congolese soil by AFDL troops. Although France’s representative

at the UN Security Council continued to champion the DRC government’s call that

the Council acknowledge the presence of Rwandan and Ugandan regular troops in the

DRC and accordingly deem it to be a case of external aggression, it is only after these

troops fought (for the fi rst time) in May/June 2000 among themselves for control of the

DRC’s eastern city of Kisangani that the UN Security Council admitted to the military

invasion of the DRC.2 As Arnold observed: ‘It took the UN Security Council nearly two

years to June 2000 before it accused Rwanda and Uganda of aggression in the Congo

and ordered them, under Resolution 1304, to withdraw.’3

Notwithstanding its reluctance to denounce the blatant aggression, the UN was

already involved in regional (African) efforts designed to resolve the confl ict in the

DRC peacefully. It provided support for initiatives undertaken by the Southern African

Development Community (SADC) as well as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)

within the framework of the Lusaka process. Facilitated by Zambian President Frederick

Chiluba, the Lusaka process involved the three major Congolese groups in the confl ict,

namely the government, the RCD and the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (Movement

for the Liberation of the Congo, MLC) as well as their respective supporters, namely

Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola (governments) and Rwanda and Uganda (rebel groups).

The Lusaka talks resulted in the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefi re Agreement on 10 July

1999 by the governments of Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and the

DRC. The MLC signed the agreement on 1 August 1999 while the RCD only endorsed

it on 30 August 1999.

It is in the Lusaka Ceasefi re Agreement that parties involved in the DRC’s second war

clearly articulated the nature of the intervention they expected the UN to provide to

the process of the search for peace in the DRC and the Great Lakes region as a whole.

The Lusaka Agreement called for the deployment of a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping

operation in the DRC. In the spirit of the agreement, the ‘appropriate’ UN force was

expected to be deployed four months after its entry into force (that is by December

1999) and to carry out both peacekeeping and peace enforcement. With regard to

peacekeeping, the mission was to ensure the full implementation of the agreement and

disarm the warring parties. Insofar as peace enforcement is concerned, the mission was

to track down all armed groups in the DRC while screening mass killers, perpetrators of

crimes against humanity and other war criminals as well as disarming and repatriating

members of foreign armed groups.4

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MONUC’s achievements and the quest for peace in the DRC

When the UN commenced the deployment of MONUC in the DRC in late 1999, the

country was divided into three vast fi efdoms controlled by the national government

(western region), the RCD-Goma (eastern region) and the MLC (north-western region).

Apart from these three major entities there were several small dominions ‘managed’

by the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération (Congolese

Rally for Democracy – Liberation Movement, RCD-ML), the Rassemblement Congolais

pour la Démocratie – National (Congolese Rally for Democracy – National, RCD-N)

and various Mai-Mai groups. At the same time, the country’s territory continued to

be used by a number of foreign rebel groups such as the Alliance pour la Libération du

Rwanda / Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Forces for the

Liberation of Rwanda, FDLR), the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the Conseil National

pour la Défense de la Démocratie / Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (National Council

for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy, CNDD-FDD),

the Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu – Forces Nationales de Libération (Party for the

Liberation of the Hutu People – Forces for National Liberation, Palipehutu-FNL), as

well as UNITA. MONUC’s primary commitment was thus to ensure the enforcement

of the Lusaka Ceasefi re Agreement. It was hoped that this would enable the enactment

of a political process (the inter-Congolese dialogue). This process was a key ingredient

to both a peaceful resolution of the confl ict and, subsequently, the reunifi cation of the

dismembered state.

In spite of diffi culties, inadequate resources (among others of personnel, logistics and

fi nances) and shaky commitment on the part of Congolese and non-Congolese parties

involved in the confl ict, MONUC – assisted by major players in the international

community – quickly turned into a symbol for the re-affi rmation of the DRC’s sovereignty.

With regard to the reform of the Congolese security sector, MONUC played a central

role in disarming and demobilising former combatants, including Ituri district militias,

while working closely with other international players (the United Kingdom, United

States, China, Belgium and South Africa) as well as the Congolese government in

the formation of a new and integrated national army in the DRC. MONUC played a

central role in the brassage process that produced 12 integrated army brigades (although

ill-equipped) in the DRC between 2004 and 2007. It was equally instrumental in the

reform of the Police Nationale Congolaise (National Congolese Police Force, PNC)

including the revamping of police training centres throughout the country. MONUC

contributed directly to the training of 10 000 Congolese police offi cers in an array of

specialisations, including police instructors, anti-riot units and fl ying squads.5 The

mission also worked in partnership with the European Union in the process of ‘physical

identifi cation’ of members of the Congolese army for salary disbursement purposes. The

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34 African Security Review 20.2 Institute for Security Studies

mission has since been directly involved in the payment of salaries to soldiers in the hope

of rooting out corruption and the embezzlement of soldiers’ salaries by the authorities.6

Notwithstanding these achievements, it should be noted that security sector reform in

the DRC remained ridden with rivalries and a lack of coordination between the main

stakeholders, which includes MONUC.

MONUC has also been directly involved in combat alongside the DRC’s national

army, the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the

Democratic Republic of Congo, FARDC), against the FDLR. Starting in January

2009, MONUC has provided support to three military operations in the Kivu region

aimed at weakening and eventually eradicating the FDLR. According to Vircoulon:

‘Launched in January 2009 in North Kivu, Operation Umoja Wetu was spearheaded by

Rwandan troops and lasted for only 35 days. It was quickly followed by Kimia II, a ten

month campaign in North and South Kivu conducted by the FARDC with MONUC

logistical support. The third military operation, Amani Leo, ... began in January 2010

and is still ongoing.’7 Unfortunately these military operations have not succeeded

in a fully pacifi ed eastern DRC region in spite of having harsh consequences for the

civilian populations.

Furthermore, ‘[d]espite enormous challenges, MONUC [working in concert with the

UN and the international community at large] steadily helped the fractious Congolese

to build confi dence in the transitional institutions inaugurated in July 2003’.8 Indeed,

throughout the transition period from 2003 to 2006, MONUC worked constantly with

other members of the Comité International d’Accompagnement de la Transition (International

Committee Accompanying the Transition, CIAT), namely the fi ve permanent members

of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US), the AU, the

EU and Angola, Belgium, Canada, Gabon, South Africa and Zambia to ensure that

the transition was held and successfully completed. As Reyntjens observed: ‘While

MONUC has been rightly criticised for its lack of robustness, its sheer presence – in a

sense acting as the military arm of CIAT – has been crucial in preserving the transition.’9

It was MONUC that designed the security plan for the protection of former rebel

leaders after they had agreed to relocate to Kinshasa following the signing of the Global

and Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria in December 2002.10

MONUC also devoted meaningful attention to civilian-type objectives in its provision

of assistance to the DRC’s government for the return of peace, security and stability

in the country. Paramount among these was its involvement in the broadcasting sector

through Radio Okapi. In a country where government control over public broadcasting

institutions (both national radio and television) remains very pronounced and private

broadcasting is ill-equipped and unable to cover the entire country, the MONUC-

operated radio channel emerged as a very reliable and trusted source of information

throughout the country.

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Finally, MONUC provided valuable support to the DRC’s Independent Electoral

Commission in the successful organisation of the presidential, parliamentary and

provincial elections which were held in the country in 2006. Through its Electoral

Division, MONUC provided logistical and technical support to the CEI, ensuring

that the latter was able to manage a very complex and tension-fi lled electoral process

relatively smoothly. MONUC’s logistical support during the electoral process

(including the provision of helicopters and other aircraft to dispatch voting materials in

areas otherwise hardly accessible) – the most expensive that the UN had ever supported

fi nancially – was valued at US$100 million,11 prompting Reyntjens to conclude that

‘without the presence of CIAT and MONUC, and the promotion of the elections with

massive funding and logistical support ... the Congolese might not have made it to the

polling stations in 2006’.12

MONUC’s shortcomings or the limitations of peacekeeping?

In spite of MONUC’s achievements in the DRC, the mission had several shortcomings

which help one to understand both its loss of credibility in the eyes of many ordinary

Congolese and its vulnerability to threats from the DRC government to end the

UN mission in the country. This paper focuses only on the mission’s most criticised

shortcoming, namely its inability to protect civilian Congolese.

In 2003, civilian populations [were] decimated in the town of Bunia as

Uruguayan troops camped only at the airport while militias were busy

killing not more than 20 kilometres away. In June 2004, the peacekeepers

failed to stop a ‘four-day orgy of rape, pillage and murder’ while rebel

forces led by General Laurent Nkunda marched on the town of Bukavu.

On 4 November 2008, General Nkunda forces executed about 150

civilians in the town of Kiwanja while MONUC troops [were] stationed

a few kilometres away. For 4 days between end of July and beginning of

August 2010 more than 200 women were raped in and around Luvungi,

30 kilometres within the perimeter of a MONUSCO peacekeepers camp.13

Kambala continues:

The inadequacy and ineffi ciency of the mandate of UN peacekeepers

to protect civilians have resurfaced again during July-August 2010. On

September 7, 2010, a consolidated report presented before the Security

Council by UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Atul Khare,

heralds that up to 500 women and children were victims of rape and

sexual abuses. Mr Khare admitted that the UN mission failed to protect

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36 African Security Review 20.2 Institute for Security Studies

those vulnerable women and children in North Kivu. Just as Alain Le

Roy, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations admitted on

November 7, 2008 the failure of MONUC to carry its operation mandate

in the killings of Kiwanja.14

This raises the question of who should be held responsible for MONUC’s shortcomings.

The primary responsibility for MONUC’s shortcomings lies with the very institution

that established and managed it: the UN. From its inception, MONUC was not

designed to perform an outstanding job in the DRC. The conceptualisation of the

mission failed to take into consideration the complexity of the confl ict, the size of the

country as well as the needs on the ground. Touring Africa in mid-2001, the French

representative to the UN, Jean-David Levitte, ‘declared that thirty-fi ve hundred

MONUC troops would be enough to monitor the process’.15 Joseph Kabila called

this statement a ‘ joke’ and requested 20 000 troops.16 However, until January 2003

MONUC only had 4 386 military personnel and 49 civilian police, well below the 5 347

provided for in Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000, and even further below the 8 700

fi gure authorised by Resolution 1445 of 4 December 2002. This limited number of

peacekeepers was expected to police an area the size of Western Europe where a decade

of confl ict had already killed nearly four million people.17

The responsibility for MONUC’s shortcomings is equally shared by the main parties

to the confl ict, namely the government of the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, the factions

of the RCD and the MLC. None of them was genuinely committed to contributing

to MONUC’s success. In their view, the task of restoring peace in the DRC

apparently lay with MONUC; they did not, therefore, see themselves as carrying the

responsibility of ending the confl ict they had ignited in the fi rst place. They repeatedly

undermined the Lusaka Ceasefi re Agreement after they had ‘voluntarily’ signed it

and entrusted MONUC with its verifi cation. Congolese parties failed to reform the

security sector as they feared losing the dividends the existing status quo provided

to them. Instead, they refused to disarm their troops, infl ated their numbers and,

at times, embezzled funds allocated to the related activities. As Reyntjens observes:

‘Not only did Vice-Presidents Bemba and Ruberwa maintain command structures

outside the FARDC, but President Kabila likewise behaved like a warlord, both by

creating his Maison militaire (a parallel army command) and by building a 12 000- to

15 000-strong presidential guard ... much better equipped and paid than ordinary

FARDC, and dominated by offi cers from Katanga.’18 Ultimately, the troops which had

not been demobilised ‘attached’ themselves to Kabila and Bemba and exchanged fi re in

Kinshasa city centre for three days following the announcement of the results of the

fi rst round of presidential elections (August 2006) and again (March 2007) after Bemba

challenged the order from the army national command to subject his last troops to the

demobilisation process.

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As far as Rwanda and Uganda are concerned, their tendency to undermine MONUC

was evident since is deployment. Their troops fought for the control of Kisangani

months after MONUC’s observers were already on the ground. They continued

to exploit MONUC’s weaknesses to support militias in Ituri.19 MONUC on several

occasions complained of Rwanda’s incursions into the DRC as well as its support to

renegade General Nkunda.

Furthermore, the responsibility for MONUC’s shortcomings lies with the mission

itself. Probably as a result of the laxity displayed by major powers with regard to its

performance as well as the lack of sustained commitment to peace by Congolese parties,

MONUC’s leadership did not display the necessary operational urgency that should

have been required for an emergency situation such as that in the DRC. Throughout its

deployment the mission displayed low levels of consistency, effectiveness and effi ciency.

The mission repeatedly failed to operationalise UN Security Council Resolution 1856

of 22 December 2008 that mandated it to ‘ensure the protection of civilians, including

humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular

violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the confl ict’.20 According to

Vircoulon, ‘despite Congolese soldiers’ actions that could qualify as war crimes in areas

monitored by MONUC, UN troops ... never used force to prevent FARDC rogue

elements from committing crimes’.21 But MONUC’s troops and offi cials were also

directly involved in criminal activities ranging from rape, to trade in natural resources

and even weapons and ammunition, to currency exchange. As De Carvalho put it: ‘In

the past few years, MONUC has faced a number of scandals that served to undermine

its credibility. From sexual abuse and exploitation to the smuggling of gold and other

resources, such scandals affect the way that the mission is perceived by the local

population, and might contribute to demands for a sooner-than-appropriate withdrawal

of MONUC from the country.’22

In the fi nal instance MONUC’s perceived failure may also be explained by contingencies

inherent to peacekeeping. Whatever the level of commitment from actors on all sides,

peacekeeping – like many international interventions – always operates between the

ideal and reality.

Charting a new path? MONUSCO and stabilisation in the DRC

Rather than being a process solely informed by the successful completion of the

peacekeeping phase and the subsequent necessity for transition to a full-fl edged post-

confl ict peacebuilding phase, the transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO has

turned out to be a compromise between the DRC government’s request that MONUC

withdraw and the UN eagerness to pursue its peace consolidation work in the country.

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38 African Security Review 20.2 Institute for Security Studies

According to UN Security Council Resolution 1925 of 28 May 2010, MONUSCO has

a two-fold task: the fi rst is the protection of civilians and the second is the stabilisation

and consolidation of peace. To this effect MONUSCO shall ‘ensure the effective

protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders,

under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any

parties engaged in the confl ict’.23 In order to achieve this objective, MONUSCO is

tasked with complementing the DRC government’s efforts with regard to pursuing

perpetrators of human rights and humanitarian law violations, strengthening the

capacity of the FARDC military justice system, assisting in the return and resettlement

of refugees and internally displaced persons, supporting the efforts of the government

of the DRC to bring the ongoing military operations against FDLR, LRA and other

armed groups to completion, as well as supporting demobilisation, disarmament,

reintegration, resettlement and repatriation activities. As far as stabilisation and peace

consolidation are concerned, MONUSCO is expected to work with the government

of the DRC in strengthening its security sector ( justice, police, army and correction

services) as a way of re-affi rming state authority; implementing the national stabilisation

and reconstruction plan; curbing the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources;

and providing technical and logistical support for the organisation of national and

local elections.

Notwithstanding these extensive tasks allocated to MONUSCO by the Security

Council, Resolution 1925 is unequivocal on the primacy of the government of the DRC

in ‘leading’ the process for the restoration of peace, security and stability in the country.

The resolution thus ‘emphasizes that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the

Congo bears primary responsibility for security, peacebuilding and development in the

country, and encourages the Government ... to remain fully committed to protecting the

population through the establishment of professional and sustainable security forces, to

promote non-military solutions as an integral part of the overall solution for reducing the

threat posed by Congolese and foreign armed groups and to restore full State authority

in the areas freed from armed groups’.24

There is a clear emphasis on the primacy of the Congolese government in shouldering

the responsibility for the peacebuilding process in the country. However, as was the

case with MONUC the Security Council has entrusted MONUSCO with a vast array

of tasks. According to Resolution 1925, the Council’s assessment of MONUSCO’s

performance and its decision on the mission’s future reconfi gurations will be informed

by the achievement of the following three key objectives:

■ The completion of the ongoing military operations in the Kivus and Orientale

provinces so that the threat of armed groups is minimised and stability in sensitive

areas is restored

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■ There is an improved capacity of the government of the DRC to effectively protect

the population through the establishment of sustainable security forces with a view

to progressively taking over MONUSCO’s security role

■ The consolidation of state authority throughout the territory by means of the

deployment of Congolese civil administration and the rule of law institutions in areas

freed from armed groups

Probably the most daunting challenges for MONUSCO with regard to its

operationalisation are to be found in the relatively short period of its deployment and,

more importantly, the continued lack of willingness on the part of the DRC government

for a prolonged stay of the mission in the country. Although it is standard practice for

a UN peacekeeping mission to operate on the basis of short-term mandates subject

to repeated extensions, there is no doubt that this approach ultimately has a negative

impact on stabilisation and peace consolidation programmes. They force the mission to

operate on ad hoc and short-term bases whereas stabilisation and peace consolidation

programmes should be grounded on medium- and long-term perspectives. In the case

of the DRC, MONUSCO’s one-year mandate – although expected to be extended – is

not conducive to an emphasis on medium- and long-term planning by different actors, a

clear impediment to the mission’s peace consolidation goal. Nevertheless, MONUSCO’s

short deployment period cannot be separated from the DRC government’s desire for the

mission to fully withdraw from the country sooner than later.

Yet the main question remains: why is the DRC government eager to relinquish the

UN mission in spite of clear evidence of the country’s continued need for international

assistance in all forms? De Carvalho sums it up succinctly: ‘[I]f the government

believes that the gains of more freedom of action in its own country are superior to

the gains provided by the presence of the mission, it will start pressuring the ... mission

to leave.’25

Conclusion

The assessment of MONUC’s performance is a delicate task, as one can expect views on

it to differ, depending on people’s situation and position. As far as ordinary Congolese

are concerned MONUC failed, especially with regard to its protection mandate. The

mission was unable to shield them from violence perpetrated by FARDC rogue elements

and Mai-Mai militias, or to dismantle foreign armed groups such as the FDLR and the

LRA. For the UN and optimistic observers, MONUC represents a success story, proof

of the international community’s readiness to make available an immeasurable amount

of resources in its commitment to state-building in fragile societies and the preservation

of international peace and security.

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40 African Security Review 20.2 Institute for Security Studies

Taking into account the predicaments of the DRC prior to the mission’s deployment,

there is no doubt that MONUC achieved much, including preserving the independence

and territorial integrity of the DRC, especially when considering that such an feat was

achieved despite inadequate resources and a lack of genuine commitment on the part

of the presumed benefi ciaries of the process: the national and regional parties involved

in the crisis. Yet, at the same time, given the tasks at hand and the scope of its mandate,

MONUC could have achieved more.

The transformation of MONUC into MONUSCO provides an opportunity for the

mission to fi ll the remaining gaps. However, the insistence by the DRC government

that the UN peacekeeping presence in the country should come to an end is a stumbling

block to any long-term post-confl ict peacebuilding planning for the country.

It could thus be advisable, as a way forward, that the DRC government and UN Secretariat

cooperate meaningfully and frankly in the current joint assessment programmes being

conducted throughout the country. On the one hand they should ensure that these

programmes take the views of other key stakeholders (civil society, political parties,

international non-governmental organisations and the like) into consideration, but on the

other hand they should focus on regional or provincial specifi cities. This would make it

possible to reach an agreement on maintaining peacekeeping operations in the most volatile

far eastern regions (Kivu and Ituri) while adopting a ‘Marshall-type’, full-fl edged long-

term and adequately-resourced post-confl ict peacebuilding plan for the country as a whole.

Notes

1 This means that the second war in the DRC – just like the fi rst one in 1996–1997 – was characterised by

a deliberate invasion by Rwandan and Ugandan troops of the DRC. They later sought to conceal their

actions by setting up and/or collaborating with Congolese rebel groups.

2 This was despite the fact that the Rwandan Vice-President and Defence Minister, Paul Kagame,

admitted to the presence of Rwandan troops in the DRC as early as 6 November 1998 and, even more

interestingly, despite the signing on 18 January 1999 of the Windhoek Agreement between Angola,

Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia and Zimbabwe to end military hostilities in the DRC. See La seconde guerre

du Congo, ExpoCongo.com, http://www.expocongo.com/DRCongo/Histoire/Action/SecondeGuerre.

aspx (accessed 15 November 2010).

3 Guy Arnold, Africa: a modern history, London: Atlantic Books, 2005, 898.

4 See Accord de Lusaka pour un cessez-le-feu en République Démocratique du Congo et modalités de sa

mise en œuvre, 10 July 1999, Grip, http://www.grip.org/bdg/g1701.html (accessed 10 December 2010).

5 Tamoussi Bonzi, Mesures des résultats de la MONUC à la lumière des mandats qui lui ont été confi és,

Unpublished dissertation for a Certifi cate of Training in United Nations Peace Support Operations,

New York / Geneva: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 2007, 72.

6 According to Ahamed nearly half of between US$6 and $8 million disbursed by the EU annually

was embezzled by Congolese civilian and army offi cials until the EU took direct charge of the entire

operation. See Saïd A Ahamed, Démocratisation en temps de guerre: le rôle des Nations Unies et de

l’Union Européenne en République Démocratique du Congo, L’Afrique des Grands Lacs, Annuaire 2005–

2006, 2006, 296.

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Features 41

7 Thierry Vircoulon, After MONUC, should MONUSCO continue to support Congolese military

campaigns? 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/blogs/on-the-african-peacebuilding-

agenda/after-monuc-should-monusco-continue-to-support-congolese-military-campaigns.aspx

(accessed 2 August 2010).

8 Gilbert Khadiagala, UN peacekeeping in the Great Lakes region: the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi,

in A Adebajo (ed), From global apartheid to global village: Africa and the United Nations, Pietermaritzburg:

University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009, 318.

9 Filip Reyntjens, The great African war: Congo and regional geopolitics, 1996–2006, New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2009, 263.

10 Ahamed, Démocratisation en temps de guerre, 295.

11 Denis Kadima and Dieudonné Tshiyoyo, Democratic Republic of Congo, in D Kadima and S Booysen

(eds), Compendium of elections in southern Africa, 1989–2009: 20 years of multiparty democracy, Johannesburg:

EISA, 2009, 132.

12 Reyntjens, The great African war, 284.

13 Olivier Kambala, The United Nations in the DRC: unanswered issues throughout Security Council

Resolutions 143 (1960) to 1925 (2010), Congo Memory Institute Bulletin 1(1) (September 2010), 3.

14 Ibid, 3.

15 Gérard Prunier, Africa’s world war: Congo, the Rwandan genocide and the making of a continental catastrophe,

New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 267.

16 Ibid, 267.

17 Bonzi, Mesures des résultats de la MONUC, 69.

18 Reyntjens, The great African war, 263–264.

19 An interesting account of the confl ict in Ituri and Rwanda and Uganda’s involvement may be found in

Gérard Prunier, The ‘ethnic’ confl ict in Ituri district: overlapping of local and international in Congo-

Kinshasa, in J-P Chrétien and R Banégas (eds), The recurring Great Lakes crisis: identity, violence and power,

London: Hurst, 2008, 180–204.

20 Vircoulon, After MONUC, should MONUSCO continue to support Congolese military campaigns?

21 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1856 (2008) [on extension of the mandate of the

UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)] (S/RES/1856 (2008),

http://www.unhcr.org/.../category,LEGAL,UNSC,resolution,COD,4961deff1a,0.html (accessed 18 May

2011).

22 Gustavo de Carvalho, MONUC and post-electoral challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Confl ict Trends (4) (2007), 46.

23 UN Security Council, Security Council Resolution 1925 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the

UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)], (S/RES/1925(2010),

http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/.../DRC%20S%20RES%201925.pdf (accessed 18 May 2011).

24 Ibid.

25 De Carvalho, MONUC and post-electoral challenges in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 46–47.Dow

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