Mers Not Licenced in California

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MERS is not licensed in california. the secretary of the state of california, suspended and terminated mers ability to conduct business in california november of 2004 and the FTB followed suit in 2005.

Text of Mers Not Licenced in California

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    Defendants. /

    This case involves the foreclosure of plaintiffs mortgage.His First Amended Complaint (FAC) names thirteen defendants andenumerates ten causes of action. Defendants American Home MortgageServicing, Inc. (AHMSI), AHMSI Default Services, Inc. (ADSI),Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche), and MortgageElectronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) move to dismiss allclaims against them, and in the alternative, for a more definitestatement of plaintiffs second and seventh causes of action. Thesedefendants also move to expunge a Lis Pendens recorded by plaintiffon the subject property and request an award of attorney fees.

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    These facts are taken from the allegations in the FAC unless1otherwise specified. The allegations are taken as true for purposesof this motion only.


    Defendant T.D. Service Company (T.D.) separately moves to dismissall claims against it. The court concluded that oral argument wasnot necessary in this matter, and decides the motions on thepapers. For the reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss aregranted in part and denied in part, and the motion to expunge isdenied. Because the court grants plaintiff leave to file an amendedcomplaint, the alternative motion for a more definite statement isdenied.

    I. BACKGROUNDA. Refinance of Plaintiffs Mortgage1

    On or about February 1, 2007, plaintiff was approached bydefendant Ken Jonobi (Jonobi) of defendant Juvon, who introducedplaintiff to defendant Anthony Alfano (Alfano), a loan officeremployed by defendant Novo Mortgage (Novo). FAC 24. DefendantAlfano approached plaintiff, representing himself as the loanofficer for defendant Novo, and solicited refinancing of a loancurrently secured by plaintiffs residence in New Castle,California. FAC 25. Defendant Alfano advised plaintiff thatAlfano could get plaintiff the best deal and best interestrates available on the market. FAC 26.

    In a loan brokered by Alfano, plaintiff then borrowed$450,000, the loan being secured by a deed of trust on hisresidence. FAC 28. Alfano advised plaintiff that he could get a

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    fixed rate loan, but the loan sold to him had a variable rate whichsubsequently adjusted. Id. At the time of the loan, plaintiffsFair Isaac Corporation (FICO) score, which is used to determinethe type of loans for which a borrower is qualified, should haveclassified him as a prime borrower, but Alfano classifiedplaintiff as a sub-prime borrower without disclosing other loanprogram options. FAC 29. Plaintiff was advised by Alfano that ifthe loan became unaffordable, Alfano would refinance it into anaffordable loan. FAC 31. Plaintiff was not given a copy of anyloan documents prior to closing, and at closing plaintiff was givenonly a few minutes to sign the documents and, as a result, couldnot review them. FAC 32. Plaintiff did not receive requireddocuments and disclosures at the origination of his refinancingloan, including the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) disclosures andthe required number of copies of the notice of right to cancel. FAC 43. This new loan was completed on or about May 16, 2007.

    The deed of trust identified Old Republic Title Company astrustee, defendant American Brokers Conduit as lender, anddefendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS)as nominee for the lender and beneficiary. FAC 34-35. MERSsconduct is governed by Terms and Conditions which provide that:

    MERS shall serve as mortgagee of record withrespect to all such mortgage loans solely as anominee, in an administrative capacity, forthe beneficial owner or owners thereof fromtime to time. MERS shall have no rightswhatsoever to any payments made on account ofsuch mortgage loans, to any servicing rightsrelated to such mortgage loans, or to anymortgaged properties securing such mortgage

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    loans. MERS agrees not to assert any rights(other than rights specified in the GoverningDocuments) with respect to such mortgage loansor mortgaged properties. References herein tomortgage(s) and mortgagee of record shallinclude deed(s) of trust and beneficiary undera deed of trust and any other form of securityinstrument under applicable state law.

    FAC 10. MERS was not licensed to do business in California andwas not registered with the state at the inception of the loan. FAC 35.

    On or about April 17, 2009, a letter was mailed to defendantAHMSI which plaintiff alleges was a qualified written request(QWR) under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),identifying the loan, stating reasons that plaintiff believed theaccount was in error, requesting specific information fromdefendant, and demanding to rescind the loan under the Truth inLending Act (TILA). FAC 36. Plaintiff alleges that AHMSI neverproperly responded to this request. Id. B. Events Subsequent to Refinance of Plaintiffs Loan

    On or about June 23, 2009, defendant T.D. filed a notice ofdefault in Placer County, identifying Deutsche as beneficiary andAHMSI as trustee. FAC 46. In an assignment of deed of trust datedJuly 15, 2009, MERS assigned the deed of trust to AHMSI.Defendants Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion toDismiss Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and Motion to ExpungeNotice of Pendency of Action (Defs. RFJN) Ex. 4. This assignmentof deed of trust purports to be effective as of June 9, 2009. Id.A second assignment of deed of trust was executed on the same date


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    as the first, July 15, 2009, but the time mark placed on the secondassignment of deed of trust by the Placer County Recorder indicatesthat it was recorded eleven seconds after the first. Defs. RFJNExs. 4-5. In this second assignment of deed of trust, AHMSIassigned the deed of trust to Deutsche. Defs. RFJN Ex. 5. Thisassignment indicates that it was effective as of June 22, 2009. Id.Both assignments were signed by Korell Harp. The assignmentpurportedly effective June 9, 2009, lists Harp as vice president ofMERS and the assignment purportedly effective June 22, 2009, listshim as vice president of AHMSI. Defs. RFJN Exs. 4-5. Six dayslater, on July 21, 2009, plaintiff recorded a notice of pendency ofaction with the Placer County Recorder. Defs. RFJN Ex. 6. In asubstitution of trustee recorded on July 29, 2009, Deutsche, aspresent beneficiary, substituted ADSI as trustee. Defs. RFJN Ex.7.

    II. STANDARDA. Standard for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

    A Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion challenges a complaintscompliance with the pleading requirements provided by the FederalRules. In general, these requirements are provided by Fed. R.Civ. P. 8, although claims that sound[] in fraud or mistakemust meet the requirements provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Vessv. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 317 F.3d 1097, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2003).

    1. Dismissal of Claims Governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a

    short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

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    is entitled to relief. The complaint must give defendant fairnotice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, at 555 (2007) (internalquotation and modification omitted).

    To meet this requirement, the complaint must be supported byfactual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct.1937, 1950 (2009). While legal conclusions can provide theframework of a complaint, neither legal conclusions norconclusory statements are themselves sufficient, and suchstatements are not entitled to a presumption of truth. Id. at1949-50. Iqbal and Twombly therefore prescribe a two step processfor evaluation of motions to dismiss. The court first identifiesthe non-conclusory factual allegations, and the court thendetermines whether these allegations, taken as true and construedin the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, plausibly giverise to an entitlement to relief. Id.; Erickson v. Pardus, 551U.S. 89 (2007).

    Plausibility, as it is used in Twombly and Iqbal, does notrefer to the likelihood that a pleader will succeed in provingthe allegations. Instead, it refers to whether the non-conclusoryfactual allegations, when assumed to be true, allow[] the courtto draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable forthe misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Theplausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement,but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendanthas acted unlawfully. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). A

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    complaint may fail to show a right to relief either by lacking acognizable legal theory or by lacking sufficient facts allegedunder a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica PoliceDept, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

    2. Dismissal of Claims Governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss may also challenge a

    complaints compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). See Vess, 317F.3d at 1107. This rule provides that In alleging fraud ormistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstancesconstituting fraud or mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, andother conditions of a persons mind may be alleged generally.These circumstances include the time, place, and specificcontent of the false representations as well a