Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton · susan brower-toland ton philosophers’ imprint – 2 – vol. 12, no. 17 (november 2012) I claim that, for Ockham, consciousness

volume12,no.17 november2012

Medieval Approaches

to Consciousness:

Ockham and Chatton

Susan Brower-TolandSaint Louis University

© 2012 SusanBrower-TolandThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/012017/>

TakingtheircuefromAugustine’saccountofself-knowledge in the latterbooksofDe Trinitate,medievalphilosophersholdthatknowledgeregardingourownmentalstatesisepistemically

distinctiveinanumberofways.Itiswidelyassumed,forexample,thatweareimmediatelyawareofawiderangeofsuchstatesandthatthenatureofouraccesstothemyieldsknowledgethatnotonlyisutterlycertainbutalsoinvolvesakindoffirst-personauthority(whichisjusttosaythatnooneisbetterpositionedtoascertainourmentalstatesthanweourselvesare).Forthesamereason,itisalsoassumed,onthismedievalAugustinianpicture,thatthejudgmentsorbeliefsconstitu-tiveofself-knowledge—callthem“self-attributing”beliefs—arechar-acterizedby(a)immediacy,(b)certainty,and(c)first-personauthority.

Yet,evenifmedievalthinkersgenerallyagreeaboutthebasicchar-acterof self-knowledge, theydisagree aboutwhat is required to ex-plainourpossessionofit.Theydisagree,inotherwords,overhowtoexplainthenatureofour accesstooursubjectivestates.AsIseeit,theirdisagreementon this issue is, atbottom,adebateabout thenatureandstructureofconsciousexperience.1Inthispaper,myaimistoad-vanceourunderstandingofmedievalapproachestoconsciousnessbyfocusingonaparticularbut,asitseemstome,representativemedievaldebate—onewhichhas,as its locus,aparticularconcernaboutself-knowledge.Thedebate inquestion isbetweenWilliamOckham(d.1349)andWalterChatton(d.1343)overtheexistenceofwhatthesetwothinkersrefertoas”reflexiveintellectiveintuitivecognition”.2Al-thoughframedinthetechnicalterminologyoflate-medievalcognitivepsychology,thebasicquestionatissuebetweenthemisthis:Doesthemind (or “intellect”) cognize its own states via higher-order (or ”re-flexive“)representationalstates(namely,actsof”intuitivecognition“)?

1. AlthoughIamnotthefirsttosuggestthatthereisaconnectionbetweenme-dievaldiscussionsofself-knowledgeandtheoriesofconsciousness(see,forexample,Yrjönsuuri2007;Rode2008,2010;andToivanen2009), the sug-gestionitselfhasyettoreceiveanysystematicdevelopmentordefense.

2. EarliertreatmentsofthedebatebetweenOckhamandChattoncanbefoundinYrjönsuuri2007,Michon2007andPutallaz2005.Althoughtherearedif-ferencesinthedetailsofouranalyses,YrjönsuuriseesthedebatemuchasIdo—namely,asfundamentallyabouttheproperanalysisofconsciousness.

ImprintPhilosophers’

susanbrower-toland Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.12,no.17(november2012)

I claim that, forOckham, consciousness turnsout tobeamatterofhigher-orderrepresentation,whereasforChattonitisneitherhigher-order,norrepresentational,nor—inanystraightforwardsenseoftheterm—even intentional innature.Aswillbecomeclear, thispartofthepaperisdesignednotonlytocallattentiontothekindsoftheoriesonofferinmedievaldebatesaboutconsciousnessbutalsotoindicatejusthowclosely thesedebatescometocontemporary treatmentsofthe same issues. Becausemedieval thinkers anticipate a number ofthetheoriesonofferinmorerecentdiscussionsofconsciousnessand,insomecases,aremotivatedbydialecticalconsiderationssimilar tothose atwork in currentdebates, the comparison, I believe, provesbothusefulandilluminating.

1. Self-Knowledge and Reflexive Intellective Intuition: Ockham’s Account

The disagreement between Ockham and Chatton is centered onOckham’s contention that themind—or intellect—can reflexively,intuitivelycognizeitsownstates.Inordertounderstandthesignifi-cance of this disagreement, however, a bit of background onOck-ham’stheoryofintuitivecognitionisinorder.5

1.1 Background: Ockham on Intuitive CognitionLike many medieval philosophers, Ockham divides psychologicalstatesintothosethatareconative(orassociatedwithappetitiveormo-tivepowers)andthosethatarecognitive(or associatedwiththesenso-ryorrationalpowersbywhichweacquireandprocessinformation).6

5. Inwhat follows, citationsofOckham’sLatin textsare toOckham1967–88.MydiscussiondrawssolelyonworksinhisOpera Theologica(=OTh).Iusethefollowingabbreviationsinreferringtoparticularvolumes: Ord. (= Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum);Rep.(=Reportatio);Quodl.(=Quodli-beta Septem).AllreferencestoChattonaretoChatton1989.Unlessotherwisenoted,translationsaremyown.

6. ThoughOckhamdistinguishes between acts ofwilling and intellect alongthesesortsof lines, in theend,hedeniesanyrealdistinctionbetweenthefacultiesofintellectandwillthemselves.

Aswe’llsee,Ockhamanswersintheaffirmative,Chattoninthenega-tive,witheacharguingthathisownpositionbestaccommodatesthenatureandcharacterofAugustinianself-knowledge.

ItakethedebatebetweenOckhamandChattontoberepresenta-tivebothbecauseitillustratesoneofthemaincontextsinwhichissuesconnectedwithconsciousnessariseinthelatermedievalperiodandalsobecauseitshowcasesthecentral dialectical issues and alternatives at play in medieval discussions of consciousness generally. Ockham and Chatton’s debate illustrates the way in which questionsaboutthenatureandrequirementsforself-knowledgegetconnectedtobroaderdebates in cognitive theory.3What ismore, the positions they stake out in the course of their debate represent what I take to be the two maintypesofapproachtoconsciousnessonefindsinthelaterMiddleAges—namely,thosethatexplainconsciousnessintermsofintention-ality(typically,higher-order intentionality)andthosethatunderstandconsciousnessasanon-intentional,sui generismodeofawareness.4

Thediscussiontofollowdividesintotwomainparts.Thefirstpart(whichspansSections1and2)introducesthebasicoutlinesofthede-batebetweenOckhamandChatton.IbeginwithabriefsketchofOck-ham’stheoryofintuitivecognitiongenerally.IthenconsiderOckham’smainargumentforintroducinghigher-order,intellectiveintuitionandChatton’sargumentsagainstdoingso.Inthesecondpartofthepaper(primarily Section 3), I drawout the implications of this debate forthetwothinkers’respectiveviewsaboutthenatureofconsciousness.

3. SeePutallaz1991,whichprovidesaveryuseful(and, todate, themostex-tensive) historical survey of latermedieval discussions of self-knowledge.Although Putallaz’s primary focus is on medieval accounts of the soul’sknowledgeofitself,hedoesalsocoversomeofthedebatesaboutthesoul’sknowledgeofitsstates.SeealsoMichon2007.

4. Aswillbecomeclear, I’musing thenotionof intentionalityexpansively torefergenericallytothataspectofamentalstateoreventthatconstitutesitsbeingdirected atorabout something.Thus,Iintendittocovernotonlythoseaccountswhich,likeOckham’s,explainsuchdirectednessintermsoftherep-resentationalfeaturesofsuchstatesbutalsoaccountswhichtakeintentionaldirectedness to be some kind of non-representational awareness of, or ac-quaintancewith,intentionalobjects.



Intuitivecognitionofathingiscognitionsuchthatbyvir-tueofitonecanknowwhetherathingexistsordoesnotexist so that, if the thingdoes exist, the intellect immedi-ately [statim] judges that itexistsand evidently cognizesthatitexists.…Likewise,intuitivecognitionissuchthatwhen [twoormore] thingsare cognized,oneofwhichinheresinanother,orisspatiallydistantfromanother,orstandsinsomeotherrelationtoanother,then,byvirtueofthisnon-propositionalcognition,oneimmediately [stat-im]knowswhethertheonethinginheresornot,isdistantornot,andsoonconcerningothercontingent truths….Forinstance,ifSocratesisinfactpale,thatawarenessofSocratesandhispallorbyvirtueofwhichwecanevident-lycognizethatSocratesispaleiscalledintuitive.And,ingeneral,anynon-propositionalawarenessofsometermorthing(ormultipletermsorthings)isanintuitivecog-nition ifwecan,byvirtueof it,evidentlycognizesomecontingent truth—especially about present matters offact.(Ord.IProl.q.1,a.1[OThI,31–32])

Inthispassage,Ockhamidentifies intuitivestatesasthosethatplaya twofold role in the formationof perceptual judgments: namely, apsychologicalroleandanepistemicrole.Hetellsus,forexample,thatanintuitivecognitionofanobjectissuchthat,byvirtueofit,“theintel-lectimmediatelyjudgesthat[theobject]exists”andpossessescertainattributes.This is thepsychological role: intuitionof someobject issuch that it automatically gives rise to judgments concerning its cur-rentexistenceandcontingent,perceptiblecharacteristics.11Inaddition,the intuition plays a second, epistemic role vis-à-vis the judgmentsitoccasions.Astheforegoingpassagemakesclear,thesortsofjudg-ments thatare formedon thebasisof intuition(namely, judgments

11. Thus, if I intuitivelycognizeSocrates, this intuitionwillautomaticallygiverisetoanumberofbeliefsabouthim—say,beliefstotheeffectthatSocratesisrighthere,thatheispale,thatheisstandingtotheleftofme,etc.

Cognitivestates,onOckham’sview,canbeexhaustivelydividedintotwo broad categories: those that are propositional in content (com-plexa) and those that are non-propositional (incomplexa). The lattercategoryhefurthersubdividesintowhathecallsintuitiveandabstrac-tive cognition.7 Broadly speaking,we can thinkofOckham’s notionof intuitive cognition in termsof ourown (perhapspre-theoretical)notionofperception:itisatypeofcognitionthatprovidesimmediate access to theworld, yielding information about contingent, current,localmattersoffact—viz.,howthingsstandrighthereandnow.Forthe same reason,wecanbeginby thinkingofOckham’sdistinctionbetweenintuitiveandabstractivecognitionas,roughly,adistinctionbetweenperceptualandnon-perceptualstates.8

While the foregoing characterization captures thebasic intuitionbehindtheintuitive/abstractivedistinction,Ockhampreferstomarkitintermsofthefunctionalrolesthesestatesplayintheformationandjustificationofcertainkindsofjudgment.9Thus,onhisview,anintui-tivecognitionofsomeobjectisonethatdirectlyproducesanddirectlyjustifiesbeliefsabouttheexistenceandobservablefeaturesofthatob-ject.10Asheexplains:

7. Typically,Ockhampresentsthedistinctionbetweenintuitiveandabstractivestatesasadistinctionbetween two typesofnon-propositional state.He iswilling,however,toallowforabroadusageoftheterm‘abstractive’accord-ingtowhichitreferstoacognitivestatethatisnotintuitive.Forthisbroaderusage,seehisdiscussionofintuitionandabstractionatRep.II12–13.

8. ThatOckhamandhiscontemporariesthinkofintuitivecognitionintermsofperceptioncanbeseenintheirtendencytocharacterizeitusingmetaphorsof“vision”or“seeing”.Indeed,forOckhamaswellasChatton,‘intuitio’and‘visio’ are interchangeable expressions.AlthoughOckham explicitly allowsthat there arenon-visualmodesof intuition, visual perception is certainlytreatedastheparadigmaticcaseofintuition.

9. AlthoughtheissueofintuitivecognitionarisesinavarietyofcontextsinOck-ham’swritings,themostextensiveandsystematictreatmentof itoccursinthePrologueofhisOrdinatiocommentary(q.1,a.1).Itisherethatheoffersasustaineddefenseofthenotionofintellectiveintuition.

10.OnOckham’sview, intuitive cognitions themselvesare causedonlybyob-jectsinrelevantproximity—i. e.,withincausalreachofone’ssensoryfaculties.Hence,barringsupernaturalintervention,intuitivecognitionisrestrictedtoentitieswithinone’simmediateenvironment.



asanabstractivecognition.Thus,non-perceptualstatessuchasactsofmemory,imagination,andconceptualizationareabstractive.

Thedistinctionbetween intuitiveandabstractivecognition isnotoriginaltoOckham—ittracesdirectlytoScotus(d.1308)andhasitsrootsinevenearlierthinkers.14Evenso,thevariouswaysOckhamde-velopsandappliesitprovebothinnovativeand,atleastinhisday,con-troversial.Acaseinpointishisclaimthatthisdistinctionholdsbothatthelevelofsensorycognitionandatthelevelofintellectivecognition.

Most medieval thinkers, Ockham included, distinguish betweensensoryand intellectual cognition.The formerconsists in theactiva-tionanddeliverancesofthefiveexternalsensesaswellasthecognitivecontributionoftheinternalsensoryfaculties.15Bycontrast,intellectiveoperations—atleastinOckham’scognitivetheory—includenotonlythingslikeconceptformation,propositionalattitudes,anddiscursivereasoningbutalso,andmuchmorecontroversially, actsof intuitivecognition.WhilemanyofOckham’scontemporarieswerewilling toembracethenotionofintuitivecognitionatthelevelofsensorycogni-tion(indeed,sensecognitionappearstobeaparadigmaticformofper-ception),therewasagreatdealmorecontroversyovertheexistenceofintuitivecognitionatthelevelofintellect.It’snotaltogetherclear,for example, that Scotus—fromwhomOckham takes the intuitive/abstractivedistinction—iswillingtoadmitintuitionatthelevelofin-tellect(thoughOckham,nodoubttobolsterhisowncase,insiststhat

14. SomethinglikethenotionofintuitionispresentinVitalduFour(d.1327),forexample.SeeLynch1972.Neithertheearlyhistoryofnorthedrivingmotiva-tionsfortheintroductionofthedistinctionbetweenintuitiveandabstractivecognitioniswellunderstood.Usefultreatmentsofthehistoryofintuitivecog-nitionincludeBoler1982,Day1947,andKingforthcoming(a).

15. There is little literature devoted to Ockham’s treatment of sensory cogni-tion—andmostofwhatexists focusesonhis rejectionof sensiblespecies.This lacunainourknowledgeof thispartofhiscognitivetheorymayoweto the fact thatOckhamhimself treats sensation as ancillary.AlthoughheconcedestheAristoteliandictumthatwhateverisintheintellectisfirstinthesenses,hegiveslittleattentiontothepreciserolesensationplaysincognition.ForusefuldiscussionofOckhamonsensation,seePerler2008andTachau1988(130ff).

aboutcurrent,contingentmatters)arealsosuchthattheyaredirectly,ornon-inferentially, justifiedbythe intuitionitself.This is indicatedbyOckham’s repeatedclaim that such judgmentsconstitute “evident knowledge”—or“evidentcognition”ofcontingentfacts.12ForOckham,thenotionofevidentnesssignalsaclassofepistemicallysecure,orevenprivileged,cognitivestates.13

Now,bycontrastwithintuitivestates,abstractivecognitionsplayneither of these roles—they neither automatically give rise to norprovide immediate justification for judgments regarding contingent,current,localmattersoffact.Indeed,Ockhamintroducesthelabel“ab-stractive”foranystatethatdoesn’tfunctionasintuitivestatesdo:

Abstractive cognition, on the other hand, is that cogni-tionbyvirtueofwhichwecannotknowconcerningsomecontingent thingwhether itexistsordoesnot.…Thus,bymeansofanabstractivecognitionwecannotevidentlycognizeanycontingenttruth—inparticular,notruthre-latingtothepresent.ThisisclearfromthefactthatwhenSocrates and his pallor are considered in his absence,we are not able to know by virtue of this non-proposi-tionalmodeofawarenesswhetherSocratesexistsornot,whetherheispaleornot,orwhetherornotheisspatiallydistantfromagivenplace—andsoonconcerningothercontingenttruths.(Ord.IProl.q.1,a.1[OThI,32])

Accordingly,anynon-propositionalstatethatdoesnotgroundknowl-edgeofcontingent,currentmattersoffactcounts,inOckham’sscheme,

12. Karger 1999 (208–9) provides a useful overview of Ockham’s notion ofevidentness.

13. Whathemeanstohighlightintheforegoingpassage,therefore,isthatper-ceptual judgments—that is, judgmentsarising from intuitiveacts—qualifyas evident in this technical sense.There is a long traditionof interpretingOckhamasholdingthatjudgmentsgroundedinintuitionareinfallible.SeeStump1999forarecentdiscussionoftheinfallibilistreadingandKarger1999forcriticismofthislineofinterpretation.



enonofself-knowledgeprovidesdecisiveevidencefortheexistenceofanintellective,non-sensorymodeofperception.Justhowitdoesso,Ishallnowattempttoexplain.

1.2 The Argument from Self-Knowledge Theargumentfromself-knowledgetakesasitsstartingpointthefactthatwepossessknowledgeregardingawiderangeofourstates.Thisis obvious,Ockham thinks, fromeveryday experience: “[E]veryoneexperiencesinhimselfthathethinks,loves,rejoices,andgrieves”.20 Notonlydoestheargumentassumetheexistenceofself-knowledge,however;italsopresupposesanAugustinianaccountofitsnature.Infact,OckhamexplicitlycallsattentiontothehallmarkfeaturesoftheAugustinian view: namely, the immediacy, certainty,21 and first-per-sonauthority22ofself-attributingbeliefs.FollowingAugustine,more-over,hecharacterizes the immediacyofself-knowledge in termsofitsnon-discursiveornon-inferentialnature.23Indeed,forreasonsthat

20. Ord.Prol.q.1,a.1 (OThI,40).

21. Indeed,asOckhamhimselfpointsout, inDe Trinitate 15,Augustinearguesthat self-knowledge is indubitable—immune from any kind of skepticaldoubt.Ord.Prol.q.1,a.1 (OThI,43–44)

22.Ockham offers the following as evidence of Augustine’s endorsement ofsomething likefirst-personauthority: “Again, inchapter2 [ofDe Trinitate] he [Augustine] proves, first, that faith does not pertain to some sense ofthebody,andafterwardcontinues: ‘this thingbelongsto theheart,not tothebody,norisitoutsideofusbutitisintheinmostpartinus;nordoesanypersonseeitinanother,buteachonlyinhimself’.Andhethencontin-ues: ‘therefore, anyone seeshis own faith inhis own self, but in anotherhebelievesthatitexists,hedoesnotsee.’Fromthisitisclearthatonehassomenon-propositionalgraspoffaithproperlythroughwhichheevidentlycognizesthatitexists,andanotherconcerningthefaithofsomeoneelsebymeansofwhichhe isnotable tocognizedwhether itexistsornot.” (Ord.Prol.q.1,a.1,[OThI,41–42])

23. Tothiseffect,OckhamquotesAugustine’saccountofthenatureofawayfarer’sknowledgeofhisownfaith:“This…canbeconfirmedbyblessedAugustinein De Trinitate 13,chapter1,wherehesays:‘[T]hefaithwhicheveryoneseesinhisheartifhebelieves,ordoesnotseeifhedoesnotbelieve,weknowinadifferentway[thanweknowotherthings];notinthewayweknowbod-ieswhichweseewithcorporealeyesandwhich—viaimagesofthem—weretaininmemoryandeventhinkaboutwhenabsent;neitherisitintheway

hedid16).Inanycase,evenifScotusissomewhatambivalentaboutthis, plenty of other thinkers are quite explicit in their rejectionofintellectiveintuition—thinkersincludingPeterAuriol(d.1322),JohnofReading(d.1346),and,aswe’llsee,Chattonhimself.17Inrejectingintellective intuition,suchauthorsareessentiallyrejecting the ideathatwepossess(atleastinthislife)akindofnon-sensoryor“extra-sensory”modeofperception.18As theysee it,perceptual statesareoneandallsensorystates.

Ockhamoffersavarietyofargumentsindefenseofintellectivein-tuitivecognition.19Amongthemostcompelling,however,iswhatI’llcall“theargumentfromself-knowledge”.Hethinksthatthephenom-

16. Actually,thereisgoodreasonforsupposingthatOckhamisrightaboutthis.ThereisagooddealoftextualevidencetosuggestthatScotustookseriouslythepossibilitythatthe‘intuitive’/‘abstractive’distinctionappliesnotonlyatthe levelofsensecognitionbutalsoat the level intellect.What ismore, itlooks like thereasonshehas for taking thispossibilityseriouslyaremuchthesameasthoseadvancedbyOckham.ForageneraltreatmentofScotus’stheoryofintuitivecognition,seeDumont1989,Marenbon1987(Chapter10),Pasnau2003,andWolter1990.

17. ForAuriol’saccountofintuition,seeFriedman2009.Ockham’sstudentandsecretary, AdamWodeham, reports John of Reading as a critic (alongsideChatton)oftheviewthattheintellectiscapableofreflexiveintellectivein-tuition.Presumably,hiscriticismsonthisscore,likeChatton’s,arepartofawholesalerejectionofthenotionofintellectiveintuition.SeeWodeham1990(Prol.q.2,a.2).

18. Interestingly,eventhosewhoareunwillingtoallowfordirectcognitionofourownstatesinthislifeoftenallowthatthiswillbepossibleintheafterlife(since,atthatpoint,humancognitionwillnolongerberestrictedtosensiblethings butwill include purely intelligible things such asGod, angels, andone’sownsoul).

19. Anumberoftheseargumentsaregroundedinconsiderationshavingtodowiththenobilityandimmaterialityoftheintellect.Thus,forexample,Ock-hamcontendsthatthatwhatevercanbecognizedbylower,sensorypowerscanalsobecognizedbytheintellect.SeehisdiscussionatRep.IIqq.12–13(OTh,284)andOrd.Prol.q.1,a.1(OThI,45).HisdiscussionatthesepointslookstobedirectlyinfluencedbyScotus.Relatedtoconsiderationsaboutthenobilityof the intellect isOckham’s insistence thatbecausesense facultiescannotactwithefficientcausalityontheintellect,itcannotbethecasethatperceptualjudgments,whicharestatesoftheintellect,haveactsofsensoryintuitionastheirimmediatecause.Suchjudgmentsmustbecausedbyactsofintellectiveintuition.SeeOrd.Prol.q.1,a.1(OThI,22ff).



are neither sensible nor do they fall under any sense.But the fact that such things are cognized intuitivelyand as particular is clear.After all, the following is evi-dentlyknowntome: ‘Iamthinking’(ego intellego).Now,either this knowledge is (a) taken principally and im-mediatelyfromasimpleawareness(notitia)oftheterms(orthethings)[thatcomprisethisproposition]or(b) itisknownthroughsomethingpriorandbetterknown.Ifit is known in thefirstway, (a), then, insofar as this isa contingent truth, it isnecessary that its terms (or thethingsdenotedbythem)areseenintuitively.For,iftheyare cognizedmerely abstractively then itwouldnot bepossiblebymeansofsuchanact toknowacontingenttruththatinvolvescertaintemporaldifferentia.(Afterall,aseveryoneagrees,thissortofcognitionabstractsfromhere and now.) Therefore, the fact that it is evidentlycognizedrequiressome intuitiveawareness.Butclearlyanintuitiveawarenessofme[viz.,thethingdenotedby”ego”]doesnotsuffice:anintuitiveawarenessoftheactofthinkingitselfisrequired.Therefore,anintellectiveintui-tiveawarenessisrequired.Thesecondalternative(b)isnottobegranted,however,sincethereisnocontingenttruthfromwhich‘Ithink’followsnecessarily.(Ord.Prol.q.1,a.1[OThI,39–40])

1.We have evident knowledge of truths regarding ourownoccurrentmental(i. e.,non-sensory)states.

2.Suchknowledgeisnotderivedfromoursenses.

3.Therefore,ourknowledgeofsuchtruthsderivesfromeither (a) the intellect’s (non-propositional)cognitionofitsownactsor(b)inferencefromsomecontingenttruthwhichisitselfevidentlyknown.

willbecome clearerbelow,OckhamhighlightsAugustine’s charac-terizationofknowledgeofourmentalstatesasinvolvingakindofinner, non-corporeal “vision” of them.24He also specifically notesthefactthat,onAugustine’saccount,thedomainofself-knowledgeincludes both occurrent sensory states as well as purely rationalstates—namely,statesofintellectandwill(suchas occurrentbeliefsanddesires).25

Theargument fromself-knowledge isdesigned to show that thebest(indeed,theonly)explanationforourpossessionofsuchknowl-edge requires the introduction of intuitive cognition at the level ofintellect.26 The core of that argument (togetherwithmyownmoreformalreconstructionofit)runsasfollows:

Itisclearthat,inthislife,ourintellectnotonlycognizessensible thingsbutalso cognizes intuitivelyandaspar-ticularcertainintelligiblethingsthatdonotfallunderthesensesanymorethanaseparatedsubstancefallsunderthesenses.Tothiscategorybelongthoughts,actsofwill,and the ensuingdelight and sadness.Ahuman can ex-periencethingsofthissortasbeinginhimself,butthey

thatweknowthosethingswhichwehavenotseen…’Onthebasisofthisauthority,itisclearthatthisfaithwhichpertainstonobodilysense(justasheclaimsinthesecondchapter[ofDe Trinitate13])canbecognizedbyasingleawareness[notitia]whichsufficesforjudgingwhetherornotitexists.”(Ord.Prol.q.1,a.1[OThI,29–30])

24.Ockhampaysspecialattentionto,andquotesatgreatlength,Augustine’sac-count(intheearlysectionsofDe Trinitate 13)ofthewayinwhichtheChris-tianwayfarer“sees”(videt)hisownfaithandhisownactsofwill.See,e. g.,textscitedinnotes22and23justabove.

25. Regarding the domain of self-knowledge, Ockham notes that Augustinespecificallysayswecanhaveknowledgeofourfaith(whichisanintellec-tivestate)andthenobservesthat“Augustinesaysthesamethingconcern-ingthewillinchapter3[of De Trinitate 13]”.(Ord.Prol.q.1,a.1[OTh,I,43])

26.Ockhamrehearsestheargumentfromself-knowledgeattwopoints.Asthereis no significant differencebetween the two, I restrictmy attention to thesecondandsimplerstatementofit.ThefirstargumentoccursatOrd.Prol.q.1,a.1(OThI,28).AsimilarbutmoreabbreviatedversionoftheargumentcanbefoundatQuodl. I.14.



with some plausibility that only a non-sensory form of cognitioncanexplain factsabout the domainof self-knowledge.Hisconten-tionthattheformofcognitioninquestionis intuitivegainstractionfromtheAugustinianpictureof natureofsuchknowledge.Aswehaveseen,intuitivecognitionisintroducedspecificallytoaccountfor non-inferential knowledge of contingent, present matters offact.Giventhis,theappealtosuchamodeofcognitionattheintel-lectivelevelprovidesaniceexplanationnotonlyofthecontentofintrospective judgments (viz., contingent facts regardingmy cur-rent states), but alsoof their immediacy. Indeed,Ockham thinksthatAugustine’s propensity to characterize self-knowledge usingvisualmetaphorsmakes it all themore fitting that the cognitivemechanismthatunderliesitshouldturnouttobeaspeciesofper-ception.And,giventhat intuitionisdefinedprecisely intermsofitsrelationtoevidentjudgments,Ockhammaintainsthatappealingtointuitionasthebasisforself-knowledgeprovidesastraightfor-wardexplanationforitsprivilegedstatus.Finally,insofarOckhamsupposes that one can intuitively cognizeonlyone’sownmentalstates, the introductionof intellective intuitionalsosquareswithfirst-personauthority.28

AlthoughOckham’sprimaryaiminofferingtheargumentfromself-knowledgeistoestablishintuitivecognitionatthelevelofintellect,itturnsoutthattheargument(ifcorrect)establishessomethingrathermore. Forwhat self-knowledge requires is notmerely the introduc-tionof intellective intuitionbut the introductionofhigher-order —orwhatOckhamhimself refers to as ”reflexive”—intellective intuition.Theargumentfromself-knowledge,thus,establishesthattheintellectisawarenotonlyofobjectsintheworldbutalso—viaactsofreflexiveintuition—ofitsownfirst-orderstates.

Insofar asChattonwants to resist the introduction intellectiveintuition,helikewiserejectstheideathatself-knowledgerequireshigher-order, or reflexive, intellective intuition. Before turning to

28.Seetextcitedatnote22.Onthefaceofit,however,theclaimseemsmerelystipulative.Aswe’llsee,itisnotclearhowOckhamcanjustifyit.

4.Not(b),since“thereisnocontingenttruthfromwhich‘Iamthinking’followsnecessarily”.

5.Therefore,(a).

6.Thisknowledgederivesfromeither(i)abstractivecogni-tionofone’sownactsor(ii)intuitivecognitionofone’sownacts.

7. It doesn’t derive from (i), since abstractive cognitioncannot ground knowledge regardingmy currentmentalstates.

8.Itderivesfrom(ii).

9.Thereisintuitivecognitionatthelevelofintellect.

Theargument is fairly straightforward.Ockhambeginswith the rel-atively uncontroversial observation that we possess introspectiveknowledgeregardingoursubjectivestates—inthiscase,heappealstoanexampleinvolvingan intellectivestate,namely,knowledgethatI’m thinking (intellego). The argument then proceeds by process ofelimination:suchknowledgecannotbederivedfromthesenses(theobjectofsuchknowledgeisn’tcorporealentity,henceisn’taccessibletothesenses);itcannotbeinferredfromanyothertruthknowntous(atleastnotinawaythatpreservesitsevidentness);27and,finally,itisn’thadon thebasisofabstractivecognition(sincesuchcognitionwouldn’tyieldawarenessofmyoccurrentstates).Thus,itmustbetheresultofanactofintellectiveintuitivecognition.

Theargumentis,ofcourse,helpedbyOckham’schoiceofexam-ple.Byfocusingon“thoughtsandactsofwill”,heisabletoargue

27. Here,ItakeitthatwhatOckhammeansisthattheproposition‘I’mthinking’doesnotfollownecessarilyfromanypropositionthatdoesn’talreadypresup-poseknowledge that I’m thinking.Obviously, therearesomepropositionsfromwhich‘I’mthinking’doesfollownecessarily.Forexample,‘I’mthinking’necessarilyfollowsfrom‘I’mthinkingaboutthisargument’or ‘IknowthatI’mthinking’,etc.Buttheseexamplesbegthequestion,sinceknowledgeofsuchpropositionspresupposestheverythingwe’retryingtoexplain.



stroke).29 “Evident assent”, in Ockham’s vocabulary, is a form ofknowledge.30

Ockhamthinksthatthissamestructureapplieswhethertheobjectinquestionisexternalor internal. If theobject isexternal, theintu-ition inquestion iswhatOckhamcallsa “direct”orwhatwemightcalla“first-order”act.Butiftheobjectoftheintuitionisitselfamen-tal state, the intuition is “reflexive”,orhigher-order.31 Ineithercase,however,Ockhamsupposesthat,providedtheobjectinquestionissufficientlyproximatetothecognizer,therewillbeanintuitivecog-nitionofit.32Thus,justasthepresenceofanexternalobjectcauses

29. “If[anintuitivecognition]isnaturallycaused,thenitcannotexistunlesstheobjectexistsandispresentintherequiredproximity.Thisisbecausetherecanbesuchadistancebetweentheobjectandthepowerthatthepowercan-not(naturally)intuittheobject.Butwhentheobjectispresentandinproxim-ityinsuchaway,theintellect(throughanactofassent)can,intheaforesaidway,judgethatthethingexists.”(RepII12–13[OThV,258])

30.The diagram and this summary involve some oversimplification. OnOck-ham’sview,inthenaturalorder,perceptionactuallyinvolvestwoactsofin-tuitivecognition:oneat thelevelof thesensesandanotherat thelevelofintellect.(Ashesays,“Naturally,theintellectintuitsnothingunlessbymeansof thesensesexisting in theiract…”[Rep. IIqq.12–13(OThV,285)].)Thus,strictlyspeaking,perceptionofsomeobject,O,wouldbeginwithasensoryintuitiveawarenessofO,whichinturnoccasionsanintellectiveintuitivecog-nitionofO.Theactofintellectiveintuitionthenefficientlycausestheforma-tion(intheintellect)ofoneormorejudgmentsregardingO.

31. Aswillbecomeclear,Ockhamholdsthatdirect(orfirst-order)statesareal-waysnumericallydistinctfromthereflexive(orhigher-order)statesthattakethem as object. Even so, both he andChatton explicitly recognize the pos-sibility thatnumericallyonestatecouldbebothdirectandreflexive in thesensethatasinglestatecouldpossessbothfirst-andsecond-ordercontent.Acaseinpointwouldbeaself-representingstate—i. e.,astatewhichrepre-sentsbothanexternalobjectanditself.(Moreonself-representationbelow.)Forthesakeofclarity,inwhatfollows,Irestricttheterm“higher-orderstate”forreflexivestatesthatarenumericallydistinctfromthedirect,orfirst-order,statestheytakeasobjects.

32. Inthecaseofreflexiveintuition,justhowtounderstandthenotionof“prox-imity”isunclear.Inmanycases,Ockhamwillspeakasifintellectivestatesareself-intimating:thatis,hesuggeststhatthemerepresenceofafirst-or-derintellectiveactissufficienttocausehigher-orderawarenessofit.Othertimes,however,heismorecautiousandspeaksasifsomeminimalformofattention(orlackofdistraction)isrequiredinorderforthefirst-orderstate

Chatton’s objections, however, we need to look a bitmore close-ly at the account of self-knowledge that emerges fromOckham’sargument.

1.3 Self-Knowledge and Higher-Order IntuitionAsisperhapsbynowclear,self-knowledge,onOckham’sview,turnsouttobeavarietyofperceptualknowledge.Toseethis,considerFig-ure1below,whichrepresents(very schematically)Ockham’saccountofthegeneralstructureofperceptualknowledge.

Figure 1. The General Structure of Perceptual Knowledge

As thediagram indicates, inordinarycases,perceptionbeginswithsomeworldlyobject,O.OnOckham’sview,thepresenceandproxim-ityoftheobjectbringsaboutinthecognizeranactofintuitivecogni-tion,I(O).Thiscognition,inturn,leadstotheformationofandevi-dentassenttoaperceptualjudgmentregardingtheexistenceoftheobjectintuited(intheforegoing,assentisindicatedbythejudgment



Now,ifweapplytheforegoingaccounttoaparticularinstanceofself-knowledge,wegetsomethinglikethefollowingpicture:

Figure 2. The Structure of Self-Knowledge (of an Intellective State)

Figure 2 representsOckham’s account of the basic structure of self-knowledge.Inthiscase,it’sknowledgeofone’sfirst-orderperceptualstate(namely,perceptionofarock).Onthispicture, there is, in thefirstplace, adirect intellective intuitionof the rock, I(r).35Thepres-enceofthisfirst-orderintuitiongeneratesbothafirst-orderperceptualjudgment(├‘thereisarock’),aswellasahigher-orderintuitivecogni-tion,I(I(r)),whichtakesthatfirst-orderintuitionasobject.Finally,thereflexiveintuition,initsturn,generatesareflexivejudgment—name-ly,aself-attributingbeliefregardingtheoccurrenceofthefirst-orderact(├‘I(r)existsinme’).AsFigure2makesclear,therefore,thestruc-tureofself-knowledgeparallelsthatofperceptualknowledge;indeed,it’sjustahigher-orderiterationofOckham’sgeneralmodelofpercep-tion.And this,of course, is theprinciple aimof theargument from

35. Here,too,forsimplicity,Iignoretheroleplayedbysensesinperception.Asnotedabove(seenote30),perceptionwouldbeginwithsensoryintuitionoftherock,whichintuitionwouldgiverisetointellectiveintuitionoftherock.

adirectintuitionofit,thepresenceofafirst-orderstategeneratesareflexiveactofintuition—onewhichtakesthatfirst-orderstateasitsobject.33Ockhamisexplicit,moreover,thatthehigher-orderstateinquestionwillbenumericallydistinct fromthatwhich it takesas itsobject.34Ashesays,

Anactbywhichwethinkofanobjectoutsidethemindiscalleda”direct”act,andtheactbywhichthatdirectactisitselfisthoughtofiscalleda”reflexive”act.…[Addition-ally,] Imaintain that thedirectactandthereflexiveactarenotasingleact.(Quodl.II.12[OThIX,165])

Ockham’sinsistenceonthispointentailsthat,onhisview,cognitiveactsarenever self-reflexive—that is, theynever take themselvesasobjects.Thus,inapassagethatcomesimmediatelybeforethatcitedjustabove,hetellsusthat

…actsmaynot,properlyspeaking,betakentobebothdi-rectandreflexive,sincewhatisproperlycalled“reflexive”begins from a given thing and terminates in that samething.Likewise,properlyspeaking,nosingleactiscalled“reflexive”.(Ibid.)

togenerateareflexiveintuition.IconsidertheseaspectsofOckham’sviewmorefullyelsewhere.

33.Ockhamholds thatonlyfirst-orderstatescausehigher-orderactsofaware-nessdirectedatthem.Second-orderstatesdonotlikewiseimmediatelygen-erate third-order reflexiveacts.Ockham’sviewseems tobe that, generallyspeaking,wearenotawareofhigher-orderstates.

34.Hemakes thesameclaim in thecontextofhisOrdinatiodiscussionofself-knowledge:“Isaythatproperlyandstrictlyspeakingtherearenoreflexiveactsofthinkingsince,strictlytaken,somethingthatis‘reflexive’includeslessthantwothings,asisclearinthecaseoflocalreflexivemotion.Buttaking‘reflexive’broadlyIconcedethat[anintellectiveawarenessofone’sownacts]is reflexive—evenso, there’snothingagainst itsalsobeing intuitive.” (Ord.Prol.q.1,a.1[OThI,43–44])



2.1 Higher-Order Intuition is Insufficient to Account for Self-KnowledgeChatton offers two arguments for the claim that higher-order intel-lective intuition can’t itself explain the phenomena associatedwithAugustinianself-knowledge.Toseewhattheseargumentsare,letusconsideragainthecaseofasubject—callherS—whoisconsciouslythinkingaboutarock.38Now,ifSisawarethatshe’sthinkingaboutarock,then,accordingtobothOckhamandChatton,Swillknow—im-mediately,withuttercertainty,andinadistinctivelyauthoritativemat-ter—boththatsheisthinkingandthatshe’sthinkingabout a rock. TheproblemwithOckham’saccount,asChattonseesit,isthatitfailstoaccountforthesetwofeaturesofself-knowledge.Inotherwords,onhisview,theintroductionofhigher-orderintellectiveintuitiondoesn’titself provide themeans to account for S’s (immediate, certain, andauthoritative)knowledgeofthecontentofherthoughtsnorevenofthefactthatsuchathoughtisoccurring.39

Let’sbeginbyconsideringthechargethatahigher-orderaccountcannot explain knowledge of the content of one’s conscious states.Here’showChattonframesit:

[Onyouraccount,Ockham,]Iwould,byvirtueofa[high-er-order] vision, be certain either that (a) I’m thinkingofarock,orIwouldbecertainonlythat(b)Iamthink-ing(butastowhetherornotthereisarock,aboutthisIwouldnotbecertain,invirtueofthatvision).Now,you[Ockham]cannotacceptthefirstoption[viz.(a)],since

38.Theexample itself I take fromChattonandOckham—and it isastandardexampleinmedievaldiscussionsofcognition.EvenAugustine,atDe Trinitate 11.2,inthecourseofhisdiscussionofsenseperception,listsastoneasamongthekindsofthingwhichmightserveastheobjectofanactofperception.ItmaybethattheexampletracesultimatelytoAristotle’sdiscussionofknowl-edgeinDe Anima and, inparticular,tohisexampleat3.8,thesoul’sknowingastoneviaitspossessionoftheformofthestone.

39.Tobeclear:Whenspeakingofcontent, I’mpresupposingan internalistno-tionofcontent.Thus,inthecaseofbeingcertainthatI’mseeingarock,Au-gustineholdsthatwhatI’mcertainofisthatIamhavingaperceptionas-of-a-rock.Buthedoesnotsupposethatcertaintyincludesknowingthatthereis,infact,arock.

self-knowledge:namely,toestablishthatself-knowledgerequiresactsofhigher-orderintellectiveintuition.

MorecouldbesaidbothaboutthedetailsofOckham’saccountofself-knowledgeandthemotivationsforit,butthissuffices,Ithink,todemonstratethebasiccontoursofhisview.Let’sturnnowtoChatton’sviews—bothtohisobjectionstoOckham’saccountandhisproposedalternative.

2. Against Higher-Order Intuition: Chatton’s Alternative Account of Self-Knowledge

Chatton is among thosewhodeny the existenceof intuitive cogni-tionatthelevelofintellect.Forthesamereason,hewantstoresisttheintroductionofreflexiveactsofintellectiveintuitionand,hence,Ockham’saccountofself-knowledgeasawhole.36 InrespondingtoOckham’saccount,hepursuesthreemainlinesofobjection:first,hearguesthatthepostulationofreflexiveintellectiveintuitionis insuf-ficienttoaccountforAugustinian-styleself-knowledge;second,thatitisunnecessary toaccountforsuchknowledge;and,third,thatitgivesrise to an infinite regress in intuitive acts. Chatton gives the lion’sshareofhisattentiontothelastofthesethreelinesofcriticism—in-deed,bymycount,hedevelopsthreedistincttypesofinfinite-regressargument againstOckham’s position (and even offersmultiple ver-sionsofeach).Butbecausethefirsttwolinesofcriticismarethemostimportantforunderstandinghisownpositiveaccountofself-knowl-edgeaswellas itsmotivation, I focusontheminwhatfollows.37 (Iwill,however,havereasonconsideroneofhis infinite-regressargu-mentsinSection3below.)

36.Chatton devotes an entire section of his own treatment of intuitive cogni-tiontothequestionofself-knowledge—namely,ata.5ofq.2ofhisSentences Prologue.(SeeChatton1989.)HisdiscussioninthiscontextisessentiallyasustainedcritiqueofOckham’sownearliertreatmentoftheissue.

37. Amoredetaileddiscussionoftheinfinite-regressargumentscanbefoundinPutallaz2005.



2.If(A),then(givenOckham’saccount)self-knowledgelacksfirst-personauthorityregardingthecontentofone’sstates.

3.Butself-knowledgedoesinvolvefirst-personauthorityre-gardingthecontentofone’sstates.

4.Not(A).

5. If (B), thenself-knowledgedoesn’t includeknowledgeofthecontentofone’s(occurrent)states.

6.Butself-knowledgedoesincludeknowledgeofthecontentofone’s(occurrent)states.

7.Not(B).

8.Ockham’saccountofself-knowledgeisfalse.

Thecrucialpremise,ofcourse,isthesecond.HereChatton’sclaimisthatif,asOckhamsupposes,S’sknowledgeregardingthecontentofherthoughtowestotheexistenceofanotherstatedistinctfromitanddirecteduponit,thenitwon’tbepossibletopreservethefirst-personauthorityassociatedwithself-knowledge.For,asChattonexplains,onsuchanaccount“itwillturnoutthatanangelcould[also]becertainthat[Sis]thinkingofarockandthuswouldn’t[even]needcommu-nicationorillumination[inordertoknowS’sthoughts]”.Andthisisbecause,inprinciple,anangelcould,asitwere,justpeerintoherheadandcometoknowthecontentofherthoughtsinjustthewaysheher-selfdoes—namely,viaan intuitivecognitionof them.Indeed, thereappears tobenothing inOckham’saccount that couldexplainhowtheangel’sknowledgeofS’sthoughtsdiffersfromS’sown.But,then,it’shardtoseehowthesubject’saccesstoherownstatesisuniqueorprivilegedorhowsheisanauthorityregardingherownstates.Hencethefirsthornmustberejected.42

42. Chattongoeson,inthepassage,toofferindependentevidencethatOckhamiscommittedtotherejectionofoption(A).AccordingtoChatton,Ockhaminothercontextsappearscommittedtotheclaimthatoneangel—Gabriel,let’ssay—cannotknow the thoughtsof another angel—Michael, say—just via

ifyoudid,itwouldturnoutthatanangelcould[also]becertainthatyouarethinkingofarockandthuswouldn’tneedcommunicationor illumination [inorder toknowyour thoughts]. But you yourself think this false, sinceelsewhereyousupposethatwhenanangelseesthecog-nitionofanotherangel,neverthelesshedoesnotknowwhattheobjectofthatcognitionis.Norcanyouacceptthesecond[viz.(b)], sinceIamascertainthatIamthink-ingofarockasthat Iamthinking.(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.IProl.q.2,a.5,122)

Admittedly,thewayChattonstatestheargumentisabitcomplicated.OnepartofthecomplicationowestohisappealingtoclaimsOckhammakes inothercontextsaboutangelicmind-reading;40anotherpartowestothefactthathisinterpretationofsuchclaimsiscontroversial.41 Butnoneofthisvitiatestheoverallthrustofhisargument—thegistofwhichisclearenough.Basically,ChattonproceedsbyarguingthatOckham’saccountpresentsadilemmaboththehornsofwhichOck-hamhimselfis committedtorejecting.

Takingourexampleofasubject,S,consciously thinkingaboutarockagain,wecanrepresenthisargumentthisway:

1.IfOckham’saccountofself-knowledgeiscorrect,thenwhenSisconsciouslyawareofherthoughtofarock,Smustknowwithcertaintyeither(A)boththatsheisthinkingandthatsheisthinkingaboutarockor(B)onlythatsheisthinking(andhencenotalsothatshe’sthinkingofarock).

40. E. g.,Ockham’sdiscussionatQuodl. I.6andatRep.II.16(seeOThV,377)

41. Ockhamdoesn’tclaim,asChatton’sglosssuggests, thatanangel—Gabriel,say—cannotknowanythingaboutthecontentofanotherangel’s—say,Mi-chael’s—act of cognitionwhenheperceivesMichael’smental acts.Rather,whatOckhamclaimsisthat,incertaincases—namely,onesinwhichMichaelisintuitivelycognizingsomesingularobject—Gabrielwillbeunabletode-termineprecisely which entity(amongseveralexactlyresemblingindividuals)istheobjectofMichael’sintuitiveact.



Figure 3. Chatton’s Skeptical Scenario

Assumingsuchascenarioispossible,Chattonwantstoknow:Willthesubject assent to (i. e.,believe)theself-attributingpropositionornot?Eitheranswer,hethinks,willbeunpalatableforOckham.Here,too,therefore,hisargumentisbestunderstoodastakingtheformofadilemma.Chatton’s own statement of the argument (once again with my more formal reconstruction) runs as follows:

SupposeGodwere to conserve in themind [of S] thisthought:‘Theactofthinkingofarockexistsinme.’Andsuppose he were to introduce alongside it a [higher-order]visionoftheactofthinkingtowhichthesubjecttermofthatthoughtrefers.Ifhedidsowhenthe[lower-order]actofthinkingdidnotinfactexist,thenperhaps,atthispoint(i. e.,withonlythatthoughtandthe[higher-order]visionexisting in the soul) itwouldnotbe suffi-cientforgeneratingassenttothethingsignifiedbythatthought—oratleastnotthesortofassentthatiscausedby intuitive cognition.… The first assumption is clear,sincethesouldoesnotseemtobeofsuchanaturethatitwouldbedisposedtocauseanassentthatitisthinking[ofsomething]whenitisnotthinkingofit.Afterall,noth-ing ismorecertain to thesoul than theexistenceof itsownact.Therefore,ifthesoulweredisposedtocausean

Tobesure,it’snotatallclearwhatadvantageishadbytakingthesecondhornof thedilemma—at leastwhen it comes topreservingfirst-person authority.After all, even if higher-order intuition yieldsonlyknowledgeabouttheoccurrence(butnotaboutthecontent)ofmythoughts,itremainsthecasethatanyangelintuitivelygazinguponmystateswillknowjustasmuchaboutthemasIknowvia reflexiveintuition.Thenagain, itmaybe thatChatton is supposing thatfirst-personauthorityextendsonly toknowledgeof thecontentofone’sstates.Butwhatever thecasemaybe,Chatton rulesout the secondhornonothergrounds.For,ashepointsout,ifhigher-orderintuitiondoesnotgiveSaccesstothecontentofherfirst-orderthought,thenthereisanotherdatumofself-knowledgeforwhichOckhamhasfailedtoaccount:namely,thefactthatself-knowledgeinvolvescertaintyre-gardingthecontentofone’sowncurrentstates.

Thisobjectionexploitsthefactthat,onOckham’saccount,asub-ject’sawarenessofheroccurrentthoughtsowestothepresenceofastate that isdistinct fromanda representationof those thoughtsofwhichsheisaware.Indeed,itispreciselythisfeatureoftheaccountthatallowsforthepossibilitythatsomeoneotherthanScouldknowasmuchabouthersubjectivestates(andinpreciselythesameway)assheherselfdoes.Thissamefeatureoftheaccountalsoallowsforthepossibilityoferror.Thus,asChattonattemptstoshowinthesecondofhis twoarguments,Ockham’s theory fails toaccountnotonly forfirst-person authority but also for the certainty associatedwith self-knowledge.Inordertoshowthis,heconstructsascenarioinwhichGodiscausingapersonwhohasasecond-orderintuitionoffirst-or-derthoughtofarocktoentertainthisself-attributingthought:‘I’mper-ceivingarock.’Inthescenario,however,thereis,infact,nofirst-orderperceptionofarock.So,basically,Chattonisconstructingascenarioinwhichwehaveatargetlesshigher-orderstate.Here’stheidea:

intuitivelycognizingthem.WhetherornotChattonisrightinascribingthisviewtoOckham,hisideaisjustthis:Ifit’sthecasethatangelGabrielcannotknowthecontentofangelMichael’sthoughtsjustbydirectlyperceivingMi-chael’sintellectiveacts,it’snotclearwhyweshouldthinkMichaelcanknowhis ownthoughtsinthisway.



objects.43Hethinksthat,insuchcases,theintuitiongivesrisetoanevidentjudgment(and,hence,certainty)thattheobjectintuiteddoesnot exist.44 Yet,while such a response is available toOckham, as arejoindertoChatton’sobjection,itdoesn’thelphiscasemuch,sincethepositionitleaveshimwithisimplausibleatbest.Afterall,itcom-mitshimtosayingSknowsherself nottobeinastatesheseemstobeawareofbeingin.Indeed,sheknowsherselfnottobeinthisstatejustin virtue ofherseemingtobeinit.Anoddstrategyforpreservingthesecurityofself-knowledge!45

WhetherornotOckhamhasaplausibleresponse,theupshotoftheargumentisclearenough.Chatton’spoint—bothhereandinthepre-viousargumentaboutself-knowledgeregardingcontentofconsciousstates—issimplythatif,asOckhamsupposes,ourawarenessofcon-sciousstatesowestoadistinct,higher-orderrepresentationofthem,itwillturnoutthattheresultingformofawarenessisinsufficienttoaccount for the variousphenomena itwas introduced to explain. Ifconsciousnessisamatterofhigher-orderperception,self-knowledgewillturnouttobelessthanutterlydirect,lessthanutterlysecure,andinnosensefirst-personauthoritative.

2.2 Higher-Order Intuition is Unnecessary to Account for Self-KnowledgeChattonmaintainsnotonlythathigher-orderintuitivestatesareinsuf-ficienttoaccountforthephenomenaassociatedwithself-knowledgebutalsothattheirpostulationisunnecessary.Onhisview,allthephe-nomenacanbepreservedwithoutappealtoanyactsofintellectivein-tuition.Ashesaysatonepoint:“[I]tissuperfluoustoposit[reflexive]

43. SinceChattonisawareofOckham’sviewsonthisscore,it’snotclearwhyhedoesn’tanticipatesucharejoinder.

44. E. g.,Ord.Prol.,q.1(OTh I,30–31)

45. OnemightalsowonderwhetherOckhamcouldrespondbysimplygraspingthesecondhornofthedilemma.Perhaps,butdoingsowouldrequirehimto revisehis general accountof perception (since it is that accountwhichcommitshimtotheclaimthatareflexiveintuitionissufficientforself-knowl-edge).Also,itwouldstillleavehimvulnerabletoalltheproblemsraisedbythepossibilityoftargetlesshigher-orderstates.

assentthatanactofthinkingofarockexistswhenitdoesnotexist,itwould,therefore,bedisposedtocauseaner-rorinitself,regardingwhatismostcertaintoit.(Reporta-tio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,123)

1.Itispossible(viadivineintervention)thatasubject,S,could have a higher-order intuition of a nonexistentfirst-orderstate.

2.Insuchacase,thehigher-orderintuitionwouldeither(A) cause S to assent to a self-attributing proposition(e. g.,’I’mperceivingarock‘)orelse(B)notcausethis.

3. If (A), it followsthatScouldbe inerrorabout thingsthataremostcertaintoher—namely,abouttheoccur-renceofherownstates.Thisisabsurd.

4.Not(A).

5. If (B), thenhigher-order intuition isnot sufficient forself-knowledge.

6. But higher-order intuition is (onOckham’s view) suf-ficientforself-knowledge.

7.Not(B).

SinceOckhamfamouslyallowsforcasesofsupernaturallyinducedin-tuitivecognitionofnonexistentobjects,hewouldn’t,presumably,ob-jecttothefirstpremise.Buthewouldmostcertainlyrejectitssecondpremiseonthegroundsthatitpresentsafalsedichotomy.Thereis,af-terall,afurtherpossibility:namely,thatthehigher-orderintuitionwill leadStoassenttosomeself-attributingproposition—nottotheprop-ositionthatshe isperceivingofarockbutrather to thepropositionthatsheisnot perceivingofarock(orthatsheseemstobeperceivingof a rock but is not). Indeed, this is preciselywhatOckham claimsincasesofsupernaturallyinducedintuitivecognitionofnonexistent



by [sensory] intuitivecognitions),all that is required isthatthe[first-order]thought[ofarock]bereceivedinthemind.Thissufficessincethatthoughtissuitedtocauseanassentwithrespecttoitselfwithoutthemediationofany act of intuitive cognitionof it. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,121)

AsChattonheresuggests,ifIamthinkingaboutarock,Iamthereby alreadyabletoknoworjudgewithcertaintythatI’mthinkingaboutarock.Noneedforanyhigher-orderintuitionofthisthought.

ThenuancesofChatton’saccountwilltakesometimetodevelop,butwecanbeginbyrepresentingtheaccountthisway:

Figure 4. Chatton on the Structure of Self-Knowledge (of an Intel-lective State)

Asitstands,Figure4involvessomeoversimplification,whichI’lleven-tuallyneedtoredress.Fornow,however, itsufficestohighlight themostimportantfeaturesofChatton’saccount.Threethings,inparticu-lar,areworthnoting.

First,notethattheexampleChattonusesisoneinwhichthestatethe subject is awareof isnotanoccurrentperceptionof a rockbut

vision”,because“ourmindcannotseeitsownacts intuitively,nor isitnecessarytosupposethatitcaninordertoaccountforitshavingcertitudewithrespecttothoseacts”.46Forobviousreasons,itisinthecourseofdevelopingthislineofobjectionthatChatton’sown(alleg-edlymoreparsimonious)accountofself-knowledgeemerges.

Whenitcomestodevelopingsuchanalternativeaccountofself-knowledge,Chatton’sprimarycontention is thatknowledgeofourown occurrent states owes not to any higher-order awareness orrepresentationofthembutrathertosomefeatureinternaltothosestatesthemselves:

WhenIamcertainthatIamthinkingofarock,itisnotnecessarytosaythatthisowestoa[higher-order]visionof it; rather it owesmerely to the fact that the thoughtitself is received in themind. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,123)

AsChattonhereindicates,hethinksthatevidentassenttoaself-attrib-utingpropositioncanbeaccountedforwithouttheintroductionofactsreflexiveintuition.Indeed,heinsiststhatourknowledgeofoursubjec-tivestatesrequiresmerelytheoccurrenceofthosestatesthemselves.47

I say that that thesoulassents to the thingsignifiedbythis ‘I am thinking about a rock’ without any intuitiveact.Andthisisbecause,inadditiontothispropositionalthought‘Iamthinkingaboutarock’(whichiscomposedofabstractivecognitionswhichmayormaynotbecaused

46. Rep.Prol.q.2,a.5,126.Chattonqualifiesthisclaimbysayingthatitholdstrueonly“inthislife”.Indeed,inotherplaces,Chattonexplicitlyallowsthatpost-mortemhumansmayindeedbecapableofintellectiveintuition—bothdirectandreflexive.

47. Inthispassage,Chattonspeaksasifthemerepresenceofthethoughtofthe rock is sufficient for introspective knowledge of it. Strictly speaking,however,itturnsoutthatthisisnotthecase;somethingfurtherisrequired.Butbecausethisfurtherrequirementisnotanactofhigher-orderintuition,I’llignorethiscomplicationforthemoment.IshallreturntoitinSection3.2below.



more,theyalsoendupwithsimilaranalysesofitsbasicstructure.48 Forboththinkers,self-knowledgetakestheformofintrospectivebe-liefsorjudgments—thatis,assenttohigher-order,propositionalrep-resentationsof lower-orderstates.Finally,andmostsignificantly forourpurposes, theyeachholdthatsuchknowledge isn’t theonly,oreven themost basic,mode of self-awareness. Rather, their analysisofself-knowledgepresupposestheexistenceofanindependentandmorebasic(sub-doxasticandnon-propositional)awarenessofone’sstates.As they see it, a subject cannotknow — i. e., immediately cog-nizeandevidentlyjudge—thatsheisperceivingarock,iftheveryactofperceiving the rock isoneofwhich she iswhollyunconscious.49 Thus, for both, knowledge regarding ourmental states is groundedinandexplainedbyone’sconsciousexperienceofthosesamestates.

Highlighting these points of agreement helps, I think, to targetwheretheprincipledisagreementlies.Whateversimilaritiesmaybefoundintheiraccountsofself-knowledge,OckhamandChattonpartwayswhen itcomes toexplainingwhat’s required forpossessionofsuchknowledge.And,asIsay,thesedifferencesamounttotwofun-damentallydifferentapproachestothenatureofconsciousness.Ock-hamexplainsconsciousnessintermsofhigher-orderrepresentation, whereasChattonexplainsitintermsofasui generismodeofawarenessthatisneitherhigher-ordernorrepresentationalinnature.Ofcourse,

48. Evenso,itseemstometheydonotagreeaboutwhatAugustinian-styleself-knowledge is,phenomenologically speaking.While theyagree in thinkingthatself-knowledgeisakindofhigher-orderbelieforjudgment,theywouldassociatesuchjudgmentswithdifferenttypesofconsciousphenomena.Thisdifferencewillemergemoreclearlybelow,butroughlyitcomestothis:ForChatton,thepresenceofsuchajudgmentwouldconstituteacaseinwhichoneisexplicitlyintrospectivelyattendingtoone’sownstates.Bycontrast,onOckham’sanalysis,suchajudgmentmerelyaccompaniesone’sordinarycon-scious (world-directed) experience. Introspection—i. e., specifically attend-ingtoone’sownstates—would,onhisview,beathird-orderphenomenon.

49. Thus, neitherOckhamnorChatton should be understood as advancing ahigher-order thought theoryof consciousness.Although self-knowledge is,ontheirview,amatterofhigher-orderthought,itisn’tthefundamentalmodeofconsciousnessofone’sstates.Rather,ontheirview(aswillbecomeclearerbelow),consciousnessisa necessary conditionforself-knowledge.

anoccurrentthoughtofarock.Chattonchangestheexampleslightly,since, likeOckham, hewants to focus on cases inwhich one pos-sessesknowledgeofan intellective state.Yet,becauseherejects theideathatperception(i. e.,intuition)occursatthelevelofintellect,hehastoalterthecaseaccordingly.(Now,asChattonalludesinthefore-goingpassageandasIindicateinthediagram,itmaybethat,inor-dertothinkaboutarock,onemusthave,atsomepoint,anintuitivecognitionofarock—butthatwouldbeasensorystate,notintellec-tive.)Thesecondthingtonoticeisthat,likeOckham,Chattontakesself-knowledgetoinvolveassenttoahigher-orderpropositionalrep-resentationoflower-orderstates.Inotherwords,ittakestheformofahigher-orderbelieforjudgmentaboutthosestates.But—andthisis thethirdpoint—onChatton’spicture,suchknowledgeregardingone’s first-order states does not require higher-order perception ofthem.Forasubjecttoknowthatshe’sthinkingaboutarock,itisnec-essarythatshebethinkingaboutarock,but,asChattonsaysintheforegoingpassage,“thissufficessincethatthoughtissuitedtocauseanassentwith respect to itselfwithout themediationofanyactofintuitivecognitionofit”.

Ofcourse,themostpressingquestionforChattonistoexplainhowexactly theoccurrenceofthefirst-orderstateaccountsforthesubject’sknowledgeofit.Theanswertothisquestion, aswe’llnowsee,turnsonChatton’sviewsaboutthenatureofconsciousness. Indeed,whatthewholeoftheforegoingdiscussionmakesclear,Ithink,isthatattheheartofthisdisagreementaboutreflexiveintellectiveintuitionisaquestionabouttheproperanalysisofconsciousnessitself.Itis,there-fore,totheaccountsofconsciousnesspresupposedbyOckham’sandChatton’srespectiveanalysesofself-knowledgethatInowturn.

3. Consciousness: Higher-Order Intentionality vs. Same-Order Acquaintance

Aswe’venowseen,bothOckhamandChattonacceptthesame,thebroadly Augustinian, characterization of self-knowledge. What is



turnsout tobeanextrinsicpropertyofconsciousstates—somethingtheypossessesonlyinvirtueoftheirrelationtoother,meta-intention-alstates.Nowadays,proponentsofHORtheoriesdivideaccordingtowhethertheytaketheconsciousness-bestowingstatetobeperception-like or thought-like innature.According to friends of “higher-orderperception”(HOP)or“inner-sense”theories,astateisconsciousjustincaseitistheobjectofsomekindofinternalmonitoringorquasi-per-ceptual faculty.52Bycontrast, thoseadvocating for the “higher-orderthought”(HOT)approachholdthatastateisconsciousjustincaseitistheobjectofanassertoricthoughttotheeffectthatoneisinthatverystate.53Onbothapproaches,however,consciousnessisamatteroftheminddirectingitsintentionalaimuponitsownstatesandactivities.

ThatOckham’sconceptionofconsciousnessfitstheHORmodelis,Ithink,fairlyclear.Aswe’veseenfromhisdiscussionofself-knowledge,Ockhamarguesthat it is thepresenceofdistinct,higher-orderrepre-sentations—namely, reflexive intellective intuitions—that accountsforourconsciousnessofand,hence,knowledgeregardingour(lower-order)subjectivestates.54Inthisrespect,heappearstosharewithHORtheoriststheviewthatthedistinctionbetweenconsciousanduncon-sciousstatesisn’tamatterofsomedifferenceintheirintrinsicnaturebutratheramatterofadifferenceintherelationsinwhichtheystandtootherstates.Indeed,Ockhamexplicitlysaysasmuchinanothercon-text—one in which he is specifically considering whether reflexive

52. Leading defenders of higher-order perception theories includeArmstrong1968andLycan1996,2001,2004.ItmayalsohavebeentheviewofLocke,Kant, and other earlymodern inner-sense theorists—though recently theattributionof this theory toLockehasbeenchallenged.SeeCoventryandKriegel2008.

53. Actually, higher-order thought theorists disagree about whether a givenstateisconsciousinvirtueofitsbeingdisposedtogiverisetoahigher-orderthought or its being theactual target of such a thought.Aprominent pro-ponentofactualisthigher-orderthoughttheoryisRosenthal(1986,2005);thedispositionalistapproachisdefendedbyCarruthers(1996).Forausefulsurvey of higher-order representationalist approaches in general, seeCar-ruthers2007.

54. ThatintuitivecognitionsarerepresentationalstatesissomethingI’vearguedforelsewhere.SeeBrower-Toland2007.

tocharacterizetheirdebateinthiswayistoframeitinaterminology that,while familiar to contemporary discussions, is foreign to theirown.Certainly,OckhamandChatton(and, tomyknowledge,medi-evalphilosophers ingeneral)havenosingleLatinexpressioncorre-sponding to our own term “consciousness.”50 Even so, the phenom-enontheirowndiscussions targetclearlydoesshareagreatdeal incommonwithcurrenttreatmentsofphenomenalconsciousness.Afterall, at bottom, the issue at stakebetween them is a question abouttheproperanalysisofourfirst-personawarenessofourstates.Inpar-ticular,OckhamandChatton are interested inwhat it is about con-scious states that explains our awareness or experienceof being inthem.Giventhiswayofcharacterizingtheirtargetphenomenon,it’squiteplausibletoreadthemasattemptingtoprovideatheoryofwhat,inthecurrentliterature,goesunderthename“self-consciousness”or“subjectiveconsciousness”.51What ismore, the typeofpositioneachdefends, and even the dialectical considerations thatmotivate theirrespective development, approximates those staked out in the con-temporarydebate—orsoIshallnowargue.

3.1 Ockham: Consciousness as Higher-Order PerceptionAccording to what are referred to as “higher-order representation”(HOR)theoriesofconsciousness,whatmakesagivenstateconsciousisthatthestateistheintentionalobjectof,orrepresentedby,anotherofthesubject’smentalstates.Thus,onHORtheories,consciousness

50.Thoughperhapstheirusageoftheterm“experior”capturesthekindofphe-nomenaweassociatewithconsciousexperience.Foradiscussionofthehis-toryandetymologyofthecontemporarynotionof“consciousness”,seetheintroductoryessayinHeinämaa,Läteenmäki,andRemes2007.

51. See, for example, Kriegel 2009 and 2003. See also Zahavi 2005, Chapter1. Like these contemporary theorists,OckhamandChatton (andmedievalphilosophers in general) are primarily interested in the subjective or first-personaldimensionofphenomenalconsciousness.Questionsaboutqualita-tive character (thewhat-it’s-like aspect of conscious experience) figure farlessprominently in theirdiscussion.For treatmentofmedieval theoriesofconsciousness in the latter sense, see King forthcoming(b), and Friedmanforthcoming.



Herewegetnotonly apictureofthestructureofself-knowledgebutalsoasenseforOckham’sunderstandingofwhereandhowconscious-nessoccurs in it. In thecase represented, theonly state thatoccursconsciouslyisthefirst-orderintuitionoftherockandconsciousnessofitowestoadistinct,higher-orderstate:namely,toasecond-order,per-ceptualrepresentationofit.Clearly,anHORmodelofconsciousness.

Therecanbelittledoubt,moreover,aboutwhichvarietyofhigh-er-order representationalismOckham endorses.He holds that theconscious-makingstateisanactofreflexiveintuitivecognition.Butsince intuitive cognition is just a form of perceptual awareness, itshouldbeclearthathisapproachalsofallsinlinewithHOPtheories.Admittedly, onOckham’s view, conscious states are such that theywilloften(ifnotalways)beaccompaniedbyhigher-orderassertoricthoughts (i. e., by self-attributing beliefs).55 After all, he holds thatactsofintuitivecognition(whetherdirectorreflexive)aresuchthattheynaturally and immediately give rise to judgments about theirobject.Evenso,itremainstruethatsuchhigher-orderthoughtsarealways psychologically (if not temporally) precededby perception-likeawarenessofone’sstates.56Fundamentally,then,consciousnessis,forhim,amatterofhigher-orderperception.

Asitturnsout,moreover, thekindsofconsiderationsthatleadOck-hamtohisviewareverysimilartothoseadvancedbycontemporaryadvocatesofHOPaccountsofconsciousness:namely,(i)thefactthatthereareprima facie similaritiesbetweenperceptualexperienceandconsciousexperience,(ii)thefactthatHOPmodelscaneasilyaccountforthedifferencebetweenconsciousandunconsciousstates,and,fi-nally,(iii)thefactthatHOPmodelscandosowithoutintroducingany

55. Ockhamoftenspeaksasifintuitivecognitionsalwaysnaturallycauseactsofjudgment. I’massuming,however, that,sincehealsoholdsthatsuchjudg-ments involveconceptsasconstituents, for subjectswho lack the relevantconcepts—small children, say—an intuitive cognitionwouldnot generatefull-fledgedperceptualjudgment.

56. Ingeneral,Ockhamholds thatactsofperceptual judgment (i. e., assertoric,propositionalthought)arealwaysprecededbyactsofintuitiveawarenessoftheobjectsofsuchjudgments.

awarenessofone’sfirst-orderstatesrequirestheintroductionofafur-ther,higher-orderstate.Hereheaskswhetherasubjectwho“hasonlyasingleactofcognitiondirectedatsome[external]object…isawareofthinkingofthatobjectornot”.Hisresponseisclearlyinthenegative:

Ifweacceptwhatisbeingsupposed—namely,thatthereisonlyasingleactofcognition,directedatsomeobject,then,solongaswebracketeveryotheractoftheintellect,Ireplythatno[heisnotawarethatheisthinkingofthatobject].Indeed,Iclaimthatifitwereaskedofhimat that very momentwhetherhe is aware thathe is thinkingofthatobject,heoughtnotagreethathedoessince,atthatinstant, hedoesnot perceive that he is thinkingof theobject.(Quest in II Sent.q.17[OThV,387–389])

OnOckham’s view, a first-order state that occurs in the absence ofanyfurtherhigher-order,ormeta-intentional,statewill,forthesamereason,occurunconsciously.

Inlightoftheforegoing,wecanadaptourearlierdiagramofOck-ham’saccountofself-knowledgesoastoincludeinithisanalysisofconsciousness(whichisindicatedbythe”pow”sign):

Figure 5. Ockham’s Account of Consciousness:



… there isAugustine’s example inDe Trinitate 9, at theendofchapter8,wherehesays thatoftenhehas read[aloud] and yet not knownwhathehas reador heardbecausehewasdistractedbytheactofanotherfaculty…So, too, it frequentlyhappensthatamanwhois intentonseeingdoesnotperceivethatheishearingsomethingeven though he is hearing it. (Quodl. 1.14 [OTh IX, 81][trans.Freddoso])60

Thedifferencebetweenunconsciousandconsciousstatesiseasilyex-plainedonthehigher-orderapproach.61Indeed,asOckhampointsouthere,it’smerelyamatterofwhetherornotthesubject“perceives”hisoccurrentstates.

Finally,whilethisisnotsomethingtowhichOckhamhimselfcallsattention,itshouldbeclearthatthereareconsiderationsoftheoreti-cal,orexplanatory,simplicityfavoringhisapproach.Afterall,aHOPtheoryofconsciousness(oranytheorywhichexplainsconsciousnessintermsofhigher-orderintentionality)isreductionistinnature:thestrategyistoexplainonesortofmentalphenomenon—namely,con-sciousness (orat leastcertain important featuresof it)—in termsofanother—namely,intentionality.62InOckham’scase,theprojectistoexplain both consciousness and the various phenomena associatedwith self-knowledge in terms of intellective intuitive cognition. Forhim, then, accounting for consciousness requiresnothingbeyond a

60.ThispointismadeinresponsetoanobjectionbroughtagainsthisviewbyChatton,who,aswe’llsee,defendsaone-levelapproach.

61. Cf. Armstrong’s well-known discussion of the “long-distance truck driver”case.

62.Ofcourse,asIindicatedabove,therearedifferentsortsofphenomenathatgo under the heading “consciousness”.Higher-order theorists are dividedoverwhether higher-order intentionality accounts for both the subjectiveandthequalitativeaspectsofconsciousexperience.Lycan(2004),forexam-ple,arguesthathisHOPtheorydoesnotpurporttoexplainanythingaboutqualitativecharacter.

mystery.57Thus,likecurrentHOPtheorists,Ockhamismotivated,inthefirstplace,by the simpleobservation that there ismuch in thephenomenology and epistemology of conscious experience whichseemsakintothatofordinaryperception.Ourawarenessofourownstates,likeourperceptualawarenessofextra-mentalobjects,isutterlyimmediate.Indeed,thephenomenologyofconsciousnessisasofourstatesbeingimmediatelypresenttous—muchasintuitivecognitionofsomeobjectmakes itpresenttous.58Similarly,ourawarenessofoursubjectivestatesissuchthatitbothimmediatelygivesrisetoandnon-inferentiallyjustifiesbeliefsaboutthem—thusconsciousnessofour states seems to function inmuch theway theordinarypercep-tual awareness functions vis-à-vis perceptual belief. Itwould seem,therefore,thattheweightofeverydayexperience(and,onOckham’sview,authority59)favorsaninner-sense,orinner-perception,theoryofconsciousness.

Again, like contemporary defenders of higher-order approaches,Ockham cites in favor of his view the fact that his theory providesmeans for explaining the difference between conscious and uncon-sciousstates.Andsincebothexperienceandauthoritymakeclearthatnotalloccurrentstatesareconscious,hetakesthistobenosmallad-vantageforhisview.Ashepointsout:

57. Lycan2004providesausefuloverviewofthemotivationsfavoringhigher-or-derperceptiontheories.Hisdiscussionfocusesprimarilyontheadvantagesofahigher-orderperceptionapproachoverahigher-orderthoughtapproach,buttheconsiderationsheadvancesusefullyhighlightthemotivationsfortheapproachgenerally.SeealsoKriegel2006andCarruthers2007 for furtherdiscussionofconsiderationsfavoring(andweighingagainst)HOPtheories(andHORtheoriesingeneral).

58.LikeScotus,Ockhamholdsthatoneofthedistinguishingfeaturesofintuitivestatesingeneralisthattheymaketheirobjectsexperientiallypresenttous.

59.AsOckhamiswellaware,Augustinehimselfmarkedlypreferstocharacter-izeconsciousnessusingperceptual(indeed,primarily,visual)metaphors.In-deed,aswe’veseen,hecallsspecialattentiontopreciselythosepassagesinwhichAugustineexplainsself-knowledgeintermsofinner-vision.Seenotes22–23above.



knowledge.66Finally,therearethosewhotakeissuewithHORtheo-ries on grounds having to dowith their explanatory adequacy—orlackthereof.Thatistosay,thosewhoopposeHORtheoriesoftendosobecause theyhold that such theories leave thedistinctively first-personalcharacterofconsciousexperiencewhollyunexplained.67Aswe’llnowsee,Chatton’saccountofconsciousnessismotivatedbypre-ciselythissortofconcern.

3.2 Chatton: Consciousness as Same-Order SubjectivityWhatwe’veseenofChatton’saccountofself-knowledgemakesclearthathenotonlyrejectsOckham’shigher-orderperceptionmodelofconsciousness but also advocates some kind of one-level, or same-order,theory.Whatislessclear,though,isexactlyhowwearetoun-derstandhisalternativeproposal. Ifawarenessofone’sstates isn’tafunctionofhigher-orderrepresentationofthem,whatdoesrenderagivenstateconscious?

Onewaytorespondtothisquestion—anapproachfrequentlytak-enbycontemporaryadvocatesofone-leveltheories—istoarguethatconsciousstatesareself-representing:thatis,theyrepresentboththeworldandthemselves(i. e.,theirownoccurrence).68Accordingtosuchtheories,consciousnessisafunctionofsame-orderself-representation.

66.Thislineofobjectioniswidelydiscussedinthecontemporaryliterature.Dis-cussionsincludeByrne1997,Neander1998,andKriegel2003b.

67.Thissortofobjectionhasbeenformulatedvariouslybyvariouspeople.Rud-derBaker(1998,2000),totakeoneexample,hasrecentlyarguedthatnatu-ralist approaches to consciousness, suchasHOR theories,presupposebutalsofailtoexplainthefirst-personperspective.Inasimilarvein,Kriegel(e. g.,2003a)arguesforthesuperiorityofasame-orderrepresentationalapproach,onthegroundsthatHORtheoriesfailtoadequatelyexplainthesubjectivecharacterofconsciousstates.This same lineofcriticism isalsoprominentin thephenomenological tradition.PhenomenologistssuchasHusserlandSartre have traditionally argued against both higher-order and representa-tionalist approaches to consciousness precisely on the grounds that suchapproachesfail toaccountforthephenomenonofsubjective,pre-reflexiveawareness.SeeZahavi2005andGallagherandZahavi2005.

68.Current proponents of such a view includeUriahKriegel andRobertVanGulick.SeeKriegel2009andKriegelandWilliford2006.

higher-orderiterationofhisgeneraltheoryofperception.63AlthoughOckhamhimselfdoesn’tcitetheoreticalsimplicityasaconsiderationinfavorofthetheory,someofhissuccessorsdidcallattentiontothefact that an approach such as Chatton’s introduces mystery whereOckham’sdoesnot.64

TotheextentthatOckham’saccountsharestheadvantagesofHORtheoriesofconsciousness,itislikewisesubjecttothesamesortsofob-jectionstraditionallybroughtagainstsuchtheories.Indeed,anumberoftheobjectionsChattonpressesagainstOckhampersistevenincur-rentdiscussionsofhigher-order theories.Forexample, likeChatton,critics of higher-order theories frequently object that this approachthreatensaninfiniteregressinhigher-orderstates.65Again,suchcrit-ics—likeChatton—oftencallattentiontofactthatHORtheoriesallowforthepossibilityofnon-veridicalself-awareness—apossibilitywhichseemsincompatiblewiththeapparentsecurityandimmediacyofself-

63.Unlikethatofmostcontemporaryhigher-orderintentionalitytheorists,how-ever,Ockham’s reductionism isn’tmotivatedbyphysicalistornaturalist in-clinations.Althoughhecertainlymeanstoexplainconsciousnessintermsofthepurelyrepresentationalfeaturesofmentalstates,thereisnoprogramtofurtherreducetheselatterfeaturestonon-mentalpropertiesorrelations.

64.Although,as indicated in thepreviousnote,medievalphilosophersdonotsharethekindofmaterialistoutlookthatmotivatescurrentreductionistac-countsofconsciousness,itisnotimmediatelyobvioushow(orwhere)con-sciousness—iftakenasprimitive—fitswithintheirownmetaphysicalpara-digm.WodehampointsthisoutinhisreactiontoChatton’saccount.Seenote83below.

65.Although I passedover thedetails ofChatton’s formulationof this lineofobjection, thegeneraldirectionof reasoninggoessomething like this: Ifasecond-order state confers consciousness on a given first-order state, thesecond-order statemust itself be conscious.Hence, theremust be a third-orderstate,andsoon.Onefinds,inthecurrent(andeveninthemedieval)literature,ahostofdifferentwaysofformulatingthissortofargument—dif-ferentformulationshavingtodowith(a)theparticularversionofHORbeingtargeted and (b) how the openingpremise ismotivated. See, for example,Rowlands2001(foraregressargumenttargetedspecificallyatHOTtheories),Kriegel2003a(111ff.),andZahavi2005(25ff.).Asitturnsout,OckhamisnomoremovedbythechargeofregressthancontemporaryproponentsofHOPapproachestypicallyare.Thestandardcontemporaryreplyissimplytorejectitsguidingassumption.Ockham’sresponseismuchthesame.IdiscussChat-ton’sregresschargeandOckham’sresponsetoitindetailelsewhere.



thinking—doesnotexistexceptasanactreceived[inthemind].Butfromthefactthatthemindreceivesthatact,oneisnotentitled(contingit)toconcludethatthatactisitsownobject.Therefore,etc.(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.1, a.1, 26)

ThispassageopenswithChattonreiteratinghisclaimthatthemereoccurrenceof agivenmental actor state is sufficient for subjectiveawarenessof it.Onhisview, there isnoneed forany furtheractofcognition.Thesubject,heinsists,“experiences”hisact“withoutanycognitionofit”.And,assubsequentremarksmakeclear,thisismeanttoruleoutnotonlycognitionoftheactbyadistinctandhigher-orderstatebutcognitionandhence representationofanykind—includingsame-orderself-representation.Ashesays, “[F]romthe fact that themindreceives”(and,Iwouldaddhere,experiences)“itsownact,oneisnotentitledtoconcludethatthatactisitsownobject”.72

AlthoughChatton’sremarksinthispassagedon’texactlyamounttoanargumentagainsttheSORapproach,thespecificcaseheconsid-ers—namely,aconsciousactofdesire/love—doesprovideprima facie, intuitivegroundsforrejectingit.Afterall,Chatton’sclaimhereisthatwheneversomeoneoccupiesaconativestate(i. e.,anactofdesireorvolition)hewill—absentanyothermentalact—experiencehimselfasbeinginthatstate.ThismuchChattontakesasintuitive.Togranthimjustthis,however,istograntallhethinksheneedsforhiscaseagainstaSORtheoryofconsciousness.Andthisisbecause,onChat-ton’s view—as on that ofmanymedieval thinkers—conative statessuchaslovingordesiringarenon-representationalinnature.73Hence,

72. Elsewhere,Chatton is evenmore explicit: “I say that a direct and a reflex-iveactareneverthesameproperlyspeaking,sinceanexternalrockandthethoughtofitinthesoularedistinctthings,thereforealsothoughtsproperlyofitaredistinct.Asaresult,thethoughtbywhichanexternalrockisthoughtof is one thing and the thoughtbywhich the thoughtof the rock is itselfthoughtofisanother.”(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,125–126)

73. Chattonholdsthattheintellectandwillarenotreallydistinct(butonlyfor-mally).Nevertheless,heholdsthat,althoughactsofwillingandrefusing(and

Aswithhigher-ordertheories,ontheself-representationalaccount,astateisconsciousjustincaseitisrepresentedintherelevantway; 69 butunlikehigher-orderrepresentationalistaccounts,onthisview,therepresentingstateandtherepresentedstatearenumericallyoneandthesame.Inordertodistinguishthisapproachfromhigher-orderrep-resentationalism(wherethelatterisunderstoodasatwo-leveltheory),Ishallrefertoitas“Same-OrderRepresentationalism”or“SOR”.

Thissortofapproachhasgainedcurrencyincontemporarydiscus-sionsofconsciousnessandhasbeenassociatedwithhistoricalfiguresranging fromAristotle to Locke and Brentano.70 It is,moreover, anapproachcountenancedbysomemedievalthinkers.Indeed,Chattonhimselfexplicitlyconsiders thissortofview—butonlytoreject it.71 Considerhisremarksinthefollowingpassage.HereChattonisfocus-ingonthecaseofaconsciousdesire(or“actoflove”):

Barring any experiential cognition relating to love, andallowingonlythis,viz.thatan[actof]loveisreceivedinthemind:insuchacase,onewillexperienceoneselftolove.Inmuchthesameway,oneexperiencesoneselftothinkofarockwhenonehasthatact—heretoo,barringanyexperientialawarenessofthatactofthinking.Itisthecase,therefore,thatifanyonehasaproximateactoflov-ingwithoutanycognitionofthatproximateact,neverthe-less,onewillexperiencethatactof loving,withoutanycognitionof it. Iconfirmthis in thesecondplace,sincethatwhich isexperienced—namelytheactof lovingor

69.Whatismore,self-representingstatesarelikehigher-orderstatesinthattheyarereflexive(inOckham’ssense)and,hence,possesshigher-ordercontent.

70.SeeCaston2002foradiscussionof thisviewinconnectionwithAristotleandKriegel2003aforitsconnectiontoBrentano;seeCoventryandKriegel2008foranattributionoftheviewtoLocke.

71. Interestingly,Ockham,too,considersandrejectsthissortofapproach.Asitturnsout,therewasagooddealofdebateaboutthepossibilityofsame-orderrepresentationamonglatemedievalthinkers.Isketchtheoutlinesofthisde-bateandsituateitvis-à-visbroadermedievaldebatesaboutconsciousnessinBrower-Tolandforthcoming(b).



experiences something as an act and not as an objectdoesnotrequiresuchanintuition.Thisisbecausetobeexperiencedinthiswaythereneedbeonlyalivingsub-jectreceivingitsownact.(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,120–1)

Intheopeninglinesofthispassage,Chattonidentifieswhathetakestobetwofundamentallydifferenttypesormodesofawareness:name-ly,thewayinwhichweareawareofobjectsandthewayinwhichweareawareofoursubjectivestates.74Afternoting thisdistinction,hegoesontoarguethatfailuretomarkitwillyieldaninfiniteregressinhigher-order states.Before considering that argument,however,weneedtobecleareraboutthenatureofthedistinctionitself.“The mind,” Chatton says, “experiences something in a two-fold

way”—namely,“itexperiencessomethingasanobjectand…asaliv-ingsubjectexperiencesitsownact”.Theideaseemstobethis:Inanygivenconsciousexperience—consciousperceptionofarock,say—onecanidentifytwophenomenallydistinctelements.Thereis(a)thesub-ject’s awarenessof theobject of theperception, and there is (b) thesubject’sawarenessofherperceiving it—thatis,subjectiveawarenessofherselfhavingsuchaperception.75Chattoncertainlydoesthinkthatthatfirst,outward-directedaspectofconsciousexperience isa func-

74.Cf. ibid., 126, where Chatton puts the same distinction this way: “[T]hemindreceivesthethoughtofthestoneandexperiencesthatthought,notasapowerexperiencesitsobjectbutasapowerexperiencesitsownactinreceivingit”.

75. Similar distinctions are often drawn in contemporary discussions. See, forexample, McGinn 1991, which describes conscious experience as “Janus-faced”(34)—havingan“outward-lookingface”(namely,directednesstowardan object) and an “inward-looking face” (namely, its “presence to the sub-ject”).Again,seeKriegel2009(7–11).Inthephenomenologicaltradition,thesamedistinctionisoftenputintermsclosertothoseChattonhimselfusesinthe foregoingpassage—namely,asonebetweenobject-consciousnessandself-consciousness.Zahavi(2005)putsitthisway:“Itmakesperfectsensetospeakofself-consciousnesswheneverIamnotsimplyconsciousofanexter-nalobject—achair,achestnuttree,orarisingsun—butacquaintedwithmyexperienceoftheobjectaswell,forinsuchacasemyconsciousnessrevealsitselftome.Thusthebasicdistinctiontobemadeisthedistinctionbetween

thesubject’sawarenessofhisdesire(or“love”)cannotbeexplainedintermsofthatstate’srepresentingitself.

Whateverwemight thinkabout theplausibilityof thisparticularexample,ithighlightswhatItaketobetheheartofChatton’sown,al-ternativeapproach.Onhisview,consciousnessisnotonlyan intrinsicbutalsoanon-representationalfeatureofthosestateswhichpossessit.Indeed,it isthislatteraspectofChatton’saccountthatmostsharplydistinguishesitfromOckham’s.WhatChattonwantstoresistinOck-ham’s theory is notmerely the appeal tohigher-order representationbutalso—and,Ithink,mostimportantly—tointentionalityin general asanexplanationforconsciousness.Thatthisisthecasebecomesallthemoreclearwhenweturntohisown,positivecharacterizationofthenatureofconsciousexperience.

Take,forexample,hisremarksinthefollowingtext:

Themindexperiencessomethinginatwo-foldway.Thisis because it experiences something as an object, andthensomethingisexperiencedasalivingsubjectexperi-encesitsownact.Otherwise,itwouldgoontoinfinity,sinceifitsactwereexperiencedonlyasanobject,therewould thereforebe thereanotherofwhich it is theob-ject,anditwouldbeexperienced.Either,therefore,itisexperiencedasanactisandnotastheobject—andwehaveourcase—orjustasanobjectthroughanotheractand so to infinity. Therefore, although the experiencebywhich the soul experiences something as an objectmayrequireintuitivecognition(inwhichcase,thesoulexperiencesnothing in thiswayduring this life exceptbysensation),nevertheless, theexperiencebywhich it

also acts of intellective assent anddissent) are states that dependon andaccompany propositional representations, they are not themselves repre-sentationalstates.(Thisisnottosay,ofcourse,thattheyarenotintentionalstatesinthebroadsenseindicatedinnote4above.)ForfurtherdiscussionofChatton’sdiscussionofthenatureofassentanddissent,seeBrower-Tolandforthcoming(a).



4.ButM*occursconsciouslyonly ifSexperiencesherhav-ingM*.

5.S’sexperiencingM*inthiswayoweseitherto(iii)theoc-currence ofM* itself or (iv) the occurrence of some act,M**,whichisdistinctfromM*andtakesM*asobject.

6.If(iv),M**mustoccurconsciously.

Andsoon…

7. If one’s experienceof having a state owes to that state’sbeingtheobjectofastatedistinctfromit,therewillbeaviciousinfiniteregressinmentalstates.

The first premise captures Chatton’s contention that a consciousstate—callitM—issuchthatitssubjectisawareofherhavingitorbeinginit.(Or,inChatton’sphrasing,itissuchthatit“is experienced as a living subject experiences its own act”.)Thesecondpremisethengoesontonotetwowaysofaccountingforsuchexperience:eitherbyappealtosomefeatureoftheoccurrenceofMitselforbyappealtothefactthatMservesastheobjectforadistinct,higher-ordermentalstate,M*.Sofar,sogood.Thecrux,ofcourse,comesatpremise3.Thebasicclaimhereisthatifasubject’sawarenessofbeinginMowestoM’sservingastheobjectofsomehigher-orderstate,M*,itmustbethatthatM*occursconsciously.And,ifthisisright,we’llgetourregress(as the remainingpremises show).Theobviousquestion:Why sup-posepremise3istrue?

Chatton’sargument isn’tmotivatedbya failure toappreciate thepossibilitythatsomestatescan occurnon-consciously(as,historically,manyregressargumentsagainsthigher-orderapproacheshavebeen).Rather,themotivationistheassumptionthatifthesecond-orderstate,M*, isn’tconscious,thenitsoccurrencefailstoexplainthephenom-enoninquestion,namely,S’sawarenessofherhavingorbeing inthefirst-orderstate,M.Wemight,then,fleshoutthesupportforpremise3thisway:

tionoftheintentionalor,morespecifically,therepresentationalstruc-tureofourmentalstates.Indeed,hesharesOckham’sviewsabouttherepresentationalnatureofthoughtandperceptionbroadlyspeaking.WhatChattonwantstoresist,however,isthenotionthatlatter,innerorsubjectiveaspectofconsciousexperiencecanbeexplainedintermsof intentionality—in particular, in termsof higher-order representa-tion.Thus,whereasOckhamholdsthatastate’sbeingconsciousisamatterofitssubjectbeingconsciousof it(via anacthigher-orderintu-ition),Chattoninsiststhatawarenessofone’sstatesismerelyamatterof“alivingsubjectreceivingitsownact”.

The argument for taking subjective awareness of one’s states asirreduciblydistinct fromhigher-order awarenessof it comeson theheelsofthedistinctionitself.Hereistherelevantbitofthepassage:

…if[themind’sfirst-order]actwereexperiencedonlyasan object, there would, therefore, be, at that point, an-other [second-order act] of which it is the object, andthatone[namely,thesecond-orderact]wouldbeexperi-enced.Buteitheritisexperiencedasanactandnotasanobject—andwehaveourcase—orasanobjectthroughanotheractandsotoinfinity.(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,120–1)

Tobesure,theargumentishighlycompressed.ButIthinkitmaybefairlyreconstructedasfollows:

1.Amentalstate,M,ofasubject,S,occursconsciouslyonlyifSexperiencesherhavingM.

2.S’sexperiencingMinthiswayoweseitherto(i)theoccur-renceofMitselfor(ii)theoccurrenceofsomefurtherstate,M*,whichisdistinctfromMandtakesMasitsobject.

3.If(ii),M*mustoccurconsciously.

thecasewhereanobjectisgiven(object-consciousness)andcaseswhereinconsciousnessitselfisgiventome(self-consciousness).”(15)



itssubject,thenpremise3(inmyreconstruction)isjustified.And,aswe’ve seen, that’s allChattonneeds to generate the regress. For, inthatcase, the fact thatM* isconsciousrequiresexplanation.And ifwetryto explainthisbyappealtoadistinct,third-orderstate(namely,M**),we’llbeoffandrunningonaninfiniteregress,sincethatstate,too,must, forall thesamereasons,occurconsciously,andsoon ad infinitum.Theregressisclearlyvicious,moreover,sinceatnopointdowearriveatanexplanationofthetargetphenomenon—namely,thedistinctively first-personal experience of our subjective states. Now,whetherChatton’sargumentisultimatelysuccessfulagainstOckhamis,ofcourse,afurtherquestion.Andit’snotoneImeantotakeuphere.Myaiminallthishasbeen,rather,justtoclarifythenatureoftheargu-mentitselfinordertoseewhatlightitshedsonChatton’sownaccountofconsciousness.

Afinalpointabouttheargumentitself:WhilespecificallytargetedatOckhamand, so, at ahigher-order representationalist accountofconsciousness,theregressargumentmakesclearwhyChattonwouldbenomoreinclinedtoacceptasame-order,orself-representational,approach—or, for that matter, any intentionalist approach to con-sciousness. After all, what characterizes ordinary intentional aware-nessis,wemightsay,akindofobject-directedness.Intentionalstatesaresuchthattheyareaboutordirectedatsomething(andthis issowhetherwe take their intentionality as a functionof their represen-tationalstructureorassomemoredirect,non-representationalmodeof acquaintance).The thrust ofChatton’s regress argument, as I un-derstandit,isjusttoshowthatthesubjectivecharacterofconsciousexperiencecannotbeexplainedbyappealtothissortobject-directedawareness.Theargumentitself,therefore,entailsthatconsciousnessisasui generis formofawareness:akindofsame-ordersubjectivitythatuniquelycharacterizesthenatureofouraccesstoouroccurrentstates.

Onesignificantconsequenceofall this isthat,on Chatton’sview,consciousnessturnsouttobenotonlysui generisbutalsoubiquitous.Ifone’smerely“receiving”orundergoingagivenactissufficientforconsciousnessofit,theneverystatewilloccurconsciously.Thereare

3a.If(ii),M*mustoccureitherconsciouslyornot.

3b.IfM*occurs non-consciously,thenitsoccurrencefailstoex-plainthefactthatSexperiencesherhavingM.

3c.If(ii),M*mustoccurconsciously.

Ofcourse,thisjustpushesthequestionbackastep.Nowwewanttoknowwhyweshouldthinkthat,forthesubjecttoexperienceherhav-ingM,shemustalsoexperienceherselfhavingthehigher-orderstate,M*,whichtakesMasobject.

Here, I thinkChatton’s answer comes to this: IfM* is anon-con-scious representationofM,thenthenatureofS’sawarenessofMwillturnouttobeanalogoustoan ordinary,third-personawarenessofanobject.Thus,justasM—sayit’saperceptionofarock—yieldsaware-nessoftherock’sexistenceorpresence,sotooM*(if itoccursnon-consciously)willmerelymakeSawareofM’spresenceoroccurrence.But,arguably,S’sbeingawareoftheoccurrenceofMisn’tthesameashersubjectivelyexperiencingherhaving it (i. e.,experiencingherself being initorundergoingit).Andthisisbecause,asChattoninsists,insuchascenario,Mwould“onlybeexperiencedasanobject”andnotinthewaythat“alivingsubjectexperiencesitsownact”.But,ofcourse,itisthelatterphenomenonwe’retryingtoexplain.What’sneeded,asChattonseesit,ismodeofawarenessadequatetogroundfirst-person, self-attributing beliefs; it’s not at all clear, however, thatmerely be-ingawareoftheoccurrenceofsomestateissufficientforfirst-personknowledgethatIoccupyoramthesubjectofsuchastate.76Onthecontrary,Chattonthinks,justtheoppositeisthecase.

Intheend,therefore,Chattonthinkshehashisregress.Forifthephenomenoninquestionrequiresthatthesubjectisawarenotonlyoftheoccurrenceofsomementalstateoreventbutalsoofherbeing

76. If,however, thehigher-orderrepresentationofMisoneSexperiencesher-selfasundergoing,S willnotbemerely (transitively)awareofM, shewillalsoexperienceherawarenessof it.And this,Chattonseems toallow,doesaccountforthe(first-order)phenomenoninquestion,butthenwemustex-plainawarenessofM*.



heisnotcausedtoassenttothethingsignifiedbyit.Asaresult,hedoesnotassentthatheisthinking[ofarock].Andthisisbecauseperceivingthathethinks(orassentingthathethinks)isanassentcausedbothby[thefirst-order]thoughtoftherockandtheentertainingofa[higher-order]propositionalrepresentation.[Butthepropositionalrepre-sentation is] formedwithout any intuitive visionof thatthought of the rock, since the thoughts fromwhich theproposition ‘Iamthinkingofarock’ iscomposedareab-stractive.(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,125)

Thecase itself isone inwhichasubject is,wemightsay, inattentive-lyawareofsomeobject.Thisexamplerepresents,Itakeit,themoremundane, non-reflective awareness that Chatton thinks constitutesordinaryconsciousexperience.Itistobecontrasted,moreover,withthekindofexplicitorattentiveself-awarenessthatcharacterizesself-knowledge(i. e.,thatcomeswiththeformingofself-attributingbeliefs).What the passage suggests, then, is that while ordinary consciousstatesmaypossessakindofsubjectivecharacter—that is,akindofimplicit,experientialawarenessofone’sbeinginthatstate—theyarenot, in theordinarycase, statesofwhich the subject isexplicitlyorfocallyaware. If this isright,however, itgoessomedistancetowardalleviatingtheworryaboutubiquity.Tosaythatallstatesoccurcon-sciously does not entail (and, indeed, is to be contrastedwith) anyexplicit self-knowledge regarding such states. Indeed, it is perfectlyconsistentwithChatton’sviewtosaythatastatecanoccurconsciouslyandyetitssubjectfailtonoticeorattendtoit.

Thisdistinctionbetweenordinaryconsciousnessandintrospectiveself-knowledgemakesclearthatcertainrefinementsarecalledforinmy earlier characterization of Chatton’s account of self-knowledge.Recall thaton thepicture I initiallyofferedofChatton’s account (cf.Figure4above),itappearedthat,forhimasforOckham,themereoc-currenceofafirst-orderstateissufficientforself-knowledgeregarding

tworeasonsfornotingthisimplicationofChatton’saccount.First,be-causeitlookstobealiabilityforit.77Indeed,onthisscore,commonsense(oreverydayexperience)appearstolineupwithOckham—andwithHOR theoriesmore generally, since such views accommodatethe(seeminglyuncontroversial)factthatwearenotalwaysawareofouroccurrentstates.Chattonhimselfseemstobeawareofthisworryforhisaccountandmakessomeattempttoaddress it.This leadstothesecondreasonfornotingChatton’scommitmenttotheubiquityofconsciousness.Inthecourseoftryingtoexplainhowitisthatwecanseemnottobeawareofsomeofourstates,Chattonintroducesanim-portantrefinementonhisaccountofself-knowledge—onetowhichIalludedearlier.InordertocompleteourpictureofChatton’saccountofconsciousnessandself-knowledge,therefore,Iwanttobrieflycon-siderhisresponsetotheworryaboutubiquity.

AlthoughChattonholdsthatalloccurrentstatesoccurconsciously,heneverthelessallowsthattherearedifferentdegreesorlevelsofcon-sciousness.Considerthefollowingcase:

…someonecanseesomethingvia thesensesand,never-theless,atthemomentheseesit,doesnotattend(advertit)tohimselfseeing.But,afterthevision,byacertaintrace[left inthememory],whenheattends,heperceivesthathesaw.Iconfirmthisbecausesomeonecanbethinkingofarockandstillnotentertainthisproposition:‘Iamthink-ingofarock’.Andifhedoesnotentertainthatproposition,

77. Chatton’sowncontemporariescallattentiontothisconsequenceasacostofChatton’sview.ConsiderWodeham’sremarksonthisscore:“Itisonethingtoexperienceanobjectandanother[toexperience]theactitself.…if[thesoul]did[experienceitsownact],thenitwouldbenotbepossibleforaliv-ingprincipletoreceiveitsownactwithoutitbeingthecasethatoneexperi-encethatact.Butthisisfalse,sinceapersoncanseeand,nevertheless,notexperiencethathesees.…Here’stheproof:asblessedAugustinesaysinDe TrinitateXI.8,andasiscertainlytrue,wheneverwearewalkingalong—overabridge,say—weseeitbutdonotregisterthatwesee.Thereasonforthis,hesupposes,isthatwedonotperceive,whileweareseeing,thatweareseeing.Butwedo,nevertheless,see.Forifwedidnot,wewould,asAugustinesays,gropearoundasif inthedark.”(Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententia-rum,Prol.q.2[I,58–59])



AsFigure6makesclear,theubiquityofordinaryconsciousnessdoesnotentailtheubiquityofself-knowledge(orintrospectiveawareness).Indeed,thelatterismuchrarer,since,afterall,werarelytakeourownstates asobjectsof attentionorobservation.Thus,whileweexperi-enceallofourstates,weare,onChatton’sview,introspectivelyawareofrelativelyfew.

4. Conclusion: Ockham, Chatton, and Medieval Approaches to Consciousness

Although framed in the context of a dispute about a technicalmat-ter—namely, the existence reflexive, intellective, intuitive cogni-tion—theissueatstakeinthedebatebetweenOckhamandChattonisboth familiar and longstanding.Atbottom, it is the issueofhowbest to explain consciousness—more specifically, our seemingly di-rect,experientialawarenessofourown(occurrent)mentalstates.ThewayinwhichOckhamandChattonapproachthisquestionnotonlyilluminatesmedievalapproachestoconsciousnessmoregenerallybut,asIhaveargued,alsosharesmuchincommonwithcurrenttreatmentsofself-orsubjectiveconsciousness.

AsthedebatebetweenOckhamandChattonalsoillustrates,me-dievaldiscussionsofconsciousnessdevelopagainst thebackdropofAugustine’stheoryofself-knowledge.Becauseself-knowledgeisattheheartofAugustine’swidelyacceptedaccountofthemindastheimago Dei,hisviewsaboutthenatureofsuchknowledgecometo figure among the basic explananda in cognitive theory. For thesame reason, questions about consciousness and self-knowledgevery often arise in connection with discussions about the natureand mechanisms of cognition. In this regard, too, therefore, thedebatebetweenOckhamandChattonisperfectlyrepresentative.78 Whatismore,thespecificissueaboutwhetherornotawarenessof

78.Whereas,inOckhamandChatton’scase,theissuearisesinconnectionwithdebatesaboutthenatureofintuitivecognition,amongearlierfigures,suchasAquinasandhiscontemporaries,itarisesinconnectionwithdebatesaboutspecies-theoriesofcognition.Inparticular,itoftenarisesinconnectionwithdebatesaboutintelligiblespeciesandtheroletheyplayinself-knowledge.

thatstate.Itshouldnowbeclear,however,thatthisisnot,infact,thecase.For,asChattoninsistsintheforegoingpassage:

someonecanthinkofarockand,nevertheless,notenter-tainthisproposition:‘Iamthinkingofarock’…butper-ceivingthathethinks(orassentingthathethinks)isanassentcausedbothbythe[first-order]thoughtoftherockandbymeansofa[higher-order]propositionalrepresen-tation.(Reportatio et Lectura super Sent.Prol.q.2,a.5,125)

On Chatton’s view, therefore, self-knowledge requires not only theconsciousoccurrenceof,butalsothesubject’sexplicitattentionto,herfirst-orderstate.And,apparently,attendingtoone’sfirst-orderstatesinvolves one’s entertaining some higher-order thought about it. Inlightof theserefinements,wearenowinapositiontoofferamorecompletepictureofChatton’saccountofself-knowledge—onewhichreflectshisdistinctionbetweenconsciousness(indicatedbythe“pow”sign) on theonehand and the sort of introspective awareness thatconstitutesself-knowledgeontheother:

Figure 6. Chatton on the Structure of Consciousness and Self- Knowledge



consciousnessisahigher-orderorsame-orderphenomenon—thatis,questionsaboutwhethertheconsciousness-bestowingstateinques-tion(whateveritsexactnature)isnumericallydistinctfromthecon-sciousstateitself.(Indeed,aswe’veseen,Chatton’santi-intentionalistarguments targetbothhigher-order and same-order versionsof theview.)Allthisistosaythat,whileOckham’sviewrepresentsthedom-inant type of approach,his ownhigher-orderperception accountofconsciousnessisbutoneamongthemanywaysinwhichthattypeofviewgetsdeveloped.

The sort of approach Chatton defends is, by contrast, far lessprominent.Forthesamereason,whiletheremaybedifferentwaysof developing the details of a non-intentionalist approach, I’m un-awareofanyextensivediscussionordevelopmentof it amongme-dievalphilosophers.82Chattonhimself,aswe’veseen,givesfarmorespace tocriticizingrivalpositions thantoarticulating thedetailsofhisown.Nevertheless,thissortofapproachdoesoccupyasignificantplace inmedieval discussions of consciousness. Indeed, it receivesattentionnotonlyfromproponentsasprominentasChattonand(asIreadhim)ThomasAquinas,butalsofromthosecriticalofthissortofapproach.83

Interestingly, when it comes to criticism of this approach, twoobjectionsinparticularcometothefore.Oneobjectionisjustthatthis non-intentional, primitively subjective mode of awareness ismysterious. Thus,forexample,AdamWodeham,whorespondsex-plicitlytoChatton’saccount,simplydeniesthepostulationofanon-intentionalornon-objectualmodeofawareness.Ashesays,“Ineverexperienceanactasanactunlessbysimultaneouslyperceivingthat

82.For example, among those working more in the phenomenological tradi-tion—atraditionwhichseemstosharemuchincommonwiththissecondtypeofapproach—onefindswhatlooktobedifferentwaysofdevelopinganaccountofsubjectivityinnon-intentionalterms.SeeSmith1986,Thomasson2000,andZahavi1999.

83. IdefendthisreadingofAquinasinBrower-Tolandforthcoming(b).Thesamesortofviewcanalso,Ibelieve,beattributedtoPeterOlivi.SeeBrower-Tolandforthcoming(c).

one’sstates isexplicable intermsofordinaryintentionalitymarksnot only the fundamental divide between Ockham and Chattonbutalso thefundamentaldividebetweenthetwomaintypesofap-proachonofferinthelatemedievalperiodgenerally:intentionalistandnon-intentionalist.Thus,therearethose,likeOckham,whoat-tempttoexplainconsciousnessinnon-subjectivetermsandthose,likeChatton,whoregardconsciousnessasaprimitivelysubjectivemodeofawareness.

The former, “Intentionalist”,approachrepresentswhat I take tobe the majority view among medieval philosophers.79 As a taxo-nomiccategory,however,itcomprisesafairlyheterogeneousgroupoftheories.Althoughallwhoadoptthisapproachshareincommontheviewthatconsciousnessreducesto intentionality,nonetheless,thereisagreatdealofdisagreementovertheproperanalysisoftheintentionality in question.80 Thus, likeOckham, a number ofme-dievalthinkersadoptarepresentationalistapproach;ontheirview,astateisconsciousjustincaseitisrepresented intherelevantway.Even here, however, there is a range of positions regardingwhatqualifiesastherelevantmodeofrepresentation:someconstrueitasperceptualinnature,othersassomethingmorethought-like.81Thenagain, thereare thosewhoexplicitly reject the representationalistapproach, insisting instead that thesubjectof intentional states isdirectly acquainted with her states without representing them inanywayatall.

Butevenasidefromquestionsabouthowtocharacterizetheprecisemodeofintentionality,therearefurtherquestionsregardingwhether

79.Althoughscholarshipon the topic isnascent (myown included), it seemstomethatthefollowingcouldbeincludedamongtheranksofintentional-ists:MatthewofAquasparta,RogerMarsden,VitalduFour,DurandofSaint-Pourçain,HenryofGhent,JohnDunsScotus,andAdamWodeham.

80.Iofferapreliminarysurveyofmedievaltreatmentsofconsciousnessandself-knowledgeinBrower-Tolandforthcoming(b).

81.Whatismore,asthereareahostofviewsaboutthenatureofmentalrepre-sentationingeneral,thereareahostofviewsaboutthenatureandmecha-nismsbywhichthemindorintellectcanrepresentitsownstates.



historyofphilosophybutalsocontinuetoplayanimportantrole incurrentdiscussionsofconsciousness.86 87

References

Armstrong, D. 1968.A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Rout-ledgeandKeganPaul.

Boler,J.1982.“IntuitiveandAbstractiveCognition”.The Cambridge His-tory of Later Medieval Philosophy,ed.N.Kretzmann,A.Kenny,andJ.Pinbourg.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Brower-Toland,S.2007.“Intuition,Externalism,andDirectReferenceinOckham”.History of Philosophy Quarterly 24: 317–336.

———.Forthcoming(a). “HowChattonChangedOckham’sMind:Wil-liamOckhamandWalterChattononObjectsofJudgment”.Inten-tionality, Cognition, and Representation in the Middle Ages,ed.G.Klima.Fordham:FordhamUniversityPress.

———. Forthcoming(b). “Self-Knowledge, Self-Consciousness, andRe-flexivity”.Companion to Cognitive Theory in the Later Middle Ages,eds.R.FriedmannandM.Pickave.Leuven:LeuvenUniversityPress.

———.Forthcoming(c). “OlivionConsciousnessandSelf-Knowledge:ThePhenomenology,Metaphysics,andEpistemologyofMind’sRe-flexivity”.Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy1(2013).

86.Contemporaryproponentsofhigher-orderperceptiontheoriesofconscious-ness, for example, while habitually citing Locke’s “Inner Sense” theory astheirphilosophicalancestor,actuallyfallwithinatraditionthatextendsasfarbackasOckham—and,indeed,evenfurther.Again,whilethetypeoftheoryChattondefendsreceiveslessattentionincurrentanalytictreatmentsofcon-sciousness,itneverthelessrepresentsanapproachthatfiguresprominentlyinthephenomenologicaltraditionandwhichhasmuchincommonwithcur-rentphenomenologicalapproachestoconsciousness.

87. I’mverygratefultoJeffreyBrowerforhiscommentsonearlierdraftsofthispaper.Portionsofthispaperwerepresentedinasymposiumsessionatthe2009CentralDivisionMeetingoftheAPA,atthe2011ColloquiuminMedi-evalPhilosophyatUniversityofToronto,andtothedepartmentofphiloso-phyatPurdueUniversity. I’mgrateful to theaudienceson threeoccasionsforstimulatingdiscussionandhelpfulfeedback.ParticularthankstoRichardCross,mycommentatoratToronto,forhiscommentsonthepaper.

act.Andthisistoexperiencetheactas an object.”84 ThesecondsortofobjectiondrawsontheauthorityofAugustine.AsOckham’sdis-cussionmakesclear,Augustineisoftenunderstoodbyhismedievalsuccessors as articulating ahigher-order, intentionalist accountofconsciousness.AndthisisbecauseAugustinehimselffrequentlyex-plainsself-knowledgeintermsofthemindturningits“gaze”uponitselfanditsinnerstates.Whatismore,it’snaturaltosupposethatAugustine takes this inner awareness tobe structurally analogoustoworld-directed awareness.Accordingly, critics of the sort of ap-proachthatChattonandAquinasadvanceobject to itongroundsthat it runs “contrary to the opinion of Augustine”85 and insist in-steadthatfidelitytoAugustinerequirestakingconsciousnessas(?)amatterofthemind’stakingitselfanditsstatesasobjectsofcogni-tiveawareness.

Intheseways,therefore,thedebatebetweenOckhamandChattonilluminatesnotonlythetwomaintypesofapproachcharacteristicofmedievaltreatmentsofconsciousnessingeneralbutalsothedialecti-calconsiderationsthatmotivatethem.Indeed,I’vearguedthat,ineachcase,thepositionsadvancednotonlyholdadistinguishedplaceinthe

84. Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum,Prol.q.2(I,60).Abitearlieron in thesamediscussion,Wodehamraises the followingquestionsaboutChatton’saccount:“Whatisthisexperience?Eitheritisthesoulitselfwhenitreceivesitsact,oristheact,orarelationtosomething,sincetherearenotmanyabsolutethingshere.It’snotarelation,sincenorelationisavitalact,whateverthenatureofeachexperienceis.Itisn’tanact,fortheactisn’tanex-perienceunlessofitsobject.Norisitthesoul,since,withthesamefacility,wecouldpositthatitwouldexperienceeverypresentobjectwhatsoeverwhenit ispresent—inwhichcase itwouldbesuperfluous topositocularvisionwhenvisiblecolor is supposedpresent.” (Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum,Prol.q.2[I,59])

85.MatthewofAquaspartatakesupjustsuchalineofargumentagainstAquinas.Alongtheselines,hequotesAugustineasclaimingthat“thegazeofthemind”looksuponthemindinjustthewaythatthe“gazeofthebodylooksonthesunormountains”.(Quaestiones Disputatae de Fide et de Cognitione,Aqaracchi,2nded.,1957,q.5,303).HereMatthewcitesAugustine’sletter“AdPaulinam”andDe TrinitateXIII.



Hellie, B. 2006. “Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Ac-quaintance”.Philosophical Studies134:289–324.

Karger, E. 1999. “Ockham’s Misunderstood Theory of Intuitive andAbstractiveCognition”.The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed.P.Spade.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

King,P.Forthcoming(a).“ThinkingAboutThings”. Intentionality, Cog-nition, and Representation in the Middle Ages,ed.G.Klima.Bronx,NY:FordhamUniversityPress.

King, P. Forthcoming(b). “Medieval Intentionality and Pseudo- Intentionality”.

Kriegel,U.2009.Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

———.2006. “TheSame-OrderMonitoringTheoryofConsciousness”.InKriegelandWilliford2006.

———. 2004. “Consciousness and Self-Consciousness”.The Monist 87:185–209

———.2003a.“ConsciousnessasIntransitiveSelf-Consciousness:TwoViewsandanArgument”.Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33:103–132.

———.2003b.“Consciousness,Higher-OrderContent,andtheIndivid-uationofVehicles”.Synthese134:477–504.

Kriegel, U. andWilliford, K. 2006.Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness.Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: MITPress.

———.2001.“Asimpleargumentforahigher-orderrepresentationthe-oryofconsciousness”.Analysis61:3–4.

———.2004.“ThesuperiorityofHOPtoHOT”.InHigher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, ed.R.Gennaro.Amsterdam/Phila-delphia:JohnBenjamins.

Lynch,J.1972.The Theory of Knowledge of Vital Du Four.St.Bonaventure,NY:St.BonaventureUniversityPress.

Marenbon, J. 1987.Later Medieval Philosophy (1150–1350): An Introduc-tion.London:Routledge.

Matthews,G.2005.Augustine.Oxford:Blackwell.

Byrne,A. 1997. “Some like itHOT: consciousness and higher-orderthoughts”.Philosophical Studies86:103–129.

Caston,V.2002.“AristotleonConsciousness”.Mind111(444):751–815.Chatton,W.1989.Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad Librum

Primum et Prologus,ed.J.Wey,CSB.[Studies and Texts90]Toronto:PontificalInstituteofMediaevalStudies.

Coventry,A.andKriegel,U.2008.“LockeonConsciousness”.History of Philosophy Quarterly 25: 221–242.

Carruthers, P. 2007. ”Higher-Order Theories ofConsciousness“.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. E. Zal-ta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/consciousness-higher/>.

———.1996.Language, Thought and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophi-cal Psychology.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Day,S.1947.Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the Later Scho-lastics.St.Bonaventure,NY:TheFranciscanInstitute.

Dumont,S.1989.“TheScientificCharacterofTheologyandtheOriginofDunScotus’DistinctionBetweenIntuitiveandAbstractiveCog-nition”.Speculum64:579–599.

Friedman,R.2009. ”PeterAuriol”.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-phy (Fall 2009 Edition), ed. E.Zalta,URL= <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/auriol/>.

———.Forthcoming.“Act,Species,andAppearance:PeterAuriolonIn-tellectiveCognitionandAppearance”.Intentionality, Cognition, and Representation in the Middle Ages,ed.G.Klima.Bronx,NY:FordhamUniversityPress.

Gallagher,S.andZahavi,D.2005.“PhenomenologicalApproachestoSelf-Consciousness”.The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition),ed.E.Zalta,URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/self-consciousness-phenomenological/>.

Heinämaa,S., Läteenmäki,V., andRemes,P. (eds.). 2007.Conscious-ness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy. Dor-drecht:Springer.



———.1998.“TheFirst-PersonPerspective:ATestforNaturalism”.Amer-ican Philosophical Quarterly35:327–48.

Smith, D. 1986. “The Structure of (Self-)Consciousness”. Topoi 5:149–156.

Stump, E. 1999. “Mechanisms of Cognition: Ockham onMediatingSpecies”.The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P. Spade. Cam-bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Tachau, K. 1988. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Episte-mology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250–1345. Leiden: E. J. Brill.

Thomasson, A. 2000. “After Brentano: A One-Level Theory of Con-sciousness”. European Journal of Philosophy 8: 190–210.

Toivanen, J.2009.Animal Consciousness: Peter Olivi on Cognitive Func-tions of the Sensitive Soul.DoctoralDissertation. Jyväskylä:Univer-sityofJyväskylä.

Weisberg,J.2008.“SameOld,SameOld:TheSame-OrderRepresen-tationTheoryofConsciousnessand theDivisionofPhenomeno-logicalLabor”.Synthese160:161–181.

Wodeham,A.1990.Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum,ed.R.WoodandG.Gal.St.Bonaventure,NY:St.BonaventureUniver-sityPress.

Wolter,A.1990.”DunsScotusonIntuition,Memory,andOurKnowl-edgeof Individuals”.The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed.M.Adams.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.

Yrjönsuuri, M. 2007. “The Structure of Self-Consciousness: A Four-teenth-CenturyDebate”.Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy,eds.S.Heinämaa,V.Lähteenmäki,andP.Remes.Springer:Dordrecht.

Zahavi,D.2005.Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Cambridge,MA:MITPress.

———. 2004. “Back to Brentano?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 11:66–87.

———.1999.Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation.Evanston,IL:NorthwesternUniversityPress.

———.1992.Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes.Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress.

McGinn, C. 1991. “Consciousness and Content”. The Problem of Con-sciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution. Oxford: Blackwell.

Michon,C.2007. “EgoIntelligo(lapidem).Deuxconceptionsdelaré-flexionauMoyenAge”.Généalogies du sujet: De saint Anselme à Mal-ebranche,ed.O.Boulnois.Vrin:Paris.

Neander,K.,1998.“Thedivisionofphenomenallabor:aproblemforrepresentational theories of consciousness”. Language, Mind, and Ontology,ed.J.Tomberlin.Oxford:Blackwell.

Ockham,W.1967–88.Opera Philosophica et Theologica.St.Bonaventure,NY:St.BonaventureUniversityPress.

Pasnau,R.2003.“Cognition”.The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed.T.Williams.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Perler,D.2008.“SeeingandJudging:OckhamandWodehamonSen-soryCognition”.Theories of Perception in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy,eds.S.KnuuttilaandP.Kärkkäinen.Dordrecht:Springer.

Putallaz,F.2005.“L’infinitédesactesréflexifs,àl’époquedeGuillaumed’Ockham”.Selbstbewusstsein und Person im Mittelalter,ed.G.Men-sching.Würzburg:Königshausen&Neumann.

———.1991.La Connaissance de soi au XIIIe Siècle: De Matthieu D’aquasparta a Thierry De Freiberg. Vrin:Paris.

Rode,C.2010.“PeterofJohnOlivionRepresentationandSelf-Repre-sentation”.Quaestio: Yearbook of the History of Metaphysics10:155–166.

———.2008. “DerBegriffderinnerenErfahrungbeiPetrusJohannisOl-ivi”.Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch fur Antike und Mittelalter, Bo-chumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter13:123–141.

Rosenthal, D. 1986. ”Two concepts of consciousness”. Philosophical Studies49:329–359.

———.2005.Consciousness and Mind.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Rowlands,M.2001.“Consciousnessandhigher-orderthoughts”.Mind

and Language16:290–310.RudderBaker,L. 2000.Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View.Cam-

bridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Documents

Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton · susan brower-toland ton philosophers’ imprint – 2 – vol. 12, no. 17 (november 2012) I claim that, for Ockham, consciousness