INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY … · 2021. 4. 25. · intelligence support for counter insurgency operations in the sahel region of africa air vice marshal ms usman

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER

INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE

SAHEL REGION OF AFRICA

AIR VICE MARSHAL MS USMAN CHIEF OF DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

19 MARCH 2020

BY

PAPER DELIVEREDIGBINEDION

UNIVERSITY OKADA

EDO STATE

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE

SAHEL REGION OF AFRICA

TOPIC

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Source: https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/

The nature of conflicts has

drastically changed globally, since

the end of the Cold War in 1991

From 1991, the world has

witnessed fewer inter-state

conflicts, and much more of intra-

state wars/conflicts, waged by

non-state actors against the state

or other actors or militant or

terrorist groups within the stateEnd of the Cold War and Non-

State Actors

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The post-Cold War period has witnessed

expanding global war on terrorism,

guerrilla wars, irregular wars, insurgency

and counter insurgency

Large parts of the Middle East and

Africa have particularly been conflict

zones for the past 2 decades

In East Africa, the sub-region has been

battling the Harakat al-Shabaab

al-Mujahideen, more commonly known as

al-Shabaab since 2006Conflicts in Middle East

and Africa

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In North and West Africa, the sub-

region is confronted with the Al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or

AQIM since 2007

Countries around the Lake Chad

Basin, particularly Nigeria, has since

2002, been grappling with the

menace of the Jamaat Ahl as-

Sunnah lid-Dawah wal-Jihad,

commonly known as Boko Haram

Map of Africa Showing arious Regions

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Source: https://www.slideshare.net/non-kinetic-warfare-share

The threat posed to the existence of

countries by these non-state actors and

violent terrorist groups have resulted to

both kinetic and non-kinetic operations and

policies to defeat or deter the threats

One of the most effective counter

terrorism and counter insurgency weapons

against terrorist groups is obtaining

information on their leaders, tactics,

supporters through intelligence

Intelligence, as a critical tool of

statecraft, provides the necessary warning

about imminent threats to policy makers

and strategic military commanders in order

to protect a nation from being subjected to

surprise attack

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Intelligence provides increased knowledge critical for

strengthening the capability to avert imminent threats to a

country by collecting relevant information which is then

processed and analysed into intelligence, and utilized in the form

of courses of action, by decision makers for the enhancement of

national security

The role of intelligence is to support and enable actions that

may be deemed necessary in the furtherance of national

interests

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What enables a wise sovereign and the

good general to strike and conquer,

and achieve things beyond the reach

of ordinary men is foreknowledge.

Foreknowledge...must be obtained

from men who know the enemy…

foreknowledge is intelligence

Sun Tzu

Source: https://medium.com/@akiranin-history-sun-tzu

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Every country generates intelligence to meet her

requirements based on the threat perception and

strategic compulsions

No two countries can be said to be confronted with

exactly the same security problems

Intelligence organizations of states are configured to

meet the security requirements and priorities of the state

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Source: https://www.newamerica.

Intelligence support for counter

insurgency operations in the Sahel

Region of Africa is vital

Intelligence operations are

conducted, usually in support of

kinetic military operations

In some cases, intelligence

operations are conducted as stand-

alone operations if the End State can

be achieved

In most cases, information is

gathered, processed into intelligence,

shared or disseminated by a wide

range of intelligence agencies to the

military and other action security

agenciesMap of Africa Showing Sahel Region

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To highlight the key elements of

intelligence support for counter

insurgency operations in the Sahel Region

of Africa

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To acquaint you with some important

perspectives on intelligence support

for counter insurgency operations in

the Sahel Region of Africa

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Conceptual Clarifications

Sources of Intelligence Support for Counter Insurgency Operations

Overview of Counter Insurgency Operations in the Sahel Region

Intelligence Support for Counter Insurgency Operations in the Sahel

Region of Africa

Roles of Local Civil Population in Intelligence Gathering in Counter

Insurgency Operations

Challenges of Intelligence Support for Counter Insurgency

Operations

Future Perspectives

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IntelligenceInsurgency Counter Insurgency

CONCEPTUAL

CLARIFICATIONS

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Intelligence is processed information; the resultant

product of the intelligence cycle or process

Intelligence is/are a specialized

group/organization/process/source or agency,

involved in the gathering, collection/acquisition,

processing, analysis, sharing and dissemination of

intelligence

Sources of information available to a force

commander of a military operation are varied and

largely multi-agency in nature

Information on the threat/adversary from the

various sources trickles to the force commander in

most cases in raw form, and sometimes not in timely

manner to give a true picture of the situation for

quick decision making

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS (CONT)

INTELLIGENCE

Source: https://fanzlive.com/effective-competitive-intelligence-gathering/

Intelligence Gathering

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The intelligence process of collection and

analysis must be professionally carried out to

realise actionable intelligence

Intelligence operations refer to processes

and actions conducted by specialized

intelligence agencies in collecting and

gathering information, processing, analysing

and disseminating the intelligence product,

either in support of further kinetic

military/security action or as stand-alone

operation in the attainment of a particular

End State

Intelligence operations are usually covert,

but at times, it can be overt for maximum

impact and to display capability thereby

deterring the adversary from further hostile

actions


INTELLIGENCE

Source: https://fanzlive.com/effective-competitive-intelligence-gathering/

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Insurgency refers to an active revolt or

uprising within a country dedicated to

overthrowing the government. An

insurgency is a rebellion

Insurgencies are movements to

overthrow governments; an organized

rebellion aimed at overthrowing a

constituted government through the use of

subversion and armed conflict


INSURGENCY

Source: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab

Insurgent Groups

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While loosely used, insurgency and

terrorism are not the same

Terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the

use of intentional violence for political or

religious purposes

Thus while terrorism is indiscriminate,

insurgency is selective, the selective use

of violence against people or groups to

overthrow a government

However, 2 main tools of insurgency are

terrorism and guerrilla warfare


Insurgency

Source: http://www.notable-quotes.com/t/terrorism_quotes.html

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Counter Insurgency is the blend of

comprehensive civilian and military efforts

designed to contain insurgency and address

its root causes

Non-military means (non-kinetic power)

are often the most effective elements, with

military forces (Kinetic power) playing an

enabling role


COUNTER INSURGENCY

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-terrorism

Counter Insurgency Operations

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Three main stages of counter insurgency operations

Clearing the insurgents, i.e. defeating/pushing the insurgents out of

the area of operations and breaking the insurgents hold on the local

community

Holding the Area, i.e. preventing the insurgents’ access to the area

of operations and eroding public support for the insurgency

Build up or establishing government support in the local community

to the point where insurgency is no longer attractive


COUNTER INSURGENCY

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The attributes of intelligence as end products of the intelligence

cycle, provision of information on impending threats/enemies

Attributes of insurgency include uprising within a nation aim at

dethroning constituted government through use of subversion and

armed conflicts

The attributes of counter insurgency are combined efforts of both

civilians and military forces in containing insurgency

Increase in intelligence gathering in conjunction with effective

counter insurgency efforts help in containing insurgency

Sustained and efficient intelligence gathering about insurgent

leaders, tactics and their modus operandi helps in countering

insurgency and weakens insurgents

Poor intelligence about insurgents, creates breeding grounds for

insurgence and undermines counter insurgency efforts

Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between intelligence,

insurgency and counter insurgency

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE,

INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY

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SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR

COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

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Intelligence could be from internal or

external sources

Internal sources include intelligence from

organic or national intelligence agencies

In Nigeria, the 3 intelligence agencies

making up the nucleus of the Nigerian

Intelligence Community are

Defence Intelligence Agency, responsible

for production of both internal and external

military intelligence

National Intelligence Agency, responsible

for the production of external civil

intelligence

Department of State Services,

responsible for the production of internal

civil intelligence

Source: DIA Archives

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER

INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (CONT)

DSS Logo

DIA Logo NIA Logo

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External sources of intelligence are those

obtained from sources other than own national

intelligence agencies

Intelligence from diplomatic sources/other

countries, intelligence exchange with friendly

nation’s security/law enforcement agencies

Intelligence from international or multilateral

organizations or non-state actors

Intelligence from the media, books,

publications, journals, online

The sources of intelligence to support

counter intelligence operations are many and

varied

These sources need to be expertly exploited

by trained operatives to achieve maximum

benefit, hence, the need for effective

coordination and management of intelligence

support to counter insurgency operations

SOURCES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER


Source: https://www.slideshare.net

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OVERVIEW OF COUNTER INSURGENCY

OPERATIONS IN THE SAHEL

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The Sahel Region of Africa is the eco-

climatic and bio-geographic zone of transition

in Africa between the Sahara Desert to the

North and the Sudanian Savannah to the South

It stretches across the South-Central

latitudes of Northern Africa between the

Atlantic Ocean and the Red Sea

The Sahel Region stretches through 10

countries; from Senegal on the Atlantic Coast,

through parts of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina

Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and Sudan, to

Eritrea on the Red Sea Coast

OVERVIEW OF COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: hhttps://afjn.org/u-s-africa-sahel-region/

Sahel Region

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The 3 main developments that have

exacerbated insecurity in the Sahel Region

of Africa are climate change, the fall of the

Ghaddafi Regime in Libya in 2011, as well

as the defeat of the Islamic State in Iraq

and Syria (ISIS)

These 3 developments found fertile

ground in the Sahel Region, which has

suffered decades of poor governance,

corruption, religious extremism

While climate change have led to

desertification and shrinking of the Lake

Chad, thus reducing economic progress and

opportunities for the populace, the fall of

Ghaddafi released huge quantities of

weapons and fighters to the Sahel Region


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)


Effect of Climate Change and the Fall of Gadafi

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The fall of ISIS in the Middle East made

the terrorists, especially those of African

descent, to return to the large open spaces

of the Sahel, exploiting the lack of

government presence and dire economic

situation of the inhabitants

The Sahel Region is confronted with

series of security threats, mainly from

increased attacks from militant Islamist

groups, coupled with cross-border

challenges such as arms, drugs and human

trafficking, migration and displacement


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)


Security Threats in the Sahel Region

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The terrorist groups active in the region

include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

(AQIM), Boko Haram, Islamic State

elements and numerous terrorist splinter

groups and rebels

The threats in the Sahel Region have led

to several national, regional and

international counter insurgency

operations currently being conducted


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source:http://arabcenterdc.org/

Members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Boko Haram Groups

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MINUSMA was established by UN

Security Council Resolution 2100 in

April 2013

It has a deployed strength of 15,900

personnel of which 8,200 are Malian

military forces, the balance troops are

contributed by 57 countries


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: https://aoav.org.uk/2015/united-nations-mali-minusma/

UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION

MISSION IN MALI

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To provide security in support of the political process to help

stabilize Mali, following insurgency by militant Islamist groups to

seize territory in the North of the country

Since 2013, 191 MINUSMA personnel have been killed, out of

which 118 resulted from insurgent attacks

This makes MINUSMA one of the deadliest peacekeeping

missions in the world today


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTEGRATED STABILIZATION

MISSION IN MALI

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The G5 Sahel Joint Force is a sub-regional

force established in 2017, to combat terrorism,

drugs, arms and human trafficking in the un-

governed parts of 5 Sahel Region countries;

Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger

These 5 countries are supported by a

coalition of 26 countries and the European

Union

The G5 Force has a deployed strength of

5,000 troops

The UN and AU have both endorsed the G5

Sahel Joint Force

France is the main facilitator of the G5 Sahel

Force and French forces are deployed in the

mission


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: https://www.africa-eu-g5-sahel-joint-force

THE G5 SAHEL JOINT FORCE

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Operation BARKHANE is an on-going counter


Operation BARKHANE evolved from

Operation SERVAL, which was launched in

January 2013

To counter militant Islamist insurgency in

Chad, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso

It consists of 4,500 troops

It’s Headquarters is in Ndjamena, Chad

The operation is coordinated and funded by

France, in support of her former colonies

Operation BARKHANE has to an extent

restored order to its area of operation and

largely curtained militant insurgency in the

Sahel


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org

OPERATION BARKHANE

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The MNJTF was initially created by Nigeria

in 1994 with a mandate to combat banditry

activities and to facilitate free movement in

the North East of Nigeria

In 1998, the MNJTF was expanded to

include Chadian and Nigerien forces, with the

mandate to deal with cross-border security

issues and banditry in the Lake Chad Region

The MNJTF Headquarters was at Baga,

Borno State

In 2012, MNJTF mandate was further

expanded to include counter terrorism

operations


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multinational_Joint_Task_Force

MULTI-NATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE

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In 2014, the MNJTF Headquarters was

moved to N’djamena, Chad as the force

became a combined multi-National

formation, comprising units, from Nigeria,

Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin

The new MNJTF was created by the Lake

Chad Basin Countries with a mandate to

bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency

This was based on the fact that the

growing regionalization of the Boko Haram

threat requires a collective and

comprehensive response to defeat terrorism


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source:

Members of MNJTF in Combating BHTs in Nigeria


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The MNJTF is supported by the United States, France, Britain,

Germany and the United Nations and African Union

The strength of the MNJTF is 10,000 uniformed personnel and a

civilian component

The Force is organized into 4 sectors

Sector 1 in Cameroon (Headquarters in Mora)

Sector 2 in Chad (Headquarters in Baga-Sola)

Sector 3 in Nigeria (Headquarters in Baga)

Sector 4 in Niger (Headquarters in Diffa)

It should be noted that apart from troops contributed by Lake Chad

Basin Countries as part of the MNJTF, each of the countries have other

national troops conducting internal counter terrorist and counter

insurgency operations within their borders


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)


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The Nigerian kinetic response to the

threat is majorly carried out by Operation

LAFIYA DOLE, which is conducting counter

terrorism and counter insurgency

operations in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe

States

Operation LAFIYA DOLE, which is

Headquartered in Maiduguri, conducts

military operations in liaison and

coordination with MNJTF as such

operations require support from the

neighbouring countries


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)


Op LAFIYA DOLE


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The EUTM is an European Union

training mission in Mali, formed in 2013,

to build the capacity of the Malian

military to combat insurgency

It’s deployed strength is 580 troops

European Union Training Mission in

Mali, since it commenced operation, has

so far trained 12,000 Malian troops


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: https://People-Organisations/Organisations/European-Union-Training-Mission-in-Mali

EUROPEAN UNION TRAINING MISSION IN MALI

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The EU CAP Mali is an European Union

civilian capacity building mission in Mali,

formed in 2015, to build the capacity of the

Malian security forces to combat insurgency

It’s deployed strength is 140 security

forces

European Union Capacity Building Mission

in the Sahel Mali, has so far trained 6,000

Malian security forces


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union_Capacity_Building_Mission_in_Niger

EUROPEAN UNION CAPACITY BUILDING MISSION IN THE SAHEL

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The EU CAP Niger is a European Union capacity building mission in

Niger, formed in 2015

To build the capacity of the Nigerian security forces to combat

insurgency

Its deployed strength is 200 security forces

EU CAP Niger, since it commenced operation has trained 13,000

Nigerian security forces


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

EUROPEAN UNION CAPACITY BUILDING MISSION IN THE SAHEL

NIGER

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President Emmanuel Macron held a Summit in

Pau, south western France with Presidents of the

G5 countries which include Niger, Mali, Burkina

Faso, Chad and Mauritania on 13 Jan 20

The Summit was to address the issues relating

to discontentment among locals with foreign

military presence in the Sahel Region

The Presidents of France and G5 countries

agreed to establish a joint operation along the

tri-border zone of Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali by

June 2020


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-51100511

President Emmanuel Macron at the G5 Countries Summit 2020

COALITION FOR THE SAHEL

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The coalition with its headquarters in Niamey, Niger

Republic would be a joint command of elements of the G5

Sahel Task Force and Operation BARKHANE

It would facilitate CTCOIN operations and curb other

trans-border crimes within the region


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)

COALITION FOR THE SAHEL

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Task Force TAKUBA is a French-led European

Union operation proposed to help in capacity

building of the Malian Armed Forces and other

local forces in the Sahel region after the visit of

the French Armed Forces Minister, Florence Parly,

on 5 Nov 19

The force would relieve Operation BARKHANE

of the training and capacity building duties

allowing them to focus on its CTCOIN efforts in

the Sahel

Several European countries including, Sweden,

France and United Kingdom among others have

already committed troops and equipment to the

force which is expected to be fully operationalized

between September and December 2020


IN THE SAHEL (CONT)


Florence Parly French Armed Forces Minister’s Visit to

Sahel Region

EUROPEAN UNION TASK FORCE TAKUBA

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INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER

INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

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The place of timely and actionable

intelligence for the success of the counter


of Africa cannot be over-emphasized

Intelligence is coordinated and managed

at various levels like mission, national,

regional and international to support the

various on-going counter insurgency

operations using a combination of HUMINT,

TECHINT and psychological operations (Psy

Ops) platforms

OVERVIEW

OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER


Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:jpg

Psy Ops Platforms

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Intelligence provides the tools utilized

for Psy Ops support to the on-going

counter insurgency operations

Intelligence operations are sometimes

conducted as stand-alone operations

towards the overall End State

The HUMINT platforms emplaced for

intelligence operations and to support the

counter insurgency operations in the Sahel

are various professional collectors

analysts dedicated to intelligence-driven

operations

Intelligence experts are part of counter

insurgency operational and tactical

mission planning, in recognition of

intelligence as a driver of combat

operations

OVERVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER


Source: https://trajectorymagazine.com/the-crowd-behind-crowdsourcing-for-humint/

HUMINT

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The TECHINT Platforms are the various

range of assets ranging from airborne

Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms to

communication assets used to collect and

process intelligence in support of counter


TECHINT equally includes open source

intelligence and the communication

intercept capabilities

Open source is a platform for collecting

from the print and electronic media, such as

journals, newspapers, internet to establish

trends of particular threats to serve as early

warning system



Source: DOPRI Archives

ISR Platforms

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Terror groups use the social media to

propagate and amplify their deeds

The open source is used to monitor

activities of terrorists and extremist groups,

their recruitment drive, propaganda and

responses from their target audience

Conversations of terrorists relating to

national security are monitored/intercepted

The capability has helped in great deal in

tracking activities and subsequent arrest of

high profile suspects including BHT



Source: https://acebook-social-media-promote-terrorism/

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Psy Ops are planned operations to convey

selected information and indicators to a

selected audience to influence their motives,

beliefs, emotions, reasoning and behaviour of

governments, organizations, individuals

ultimately to make them behave in a desired

manner in the achievement of national

objectives

The tools of Psy Ops are derived from

intelligence products

Psy Ops conducts appropriate

psychological operations line of support in

the counter insurgency operations in the

Sahel Region of Africa



Source: https://www.world-with-psyops/5581971

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Psy Ops aims to combat the terrorists threats, boost troops’

morale and seek support of the civil populace in the theatre of

operation

Morale boosting operations for own troops have been conducted

as well as demoralizing operations targeted at the

terrorists/insurgents

Leaflets have been dropped at different times targeting insurgent

Strategic communications have been undertaken through various

media to influence the behaviour of insurgents and the populace



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ROLES OF LOCAL CIVIL POPULATION IN

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING IN COUNTER

INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN

THE SAHEL REGION

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The local civilian population plays very important roles in the intelligence

gathering process in counter insurgency operations in the Sahel Region of

Africa

Due to the growing nature of the terrorist threats and the protracted nature

of the counter insurgency operations, the local civilian population in the

conflict areas actively support the counter insurgency operations in 5 main

categories; as

Informants

Walk-in-sources

Vigilante members

Hunters

Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force

ROLES OF LOCAL CIVIL POPULATION IN INTELLIGENCE

GATHERING IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

IN THE SAHEL REGION (CONT)

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The bulk of the local civilian population are informants to the

military and other security agencies providing intelligence

support to the counter insurgency operations in the Sahel Region

of Africa

Local members of road transport unions provide information on

movement of suspected insurgents especially those using public

transport; traders provide information on individuals purchasing

un-usually large quantities of food, fuel, medicines

The informants are usually tasked for information by the troops

and sometimes given incentives or monetary reward to

encourage them

Thus, the locals, by serving as sources of information are a

veritable part of the intelligence gathering process

INFORMANTS




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The walk-in-sources are those locals who stumble on information

or activity of suspicious nature and alert troops

A local may observe a person nursing gun-shot wounds, or hiding

weapons

The walk-in-source is not tasked to provide information like the

informant, but he/she is usually a one-off source of a very important

information

Some of the local civilian population going about their legitimate

businesses in areas where counter insurgency operations are on-

going, are walk-in-sources

WALK-IN-SOURCES




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Some of the local population are also

organized into vigilante groups to protect

their local communities from attacks by

terrorists and bandits

The Vigilante members, due to affinity

with their villages/towns sometimes form

resistance groups to protect their

localities

The vigilante groups maintain close

collaboration with military and security

forces in their localities

VIGILANTE MEMBERS




Source: DOPRI Archives

Vigilante Groups

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The members of the local civilian

population who are hunters are equally

organized and they conduct patrols and

reconnaissance on terrorist activities in

the course of their hunting expeditions

The hunters have been an important

source of information for the forces

conducting counter insurgency

operations in the Sahel Region of Africa

HUNTERS




Source: https://-haram-how-10000-hunters-want-to-defeat-terrorist-sect/

Hunters

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Another important role performed by the

local civilian population in the counter

insurgency operations is by joining the

CJTF

The CJTF are youths of the community

who organize themselves to actively

support the military forces in combat

operations

The CJTF members serve as guides

alongside troops during active combat

operations

CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE




Source: https://www.dw.com/ha/najeriya-gudunmawar-yan-kato-da-gora-wajen-samar-

CJTF

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The CJTF members are armed with dane

guns to be able to physically protect their

communities from the terrorists

They equally assist in identifying terrorists

who attempt to mingle with the local

population

The CJTF have greatly assisted the counter

insurgency operations in the Sahel

CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE




Source: https://www.today.ng/news/nigeria/cjtf-move-child-soldiers-

Armed CJTF

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CHALLENGES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS

IN THE SAHEL REGION

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The challenges of intelligence support in counter insurgency

operations in the Sahel Region of Africa starts with the absence of a

technologically driven platform to securely exchange intelligence among

the intelligence agencies and other security agencies

Means of production and dissemination of intelligence to the counter

insurgency operations in the Sahel is still largely manually based

Evaluation of both historical and contemporary differences of the

various countries in the Sahel where these counter insurgency

operations are on-going, indicate that a major challenge to smooth

intelligence sharing, intelligence exchange and intelligence support is

that the countries do not possess the same range of capabilities to

collect and process intelligence

There also exist differences in national interests, national aspirations,

doctrine, professionalism, terminology, and operational concepts

The influence of each nation’s local politics on intelligence operations

cannot be ruled out

CHALLENGES OF INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IN COUNTER

INSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN THE SAHEL REGION (CONT)

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Many nations are involved in providing

intelligence support to the various

counter insurgency operations on-going

in the Sahel Region of Africa

Regional and international powers and

organizations are also involved

The interests of these nations and

organizations are different, hence the

intelligence support may not be

optimally provided


Counter Insurgency Operations in the Sahel Region

DIFFERENCES IN NATIONAL INTERESTS



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Lack of trust among various countries and non-state actors

providing intelligence support to the on-going counter insurgency

operations is a big challenge

The Anglo-phone and Franco-phone countries intelligence/security

agencies are suspicious of each other, perhaps due to belief that

the sharing of intelligence could compromise sources

LACK OF TRUST AMONG THE COUNTRIES/NON-STATE

ACTORS



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The lack of uniformity in intelligence doctrine, training, and inter-

operability of equipment deployed in intelligence gathering and

processing systems of the countries various security, military and

law enforcement agencies

The institutional platform for joint intelligence training/doctrine

does not exist

There is therefore the need to develop infrastructure for joint

intelligence training/doctrine to adequately support own operations

LACK OF JOINT TRAINING AND DOCTRINE



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There exist inter-agency rivalry, especially within countries, fostered by a

keen sense of competitiveness and belief that relevance lies in hoarding

information from others and being the first and only source of a crucial piece

of information

This is a hugely mistaken belief and is a present and clear threat to national

security

Such an attitude denies relevant agencies of the needed information which

would have informed the immediate conduct of remedial counter actions

It is more tragic when the agency hoarding the information has no capability

to conduct any counter measures, regarding the said security development;

yet it withholds the information from the relevant action agency because it

wants to be relevant and take credit for obtaining the said information

INTER-AGENCY RIVALRIES



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Intelligence operations is also inhibited by situations where the

operational mandates of intelligence agencies overlap, resulting in

"territorial struggles' and scheming for relevance

No matter the width and depth of overlap of functions, ultimately

each Agency has a core area of responsibility which it should define

and vigorously pursue

Each organization should strive to avail other agencies such

intelligence and other forms of assistance as deemed appropriate

to enable others fulfil their core mandates

OVERLAP OF FUNCTIONS OF AGENCIES



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Intelligence operations and collaboration has been found to be

relatively easier at higher echelons of the security agencies

Perhaps this can be attributed to the wider recognition at this level

of the imperative of inter-agency intelligence sharing, and liaison,

given its broader field vision

At the lower levels of command such as tactical operations, such

collaboration is fraught with intense competition and suspicion

This is most worrisome as the intelligence picture at the national

level is often determined by the clarity of inputs from the lower

commands/units

DIFFICULTIES OF COLLABORATION AT LOWER LEVELS OF

COMMAND



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Inadequate capacity for real-time intelligence gathering is one of

the major challenges confronting CTCOIN Ops in the Sahel region

The Global Fire Index (GFI) report of 2019 revealed that most of the

Sahel countries have higher power index value

This means that they possess less technical fighting capabilities

including low capacity for effective ISR

INADEQUATE CAPACITY FOR REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE

GATHERING



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Some of the countries are in partnership

with UK, US, and France to improve their ISR

capability in the various operations using

satellite based technologies

Military commanders in the various

CTCOIN Ops in the Sahel Region would be

comfortable with depending on their national

assets to provide them with timely

information

The GFI report also indicate that some of

the Sahel Region countries’ military lack

individual capacity to acquire and maintain

necessary real time intelligence gathering

high-tech due to poor funding

Source: https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2013/08/02/nigerian-

CTCOIN Ops

INADEQUATE CAPACITY FOR REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE

GATHERING



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The lack of interoperability of equipment of the various

countries providing intelligence support to counter

insurgency operations in the Sahel is another challenge

Due to the different doctrines and training of the

countries, their equipment and intelligence tools lack

interoperability

LACK OF INTEROPERABILITY OF EQUIPMENT



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There is also the lack of a secure, common communication

platform as a significant challenge to intelligence sharing and

intelligence support to the counter insurgency operations

There is therefore the need to establish a reliable

communication platform and process to develop and disseminate

intelligence support

LACK OF A SECURE COMMUNICATION PLATFORM



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Some of the countries in the Sahel Region can hardly

take any decision without clearance from their colonial

masters

This over bearing external influence is a major

impediment to intelligence sharing and intelligence support

to the counter insurgency operations in the Region

OVER BEARING EXTERNAL INFLUENCES



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FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

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An appropriate starting point for improving intelligence support

in counter insurgency operations in the Sahel Region of Africa is

perhaps for the affected countries to establish a multilateral

diplomatic framework for intelligence sharing

The framework would spell out how intelligence is to be shared

by various countries’ intelligence agencies, thus addressing the

existing jurisdictional and bureaucratic obstacles to intelligence

support to on-going counter insurgency operations in the Region

Deliberate steps need to be taken to develop a common

intelligence doctrine for the countries of the Region as well as

common intelligence gathering, processing and sharing

procedures

FUTURE PERSPECTIVES (CONT)

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There is the need for common intelligence training to make the

various countries intelligence networks to work seamlessly

Other measures that could improve intelligence support in

counter insurgency operations in the Sahel Region of Arica is the

poor exploitation and use of an early warning mechanism at sub-

regional and at AU levels for intelligence support

All the counter insurgency missions in the Sahel Region of

Africa require greater collaboration and synergy for intelligence

sharing


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Effective coordination and management

of intelligence require resolving or

minimizing differences among the various

countries

Where countries have differing national

interests, it becomes difficult to work

together

Routinely conducting combined

exercises and intelligence operations are

among the ways of eliminating differences

and improving intelligence readiness

Special arrangements should be made,

when necessary, to accommodate

countries differences in doctrine,

terminologies, methods of operation,

communications, and structures.


Joint Exercise by Sahel Countries Armed Forces

RESOLVING DIFFERENCES AMONG COUNTRIES


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The various countries intelligence agencies intelligence requirements,

production and use should be agreed upon, planned, and exercised in

advance

The strengths and weaknesses of each country’s intelligence doctrine and

operations should be evaluated at the planning stage to determine the best

blend of capabilities available to accomplish the mission

Countries fighting insurgency in the Sahel Region need to establish legal

framework for effective intelligence collaboration and sharing

DETERMINING AND PLANNING INTELLIGENCE SHARING


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Each country in the Sahel region should exploit opportunities in AU’s early

warning mechanism, Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa

(CISSA) and the Defence Attaché system to strengthen intelligence

collaboration and intelligence sharing in support of the counter insurgency

operations

Each country’s intelligence organization should be able to translate and

disseminate the product from other countries

The exchange of intelligence liaison personnel among countries would

bridge differences and ensures access to intelligence resources of each nation

FULL EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE


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The external influences on some countries in the Sahel by their

former colonial power (France), needs to be reduced to enable

the countries fully share intelligence in the on-going counter


REDUCTION OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCES


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To improve the capacity and capability of each countries intelligence

organization as well as obtain interoperability of equipment and

communication systems, there is need for joint intelligence training

An appropriate military intelligence school in West Africa like the Defence

Intelligence College Abuja, could be strengthened and designated as Regional

Intelligence Training Center to build military intelligence capacity of the

countries of the Lake Chad Region

This action would go a long way in improving intelligence support in counter

insurgency operations in the Sahel Region of Africa

JOINT INTELLIGENCE TRAINING


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To achieve improved real time intelligence gathering capacity

in the Sahel Region, member states could consider joint

acquisition of ISR Satellites that would operate at sub-regional

level

Regional leaders must exercise the political will to acquire

necessary high-tech for their armed forces

JOINT ACQUISITION OF ISR SATELLITE


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Thank You for Your Attention

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REFERENCES

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Carl Von Clauztwitz, On War

Bugaje Usman The Insurgency Operations in the Sahel Region of Africa

https://www.wikipedea.com [accessed 2 Mar 2020]

AVM MS Usman, DSS psc(+) fdc(+) BSc MSc CDI lecture Threat Assessment,

presented to participants of National Defence College, Nigeria, on 9 Mar 17

Maj Gen HOU Adoga, The Combat Arms and the Emerging Global Security

Regime, Jaji 2007

National Open University of Nigeria CSS 24 on ‘Future Wars’

US National Institute of Standards and Technology cited in Kuban

&MacKenzie-Carey, 2018

Osita Agbu, Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case

Wole Soyinka, The Sahel Region, https://www.wikipedea.com [accessed 1 Mar

2020]

Valentine Okoro, Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West

Africa: Implication for Regional Security, 2019

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REFERENCES

Global Terrorism, https://www.UNITAR POCI.com [accessed 28 Feb 2020]

Mr. Francis Adesina, Wars of the Future, (OAU, Ile-

Ife)https://climatechange.gov.ng/climate-change-major-challenge-to-

agriculture-development/ (accessed 15 Jan 2020)

Maj Gen SJ Davies, DSS Fndc Psc Ag CDI’s lecture on Assessment of

Nigeria’s Internal and External Threats: The Roles of Defence Intelligence

Agency presented to participants of National Defence College, Course 24

on 1 June 2016

Col Golo Digol Victor, Emerging Concepts, Strategy and the Future of War,

Paper Presented at Nasser Higher Military Academy, Cairo Egypt, 21

Dec 16

Documents

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY … · 2021. 4. 25. · intelligence support for counter insurgency operations in the sahel region of africa air vice marshal ms usman