Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia

J.K.Cilliers

GROOM HELMLondon • Sydney • Dover, New Hampshire

CONTENTS

©1985J.K. CiUiersCroom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell RowBeckenham, Kent BR3 1ATCroom Helm Australia Pty Ltd, First Floor,139 King Street, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Cilliers, J.K.Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia.1. Zimbabwe - HistoryI. Title968.91 DT962.5

ISBN 0-7099-3412-2

Croom Helm, 51 Washington Street,Dover, New Hampshire 03820.USA

Cataloging in Publication Data applied for.Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:84-45702

List of Tables and FiguresList of Abbreviations and TerminologyAcknowledgementIntroduction

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE:1890 TO 1979

1.1 The Early Years1.2 The Establishment of a Strategic

Base Area in the North-east1 , 3 Operation Hurricane1.4 1974: Security Force Reaction ...

Detente1976 and Dr Henry KissingerThe Patriotic Front1977: ZPRA Intensifies the War ..The Internal Settlement

1 .51 .61 .71 .81 .91.10 Lancaster House

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1

2.22.32.42.5

The Rhodesian Security Force'sapproach to command and control ...JOC's, JPS and Operation Hurricane.War Council, COMOPS and NATJOCSpecial ForcesConclusion

PROTECTED AND CONSOLIDATED VILLAGES

Printed and bound in Great Britain byBiddies Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn

3.1 The Concept3.2 Initial Attempts at Creating

Protected Areas

1

1 11418222733354455

6061667376

79

82

3.3 Operations Overload and OverloadTwo

3.4 Extension of the Protected VillageScheme

3.5 Opening of Protected Villages3.6 Guarding Forces ,3.7 The Rhodesian Approach and Condi-

tions in Protected Villages ,Conclusion ,3.8

4* BORDER MINEFIELD OBSTACLES

4.1 Cordon Sanitaire4.2 Rhodesian Cordons Sanitaires4 . 3 Border Minefields4. 4 Conclusion

PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS

5.1 The Concept5.2 The Formation of the Selous Scouts.5. 3 Pseudo Modus Operand!5 . 4 Conclusion

INTERNAL DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT:PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, POPULATION ANDRESOURCE CONTROL, CIVIC ACTION

6.1 The American Concept of StabilityOperations

6.2 Population and Resources Control,Psychological Operations and CivicAction

6 . 3 The Sheppard Group6.4 Branch of Special Duties (BOSD) and

the Formation of 1 POU6.5 The Directorate of Psychological

Warfare6.6 Rewards6.7 Safe Returns and Amnesty Offers ...6.8 Interface and Manila Interface ....6.9 Food Control: Operation Turkey ....6.10 Psyop: Operation Splitshot6.11 Use of Spirit Mediums6.12 Conclusion

EXTERNAL OPERATIONS

7.1 Strategic Base Areas and InsurgentSanctuaries

83

9093

9699

104105112115

118120124131

135

137139

145

146149150153158160165167

172

7.27.37.47.57.6

MozambiqueZambiaBotswana ..AngolaConclusion

8. OPERATION FAVOUR: SECURITY FORCEAUXILIARIES

8.1 Introduction: The Concept8.2 Operation Favour8.3 Conclusion

9.

10.

11 .

INTELLIGENCE

9 .1 Introduction9.2 Organisation and Major Characteris-

tics of the Rhodesian IntelligenceCommunity prior to 1973

9.3 Revolutionary War and SpecialBranch Intelligence

9.4 The Development of Military Intel-ligence Organisations

9.5 The Role of COMOPS9.6 Special Air Service, Selous Scouts

and the Special Forces IntelligenceCentre (SFIC)

9.7 Security and Counter-intelligence .9 . 8 Conclusion

THE SECURITY SITUATION BY LATE 1979 ....

CONCLUSION

Selected Bibliography

Index

175185193196196

202203213

218

218

221

223230

231232234

238

243

255

258

TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

1.1 Casualty Figures per Operational Areaup to 30 Jan. 1977 36

10.1 Casualty Figures 1973-78 242

Figures

1.1 Land Apportionment 1968 . 21.2 Major Tribal Groupings in Zimbabwe ... 81.3 Delimitation of Operational Areas .... 291.4 Insurgent Infiltration Routes 381.5 Increase in Insurgent Numbers: Dec.

1978 to Jan. 1979 513.1 Existing and Planned Protected

Villages: 6 Jan. 1978 914.1 Cordon Sanitaire 1064.2 Modified Cordon Sanitaire 1094.3 Modified Modified Cordon Sanitaire ... 1114.4 Border Minefield Obstacles 1166.1 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 1626.2 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 1636.3 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 1647.1 Mozambique 1767.2 Zambia 186

11.1 Vital Assets Ground 251

ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Air Force

ANCArmy

BOSDBSAP

CESC

CIOCorsanCOMOPSCVFPLM

FRELIMO

Frontline States

GTIinsurgents

Internal Affairs

JOGJPSJSPIS

JSTC

MIDmujibasNATJOCOCC

Rhodesian Air Force/Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Air ForceAfrican National CongressRhodesian Army/Zimbabwe-RhodesianArmyBureau of Special DutiesBritish South Africa Police, nowthe Zimbabwe Republic PoliceCivil Executive to the SecurityCouncilCentral Intelligence OrganisationCordon SanitaireCombined Operations HeadquartersConsolidated VillageArmy of Mozambique, now known asFAMFront for the Liberation ofMozambiqueZambia, Botswana, Mozambique,Angola, TanzaniaGround of Tactical Importancearmed, trained members of eitherZANLA or ZPRADepartment of Internal Affairs,now the Department of HomeAffairsJoint Operational CentreJoint Planning StaffJoint Services PhotographicInterpretation StaffJoint Services Targetting Commit-teeMilitary Intelligence Directorateinsurgent local youth supportersNational Joint Operational CentreOperations Co-ordinating Committee

PACC

PF

PolicePOUPROVOPSPsywar CommitteePVRARRhodesia

Rhodesian Front

Rh$RICRLI

SAANC

SASSecurity Forces

SFASFIC

situpa

TPDFUANCUDI

VAGZANLA

ZANUZANU(S)

ZANU(PF)

ZAPU

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

ZIPA

Psychological Action Co-ordina-ting CommitteeZimbabwe Patriotic Front. At pre-sent the PF refers to the formerZAPU. As used in this study itrefers to the ZANU/ZAPU pact for-med in 1976British South Africa PolicePsychological Operation UnitProvincial Operation CentrePsychological Warfare CommitteeProtected VillageRhodesia African RiflesZimbabwe. Name used for period upto 1 June 1979Rhodesian Front party. Now theRepublican Front PartyRhodesian dollarRhodesian Intelligence CorpsRhodesian Light Infantry, 1stBattalion ofSouth African African NationalCongressSpecial Air ServiceRhodesian/Zimbabwe-RhodesianArmy, Air Force, BSAP, GuardForce, Security Force Auxiliariesand para-military InternalAffairs forcesSecurity Force AuxiliariesSpecial Forces Intelligence Cen-treregistration card carried byadult black malesTanzania People's Defence ForceUnited African National CouncilUnilateral Declaration of Inde-pendenceVital Asset GroundZimbabwe African National Libera-tion ArmyZimbabwe Africa National UnionFaction of ZANU headed by theRev. N. SitholePresent name of ZANU. PF refersto the Zimbabwe Patriotic FrontZimbabwe African Peoples Union,now known as the Patriotic FrontZimbabwe. Refers to the period1 June 1979, to April 1980Zimbabwe Peoples Army

ZNDFZPRA

Zambian National Defence ForceZimbabwe Peoples RevolutionaryArmy. Also known as ZIPRA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This book is based on a dissertation submittedin 1981 for a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies atthe University of South Africa. The title of thethesis was A Critique on Selected Aspects of theRhodesian Security Forces Counter-insurgency Stra-tegy, 1972-1980. Additional information drawn fromsubsequent publications has been included whereappropriate but the content remains largelyunchanged.

Grateful acknowledgement is due to Prof D.F.S.Fourie for supervising the original study, Mr M.A.Curr for valuable criticism and Mrs A Basson fortyping the manuscript.

J K CilliersTsumeb

INTRODUCTION

On 11 November 1965 the British colony of SouthernRhodesia unilaterally declared its independence.Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith made this declara-tion fully confident that his Rhodesian Front Partycould maintain power indefinitely for the whiteminority group it represented. Only fifteen yearslater on 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe emerged as an inde-pendent country under majority rule with internatio-nal recognition. Mr Smith's major adversory, RobertMbellarmine Mugabe, became the new prime minister ofthis fledgeling state. During the intervening yearsa relentless war had been waged. The two blacknationalist armies, ZANLA and ZPRA gained ascendencyover the smaller but technically superior armed for-ces of Rhodesia. This bitter struggle can be seen asa classic model of insurgent versus counter-insurgent strategies. The final outcome permanentlyaltered the balance of power in the sub-continent ofSouthern Africa.

This general study is an interpretative analy-sis of the counter-insurgency strategy during theeight crucial years of the war, 1972 tot 1979. Since1981 a small number of books have been published oncertain aspects of the war, notably D. Martin and P.Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Faber and Faber,London, 1981), J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves:Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe (RavenPress, Johannesburg, 1982) and P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Galago, Alber-ton, 1982). Considering the scope of the conflict,comparatively little that is available to the publichas been written on the war itself.

A large number of primary sources were consul-ted to obtain the basic historical data for thisstudy, but the Africa Research Bulletin series wasthe single most important reference work used. The

information presented by the media was often distor-ted and based on rumours and speculation divorcedfrom reality. Details regarding specific operations,projects, organisations and general modus operandiof the Security Forces gathered for this study werecollected and cross-checked through numerous and in-depth interviews conducted both in the Republic ofSouth Africa where many expatriate Rhodesians nowreside and in Zimbabwe. The subject files at theoffices of the Herald newspaper in Harare also pro-ved valuable in this research. Numerous officiallyclassified documents obtained from former SecurityForce members were used as well.

Chapter 1 provides a resume of events over theperiod 1890 to 1979 with an emphasis on the intensi-fied confrontation from 1972 to 1979. This is a cen-tral chapter for evaluating and co-ordinatingaspects of the struggle discussed in subsequentchapters. Each of the following eight chapters isconcerned with specific organisations or counter-insurgency strategies which had direct bearing onthe development of the conflict. The second andninth chapters are, in particular, devoted to orga-nisations and systems. Chapter 2 examines the com-mand and control structures employed by the Rhode-sian Security Forces, and Chapter 9 discusses theintelligence organisations and methods employed.Both aspects are vital for a complete picture of theRhodesian Security Forces' counter actions, as thesuccess of other counter-insurgency activitiesdepended to a large extent on the successes andfailures achieved in these fields. Chapters 3 to 8analyse in turn a number of specific counter-insurgency strategies as employed in Zimbabwe,namely those of protected villages (strategic ham-lets) , border minefield obstacles, pseudo-insurgentactivities, internal defence and development,external operations and the institution of a self-defence militia system. Chapter 10 briefly describesthe general security situation that had developed by1979. Only at this point is it possible to commenton the conduct of the war in general.

dedicated to my parents

Chapter 1

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE 1965-1979

1.1 The Early Years

By 1890 there were already a number of white sett-lers inhabiting what was later known as the Britishcolony of Southern Rhodesia. The impingement ofwhite interests upon indigenous black customs andproperty, however, led to racial tension. So, in1893 and again in 1895, the Matabele regiments roseup under their king, Lobengula, in the first free-dom struggles or Chimurenga against the whites. Al-though the black warriors were overwhelmingly defea-ted this did not secure the position of the whitesettlers, who remained ill at ease in their isola-ted outposts across Mashonaland. White militarypreparedness was consequently directed towardssecuring internal security and remained so for anumber of years.

Gradually, as European influence grew, racialprejudice against the blacks increased as well,became established and institutionalized. It wasexpressed clearly in the Land Apportionment Act of1930 by which the country was divided into distinctareas for black and white habitation. Areas assignedfor black habitation were known as Reserves until1969 and after that as Tribal Trust Lands untilindependence in 1981. Generally these areas lay inthe more arid reaches surrounding the more fertilewhite controlled region which ran from southwest tonortheast (see Figure 1.1). This division of land wasmade possible by the white referendum of 1922 afterwhich Britain granted self-government to SouthernRhodesia in 1923. Faint awareness of a threat otherthan that from the indigenous black peoples aroseafter 1926, and in response to this a small stan-ding army was formed. This force was expandedduring the troubled years preceding the Second World

1

History of War

African Purchase Area

Unreserved Area

National Land

Figure 1.1 Land Apportionment 1968

History of War

War. During this war Rhodesian squadrons servedwith distinction in the Royal Air Force. After1945 the armed forces were demobilized. However,during 1947 a largely black unit, the RhodesianAfrican Rifles, was constituted as the core of aregular Army. The territorial force, on the otherhand, was almost entirely white and comprised theIsL and 2nd Battalions of the Royal Rhodesian Regi-ment. The Rhodesian African Rifles saw service inMalaya from 1956 to 1958.

After the general strike in Bulawayo during1948, a revision of military policy apparentlyoccurred, since three additional white territorialbattalions were formed. Recruits into No. 1Training Unit were formed into the Rhodesian LightInfantry Battalion in 1961. Two other units esta-blished were C Squadron of the Special Air Serviceand an armoured car unit, the Selous Scouts, namedafter Courtney Selous, a nineteenth century explo-rer. (This name was relinquished by the armouredcar unit and given to a pseudo-insurgent infantryunit in 1973.)

During 1963 an attempted federation withNorthern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (nowMalawi) ended in failure. This politically ambi-tious scheme was launched in 1953. its failurecould largely be ascribed to the internal racialpolicies of Southern Rhodesia and the realisationthat these policies were incompatible with a closerrelationship to neighbouring black states. Blackriots during 1960 increased white intransigence andmade them less willing than ever to consider reform.Unrest first broke out in the black townships ofSalisbury (now renamed Harare) when three leadersof the National Democratic Party were detained.Over twenty thousand people gathered in protest atStodart Hall. Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead respon-ded by ordering the distribution of leaflets fromthe air announcing a ban on all similar meetings.He also ordered the partial mobilisation of theArmy. Further disturbances in Bulawayo were alsodispersed and gatherings were banned.

During December 1962 the new Rhodesian Frontparty was elected to power. Since its inception theparty had been committed to the entrenchment andmaintenance of white supremacy without the involve-ment of a distant colonial mother. The leader of theRhodesian Front, Ian Douglas Smith, was electedPrime Minister on 14 April 1964. He was initiallyelected to the Southern Rhodesia legislative assem-bly as a Liberal Party member in 1948 but became

History of Mar

a founder member of the Rhodesian Front party in1962. He was a dour speaker who had won littlepublic attention before the formation of the Front.Once elected Prime Minister, however, he gainedunprecedented popularity among the white population.This support even endured beyond the war against theinsurgents. Two events in particular strengthenedthe resolve of an increasing!" isolated SouthernRhodesia to 'go it alone1 in an attempt to maintainwhite supremacy: the massacre of whites in Kenyaduring the Mau Mau uprising of the early sixtiesand the election to power of an unsympathetic Labourgovernment in Britain in 1964. So, on Armistice day,11 November 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declaredits independence (UDI). Although aware of the immi-nent declaration, Rhodesian black nationalists weretotally unprepared to offer any form of organizedprotest. The small number of blacks sent fortraining in insurgency warfare by emerging nationa-list movements at the time were apparently intendedfor political propaganda rather than to wage a realrevolutionary campaign. Arguably the major nationa-list insurgent incident before UDI occurred duringJuly 1964: a group calling itself the CrocodileGang killed a white farmer at a roadblock in theMelsetter area.

Recruitment and training for an insurgent cam-paign against the Rhodesian Front government star-ted in 1963. The formation of the Zimbabwe AfricanNational Union (ZANU) in that year in competitionwith the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)acted as a catalyst for armed confrontation betweenthe black nationalist forces and the white control-led Rhodesian Security Forces.

The undisputed father and leader of Rhodesiannationalist movements in the late fifties and formany years afterwards, was Joshua Nqabuko NyangoloNkomo.He had been elected president of^the newlyformed African National Congress on 1i September1957, after the Southern Rhodesian African Nationa-list Congress and the City Youth League had united.The African National Congress was subsequently ban-ned in February 1959, but re-emerged on 1 January1960 as the National Democratic Party. This party,in turn, was banned on 9 December 1961. It reap-peared on 17 December 1961, as the Zimbabwe AfricanPeoples Union or ZAPU.

For some months before the formation of ZAPU,Nkomo's leadership had come under increased criti-cism. It was alleged that he spent more time abroad,canvassing for the nationalist cause, than in

History of War

Southern Rhodesia leading it. Further dissensionbroke out among black nationalists after theNational Democratic Party executives agreed to theproposals of the 1961 London constitutional conferencewhereby only 15 out of 65 parliamentry seats wereallocated to blacks. African nationalists reactedangrily to this agreement and forced the NationalDeiuocraLic Party lias Lily Lo repudiate the agreement,but the damage to the unity of Rhodesian African na-tionalism had been done. When ZAPU was banned on 20September 1962, Nkomo was again absent from Rhodesia.He was persuaded to return only after considerablepressure from his own followers as well as from Pre-sident Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. After his releasefrom 3 months' restriction, Nkomo persuaded the for-mer ZAPU executive to flee with him to Tanzania andthere form a government in exile. Bitter dissensionabout the leadership of the Rhodesian nationalistmovement now arose amongst prominent black nationa-lists including the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole andRobert Mbellarmine Mugabe. In response, ZAPU Presi-dent Nkomo suspended his executive council andreturned to Rhodesia to form the interim People'sCaretaker Council. Outside Rhodesia the People'sCaretaker Council retained the name ZAPU. Nkomowas rearrested and detained until 1974. In spiteof his long detention, he was never again seriouslychallenged as ZAPU president.Nkomo's foremost cri-tics formed the Zimbabwe African National Union(ZANU) on 8 August 1963 with the Reverend Sitholeas interim president and Robert Mugabe as SecretaryGeneral. Both ZANU and the People's Caretaker Coun-cil were banned in Rhodesia on 26 August 1964. Mugabeand Sithole we're arrested. Although he was relea-sed during June of the following year, Mugabe wasrestricted to Sikombela until his rearrest inNovember 1965. Both Mugabe and Sithole remained indetention until December 1974.

ZANU sent its first contingent of five men ledby Emmerson Mnangagwa to the People's Republic ofChina for military training in September 1963. Theyformed the nucleus of ZANU's armed wing, theZimbabwe African National Liberation Army, or ZANLA.Having been actively involved in operations againstthe Rhodesian regime since 1964 it was thus under-standable that Sithole precipitated his own fallfrom the ZANU presidency during 1969 when he statedin the dock

History of War

I wish publicly to dissociate my name in word,thought or deed from any subversive activities,from any terrorist activities and from anyform of violence.'''

Internal dissension within the ranks of the blacknations!isfcs thus brought about the formation ofZANU. Although Nkomo's vacillation had discreditedhim among a large section of the Rhodesian nationa-list leaders, he still appeared to commandmajority black nationalist support within the coun-try at the turn of the decade. At this stage thetribal bias of both ZANU and ZAPU was not asstrongly manifested as from 1972 onward.

ZANU and ZAPU, however, increasingly competedin revolutionary zeal and recruitment. The ZAPUarmed forces later became known as the ZimbabwePeople's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA or ZIPRA)(2)

The insurgents' strategy at this stage wasbased on two false assumptions. First, thatBritain could be induced to intervene forcibly inRhodesia should law and order seem in imminent dan-ger of collapsing, and second that

... all that was necessary to end white domina-tion was to train some guerrillas and send themhome with guns: this would not only scare thewhites but would ignite a wave of civil disobe-dience by blacks. (')

By 1966, however, ZAPU, still the major black natio-nalist movement, had realized that the Britishgovernment could not be induced to interveneactively in Rhodesia. ZAPU's armed wing, ZPRA, alsorecognized that it did not have the ability to forcea collapse of law and order. The major task of theinsurgent forces existing at this early stage wastherefore to convince the Organisation of AfricanUnity and the world at large that the forces tooverthrow the regime of Ian Smith really did exist.This was vitally important if financial and politi-cal support was to be forthcoming. It was also appa-rent that if Rhodesia was to become Zimbabwe,Zimbabweans themselves would have to take up armsand fight for it. While leaders of ZANLA and ZPRAwere convinced of this, black Rhodesians asyet were not. Rhodesian citizens resident in Zambiaand Tanzania were thus forcibly recruited to swellZANLA and ZPRA ranks until the trickle of refugeesand recruits turned into a flood.

While ZPRA bore almost the full weight of the

History of War

war effort in these initial years, ZAPU remained atthe same time the major exponent of the 'externalmanoeuvre' designed to obtain maximum internationalsupport. ZANLA, trained by China, played a verylimited military role during this period. Both move-ments also increasingly appeared to represent a majortribal grouping in Rhodesia. ZAPU had the backing ofthe Matabeles, who constitute some 19% of Zimbabwe'sblack population, while ZANU had that of theloosely grouped Shona nations (77%). (See Figure 1.2)

Following UDI the first military engagementrecognised officially by Rhodesia occurred on 28April 1966 between Security Forces and seven ZANLAinsurgents near Sinoia, 100 km northwest of Harare.

That day is now commemorated in Zimbabweas Chimurenga Day - the start of the war.The group eliminated was in fact one of three teamsthat had entered Rhodesia with the aim of cuttingpower lines and attacking white farmsteads. Asecond of the groups murdered a white couple withthe surname of Viljoen on their farm near Hartleyon the night of 16 May 1966. The insurgents weresubsequently captured by Security Forces. In totalall but one of the original fourteen insurgents wereeither killed or captured.

Shortly afterwards a second ZANLA infiltrationwas detected near Sinoia. In the ensuing battleseven insurgents were killed and a numbercaptured.

During August 1967 a combined force of 90insurgents from ZPRA and the South African AfricanNational Congress entered Rhodesia near the VictoriaFalls. They miscalculated the attitude of the localblack population and the Security Forces soon knew oftheir presence there, in the first major operationof the war 47 insurgents were killed within threeweeks and more than 20 were captured. The remainderfled to Botswana in disarray. Fourteen of the Securi-ty Force members were wounded and seven others killed.

Early in 1968 a second force of 123 insurgentsfrom ZPRA and the South African African NationalCongress crossed the Zambezi River from Zambia intonorthern Mashonaland. The group remained undetectedfor three months, setting up a series of six basecamps at intervals of 30 kilometers before beingreported by a game ranger. On 18 March Security For-ces attacked and destroyed all of the six camps.During the ensuing month 60 insurgents were killedfor the loss of six members of the Security Forces.

During July 1968 a third joint incursion tookplace. The 91 insurgents involved formed into three groups.

History of War

BEIT BRIDGE

NDEBELE ORIENTATED TRIBES SHONA ORIENTATED TRIBES

Ndebe'leKalanga 5%

RozwiKorekoreZezuruManyikaKarangaNdau

9%12%18%13%22%3%

OTHERS

I TongaJ VendaK Shangaan

2*1%1*

Figure 1.2 Major Tribal Groupings in Zimbabwe

Hi story of War

About 80 insurgents were either killed or captured atthat time and significantly, the first member of theSouth African Police deployed in Rhodesia also diedthen. Following the entrance of the South AfricanAfrican National Congress into Rhodesia, members ofSouth African Police counter-insurgency units weredetached to the Rhodesian Security Forces. In theensuing years the Republic of south Africa involveditself increasingly with the security situation onthe borders of its northern neighbour.

These first insurgent incursions into Rhodesiaall originated from Zambia across the floor of theZambezi River valley. This sparsely populated areawas deemed the natural infiltration route as mobili-sation of the masses did not yet constitute an impor-tant principle in insurgent strategy. Security Forcecounter-measures were thus largely track and killtype operations. Furthermore infiltrations tookplace in relatively large groups, which SecurityForces located more easily.

After a peak during 1968, almost no incur-sions took place the following year. By the end of1969 both ZANU and ZAPU had realized that theirmilitary strategy had serious shortcomings. Theseproblems proved to have less impact on ZANLA thanon ZPRA, for since the latter had borne the brunt ofthe insurgency effort up to that stage, the defeatssuffered in the field resulted in a collapse ofmorale and the withdrawal of ZPRA from the conflictfor a number of years. On the other hand, Rhodesianauthorities were satisfied with the performance oftheir small Security Forces. This later had theeffect of lulling Rhodesia into a false sense ofsecurity, as reflected in the figures for defenceexpenditure which remained relatively constant overthis period. It also tended to strengthen theimpression amongst Rhodesians that military action,to the exclusion of political and other non-militaryaction, would be sufficient to destroy the insur-gency threat, for, at this stage, the insurgentgroups had not yet resorted to internal subversionas a major element in their strategy. This sense ofcomplacency was further increased by the apparenteconomic success of UDI. The economic upswing led toan influx of white immigrants and increased optimism.This was in stark contrast to the defeatism and lowmorale among insurgent forces.

By 1970 ZANU, under the external leadershipof Herbert Chitepo, emerged as leader of what wasregarded as a liberation struggle. Althoughthe ZANU president. Reverend Sithole, was

History of War History of War

still imprisoned in Rhodesia, this did not have thedivisive and eventual disruptive effect on ZANU thatthe concurrent imprisonment of ZAPU leader, Nkomo,had on his organisation. Within ZAPU a strugglehad been waged between James Chikerema and JasonMoyo for external leadership. The infighting soonled to a split between ZAPU as a political wing andZPRA as a military wing. In a document entitledlObservations on our Struggle' Moyo summarized thesituation as follows: ~

Since 1969 there has been a steady decline ofserious (sic) nature in our Military Adminis-tration and Army. Military rules have beencast overboard. Relations between some membersof the War Council and the Military Administra-tion are strained. Accusations of a seriousnature have been made. Military Administrationand War Council meetings are no longer beingheld. Planning of strategy is seriously lacking.There is no co-ordination in the deployment ofcadres in Zimbabwe.(4)

The clash between Moyo and Chikerema reached a cli-max in April 1970. From the total number of appro-ximately four hundred ZPRA insurgents some decidedto side with one of the two faction leaders whileothers either stayed in a small neutral group, ordeserted altogether. Chikerema subsequently formedFROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe)inOctober 1971 with a splinter ZANU group led byNathan Shamuyarira. The original objective behindthe creation of FROLIZI was to reunite ZANU and ZAPUinto a single nationalist movement but neither partywas prepared to do so. In 1973 FROLIZI itself split and conse-quently played an insignificant part in the insurgency campaign.

Even at this early stage the basic differencesin strategic concept between ZANLA and ZPRA werereadily discernable.

By 1971, ZANU's emphasis was on the politicaleducation of the Zimbabwe workers and peasants.The purpose of this was to elicit support fromthe masses and to recruit more people forguerrilla warfare training. Another significantfactor for this change in strategy was to widenthe areas of combat.(5)

As regards ZPRA, the general strategy adopted reliedprincipally on military action. As expressed byW.W. Nyangoni:

10

Since 1970 we have analysed the basis of theenemy strength and revised our strategy andtactics so as to be able to strike where ithurts most.(6)

and further

The strategy pursued by the liberation forcesof ZAPU was that of engaging the enemy largely—

"~~ with series of landmines accompanied by limitedand calculated armed attacks.(7)

From 1970 onwards ZANLA placed a higher premium onpoliticizing the population than ZPRA. Rhodesianintelligence reports indicated that it was only asfrom 1978 that ZPRA turned to the politicization ofthe local population to the same degree that ZANLAhad been doing. Probably with Russian backing andinstruction ZPRA forces also tended to be more con-ventionally orientated and trained than those ofZANLA. The latter took its doctrine from Chinathat the main object of such a protracted waris to gain the support of the local popula-tion.

Regarding the politicization of the Rhodesianblack population in general, the single most signi-ficant event was the formation of the AfricanNational Council on 16 October 1971, led by BishopAbel Muzurewa. In December of the following year theAfrican National Council succeeded in helping to per-suade the Pearce Commission to report adversely onthe acceptability of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposalsfor a settlement. Possibly for the first time, therural and urban black population of Rhodesia hadbeen made politically aware en masse. In its report,the Pearce Commission inter alia noted:

Mistrust of the intentions and motives of theGovernment transcended all other considerations.Apprehension for the future stemmed from resent-ment of what they felt to be the humiliationsof the past and at the limitations on policieson land, education, and personal advancement.One summed it up in saying, 'We do not rejectthe Proposals, we reject the Government'.(8)

1.2 The Establishment of a Strategic Base Area inthe North-East

ZANLA chose the Tete province in Mozambique

11

History of War

as approach route to Rhodesia more by force ofcircumstance than by conscious analysis. Both ZANLAand ZPRA were still based in Zambia, and were forcedto operate from that country as Mozambique was aPortuguese colony at the time. Yet the Front for theLiberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO, who had beenfighting against the Portuguese for a number ofyears, had been gaining ground steadily in the Teteprovince and initially offered ZPRA the use of thisfront as an alternative entry route into Rhodesia.Not least as a result of the continual small scaleRhodesian operations in support of the Portugueseforces, FRELIMO had become convinced of the neces-sity to 'liberate' Rhodesia as well, if the libera-tion of Mozambique was to be effected. Low moraleand internal strife caused ZPRA to show little inte-rest in this route. Furthermore it would take ZPRA, amovement under Matabele control into an area of thecountry under Shona control. The use of the route wasthus offered to ZANLA, who eagerly grasped this opportunity.(9)

A number of demographic, historic and geogra-phical factors favoured the North-eastern border ofRhodesia for insurgency. The rugged Mavuradonhamountains presented numerous obstacles to SecurityForces in locating and eliminating known insurgentgroups, while dense vegetation hindered .observation,especially during the summer rainy season (Novemberto March). Owing to its vast expanse and relatively loweconomic value, the area had furthermore suffereddecades of administrative neglect. The traditionaltribal way of life had been allowed to continue, withlittle active interference from Harare. The Shonatribe in the area, the Korekore, also spilt acrossthe border into the Tete province of Mozambique,thus easing the infiltration of insurgents from thatcountry into the North-east. A final factor was thelack of a physical impediment comparable to theZambezi river on the common national border. Withactive FRELIMO cooperation ZANLA was presented withan excellent opportunity. d°)

As indicated above, ZANLA strategy had shiftedits emphasis markedly since the sixties. In accor-dance with the teaching of Mao Zedong greater atten-tion was now given to the politicization and mobili-zation of the local population before mounting anyattacks on Rhodesian Security Forces or white farms.Yet at this early stage ZANLA had, in total, onlyabout 300 trained insurgents. Of these,60 men moun-ted the infiltrations in the north-east.

Noel Mukona, the head of ZANLA from 1969 to1973 could later claim with little hyperbole:

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In 1969 it was decided to operate silently ...We worked underground, training, stockingequipment and regrouping inside the country.Special Branch could not find out what wasgoing on and that we were preparing for a con-tinuation of the struggle. Much contact wasmaintained with the local population to reviewthe terrain ... In July 1972 ZANU calledtogether all its forces and met in the bush inMozambique and reviewed the situation. We weresatisfied that the preparations were enough andthat enough arms and food had been stashed inthe bush and that we could restart theonslaught. (11)

In the early hours of 21 December 1972, ZANLA insur-gents attacked the white homestead of Marc deBorchgrave in the Centenary district, marking theresurgence of the insurgent onslaught, indeed of anew campaign. Most Rhodesians, however, accepted thenews philosophically. Official concern over the dete-riorating situation in the area had been expressedsome weeks earlier by Prime Minister Ian Smith whenhe stated on the radio that the security situationwas

... far more serious than it appears on thesurface, and if the man in the street couldhave access to the security information whichI and my colleagues in government have, then Ithink he would be a lot more worried than he istoday.(12)

Yet the information available to the government atthis stage was somewhat incomplete. All of the fourtraditional intelligence sources, Army, uniformedPolice, Special Branch and the Department of Inter-nal Affairs (subsequently renamed Home Affairs) hadlimited representation in the area, and in the caseof the Army had maintained little more than a tokenpresence.

At a later stage Prime Minister Smith explainedhow the insurgents were able to remain undetectedfor such a period of time:

... they were able to move backwards and for-wards across the border from their so-calledbase camps and were thereby able to avoiddetection for long enough to enable them tosubvert pockets of local tribesmen. Thereaftertheir task was made easy through shelter, food

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and assistance they received from the locals.This situation has complicated the position asfar as our security forces are concerned. (13)

Not only had ZANLA succeeded in establishing a rela-tively secure base area inside Rhodesia, but hadalso succeeded in obtaining the full co-operationand support of the black rural population within thearea. This proved a crucial factor in their latersuccess and in the way the Rhodesian governmentattempted to eradicate the threat.

1.3 Operation Hurricane

Before the formation of the operational area in theNorth-east that was to become known as OperationHurricane, Rhodesian Security Force authorities hadbecome increasingly anxious about the securitysituation in the neigbouring province of Tete inMozambique. Although the Security Forces was largelyunaware of the extent of insurgent activities insideRhodesia itself, they had, since early 1972, conside-rably stepped up co-operation with the Portugueseforces who were then still in control of Mozambique.The two elite Rhodesian Army units, C Squadronof the Special Air Service and the 1st Battalion ofthe Rhodesian Light Infantry, were operating in Teteitself on an almost continuous basis. Yet wheninsurgent operations inside Rhodesia resumed in late1972, Army presence in an area of more than 1 000square kilometers was only at company strength.

The extent of the insurgent penetration at theturn of 1972 was widespread, ranging from Sipolilo,west of Centenary, across to Mutoko in the east, andsouthwards to the Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal TrustLands. In contrast to the Security Force operationsof the sixties, the war for Rhodesia had now entereda new phase. Previously members of the local popula-tion had willingly come forward to supply informationon the presence and activities of insurgents, butwithin a matter of weeks all intelligence sources inthe North-east dried up. Security Force morale plum-meted as they failed to meet the enemy face to face.After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote

For the first time the Rhodesian Security For-ces were faced with a seemingly insoluble pro-blem ... after carrying out their attacks theterrorists had not gone to ground in bush-camps in uninhabited areas where they could

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eventually be tracked down ... neither had theygone to ground in inhabited areas where infor-mation from the local population to the Policeor Special Branch had indicated their where-abouts. This time there was nothing. No tracks... no information.(14)

A Joint Operation Centre (JOC) , code-named Hurricane,(see Figure 1.3} was formed at Army brigade level ofcommand to counter the internal threat that haddeveloped. JOC Hurricane was initially situated atCentenary, was then moved to Bindura and eventually toHarare as its area of responsibility increased. Itconstituted the formalization of a committee systemapproach that had already been used to counter theinsurgency threats of the sixties.

With the limited scope of active operationsduring 1973-74, JOC Hurricane benefitted from almostall the available forces of the Army, Air Force andBritish South Africa Police. The latter alone couldcontribute some 16 companies to the counter-insur-gency effort. This enabled the Army, nominally incontrol of Hurricane, to formulate a strategy basedon two fundamental requirements; first, the necessity.of stemming the flow of insurgents from Mozambique andsecond, that of population control. The vital ele-ments of JOC Hurricane strategy as developed by 1974were succinctly summarized by the then brigade majoras follows:

Large external operations to turn off the tap;a cordon sanitaire with warning devices, patrol-led and backed by a 20 km wide no-go area;population control consisting of Protected Vil-lages, food control, curfews and (eventually)martial law, and massive psychologicalaction.(15)

The object was to channel insurgents into designatedareas from which the local population had been remo-ved. Here the Security Forces could easily track andeliminate the insurgents before they reachedpopulated areas. In areas adjoining these depopula-ted or 'no-go' areas, movement of the local popula-tion was to be restricted by placing them in Protec-ted and Consolidated Villages. Strict curfews wereto be enforced within these areas with the aim ofcutting the link between the local population andthe insurgents. Largely due to the limited availabi-lity of manpower and other resources, and the increa-sing demands made upon them, the strategy described

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was not employed in full.In an attempt to reassert control over rural

areas, four new districts were proclaimed in thenorth-eastern and eastern highlands, at Centenary,Rushinga, Mudzi and Mutasa. In an attempt to per-suade Zambia to desist from aiding both ZANLA andZPRA, Rhodesia closed its border at Chirundu,Kariba, and Victoria Falls to all Zambian traffic on9 January 1973. Although Zambian copper exports wereexempted from this embargo shortly afterwards, Pre-sident Kaunda refused to use any of these routes.Officially the border remained closed until 1978,when Rhodesian external raids into Zambia forcedPresident Kaunda to reopen his southern exportroutes'.

When the campaign began in 1973 it seemed thatthe Rhodesian government was not yet convinced ofthe political character of the threat facing it.Heedless of the possible consequences of suchaction,government then empowered Provincial Commis-sioners on 19 January 1973 to impose collective punish-ment on tribal communities assisting the insurgent forces inaccordance with the Emergency Powers (CollectiveFines) Regulations. The most extreme case of collec-tive punishment documented was the resettlement ofnearly 200 members of the local population fromMadziwa Tribal Trust land in the Beit bridge area in1974 "... as punishment for assisting terrorists."(16)The extent to which collective punishment was to beenforced is apparent from the following extractionfrom a poster distributed in Marante Tribal TrustLand and Mukumi African Purchase Area duringJanuary 1978:

as from dawn on the 20th January 1978 the fol-lowing restrictions will be posed upon all ofyou and your TTL (Tribal Trust Land) and Purchase Land1. Human curfew from last light to 12 o'clock

daily2. Cattle, yolked oxen, goats and sheep curfew

from last light to 12 o'clock daily3. No vehicles, including bicycles and buses to

run either (in) the TTL or the APL (AfricanPurchase Land)

4. No person will either go on or near any highground or they will be shot

5. All dogs to be tied up 24 hours each day orthey will be shot

6. Cattle, sheep and goats, after 12 o'clock,are only to be herded by adults

7. No juveniles (to the age of 16 years) will

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be allowed out of the kraal area at any timeeither day or night, or they will be shot

8. No schools will be open9. All stores and grinding mills will be clo-

sed. (17)

Specifically during the period up to 1976 collectivepunishment measures such as those quoted above couldonly have had serious negative effects on the atti-tude of the black rural massas for at this stage themajority of the local population were not neccessa-rily supporters of either ZANU or ZAPU.

In execution of the strategy devised for Opera-tion Hurricane, the first 'no-go' area was proclai-med along the Mozambique border on 17 May 1973. Inone way or another 'no-go' areas were extended alongvast stretches of Rhodesian border in an attempt toestablish depopulated 'free-fire' zones for SecurityForce operations. Government attitude to the infrin-gement of curfews and 'no-go' areas was well summa-rised by P.K. van der Byl, Rhodesian Minister ofInformation on 31 July 1975 in Parliament when hestated that "... as far as I am concerned the morecurfew breakers that are shot the better".(18) On 21June the-Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Mr Wickusde Kock, told Parliament that there were indicationsthat the removal of tribesmen from parts of thenorth-eastern border to form a cordon sanitaire wasbeginning to have the desired effect. The use of thename cordon sanitaire was however misleading andshould not be confused with attempts to establish aproper cordon sanitaire some months later (see Chap-ter 4) .

In July 1973 the first major abduction ofschoolchildren by insurgents occurred. St Albert'sMission, on the Zambezi Valley escarpment, was ente-red by a group which abducted 292 pupils and membersof staff, who were then forced to march into theZambezi Valley and north towards Mozambique. Secu-rity Forces intercepted the column and rescued allbut eight of the abductees. Similar abductions wererepeated in years to come and Security Forces wereincreasingly unable to prevent these actions.

At the start of the summer rainy season towardsthe close of 1973, the insurgent forces intensifiedtheir efforts. In an attempt to cut all links withthe insurgents in subverted areas, Deputy Ministerde Kock announced the initiation of the ProtectedVillage programme. Four villages were in various stages ofcompletion as part of a pilot scheme. It was estima-ted that more than 8 000 blacks would be resettled

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in the Zambezi Valley by the end of December. Thusstarted one of the essential elements of Rhodesianmilitary strategy which eventually led to the forma-tion of an independent arm of the Security Forces,the Guard Force, to man and protect these villages.It placed a heavy strain on the limited resourcesavailable to the war effort, but some 750 000 ruralblacks were eventually resettled in over 200 Protec-ted Villages. Geographically, the distribution ofthese villages gave a very clear impression of thespread of insurgency, but even when the scheme hadreached its most extended phase, the vast majorityof Protected Villages were still found in the North-east where ZANLA had set up its original base area.In general the strategy was not consistently executedand, as a result, success varied. Eventually theSecurity Force punitive approach to the scheme,limited manpower and finance and bad execution wasto lead to the failure of Protected Villages ingeneral. (This strategy is evaluated in Chapter 3.)

But by the close of 1973 the number of insur-gents in Hurricane was estimated at a mere 145 men.Insurgent casualties for the year stood at 179 while44 members of the Security Forces and 12 white civi-lians had lost their lives. All in all the RhodesianSecurity Forces had barely succeeded in holdingtheir own. As a result Government announced duringDecember that the period of national service wouldbe extended from that of nine months instituted in1966 to one year. Prior to 1966 national servicehad consisted of a short 4£ months.

1.4 1974: Security Force Reaction

During 1974 the Rhodesian authorities made a concer-ted effort to restore law and order. The Minister ofDefence announced in February:

The Government is embarking on a call-up pro-gramme in which the first phase will be todouble the national service intake. A secondbattalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles willbe raised to augment the Army ... These arran-gements by the Ministry of Defence, togetherwith other actions are designed to eliminatethe terrorists in the shortest possibletime.(19)

Measures introduced included extensing the powers ofprotecting authorities in the north-eastern area.

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These authorities had previously consisted of com-sioned police officers, but legislation was extendedto include certain District Commissioners from the Depart-ment of Internal Affairs. Protecting authorities couldnow order residents to do specified public securitywork, which included the building or maintenance ofbridges,, roads, fences, and darns. Detention withouttrial was extended to sixty days. A governmentstatement during April set out a scale of fixedrewards ranging from Rh$ 300 to Rh$ 5 000 for infor-mation. This included information leading to thedeath or capture of a senior insurgent leader or tothe recovery of insurgent weaponry.

Already, at this early stage of the conflict,logistics played a major role in the insurgents'strategy. All weaponry had to be carried in fromeither Mozambique or Zambia. While food was readilyobtainable from the local population, the insurgentforces were not able to capture and thereby arm andresupply themselves with weaponry from the SecurityForces. In the case of ZANLA, which was supplied bythe People's Republic of China, this problem was fur-ther complicated by the erratic and limited supplyof arms. ZPRA, in contrast, tended to be better andmore heavily armed by the USSR. Awareness of theZANLA problems influenced Army and Air Force plan-ning for external operations in the years to come.

Operations were almost exclusively confined tothe North-east at this stage. During March 1974,however, it was becoming clear that the ZPRA reope-ning of the Zambian front in the North-west was immi-nent. This was officially confirmed on 6 October ina government statement which lodged a formal com-plaint with Zambia over the use of its territory byinsurgents.

On 25 April 1974, the armed forces of Portugalstaged a successful coup d'' etat and overthrew Pre-sident Ceatano. General Antonio de Spinola becamethe new President. On 27 July he recognised theright of Portugal's overseas provincesof Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea to inde-pendence. June 1975, was set as date for the trans-fer of power in Mozambique to FRELIMO. A month afterthe coup the revolutionary junta in Lisbon askedHarare to halt all cross-border operations intoMozambique. Rhodesia did not immediately feel themilitary impact, for it was some months beforeFRELIMO leader, Samora Machel, moved south to Maputothen still known as Lourenco Marques, and assumed thepresidency. Once in power, however, his commitment tothe 'liberation' of Rhodesia was clear. As a result

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construction of the Rutenga-Beit bridge rail link toSouth Africa was hastily begun: during the years tofollow it developed into a Rhodesian life-line andimportant, insurgent target. The collapse of Portu-guese colonial control in Mozambique also had a dis-tinct effect on politically conscious black Rhode-

sians.

In 1974, particularly following the collapse ofPortuguese colonialism, and the impending inde-pendence of neighbouring Mozambique, sent (sic)an euphoric wave of high revolutionary hopesamong the masses who now voluntarily sought andfollowed the ZANU-ZANLA 'freedom trail' intothe training camps.(20)

A team of Security Force pseudo insurgents, whenposing as members of ZANLA were '... shocked anddisillusioned at the wild sometimes ecstatic,receptions that ZANLA was getting (amongst the localpopulation)1 (21)

Not only did the independence of Mozambiquehave a profound effect on the war in Rhodesia, butalso on the independence of Angola, which was prepa-red to play a large role in the training of ZPRA

forces.During May 1974, construction began on the

first border minefield obstacle. Known as the CordonSanitaire it was completed in April 1976 and stret-ched from the Musengedzi to the Mazoe river. As thename implies, it was planned to establish an impas-sable obstacle to prevent all cross-border movementin the areas in which it was erected. Despite thefact that this soon proved impractical, however, by1978 border obstacles of various descriptions hadbeen constructed along virtually the entire easternborder with Mozambique, as was the section of Rhode-sian border with Zambia from Victoria Falls eastwardto Milibezi. While all the initial efforts entailedthe use of an electronic alarm system and a reactionforce, these were phased out. Eventually the CordonSanitaire merely became a border minefield obstacle.Owing to restrictions in manpower and finance, Secu-rity Forces were unable to cover it by observation orfire, patrol or even maintain it. In planning and exe-cution these border minefield obstacles bore clea-rest witness to a lack of a coherent national stra-tegy to counter the insurgency, as discussed in

Chapter 5.The pressures of the war were now increasingly

exerted upon white farmers in the affected areas.

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During June a scheme was announced which includedgrants of up to Rh$ 3 000 for establishing protectedcompounds for labourers. The compounds were to havefloodlighting and wire fences. It was envisaged thatthe Department of Internal Affairs would providearmed guards at a later stage, yet manpower limita-tions precluded any such plans.

In the latter half of 1974 the first two majoroperations to move the total black population of aTribal Trust Land into Protected Villages tookplace. On 25 July Operation Overload was announcedby Army Headquarters and consisted of moving the46 960 people of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land simulta-neously within 6 weeks into 21 Protected Villages.Although this objective was achieved, it totallyfailed to provide the local population with improvedliving conditions. Operation Overload Two followedin Madziwa Tribal Trust Land in August/September/October and proved to be a substantial improvement.Both Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands wereseen as key areas in halting the insurgent advanceon Harare. Contrary to established principles it wasdecided to relocate the most subverted areas first,instead of consolidating government controlled areasas a secure base. As documented in Chapter 4 the Armyviewed the Protected and Consolidated villagespurely as population control measures. Where membersof the local population were concentrated in arestricted area, the Security Forces could movefreely in the vast depopulated areas. This approachnegated any advantages achieved by the whole schemein the long run, although both Operations OverloadOne and Two temporarily broke contact between localpopulation and insurgent forces in the areas concer-ned. This break enabled Security Forces to regainthe initiative in these heavily infiltrated areas.

Government estimates of defence expendituretabled in Parliament on 24 August for the financialyear 1974/75, provided for greatly increased spen-ding in all the related ministries for the periodending 30 June 1975. The defence vote was increasedby Rh$ 6,7 mil to a total of Rh$ 46,176 mil.

Intelligence estimates released towards the endof 1974 put the number of insurgents inside Rhodesiaat between three and four hundred. Nevertheless,despite the opening of the Zambian Front, SecurityForce morale was high and prospects seemed betterthan a mere twelve months previously. Since December1972, 468 insurgents had been killed and only 48members of the Security Forces lost - a ratio ofnearly 10 to 1. This high kill ratio was also the

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