DI{AFT

Pre face

Aim

This publ icat ion establ ishes doctnne for mrl i tary operatrons in a counter insurgency

environment.

App l icab i l i t y

'I 'his publication rs intended for staff of ficers involved in planning the deployment and

employrnent of Canadian Army formations and units to combat insurgency and for

commanders and staff of f icers, down to sub-unit level, involved in the planning and

conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

Scope

To make this publication useful to commanders and staffs involved in counterinsurgency

operations regardless of geographic location, the doctrine contained herein is broad in

scope and involves principlei appticabie to any area of operation. This publication deals

firsily, with the poliiical, social-ind economic factors, that-can lead to the development of

armed attempts to overthrow or affect the legally constituted government of a country,

and secondly, with the way in which typical insurgent wars are conducted' The major

factors and mechanisms involved in planning a counterinsurgency campaign at the

strategic, operational and tactical levels are described'

Associated Publ icat ions

-l'his publication should be read in conjunction with the following Land Force

publ icat ions:

B-GL-300-000 Canada's ArmY

B-GL-3 00-00 I Operat ions

B-CL-30U-002 Tac t ics

B-GI - -300-003 Command

B-CL-300-005 In fo rmat ion Opera t ions

l i t

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INTRODUCTION TO

' ln .sr t rganct , is ' roo/ed in .squct /or ,

( i cne ra l S i r F rank K i t son

DRAI. 'T

CHAPTER I

CO UNTER- INS URGENCY OPERA 'T IONS

ctncl fear ancl :u,f/ering ure its'flav,er.r,'

SECTION I : D I IF INI I . IONS

INSUI I .GI iNCY

l A nu lnber o1 'de f in i t ions cx is t fo r thc tc r rn insurgency and a l though r lany ha l ,cbec t r devc lopcd over thc years , most have conta ined thc sarne key e lements : v io lence, , ra t Ieas t the th rea t o fv io lence; subvers ion ; p ropaganda; and a po l i t i ca l a im

L An insurgency has been def ined as fol lows:

The uctions of u minority group v,ilhin u s/ate v,hct arc intent on./orcilg politic,crlc'hange by meun.s o.f u ntixlure oJ.subt,er.ston, propagantla ancJ mililurl:p're.r.sura,ui.ming 1o pcrsuude or inlimic/ctte lhe hroud ntct.s.s o.f peopla to accep/ .rtrc,h ctL',nu n {c.

l Recen l t rends in insurgenc ies have cha i lenged in te l l cc tua l l y the assLr rnp t ions orconstrucI in this and otherdef ini t ions. NAI 'o AAp 6 def ines an ir . rsurgcnc! ?S t tnrttgtrtti.secl movemenl aimecl ut the otterthrow o/ ct con.\'l it ltted government. Most recently.NA'|O and AIICA stud; 'groups have proposed sl ight ly cl i f fe ient def ini t rons ro r .ecogrr izethe t ran-s -na t iona l na ture o f insurgenc ies , and the i r o f ten vary ing anc l l im i ted ob lec t i i ,es .I {encc . ins r - r rgencv has bcen recent ly dc i lned as fo l lows.

I t t .s ' t rrgencv i .s cr ccttnpc/ i l ictn int ,ol t , ing ct l leu.sl one non-slule movcntcnt u. \ . i1gnl:un\ thct l rncl t tda violencc ctgain.sl en e,\ ' tubl i . \ 'hed ctuthr;r i l .1, /o ctchicvt: ppl i t igct lcnun,qL'.

In th is dc f in i t ion , the fb l lowtng can be no tcd :

a lnsurgencv is no t a mover ren t o r peop le . I t i s a compet i t ion , s t r r , rgg le . o rcon l l i c t . I t i s a rnan i fes ta t ion o f war .

b. I t must include at least one nolt-state n-]ovement to cl i f fcrentrate i t f ior lwars between states.

D c v c l o p e d b y t h e W a r S t u d i e s D e p a r i m e n t o f R o y a l M i i i t a r y A c a d e r n y , S a n d h u r s t , a s c t u o r c d i n U KA r n r y F i c l d M a n u a l V o l I C o r r r b i n e c i A r m s o p e r a r o n s . P a r t 1 0 , C o u n t e i - l n s u r g e ; c v o p e i - a t i o n s .

l ) c f l n i t i o r r a s t i e r e l o p e d b v a c o u n t e r - r n s u r g c n c v s t u d y u r o u p d u r i n g U S M C J o i n t L l r b a n W a i l . i o r 2 0 ( ) 5

( ' l r a p l : L l 5

an?n r?n t r_ { nnnnn t

DRAF'f

I h e c s t a b l i s h e d a u t h o n t v n e e d n c t u c c e s s a r i l l ' b e t h e g o v c r n n r c n t o i ' t h cr ra t i cn sub. ]ec t to an insurgency . I t cou ld be a loca l au thor - i t y , a ren tporarvmi l i ta ry au thor i ty , o r a gove inu ten t o1 'a th r rd par ty

l n s u r g e n c i e s s e e k p o l i t r c a l c h a n g c . l i k e a l l r v a r s . B r L t t h e p o l i t i c a l n a l u r co f insurgency is so rnpor ta r r t i l shoLrLd be ernphas ized in the de l ln j r ion ,' l ' he

change soLrght coL i ld bc govcrnmenl co l lapse, t l ,p ica l l y an ob 'Jec t ive o l1 9 5 0 - 6 0 s c o m m u n i s t i n s u r g c n c i e s . o r a l e s s e r o b j e c t i v e s u c h a s s c l l ' -c le te rmina t ion or re lease o f po l i t i ca l p r isoners .

CO T] NT[] I ] . INS UI{G ENCY

5 Counter- insurscncv is dei lned as fol lor.vs

' fho.s'c tnil i tary, paramilitary, polit ical, cconomic, p.sychologic'al uncl t ' i t ' ic crt,t ion.s

Ittkt tt lo dcft,ttt .tn insltrgt'nt'-V.J

6. Cout r te r - insL l rgcncy thus invo lves much morc than s i rnp ly mi i i ta ry ac t ion . I t rs amul t i -agency approach tha t sceks to no t on ly de fea t the insurgents themsc lvcs . bu t theroot causes of- , and support for. the insurgcncy.

SECI . ION 2 : . I I {E CONTINUUM OF OPEI IATIONS AND OPERATIONAL

( ' A ] \ I P A I C N T H E M E S {

CENEI I .AT,

1 Campargns and subord ina te opera t ions o f ien requ i re mi l r ta ry fb rces to opera tee l ' l ' ec t i ve ly across the spcc t rum o1 'conf l i c t . conduct a w idc range o Imi l i ta ry ac t iv i t iess i tnu l taneor , rs ly . and t rans i t ion qu ick ly f ro rn onc type o i 'opera t ion to another i t i rap i t l l yc l tang i i tg opera t iona l env i ronments . Conrmanders rnus t be ab le to v isua l i ze hou,acampaign or opera t ion w i l l l i ke ly cvo lve over t i rnc in l igh t o f chang ing c i rcurns tances .

. f H I I CONTINUT- jM OF OPEITATIONS FI I .AMEWORK

t i The concept o l - a cont inuum o f opcra t ions ident i f ie s a numbcr o f campargn t i re r lesand provides a fral lcwork for cornmandcrs to understand the complexi ty of theopera t iona i env i ronment and the l ranner in wh ich r r i ss ions cont r ibu te to a las t i t rg pcacc .or a t leas t to an env i ronn len t in wh ich conf l i c t i s d imin ished. The cont inuum o l '( )11e ra t ions c t - rns is ts o l four aspec ts :

\ ,^, I-O Ar\P (r' ' l h i s s e c t r o n l r a s b e e r r s u n r r l a r i s c d f i o m t r v o( o n t i n u u r r o f O p e r a t i o n s P r c . j e c r T e a n t F i n a ll e l l r r c d f i o I r h e A B C A d o c u r n e n t .

s o u r c c s N A I ' O A J I ) i 2 a r r d A 1 3 C A A r r n i e s p r o s r a r t l l eR e p o r t 2 0 L l - 5 . I h e N r \ - f O d o c u m c r . t t h a s b c c n d c r i v e d a n C

( ' h a p 1 ; f r l 5

A n a n t t n t o n n n n n t

D R A F T

the spe c t run t o i con f l i c t :

p redomrnant (opera t iona i lever ) can ipa ign themes, i ^c lL rd ing coL in tc r -i ns u rgency ;

typcs o f tac r icaL opera t io rs (o f f 'ens ivc . c le f 'ens i 'e and s tabr l i t y ) : , rd

s : rnu l tane ous conduct o f 'd i f fe ren t types o f tac t i ca l oDera t io .s .

CO T]NTER- INS URG ENCY WITH IN TH E S PECTRUM O I . ' CON T ' I - I C ' f

9 - l ' he spcc t runr o f con f l i c t i s a backc l rop fb r a l l opera t ions apc l descr ibes t5e

c l l \ i l ron lnent in wh ich they occut ' . J 'hc main d isc r im ina tor i s the leve l o f v io lcncci r l vo lved. rvhrch ranges f iom peacefu l in te rac t ion amongst in te rna t iona l p layers (s ta tes .corp t l ra t ions ' NGOs) , th roug i t low- leve i con f l rc ts , to gcnera l war (see F igurc l ) . M i l i ta r l ,I t t rces opcra te th roughout th is spec t rL im.

F igure 1 . The Spect rum o f Conf l i c t

l0 A t onc cnd o1 ' the spec t rum is a conc l i t ion o f s rab le peace w i th l i t t le o r nov ' to le t l cc l ' he In i l i ta ry migh t be invo lved in peacet iu re mi f i ta ry cngagenre p t (pMI r )dcs igned to shape the env i ronment th rough t ra in ing a .ss is tance progranrmes, . jo i r tcxcrc ises and co-ord ina t ion , '1 'he mi i i ta ry w i l l I i ke ly work w i th o ther agcnc ies

I l As s tab le peace degenera tes , v io lence. o r a t leas t the th rea t o f i t . inc reases as rwoof Inore iac t ions conte in to conf l i c t . M i l i ta ry opera t ions are c lo rn ina tcd by peace sL lppor r .a r ld in so lne cases ou ts ide powers rna1, in te r jec t in o rder to I im i t t i re conf l i c i . I ,eace

'

s t t l l p t l r t opera t io t l s w i l l inc lude a range o f campaigns . f ionr low leve l peacekecp ipu tc rn rorc s t renuoL ls pcacc cn lb rcemcnts

l l I t ' a s i tL ra t ion worscns , an insurgency n tay erup t . Th is n ta l , invo lve s ign t f i can li r t t ra - o r in te r -s ta te v io ience, bu t w i l l la i l shor t o f la rge-sca le , convent rona l opera t io rs .[ -he nr i ] i ta rv ro le * ,ou ld bc counter - insurgency (co lN) , rv i th the goa l o f reduc i 'gV io lence a i rd t rans i t ing to peace suppor t , w i th suppor t ing po l i t i ca l apd econorn ici . i t ia l i ves .Aga in , the mi i i ta ry wou id be ivork ing in co-opera t ion rv i th o ther asenc iesaddre ss ing t l - re r ron- rn i i r ta ry aspec ts o f the sccur i ty env i ronmcnt , sLrch as govcr .nmcr tr .c I onn.

c l

b

C .

d

Abso lu te peace/peacefu l in te rac t ion Abso lu t e /

g e n e r a t w a r

( ' h r p I : - 1 i j

i l

DI{AFT

l - l ' l ' hc

fa r end o1 ' the spec t run l sees in te r -s ta te con l l i c t * , ] re re the malor mi l r ta r ri l c l l \ ' l t ) ' L S c o t l l b a t o p c r a t i o n s , I f ' c o n d u c t c d s u c c e s s f u l l r , . m a j o r c o m b a t r v i l l b e a b l c t or c d u c e t h e l c v e i o t ' r ' i o l e n c c a n d t h e m i l r t a r y ' s r o l e c a n t h e n i r a n s j t i o n l o l e s s i n t e n s copcru t io r rs . idea l l y , th is r ,v i l l eventua i l y evo lve to peace iu l in te rac t jon ,

1-+ Mi l i ta ry opera t ions do no t necessar i l y go th rough a progress ion a long thes l lecLr l l l r l rn e i t i re r d i rec t ion . Opera t ions typ ica l l y s ta r t some\ \ ,herc in the t r i c jd lc o f ' thcspcclr t lm. I tot at ei ther end. There rnay be di f ferent ler. ,els of conf l ict in di1 '1-erent par ls o1'a s i r lq lc theat rc o f opera t ions , o r even w i th in a . jo in t opera t ions arca . lndced, leve ls o fcor l l ' l i c t l l l aY vary over t i rnc w i th in a s rng ie a rea , In genera l , r - ro spcc i f i c oper .a t ion ex is tsa t . j L rs t one po in t o1 ' th is spec t rum. Rea l i t y i s more complex : a l any one t ime thcrc r -na1,bca i luman i ta r ian c r is is in one loca t ion . an insurgency in another . and in tense f igh t ingbc t rvecn lb rces nearby , a l l rv i th in the same area o f opcra t ions . S imi la r ly , a t a i r l ,oneI t l ca t ion there may be housc- to -housc i igh t ing one day . co l lec t ion o f lb rcns ic cv idenccLirc I tcxt dav. and restorat ion of electr ic i ty and water sr-rppl ies thc day aftcr. In otheru ords . fu l l spec t rL r rn ope ra t ions w i l i bc conducted s in ru i taneous ly and sequent ia l l y .

P R E D O M I N A N T C A M P A I G N T H E M E S

l - - \ As a c t tn f l i c t var ies o r changes over t imc the charac tc r o f a campaign car r bed i f f l cLr l t to de f ine prec ise ly , and i t i s l i ke ly to evo lve , I t w i l l cons is t o f a w ide var ie ty o ftac t i ca l ac t i v i t ies tha t w i l l a lso vary w i th t i rne . l t i s poss ib le nevef the iess to ident i l y ,anddcscr ibc p rcdorn inant themes a t the campaigr r /opera t iona l leve l .

' l -he charac ter o f thc

carnpaign and the cmphasis on di f ferent tact ical act iv i t ics vary accorci ing to the therre .Ma jor combat i s idcn t i f iab ly d i f fe rcn t than counter - insLr lgcncy , and bo th d i f fe r f tonrpcace suppor t . D i f le rcn t cz impe ign thernes demand d i f fe ren t approachcs . d i l le rep t lo rccpackagcs . and d i f f -e ren t cmphas is on var ious tac t i ca l tasks . For example , ma jor combatu i l l invo l r ,c tnore o l tens ive opera l ions (such as a t tacks) , wh i le counter - insurgenc i , wr l lco t l s is t o l 'Lnore de fe ns ivc and in fo rmat ion opcra t ions . inc lud ing c rv i l - rn i i i ta ry co-opcra t ion tasks conducted a t the tac t i ca l l cve l . i - lovn ,cver , some ac t iv i t ies (e g fb rcep r o t c c t r o n ) a r e c o m m o n t o a i l .

i 6 T h e c a n t p a i g n t h e n t c i s a L r s c l u l i l i u s t l a l : r , e t o o l 1 b r c o m m a n d e r s . a n d c j i c t a t c s t h ep t ' cdo r t t i l i a l t i t ) ' pe o f ope t .a t i on bc ing conduc tcd a t anv one r i r nc w i t h i n a j o i r t rc t ' r t t l t na i l dc r ' s a rea c f ' ope t ' a t i ons I t w i i l gu ide sL rch de ia i l s as f b r ce packapes . one ra t i ona l

"In one momenl in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaceclrefugees - providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they wilt ie holcjinghvo warring tribes apart conducting peacekeeping operations. Finatty, they will befighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. Alt on the same clay, allwithin three cityblocl<s. It will be what we call the three blockwar."

General Charles C. Kruiak, USMC

( h a p l . : 1 r 1 5

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DIlAFT

appr t )aches ar ld iac t i ca l tasks . ' fhe var ioLrs t l iemes can be p lo t ted a long thc spec t r l i i , ( - r jcon l l rc t to rc f l cc t thc genera l levc l o l . r , io lence o i - the cantpa ign (sec I - . tgurc 2 ) .

l l - fhc carnpa ign then le a lso prov ides the pr incrp les tha t goyern the conduct o f 'opera t tons l t shoL l ld ind ica tc thc commandcr 's in ten t rv i th re ipec i to the usc o f fo rcc a rc lgencra l gu idc l ines fo r assess ing the progrcss o f the campaign . I t has i rnp l rca t io rs l i r r

lb rce s t ruc t r r res . a l loca t ton o f resour . . r , fb r . . p ro lec t io r i , and rac t rca l tasks ass igncc i tosubord i t la te s . Each has d i f fe r ing pr inc ip les o f fb rce app l rca t ion and de s i red cnd s ta te .' i he ibur nra. jor thcmes are:

ci

peacet imc mi I i ta ry engagement ;

peace suppon;

cour r te r - insurgency ; and

major cornbat opcra t ions .

F ' igure 2 . Predominant Campaign Themcs,

I u Peacc t i l l l c m i l i ta ry e ngagcment , peace suppor t , counter - insurgency , a r rc l rna j o rcombat b road ly cor respond to inc rcas ing lcveLs o f v io icnce a long the lpec t rum o f

'

' A l i r ' i t e d r l i J i t a r ; ' i n t c r v e n r i o n ( s u c h a s a n o n - c o m b a t a n t e v a c u a t i o nu r d c r t a k i n q , b u t i s n o t c o n s i d e r e d a c a r . n p a i g n t h e r n e ( s e e A J p l 2 ) I ls p c c t r u i r l o f c o n t l i c t .

0 p c r a t l 0 n ) r s a n o p e r a t i o n a l l c v e lI n a ) / o c c u r a t a n v p o i n t o n t h c

C' i rap I 5 / l . i

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I ' r , r i i

I ) I {AF'f

ton l l i c t I ' herc 1s ra re l y 'a d is t inc t b leak be t r i . ' een 1e \ /e l s and themes. a l thor , rgh ihere nraybc , \dc i i t iona l l ) ' . the fe ma) / be d i f f ' e ren t leve ls o f con f l rc t and d i f fe rcn t campargn rhcnrcsr lc r .oss geograph ic a reas , and in sonre cases . eve n u , i t i r jn a . ;o in t opcra t tous area .

19 . Prcdorn inant can ipa tgn themes have rnany over lapp ing charac ter is t i cs . horvever i lr s poss ib )e to d isc r r rn ina te among theur by charac tc r iz ing the levc l o f po l i t i ca l r i sk .lesor t rcc comrn i tment . c f fec t sought , charac tc r o f ' combat , and ty ,pe o f enemy facec l

20 Carnpa ign themes shou id l . ro t be confused iv i th tac t i ca l opera t ions , tasks orac t iv r t ies

' fac t i ca l tasks arc the spec i { i c app l rca t ion o f c loc t r ine lo so lve spec i f i c tac t i ca l

proLrlerns, atnd are oftcn use d to assign rnissior-rs to subordtnates. Campaign themes, as ar l t l c , a re too genera l to L lse in ass ign ing miss ions . Rat l ie r , they c lescr ibe the broad genera lcond i t ions tha t ex is t in an area o1 'opera t ions , no t the de ta i l s o f execut ion fo r subord ina tcs

I l . Whi lc d i l ' fe ren t campaign thcmes requ i re s ign i f rcan t ly d i f l -e ren t gcnera lapproaches to a g iven conf l i c t , i t i s s t i l i poss ib le tha t ac tua l cond i t ions faced a t any t i r rcor p iace dur ing a campaign may vary a long t l ie spec t ru rn o f con l l i c t . For example ,hurnan i ta r i : in a id nay s t i l l be a fca ture o f ma jor combat , anc l an a t tack aga insLbc l l igeren ts may be necessary dur ing pcace suppor t . A l though subord ina te miss ions urayrcqu i re app ly ing o ther tac t i ca l - leve l p r inc ip les , care rnus t bc taken no t to cont rad ic t thelog ic o f the overa l i campaign . For cxample , an a t tack conducted dur ing a counter -rnsL l rgencY campaign may Lrse tac t i ca l p r inc ip les o f the o f fens ivc , bu t the dcc is ion toconduct the attack and the manner in whioh i t is done, shor-r ld not contradict the broaderpr inc ip les o f counter - insurgency .

' l ' ac t i ca l ac t ions shou ld a lways be focLrsed. to fac i l i ta te

tnov i t tg to a lower leve l o f con f l i c t . I t i s i rnpor ran t to rea l i ze tha t us ing fo rce canpoten t ia l l y 'L rndermine c rea t ion o f the cond i t ions necessary to Iower the leve I o1 'conf l i c t .

. f Y I ' I IS OF OPERATIONS

2) . ' l ' he

b road range o f tac t i ca l leve l opera t ions , tasks and ac t iv i t ies tha t a re. u n d t r c t c d t , r r c a l i s e s u c c c s s i n l c a r r t p a i g n a r e d i v i J c r l i n t o t h r e e g r o r r p i n g s o r c a t e g u r i c . ,i i s fb l lows:

b

of fens ivc opera t ions ;

c ie fens ive opera t ions ; and

s tab i l i t y opera l ions .

l l . These typcs o f tac t i ca l leve l opcra t ions , together w i th tac t i ca l tasks , descr ibe thcto ta l tac t i ca l ac t i v i t y undef iaken by a rn i l i ta ry fo rce w i th in a campaign . Each type isgu ided by 'a se t o f 'p r inc ip les .

' fhese types o f opera t ions are fu r rher b roken dor .vp in to

subord ina te t -vpes o f tac t i ca i opera t ions (sec I i igLr re 3 ) .

l -+ . Notc tha t eac i r subord ina te typc cons t i tu tcs ind iv idua l tac t i ca l tasks A1 ar tackt l tav c : t l t - t s is1 o f a suppor t b \ ' f i re task and c lear ing task . v i ' l t i l c hur lan i ta r ia i t ass is tancc

( ' h a p l : ( r i l 5

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I )RAFT

r a ] ' s e e o n e s L i b - u n i t d r s t r i : u t r n g f o o d a n d a n o t h c r o n e c o n d u c t i r g i i n r e d r c a r c r i n i c' \ga in . i t i s i rnpor tan t to no te tha t in any t -vpe o f campaign therne . these iac t j ca l tasks r ra rbc conducted s imu l taneous ly . For example , one sub-un i t may be conduct ing an a t tack .another may be conduct ing sccur i t l , o f an arca th rough veh ic je chcck po in ts , anc j ano lhcrnray be d is t r ibu t ing emergency water and ra t ions to ie fugees

t;ou-r o*,;o";-=1Cont ro l and Secur i ty ( l )

Exp lo i ta t ion

Pursr- i i t Feint

D e l a y Suppor t to Demobi l i sa t ion ,

Demonst ra t ion

Disarmamcnt andRein tegra t ion (DDR)

Suppor t to Sccur i t , v Sec torRe lbrm (SSn)

Of fens ive Opera t ions

Ar rack Ra id

Rcconnaissance Link-up

Secur i ty Re l ie f o f

Mcct ing Engagement

Dcfens ive Opera t ions

Dc1'encc

Enab l ing Ac t iv i t ies

Ret i rement

[rncircled Force

Withdrawal

Advance to Contact

Re l ie f o f T roops in Cornbat

Obstacle Breaching/Crossi nr

Notes :

l . control and sccuri ty refers to the establ ishment of a safe andin which ot l ter non-mil i tary agencies may operate and assiststrategic object ives.

secure cnv i ronnrc l t t ,in the operat ional ancl

...--_-''..__--_-J

Suppor t to in f ias t ruc tu re and Govcrnancc w i l l inc lude mi l i ta ry resour .ccs be inguscd to suppof l c iv i l infrastr l rctLrre and the appl icat ion of mi l i iary resour.ce s a.dpcrsonnc l to es tab l i sh and/or conc lL rc t in tc r im or in i t ia l govenrance tasks .I l xarnp les o f govemance tasks rnay inc lude runn ing schoo ls . es tab i i s5 ing markc tplaces i incl act ing as mayors and pubi ic off ic ials

Ass is tance to o ther agenc ies re fe rs to ' i l i tu ry ass is ta 'ce to spcc i f i c agenc ies .hclping them to reach operat ional object ives. For example, n-, i l i to.y for. . , may bcal located to assist elect ion organisers with securi ty and iogist ical support

F igure 3 ' ' I ' ypcs o f 'Tac t ica l opera t ions and subord ina tc ' l r . res

Break-ou1

C J r a p I . 7 i : 5

A n . ) n o a n E t n n n n 6

DRAI'"f

] -HF- CONTINTJU} , I OF OPERATIONS 1 \ , IODEL

l - i ' l -hc

th ree contpone n is o1 ' the mode l fo r thc cor r t inuun o f opcra t ions rha t har , ,ebcen de l lned - the spec t run o f con f l i c t , p rec lominant campaign themes, and types o f( ) l l c ra t lons - u t r - ts t norv be combinec i rv i th the four - th e Ien ten t , s imr - r l tane i ty , ln o therrvords , d r - r r ing a car lpa ign w i th rn thc spec t ru rn o f con f l j c t . events w i l l rnc ludc e leuren ts o lthe th re e t1 'pcs o f tac t i ca l opera t ions occr . r r ing s imr - r i taneous ly

- fhe ab i l i t y to v isua l i z ,e

th is rv i l la .ss is t comtnauders bo th to ba iance resoL l rces and to unders tand horv opera t ionsrvi l l i rnpact Llpol t crne anot l ier and the futurc,

16 . z \ campaign is a ser ies o f 'opcra t ions lead ing to a des i red end s ta te , oncchar : tc tc r i s t i c o f l vh ich is usua l ly t i ' re c rea t ion o f a s ta tb le pcace. In o rdcr to p rogresstowards the end s ta te , commanders must cont inua) ly assess thc charac tens t ics o f thecampaign and, as success or fa i lu re o f a g iven phase o l the campaign un fo lds . ad jus t thel l red t r tn inant eamprrgn therne Ad j us t ing thc campr ign thcme in tu rn ad jus ts lbcus .reso t l rces . d i rec ted tasks , and so on . A campaign t l ra t bcg ins as ma" jo rcombat shou lc le ventua i l ) ' l cad to pcace sL lppor t and f ina l l y to peacet i r le rn i l i ta ry engagemcnt .

' fhe

campalgn may no t inc lude counter - insurgency . bu t commanders must no t over look tha tposs ib i l i t y and must p lan accord ing ly . I t i s par t i cLr la r ly i rnpor tan t tha t opera t ion .scondt tc ted under a g iven campaign theme shou ld cons ider those aspec ts t l ia t rv i l l 1 'ac i l i ta teI r love l re l l t to a lower leve l o f con f l i c t and i t s eqLr iva len t campaign theme. ' fhc rc rv i l l bel l lstances whcn shof i term tact ical success wi i l have to be sacr i f iccd in ordcr to suDDorlthe longer tenn goa ls o f s tab le pcace and thc we l l -be ing o f the popu)ace.

?7 . Wi th in a campaign thenre , aL i th rce typcs o i 'opcra t ions are conducteds t t t - tu l taneous ly (see F igure 4) . A l though some may bc sequent ia l , such as an a t tacklb l lowed by de fence, many occur concur ren t ly . i ro r example :

a w i th in a major combat campaign theme. a fb rce may be a t tack ing in o r rearea, de f ' cnd ing in another , rnd condr . rc t ing humani ta r ian ass ls ta l rcc lp ath i rd a rca :

b off-ensive operat ions in part of the areawith stabi l i ty operat ions conducted bylbl low-on forces, and

o l opera t ions may be re in fo rcedthe lead combat forccs or by

d u r i n g a p c a c e s u p p o : 1 c a n i p a i g n . c c - , r n p r i s i n g r n a i n l v s r a b i l i t y a c r j r i t i c s .thcre rnay be a rcqu i rement to suard v i ta l po in ts (dc fens ive opera t ion) .attack a rccalci t rant elernent (an ol ' fcnsivc operat ion) or secure a block olbu i ld i r rgs (cordon and search - s tab i l i t y opera t ion) dur ing the ar res t o1 'au a r c r i n r i n a l t a s t a b i ) i t y o p e r a t i t - ' n . ) .

l8 I i t shor l . . , r ' i t l t i n v i r tua l l y anv campaien therxe , comrnanCcrs mus l be or .eoared t3co t td r tc t fL r i l spcc t rum opera t ions u , i th a v ic l l , to mov ing to i . r ,a rc ls the more p .u . . fu l end o lthc spcc t r r -u r - r o1 'conf l i c t . The ba lancc among typcs o f tac i i ca l opera t ions g ives aca t t rpa ign i t s p redorn inant charac ter : a ma j o r combat carnpa ign ihentc rnay cons isL

C h a p L B / l - s

A0202305-8.000009

pnman I \ o1 ' o f i ' ens i r . ,et l t ree- tvpc- i .

DITAFT

ope ra t i ons . " i

h i i c coL r . t c r - l f i sL r rgc rc ' has a comp lcx r , , x o f ' a i l

Offens iveO p e r a t i o n s

Sta b i l i t yO p e r a t i o n s

Peace Suppor t cotN

Figurc 4 , The cont inuum o f opera t ions Moder : An I i lus t ra t i ve E,xampre

29 ' ' l hc rnoc le I o f the cont inuum o f opera t ions i l l us t ra tes th is combina t ion o f

st tnul tancous offensive' defensive, and stabi l i ty operat ions. The combinat ion ar-rd balanceo1 ' thc t l i r ce types o f opera t ions w i l l change w i th the campaign theme. Any opera t io r r i s acombinal ion o1-offe ncc' defence, and stabi l i ty tasks condirct lc l s imultaneously. T5erc la t i vc rve igh t g iven to each th rough the a l loca t ion o f resources and thc task c rgan iza t ionis dcpcndcnt on the predominant campaign themc.

l0 wh i le d i f fe ren t types o f opera t ions may be conc juc tec l s imu l raneous ly , thc w,e rg6 tass igned to cach w, i l l sh i f t wr th t ime, bo th w i th in a carnpa ign theme anc l be twcencampaign themcs. idea l l y , campaign themes w i l l sh i f i i i o r t r ig t - r . , Ieve ls o { ' con l l rc t iolo rvc t ' l cVc ls . bu t thc i 'may a lso go in thc oppos i tc c l i rcc t ion i f con f l i c t inc reases c lL r r i r rgt l ie c i r rnpa ign . A gcod cxample o f th is was the esca la t iop o f the opera t ic , . , rn So 'a l iat io tn pe acc sL lppor t to counte r - insurgenc ,v (a i thoLrgh o f 'a very l im i ted c lu ra t ion) ,

' l I when opcra t ing a t anv po in t a long the con l inuum, commanc lers and s ra l ' f \ shoLr lc icons ider how' to p revent the esca la t ion o f v io lence by the adversary . Dur ing peaccsupp( ) f t . fb r cxarnp le , opcra t ions must be conducted w i th a v iew to p revent ing csca la t i t - r 'to an insur_ee ncv or to ma jor cornbat .

l l I l ccogn iz ing chang ing c i rcumstances or cond i t ions . cspec ia l l y oncs lh l t rcqu i re ac l lansc to the n laJor theme o f a campaign , i s bo th an in lc l lec tL ra l as wc l l as an in re l l igencccha i lense Th i .s i s par t o f the ar t o1 'war , The in te l l igence sys te ln must bc a t tunec j to . a rc j

De fen s i veO p e r a t i o n s

( ' h a p 1 : 9 , 1 5

A n o n a t n E n n n n ^ 4 ^

DI{AFT

l ' - r t l k 1 t - r r . lnd ica to t :s o ish i l i s . and ccmmandcrs anc l s ta l '1s must be ab lc to in tc r .p re t the kert t ld tca tors t l ta t shorv 'a sh i f t i s tak ing p lace . Cominandcrs and s ta f fs rn i i s t then ac t in achang ing c t l v i ronnten t , e i thc r lo p rcvent esca la t ton c l ' v io lcnce or fac i l j ta te a sh i l t to aio rver , levc i o f v io lence, in such a wa) / tha t the s i tua t ion rs rnanageab le by the fo rces a tl r a l r d . "

S E C T I O N 3 : O V E I T V I E W O I . I N S U R G I T N C I E S A N D C O U N ' I E R -I N S U I l G E N C I E S

i i . , ' \ t i t s n ros t bas ic , a t ' i i nsurgency is an r - rp r is ing or insur rec t ion aga ins t : r1cs tab l i shcd fb r rn o f au thor i ty , nor rna l l y a go \ /c lnment , occupy ing au thor i ty o . ro i iu ls t r l l c tu re . Var ious s i tua t ions may g ive r i se to an insurgency and a s ing le insurgency Lnayhave sevcra l roo t and cont r ibu t rng causcs . In gencra l , they sp l ing f rom c l i ssa t i i l o . t ionu ' i th a soc ia l s t ruc tu re o r governrnent a r rangement , and the be l ie f tha t on ly v io lence anc lsubvers io t t can br ing about the des i red and jus t i f ied changes w i th in a reasonab ly b r ie i 't i r n c I i a m e .

14. Although some insurgents have exploi tcd new opportunit ies ancl gained highpro f i l cs in rccent t imes, insurgenc ies themse lves are no th ing new.

- [ 'hey are a method

used by a d isa f fec tcd and commi t ted group tha t knows they cannot w in on the i le ld o fba t l le aga ins t a super io r , convent iona l mi l i ta ry fo rce , and they there fore resor t toasy t r rne t r i c ac t ions tha t a t tack the w i l l and mot iva t ion o i the s ta tus quo goventment andsoc ie ty .

Insurgencies are not a new phenomenon. Insurgents effectively caused the withdrawal ofRoman troops over 2000 years ago fiom what is today Gennany and Scotland. TheRoman Ernpire had overextended itself and was seen as lacking legitimacy with the localpeoples - peoples who were not averse to utilizing violence in,altering the politicallandscape. Likewise, the Jew'ish insurrection challenged the rule of Roman authority rnthe Middle East.

l5 I lach insurgency rvi l l have rts own set of causes and i ts aim or desirecl cpcJ-srare .Sontc insurgenc ies w i l l s tenr f ro rn a po l i t i ca l , socra l and/or re l ig ious idco logy tha tc t l v is ions an i tnproved (even u top ian) s ta te o f a f fa i rs , the rca l i za t ion o f wh ic | . ius t i f i cs rheLtse o1-subvers ion and fo rce . Other insurgenc ies w i l l s te rn f rom rea l o r perce iveds t ' i cvances tha t havc no t been sa t is f ied hy peacefu l means, wh i le o thers w, i l l be conducrcd

l r t l r a c o t t r p l e t e d i s c u s s i o n o n h o w c o r l n r a n d e r s r n a y u s e l h e r n o d e l o f t h c c o n t j n u u n r o 1 ' c p e r a t i o r r s l ou . r r c l c c a n r p a i g n s , r e f ' c r t o N A - l - O A J I , i 2 .

I ) c v c l o p e d b y t h c W a r S l L r d i e s D e p a r t r n c n t o f R o v a l M i i i l a r y , A c a d e r l y , S a n d h L r r s r . a s q u o t e d i i r U K\ r : l r r ' i r r e l d M a n u a l V o l I C o m b r n c d A r m s O p c r a t i o n s , P a r t l O , C o L r n t e r - l n s u r g e n c v C ) p e r . a t i o r r s' I ) c i i r r i t i c r t a s d e v e l o p c d b v a c o u n t c r - i n s L r r ! e n o y s t u d v g r c L t l t d L r r i n g l . . l S M C J o i r t r L j r b a n W a r r i o r 2 0 U - 5\ , ' \ l -o AAI ) 6

( ' h a p I l 0 i l 5

A n t n t a n E _ 4 n n n n n , t ' t

DI{ i \FT

0\ 'a panrcLr la f g roL lp lha t s r rnDlv r . i i shcs to ga in po \ \ ,c r -bu t cannor oo so tn roL lghlcq i t r rna tc means or convent iona i use o f mr l i ta r ,v - por ' ; c r S t i l l o thers . , r , i l i r i . ,n - i - . " ,n udc 's i rc fb r independence o f a d is t i r rc t na t rona l i t y o r cu l tu rc lack ing iLs o r in aLr to r ro rn l , .l t l su rgenc ies are n ]o rc 1 ike1y to occur in s ta tes u 'herc there are inhcren t rac ia l . cu ] iu ra l .rc i ig rous , o r ideo iog ica l d iv is ions tha t lead to a Iack o f na t iona l cohcs ion and wcax.i r l c f f i c ie r l t . i rns tab le . o r unpopu lar go \ /e rnme n ts Adc i i t iona l fac to rs , such as cor rL ip t ionand ex terna l agr ta t ion , rnay fac i l i ta te an insurgency .

l6 In o the r rvords , many insurgenc ics w i l l c ieve lop oLr t o f i -a i led or fa i ) ing s ta tes rha t1) r i l to addrcss or sa t is ly the bas ic needs o f the i r popu lace . Thcse nccc ls rv r l l d i l -1 'c rdepend ing upon thc reg ion and cu l tu re invo lved, bLr t in gcr re ra l w j l l inc lude the basrce ' ssent ia ls o f a s tab le l i f -e , respons ib le government , re l ig ious f reedom and ccononr i cviabi i i ty. I t is f iom sr:ch fert i le cnvironments thar insuigencies wi l l of tcn grow.

17 ' ' l ' he

a im or des i red end s ta te o f the insurgency may bc qu i tc cx t repre , sLrcS as t6ccrca t ron o f a new s ta te and soc ia l cons t ruc t , o thers may i imp ly seek to sc ize powe r .cxpeJ a lb re ign power ! o r acqu i rc spec i f i c bu t l im i ted po l i t i ca l u , tuontug . , o r co . t ro l .whatevcr thc a in t ' the insurgcnts thcrnse lves l -ee l tha t1h . i r .uur . , anc i i im jusr i l . y thc usei l f v io lencc and subvers ion , and even thc use o f te r ro r is rn aga ins t the c iv i l ian ponu lace i 'so rne cases .

The rise of radicalNative American organizations, such as the Mohawk warriorsociety, can be viewed as insurgencle9 wlth specific and limited aims, Althoughthev do not seek comprere contr'or or th. r#;.:;;#.ffiil?]lili il';.lit"""particular political concessions in their reldtionship with national governmentsand control (ei ther overt or covert) of pol i t ical af fairs at a local/reserve (. ,FirstNat ion") level, through the threat ol , or use of, v iolence.

38 ' - l ' he

tac t i cs uscd by insurgents rv i l i vary w i th each campaign anc l s i tua t ion . ' l ' hcvr i ' i i l cc r ta in ly i l l c ludc v io lence or a t the vcry leas t the th rea t o f v io lencc . SuU, , . r . r ;n , . , , . ,napropaganda have t rad i t iona l l y been used to g rea t c f f ' cc t . Most recen ly , rnsLLreer ts h lvecxpJo i ted tnass tned ia to convey the i r mcssage, p ropaganda, th rea t anc l capab i l i t ies to ala rgc aud icnce. - l -he t ' seek

suppor t in te rna l l y and ex terna l l y , and o f ien mask f lnanc ia lca l l lpa lgns w i th { 'acades o f char i tab le o r po l i t i ca l o rgan isa t ions . Dense urban tc r ra in r , i , r l lbc c . rp lc l i t cd in o rder to a t tack hrgh va lue ta rge ts , in f l i c t mass casua l t res , and h idc thcr ro\\ 'n j l resence. Unfortunatcly, many insr lrgencies rcsort to the tact ic of terror isnr as i il l l eans to rca l i ze the l r opera t rona i and s t ra teg ic end. Insurgents w i l l a lso exp l . i t thet t rheren t rveakncsses o f ' the soc ie ty under a t tack , par t i cu la r ly l ibera l democrac ies . in o rc le r .l ( ) sL lppor t the l r opera t ions . The i r p ropaganda w i l l con t inua l l y pa in t themse lves as t5cV ic t in is o f a r l un jus t soc ia l o r power s t ruc tu re , and the i r ac t ions w i l l o f ten seek to p rovokearl ovcr-react ion fror l governn.]ent forces that can enhance their image as thc yict i rn

C I r a p 1 1 1 , , 1 5

qJ

1_.

IIRAFT

l9 I t l surgenc ieS i la l r be conducted in ru ra l a reas . in L i ibar r a rcas , o r rn borh .i t t s u r g e n c i e s r v i l l a l s o c r o s s n a t i o i - L a l b o r d e r s . 1 ; r s u r g e n t s m a y b a s e t h e m s c l v e s a c r o s s a ni t t le r t ra t iona l border in a svmpathet ic count r . ) / , o r the ! rnay have pan-nat io : ra l a in ts andthere fb rc conduct the i r a t tacks in more than one geograph ic a rea . Dur ing thc Co id WarCor r tnun is t expans ion fo l lowed th is r r rode l . and re cent ly rad ica l re l ig io r - rs t - r love l ren lshave deurons t ra ted thc i r g loba l reach,

-10 Insurgenc ies have normal ly been tbcLrsed on ga in ing thc suppor t o f a s ign i f i can tpor t ion o l -a popu lace , idea l l y a ma jor i t y .

- fhose who do no t ra l l y to the cause are

sub i 'e r ted and in t im ida ted in to a t leas t s i len t suppor t . Insurgenc ies usr . ra l l y ga in thc i rg rea lcs t success amongst tha t segrnent o f the popu la t ion tha t i s d isa f ' f -ec ted ord isa t lvar t taged, i .e . thosc r .vho have ga ined the leas t f ion the cur ren t soc ia l o rgan iza t ion .l : ven i f the rna jo r i t y o f the popuJat ion la i l s to evcntua l l y ra l l y to rhe s ide o f thct t l surgents , thc i r rsurgents s in tp ly have to rnake dc fend ing the s ta tus quo too expens ive ord i f f i cu l t f i t r thc secur i ty fb rces , the govenrments coucerncd, and the genera l popu lacc .,An rnsurgcncy is . there fore , o f i cn a ba t t le o1 'w i l l s .

+ I . Opcra t ions conducted w i th in a counter - insurgency campaign a im to dc1 'ea t apinsurgency th rough mi l i ta ry , parami l i ta ry , po l i t i ca l , economic , psycho log ica l . and c iv i lact ions. Act ions not only target the insurgent, but more imporlant ly, target the support tothe i t t surgent and the roo t causes tha t have led to co l lec t i ve d issa t is fac t ion and jus t i f y thct t rsurgents ' ac t ions . I r r o ther words , the mi l i ta ry p lays bu t one par t in a counter -i t t surgencv and the en t i re campaign w i l l invo lve a w ide var ic ty o f o ther agenc ies .

42. Thtrs the mi l i tary 's role, in general ten'r ' rs, rv i l l be to provide thc secr-rrc l rameworki r r w l r i ch o ther agenc ies may work to so lve the soc ia l p rob lems a t the roo t o f theinsurgency . A l t i rough the mi l i ta ry 's ro le i s l im i ted , the manner in wh ich i t conducts i t srcspons ib i l i t i es w i l l in f luence the overa l l env i ronment and success in a l l face ts o f thccarnpa ign . For example , a heavy-handed response to insurgent ac t i v i t i cs w i l l be exp lo i tedbv thc insurgents' propaganda and underrnine thc trust of the locaI populace in thesccur i ty lb rces .

' r+i . A governme nt iacingcan there lbre be cxpected toc , ' e l i t i o r r p a r t n c r r s s i s t i r r g i t .

an insurgency in i ts own terr i tory is under direct threat. andbear a h igher r i sk and accept h igher casua l t ies than a

+4. ' l ' hc

overa l l e f fec t sought in a counter - insurgency is r ro t the dca th o r cap ture o1 'i t t surgents . bu1 I lo re i rnpor lan t ly . the prov is ion o f secur i ty to the popu la t ion , thcreduc t ion o1 'popu lar suppor t fo r the insurgencv th rough re fb rm. and the c r - r t t ing o f ' thei t t surgcnt ' s cx te rna l l inks .

- l -yp ica l measures o1 'e f fec t i veness arc numbcrs o f v io lenr

i r rc idents and the levc l o f popu lar s l lppor t 1br the governntcn t .

4 -5 . A l thoLrgh r - ro t spe c i f - i ca l l y des igned fb r such courmi t rnents , m i l i ta ry fo r .ccs haveo l ie t r becn uscd to conduct counter - insurgency 'campaigns . Th is i s genera l l y due to thcle r "e l o f ' r ' i o lence o l fu red by thc i t rsurgent -s , and the rcsu l t ing requ i rcment fo r . la r te

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l lun lbers o i ' i ve l l -a rmcd t toops to denv t i re insu i 'qen ts h igh va lue ra rgers . p ro tcc t t5cpcpL i lacc anc governn- ien t , and seek ou t anc i des t rov ihc insurgents w, l ien l reccssar \ , .

+6 Counter - insurgency is charac te r i ze d b t , a lo rver p reva lence o f ' combat tha .cxpcc ted ln ma jor ccmbat campaigns . Th is combat occurs p r iman ly a t the smal l -un j tl cvc l ' i c sec t ion ' pJa toon. o r company, a l thoLLgh ln rger . o rgon iza t ions uray sourc t imcs bet t l vo lved - lhe

ra te o f resource consunpt ion rs a lso lower ihan in ma j o r combat , a l thoLrghthe campaign as a who lc rs i i ke ly to ias t much Ionger . w i th severa l vears be ing typ ica lI 'hLrs thc overal l resource requirement is usual iy higher. Certainly the pol i t ical u, . .1. i , . , ,nrolco t l tn t tme n t o f the na t ion sLrppor l ing the counte r - insurge ncy and pr -ov id ing the resoLr rcesnr r - rs t be endur ing .

17 ' An over r id ing fu t rdamenta l o f counter - insurgency opera t ions is tha t mi i r ta rvl i r rces p lay a key bu t suppor t ing ro le in the canrpa ign . t i i s un l i ke ly , r - ru f , i . .onn i . , * i i rbc sucldenly ended with a major mi l i tary victory against the insr,rrgents, who arc ofte '1 )ce t ing and sca t tc red in s rna l l , c landes t ine cc l l s . i l though therc a re exarnp les o fi r l sursenc ics and counter - insurgenc ies tha t havc resr - r l t ccJ ln < jec is ivc rn i l i ra iy successeslc g Castro's Cuban revolut ion in the formcr case, and the defeat of ' the Nort l r WestRebc l l ion in t i re la t te rcasc) the long tc rm so lu t ions s t i l l requ i rec i po l i t i ca l anc l cco lo rn icl . I ]casures.

'1 l l ' I I insurgcnc ics s tem f rom po l i t i ca l and soc ia l d issa t is fac t rons , and ideas lb r soc ia lchangc, then they can only be effect ively fought with rcfcrence to cl ivcrse f 'actors such aspo l i t i cs , economics , po l i ce capab i l i t y , soc ia l s t ruc tu re , cu l tu re and psycho log l , , a longrvi t i i mi l i tary power. Flencc, any counter- insurgency must con.sist of a mult i -_; ;nng;,mult i -agency approach at thc strategic, operat ional and tact ical lcvels. Thc causes"andsYlnptolns ( t .e. symptoms such as the insurgents themselves and their popular support)tnust be addresscd through a combinat ion of k inet ic and non-kinet ic ci fects, alonj' ' ' a r i o u s l i n c s o f ' o p e r a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , w h i l c p o l i c e a n d m i l i t a r y a r e c o - o p e r a t i n g i n t h escarch for insurgent bascs. internat ional and non-govemmental aid organizat ions ( i longvvith mi l i tary supporl) may be dcveloping improv-d infrastructure in Jisadvantagcd L,.banareas whi lc lhe government, with help l iom a supporl ing western democracy, n, , Iy b"rc fb r rn ing e lec t ion laws to address some under ly ing d issa t is lac t ion fb r the g .n . rn lPopuiat iotr ' In short , al though di f ferent methocls and aims may bc Lrsecl at c l i f l -crent ]cvelso lau thor i t l . a l l rn r - rs t be bounc l by a un i ty o f purposc , rha t i s , io c le l ' ca t the insurgencvar ld i l s caL lses F igure 5 i l l us t ra tes the var ious l ines o1 'opcra t ion , in an in tc r lo .L i . ,gs - \ ' s ten o f 'ac t ion , lbcLrscd on ach icv ing the po l i t i ca l end s ta te .

( . hap I 1 3 , : 5

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OPPOSNG

J)URPoSF

EN

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F igu re 5 , Mu l t i - agcncy App roach

I i t e | ; i : r e i l t l c s t l l L t l L r i t l c r n i l i t u l r o l t e n r ( i r r r . t s r r r r r l t l r e t i e s r r i t h i n l r e ( ) u n t ( . 1i r l \ t t l . ! c r t e \ , l t l t t e r c t l i t i n c d c r t u n t l i r r d e c r i c i c s . r l n t r t e c r r t i r r i c s . I l r o s c t r l i n c j r r l e st r t l i c t t l l t t e t l J i r l l , r r r i r r s l l r c i n s r , r r g c r t e i c s o l ' t h c n r i c l c l l c t r l ' t l t c l i r s l c u n t r r l r l c r n l r i n r l r l i t l r r p t j. ' i ' l c c L i i t ' l r r r i l t r ( ' o t t r c r t t i r r t t l t l i t r . n t i c s i l l c n r ) l n c c c s s i r r i ] r ' s L r u c t r r r u t l t 9 l l t l r r i l ! ' ! , 1 1 1 [ u r . -i r t s t t t ' . -encr ba t t le . However , such opera t ions are no t the purv iew o f spec ia l o r e l i terni l i tary or para-mil i tary forces (al though they rnay have roles to play as wel l ) . I { isroryItas demonstrated that the most successful counter- insurgency operat ions havc beenconducted by non-doctr inaire, convent ional (even conscript) annies that havc deployeclr .v i th s i rnp l l ' a gu id rng sc t o f p r inc ip les , dcve lop ing the i r tac t i cs as the s i tuar iop becarneitndet 'stood. Paramourtt to the success of the rni l i tary port ion of the campaign has beenthe ab i l i t y o f o f f i cers to exerc ise the i r command w i th l i ccdom, f )ex ib i l i t y and co l f i c iencecvcn dow'n to t l te Iorryest levcls, using ingenuit l l ancl resourccfulness to take the batt lc tothe tnsurget t ts on one hand, v l ,h i l s t a t te rnp t ing to reso lve the roo t caL lses on the o ther .l r rdeed, those a t t r ibu tes o f a reg imcnta l sys tem - con f ic lence a l fo rdec i thc comnrander inrcn lo lc s i t t ta t i c lns , la rn i l ia r i t y among cornrades and across ranks , anc l re i iance o1 sura l lL t t l i t (cvc t l se ,c l i t tn ) ac t ions - have provcr r r ros I e f ' fec t i ve in counter - rnsurgencyo p c r a t l o n s .

4 9 .

' 1 t n t t as n t / , r t ' , t , - l n / en r r ' t . ) .Con f l i c t - A Co r t t pc t r u ! i t , e An i t l . t ' . s r . : . . cd i t ed byi i r s * , e l l . l 3 r - a s s c ; , ' s D e i ' e n c e I ) u b l i s h e r s . T o r o n t o . I 9 8 9 .

D a v i d C l t a r t e r s a n d N l u u r i c c

( ' l r a p i l . + / 1 5

A n a n t t n E 4 i n n n n { t

I )RAF ' I

"successful wqrri,rs are practical men. 'they rend ro use what works. Ancj

tnsurgency works. Insurgents have defeated the us in vietnam. ,

colonel [R-etd) T.X. Hammes, uSMC, "why Study Smair wars?,,, snartI lars Journol,Yol 1 (Apri l 2005): 1,3

50 ' [ -he commitment of western clcmocracics ancl ai l iances to the stabi l izat ion of.la i led or fa i i ing s ta tes and the des i re to l im i t g loba le f fec ts o f insurgencres in an era o f\ \capons o f mass des t ruc t ion means tha t governrncnts w i l l c lep loy bo th r r i l i ta ry fo rccsand c r iv i l ian agenc ies , togc ther , in o rdcr to address these th rea is to rcgrona l and g loba l

s tab i l i t y Not on ly must comtnanders unders tand the mi l i ta ry 's ro le in a countc r -Insurge l l cy carnpa ign , bLr t they must be ab le to unc le rs tand t l ie key ro le p layed by o ther

: : : ' l : i . : : . 1": l f "* al l agencies w,ork rogether in a unrty ol .purposc ro dcfcar insurgcncics

l r n o I l t e l l ' c a 1 1 s c s .

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CHAPTER 2

DESCRIB ING AN INS URGENCY

' What the Israeli.s soon discoveredwas that Arafat had transformed a loosefederation ofarmed groups into a campLex economic organization. Acting like a legitimate state, thePLO generated annual revenue in excess ofthe gross national produit ofa number ofArab countries, includingJordan. Thanks to this windfalt it effectively ran Gaza ancl theLlest Bank"

Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporaled; TracingNeltyorks. New York: Seven Stories Press. 2005:(upr is ing) in December 1987.

SECTION I: GENERAL

the Dollars Behind the Terror65, on the outbreak of the Intifada

I Causes. An insurgency may spring from many causes; however, the classiclnsurgency usual ly begins with the percept ion of oppression due to pol i t ical , societal andeconomic gr ievances. When these percept ions become suff ic ient ly emotive, leaders mayemerge who are able to organise protest or resistance, and inf luence people to r iskimprisonment and even death in order to resist the establ ished order.

2. Aim. An insurrect ion wi l l a im to gain the advantage of power within a givenpol i t ical context in order to real ise socio-economic, cul tural , rel ig ious and geographicgoals or some combinat ion of these,

3 Characteristics. Each insurgency is unique and will therefore have its own set ofcharacter ist ics. Al though insurgencies may share simi lar character ist ics, each wi l l haveexceptional features. For this reason, Cold War-styie intelligence and planning templateshave reduced utility. In conventional manoeuvre warfare, the known structure of militaryformations and evident pattern of troop concentration in specific terrain often gave vcrygood indicat ion of intent. For example, the concentrat ion of Army level br idging assets ina Mechanized Divis ion's area of responsibi l i ty f ront ing on a r iver, with two ArmouredDivisions moving into assembly areas in the immediate depth, are very good indicat ionsof the preparatory phases of a del iberate assault r iver crossing. An insurgent movcmentwi l l probably use a cel lular structure within which the cel ls do not conform to a Datrernamongst or within themselves. Nottcthclcss. al t l toush ntuch i . r-r t l 'c cprni t lcx. thc inte nt of 'insurgents bascd on struclul 'es can be r lcternr incd. Ir t t r erarnple, su.stai trecl observat ionmay reveal certain ce1ls l inked with specif ic act iv i t ies such as information operat ions,kidnapping or bank robbery, Nonetheless, as a securi ty measure, insurgents may al ter ortransform cel ls for specif ic operat ions in a random manner. The one key attr ibuie, wSichdist inguishes insurgency from most other forms of conf l ict , is the insurgent 's aim o1'fo rc ing po l i t i ca l change.

4 . Trans i t iona l Nature o f Insurgenc ies . Insurgenc ies are more l i ke ly to occur instates with inherent social boundaries, whose racial , cul tural , rel ig ious, or ideologicai

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drl ferences dtsrupt nat ional cohesion, Insurgencies thr ive in states lacking eff ic ient,s tab le . o r popu lar go \e rnments , cond i t ions tha t a re aggravated by economic weakness .corrupt ion, or foreign agitat ion. Al though various insurgency ntoclcls exist , fervinsurgenc ies f i t nea tJy iu to any r ig id c lass i f i ca t ion . such as ru ra l o r u rbau. Len in is t o rMaoist. Effect ive insurgents wi i l take previous campaigns' lessons and adaptthem tothe i r ou 'n par t i cu la r needs . For example , in rhe 1990s. Hamas pro f i ted b1 , the pLO's lossdue to Arafat 's al ignment with Saddam Hussein and his relat ively moderate pol ic iestoward Israel. The Saudis cut of f money to the pLO, which caused them to loscinf luence. Whi le not lessening i ts ant i - lsrael s[ance, Hamas avoided support ing the Iraqidictator. Palest inians began looking to Hamas for leadership By the end of the 1990s,Flamas was carrying out most of the terror act iv i ty in Israel. Israel i sources claimed thatin the l6 months before May 2002, Hamas received $135 MILLION (uS) from SaudiArabia to meet expcnses, '

5 Assessing the Insurgencl, . Examining the complete range of character ist ics wi l lt issist a commander and staff in predict ing the insurgents' campaign plan. Prcviousexperience and historical research may provide valuable guidance, however, the key to anapproprtate response remains an object ive mi l i tary est imate: see annex A for a l ist offactors that should be considered. trsscnt ial lv. 1o support opcrat ional piapninq. thcest imate wi i l ident i fy the insurgency's causes, the extent of i ts ' internal and externalsupport, including the basis of the insurgents' appeal to the target population, motivationand depth of iocal commitment, and the likely weapons and tactics COIN forces mavface.

6. Forms of Insurqencv. As establ ished above, i t is v i tal to mi l i tary success forcommanders and staffs to fuily understand the nature of the insurgency. To this end, sixmain forms of insurgency have been defined, which are listed in the foilowins table.

Anarchist Intent is to destroy the system. Thereare normaily no plans to replace anyform of government with anothersystem. The most potent ial lydangerous form of insurrection is thatof the anarchist group which sets outto eliminate all poiitical structuresand the social fabr ic associated withthem.

Being very secret ive, suchgroups remain smali andlacking public support.Given the rising threat ofterrorism based onWeapons of MassDestruct ion their potent ialdes t ruc t iveness to soc ie tycannot be overlooked.2This has been seen recent lvln two variants: Communist(Malaya, Vietnam), and

Loretta Napoleoni, Terror lncorporated Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Netvorks. New york:Seven Stor ies Press , 2005: 72-73 pass im.: F 'o r example , The US Senate Nuc lear Pro l i fe ra t ion survey assesses a 70 percent chance o fnuc lear / rad io log ica l te r ro r is rn w i th in the decade. On l ine h t tp : / / lugar .senate ,gov / repor ts ,NpSurvey ,pd f .A c c e s s e d l 6 J u l y 2 0 0 5 .

c h 2 ' . 2 t 1 1

Comment

Egal i tar ian Seeks to impose central ly control ledstructures and institutions. bvmobi l iz ing the people (masses). to

A n ^ n 6 - n

DRAFT

I - radi t ional ist

p lov loe equar l t )al l state resourcS..kt to *". t1n a f i n r a l / n r i n r n o

n r p r l i n r r c n B e n

n f t h e . e o i ^ .

/ rn the dts t r rbut ron o l

,".k t"I vaiues rooted in the- . d ] " ^ l ^ - i - - . 1 l " i . r ^ . . ,. r r J L r l w l w S t z r u , r i t J ! v 1 )

Ba'a thrs t (Syna, I raq)

-l n ls Iype o I rnsurgencvoften inci tes simi larmovements eisewhere. Seenrecent ly as Is lamic Jihad(Egypt) or I lezbol lah(Lebanon)

S eparatist Seeks to remove themselves, and thearea in which they live, from thecontrol of the remainder of the state

T h e l n m n f n n l i t i n a l

system adopted bysuccessful insurgents var iesenormously. Amongst theexamples are the Tamils(LTTE) in Sri Lanka

Reformist This form of insurgency is similar tothe separatist type but more moderate,in that insurgent groups fight forpolitical, economic or social reformsand possibly some form of autonomy,without dramatically altering theoolitical status ouo.

Fight ing by MexicanIndians (1994) in thatcountry 's south is a recentexample.

Preservationist Seeks to maintain the political statusquo because ofthe relativeadvantages avai lable. Theseinsurgents fight non-ruling groupsand the goverrrment, where necessary,in order to frustrate anv movestowards chanse,

Can be seen in theAfrikaner ResistanceMovement in apartheidSouth Africa, and NorthemIreland's Protestantparamilitary groups.

SECTION 2: THE SCOPE, CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS OF INSURGENCY

7 . Strategies. Insurgent leaders are generally well informed, astute and willprobably study the lessons of previous campaigns of insurgency. Global ly, becausepopuiar insurgent strategies cont inue to provide inspirat ion and assistance for diversegroups, the professional development of intei l igence and operat ions staff should includestudy in this area. Analysis of an insurgent 's strategic approach has pract icalappl icat ion,including the product ion of doctr inal COIN guidance. Four broad strategic approachesare sLrggested below, the elements of whichmay be combined by the insurgents:

a. Conspirator ial Stratesy. The oldest and least compl icated of thestrategies features smal l cel ls at tempting to release the energy of adisal fected society. generat ing a "spontaneous" upris ing by means of boldarmed ac t ion . Th is was the s t ra tegy used by the Bo lshev iks in 1917,wherein ke1' points are se ized and a decapitat ing str ike made against the

C h 2 : 3 1 1 7

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govemlng reg lmc, In r ts modern var ian t . the insurgents p lace grea t e i lb r ti n t o e x p l o i t j n g m e d i a c o v c r a g e .

Profracted Popular War This Maoist strategy sees three , ,phase s,, :strategic defence (organizat ion), strategic equi l ibr ium lgueni i la warfare)and strategic offensive (open batt le), culminat ing in theleizure of pol i t icalpower. This strategy assumes that the cause wi l l at tract ever- increasingnumbers of supporters. I ts tact ics involve a mix of pol i t ical act iv i t l , ,tenorism and guenilla warfare, with the former always predominating.The strategy has been most appl icable in rural , peasant_ius., tenvironments in si tuat ions where govemment control is weak or non_existent. c i t ies and urbanrzat ion may provide a simi lar space nceded tofoster the groMh of this type of insurrcct ion,

Urban Insurgencv. In i ts pure form this strategy involves the appl icat ionof organized cr ime and tenorism in a systematic and ruthless manner. Thisstrategy, more than the others, aims to provoke a repressive mi l i taryresponse that wi l l a l ienate a volat i le mass of the urban poor and movethem to revolt . I t rel ies pr imari ly upon ruthless terror tact ics augmentect bymedia manipulation to generate an air of panic, erode the morale of thepol i t ic ians, the administrators and the judiciary, the pol ice and the army,with the aim of inducing a cl imate of col lapse. The insurgency ant ic ipatesthat the government will then capitulate or be provoked i-nto actoptingrepressive measures and, above al l , causing bloodshed. Against suchrepression, the insurgent appears as the peoples, protectoi

Mi l i tarv Focus. In contradict ion with almost al l insurgent strategres, thisone places priority on military, rather than political, suc-cess. It has beenascribed to the cuban leadership (Fidel and Raul castro, and , ,che' ,Guevara). Assuming that the population will flock to the winning side, itworks only when the government is weak, has been discredited, and racksreliable, effective, armed forces, Be aware that other types of insurgentgroups appear by seeking a wel l -publ ic ized mil i ta$ui. . r , ear ly on, so asto gain popular support; and

Liberat ion Strategy. Whi lst many insurgencies may be focused onnat ional aims and the creat ion of a new state, some insurgencies maysimply aim at the expulsion of what is v iewed u, un o.. . ipying authori tyor nat ion(s). In many peace support or stabi l is ing operat ions u-. ingconducted by a coal i t ion with an rnternat ional ly ianct ioned mandate , adisaffected element (often one that has lost power) may resort to aninsurgency strategy in order to disrupt the efforts to stabi l ise or cement thenew pol i t ical order.

d .

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Basic Tenets. AII successful insurgen'rs adhere to certain basrc tenets. Natural ly

sLrch pr inc ip ies must be app l ied ra t rona l i y w i th in the ex is t ing soc ia l and po i i t i ca l

c i rcumstances when assess ing an insurgency . These tcnets a re :

a. a sui table cause;

b

c .

leadership;

popular support; and

organizat ion.

9. Motivat ing Central Cause. As mentioned previously, the def ini t ion of " the

cause" is crucial as a ral ly ing point. The "cause" must appeal to al l levels f iom

support ing the phi losophic ideals of the strategic leadership to the tact ical motivat ion of

the rank and file.

10. Leadership. An insurrect ion of len gives r ise to a charismatic leader, who

inspires followers, converts the uncommitted, and commands the respect or fear of those

who normally support the government. Often throughout history, such leaders have

become "cult f igures" whose very name becomes a ral ly ing point, Lxamplcs inclucic

Lenin, General Franco and Che Guevara. Insurgencies require leaders able to determine

political/strategic aims as well as the enabling tactics. While a strong leader is required in

the early stages of an insurgency when it is necessary to enforce ones leadership against

contending r ivals or i f the cause seems weak or div is ive. When the cause is sound, the

leader need not be so charismatic.

I L Popular Support. 'fhe

cause and the leader must appeal to as wide an audience

as possible, Those who are uncommitted or hostile to the cause must be persuaded or

coerced to join the cause. Some may have to be killed to persuade the others. Popular

support is important from a political point of view, and essential to the provision of

intel l igence, Iogist ics, and to support a protect ive securi ty screen around the insurgents'

c landcst ine organizat ion.

12. Orqanizat ion. A successful insurgency must have some organizat ion in order to

funct ion and respond to the many aspects of an insurgency. As the insurgency develops,

organiz-at ion into groups/cel ls i companies etc wi l l be vi tal for securi ty and to expand

fur ther . ln add i t ion , the organ iza t ion may prove to be the nuc ieus o f a successor

goverrrment should the insurgency succeed. Modern networking enables communicat ions

for the coordinat ion of rnsurgent act iv i t ies. Fund raising and the transfer of money are

made easier and more discrete. Vir tual command saves on r iskl ' face-to-face meetings

and courier act iv i t ies but also tends to lessen central ized control . The bombings in

Madr id and London in 2005 are cxamples o f th is para i le l i sm enab led by modern web

based communicat ions. The Madrid bombings probably inf luenced an elect ion and

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caused the a l te ra t ion o f Span ish government po l i cy . 81 , con t ras t , the London bombincsrvere probably counterproduct ive ancl onl1, served to st i f ien Bri t ish nat ionaj resolve.

13 ' Contex t o f the Insurgencv . Beyond these four bas ic tenets , a success lu i Co lNprogram must also consider the insurgency's context, Circumstance wi l l o{ten dictatewhat an insurgent can, and canrot, do. For exalnple, several upr is ings that s lavishly

::fl:l r"r]:r:r,-t:lussia or cuba were dism.al faiiules The Spartacist revolts in Germany

\ tY tv ) , and Lhe uuevar ra 's a t tempts rn Bo l iv ia (1961) fa i led g iven tha t ideo log ica) lybascd campaign plans did not f i t the socio-pol i t ical context of"G.rrnuny and Bol iv iare spect iveiy. Nonetheless, a populat ion, that is dissat isf ied with i ts condit ions in generaland holds the percept ion of a weak government, can provide fert i le soi l for a ski l lcdinsurrect ionary leader with a popular cause and comietent organizat ional support . A wel lled and organized insurrection may, if the government commands a wide measure ofsupport and can rely on its security forces, devolve into a protracted, attritional war. Suchan attr i t ion campaign may st i l l succeed i f the insurg.n.y.un gradual ly erode the wi l l ofthe government 's supporters at and persuade publ ic opinion airongst i ts foreign al l ies thatthe govemment 's cause is hopeless.

14. Factors Affectins. The factorstenets of the insurgency i tsel f and wi l lcarefully applied. 'l 'he

factors are:

affecting an insurgency can be as important as thecontribute significantiy to the end results if

Protracted war' Although a weak govemment may falr quite quickry to awell organized rebellion, or even overnight to a coup d'dtat, u ,trunggovernment may only be defeated by a war of attrition. Time is on the sideof the insurgent. Rural territory supports a gradual occupation of acountry, as demonstrated by Mao Tse-tung in china. arihough an urbanguerrilla's inability to occupy territory can be partially overJore byestablishing "no-go" areas with in cities, the strategyl, -o." one of'war-weariness, economic privation, and the inability oith. gou"-ment tosuppress terrorism, than on winning an overall militaryiictory to achievevictory.choice of Terrain. Given the reiat ive wcakness, rn rerat ion to thegovernment 's standing army, an insurgent force is compel led to make bestuse of terrain. As recent ly noteci in one academic ru*.y, , . . . .wi thout theabi l i ty to seize and hold rerr i tory or to win quick victory, ,pu.. and t imebecame weapons rather than goals."3 when canadian troops hrst arr ivedin cyprus, bel l igerent forces on both sides rnade best possible use of theTroodos mountains and urban Nicosia in order to coniinue operution..

b .

' John Shy and Thomas W Col l ier , , ,Revoiut ionary War, , , MakersOx fo rd , C la rendon P ress , 1986 : 839 .

c h 2 . . 6 ^ 7

2

of Modern Strategt, peter paret, ed

" . thc guer r i l l a ' s g rea tes t advantages are h is per [ec t knowledge o f an

area (wh ich he h imse l f has chosen) and i t s po ten t ia l . and the suppor tg iven h im by the jnhab i tan ts . " To tu rn th is de fea t in to a v ic to ry , the

counter insurgent must rccogn ise tha t " th is to ta l dependence upon te r ra in

and populat ion is also the gueni l la 's weak point."

Roger Trinquier, Modern lVarfare; A French View of COIll. New York:

Praeger, 1964: ci ted in Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning CON Warfare,"

Parameters , Spr ing 2004. l8 -19 .

DRAFT

Intelligence. The insurgency threat picture is vastly more complicated thanmost other forms of conflict in the sense that there are no "templated"solut ions to the intel l igence problem. Unl ike convent ional warfare, where

mass fires and manoeuvre may potentially substitute for comprehensiveintelligencc and planning, neither insurgency nor COIN can afford thatluxury. For the insurgent, the best source of intel l igence is a sympathiserworking for the government, preferably in security-related employment.'fhe

media may also contribute to the insurgent's information gatheringprocess, ei ther inadvertent ly or intent ional ly.

Establishment of an Alternative Society. The insurgents aim to imposetheir altemative view of society, motivated by nationalist, religious, orpoliticai beliefs. Nationalism presents an emotive call to patriotism toreplace a government not portrayed as ruiing in the country's bestinterests. An insurgents' desire to restructure sociefy along morefundamentai ist rel ig ious l ines is increasingly common. Pol i t icalmotivat ions, spanning both lef t- and r ight-wing ideologies, compete with

the simple desire for power, as a cause of insurgencies. Depending uponthe political faction and the current international situation, insurgents maytherefore receive support from sympathetic nations in terms of diplomaticsupport , the supply of weapons, and training assistance. Converseiy,internal support may also come in the form of wide spread criminalact iv i ty, which wi l l I ikely have to be addressed in any COIN plan.

In a recent book, Loretta Napoleoni puts forward the concept of a"state shel l" to establ ish an al ternat ive society as fol lows: " The resultof a process through which armed organizat ions assemble the socio-economic infrastructure ( taxat ion, employment, services, etc.) of a statew i t h n r r r t l ^ e n o l i t i c a l n n o / n n t p r r f ^ r v n n s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i n n ) " I n t h ev Y r ( l r v u L L l r L P v r r r r ! s r

course of the book the author considers numerous examples includingthe Christian Miiitia in Lebanon, Ihe Fuerzas Armadas Revelucionariasde Colombia (FARC), Hamas, the Is lamic Movement of Uzbekistan,thc Nor thern AI I iance in A fghan is tan . the PLO and Samed th roughoutthe Middlc East and elsewhere. and last but not least the Tal iban inAfghanistan.

Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated Tracing the Dollars Behindc h 2 . 1 i l 7

1 the Ter ror Ne l . ,vorks . New York : Sevcn S ior ies Press ,2005: 65-R0 ̂- ' r l l- - - Ar r . r r l t?nA_7 nnnnt?

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External support As mentioned previousry. insurgencies wi l l at lempt touse the var ious "weapons" at i ts disposal. The leadership wrl l a im ro wageinsurgency on poir t ical , economic, propaganda, and mil l tary frontssimultaneously, Foreign support is enl isted for the insurg.n.y, whi le everyeffort is made to discredit the govemment at home and abroud. A mrl i tarystruggle of "hi t & run" tactrcs wi l l be conducted, potent ial ly augmented bvtenorist attacks where the insurgent determines their util ity. ,{i activity isdesigned to overturn and embarrass the state to the point where thecol lapse ofauthori ty and control occurs.

concurrent Act iv i ty As for any effect ive organizat ion, c iv i l or mi l i tary,the ability to conduct its range of activities simultaneously enhances theeffectiveness of its overall operations with the coroliary effect ofheightening the publ ic 's percept ion of i ts cohesion uni"upubir i ty. In otherwords, the insurrect ion that looks and acts l ike a competent paral lel state,idcologies aside, could becomc the state.

I5. weak Points. There are usual ly many potent ial weak points within aninsurgency, particr-rlarly apparent in the earlydays of a.urnpuign, that are vulnerable tosome form of attack and disruption by COIN forces:

Secrecv' Any group planning to use force and violence to prosecute itsaims must adopt a secretive, conspiratoriar approach to their pranning andactions. This may a'id a degree of glamour and attractiv.n.r, to potentiairecrui ts. (stal in and Lenin are st i l l better known to history by their , ,nomsde guerre," than their real names.) This secrecy, however, .un ,oonbecome counterproductive by affecting the necessary freedom of'action,lowering conf idence in other simi lar insurgent groups, and courci readi lylead to serious misunderstanding within the organisation. There rs abalance to be struck between a too secretiu. ond clandestine approach toinsurgency actions, and the need to avoid undue attention by tireauthorities or rival groups Some insurgencies have attempted to minimizethe di f f icul t ies by creat ing a more pubric, poi i t ical arm. I .or exanrpre . rhcreis the I I IA 's assoc ia ted S inn Fe in :

Q4ining sunport. Gaining popular support for the cause can be adifficult and sensitive period in the early life of an insurgency. if thepubiicly accepted reason for rising against the governmJnil-,u, appeal thernsurgency should thrive. Various groupings and factions may holddif fer ing opinions, requir ing di f ferent techniques, including possiblecompromises and/or intimidation, to gain their support. Ind-iiference,ant ipathy, and l ikely fear of government repr isal * i l l urro have to beovercome. Publ ic i ty dramatical ly improves the prospect of gaining

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popu lar suppor l , even bad pub l ic i t y can spread word tha t there is 3 g rou ; ). ^ " i " r i - ^

" . 1 ^ i ^ h ^ o r c v n 2 n d r p c n r i t m e n l '1 g ) l J L t l l B l w . l l l L i l t d l l e A P s l I u - ! ! / u . L r r r ! . r . .

Secure Operat ing Base. Insurgents require a secure base from which toopera te . Se lec t ing a loca t ion d is tan t f rom ac t iv i t y cen t res mav hcpotent iai ly more secure for the insurgett ts, but nral 'a lso put t l tent out oftouch with the people and vulnerable to isolat ion. Close proximity l ikel ; ,eases the securi ty force tasks of survei l lance. inf i l t rat ion, and destruct ion.Establ ishing an operat ing base in a border region can of len provide atemporary, or perhaps permanenl headquarters beyond the authori ty of thestate;

Funding. Al l insurgencies require some degree of funding in order toacquire the staples of conf l ict : weapons, ammunit ion, food and medicines.Lack of sufficient funds could limit the scope of an insurgency and inhibitits prospects of success. This is a weakness that the state authorities couldutilise to their advantage if it is recognised. Unless a friendly nation orindividuals back the insurgency, funding can be found in criminalactivities such as narcotic trafficking, robberies, and extortion. Whiledrugs in particular have proven to be a more enduring source of incomethan bank robberies, i t br ings the movement into contact with unrel iable,vulnerable groups who could attract undue attention from the authorities.On the other hand, external support may also have a poiitical price thatcould affect the overal l aim ofan insurgency,

The Problem of Chaneine Aims. Cl ianging aims is not so much of aproblem at the start of an insurgency but has a potentially damaging effectonce an insurgency has been in operation for some time. Changing aims isa common occurrence when an insurgency is stil l coalescing. Initialoperat ions may change the out look of some insurgents with some quest ionas to the pr ice of the overal l aim part icrr lar ly i f securi ty force successesspread doubt about the cause or the insurgency's leadership. A seeminglygenerous compromise offered by the state to the insurgents could provedivisive; insurgent leaders may have to apply ruthless measures to ensurethat unity and secrecy are preserved. Changing aims can be furtherproblematic given the aforementioned secrecy, which may sparkmisunderstanding and suspicion throughout the insurgency;

Sett ing the Pace. Control i ing the pace and t iming of operatrons is vi tal tothe success of any campaign, Given that insurgents can control the start ofoperat ions, and have some measure of control over subsequent act iv i ty, i tis surprising to note that many insurgencies have failed to capitalize onopportunit ies, or have al lowed the pace of events and scope of act iv i t ies tobe dictated by the state authori t ies. Once momentum is lost, the strategicini t iat ive returns to the state , Leaving the insurgency exposed; and

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Informers. whi le informers have sometimes been inf i l t rated inrornsurgent ce l l s , i t i s fa r more common to ach ievc success by persuad ingI l re rnsLr rgen l to become an in fo rmer Th is i s someone a l ready in theorganizat ion, or is a l ink between ciandest ine cel ls and their publ icaccomplices, such as the couriers, cut-outs, or suppi iers. There is nothrngmore demoral iz ing to the insurgents than to fear that of one of therr t rustecipeople is giv ing information to the government. Insurgent leaders wi l l t ryto st i f le informers by ruthless exemplary punishmcnts.

INSURGENT WAYS AND MEANS

INSURGENT TACTICS

16. General . The del iberate promotion of adverse publ ic i ty against governmentagencies and security forces is essential and complementary. This aspect has proven rnoreeffective with the growing trcnd towards political groups using civil l iberties and humanrights to lower the tolerance of the public for harsher COINrn.urur.r. 'fhe

insurgents'claim to legitimacy is based on their declared ability to improve the position of tileoppressed. The essentially violent nature of insurgencies moves in two concurrentcomplementary paths, one destructive and the other constructive, as follows:

a. destructive actions are clearly aimed at overthrowing the cstablished orderand creat ing a cl imate of col lapse in the states. authori ty. Destruct ivcact iv i t ies includc;

( l ) subversion,

(2) sabotage of the economic framework,

(3) terrorism and guerrilla activity, and

(4) large scale combat operations;

b. the constructive effort, meanwhile, aims at creating an organization tosubsequently replace the established order at a suitable moment.

17. Subversion. Subversive act iv i ty attempts to undermine the pol i t ical , economicand mil i tary strength of a state, r .v i thout resort ing to the use of forcebythe insurgent.These may provoke violent countermeasures to be denounced as an over-reaction bv theauthorities, discrediting the government. Subversion takes many forms. such aspenetrat ing exist ing pol i t ical part ies and organizar ions, and developing frontorganizations that can have the appearance ofchallenging and Oefying tne authority ofgoverrlment. An insurgency wili seek to win supporters within the govemment, especiallythe securi ty elements, in order to discern future plans and possibly any other."onor, .and f lnancial information. These are al l useful for an insurgency to exploi t as approprrate.paf i icular ly in the eariy days of an insunect ion.

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18. Insursent In fo rmat ion Opera t ions . Propaganda is a ke1, e lement o f subvers ion .I t inc ludes pub l ish :ng in fo rmat ion de t r imenta l to the govemmenl o r secur i ty fo rces . thesn 'ear l jno nFr t r r rn r , -S . whether tn le o l " fa lse de" ipned to r rndern inc t rus t and conf idencc1n tne goverrunent,

19. Passive Resistance. Depending upon the society in which the insurgency isoperat ing, passive resistance may be a useful tact ic. I t is more effect ive in l iberalsociet ies, given an authori tar ian regime's abi l i ty to crush such open dissent. Examples ofpassive resistance include rvithdrawing labour from public services, obstructing the iaw,or si t - ins in publ ic places,

20. Sabotase. Sabotage is disrupt ive act iv i ty that furthers the insurgents' interests. i tmay be act ive or passive.

b

Active sabotage sees insurgents set out to disrupt important services,functions or industrial processes by violent means. Targets may beselected at random for political or economic impact, or they may fit into awider tacticai plan with the aim of increasing general confusion and tyingdown troops in the static defence of installations. Suitable targets includebridges, roads, telephone l ines, or dispersed mil i tary logist ics si tes.Targets whose destruction might cause mass unemployment and therebylose the goodwill of the people are in general avoided.

Passive sabotage is generally aimed at causing disorder and disruption bydeliberate error, contrived accident, absenteeism or strikes. The target canbe industry, public services, supplies or troops, where action is usuallyplanned on a wide scale through political front organizations. Datasabotage is facilitated by the universality of computers in government,business, and industrial control systems. These can be carried throughcyber attack or by having an insurgent or sympathizer physical ly damagethe system.

21. Terror ism. T'error ism, in i ts standard formulat ion of "ki l l ing one to int imidate athousand" is an ever-present technique within insurgencies. Global ly, terror ist at tackssecnr to be increasing in frequency, violence, and number of fatal i t ies. Terror can be usedtac t ica l l y to p rov idc pub l i c i t y fo r the insurgent movement , coerce the government in tochanging pol ic ies or surrendertng, and maintaining discipl ine within the insurgentmovement. Ubiquity of media and Internet Jras simpl i f ied the insurgents' chal lenge ol 'communicat ing their message. Contemporary terror ists simply pass videotape to asupporl ive news out let , and there is no doubt about the insurgents' c laimed motivat ions.

"The chief c laim used ro just i fy terror ism is that i f oppressed groups were requiredto abstain,from violence directed at civiiians;,their,political cause would becondemned to failure.In,th6l'face of oppreSsibn and supeiior force, terrorismrat ional izes i tsel fas the only strategy that can Iead the oppressed to vicrory."

Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil Polirical Ethics in an Age of Terror. Toronro;(:F a4\AltEroup, 2 004. ix.

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22. Fund Raising. The insiu'ge tr ts ' costs fbr weapons, medicines, pol i t ical br ibes au6thc l ike are often very expensive. An indicator of a developing insurgency shgLrlc itherefore include fund-raising efforts. In the early stages, this will p-UuUty be covert andcriminal, such as bank robbery. Subsequently, the politicai organization within theinsurgency wi l l take on the task of extract ing aid from wel l- in ient ioned, chantable andphi lanthropic organizat ions, and from sympathizers abroad. Some cr iminal organizatronsblur the line between lawbreaking and insurgency. For example, the Cali drug cartelfunds an insurgency in Colombia through narco terrorism thit has spin-off economicbenef i ts to the local growers of the coca plants.o More violent methods may i lc ludc, theextorting of ransom from individuals (kidnapping), or from governments (Lijacking), andperhaps the enforced levying of taxes on intimidated sections of the population. f;inall1,,as has been demonstrated by the PLO and the FARC, a mature insurgency can develop aparal lel socio-economic order, which may attain a level of pol i t ical legi t imacy in the eyesof the local populace greater than that enjoyed by the legal government.

23. weapons and Equinment. Insurgents tend to use basic weapons whoseessentials have not changed very much since the i 940s. Beyond simple availability,select ion cr i ter ia are based upon compactness, lethal i ty and simple operat ing pro..du..r .The followins should be noted:

b .

Personal weapons are principally pistols, carbines, rifles and weapons witha high rate of fire. In recent times weapons and bombs have beenminiatur ized, explosives harder to detect and more lethal, accompanied bya dramatic increasc in improvised explosive devices.

Insurgents general ly have access to a complete range of combat supponweapons. Sniper r i f les ut i l is ing arrnour-piercing ammunit ion are beingsecn more frcquent ly. Improvised morrars are easy to make al th, . ,uglr i reusual ly inaccurate and unrel iable, Most require some form of , , f lat bed,,for t ransportat ion. Acquisi t ion of mi i i tary mortars and ammunitronsignif icant ly increase the range and iethal i ty of such weapons. RpG-typeant i-armour weapons prol i ferate. Portable air defence missi les pose asignif icant threat. The mere possession of air defen.. * .uoonr.

2

' Lo re f ta Napo leon i , Ter ro r lncorpora ted ; See espec ia l l y Chapter 2 "The N, lacroeconomics o f Ter ro r , , , pp

I3 -29 and Chapter 3 "The Pr iva t iza t ion o f Ter ro r " , Pp 3 l - 48 . Napo leon i examines and cara logues rhemethods and e f fec ts o f var ious Insurgent movements ' l i nkages , i f no t ou t r igh t invo lvement . w i th narco t rcst rade and o ther fo rms o f para l le l soc io -economic s t ruc tu re and ac t iv iw .

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par . t i cu la r iv MANPAI)S, by an insurgent g roup w i l l d is rup t thegoverr iment use of hel icopters.

c . Exp los ives in la r ious fo rms are favoured weapons o f insurgents . M i l i ta rymines , bo th an t i -personne l and an t i - tank . a re f requent ly u t i l i sed byinsurgent. They have the dual purpose of hampering counter rnsurgencyforces' ef forts and terr i fy ing the local populat ion. lnsurgency forces areincreasrngly using Improvised Explosive Devices ( lEDs). fheeffect iveness of these weapons is wel l known and experl ise in theirmanufacture and handl ing is often of a high order. Sophist icatcd ini t iat ingder i ces , anr i - l i f t ing nrec l i rn isnrs , and innovat ive tac t i ca l p lacement( i r rc l r rd i r rg sec( ) r )d r rv I I IDs) a re becoming common. Fur ther , any inc ident .bomb or hoax can be used as a bait to kill security forces and EODspecial ists. Recent)1,. the sLr ic ide bomber has emereed as a paft icular l \ ,ef ' lbct ive vveapon. The sLric ic ' le bornber is in el ' lect aplccision rr ,eapon thata I so clc m onstratcs thc i t tst t t 'gcnc\" s ct tmm i tnt c t t t

d. Sophist icated chemicai, brological , radiological , or nuclear wcapons wi l ll ikely remain beyond the capabi l i ty of insurgent groups. Since the releaseof Sarin gas in Tokyo subway in 1995, the potential for insurgents to usecrude CBRN devices must be considered. Such a capability would beexpected only in an insurgent group already employing terrorist tactics.

INSUITGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

24. Rural insurgency remains widespread as the allocation of land, water or otherscarce mineral resources continues to provide a real or perceived grievance, particuiarlyin areas where there is a burgeoning population. Insurgent bases will be established rnremote areas often in di t f icut l terraiu (rnouutains. jLrngles. tbrest. etc.) . f rom whichattacks may be launched over as wide an area as possible to disperse scarce securi tyresources. These act ions may be mistaken for banditry;under the pretext of protect ionagainst such banditry, isolated vi l lages wi l l be prepared for det 'ence, including thediscreet clearance of fields of fire, Other indications that a campaign is developinginclude hoarding suppl ies, t raining and arming of v i l lage "sel f-defence" groups, andincreased evidence of local int imidat ion and coercion.

25. In i ts ear ly stages, d rural insurgency rel ies upon smal l bands assembling for al imited attack, probably against a remote and inadequately guarded target. As themovement grows to the stage where it can command significant support from the localpopulat ion, so i ts object ives wi l l become more ambit ious and larger forces wi l l benecessary. The relat ive strength of insurgent bands wi l l a lways place them at adisadvantage vis- i r-v is the securi ty forces and they wi l l seek to avoid a pi tched batt le;thcrr tact ics are therefore based on mobi l i ty and surpr ise, generalLy using ambushes andexp los ives .

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?6 Rural populat ions are vulnerable to terror ism and int imrdat ion and very quickly afcc l ing o f insecur i ty can spread around a who le reg ion , Such in t imrdat ion is commonrvi thin rural insurgencies because of the populat ion's relat ive physical isolat ion from thepro tec t ive secur i ty fo rces .

27. Ambush is the most widely used insurgent tact ic. I t is part icular ly effect iveagainst road movement, especial ly when the ground makes i t di f f icul t for the governmentforces to move off the road and take cover. In addition to sniping and massecl firesambushes, there is a growing trend in ambushes featur ing IEDs and suicide bombing

INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMBNT

28. With the degree of urbanization increasing globaliy, encountering urbantnsurgencies wi l l l ikely expand. Urban civi l izat ion is suff ic ient ly vulnerable to providerelatively small insurgent forces with the opportunity to create an atmosph.r. oiseriousalarm and insecurity sufficient to discredit the government.

29 lnsurgents do not normal ly plan to occupy and control teni tory al though they mayseize smal l areas for a l imited t ime to establ ish a presence from which they co-uldsubsequently receive support, Lacking the ability to occupy territory on a significantscale, insurgents wi l l a im to make the government 's posi t ion untenable by engendering astate of war-weariness, frustration and anger against govemment emergency measures.Under such condit ions, the people may ral ly to any organizat ion or leader who offersstabi l i ty.

30. Cities and towns provide great scope for insurgencies. The conccntration of alarge number of people in a relatively small area provides cover for the insursents.Moreover, the needs of a great city, related to the complexity of urban livingiherebyintemrption of power supplies, non-coliection of rubbish, cutting off water,-etc couldsoon bring a community to its knees. However, the insurgent may only find support incerlain areas of the towns or ci t ies,

31. The urban insurgent can operate more boldly than his rural counterpart for thesereasons, and his tactics reflect this. Intimidating the local population, as seen in ruralinsurgencies, also occurs in urban environments, In this sefting, population densitylaci l i tates the, insurgents' audacrty; they are able to readi ly disappear amongst thepopulace. However, this too is another double-edged sword, populat ion density may alsobe used to advantage by the counterinsurgent forces in the recruitment and placemcnt ofagents and in the stealthy infiltration of patrols.

32. The ready avai labi l i ty of large numbers of people means that a crowd can beassembled and demonstrat ions engineered, with comparat ive ease; these can then bernanipulated. The presence of women and chi ldren wi l i normal ly be an embanassment tothe securi ty forces, panicular l f i f the dernonstrat ion is stage managed to cause overreact ion by the sccuri ty forces against such a group.

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INS T-, R.GENT COMMUNICATIONS

33. G iven the po i i t i ca l a ims and secre t ivc na lu re o f insurgency , communica t ing isc r i t i ca l . Contac t amongst the inswgents i s accompl ished th rough smal i surep t i r iousgroups, or cel ls. They make extensive use of sccure methods, such as dead-let ter drops orcoded graff i t i . In addit ion to the methods below, the insurgents wi l l a lso use pol i t icali i terature such as manifestos. magazines, posters and circulars in order to communicate.Today, modern mass communicat ions faci l i tate the task of the insurrect ionary leader andsupport ing cadres. They can gain secure communicat ions within their organizat ion andstage broad appeais to the mass audience provided by the publ ic. Therefore, a modernmil i tary seeking to defend i ts parent or foster society, must be prepared to exploi t modernmedia and deny its use to an opponent. Currently, insurgents are known to employmodem communicat ions as fol lows:

a. Cel lular Telephone and Hand Held Motorolas. The mobi le phone andthe ICOM have become ubiquitous in the developing world. Insurgentsuse them for communication and deception. Veiled speech and falseinformation are used to compensate for and even exploit the open natureof these types of systems;

b. Radio. Radio is an increasingly used component of controlas wel l as ameans of passing information or propaganda. Underground radio stationsmay disseminate propaganda or order crowds out for demonstrations.They may also use radio frequencies to detonate bombs;

c. Television. Almost every insurgent group has used television directly topromote their cause, or indirectly, ensuring that incidents are newsworthyenough to be reported on television. It is no coincidence that the steep risein terrorist and insurgent action has taken place at the same time as thegroMh in television. The distribution of video tapes also enormouslyenhances an insurgent cause, as seen by the linkage between al-Qaeda andthe al-Jazeera media network:

d. The Press. Coded messages may be included in newspaperadvert isements, art ic ies in magazines, or on posters or circulars to conveyinstruct ions to cel ls, perhaps in conjunct ion with the dead let ter boxsystem. Such messages may be used to pass information when t ime rs notessent ial for the execut ion of an operat ion or to inform an insurgent of thet ime and date a pre-planned attack or incident is tn he steoed'end

e. Internet. The World Wide Web is being used increasingly withininsurgencies. Not only can i t be used fbr propaganda purposes, but also asa tool to pass along terror ist and insurgent techniques and procedures.Insurgents are increasingly publ ishing their versions of events in order toa t t rac t suppor t and show the i r s t rength . o f ten th rough v ideo c l ips o f anacks

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on securi ty forces or ki l l ings of k idnapped governmenr supporters. Suchr.vebsites thus become a pr imary source of intel l igence as analysts seekrndicators of insurgent morale, noms-de-guerre, var ious fact ions, and the i rmotrvators or ideologies, which may then be useful for negot iat ions orPSYOPS target ing.

"There was a concerted effort to take down the al-Qaida site a few ye ars ago and itkeptpopping up. The lsrael is tr ied to do i t with the Hezbol lah sire and i l nrnmnrerJ rwar of escalation. The result was a Iive-and-let-live mentalifv."

Bruce Hoffman, RAND, wastrington, cited in Jim Klane, .,Insurgency-friendly

sites Prone to Hoaxes," online, hftp://cnews.canoe.ca, 9 February 2005

SECTION 4 : OUTLOOK

34, A quick review of the international scene on any given day will confirminsurgency is on the increase. A host of groups and statesare using i t to al ter the pol i t icallandscape. Over the lasttwo decades, the number of intemational terrorist incidents hasrisen from 200 per year to over 800. This increase in the incidence of insurgency remainstrue even i f the f ight ing in Iraq is discounted. Insurgency seems l ikely to.emain the mostprevalent form of conflict and source of human suffering for the foreseeabie future.

35. Insurgency has been a potent force throughout the Cold War, a period that sawboth Superpowers defeated by insurgents, not decisive military defeat on the battlefield,but because thc political and economic costs were too high to sustain furtherinvolvement. The end of the Cold War created an unstable security environment thatsupported the growth of insurgent conflict. In paraliel, technological advances and thelowering of national baniers have created many more vulnerabiiities, which the insurgentcan exp. loi t . Developing communicat ions mean that the media (even those elements of i twhich are potent ial ly ' f r iendly ' to the state authori t ies) canbring the impactof insurgencyinto homes worldwide and live. Thus providing the insurgent with a free intematioialpublic platfonn, with insurgents driven to seek ever greater spectacular attacks to makenews, September 11th being a case in point, As a result , c iv i l and mil i tary leadershin canbe subjected to enormous pressures to act, based on the dubious whims of media-informed publ ic opinion.

36. The r ise in rural and urban insurgencies already noted is being increasinglyinf luenced by the release of long suppressed ethnic and rei igious tensions. Balkannat ional ism erupted into civ i lwar, the brutal i ty of which shocked l iberal democracies. Tothe south, the spread of radical fundamentalism into Algeria, 'furkey

and Egyptcontr ibutes to regional instabi l i ty.

Web

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37, The conf l i c ts in A fghan is tan and I raq are c i ted as gr ievances b1 , 'a g rowing t ide o fIs lamic extrcmists. Added to this threat is growing evidence of shadowy i inks betweenr ^ * ^ - i ^ t r - r : c a t i n o s c m e k : n d o f ' n t e r n a t i o n a l f o r m g f i n c r r - o n . r - v ' n " o h t h vL ! r r v l t ) l S l U u P ) ) l l l u l - * , . ^ . D - - , l l L g l l l 4 L l U l l d L l U l l l l U l l L l ) u . 5 U l r L ) : . L , e B i l L U )

those rvho do no t necessar i l y share s imi la r va lues or insurgent a ims.

38. The recent explosion of rel ig ious extremism has become a real threal to Canada. I tthreatens stability in severalNofih African states, around the rim of the former SovietUnion, parts of South East Asia, and some of our NATO Al l ies. I t is most obviousthroughout the Middle East. Fears of violence in many of these regions has added apotent ial t ide of exi les and refugees to the concems of regional instabi l i ty.

39. To the extent that a radical ized movement const i tutes a danger to Canada orelsewhere, the best way to counter i t is to understand the intel lectual and organizat ionalmechanisms in which the adherents operate. Whi le the mi i i tary must be prepared toexecute the "Defence" port ion of the government 's "3D" pol icy, ef fect ive counter-measures rnust begin with comprehending the threat, because ideas, even those thatdistor l real i ty, can only be fought by other ideas.

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Annex A D R A F T

CL'LTURAL FACTOR.SI

GENER-AL

I . Cultural Factors are dynamic aspects of society that have the capacity to affectmi l i tary operat ions. They include rel igion, ethnici ty, language, customs, values,pract lces, percept ions and assumptions, and dr iv ing causes l ike economy and securi tyAll these factors affect the thinking and motivation of the individual or group and makeup the cultural tenain2 of the battlespace. Not all factors are applicable*to ail operations,and addit ional lactors may be considered as necessary. This l is i rng is not exhaust ive.

Cultural Factors.

General.a. Socio-culturalsystemb. Culturalhistoryc. Shame and honour conceptsd. Tribal/Clan/Group dynamicse. Urban/rural divideI Soc ia l iden t i t yg Ro le o f re l ig ionh. Geopol i t ical boundariesi . Formal pol i t ical systemj Pol i t ical parr iesk. Nat ional

i . Representat ivesii. Ministries/Depts

l . Regionali. Representatives

i i . Municipal i t ies/Deptsm. Loca l

i . Representat iven, For each group consider:

i . Where do they get their securi ty?i i . Where do they get goods, services and wages?

i i i . What ideologies resonate with them?iv. who are the tradi t ional authori ty f igures they look to for direct ion?v. Who arc they allied rvith?

v i , What i s impor tan t to rhcm?vi i . Cultural narrat ives

o. For each leader:

' Exce rp t f r om ABCA cu l t u ra l Awareness p ro jec t r eam F ina l Repo r t , March 2005 .' Cu l t u ra l Te r ra in . Cu l t u re i s s imp ly ano the r e lemen t o f t e r ra in . Cu l t u ra i t e r ra in pa ra l l e l sgeog raph l c t e r ra in f o r m i l i t a r y cons ide ra t i on as bo th i n f l uence dec i s i ons . Cu l t u ra l t e r ra in p resen tsba t t l espace obs tac les and oppo r tun r t i es .

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an,)nt ' tn7_{ nnnnz,

Annex A DRAFT

r . Where does his authort ty come from?i i . Coercive force?

1 i i . Economic incent ive and d is incent ive?iv . Ideo logy?v. Charisma?

v i . T rad i t iona i Author i ty?vi i . Who is he al l ied with?

vi i i . What are the reasons for that al l iance?p. Outside inf luences

a. Foreign govemmentsb. Relat ionship with border countr ies Foreign NGOsc. Internal ly Displaced Personsd. Foreign groups (non-cr iminal)e . Misc

i . Gender Roiesi i . V is i t ing

i i i . Greet ingsiv. Interact ionsv. Showing Respect

v i . Workvi i . Gif ts

vi i i . Taboosix. Weddings and Funcralsx. Blood money (or related concept)

3. Ethno-Rel igious Groups.a. Primary groupsb. Religious structure

i. Patronage networksi i . Chari t ies

c. External i inksd. Tribes/Clans/Groups

i. Sub-Tribesi i . Sub-c lans

e. Fami l iesf. Non-tradit ional groupingsg. Iror each group consider:

i . Where do they get their securi ty?i i . Where do they get goods, services and wages?

i i i . What ideologies resonate with them?iv. Who are the traditional authority figures they look to for direction?v. Who are they al l ied vvi th?

vi . What is important to them?vi i . Cuitural narrat ives

h. For each leader :i . Where does his authori ty come from?

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ao2f i)?o7 -2.000n35

A n n e x A DRAFT

i i . Coercive force?i i i . Economic incent ive and d is incent ive?iv . Ideo logy?v. Charisma?

vr. Tradit ional Authori ty?v i i . Who is he a l l ied w i th?

vi i i . What are the reasons for that al l iance?i. Patronage nctworks

4 . Secur i tv .a. Pol ic ingb. Judicial systemc. Penal systemd. Criminal act iv i t ies

i. Narco-traffickingi i . Black market

i i i . Smuggl ingiv. Routes

e. Commodit ies[. Front companiesg. Intimidation and extortionh. Kidnapping, theft, murder, etc.i. Ordnance and miiitary suppliesj Unexploded ordnance availablek. Weapons, explosives marketsl . Weapons smuggl ing routes

5. Economy.a. Imports and exportsb. Social isolat ion legacyc. Agricultured. Barter economye. Trading companiesf. Business law, banking, contracts, insuranceg. Employment rates and impact on population/perceptionsh. Labour forcc occupation and demographicsi . Local businesses and companiesj Income demograph icsk. Major sourcesl. Per capita incomem. Coal i t ion goverrrment projectsn. Natural resources

6. Serv ices .a. Hospital and cl in ics

i . Avai labi l i ty of advanced services

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JLa

A n n e x A D R A F T

i i . Number , quaL i t l and typeb. Educat ion of staffc. E,ducat ion

i . Qua l i t y and typei i Number of schools and avai labi l i tyi i i . Ages taught , t ypes

d. Govemment wagese. Waterf , Sewer

i , Age and qual i ty of systemii . Open system and health effects

i i i . Map of sewers

e. Electr ic i tyi . Avai labi l i ty by zone, by Ki lowat per/hour

i i . Sources and product ion plantsi . How are the plants powered?

ii. Distribution networks and administrationb. Subs id ized goods

i. Gasi i . Cooking oi l

i i i . Foodiv. impact of change in subsidies

c, Government improvement projectsi. Ongoing, planned

ii. Rate successd. Publ ic Safetye. Armed Force

7. InfbrmationEnvironment.a. Formal communicationb. Broadcast mediac . Pr in t med iad. Newspaperse. Freedom or lack thereof

i. Trust in tire mediai i . Connect ion to govemment or opposit ion

f Fliers,ftandoutsg. Outdoor media (banners, ads)h. Websites and Internet avai labi l i tyi . Information Communicat ionj Impact of Internet by zonek. Authori ty f igures (Family, rel ig ious, group)L Rumour centres ( tea shops. markets, taxis)m. Telecommunicat ionsn. Cel l phone nodes and avai labi l i tyo.

' fext messaging capable?

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A n n e x A DRAFT

p. Ava i lab i l i t y anc l use o f emai l

B . Ma- io r Resources ,a. Drinking watcrb. Reservoirsc. Pumping stat lonsd. P ipe l inesc. Water treatment plantsf . Oi l and fuel

i . Sourcesi i . Pumping stat ions

i i i . Pipel inesiv. Refineries

g. Gas stat ionsi . Distr ibut ion locat ions

h. Agricul turali . In igat ion pathsj Chemicalsk. Communicat ionsl . Telecom systemsm. Intemet cafesn. Courier routes

9. Key Individuals.a. Rel igiousb. Tr ibalc. Communityd . Po l i t i ca le . E,ducatorsf. Medicalg . Bus inessh. Mi l i taryi . For each group consider:

i . Where do they get their securi ty?i i . Where do they get goods, services and wages?

i i i . What ideologies resonate with them?iv. Who are the traditional authority figures they look to for direction?v. Who are they al l ied with?

vi, What is important to them?vii. Cultural narratives

j . For each leader :i. Where does his authority come from?

i i . Coercive force?i i i . Economic incent ive and disincent ive?iv. Ideology?v. Charisma?

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A n n e x A D R A F T

vi . Tradit ional Authori ty?v i i . Who is he a l l ied r , ' i th?

vir i . What are the reasons for that al l iance?

A n o n t a n T a n n n n 2 o

D R A F T

CHAPTEI ] .3

COIN PRINCIPLES

"The f rst thing that mu.st be apparent when contemplating /|te .rort of crction yyhich ctgavernment facing insurgency .chould lake, is thal lhere can be no such thing as a ptrreiymilitarl' solutiort because insurgency is not primarily a military activity At the,sctme /inte

there is no such thing as awhol lypol i t ical solur ion ei ther, short of surrenrJer, becctuselhe verT'facl that a state of insurgency exist.s implre.s that violence is involvecl which v,iLl

huve to be countered to some extent at least by the use offorce. ' ,

Gencral Sir Frank Kitson, ref lect ing upon his experiences from campaigns in Kcnya,Malaya, Oman and Cyprus.

SECTION 1 : OVERVIEW

l. No insurgency has been succe.ssful ly fought and defeated in a purcry mi l i tarvmanner. Indeed, mi l i tary forces play a key, but in many facets, support ing iole pol i t rcal ,social , economic, psychological and mil i tary measures al l have their roleln restor ing theauthori ty of a iegi t imate government and addressing the root causes of the insurgency.Al l securi ty forces ( including the mi l i tary) act in support of , and in harmony wit i , c iv i lauthori ty in a rni l ieu in which there is much less certainty than rn convent ional war. In aconvent ional war, i t is obvious who conducts the act against an e nemy posit ion. in aCOIN campaign, however, the insurgents, their support and their motivat ion, al l have tobe attacked with a myriad of assets and capabi l i t ies. That is, a mix of k inet ic and non-kinet ic effects must be appl ied that wi l l include mil i tary force, pol ice arrests,reconstruclion in poor urban areas and information operations, to name a few.

2' At issue within a COIN, part icuiar ly in the eariy stages, is that with a lack ofsufficient information, decisions have to be macle affecting significant aspects o1,pol i t ical , economic and social l i fe in the country. These dccisions have rcpe.cussions fora nation far beyond its borders, both in the diplomatic field and in the ail-imnortantsphere o f pub l i c op in ion .

3. Al though mil i tary and strategic theorie s cont inual ly evolve, one constantregarding insurgency and colN is the batt le to win and hold popular support , in thetheatre of operat ions and at home. That is, not only does the coi lect ive puUri . s l lpporthave to be won and maintained within the area or nat ion uncier threat, but me populace ofthose nat ions contr ibut ing to the COIN- must cont inue to support the mission t ia i maywel l cont inue for years on end. Thus, operat ions at al l levels must be conducted with thrsstrategic goal in mind.

4. Tradit ional ly, insurgents have had a head-start in the campaign. whi le thegovernment has had to f i rst discern a thre at. and then formulate an appropnare response,within the rule ol lar.v. The side that can organise f i rst and deveiop a tai lor-mad" , t ru, .gythat is ef fect ive and attract ive to the seneral populace wi l i be at a i igni f icant advantage,

C h a p 3 : 1 i 1 4

DRAFT

Thus, in o rder fo r govemments and mi l i ta r ies to o rgan ise qu ick ly . i t i s inva luab le to havea set of general pr inciples for the conduct of a COll .J campaign that can be used to designand conduct the campaign . I t must , however , be remembered tha t pnnc ip ies a reguidel ines only and must be tempered by a real ist ic est imate of the si tuat ion and anappra isa l o f the var iab lcs and po ten t ia l responses . So lu t ions canxot be templared and rheoperat ional environment must be taken into account.

5. Pr inciples offer the civ i l leadership and the heads of al l agencies, including theIn i l i ta ry commander , bo th a s ta r r po in t and usefu l s ignpos ts . The n ine COIN pr inc ip lesproposed are arranged into a iogical sequence and provide a government and mii i tarycommanders with a general pattem on which to base and review strategy and operationalplans. Like al l pr inciples they should be appl ied pragmatical ly and with common senseto sui t the circumstances pecul iar to each campaign. The assessment of the si tuat ion wi l lindicate where appl icat ion of a pr inciple may not be possible (at least temporari ly) , wherethey may conf l ic l or where there is overlap. As with the pr inciples of war, they must bebalanced with one another and al l operat ions must be examined against them.Underpinning the principles are the guidelines of minimum necessary force andlegit imacy of al l act ions.

6. The nine principles for the conduct of a COIN campaign are as follows:

a. effect political primacy in the pursuit of a strategic aim,

b. promote unity of purpose to co-ordinate the act ions of parr ic ipat ingagencies ( including government machinery);

c. undcrstand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the widerenv i ronment ;

d. exploi t intei l igence and information;

e. isolate the insurgents from their physical and moral support base;

f . apply power discr iminately to inf luence human wi l l ;

g . neut ra l i se the insurgent ;

h . sus ta in commi tment to expend po l i t i ca l cap i ta l and resources over a longperiod; and

i. conduct longer term post- insurgency pianning.

Chap 3 . 2 l l1

A nrn??nR-t _AnAna4

DRAFT

SECTION 2: EFFECT POLITICAL PRIMACY IN THE PURSUIT OF ASTRATEGIC AIM

' 7 I t n tus t be unders tood by a l l tha t an insurgency is a po l i t i ca l p robJem thar cannor

be countered by a single means, Once an insurgency has been ident i f ied, the government(aLong with i ts supporlers) must decide how to stop, neutral ise or reverse theconsequences of such an insurgency This must include an effect ive, pro-act ive responseto thc v io lence and in t im idar ion gcnera ted by the insurgents . Apaf l f ronr imrned ia teshort- term act ions, many of which wi l l be taken with the advice of the mi l i tary forcecommander, thc government must formulate long-term pol i t ical aims that wi l l be backedby pol i t ical , economic and social programmes. Given this overarching aim, the securi tyfbrces must conduct their part as a supporting programme. A COIN plan involving thepol ice, mi l i tary, local ly raised mil i t ias and coal i t ion securi ty forces wi l l implement this.r

8. Pol i t ical pr imacy underpins CON as i t legi trmises stratcgic, operat ional andtact icalact ions. Al lact ions fol low the pol i t ical lead and suppoft i ts strategic aim. Withina coN, the specif ic strategy determines which instrument of power (diplomatic,informational, mi l i tary or economic) is the focus of ef fort , and which agency may havethe lead at operat ional and tact ical levels. This wi l l change over t ime as the COINoperat ion and si tuat ion evolve.

SECTION 3 PROMOTB UNITY OF PURPOSB TO CO-ORDINATE THEACTIONS OF PARTICIPATING AGENCIBS

CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATION

9. Funct ions to be Co-ordinated. ' fhe

COIN effort requires a mult i - faceted andmult i -agency approach united by common object ives and end state, Many of theseagencies have different philosophies, modus operandi, and methods. Unity of commandacross this array' is impract ical . Al though unity of cf fort is mostdesirable, i t too may notbc achievable. Unity of purpose however, must be achieved and al l agencies must agreeto work tovrards th is common purpose. Ihe idca l i s fo r the gover runcnt ro g ivc oncperson or err l l responsibi l i ty for the direct ion of the government carnpaign, al lowingdif i l -erences of opinion between agencies to be resolved by an impart ialdirector. Whi iethis could be a soldrer, control wi l l l ikely be vested in a pol i t ic ian or civ i l serv'ant. In anycase, hc rvi l l be rvorking to str ict government guidel ines and overal l control . Idcai iv, ajoint command and control structure wi l l be achieved.

10. Single Command System. In a single command construct, the chairman ordirector of t l - ie co-ordinated effort is in overal l command of the campaign. In this system,po l i cy and execut ive au thor i t r a re res ted in a s ins le cornmander . usua l ly a mi l i ta ryoff icer, with senior civ i l sen, ice , pol ice and subordinate mi l i tary commanders as advisersThe sys tem requ i res a pe rcept ive and char ismat ic ( team bu i ld ine) commander and w i l i

S e c u r i t y f o r c e s i n c l u C e : n i l i t a n ' : c c a l i t i o n n r i l i t a r , v f c r c e s ; r , a i i o n a l l o l r c e ; l o c a l p o ) i c c ; a n d l o c a l l yr e e . " i t e d < r r n n n r f f n r - - r

Chap 3: , : i 1 4

DRAFT

func t ion agarnsr a re la t i ve ly uncompl ica ted rnsurgency th rea t . Not rv i ths tandrng th isnr i l i tarv Iead, the commander wi l l be act ing on behalf of the government and u' i l l have avariety of mi i i tary and civi i ran advisers.

1 l . The Committee System. Under this system, committees are fomed at thestrategic, operat ional and tact ical Ievels in ordcr to co-ordinate al l act ions (kinettc andnon-kinet ic) to counter the insurgency. The civi l administrat ion provides the chairman oft l r e i o i n t n n e r r l i o n c w h i l e t h e n o l i c e a n d ' h e a r m e d f o - c e s n ' n v i 6 i g m e m b e r s t o t h e v a r i o u soperat ions committees at each level in the administrat ive and command hierarchy.Decisions are taken joint ly and implemented by the chairman and members through theirown c iv i l serv ice , po l i ce and mi l i ta ry command. A t var ious leve ls , thc commi t tecs mayalso include lead administrators from various non-govelrtmental organisations Q'fGOs)and international bodies providing support to the operation (such as the LN specralenvoy, LINHCR co-ordinator, etc). The structure of the commiftees must be flexible andaltered to sui t the circumstances at hand. Whi le the committees at var ious levels wi l lguide and co-ordinate operat ions, mi l i tary commanders at al l levels must be prepared toexploi t f leet ing opportunit ies in order to do damage to the insurgency movement. Insimple tenns, t ime may not exist to refer potent ial mi l i tary act ions back to a committee.Any mrlitary action taken, however, must be fully in concert with the overall strategy ofthe COIN operation, use the minimal force necessary and support the campaignobj ect ives.

12. Personal i t ies. Given the inter-agency aspect of COIN operat ions and the needfor the military to work hand-in-hand with its civilian and police partners, many of whomwill have littie understanding2 of how the military operates, the role of individualpersonal i t ies becomes magnif ied. Any system of control and co-ordinat ion must be ableto adapt to the personal i t ies of those involved. Mi l i tary commanders must select theirI ia ison off icers and committee members with care, exploi t ing those who can achieveprogress through a balance of charisma, persuasion and graceful force of personal i ty.Commanders must be able to real ise that they themselves may not be the most sui tableindividuals to conduct dai ly face-to-face operat ions and co-ordinat ion with their c iv i l iancounter-parts and thcrefore must select the most sui table representat ive.

13. Assistance to Al l ies and Foreign Powers. -When a mi l i tary provides assistanceto a foreign state, the fbrces assigned will necessarily be subordinate to that governmentin order to preserve the host nation's sovereignty and the government's credibility in thecyes of i ts populace. The forces wi l l l ikely be obl iged to adopt the co-ordinat ion systemof the host nat ion.

GOVERNMENT PLANNING

14. Assessment and Es t imate o f the S i tua t ion and Mi l i ta ry Adv isors . When theso\errurrent is determining which of i ts object ives can best be attained with the help of

t E x p e r i e n c e h a s s h o w n t h a t s o m e g o v e r n m e n t p o l l t i c a l l e a d e r s , c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t o r s a n d s t a f f o f N G O s w i l ln o t o n i y h a v e l a c k a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h o w t h e m r l i t a r y f u n c t i o n s a n d o p e r a t e s , b u t w i l l h a v e s i g n i f i c a n tr r i s c o n c e p t r o n s a n d e v e n h o l d h o s t i l i t i e s t o r v a r d s t h e m i l i t a r l ' , a n d t h u s b e v e r y r e l u c t a n t t o c o - o p e r a t e .

Chap 3 . 4114

a n2n2 ? nR -d .nnnnd?

DRAFT

the armed forccs, the mrl i tary commanders and advisers wi l l be able to expiain theforces' capabi l i t res and l imitat ions in the context of the part icular emergency. A1anaiysis of the si tuat ion should reveal the areas in which the government ald theinsurgents are most vulnerable. These vulnerabi l i t ies are l ikely to be spread over theent ire pol i t ical , economic, sociai , and securi ty spectrum, The aim wi l l be to ident i fy thosegovernment vuinerabrl i t ies that are best sui ted to mi l i tary defensrve actron and thosevulnerabi l i t ies of the insurgents that are most sLiscept ible to offensive mi lr tary act ion,

15 Al locat ion of Pr ior i t ies. The co-ordinated nat ional plan that emerges from thcabove est imate should address the pol i t ical , economic, social and securi ty ro.. t .ur.Determining the type of insurgency faced wi l l h ighl ight two pr ior i t ies: i jeni i f icat ion ot 'where the insurgents obtain most of their support; and identification of the goverlmentact ions that wi l l achieve meaningful results quickly, For example, an urban insurgencywill require different priorities to a rural based insurgency. 'fhe

national priorities-need tobe addressed at this stage of the planning process. Once the overarching pr ior i t ies areident i f ied, other al locat ions of tasks and resources wi l l fo l low, to include:

a. role and responsibi l i t ies between government departments and mil i taryoffices in order to avoid duplication of effort, gaps and potential confllct;

pr ior i ty of act ion between the social , economic, mi l i tary and civi ladministrat ion f i e lds; and

prior i t ies within each f ield of act iv i ty (social , economic, mi l i tary and civi ladministration). Just as the military will apportion their efforts across theoperational functions (command, Scnse, Act, shield, Sustain), so too mustthe civil, police and other authorities set priorities across their ownorganisat ions and l ines of operat ion.

SECTION 4: UNDERSTAND THE COMPLEX DYNAMICS oF THEINSURGENCY, INCLUDING THE WIDBR ENVIRONMENT

' fhe dynamics of an insurgency rnay include:

17. The various inter-related dynamics of an insurgency wi l l prescnt profoundintellectual challenges for commanders and staff. Given the large number of valables al\r 'ork (see Chapter 2, Annex A), i t may very wel l be impossible to predict the secondaryand tertiary effects of specific actions. Still, effort must be expended to understand thesevariables and dynamics at hand and how best to tackle them.

1 8 .

a , cause * what makes the insurgency attract ive to the uncommitted;

central idea of the insurgenc,v - this may be an ideoiogl, or a strategic endstate;

arms of the insurgencl - long term. short term. advert ised ancl hidden;

C h a p 3 : 5 i I 4

DRAFT

d. o rgan isa t ion and capab i l i t ies - leaders , cadre , combatants . suppof i base

and pol i t ical wings;

e , ex te rna l suppor t - mora l , p l rys ica l and conceptua l ;

f . methodology - strategies and tactrcs; and

g the w ider env i ronment - po l i t i ca l , economic , soc io logrca l , and techn ica l

19. For every dynamic within an insurgency, the l ines of operat ion within the

campaign plan must anticipate and counter the evoiving dynamics of the insurgency.

SECTION 5: EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

20. The Overarching Importance of Intelligence. in order to truly understand an

insurgency and its dynamics and, once this has been done, to attack its weaknesses,

intelligence and information must be exploited in a systematic and thorough manner. All

individuals concerned, civ i l ians, commanders and soldiers of al l ranks must understand

the oveniding importance of intelligence in actively defeating an insurgency, It wilL

support direct military action against insurgents, guide non-kinetic effects to attack the

root causes of the insurgency, and allow for success to be measured. It applies at the

operational and tactical levels.

2l . Operat ional Level Appl icat ion - Local Knowledge. Knowiedge of the country,

its ethnic composition, culture, religions and schisms, the political scene and party

leaders, the clandestine political organisations and their undercover armed groups, the

influence of neighbouring states and the economy, provides the essential backdrop to

understanding the insurgency but this takes t ime to bui ld up. Such background

information is essent ial because the development of intel l igence rel ies on an abi l i ty to

discern pattems of change in behaviour. The host nat ion poi ice and i ts intel l igenceservice shouid be the pr ime agencies for providing (at least the background) information

and intel l igence, with the best source being, natural ly, a member of the insurgency i tsel f .

22. Tact ical Level Appl icat ion, Without accurate, act ionable intel l igence the

se curity forces conduct random, ineffective offensive operations, which tend to produce

very l i t t le posi t ive and much negat ive react ion amongst the populat ion. The ensuing

ne gative media reporting further benefits the insurgents. Furthermore, troops conductingroutine framework patrolling tend to loose their focus and motivation, with the resultof len being the conduct of patrol l ing forthe sake of patrol l ing i tsel f . Tact ical intel l igencerequirements should be pushed down to the lowest levels and al l sources, special ist androut ine framework patrols al ike, should be given specif ic informational requirements togather, Furthermore, special ists wherever possible, should be pushed down to the iower(sub-un i t ) tac t i ca l leve ls so tha t they may remain respons ive to the i r in te l l igencerequireme nts r i 'h i le ful f i i l ing those of the units and formations.

C h a P , 1 . 6 1 4

A n t n n t n o a n n n n r t r

DR{FT

?3. The tac t i ca l leve I app i i ca t ion o f in fo rmai ron and in tc l l rgence w i l l a l lou , la rgeNamed Areas of Interest ("1\tAIs) to be reduced to point NAIs and eventual ly to Tar:getAreas of Interest (TAls) fbr subsequent precision str ikes. For example, I , l iMl\ jT ieportsnlay indicate a gang and their suspected weapons cache are iocated in a neighbourhoodcontaining 20,000 occupants. Patrols and other sources, through specif ic tasks ancj stater linformation requiremcnts, may reduce this area NAI to u ,p. . i f i . c i ty block or l - iousc.This wi l l eventual ly become a TAI that can be passed to operat ions staff and commandcrsfor subscqucnt act jon, in this case. a surgical cordon and search operat lon,

24' The same can be said regarding information exploitation for non-kinetic effects.HUMINT reports or interrogations may indicate that an insurgency is recruiting membersfrom a particular suburban region. Further examination and collection regardini this are amay reveal that i t is an ethnic enclave with high unemployment. Hence, ihir u. !u1noybecome a TAI for the appl icat ion of CIMIC and other Inio Ops resources in order tost imulate development and inclusion of thjs enclave. Fol lowlup patrols can in t ime gaugethe publ ic react ion to such measures, In short , intel l igence dr ives tact ical operat ions,l imits col lateral damage and measures success.

25 . The In te l l igence Organ isa t ion . I t shou id be expec ted tha t in te l l igenceorganizat ions wi l l have to grow considerably. Ideal ly, the intel l igence orfanisat ionshould start expanding in lock step with the insurgents'developing threat i lnevi tably,however, there is usual iy an embarrassing interval before the expanded organisat ionbecomes effect ive,

SECTION 6: ISOLATE THE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR PHYSICAL ANI)MORAL SUPPORT BASE

26. Three Facets of [solat ion. The aim here must be to isolate the insursents andtheir movement, physicai ly, intel lectual iy and moral ly. Al l agencies involvel in theCOIN operation must understand this and work within their own fields to this end. AIIthree elements must be addressed:

insurgents must be separated from their physical support , which inciudcsrecrui ts. f inances, weapons and combat suppl ies that may come frominternal sources or sources external to the nat ion or resion:

Chap 3 : 7 i11

tr.

DRAFT

insurgents must be undermined in te l iec tua l l y in the i r a ims. A lega l , v iab le

altemative to the insurgency must be offered to members of the

insurgency, their supporters and the uncommitted in the populat ion. Hand-

in-hand with this is the fact that the condit ions that pennit the spread of

the insurgency, and i ts just i f icat ion in the eyes of many, must be addressed

and resolved with long-tenn solut ions that are wel l publ ic ised through

information operations ;

insurgents cannot be al lowed to be seen to hold the moral [ igh ground.

The legitimate or desired govemment structure must be made to be, and

secn to be , rnora l l y super io r to the insurgency and i t s a l te rna t ive o f fc r ings .' fhere

is a great tendency by some mil i tary commanders and others

operat ing in a foreign nat ion to pract ise moral relat iv ism, and thus simply

attr ibute violat ions of the rule of law to local custom and culture, even

when such violat ions clear ly undermine the legi t imacy, moral superior i ty

and effect iveness of those authori t ies. Commanders conduct ing a COIN,

and even their soldiers, must understand the need to help ensure the

supported govelrlment remains legitimate and acts accordingly. Where

possible, they must assist in the raising of standards of conduct, from the

local level upwards. Violations must be reported to the military and civil

chains-of-command. The insurgency must be deprived of any claim to

moral superiority.

27. Firm Base. The f i rst requirement may be to secure the base areas essent ial to the

survival of the government and, state. These normal ly include the capital , the points of

entry, key instal lat ions and those areas which are loyal to the govemment. The provision

of securi ty in those vi tal areas encourages their inhabitants to ral ly to the government.

28. Expansion of Secure Areas. Once establ ished, securi ty forces expand outwardfrom the secure bases in an campaign akin to the spreading of an oi l s l ick. As each areais consol idated. loval local forces would be raised to secure the area to release mobi le

Chap 3 : t3 / I 4

A0202308-8.000047

DRAFT

Iegu lar t roops to secure ihe nex t a rea whr le the hos t s ta te 's c iv i l admin is t ra t ion and oo l rcete-es tab i i sh themse lves in the recent ly l ibera ted ten i to ry . Th is i s a we l l - t r ied approac5 iocombating an insurgency.

29 E l im ina t ion o f the Insurgent Subvers ive and Suppor t Sys tem. The secur i tylorces' operat ions must focus on el iminat ing the insurgents;subversive and supportorganizat ions. This is an essent ial prerequisi tc to defeat ing any act ivc insurgent group fort l re fo l lo rv ing reasons :

b .

the subversive organization controls the population, denics thegovernmcnt popular support , spreads propaganda unchecked and preventswitnesses from providing information;

the insurgents continue to receivc supplies, recruits, and informationregarding the security forces;

once the subversive organisation is destroyed, the insurgents are forces tooperate more openly and thus expose themseives to deliberate militarvactions and arrest: and

d. subversive elements arrested are the best sources of information on thei l legal organisat ion. They must be careful ly handled by special ist staff .

30. Separat ion Methods. A thoughtful combinat ion of methods by al l agenciesinvolved is needed to separate the insurgents from their subversive andsuppJ.tingconstructs:

C .

d

intelligence should aim at the identification of subversive cells andpropagandists. This information should come in good part from civilianpolice sources, but where police forces lack a phyiical presence in aremote geographical

1rea, the void may be fil led with elements of specialforces assigned specific information requirements;

security force protection for residents and informers. This is best doneproact ively through the use of anonymous t ip teiephone l ines, special isthandl ing of sources and low level measures (such as face rnasks) to hidethe ident i fy of informers;

the gradual spread of government and security force control over areas:

curfews and searches of individuals thought to be supporting insurgenrs;

patrols, ambushes and vehicle check points ( the lat ter best done at lowIevels for short intervals on l ikely suspects);

interdict ion operat ions against the entry ofexternal suppl ies

a .

C h a p 3 : 9 i 1 4

A n 6 A A ^ ^ ^

DRAFT

3 1 . Reforming the Government and I ts Ins t i tu t ions . ln many cases , the

government under attack from an insurgency requires some form of reform in order to

so l id i fy i t s leg i t imacy . ga in in temat iona l suppor l and w in and main ta in the suppof i o l i t s

own populace. Government act ions within a moral context, such as, observance of the

iaw, restraint in the use of force, gaining of popular support andthe benef i ts bestowed by

the social and economic aspects of the nat ional plan, wi l l help to produce a favourable

cl imate domest ical ly and internat ional ly Diplomacy wi i l a lso be key in gaining support

for the besieged govemment and in denying external support to the insurgents.

SECTION 7: APPLY POWER DISCRIMTNATELY TO INFLUENCE HUMAN

WILL

32, Instruments of nat ionalpower should be employed to neutral ise the power of the

insurgency. Often, the key will be to pre-empt or supplant the ideas that underhe the

insurgency. One of the pr inciple means of inf luencing the human wi l l of the broader

populat ion is through contr ibut ing to the welfare of society, on the psychological , social

and security fronts.

33. The exercise of power by any of the agencies operating within a COIN, must be

conducted with legitimacy (ie, within the rule of law) and must follow the fundamental of

the minimum use of force. Additionally, disruption to normal civic life must be limited

to the greatest extent possible. This must be applied at the operational and tactical levels.

34. For example, the imposit ion of curfews should be as l imited in t ime and scope as

possible in order to avoid disruption to the lives of the majority of the populace, who are

always at r isk of becoming fat igued by securi ty measures. Likewise, at the tact ical level,

the conduct of a cordon and search in private homes may require forced entry into locked

rooms. I f the owners cannot locate keys, even when breaching tools are produced, then

the door should, whenever possible, be removed from i ts hinges. I f nothing is found (as

wi l l of ten be the case), the door can then be replaced without damage. ' fh is

in tums l imits

embarrassment for the security forces and the extra effort taken to avoid damages to

pr ivate property is. to a certain extent, appreciated by the populace. I t in turn helps gain

and maintain their support and counter the propaganda undoubtedly spread by the

ipsurgents regarding the securi ty forces and their methods. In short , commanders at al l

levels must understand the appl icat ion of this pr inciple,

SECTION 8: NEUTRALISE THE INSURGENT

35. The securi ty forces of the goverrrment or coal i t ion wi l lhave a signi f icant role in

the seiective destruction, disruption and dislodgment of insurgents. Confidence, trust and

freedom of action (without the need to refer routine and anticipated operations that

exploi t of ten f leet ing opportunit ies, back to a higher level(s) of command) must be

ar ' forded tact ical commanders (parr icular ly down to sub-unit level) i f thev are to be

:uccess fu l in s t r i k :ng the insurgent and d is lodg ing h im f rom h is power base .

C h a p 3 : 1 0 / 1 4

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DILAFT

36 .A1though mul t ip le un i ts may be dep loyed in a CON opera t ion , a c r i t i ca l aspec t o tsuccess fu l m i l i ta ry COIN is command and ac t ion a t the lowest tac t i ca i leve l tha t invo lvesthe . lunior commander (piatoon and sect ion level) leading smal l patrols into thetnsurgents' area of operat ions. The aim should be to defeat the insurgent on,,homeground" using adequate , but no more, force than is absoiutely necessary, Proport ional i tymust be the measure appl ied when employing force.

37 ' Al l mi l i tary tact ical act ions must be conductecl in harmony with the othcr acrronstaken to neutral ise and defeat the insurgency: amel iorat ion of thc causes; reformation ofthc government and local securi ty forces ( i f necessary); informatron operatrons ( toexplain the mi l i tary act ions); and social development. Without this mult i -p.ong.dapproach, ki l l ing insurgents may sirnply cncourage more coverts to the insurcencv.

SECTION 9: SUSTAIN COMMITMENI.To EXPBND POLITICAL CAPITALAND RESOURCES OVER A LONG PERIOD

38 Insurgency is in many ways a protracted contest of wi l ls. Insurgents understandthat they do not have to win a decisive batt le, but have to make the campaign tooexpensive and dcmanding (in terms of time, resources, financial una poiit"lal capital) forthe govemment, the populace and/or the government's extemal supporterr, so-. ofwhom may be supplying troops to stabilise and support the state. Not only must thecommitment of the local populace be sustained, but the populat ions of any support ingnat ions must be convinccd to rcmain committed to the COIN.

39' A sustained commitmentto the COIN is underpinned by unity of purpose across awide range of disparate elements and organisations involved inttre campaign.Information operations will have to work towards this aim. Furthennore, .ealisticmeasures of success wi l i have to decided and promulgated so that successful l ines ofoperatron may be ful ly ident i f ied, broadened and exploi ted.

SECTION 1( ) : CONDUCT LONGER TERM POST. INSURGBNCY PLANNING

40. 1'he requirement for post- insurgency securi ty and development probably holds thekey to effect ively appiying al lof the other f ive pr incipLes. Merely prouiding foi t t remilitary defeat of insurgents does not in any way end the government requiiement tomake suitable longer-term plans to cnhance the cconomic and social aspects of i tspopulat ion and to ensure that the pol i t ical causes of the insurgency have been el iminated.

4l . The announcement of bold government initiatives to be started after therllsurgency has been defeated can have a real and significant effect on winning the heafisand mrnds of the populat ion during any campaign. Such ini t iat ives should be iesigned atthe same t ime as the comprehensive strategic plans are being prepared to defeat th"ernsurgency. The t iming of any statement about longerterm plans could be of crucialtmpoftance and should be handled in a sensit ivc and control led manner by the stateauthori t ies in concert u, i th the overal l information operat ions olan.

C h a p 3 ' , I I l 1 4

In the Br i t i sh Dhofar campaign (1970- i975; . the end o f insurgent ac t i v i t y occur red

in December 1975, but the authori t ies had to work relent lessly for severalmore

years to achieve continued support from the population before the causes ofthe

insurgency had been fuliy rectified. As with subduing a fire, the flames have to be

out and the embers cold. before i t can be considered f inished.

DRAFT

SECTION 11: FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE

PRINCIPLES OF COIN

P o p u l a r S u p p o r t

42. Insurgent Aims. An insurgency aims to discredit the government and its

policies. It will have spent much time preparing the ground for insurgency with

propaganda, using real and contrived discontents. When it considers that the government

and/or its supporting authorities (from an extemal nation) have been sufficientiy

undermined and that a significant part of the population has been alienated from

authority, it will use coercion and terror to reinforce its propaganda campaign'

43. Hearts and Minds and Competi t ion for Loyalty. A government must

convince its population that it can offer a better solution, better government and a better

life than the opposing insurgents in order to win the hearts and minds of the population.'fhis

will be a focal point for the information operations campaign. Just as an insurgency

needs the sympathy or the acquiescence of a sizeable percentage of the popuiation to

survive and to overthrow the government, so the government needs the people's support

to appear legitimate in its eyes and to obtain information leading to the arrest or capture

of the terror ists. Violence, or the threat of i t , is aimed at the ci t izen's fears for his family

and freedom to earn a wage to feed them. Whoever can guarantee a citizens security can

often command their al legiance. An insurgency is a competi t ion between government and

insurgent for the individual 's loyalty. Unless the govemment can offer reasonable

protection, individuals are unlikely to risk their own or their families' lives by

volunteering information. ' fhe

securi ty forces wi l l meet passive resistance in addit ion to

the act ive resistance ofthe insurgents.

44. Government Protect ion. Protect ion of the civ i l ian populat ion wi l l require

restr ict ions and measures (searches, check points, curfews, etc) that wi l l d isrupt normal

lives and frustrate the local populations. Their frustration will increase with time.

Insurgents wi i l seek to misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harsh and oppresstve.

Consequent ly, the government and i ts securi ty forces must ant ic ipate a possible host i le

publ ic react ion to i ts securi ty measures and prepare arguments to rebut insurgentpropaganda in order to keep the ini t iat ive in the batt le for the hearts and minds of thep c o p l e .

C h a p 3 : 1 2 1 1 4

a n2n2 30R-1 t -nnnn c , l

DR-AFT

15 Invo lv ing the Loca l Popu la t ions in the Campaign . Even in s i tua t ions in wh ichthe local authol i t ies and host nat ion pol ice forces require i igni f icant reform, much e f fonshould be made to include them, rvi thin the dictate s of force protect ion and OpSEC, rnthe campaign. I t wi l l bui ld their conf idence, encourage higher standards and raise therrprof i le in the eyes of the local communit ies. Lrkewise, local populatrons should be madeto feel that they have a vrtal part to play in counter ing the insurgency and leading to r tsconclusion. They may even extend to having remote communit ies raise their own localdefence forces.

- fhe trust the community ini t ia l ly place in their protectors is repaid by the

trust the government shows in them by al lowing them to bear arms rn a common causc,

46 counter ing Propaganda. Insurgent propaganda must be monitored andaddressed by a del iberate and mult i - faceted IO campaign. Special ist advice wi i l have tobe sought. However, as much authori ty as possible must be pushed down to the tact icallevels in order that information operat ions at that level are able to be executed in a t imelyand ef fect ivc mamer. A good approach and message aimed at the circumstances of aspecif ic tact ical area wi i l be much more effect ive than an operat ional- ievel approvedmessage del ivered late and watered down to make i t as generic and broad as possible.Canadian and coalition soidiers must be aware of the key role that they play in counteringinsurgent propaganda, which will paint them as foreign, oppressive occupiers. Theirfriendly (but professional) disposition, tone and decorum while patrolling amongst thelocal population, and their abiiity to relate to the populace, will quickly rindermi'ne thatpropaganda.

POLITICAL AWARENESS

41. Commanders at all levels and individual soldiers must be aware of theconsequences of any action they may take. This is especiaily important should anunexpected opportunity present itself or in a sudden emergency when there is no time tcrscek advice or direct ion from higher authori ty. fhose with a knowledge of the pol i t icalscene are better ablc to assess the i ikely effect of their act ions on publ ic opinion ancl tomake a sens ib le dec is ron .

48. Al l ranks must be br iefed on the government aims, insurgency aims andpropaganda. An understanding ofthe issues at stake ensures that soldiers know how toreinforce thc government cf fort . Furthermore. soldiers must be educated as to whatconst i tutes success in a COIN,

ACTING WITHIN THE LAW

49. Although terror ists and insurgcnts use lawless and violent methods, maintainrngthat the end just i f ies the means, the securi ty forces cannot operate outside the law withoutdiscredit ing themselves, the government they are support ing and providing the dissidentpoi i t ical machine with damaging propaganda mater ial . I f the government and i ts securi tyforces lose the moral high ground the people have no incent ive to back them. The poi iceand the anny must act within the law of the state within which they are operat ing una U.seeu to be doing so. In manv nat ions, the pol ice and local mi l i tary wi l l require close

C h a p 3 ' , 1 3 1 4

DRA.FT

superv is i rn in o rder to ensurc tha t thcy ano the i r ac t ions [a ] l w i th rn t ) r i s paran :e te r .Leaders at al l levels must not be reluctant to voice their concerns with respect to theconduct of local securi ty forces. both on the spot and in their reports to their chain-of-command.

MINIMUM NECBSSARY FORCE

50. No more force may be used than is necessary to achieve a legai aim. The amountused must be reasonable and i t must not be punit ive. Once the aim is achieved no moreforce mav be used.

51. The need to use minimum force is not to bc confused with deploying theminimum number of troops.

'fhe appearance of a force large enough to contain a situation

at the right psychological moment may convince insurgents and other dissidents that theauthorities are well prepared and determined to deal with lawlessness.

52. As in all operations, commanders remain morally responsible to ensure that allranks can apply their rules of engagement robustly and with confidence. In doing so,commanders and soldiers alike must recognise the need to limit coliateral damages and toonly engage clearly identified threats. insurgents will undoubtedly attack from the shelterand screen of civilian populations and soldiers must ensure that thcy clearly identify thethreat before engaging with deadly force. This mustbe a key aspect of t raining.

Chap 3 . 14 14

a n rn r?nR-4 / _nnnnq l

DRAFT

CTIAPTER 4

STRATEGIC LBVEL CONSIDBRATIONS FOR COUNTER INSURGENCY

"...thefrst requiremenrfor the successful conclucl of a ColN campaign isfor thegoyernmenl to set L.tp a sound framework v,ithin which it can take place. "

Generul Sir Frank Kitson

S c c t i o n 1 : G e n e r a l

l . In i ts widest context, an insurrect ion wi l l be pol i t ical ly motivated; therefore, thcoverarching strategy to defeat the insurrect ion must be pol i t ical . Mi l i tary act iv i t ies wi l lform a part ofthis higher strategy to a greater or lesser degree depending on the strengthof the insurgent forces, plus their tactics, techniques and piocedures. In othcr words, atthe strategic level, there are increasingly signi f icant areaipecuhar to COIN. Strategic andoperational considerations are fundamentally different for COIN than for conventiJnalwars: they require closer co-operation with ongoing diplomatic activities and moreconsideration of the overarching political objectives at lower operational and tacticallevels of command. They are usually about minimum use of foice versus maximumfirepower and destruction. Therefore, they require closer and more extensive coordinationbetween the military and other governmental and non-governmental agencies,Nonetheless, whether or not an insurgency develops to thc point where there is majorcombat as with the Chinese Peoples' Liberation Anny in 1947 or the Afghan NortternAl l iance in2002, the outcome of a corN campaign rvr l l be profound.

Sect ion 2 : Government Concept

The Set t ing

2' Al l iances and global securi ty arrangements improve the securi ty environment byreducing the threat of attack on Canada and increasing the likelihood of support fronrothers. Working r 'v i th other countr ies is an essent ial element of our foreign and defencepol icy, Wil l ingness to contr ibute to al l ies, both regional iy and on a more global level, hasbeen seen as effect ive in containing potent ial iy unstable si tuat ions. The mil i tary has aproven role in maintaining intemational pol ic ies and relat ionships.

4' Parr ic lpat ion in intemational deployments is considered on a case-by-case basisand i t would be expected that missions would have specif ic object ives with a goodprobabi l i ty of success, be of l imited durat ion and be fui ly resourced. Canadian interestsand cos1s, r isks to mi l i tary personnel and exist ing commitments are addit ional factors thatmust be considered.

5. I t is possible that a nat ional governlTlenr,an rnsurgent t iueat, wi l l request assistance from

U6

the LDrr or other lead nation faced withCanada and, in the event of the

DRAFT

Govemment of Canada agreeing to such a request, the Canadian mii i tary may deploy a

force to conduct COIN operatrons. Such a deployment may be a uni lateral act ion,

reminiscent of the exercises wherein there were Canadian infantry battal ion deployments

to Jamaica in the 1970s, or part of a mult inat ional coal i t ion, under the United NatronsqLN) or other lead-nat ion arrangements.

6 A na t iona l government o r the [ ,N cons ider ing reques t ing Canad ian mi l i ta ry

assistance is i ikely to delay such a request in the hope that the exist ing si tuat ion wi l l

improve so that outside assistance wi l l not be necessary. I t should be expected, therefore,

that insurgency wi l l be wel l establ ished by the t ime Canadian troops are committed,

The Primacy of Host Nat ion (HN) Pol ic ies

1. A COIN campaign must be conducted in accordance with an agreed, universal ly

appl ied, nat ional pol icy of the HN. In the case of a fai led, fai l ing or re-establ ished state,

an interim government mandate and its military campaign must be in accordance with the

mandate issued by the UN.

8. All actions and restrictions arising from strategic policy affecting the nation, its

population and resources, must be carefully explained to all people. Similarly' the

operations of the security forces must be seen to stem from national policy.

The Primacy of Law

9. The legal f ramework within which COIN operat ions may be conducted wi l l

almost certainly changc from situation to situation, but the primacy of the law cannot be

usurped by military action. Where the national or mandated government maintains

control of the country or parts of the country, it should determine the policy and priorities

for COIN operations and the restoration of legitimate government. If martial law or

emergency powers are enacted, these measures would be temporary in nature and their

purpose must be clearly explained to the people of the HN. These facts dictate the

development and distr ibut ion of a strategic message by the highest level of government,

which pervades down to the lowest tactical ievel. Furtherrnore, restoration of legal

normalcy is a decisive factor.

Sec t ion 3 : S t ra teg ic Ob jec t ives

10. Since insurgency is pr incipal ly a pol i t ical struggle, the ul t imate object ive wi l lbe

achieved by a combinat ion of complementary object ives, under the overal l direct ion of

the highest civ i l ian authori ty. These object ives wi l l be achieved through:

i)

bc .d

po l i t i ca l po l i cy ;o ^ n - ^ - i n ^ n l i n r r 'v L v r r v r . r r ! P v r r v J t

social programmes; andsecur i ty opera t ions .

2t6

an2n2?nq-?-nnnn66

DRAT-T

rneasures as the popu iace seeks secur i ty indecd, p rovok ing an i l l - cons idered response is: c lass ic insurgent iac t i c .

15. The government may conclude that a combrnat ion of select ive legisiat ion andsmai l -sca le , p rec is ion secur i ty fo rce opera t ions wou ld s tand a good chance o f n ipp ing thei n s r r r o e n c v i n t h e h ' r d

' n n r e e t i r - c h n w e v e l c r o s s i n p t h a t t h r e s h o l d : s s e l d n m e 2 s v a Su u u , r r r r q J J ! e

sens i t i v i t y to po ten t ia l domest ic and in te rna t iona l repercuss ions f i rm ly inc l ines agovernment towards the deferment of painful decisions.

16. During this threshold period, the Government of Canada monitors the si tuat ion inthe strategic environment. If it deteriorates, relevant departments, such as NationalDefence and Foreign Affairs, would begin contingency planning. fhis would includekeeping the respect ive Ministers informed of possible capabi l i t ies, opt ions, andrestrictions, within the context of the insurgency's perceived causes and objectives. Fromthis ini t ia l planning, a strategic direct ive could be prepared, ' sett ing out the government 'spolicy vis-a-vis engagement in the crucial areas of:

2 pol i t ical , economic and social pol icy;

strategic information operations; and

mil i tary est imates and plans.

11. Although such a scenario is l ikely to develop gradual ly as the ser iousness of thethreat becomes obvious, there are a number of issues that would be part icular ly benef ic ialto mi l i tary planners, should the government give them early considerat ion. These include,but are not I imited to formulat ing a long-term pol i t ical aim, integrat ing and expanding therequisi te intel l igence and securi ty services, and cstabl ishing a mult i -agency frameworkfor the planning and conduct of securi ty and other operat ions requir ing civ i l , pol ice andmil i tary cooperat ion. Natural ly, such efforts would be expanded shouid the si tuat ioncont inue to deter iorate.

Sect ion 5: Mi l i tary Commitment

18. Guided by the nat ional strategic direct ive, the Canadian mil i tary wi l i dcvelop amil i tary strategy, which is a subset of nat ional strategy. The degree of preparat ionenabled by this mi l i tary strategy during the threshold phase wi l l detennine the ease ofdeployment and subsequent operat ions for Canadian troops, The earl ier that l ia ison isestabl ished between the CF, govemment agencies, coal i t ion and local forces, and themore integrated the planning that has taken place beforehand, the smoother wi l l be thedeo lovment .

' B - C C - 0 0 5 - 0 0 4 / A F - 0 0 0 C a n a d i a n F o r c e s O p e r a t i o n s d a t e c i 2 0 0 0 - l 2 - 1 8 ; s e e C h a p r e r 3 " T h e C a m p a i g n

P I a n " e s p e c i a l l y S e c t i o n l " C a m p a i g n D e s i g n " , a r t i c l e 3 0 1 , " T h e S t r a t e g i c E . n v i r o n m e n t " : 3 - i ,

/ t a

+ / o

anrnr?no- r -nnnnAT

DRAFT

19. The aim of mi l i tary rntervent ion is to restore the si tuatron to the point where thepo l ice arc once aga in ab le to ma in ta in law and order . Exper ience has shown tha t i t i seasier to commit the Army than to extract i t , wi th the r isk that the mi l i tary replaces, ratherthan supp lements , the loca l fo rces . ' fh is s r tua t ion must be avo ided in the in te ies ts o fmaintaining the propcr relat ionship between government, pol ice, and the armed forces, aswel l as preserving the securi ty forces' morale and therr standing with the populat ion i t, .v i l l have to serve upon the return to normalcy,

20. when operatrng in support of a fr iendly govcrnment, the cF must be seen tooperate clear ly in supporl of the civ i l power and not in isolat ion f iom i t . This can beaccomplished more readi ly i f the locai securi ty forces are incorporated into mi l i taryplanning whenever possible, and the civ i l government is seen to be implementing ihoseaspects of pol icy, planning, and control which closely affect mi l i tary operat ions. As arough out l ine, a table of c iv i l and mil i tary responsibi l i t ies is provided as an Annex to thischapter.

Militarv ResAdvice on the overal l direct ion of securi tyforce operations

Defining pol icy, part icular determining:- at which levels of the government

and security force hierarchydecistons on pol icy matters ofvarying degrees of importance areto be taken.limits to be imposed upon securityforce planning and operations, bothovert and covertpol icy for intel l igence,and coordinat ion.information and counter-

n d e n n ] i n . r

E s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c i r i l m a c h i n e r y f o r l i a i s o nwith the securi ty forces on al l planning and

rational mattersDraft ing and promuigat ing legislat ion,i ' . ^ l " . l i - ^i l r L l u u l i l B s l n s r B c i l u y p O W e f S .

Maintenancecommodi t ies

The mil i tary contr ibut ion to joint /combinedact ion in:

- Planning- Intel l igence and securi ty- Information and counter-

propaganda pol icy

Assistance in the provision of securecommLlntcat lons.

Advice on:- Training

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Equipment and weapondeve lopmen t .

direct ion

Civ i l Resnons ib i l i t i esThe formulat ion of the pol i t ical aim and thelong-term planning covering the durat ionof military commitment and its aftermath

T h e p r o v i s i o n o f c i v i l i n t e l l i g e n c e A s s i s t a n c e * i t f f iand engineer resoLlrces

(EOD)

5 t 6

of s tocks o f essent ia l

DILAFT

Main tenance o f essent ia l serv icesTab le 4 -1 : A Compar ison o f C iv i l and Mi l i ta ry l {e spons ib i l i t i es

Sect ion 6 : Wi thdrawal

21. The withdrawal phase of mi l i tary disengagement may prove probLematic. Whi lst

no goverrrment or miLi tary aspires to a protracted conf l ict , history provides scant few

examples of short- l ived counter insurgencies, There is always the potent ial that pubi ic

an t ipa thy , manr fes t in w idespread oppos i t ion to a dep loyment and demands fo rui thdrawal, could form a strategic chal lcnge to thc Coverr lment of Canada and the

mil i tary to maintain the morale of the publ ic and of mi l i tary elements deploycd and in

training to deploy. The key eiement in achieving these object ives is a strategic publ ic

al lalrs programme.

22. Potentially, a domestic or international settlement may allow for a swift troopwithdrawal. Nevertheless, the history of COIN indicates a greater probability that aprolonged attritional struggle will ensue. Often the ll\l govemment will only regain

control of its disaffected territory area by area. This willnecessitate a prolonged military

withdrawal phase. Therefore, as military manoeuvre force levels are reduced, it will be of

vi tai importance strategical ly to careful ly manage the information operat ions campaign.

In March 1964, thefour-month period.LINFICYP.

Govemment of Canada agreedForty-one years later, as of this

to deploy troops to Cyprus for awriting, the CF is still involved in

6i6

A n t n a o n d ^ n ^ n n E A

D R A F T

CFIAPTEI { 5 :

O P E RAI ' I ONAI , -LEV F] , I - CO NS I DEI {ATIONS FO I I CO UNTERINS U RG ENCY

li the l r tng-terrn po/ i t ical oh1 e cl i t ,e r . ; nat J ir .st rn the nt int l of r t l l pctr t ig iputt t .s therav ill be u le ndenc'y lo odr,tpl ,shorl-lerrn, ctcl hoc n1ea.tltre.\' tn raspon.\'e lg il.suycant ot.l , t ' r t t t i r I d ( l i I i l \

Sr r Rohc r l ' f hon tpson

SECTION I : IN 'TRODUCTION

, f o i n t a n d C o m b i n e d A s p e c t s o l ' C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y ,

l ' Ihe

p lann ing and conduct o f COIN a t the Opera t iona l leve l requ i rcs a mi ldse t d i f fb ren tf t 'o t t t convcnt iona l war f igh t ing . Mi l i ta ry un i ts tend to be t ra ined, o rgan ized a ld eqLr ippcd fb rcOl lvct. t t ional r 'varf ight ing, nccessitat ing a reorientat ion to defeat insurgcncy. COIN- wi l l bcconducted th rough a jo in t and combinec i command, in t imate ly l inkec j * i th . iu i l iun po l i t i ca lac t i v i t ies . ' l ' he sh i f i in log ica l emphas is { iom des t ruc t ion to persuas ion requ i res g rca ter awarcressc f in te l l igence and in fo rmat ion . P lanners must cons is ten t ly emphas ize the min imLrn i use o1 ' fb rcerather than maximum l i rcpower. Al l of these wi l l require a greater degree of cooperat ion apdulr i t l 'of ef fort . ' ,v i th a more diverse range of c iv i l ian and sccuri ty fbrce actors than is cl lstomarvtr .) nt l tnY within the mi l i tary

?- . S t rL rc tu ra l l y , o rgan iza t ions a t thc opera t iona l levc l w i l lm i r ro r those c iv i l and n i l i ta ryar ra l lgen len ts c rea tcd a t the s t ra teg ic Ieve l , thus ensur ing cont inued jo in t and combined in tegr i t yth roughout the var ious leve ls o f command. Mi l i ta ry leaders a t the opera t iona l levc l u , i l l cop t isuet ' ' ) asstrre lhat Ini l i tary efforts retnain subordinate to pol i t ical-civ i l constraints arrcl reclLl i lc lnents,l -h is w i l i ho ld t ruc regard less o f the sh i f t ing e i lb r t and cmphas is as the insursencv cvo lves ,

S ing lc C 'onrmander Sys tem

l . l in i t y 'o1 'c f fo r t i s fac i l i ta ted by organ iz ing the COIN campaign under a s ing leco t r l l t tanc le r . o r Commi t tee D i rec tor . Whi le the person so c ics ignateJroy be c iv i l ian or rn i l i ta r l , ,i l i s c r i t i ca l tha t respons ib i l i t y fo r overa l l d i rec t ion is ves lec i i iope hcadquar te r .s Aov isors w i l ib 'e t l radc ava i iab le f iom a l l o f the re levant par t i c ipa t ing c le mcnts , such as the c iv i l serv icc . po l rceand r l r i l i ta ry

' fhe commat ldcr w i l l oversce a commi t tcc . cs tab l i shcd to ensL l rc tha t a l l p lans ar rd

ac t io l l s a rc conductcd towards a contmon qoa l .

( lonrmi t tec Sys tc rn

'1 ( )pcra t iona l -1cve l commi t tee s a t ' c ib r r le d . aga in . mi r ro r ing thc s t ra teg ic - le vc l co ' rnand.I hcsc cor r t -n iL tees w i l l conduct jo in t p lann ing , in o rder to ensure tha t the rep icsento t i "esLrbord ina tc e lcn len ts exec l l te such p lans in a manncr keep ing w i th the overarch ing caurpa igup la r l

' l -he ac tua l commi t tce s t ruc tu rc and rcprcsenta t ion lv i l l r , ,a ry be t r .veen insurce ] rc res . and

( h 5 : 1 r 1 1

DRr\Fl '

i ; i i i ec i j u i l l l i ke 1 l changc as ihe conf l i c t evoLves , As a t l i t t t t r tL lm. representa t ives r " r l l i nc lude thc

I , lN po l i t rca l anc i c iv i l au thor i t ies . hos l -na t iou L l i l i ta ry 'and secur i l v au thor i t les . po l i t i ca l anc c iv i l

t t .o t rp cont r ibu t ing representa t ivcs , t loop cont r ibu t ing rn i l t taLy co tnmanders and se lec t s ta f f .

sccur i t ; , con t r ibu t r r - rg representa t ives , and probab ly In tc rna t iona l Organ isa t ion 's representa t ivcs .

,S A kcy facror in making such an organizat ion work effect ively is t rust. - fhis

is of ten

c l i i ' f l cu i r to es tab l i sh across d i f fe r ing cu l tu res . For cxample , the mr l i ta ry requ i rcuent fo r sccL t r l t l '

l nc l exper t i se in app l ied v io lence is po ten t ia l l y the an t i thes is o f humani ta r ian NGOs'ner : t t ' a l

L ra lspa lcncy and abhor rence o f th ings rn i i i ta ry . - fhe

Cornmi t tee D i rec tor , and a l l mctnbers- Inus t

cont i lua l l l , and ac t iye ly s t r i ve to ma in ta in mutua l openne ss and conf ic lence.

S E C - T I O N 2 : P L A N N I N G A N D E X E C U T I N G T H E C A M P A I G N

0 P E R A T I O N A I , C A M P A I G N P L A N N I N ( ;

( r - lhe n ine counter insurgency pr i r rc ip les ident i f ied fo r the success fu l conduct o f opera t ions ,

as detai iecl in Chapter 3, must be clear ly understood, and integrated into dai ly operat ions. '

Devc lop i lg t [e mi l i ta ry aspec ts o f a COIN p lan depends or l many fac to rs , bu t usua l ly invo lve the

secLrr ing o1'a f lnn base from which to operate. Once this is establ ishcd mil i tary forces shor"r ld

tScp seizc the ini t iat ive in separat ing the insurgent f iorn the support lng populat iot t , in order to

suppor t the government 's subsequent ambi t ions .

7 . ' l he

long- tc rm ob jec t ive must be based uponthe insurgent ' s cen t re o l -g rav i ty , wh ich iv i l l

b,e the organizat ions, ancl condit ions that create and support the insurgency, and not individual

terror ists or their tacttcs. Higher headquarters and nat ional sources can provide valuable

ip te l l ige lce anc l in fo rmat ion , bu t w i l l se ldom be ab le to p rov ide in fo rmat ion o f the requ is i te

qLral iLy to conduct tact ical operat ions. 1-he operat ional planning process wi l l therefore dedicate a

sigl i l icant arnount of ef fort towards acquir ing the information necessary to target the insurgents'

c c n t r c o 1 ' g r a v i t y .

( ] A M P A I G N O B . I E C T I V E S

8. ' [

he a i rn o { ' rn i l i ta ry opera t ions is to ass is t the i ros t na t ion government to re -es t t ib l i sh

cont ro l th roughout the count ry so tha t the c iv i l admin is t ra t ion can excrc ise i t s p ropcr f unc t ion .

l 'hc n i l i ta ry co tnmander 's task w iL i no t be as s t ra igh t fo r rvard as is l i ke ly dur ing co t lver l t io t la i

rvar lh rc . T [c Opera t iona l P lann ing Process must take accoL ln t o f a rv ide range o f po l i t i ca l ,

ccc tpgur ic , c iv i i anc l secur i ty in te res ts . These rea l r t ies a rc re f lec ted in the way ln wh ich opera t i t lns

are sLrb . jcc t to the approva lo f the c iv i l adr r in is t ra t ion t l r rough the jo in t co tnmi t tee sys ten l . lnposr ins ta lces . thc opera t iona l p ian w i l l a im to i so la te and neut ra l i ze the insurger r ts bo th rnora l l y

ar - .d ph l ,s ica l l y , ' t i r rough s imu l taneous ly conducted and para l le l po l i t i ca l . soc ia l . and rn i l i ta r l '

a c t r 0 l r s ,( ' c n i r e o f ' ( i r a v i t v

i i r r n i n s p r i n c i p l e s a r e : E f f c c t P o L i t i c a l P r i r n a c y . P r o t r t o t c ' t j n i t . v o t

l . ) , r r r n r i c s , E x p l o i t l r r t e l l i g e n c e ; l s o l a t c t h e l n s u r g e n t s ; A p o i y P o r v e r

. - ( . : : i r r r C o n r n r i t r r e n t , a n d , C o r t d u c t P o s t - l l t s u r g e n c l ' P l a n n i n g

( I r 5 : 2 r l 1

P u r p o s c . U n d e r s t a n d t h e l n s u r q e n c v ' sD i s c r i r n i n a t e l y ; N e u t r a l i z e t h e I n s i t r g c n t ,

A n r n t 2 ' l n t n n n n A ' l

DRAFT

! ) The s t ra tegrc cent re o f g rav i r l , ' . r , i l l be rhc ieg i t in rac l ,o f the governrnent . bo thc o n l c s t t c a l l r a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l i y . O p e r a t i o n a l l y , l v h r i s t t h c r c i s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a l n i f o r p i l ,obvror - rs operar iona l -1e 'e l cen t re o f g rav i t1 , , the suppor t c f the masses o f the popu la t ion 1or the(JLr \ ' c rn l ren t . acqLr i red th roLrgh po l i t i ca l ac t ion . a sa fe and secure env j ronment and socro-ecor tomic p rogrammes is one o f very h igh s ign i f i cancc I t i s f rom th is opera t iona l cen t re o fg raV i t ; ' tha t the insurgents d raw the i r f reedom o{ 'ac t ion , phys ica l s t reng ih , o r i v i l l to f rgh t .A l though carnpa ign p)ann ing ml ls t suppor t the overarch ing e f fo r t aga ins t the insLr rsents ' s t ra teg icccn t re o f g rav i ty , opera t iona l - leve l leadersh ip must de ter rn ine the re levant ob iec t i i u , i ih in the i ra rea o f opera t ions . Poten t ia l c r i t i ca l f i c lds may inc lude c ies t ruc t ion or c i i s rup t ion o f insLr rgepts ,higher cOmntand and control str l lctures, removing fear of repr isals ur. ' - rnngri the genera)popu la t i .n , o r the pro ' i s ion o f u t i l i t i cs and med ica l a ic l to soc ie ty a t la rqc .

llcr511ctryLtt

1 0 . F r o m t h e o p e r a t i o t r a l c c n t r e o f g r a v i t y a n a l y s i s , t h e p i l l a r s o f ' t h c i n s u r g c n t s ' c a n r p a i g ncan be ident i f ied . The government and secur i ty fo rces then ta rge t t l rese p i l la rs in o rder to redr rcet l l c insurgcnts ' in f luencc or ho ld on the popLr la t ion , se t t ing the cond i t ions to p reva i l over thci t - l surgent cent re o1 'g rav i ty . These dec is ive po in ts a re de termined th rough a s i ra teg ic apprecra t lonp'roccss, f iom which wi l l f low further operat ional and tact ical est imates and plans. - fhe

mi l i tarvaspec t shou ld fb rm but one s t rand in a coord ina ted assau l t upon the insurgents 'overa l l a ims.\Vhi le rni l i tarv lbrces may have a cr i t ical role to play during ceftain stagei of the carnpargn, i rsovera l l con t r ibur ion w i l l be secondary and shou ld be kept in pcrspec t ive .

l l Therc w i l l t yp ica l l y be fbur l ines o f opera t ron tha t a re po l i t i ca l , c iv i l ian2 , Iega l ( inc ludrngpo l ice anc l j t rd ic ia ry ) and mi l i ta ry , work ing th rough a ser ies o f se lec ted dec is ivc po ln ts undcoo|d ina ted th rough jo in t command e f fo r ts to ach ieve respec t ive po l i t i ca l , c iv i l ian . po l i ce anc lnr i i i tary object ives culminat ing in the achievement of the cnclstate as depicted in f igure L Oncet l te carnpa ign p lan is deve ioped i t must be rev is i ted cont inuous ly , as in .surgenr ac t iJ i t ies anc jte r t ia ry e f f 'ec ts w i l l causc dec is rve po in ts and ob jec t ivc .s to sh i f t bo th in t ime and space.

2 l : , . l r ' l he pL l rpcrses o f b rev i ty ,p o l i t r c a l a r r C c i v t l t a n . I n r e a l r n

( ' h 5 . 3 r l i

i t . r s c o n s i d e r e d t h a l e c o n o t r i ct h c s e \ \ ' o u l d b e 6 u i t i - l a y e r e d

a n d b u s i r r e s s i i n e s o f ' o p e r a t i o n a r e i n c l u d c d r v i t h t l r o s ea n d s e c t o r a l b u t , , v o u l d o v e r l a p .

t)RAF'T

OPPOSINGC Of C

(,,

\

POLITICAL

F igu re I : l \ l u l t i agencY aPProach

I m p l e m e n t i n g t h c C a m P a i g n P I a n

12. Phases . Carnpa ign p lan imp lementa t ion may conven ien t ly be d iv idcd in to a numbero l '

p ,6ases . A l thoLrgh an insurgency w i l t dcve lop uneven ly across an a f f l i c ted count ry , thc na t iona l

i t ra reg ic p lan w i l l lay down pr io r i t ies fo r the prosecut iou o f thc campaign , poss ib ly conccnt ra t ing

on seiccted arcas in turn. At the operat ional Ievel the phases in any one area are not mutual ly

crclLLsivc. The COIN requirements in these di f ferent areas lnay therefore be understood through

t)rc ct inent lY popular " three-block rvar" construct.

l l . Secur ing a I lase Area. l t can be an t ic ipa ted tha t the hos t na t ion governmer l t w i l l have

sLr f l l c ien t conr ro l o f i t s tcn i to ry to p rov ide a secure base where re in fo rc ing coa l i t io r r con t inger t ts

can bu i l c l up and es tab l i sh essent ia l suppor t e leme n ts . Cons idera t ion mus l be g iven to no t

over.burdeni lg the host rrat ion; t l - r is can be bcst achieved through increased self-sLrf i lc iency b1'

rhe dep loy ing un i ts Incorn ing mi l i ta ry lb rmat ions and un i ts shou ld be dep loyed on the same

geograph ica l bas is as the hos t -na t io r r secur i ty fo rces , cor respond ing w i th the boundar ies o1 ' thc

c iv i l adr l in i - r t ra i ion . I r i s poss ib le , horvcver , tha l the s i t t ra l ion has de ter io ra ted to thc cx tcn t tha tpr ) i l rea ts sa le i r t t rn insu lgent ac t i l ' i t1 ' , I t tnar ' there lb rc bc ncccssary to ho ld sornc iog ts t i c assc ts

a l lou t c l . .n : i : i t i r c j count fy rv l i i l e t roops are co t r l l t t i t ted to secure a base area . Fro t t i th is sccL t rc

it_

( . h 5 r i l

an)o)?10-4 .on0n63

DRAFT

i l r . ca . l f o i ) ps l f 3 dep lo ) ' ed t n to hos t i j e t c t ' r i t o r v t o beg in t he p roccss o1 ' r c i n teg ra t i nc t 5c l a i r d a rdp c o p l e c t i p t u r e d b 1 i n e r e b e l s

1 1 L s t a b l i s h n r e n t o l ' a F i r m l : o r r . v a r d O p e r a t i o n a l B a s C ] F a ! l ' l - h i s i s t h e i n i t r a l d r o p o l ' o r Jrn Ihc luche c l hu i le .s t ra tegy , For example , i t may be feasrb le to cs tab l rsh a fo rward onera t rona lbasc lL t a sur tab le p rovrnc ia l cap i ta l w l i i ch has becomc iso la tcd f rom the area s t i l l Joy . ,a l to t5ci lovc l 'nment Pre f 'e rab ly the area se lec ted shou ld be one rv i th t rad i t iona l loya l r ies to thego\ 'c f l ln len t vuherc the popu la t ion rv i l i read i l v ra1 ly back to i t s o ld a l lep iance oncc i t l . cc ls secr , r rclrot l t an insr-rrqcnt off 'ensive aud serioLrs terror ist at tack.

- l 'he area seLectcci must bc o'c t l ' rat ca'

bc conso l lc la tec i qu ick )y and used as a base fo r fu r ther opera t ions des igncd to l jnk L rp i i , i rh thenra in base and cx tenc l governmcnt cont ro l to o thcr a reas .

15 . Secur inp a Cont ro l led Area. Of fcns ive opera t ious are conductcd in o rder to separa tc rhci l ls l t rgel l ts i iom thcir sLlpportcrs, fbod suppl iers, and sourccs of infornrat ion i rr the clcsigrratecla rca . Sr " rc l l opcra t ions are to be based on ac t ionab le in te l l igence and sound p lann i r rg . C iy i iadrn in is t ra t ion w i l l then be re -es tab l i shed as areas o f hos t i le te r r i to ry a re c ieared n f t in r . . , rg .n , r .J 'hc a rmY n la l 'p rov ide robus t secur i ty s r - rppor t to thc po l i ce , o r be asked to hc lp rs l ra in loca laLrx i l ia rv fb rces tha t w i l l sLrppor t thc po l i ce when the coa l i t io r r fo rccs r . r , i thdraw. ' l ' hese l r -esh lycort trol lcd areas then provide f i r rn bases for furthersecuri ty opcrat ions unt i l gradual ly the ent irecount r ) / i s res to red to government cont ro l .

16 . I :o l low-on Opcra t ions . Surve i l lance, based L lpon a co i re ren t p lan , p rov ides in fo rmat io l g r - rthc insurgcnts . con t r ibu t ing d i rec t l y to the e f fec t i veness o f fb l low-on opera t ions . Th is suppo lsl{-)118-range raids and penetrat ions designed to destroy specif ic targets, such as insurgcntconcc t l t ra t ions . key ind iv idLra ls , o r supp l ies depress insurgcnt mora le aud suppor t the f r ienc l l y" I l car ts and N l inds" carnpa ign . Such surg ica l opera t ions are launched on ly when there issu t f i c icn t ly rc l iab lc and de ta i led in te l l igcnce to make success cer ta in .

17. Rslqt ionship bet*eer . Counter- insurgencycperat iot ls may bc groLrped into two categorics, del 'ensivc and ol ' fensive. General k i t r , , , , ,descr ibes thcse ca tegor ies and the re la t ionsh ip be twe cn them as fb l lo rvs :

I ' - i rst ly there are defensive operat ions. which are those designed to preventinsurgents t iorr disrupt ing the government 's programme. Seconci ly there areo l ' f -ens ive opcra t ions , wh ich arc those des igned to roo t ou t t l re insurgenrsl l len tse lves , . . i t i s wor th no t ic ing how i rnpor tan t i t i s to s t r i ke a ba lancc be t r . r ,eent l re n r , l1 ' too l r t t l c cmpl - ras is rs p laced on de fens ive rxeasurcs in o rder toconcentrate resources on the offensive, the insr,Lrgents arc of l 'crecl an opporrupityt t l ach teve easy successcs , wh ich they can Lrse to embar rass the governmel t audl l le rebv u t tdern i ine i t s suppor t . I f , on the o ther hand, too l i t t le emphas is i s p lacedou o l leus ive opera t ions , the insurgent o rgan iza t ion gc ts b igger and b iggerand anever - inc reas ing propor t ion o f the count ry 's resources has ro be devoted to theSecLrr i ty [rorce s for defensive counterrneasLrres, so t i rat eventual ly the insurgeqtsach ieve the i r a im by mak ing i t appear tha t the pr ice o f fu r - ther res is tance is Gol r l [ 1 r .

' I : r i r n k K j t s o l . l J t r n c l . i o f l . ' t , e . L . o n d o n : F a b e r a n d F a b e r , I 9 7 1 . p a . s . t r i . t

( ' h - - i : 5 1 1 1

DRAF'T

lE . Opcra l io r ra l and Tac t ica l l , cve ls oJ 'Cont ro l Thc rc ia t ionsh ip be tvveen the opera t rona l and

t i rc t i ca l leve l o f con l ro l dur ing counter insurgenc \ / oper r t ions rv i l i d r f fe r fb r each s i tua t io r t , and

r r i l l no t be as c lear cu t as i s the case o f convent iona l war . Ac t ions a t the lowest tac t i ca l leve l ca l t

l rav ,e fa r reach ing opera t iona l and even s t ra teg ic consequence s , lndeed, i f the tes t o lwhether

rherc i s a po l i t i ca l d i rnens ion is r ig id ly app l ied , ever l 'pa t ro i i s po ten t ra l l y conducted a t the"opcra t iona l ' ' l evc l because the conduct o f an ind iv idLra l so ld ie r , ampl i f ied by the med ia . can

bccgr le an issue reqr - r i r ing s t ra teg ic a t ten t ion . A thought less move or over reac t ion a t sec t io t l o r

p la loon leve l can cas i l y have rami f i ca t ions above the imrned ia tc tac t i ca i leve i .

SECTION 3 : APPLICATION OF MIL ITAI IY DOCTI I . INE

l9 lv{anoeuvrist Approach. Whi le the past is replete with examples of a straightforward

attr i t ional approach to operat ions, the record ofattr i t ional success in counter insurgency is

gepcra l l l ,a poor one. L , f fec t i ve COIN p laces due emphas is on the in te l lec tua l and psycho log ica l

aspcc ts o t 'opera t ions , no t s imp ly the mater ia l . I t emphas ises the focus on peop le and ideas , no t

o l l y ,on ground. Insurgent cohes ion is iden t i f ied and a t tacked by app ly ing concent ra ted ye t

d isc re te io rce aga ins t c r i t i ca l weaknesses . Surpr ise , tempo. and s imu l tane i ty a rc used to

over rvhe lm and unh inge the insurgent , b r ing ing about a cornp le te co i lapse o f w i l l . a r rd u l t i rna te ly

5e lp ipg ro c rea te the cond i t ions fo rpo l i t i ca l de fea t . l t i s wor th emphas iz ing tha t fo rce is app l ied

se lec t i ve iy ; de s t ruc t ion is a tneans no t an cnd

20. \4ission Comrnand. Echoing the sent iment of Sir Robert Thornpson that opened this

chapter, COIN success requires al lpart ic ipants to be act ively aware of the long-term goals and

thc plan to get there. The mission command approach to leadership reaff i rms this view.

eniphasiz, ing infonned ini t iat ive throughout the force. This methodology is part icular ly

app l icab le to COIN, g iven the key ro le p layed by low- levc l tac t i ca l commanders ; mi l i ta r i l y ,( 'O lN is qu i te o f ten a p ia toon and sec t ion conf l i c t .

21 . Success in Opera t ions . Succcss is de f ined by the s ta te o f a f fa i rs wh ich nccds to be

ach icved by the end o f a campaign . S incc insurgency is p r inc ipa l l y a po l i t i ca l s t r l rgg le . i t may be

t6at t5e clesired aim of the governrnent fal ls short of v ictory in a str ict ly mi l i tary context and

set t ing . COIN "success" may equate to hand ing over an in te rna l secur i ty p rob lem to the c iv i l

po l i cc . o r s imp ly no t los ing . i f , fo r example , the in ten t ion o f commi t t ing t roops is to buy t ime in

which to aclclress part icular gr ievances, then dramatic tact ical mi l i tary success may in fact be

cc)up tc r -p roc luc t i ve , ' l ' roops must be aware o f ' the mi l i ta ry ro le and commanders shou ld se lec t

accr l ra te r leasL l res aga ins t wh ich to judge the e f fec t i veness o f rn i l i ta ry tac t i cs , g round capt t t red

has even less s ign i f i cance in counter insurgency than i t does in convent iona l wer f igh t ing

N4i ) i ta r i l y speak ing . carnpa ign v ic to ry rnay equate to the conta inment o f the v io len t aspec ts o1 ' the

i l sLr rgenc ; . to a le r , ,e l rvhere the po l i ce can dca l w i th thern and soc ie ty func t ions nor tna l l v .

j l . L )csr lo r jng t l - rc ._ lnsursents . ln COIN phys ica l des t ruc t ion o I the enemy s t i l l has ar r

i1 . t1 - .e1 ' , . , , , f . lL - lo p lay . A t t r i t ion w i l l be necessary , bu t the number o f insurgents k i l lec i shou ld bc

: - .o ; tL . r3 : i ta : r i s abso lu te ly necessary io ach icve sL lccess . Wherever poss ib le , "so f t " tne thods c l l '

l ' r cL i l : ' . l l i z i i tg lhe enemy - - a r res t , phvs ica l i so la t ion . o r subvcrs io l l - - a rc rnorc l i ke ly tc l advancc

t t . S . ) . ,e l .nu tcn t ' s causc . In an era in l vhrch i t r tense rned ia scr l t t iny and dontcs t i c a r td in te rna t io t la l

( i r i 6 , l l

Ln)n) ' t .4 n-A_nnnnAA

t )RAFT

icu l l o r ' ' c rs igh t r i ' i l l beconrc r ro re in a t tendance. sound. l udgenrcn t anc j c lose con i ro l r . , , j l l peed tobe exerc iscd

] 3 . @ . A t t a c k r n g t h e i n s u r g c n t s ' w i l l ( a n d b y i n f e r e n c e u n i tcohes ion) i s l i ke ly to be morc produc t ive than phys ica l a t tack . par l rcu la r ly in the ear l .v s tascs o l 'a( 'o lN caurpa ign be lo re the insurgency has conso l ida ted . There are many vva) ,s iu rvh ich i t rsposs ib le to a t tack and se izc the in i t ia t i ve t iom an insurgent g roup. Exper iencc has shown tha t acor l lb ina t ton o f ac t rv i t ies s imu l taneous ly app i ied has the bes t chancc o f succcss . - fhe th rce m.s tapp l rcab le approaches invo lve preempt ion , d is loca t ion . and d is rup t ron a t the opera t iona l andt l c t i c a l l c v e l

21. Attqrkr lg&lsdp-l ] . Any cornbinat ion of the above act iv i t ies can be usclul in shat ler ingthe cnc tny 's tnora l and phys ica l cohes ion . Cohes ion can be a t tacked th rough bo th le tha l and non-lc tha l tncans . F i repower may neut ra l i se key nodes or ce l l s . wh i le PSYOpS anc l HUMIN' l 'C isor ien t . co t r luse and t rans form o thers . C lass ic po l i cc work w i l l undermine enerny cohes ion bycv idence ga ther ing , anes t , and iega l ac t ion . Surpr ise can be ach ieved, fo r examplq th roughdevc lop i r rg in fo rmat ion by a l l sources then ac t ing on the cue o f in te l l igence ga t i re r ing techno logyt : ' r I l [ jMINT. I tap id exp lo i ta t ion o f th is in te l l igence by e i thcr cover t acr ion or rap idconcent ra t io t t o1 'combat fo rces in to a g iven area .sews confus ion and d is rup t ion th roughoLr t theel lc lny's str t lcture. This occurs in large parl because the lcvei of t rust withir-r ancl anronssr epemvc e l l s i s c o m p r o m i s e d a n d r e d u c e d ,

25' Simultaneitv. Al l ef fect ive insurgent strategies emphasise simultane i ty by creat ipgpara l le l po l i t i ca l and soc ia l cha l lenges as we l l as mi l i ta ryones . I f the use o f s imu l tane i ty i sprodttct i r , 'e foI the insurgent, then i t is equal ly appl icable fbr the COIN e f fort . Tact ical ly i t can beach ieved th rough the res t ra ined and care fu l l y cons idercd use o f 'a mix o f agenc ies , and bygror-rping for i r ldependent act ion, such as joint mi l i tary-pol ice patrols with compatibleconlnrunical ions working to a singlc headqr-rarters. Operat ional ly i t is achievedihroLrgh thede i "c lopment r l 1 'a har rnon ized campaigr - r p lan a long mul t ip le l ines o1 'opera t ion . as dcscr rbec ip rc r i . r r rs ly .

2 ' 6 . i . @ ' A l l C o I N o p e r a t i o n s , i n c o n t r a s t t o c o n v e n t i o n a l w a r f i g h t i n g . a r ealtnost alr la l 's conductcd in a non-cont igr-rous batt lespace. For most purposes ther.e is no reararca . a l ia reas requ i re secur i ty . Because o l the c lose ly in tegra tcd na turc o f the resps lsc tor i rsLr f {enc} ' , aJ iaspec ts o f the rn i l i ta ry carnpa ign rnus t be equa l ly ba lanced. - f5e a i ' shou ld n . ,c rL 'e a s i le0 tacu la r , rso la tcd succcss fo r onc ar rn o f gover r iment . bu t a sequence o f successes tha tccnlbr ine to r ' " 'ork in cornplementary ways toward a single strategic goal. The carrpaign plaps l roLr lc i bc d i rec ted in suc l ' r a way as to sequence and coord ina te the c i rs t rnc t l ines o f opera t io .acc t l rd ing to the ovcra l l s t ra teg ic rcqu i rements a t the t imc. ' fhe in ten t i s to over lap thec ,pe fa t jona l p lans o f each w i th the o thers .

S E C ' f I O N . 1 : K E Y S E C U R I T Y F O R C E P A R T I C I P A N T S

l ' h c A r n r r " s I t o l e i n C O I N

( l h i T i l l

D R A F T

)1 ' lhc p redominant Scrv ice in counter insurgency is t l i e Aru tv aL though A i r Forces c11en

p^1ar a s t l ' ong sL lppor t ing ro lc . UnLess t i rc iusurgents a re lo inec i b1 ' an ou ts ide po lve r r .v i th

s rgn i l rcan t nava l and a i r fo rces . coun ler insurgencv w i l l remai r - r p r iman ly a g round lo rcerespons i l t i i i t y r .v r th the o ther two Serv ices ac t i r - rg laLge ly i i r suppor l . Whi le spec i f i c Ar r ry ' ro lesr i i l l bc expandcd upon in chapter 6 , the Army can expec t to be ca i led upon, par t i cu ia r ly a t the

t r rc t i ca l leve l . to employ i t s t rad i t iona l sk i l i s , rang ing l rom prov id ing observa t ron and secur i t \ to

c los ing l , i th and des t roy ing the enerny . The subt le po l i t i ca l nuances underp inn ing COINcpcra t ions , cor - rp led w i th the d isperscd na ture o f the ba t t lespace, I towevcr , rcqu i res g rea ter

r r i t ia t i vc and f lex ib i l i t v a t lhc sub-un i t . p ia toon and scc t ion leve l .

' l ' he l {o le o f Other Mi l i ta rv Arms and E lcments

,ur i r S upnort

28 . C lanad ian A i r Force opera t ions dur ing the Kosovo carnpa ign de tnons t ra ted the po ten t ra l

c f 'advanced te chnology for survei l lance, target acquisi t ion and attack of targcts. ' l

hcsecapab i l i t ies have bcen expanded upon th rough the use o f UAVs in A I 'ghan is ta r t and thus become

a s ign i f i can t enab ler o i land opera t ions . Ma jor improvements have been ach ievec l in redLrc ing

casLral t ies al td col latcral damage to infrastructure near the target area, which sccondary eff 'ectstha t 1 r 'adr t iona l l y l i rn i tcd o f fens ive a i r suppor t in some COIN opera t ions .

)9 . ( lanada 's ex tens ive exper icnce in peacc suppor t opera t ions a lso ind ica tes the po ten t ia l

app l i ca t ion o1 'a i r power whcre the techno log ica l gap be tween be l l igeren ts cou ld be la rge ' l -h rs

vvas i l l L rs t ra ted by the use o f CF- l8s to de tc r and neut ra l i ze the e l fec t i veness o f g round fo rces inthe [ ]a lkans . concur ren t w i th ro ta ry av ia t ion 's surve i l lance and mob i l i t y -suppor t ing ro les . [ :o r( 'OIN operat ions, f ixed-wing aircraft can provide the same types of support as they do Jbrconvent iona l opera t ions , such as t roop l i f t and resupp ly , and photograph ic and v isua lrrconnaissance. Air Force capabi l i t res can escalate up to interdict ion rnissiot- ts, when worthwlt i le

t . l rgel .s c,rn be found along an insurgent 's l ines of communicat ion. Nonetheless, one n)Llst notr - rndercs t imate the eneury 's ab i l i t y to counter Westc r t r t ype a t rpower th rough decept ion . reduced

s ignaturc and even lo iv Icve l a i r de i -ence weapons such as MANPADS.

i0 . l - le l i cop tc rs have obv ious ro les fo r t roop car ry ing , survc i l lancc , l ia ison , and tac t rca lhe l i cop ter l i f t o l 'assau l t t roops , bu t shou ld a lso be fu l l y incorpora ted in to the overa l l concept o fc rpcra t io l ts in a rnanner s i rn i la r to o ther cornbat a rms. Av ia t ion cau be used in mat ty ro lesconrparab le to those u ivcn to a rmoured reconna issancc reg iments ' surve i l lance, po in l and areareconna issance . imagcry suppor t to in te i l igence, eco l tomy o f fo rce tasks , and C2.

Ndef$ppsa

I i . \ ,1uch o i ' the wor ld 's popu la t ion l i ves in l i t to ra l s ta tes and rn la rge coas ta l c i t i cs .t l i c rc lb rc . rnar i t ime cons idera t ions in such s i tua t io r - rs w i l l havc a s ign i f i can t impact upon Iand

j ' f r r : i , n S . \ : \ a i s u p p o l t r v i i l c o n s i s t o t p r o v i d i r r g r p o l i r i c a l s t a t e m e n t t h r o u g h p r e s e n c c p a t r o l s .c i t1 i - . r ' c l : t_ : U \ sanc t io r . rs and b lockadcs . and prov id ing so tne degree o f suppor t fo r t roops ashore .) , r1 ,a . s i lps i ra1 ,be c losc enoLrgh io p rov ide a t ime ly , i r igh pro f i le appearance to demons l la tes . r i - - : t . , l i i c i . , r th rea tened a l l r , , Cc- -nverse ly . nava l fc rces have ihe ab i l i t i , to hover ovcr the hor iz -on

( ' h i : 8 r 1 1

40202310,8.000067

D R A F T

l i r r n ro longed per ioCs, p rov id ing a , , ' "a rn i i rg to hos t i l c c lcmen ls . r i , i th r r jn imr - r r l p ro r ,oca t ion . Asd e t t t o n s t t a t e d i n S o m a l i a , C a n a d i a n N a v y s h i p s c a n p r o v i d c a s e c u r e l o c a t i o n f c r t h e N a t i o n a lC o n t m a n d E l c m e n i . a s s r : r i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e d e p l o y e d u n i t s a n d N D I I e . 1 nadd i t ion , nava i av ia t ion can po ten t ra l l y augment thc o ther he l i cop ter opera t ions in - theat re ,

i2 A rna . jo r immedia te advantagc o f Nava l fo rces w i th t roops embarked apdava i lab le fo r counter insurgency opera t ions is tha l the "base area" i s sccure and cos t e f fcc t i r . ,e .TIrcre is no t leed to -Quard thc barracks whcn at sea and the insr-rrgent cannot lnount anl,cf f-ect ivcsur .ve i l l ance o f t roop ac t iv i t y and movement

' fhey arc thus less vu lnerab le and morc f l cx ib lc

than t roops loca tcd in s ta t i c bases .

S pcc i al I -orc e s

33. - I i re

o rgan isa t ion o f ' spcc ia l I ro rces (S i r ) L rn i ts , thc h igh qua l i t v , versa t i l i t l ,a ldc t l l l l p rehens ive t ra in ing o f thesc t roops , and the i r capac i ty to work we l l in smai l e rc lups rnaket i re rn par t i cu la r ly su i tab le fo r Co lN. Carc shou ld be taken, however , tha t they be Lrsed tocompJcment ra ther than rep lace convent iona l un i ts .

i '+ One o1 ' the main charac ter is t i cs o f most Spec ia l Forces is the i r capac i ty to ca f fy our a vervra' ide spectrum of tasks ranging lrom discreet, advisory vis i ts of a few days through to apro longed cantpa ign invo lv ing ex tended dep loyments o f a comple te sqr . rac i ron . The r i i i s ipg anc ltrai l l ing t ; f local forces has become a tradi t ional task for some special lorces Lroops.

IRegarding the Canadian Embedded Training Team, training the 1st Battal ion/]srBrigade/Afghan National Army] This is not the f i rst t ime that the Canadian Forces havebeen involved in mentor ing soldiers of other nat ions, but previous tasks were of a muchsmaller magnitude. In the last few years, individual Canadian solcl iers were involved intraining w' i th the armies in Siena Leone and in the Congo. This t ime the 21-person team istraining at l ent i re infantrv battal ion, with mentors at every level of the command structure.

Army Lessons Learned Centre, Bul let in I 0 , N o .

35 . Spec ia l Forces 'sk i l l s deve loped fo r opera t ions in convcnt iona l war can be app l iedcqLra l l y c l ' fec t i vc lv in those counter insurgency campaigns where la rge areas have f i r i l en unc lc r theadvcrsarv 's cont ro l . Br i t i sh SAS opera t ions th roughout the 19 ,50s and 1960s exenp l i f ies th isc lcep penet ra t ion pa t ro l l ing and surve i l lance capab i l i t y Canad ian SF personne l w i i l a lso beca l l cc i unon to p rov idc execut ive and d ip lomal ic c lose pro tec t io r - r ; the assass ina t ion o f 'a1 : r t l r r l inc t l t d ip lonra t ic o r rn i l i ta ry leadcr wor . r l c i p rov ide the insurgents w i th a p ropaganda cc)up .

l6 ' l

l te r la in cons t ra in ts on Spec ia l Forccs opera t ions are personneL, reac t ion t iu re . anc lendt t rance. Becar tse Spec ia l Forces are usua l ly fcw in nur rber , casua l t ies cannot be cas i l y o rqu ick ly rep laced because o f the long se lec t ion and t ra in ing process . Moreover , the l tend to lackt ; rc t i ca l mob i l i t y . and requ i re add i t iona l log is t i c sLrppor t oncc dep loyed in the f ie ld . Forexample .i : l hos t i l t : env i ronments p rov is ion o f r .va ter can presenr a major p rob lem, as seeu in A fghan is ta r r ' sn ) { ) L l n t a i l t s .

( ' h i : 9 / l l

A l l a ^ n a a n n n n n n ^ 6

DIIAFT

3 , ' S p c c i a l I r o r c e s p r o v i d e u n i q u c c a p a b i l i t j e s l b r C O I N H o r i ' e v e r . t h c l ' c a n o n l ; , b ce f l cc t i ve i f those d i rec t ing t l " re campaign apprcc ia tc the i r po ten t ia l , ther r l i r l i ta t ions . and thcp r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g t h e i r e m p l o y m e n t .

[ , o c a l S e c u r i t y F o r c e s

!olis-q-&r!!

38. the po l i cc ro ies , and leve l o f fo rce employed, dcpcnd on the cu l tu re and preva i l ing

a t t i tudes o f cach count ry . Some count r i cs ma in ta in parami l i ta ry po l i ce {b rces , c i ther on aperntancnt basis or as a reselrye, which can bc feared/hated in authori tar ian countr ies. In statesr.r , , i rcrc such forces are acceptable to the populat ion they provide an important relrcf to the pol icc

c tu r ing the ear ly s tages o f an insurgency , a l low ing the la t te r to concent ra tc on c r imc prevet r t ie r r l .

I f t l re y ac t in a d isc ip l ined and pro fess iona l manner they rnay have a usc fu l s tab i l i z ing e l fec t .cncorrral l ing Inodcrate opinion to ral ly to the government.

-19 . l t i s possrb le tha t the po l i ce fo rces o f a s ta te a re no t o rgan ized or cont ro l led in a tnannercoutnton to l iberal dernocracies. fhere have been many instances when pol ice fbrces have bccnpoorly organized, i l l equipped, or decidedly host i le to any fonn of cooperat ion wit l i the rni l i tary.

Onc must also understand the potent ial ramif icat ion of using former-combatants as pol ice. E,r 'err

i l 'Canad ian leadersh ip has l i t t l c say in the dec is ion , account must be taken o f these fac to rs when

p, la r rn ing the ovcra l l campaign .

Ind iqe nous and I r regu la r Aux i l ia ry Forccs

40. In a l rnos t a l l COIN campaigns governments have a t tempted to rnob i l i ze t i re Ioca lpopu la t ion to p ro tec t themse lves by fo rming aux i l ia ry fo rccs . When sound ly based, sens ib ly

c,rganized and properly coordinated with other units, these forces have proved indispensable and

indccd, on occas ions , the key to a success fu l carnpa ign .

41. l r is not r ,u 'rusual for regular soldiers to be scathing about the appearance, operat ionalc l ' l i c iency , f igh t ing po ten t ia l and loya l ty o l 'aux i l ia ry fb rces . l ' h is a t t i tude , usua l ly ' s temt t t ingf lo r l an ignorance o f the charac tc r is t i cs o f aux i l ia ry lb rces and a misunders tand ing o f the i rn to t i va t ion . togc ' .hc r rv i th a lack o f apprec ia t ron o f the w ider i ssues a t s take in a CIOIN carnpa ign .r r ta \ l tavc un fbr tunate consequences . I t can h :nder t l te p roper deve lopment o f aux i l ia ry fo rcesand rhc i r in tegra t ion in to the overa l l opera t iona l p lan . A l though the na ture o f these fb rces n tavd i f l ' c r be t rveen campaigus , commanders and s ta f f o f f i cers need to unders ta t rd the charac tens t rcsc ,1 'Lhcse lb rccs and thc rcqu i rcmcnts and prob lems assoc ia ted w i th the i r ra is ing .

42 . Aux t l ia ry ib rces cont r ibu te in four rna in a reas : co tn tn i tment ; rnanpower , in te l l igence.and. l igh t ing sk i l l s . ' l ' he govcrnrncnt campaign to de fca t an insurgency w i l l s r . rcceed on ly i f i tr i , ins the loya l t i ,and suppor t o f the popr i la t ion . The ac id tes t o f loya l ty i s whether the peop le w ' i l ia c t i v e I v s L l p p o r l . r h c C O I N c a r n p a i g n s i n c e t h i s w i l l r n e v i L a b l t ' i n v o i v e r i s k . C O l t . x i s c r p e n s i r c i npcrsonnc l . r . i i th s r - :cce ss f 'L r i campaigns har . , ing a secur i ty ' fb rcc- to - insurgcnt ra t io o1- LLp to 20 .1 .ALr r i l i a r_ r , l i t r ccs hc ip n rcc t the personnc l rcc lu i re rnen i .

' l ' hcv a re par t i cu la r ly ,use t i r l fo r de fens ivc

( h i i l l l

A r r a n a a 4 n 4 n n n n n a o

DI{AFT

opcra t lons . re Icas t l tg the more r r 'ob i le . be l le r - t la ined rcgu la r t ioops and po l i ce fo l o l - j ' cns ivco p c r a i L o n s . P r o p e r l y o r g a n r z e d a u x i l i a r l ' f b r c e s ' t h o r o L r g h k n o w l e d g e o f t h e r r l o c a l a r e a a n c l r t speop le cons iderab ly ease thc in te lL igence prob lenr , Thev arc more l rke lv to p ick up in fo rmat ionf lo l t l the nc tq 'o rk o i in fo rmal con lac ts tha t l ink v i l lagers w i th bo th government and insLr rsen, .f i r rces than arc rcgu la r t roops who are no t na t jvc to the area f r ina l l i r . so tne aux i l ia r r , fo rces havcspec ia l i zed f igh t ing sk i l l s , wh ich con- ipLemcnt those o f thc regu la r fo rces . Whi le the l ,havcne i ther the t ra in ing nor cc lL r ipmcnt to opcra te l i ke regu la r so id rers , they may exce l in cer ta in sk i l l ss t tch as t lack ing , pa t ro l l ing , obseruat ion , the use o f g round. and communica t ins vv i rh the loca lp o p L r l a t r o n

'13 8y the t i rnc Canad ian fo rces dep loy , loca l aux i l ia ry io rces may be under cons idcrab leprcssure and d iscouraged by insurgent successes . They w i l l need suppor t and cncourageurent asr^ ,e l i as thc oppor tun i ty to p lay a pos i t i ve and cons t ruc t ive ro le in opera t ions . As areas aresLtcccssively brought back under government control they wi l l be handecj ovcr to the localadrr l i r l istrat i r tn together with i ts pol icc and armed forces. Thosc recrui ted and cleployecj on atc r r i to r ia l bas is near the i r hornes s l - rou ld be usc fu l sources o f rn fo rmat ron and make comnerenrgr r ides ar rd . perhaps . p rov idc in le rprc te rs .

41 . Cus toms, Immigra t ion , Bordcr Po l i ce , and Coastguards are a l ldes igned to cont ro ll l lovelrent across front iers and coast l ines and prevent smuggl ing Whi le t l iey tencl to coucentratetJreir cf forts at of f ic ial ly designated crossing points thcy also incorporare a mobi lc element fbrpa t ro l l ing unrva tched sec tors . l ' hese seru ices arc usua l ly we l l acqua in tcd w i th t f ie iden t i t ies ,hab i ts and rou tes uscd by smugg lers and i i lega l border c rosscrs , wh ich an insurgent o rgan iza t io lvvi l l r rse to l r lovc troops, arms and equipmcnt into the threatened state. lnsurg"nir .oy also trv tobr ibc o r subvcr l o l l l c ia ls . Where thcy ex is t they shou id be brought w i th in the sccr - r r i t y fo rccs asc u r l v a s P o s s i h l c

( ' h 5 1 t / l I

DRAFT

C H A P T E R 6

A I I M Y O P E R A T I O N S I N C O U N T E R - I N S U R C E N C Y

S E C T I O N l : I N ' I R O D U C T I O N

l . Amongst a l l thc var ious rn i l i ta ry assets dep loyed to a COIN theat re o f 'opera t tons .

rhe Army p lays the cent ra l ro le . I t s tac t i ca lun i ts conduct a l l opera t iona l func t ions(C 'ornmand. Sense, Ac t , Sh ie ld and Susta in ) th rough exccut ion o f the th ree types o f

operat ions: of f-ensive, defensive, and stabi l i ty. Indeed, givcn the nature of COIN

opera t ions , the emphas is in te rms o f t i rne and rcsources w i l l be a l loca ted to the la t te r .

I In thc conduct o f fu l l spec t rum opera t ions , un i ts w i l l car ry ou t tac t i ca l tasks tha t

r r i l l be . in te r rns o f the i r purpose, shap ing , dec is ive or sus ta in ing , in suppor t o1- the overa l l

objcct ivcs and campaign. Through the operat ional funct ions, they wi l l f ind. l ix and

s t r i ke . Wi th in a s ing le un i t ' s a rea o f opera t ions , one sub-un i t may be de fend ing indus t r ia l

v i tal points. another may be attacking a recent ly discovered insurgent I lQ, another

ass is t ing po l i ce in conduct ing snap veh ic le chcck po in ts and another p rov id ing secur i ty

lo r c i v i l i a i r con l rac to rs and ass is t ing in a ree ons t ruc t ion pro jec t .

Operat ions wi l i be conducted through the appl icat ion of doctr ine, both

convent iona l opera t ions doc t r ine and tha t wh ich is spec i f i c to a COiN. - l -ac t i cs .

techn iques and procedures ( ' l 'TPs) w i l l be a l te red to meet the th rea t and s i tua t ion in

lhearrc. Al though tact ical operat ions may be planned and co-ordinated at the highest

lcve ls , the l 'must be cont ro l led and executed a t the lowest leve ls . Un i ts become cnab lers

l i r r the i r sub-un i ts tha t in t l l rn p rosecute thc tac t i ca l tasks in a dccent ra l i sed bu t co-

ordinate d Iashion. l -he batt le, both physical and moral, is fought and won at t l te sect iorr

and p la toon leve l .

SE,CTION 2 : ESTABLISFI ING THE FOOTHOI ,D _ PHYSICAL AND MORAL

+. As w, i th any mi l i ta ry opcra t ion , the f i rs t phase o f a CON force dep loyrnent w i l l

l i ke lv be to sccurc a lbo tho ld . A un i t /sub-un i t w i l l be ass igned, nonra l l y , , an arca o f

oper i r t ions (AO) in wh ich i t rv i l l be rcspons ib lc fo r the conduct o f fL r l l spec t ru rno l rc rur t io r rs .

j . 1 'h is phys ica l foo tho ld shou ld fb l low t l - re p r inc ip les and charac ter is t i cs o1 ' thec lc f ' cnce . bur ad . lus ted fo r COIN. ' Th is fbo tho ld w i l l become (a t Icas t in i t ia t l y ) the base o j( )pcra t ions fo r the un i t /s r - rb -un i t I t shor - r ld be loca ted on key te r ra in tha t rv r l l a l lou ' the

[ : o r r : x a r n p l e . t h e a r c al b r c e p r o t c c t i o n n r e a s L i ll o c a l s i n t h e i r r r u i e d i a t e

( h a p 6 : l / i l

w i L l h a v e O P s . s t a n d - t o p o s i t i o n s a n d i n t e r l o c k i n g a r c s o f f i r es s - b u t u , i l l u n l i k e i y c l e a r l l e l d s o f l l r e i n t h e u r b a n a r e a a n d

a r e a i n o r d e r t o i d e n t i f y l h e l o c a l p a t t c r n o f l r f e

- t h a t i s . d e f e n s i b l c .l i a i s o n r v i l l o c c u r r v i t l r

Anonat. l ' l ' t / / rnr l^a ' l

I ) ITAFT

f i ) fccs to responc i rap iC l l ' to anv th rca t c r jnc idcn t in the ,AO, to sc izc suc lc ]c i to p p o r t u n i t r c s a t l d l o p r o t ' i d c a c o r s t a n t p r c s e n c e i n t h c , { C . A l l h o u g h i t ; t p s r b cdef -ens ib le , the loca t ron cannot be v ie r , , ,ed as a fb r t ress on a h i l l , remote and d js ran t l io r rt i t c loca i popu lace i t must be , physrca l l y and emot ionaJ ly , a r rongs t t6e loca l popu laccI t td bcc t ln tc par t o f the da i l y landscapc . ' l ' he so ld ie rs n ius t be see l t lo rn teqra tc . u , i th thepopLr la t ion .

6 Apar t f iom thc ga in i r - rg o f 'a phys icz r l foo tho ld , thc rn r l i ta ry to rce ml rs t garn ar lo ra l f i l o tho ld w i th in the AO; tha t i s , the lb rce rnus t rvork qu ick ly to es tab l i s l ia r rcasqrco1 'au thor i ty and to es tab l i sh a levc l o f t r r - rs t and conf idence w i th thc ioca l popLr )a t ion

l Whi ls t the commander w i l l seck ou t and ident i l y thc key pub l ic f igures ip thc a rca(po l i ce ch ie f cons tab le , loca l mayor , indus t ry managers) rn te l l igence spec ia l i s ts( l i t JMINl ' . counter - in te l l igence and poss ib ly SF) w i l l seek to ident i f y and co l rac t r l i cact l ral power brokers within the sociai structurc. who may be di f ferent from thc pub)iel igurcs . P la toon and scc t ion pa l ro ls w i l l seek to es tab l i sh contac t w, i th the averagcc i t i zcns in thc s t rec ts and v r l lages , ' lhc tone and deureanor . r r se t by the pa t ro is i s i r i t i ca l .

8 A cer ta in a rnount o f r i sk management mL ls t be taken to a l lo rv pa t ro ls to se t th isncedcd pro f i le and to send the appropr ia te r .nessage to the popu lace . - fh is

o f course c j resr lot nleal l t l iat the troops conduct themsclves in a lax manner. Al though the patrol leaclerr lay be ta lk ing w i th loca l sc l - roo l ch i ld ren orshopkeepers , o ther members o i the pa t ro lmaintain a secure stance that i rnpl ies the patrol remains a hard target for insurgcnts 1-hrsb lend o f openness and s te rn p ro f -ess iona l cx te r io r impres .ses the c iv i l ians . e ive i ther lcon l rdence and unnerves thc insurgents , who w i l l a lways be watch ing

9 - l 'h is foothold not only begins to reassure the populace and dislocate thc insLrrgenr.

bu t i t beg ins the tac t i ca l leve l in te l l igence co l lec t ion , aga ins t wh ich measures o t ' succe*i r i l l be use d us thc car rpa ign progrcsscs .

l ( ) , \ s the s i iL ia t ion deve lops o ther sa te l l i te camps or pa t ro l bases may be esrab l i shed.pcrmane l l t iV Cr te lnporar i l y , even a t the pJa toon leve l . 1 'h is spreads the in f luence o f thes lc t r r r t r lb rccs . sL lppons in te l l igence co l lec t ion and drs loca tes the ursLr r !en ts .

Upon arr i r"al in Hait i in March 2004,1Coy, 2RCR establ ished their company locat ion inthe centre of their AO, on the main MSR, across from a public park. Withiniours ofaniving, an OP reported a civilian man beating a woman in the park. Whilst many mayhave simply dismissed the matter as a non-miiitary affair, or as just an aspect of Haitianculture, the company recognised the incident as firstly a violation of the rule of law. andsecondly, as simply unacceptable behaviour in their AO. The QRF was dispatched and theman was apprehended and detained. The action and the ,.uronr= for it, were explained tothe individual and those in the immediate area. After a quick medical inspection, thedetainee was transported to the nearest civilian police stition and passed io their authority.Although i t was highly unJikelv that any civ i l ian charges resulted, a clear message had beensent to the populace. The security forces had estabiished their physical and mora'i footholdin the area. In addit ion, the act ion beganto dislocatethe inf luaqce of the cr iminal andinsurgent elements in the region. That following Sunday, the park was populated wrthlami l ies ,

DRAFT

S I i C T I O N 3 : A T T A C K I N G T H E I N S U R G E N T S , W I L L

ITOLE OF THL ' IACTICAL COMMANDI I I I

I l . l : vcn a t thc tac t i ca l leve l a rnanoeuvr is t approach to a COIN opera t ion rv i l l seek toshat te r the encrny mora l and phys ica l cohcs ion , ra thcr than pursuc h is who lesa ledestruct ion. Commanders at the tactrcal level, af forded conf idence and freedom of. . rc t ion . and suppor tcd by good in tc l l igcnce w i l l , t l r rough ingcuu i ty and a pro-ac t ives tance, be ab le to undermine the power . au thor i ty and eventua l l y w i1 l , o f the insurgent .

12 . Commanders mLrs t be ab le to qu ick ly ident i f y and exp lo i t those oppor tun i l i cs topre-ernp t . d is loca tc and d is rup t the insurgency move lnent and i t s opera t ions . H is suppor tbase and the power that the insurgcnts holds over the local populace must be scvcredLrs ing a l l the assets ava i lab le .

l l . ln o rder to be success fu l in a t tack ing the insurgent on the phys ica l and nora lp lanes , the tac t i ca l comrnander requ i res more assets , indcpe ndence and au thor i ty thau hcr iou ld normal ly have in convent iona l opera t ions . Some examples are as fo l lows:

a. independence and f lexibi l i ty to establ ish and i f possiblc, chair , operat ionaland in te l l igence commi t tees appropr ia te to h is leve l o f command w i thNGOs, coal i t ion partners and local pol ice and civic authori t ies;

b . resources (namely money) and au thor i ty to conduct low- leve l CIMIC andreconstruct ion projects in order to create an irnmediate i rnpact that wi l l . inturn, reinforcc the posit ive aspects ofthe securi ty force's presence;

c . au thor i ty to respond immedia te ly to ca l l s fo r ass is tance f iom loca l po l i ceand securi ty forces, without refe rence to higher authori ty (as long as thcrequirements fal l wi thin the ROE, tact ical tasks assigned to the unit andthe campaign ob jec t ives) ; and

d au thor r ty to conduct in fo r rna t ion opera t ions ( lO) in accordance rv i th thcpLrb l i shed IO thernes Commanders u rus t be ab le to p re -cmpt andJ is loca tc the propaganda mcssages o f the insurgents .

P R E . E N l P T I O N

l l I ) re -c rnp t ion is the tak ing o f ac i ion so as to p revent sorne th ing happen ing . lnr n i l i t a r y l p e r a t i o n s , p a r l r c u l a r l y C O t N , p r e - e r n p t i o n r . v i l l r e q u i r e t h c s e i z i n g o 1 ' a ) i k e i yi l : c : i l r ! . oppor tun i tv be ib re an encrn) 'can ac l , in o rder to deny h in r an advantageouse ( ,L l -se o i ac t ion . I t a in rs to ident i f i ' and exp lo i t the f lee t ing oppor tun i ty to rnax i r l i se:u :p r isc a r rd p rec lude insurgent ac t ion ,

' fhe lns r t rgen ls may be cons tan t ly ,dcs tab i ) rsed b1 ,

C ' h a p 6 : 3 r 3 1

A n r n r 2 , l 4 I n n n n T ?

DIIAF-T

i h c i r l i t i a t r r c o i ' s e c ' r r i t t ' f o r c e a c t i o n s l n t e r u r s o f b o l h k r n e L t c a n c i n o n - k i n e t i c; tpp 1 ic a t io ns ,

l '5 Prc -e inp t ion is Iac i l i ta ted by a sensor to shooter l ink tha t i s rns t i tu ted th roug l rc l t l c t r tnc : techno logv ; t ra rn ing ; and organ isa t ion . Pre-c rnp t lve opera t ions rv i l ldepenc l on ap to-ac t ive and respons ive in te l l igence sys teu ' l , l i nked w i th a rap id dec is ion nrak ingpfoccss in such a way tha t the de tec t io r r o f an oppor tun i ty can te r rans la tcd rn io as Lrcccss 1 Lr l or.r tcome.

1( i Key to p re-ernp t ion is a cover l surye i l lance capab i l i t y a t the un i t anc l sub-unr rle l ' c l . ' fh is

may cons is t o f d ismounted reconnarssance assets , sn ipcr de tachmcnts o r r i l l epJatoon elel .nents rehearsed and equipped for the task. Cunning use of survei l ia lce wrl lact as tr iggers for other forces to deploy to exploi t thc 1' leet ing opportunrty.

l7 ' Lven ovef t f ramework opera t ions can pre-cmpt insurgents . I For e xar lp ie , tSrca tsbv Insurgcnts to keep the loca l sc i too ls c losed (and a t tempts to in t im ida tc fami l i cs to kccpch i ld rcn horne) can be pre-cmpted by the p lacement o f s tand ing pa t ro ls a t the sc6oo ls ,c t t c h d a v a 1 o p c n i n g t i m e , a t l e a s t u n t i l t h e i n s u r g e n t ' s n o l o n g e r h a v e t h e w i l l t o c o n t i n u ct l r i s l b r r n o f i r r t i m i t j a t i o n .

l l i ln COIN i t is f ie quent ly the case that one slrccess leads to opportunit ics fbrattot l ter: an arrest may lead to the discovery of an arms cache and so on. Special I rorces(SI- ' ) and Quick React ion Forces (QRF-s) must be avai lable, properly posi t ionecl and ableto exploi t unplanned opporluni t ies to str ike at the insurgency. Locat ing the eRps with.sL t rve i l l a r rce assets ( fo r example , cover t l y , ins ide a d i lap ida ted bu i ld ingJ w i i l ensr_r re .ni ln rncd ia te rcsponse. Po l i ce and o thcr govcrnment agcnc ies mLls t move rn qu ick ly bch indthe nr i l i tary forces to rc-establ ish and retain control ancj inf luence.

l ( ) l ) re -empt ion shou ld a lso be a goa l o f IO tac t i cs . A f l yer handec l ou t by par ro lscxpl i t in i l lg the purpose of the secttr i ty forces and thcir future operat ions wi l l pfc-emtl tlns t l rgent p ropaganda tha t pa in ts the secur i ty fo rces as oppressors . l . i kc .wrse , t5c t i rnc ly ,i rnple rrrcntat ion of rcconstruct ion pro. iccts at local schools wi l l rob insurse nts of aposs ib le g r ic r 'ance tha t the cur ren t rcg ime fa i l s to p rov ide fo r the .urn t r i ' , c i t i zc r r ry ,andI LL t u re .

I ) I S I - O C , \ T I O N

: I ( )ne o1 ' the r l la in a ims o i f iamework ope ra t ions js to d is loca te the insLr rgcn t apc ll r i s i r r l l r - rcnce over the popu lace D is loca t ion den ies the insurgent thc ab i l i t y rc , -b r ing hrss t re ns th to bcar , and qoes bcyond mere ly l ius t ra t ing t ) re enemy 's p lans by rnak ing

"h is

s t rcngth i r re levant by re fus ing to { igh t on h is te rms. l t rv i l l cons is r o f de ter ren . . ondsccr ' t r i l1 ' Ineasufe s such as : p ro te c t ion o f vLr lnerab le ta rge ts ; se arch opera t ions . over l

- l r a n t e u ' o r k o p e r a t i c n s a r e t h o s e o v e r t m i l i t a r y c p e r a t i o r r s c o n d u c t e d r o e s t a b l l s h a s a f e a n d s c c u r cc r r v l T o n l r e n t ' r v h i c h c o n t r i b l r t e s t o t h e d e l e a t o f t h e i n s u r g e n t i n a n a r e a . ( B r i t i s h A r : n y F i e l d M a n u a l . V o Ll , I ) a r t i 0 )

- i h e ; r p l l - - v i i e t h e s e c u r e e n v i r o n m e n t i n w h i c h o t h e r a g e n c i e s r n a y c o n d u c t t h c i r l i n c s o f' l c r l l . o r I . . . r : . : 1 . : t : . _ . _ - : l p : i t r .

( ' h a p 6 : ; 3 i

DRAFT

s L l r - \ r i l l a n c e o 1 - p o t e n t i a l m c u n t i n g a f e a s o r m e e t i n g p l a c e s o r p l a c e s o t ' r n t i m i d a t i o n , a t t c l

r t p roac t ive IC message tha l re in fo rces the leg i t rmacy o f the governmcnt and secur i t \lb rccs . I -hc rcsu l ts o f a de tc rmined c f fo r t to d is loca te the rnsurgent may no t bcspec tacu la r and may no t even be apparent to t roops on the ground, bu t over t i r re rv i l l robthe ins i r : 'geu t o f the rn i : ia t i ve

DISRUP' f ION

11. l ) i s rup t ion sceks to a t tack t l " re insurgent se lec t i ve ly . ta rge t ing h is most i rnpor tan tassets and so th rowing h im in to confus ion . Wel l -executed over t rn i l i ta ry opera t ions rv i l lI r c . lp to d is rup t thc insurgent by th rea ten ing dep loyrnent and escape rou tes , loca t ing arn tsc lches an t l res t r i c t ing movements , E ,ven the th rea t o f aggress ive cover t and over topera t ions can be e f fec t i ve . Insurgents who knowthat they are bc ing ac t ive ly hLrn ted rv i l ll r , - t , ' r r n r n d t n { l c e l h n e r c e , r f n n e r r t i n n c

l 5 [ ) i s rup t ion ca l l s f lo r tac t i ca l awareness , cunn ing and a robus t use o f fb rces .Comrnanders shou ld a lso apprec ia te tha t ra re oppor tun i t ies may be be t te r cxp lo i ted byr r thcr agenc ies (a minor anns f lnd fo r examplc cou ld . i f le f t und is tu rbed, become al ' rL r iuu l anrbush s i te fb r Spec ia l Forces) . Spccd and a le r tness w i l l be essent ia l .

)6. ln order to affect disrupt iorr , tact ical commanders must be afforded freedorn oi 'ac t ion . C lommanders cannot awa i t au thor i ty f ro rn h igher eche lons fo r fear o f los ing an

oppor tun i tv .

APPRECIATING SECONDARY AND 1 'ER1 ' IARY EFFECTS

21. ( lommanders and staff must understand that every act ion wi l l have second andthird order effects, On one hand, pro-act ive framework operat ions, robust del ibcrateoperat ions arrd thoughtful IO lneasures wi l l d is locate and disrupt the insurgents'presenceand inf l r-Lcnce amongst the populace and in turn corrode and undermine their conf ldenceand rvi l l . On the other hand, these operat ions, paf i icular ly i f they do not mcet the i ri rnmed ia te a i rns and produce physrca l s igns o f succcss , may cause embar rassntcn t to thcsccur i ty fb rces . unwanted d is rup t ion to the popu la t ion and in tu rn undermine the pLrb l i c ' scon l ldence and empathy . Long- tenn sL lccess in COIN wi l l depend upon thcse scconc l a t rc lthird order effects

l ( ) , ' l

h is i ss r " rc rnay bes t be i i l us t ra ted by the fo l low ing example . A cordo t to l te r i i t iou o f 'a suspec ted weapons cache in the hear t o f an insurgcnL cont ro l ledne ighbourhood, conducted w i th the ass is tance o f loca l po l i ce fo rces , rnay f ' rnd! \eapons. l lo rvever , the second and th i rd o rder e f fec ts may be s ign i f i can t andboth pos i t i ve and ne sa t ive e f fec ts :

the posr t rve seconc la ry and te r t ia rv e f1 -ec ts mav inc luc lc the 1 'o l lo r r , i r r r : :

and scarch

f e, .v i f anynray have

C h a p 6 : 5 i 3 l

antnt14, l -E_nnnnTq

D R A F T

( l ) n e * ' r n t e l l i q e n c e - \ o L l r c e s a r c i c i c n t r f i c c r v i t h i n t h c e s t a b i i s h r n c i r land i iom rv i th in the spec ta to rs u ,ho ga thcrcd c lu r ing the condLrc t o lthe opera t ion ;

( l ) i r l surgent leadcrs a rc idcn t i f i cd c i ther th rough ar res t /dc tep t io r rs o rf rom ev idence found a t thc scenc :

( l ) the use o f loca l po l i ce lb rccs n tay have sevcra l c1 ' fcc ts :

(a ) inc rease the leg i t imacy o f the rn i l i ta ry fo rces in tha t rhevare seen to be rvorking w, i th local authori t ies;

(b) increasc thc prof i lc anci esteem of the local polrce forccs(who may no t be rve l l - regarded by the loca l popu la t ions) ;

(c ) lmprove the pro l 'e ss iona l conduct o f the loca l po l i ce fb rccby way o i 'exarnp le and th rough the t ra in ing va luc o f theoperat ion;

(4) insurgents, knowing that thcy and their rcsource s are beiqg soLrgStact ively, are forced further undcrground and may even f lce thcarea;

(5) thc local populace begins to i 'eel rr lorc secure and less af iaic l of ' thernsurgcnts and the i r powe r; ancl

(6) we apons are forced f unher undcrground and are iess rcacl i lvavai lable to insurgent fbrces;

b' . thc ne gat ivc effects in this example may rnclude the fbl lowing:

( l ) ernbarrassment in that no weapons were lound;

(2 ) insurgents 'p ropaganda h igh l igh ts th is lack o fsuccess and a t tenrp tsto demonstrate that the securi ty forccs are over-react ing, heavy,-handed ancl not to bc trr_rsted;

(3 ) i r r t c l l rgence sources arc co lnprorn ised;

(4 ) in tc r f 'e rence to the loca l popu ia t ion 's da i l y ro r i t ine inc i tes angcr ;

( - t ) loca l po l i ce ass is t ing w, i th the ac t ion ioose conf ic jcnce anc l t r .L rs r inthe secr:r i ty. . forces.

C ' l rap 6 . 6 - l1

( 5 )

DRAFT

c lamagc occur r inq to shops and hcntcs c l r " r r ing oDe i 'a t i cns a l tge fs L i l cp o p u l a c e '

support of ' f i -amew,ork and deLrberate operal ions shor-r ldfo l low-on e f fec ts and a t tempt to mi t iga te the impact o1

i ( ) . In lb r rna t ion opera t ions inl r , ' r r l , r n n n . l t , '

" r . l o i t t h c r r n c i t i r r e

th e ne gat ir . 'e effects.

SECTION 4 : SECUI{ ING AND CONSOLTDAT. INC A CONTROLLED AREA

I1 . Once the presence o f a secur i ty fo rce has been es tabL ished, opera t ions to c lear ,sccu fc and conso l ida te thc nex t a rea to be brought under government cont ro l , a reIaurrchcd f iorn establ ished operat ing bases.

- l 'he immediate aim of a f iarnework

o l te ra t io r r . v iewed as the spread o f an o i l s l i ck , i s to scpara te the insurgents f rom the i rs r rppor te rs . fbod supp l ie rs and sources o f in fo rmat ion .

- fhese opera t ions are essent ia l l y

of ' fensivc in nature as they aim to wrest terr i tory, and more imporlant ly the hearts andrn inds o1 'peop le who l i ve in i t , f rom insurgent cont ro l and in f luence.

l l . l he o t fens ive e lement o f f ramework opera t ions inc ludes surg ica l cordons andscarches. raids, of fensive patrol l ing and attacks. ' l 'hese tact ics force the insurgents to react

or sur render the in i t ia t i ve . Wel l p lanned and organ ized ambushcs des t roy the cnemy as he

rcacts. \ , \ /hen thc opportunity ar ises, inf i l t rat ions and attacks may be used to destroy

knor.r ,n and vulnerable insurgcnt camps and base posit ions. Success however, rests onvcry good in te l l igence.

l-1. As areas of the host i ie terr i tory arc cleared of insurgents, the civ i l administrat ionwi l l bc re -es tab l i shed. I t i s poss ib lc tha t many o f the area 's fo rmer c iv i l servants .nragistrares and pol ice rnay have escaped the ini t ia l insurgent take over and woLrid be ablc

to pLrt thcir local knowledge to good use on their return. I iowever, they and the civ i lpol ice wi l l undoubtedly need the backing of sui table rni l i tary forces for some t ime and

ccr la rn l ; un t i l the ne ighbour ing rcg ions have been broug l i t back under govcntment

ccru t ro l . - [he

army may be asked to he lp to t ra in Ioca l aux i l ia ry fo rces tha t w i l ] eventua l l y

s r . rppor t the i r own po l i ce .

S[ .C ' I ION 5 : DI ' ]FENSIVE OPEI {ATIONS ANI ) TACTICS

. I ' Y P E S O F D E F E N S I V E O P E R A T ' I O N S

i -+ Dc lcns ive opera t ions by the sccur i ty fo rces rv i l l ass is t in the s tab i l i sa t ion o f ' theI r rca ur rd a l lo rv the govern lnent and o thcr ager tc ies to e f f -ec t ther r tasks . The main typcs o fr l c f -cns i r ' c e rpcra t io r . ts a re as fo l lows:

- r p ro tecL i vc mersu res : a t t d

( i r r r l l a n J c r s r r u s t i n s i s { t h a t d u r i n g s u c h o p e r a t i o n s , c o l i a t c i a l d a m a g e s a r e I r n r i t e d t o t h e g r e a t e s t e x t e i r t. , - r t s s i b l e . A ) t h o u g h t r o o p s l t l u s : b e p r e p a r e d f o r b r e a c h e s , l o c k e d d o o r s c a n u s u a l l y b e r e m o v e d l i o r r t h e i r: i r g e s . c L r i l o c k s c a n b e r c p l a c e o a n C c l a r r a g e s r c p a i r e d b , 1 , . ' ' , t , n . . t t i n t h e d a y s l b l l o w i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n .

C h a p 6 : 7 i 3 1

A020231 1-7,OOOO77

b de fcnsr i ,e comi land and cont ro l u ,a r fa re (C2W)

P I l O T E C T I V E M E A S U R E S

' l -5 - l ' h rea t ln many campaigns , a reas o f ope ra t ion rv i l l be non- l rne ar and pcrhapst lo t ' t -co l l t iguoL is ' fhe

th rea t rv r l l be asvmmet r ic and no area can be assumed to be sa fcun less i t i s searched_anc i then gLrardc j . Even in a c leared and conso l jc la ted arca thci t lst t l gents rnay st i l l have a few operat ional cel ls that can launch borrb attacks or carryout assass tna t ions They may a t ten lp t to re in t roduce insurgcnt ce l l s to launch tc r ro r is tattacks both for their propagancla valuc and in an attempt Io fo. .e a redeployment of.pol ice ancl t roops to remove the pressure l rom their l 'orces elsewhere. Hence, defensivelreasl l rcs and protect ion may be nccessary fbr a wide range of people, erreas apd faci l i t jes

i6 ECurancc Protect ive measures wi l l st i l l be required in the most secure bascareas' al thor-rgh the tasks may eventua)ly be handed over (at Ieast in part) to the civ i lpo l i ce o l 'a l rx i l ia r ies A pr io r i t y w i l l be fo rce pro tec t ion o f the secur i ty fo rces , base areas .Covcrnment and indus t r ia l v i ta l po in ts and l ines o f communica t ions w i l l requ i reprotect ion for they provide high value targets fbr the insurgents. At al l t imes a'c i at al lleve ls v ig i lance lnus t be s t ressed and en forccd .

i ( r ' I Ja lancc ' Pro tec t ivc l rcasures in h igh r i sk a reas are rnanpower rn tens ivc . Many o lt l ie t i tsks are rout i t . tc and boring, and soldiers tend to lose their v igi lance al . ter longpcr iods w i thout an inc idcn t . i f poss ib le , t roops on such du t ies shou ld bc ro ta tcd w i ththose on r .o re ac t ive opera t ions and evcry e f rbn m's t be made to keep a t ra in ingprog l 'ammc go ing .

l7 ob. iect ives of Protect ive Measures. Protect ivc measures apply to both t6csccLrr i ty fbrces themselves, other agencies in the carnpaign unJ tn. local populace. l -hcgcnelal object ivcs of protect ive measures inclucie the fofowinc:

I ) ] I A F T

c . p reve l t t d i s rup t i on oJ ' t he economic

i7 . Tasks . P ro t cc t i r c measL l res , , v i l l i nc lL rde aL rn i t s r v i i l bc expec tec l 1o conduc t t he f o i l o . . , 111g '

a. ensure securi ty of al l base areas, i rc luding l i r rward operat ing bases aucltemporary bases ,

b . -sccure contro l lcd areas;

s c c L r r e l i n c s o f c o r n r n u n i r . l t i o n .

d pre ve n t supp ly and re in fo rcement o f insurgent un i ts ; and

l i f c o f the na t ion .

wrde var ie ty o f tasks . Tac t jca l l cve I

( ihap 6 ; 8 _3 I

A n 4 n 6 4 a / A ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^

DRAFT

l persor ' )ne l p ro tec t ion fo r V IPs Th is r , , i1 l inc l r , rde key member -s o f thcgovernme n t , cer ta in sccur i ty fo r ce cor l rnanders and v is i t ing d ign i ta r ics . I trnay inc iude the t ra in ing o f loca l fo rces in th is ro le , C losc pro tcc t ron w i l li i ke ly be condLrc ted bry mi l i ta ry po l rce and SF t roops , rvh i le temporaryoutc r cordons mf ,y be conducted by l r r re I roops ;

[ r , secur i ty fo rcc t roops . bo th on and o f f du ty . Admin is t ra t i ve moves o ft roops o f ten expose concent ra t ions o f ' t roops as so f t ta rge ts . Forces u , j l ll i ke l y have to be a l loca tcd fo r thc i r p ro tcc t ion :

c . convoy secur i ty . ' fhe secur r ty fo rces w i l l be expec tcd to securegovernment and NGO convoys, as wel l as their or.r 'n;

d. large protected road movements, Large movernents of uni ts or assets fromothcr agenc ies , par t i cu la r ly in the conso l ida t ion o f newly securcd ereas orin a s i tua t ion o f non-cont iguous ba t t le -space, w i l l requ i re s ign i l i can t lb rcea l loca t ion I

c . p icke t ing rou tcs and l ines o f cor rmun ica t ions . MSRs and l ines o fconrmun ica t ion w i l l a lways bc vu lnerab le to a t tack . L ike ly o r p rev ious lyused ambush areas may requ i re p icke t ing Techno logy can be exp lo i tedand pickets locat ing on dorninat ing terrain wi l l be able to act as tr iggersfor the dispatch of reservcs to ei ther increase protect ion or disrr .rpt aninsurgent opcra l ion :

l - . guarding instal lat ions, both mi l i tary and civi l ian; and

g. c lear ing pa t ro ls o r sweeps (normal ly a round f i xed bases or es tab l i shedMSRs) in order to defcat insurgent survei l lance and ident i fy possibleimproved exp los ive dev ices ( lED) .

18 . Countc r -Surve i l lance Measures . lnsurgcnt g roups w i l l re ly on the i r n rernberslb r survc i l lance and in fb rmat ion on the ac t ions o f HN and coa l i t i t rn secur i ty fo rces ': rc t ions . capab i l i t ies and weaknesses . Much o f th is surve i l lance w i l l occur in a fa i r l yopen, low- techno logy fash ion w i th watchers b lend ing in rv i th the genera l pub l i c .shac low ' ing pa t ro ls o r u ,a lch ing base carnps , Coun lc r - tneasures must bc enrp loycd a t a l ll cve ls . V ig i lance must be s t rcssed and prac t ised cons tan t ly . So ld ie rs can be assured tha tin rn t ts t cases the i r depar - tu rcs and movements a re repor ted . Some methods inc ludecha l leng ing susp ic ious pe isons or those shadowing pa t ro ls , and avo id ing pa t ro l l ingpat te rns . and use o f c lear ing pa t ro ls ,

C ' l r r p 6 : 9 ' 3 1

A n t n t ? , 1 4 - o n n n n 7 o

DRAI'-T

Survet l lance by insurgent gangs began as soon as cdn troops arrrved in l ja i t i in e ar l1,2004' Observant soldiers in OPs and clear ing patrols quicf ty ident i f ied and el iminatedwatchers. Patrol commanders detained individuals who werl shadowing patrols,removed (temporarily) their ce1l phones and recorded the names and nurnters in thecalling memory and directory. This information was passed to USMC regimental andCanadian intelligence stalfs who used it to identily the insurgent organrsation andcommand.

DEFENSTVE COMMAND AND CON.TROL WALFARE (C2W)

i9 ' [ )c fens ivc C2W is used to de ny , negate , rcducc or lu rn to f i i cnd ly advar r tage.c l len ly e f lb r ts to dcs t roy ' d is rup t , exp lo i t our command and cont ro l sys tcms. inc lL r i ing i t ssuppor t ing communica t ions , in fo rmat ion and in te l l igence ac t iv i t ies . ia fcguard ing thcconttnand systems of the securi ty forces and government is a lundamental considlerat i ,nas fa i lu re to do so is l i ke ly to resu l t in loss o f f recdom o f ac t ion anc l in i t ia t j ve . r r i s -d i rcc t ion o f e l ' fo r t , o r even miss ion fa i lu re .

r10 [ )e l i :ns ive C2W wi l ] have the fb l low ing goa ls

protect the vulnerabi l i ty of command support assets. procedurcs andins ta l la t ions to a t tack , subvers ion or in f i l t ra t ion ;

reduce the effects of enemy deccpt ion act ions against our co.rrnandsystems, part icular ly those of the government which, in seekinsincxpens ive , low r isk op t ions , may be more suscept ib le to c lece"p t io r ;

nu l l i f y the e f fec ts o f enemy EW ac t ions aga ins t f r ie nd ly comma'dsys lems;

deny the enem) / the ab i l i t y to exp lo i t l i i cnd ly command sys tems;

ens l r re tha t the ene i ry 's PSYops are ine f fec t i ve , ma in ly th roLrghdel 'ensive IO plans; and

br ie f ing t roops on insurgent Io a i rns aud means, in o rder tha t the 'a reaware of the possible eff 'ccts on the populace and in order to inoculatethem from thc effccts of host i le propaganda.

SECTIoN 6 : oFFENSIVE opERAt ' I oNS - cATNING THE IN I ' I IAT IVE

' l l ( ) f f -cns i 'e operar ions sL lppofr the ' , i r i tarv 's key ro le in neutrar is ing the i 's r - r rgc.1' l ' hey c f t 'ec t iVc l ) take the ba t t le to the insLr rgcn t in o rc ie r p fe -empt , c l i s loca te anc l d is r : ,p r

h i rn o f f 'e rs i rze tac t i cs rv i l l r ,a ry , bLr t * ' i l l l i ke l ' inc lL rc le rhe fo l lo rv rns :

C h a p 6 : 1 0 i 3 1

b .

DRAFT

C

C

L

commaud and cont ro l war fa re (C2U/ ) opera t ions ;

pa t ro l l i ng ;

qu ick reac t ion fo rces ;

arnbushes;

r a i d s ;

la rger sca le dc l ibera te opera t ions , to dcs t roy , o r a t leas t d is ioca te andd i s r r r n t i n s r r r p o n l r r n i t s , a r e a s u n d l i n c s o f c o m r n u n i c r t i o n .u , u r e y ! )

C 2 W O P E R A T I O N S

-+1. C2W is used to dcny insurgent commanders cf fect ive cornmand of ' their forcesthrough des t ruc t ion , d is rup t ion , exp lo i ta t ion , decept ion , in f luence or den ia l o f a l l o r par to f the i r comrnand sys tem, inc lud ing i t s suppor t ing communica t ions , in fbnnat ion andi r r tc l l ige ncc ac t iv i t ies . C2W is a par t i cu la r ly e f fec t i vc , and o f ten the most econorn ica l ,n reans o f ' reduc ing the combat e f fec t i veness o f insurgents , app l i cab le a t a l l leve ls o1 'cornurand Thc pr in rary ob jec t ives o f C2W d i rec ted aga ins t insurgent combat po ten t ia la |e I ( ) :

s low his tempo in relat ion to that of ' the sccuri ty forces;

d is rup t h is ac t i v i t ies ;

degrade the insurgent commander 's ab i l i t y to command and cont ro l ; and

disrupt his abi l i ty to generatc and sustain offensive act ion.

-13 . - l ' echno log ica l advances w i l l g rea t ly enhance thc ab i l i t y o f secur i ty fb rces to

a i tec t t l re insurgents 'C2 sys tems. Care must be taken, however , to rn in imize negat iveconscquenccs fo r thc non- insurgents . A lso , one must bc aware o f ' the e f f 'ec t L rpon ther r r te l l iger - rcc ba t t le , when ta rge t ing ins r . r rgents 'C2 sys ten ' IS . [ 'o r exarnp le , shu t t ing down ace l lL r la r te lephone gr id in o rder to dcny i t s use by insurgents has a s t rong negat ive iu rpac t( )n the c iv i l soc ie ty in add i t ion to p rcc lud ing EW exp lo i ta t ion o f in te rceptedc t l r l rnun ica t ions .

P A T I I O L L I N G

+4. ( l cnera l . fhe types o f pa t ro l and the i r purpose are the same fo r counter -insurge ncv opera t ions as fb r convcnt iona i war fa rc , w i t l i some mod i f i ca t ions , Pat ro ls a re arn i i ins tay 'o f COIN opcra t ions ar rd must be conducted w i th an o f fens ive sp i r i t , tak ing in tocons idera t io r r hor .vever , tha t they w i l l bc occur r ing o f ien amongst c iv i l ian popu la t ions .

C h a p 6 : I t / 3 1

an,nta4, ' l - .1 I -nnnoR,l

D R A F T

\ l O s i t r p c s o l ' p a t r c l s s h o L r i d b c a s s i g n c c l s t a n d i n g a n d s p e c i f i c I R s t o s L r p p c r t r i r c o r . c r a l lc ' t t t l l l a iu l l a l l c - i spec i f i ca l l y p lanned opcra t ions . Gr r . ,en thc o \ /e r t na tLr re o i 'mos i COINp a L r o i i i n e ' p a t r o l s a r c m o r c v u l n c r a b l c t c a m b u s h i h a n t h o s e c o n d u c t e d i r r c o n v e n t i o n a loDcr . r t ions . 1 -he t1 ,pes o f pa t ro l l ing tha t v i ' r l l occLr r in co lN are :

reconna lssance pa t ro l s ;

s tand ing pa t ro ls ;

f iamework patrols; and

f ight ing patrols.

4 - i Reconna issance Pat ro ls . A t t i rnes there w i l l bc a spcc i f i c requ i rcmel t ib r rheconduct o f a pa t ro l whose so le purposc is rcconna issance. As in convent iona l opera t ions .they tnav be conducted as po in t , a rea or roL l tc reconna issance. In do ing so , the fo l lowr 'gs l r o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d :

b .

a . smal l reconna issance pa t ro ls (wh ichvulncrable, par l icular ly i f conclucteclor srvarme d by crowds;

are re lat ively weak) wi l l bcover t l y . They can be eas i l y a t tacked

covcrt patrols have a rcducecl thre at prof i le, avoidinsurgcnts o f thc i r p resencc , and c lo no t revea l thesoLrght;

reconna lssancc pa t ro ls w i t l - r techn ica l requ i rements (eg , rou tereconna issance) shou ld inc lude spec ia l i s ts such as eng" inccrs , u ,hereapp i icab le . Depend ing upon the in tended miss ion , i t mav inc ludcnrembers o f o ther agenc ies , such as NGOs:

ear l y wa rn ing toin l ' o rma t i on be ing

d the insert ion of covert patrols and ops is very di f f icul t in clense Lrrbanareas . Ingenu i ty must be used to d rsgu ise the i r inscr t ion , wh ich ca , beconcealed amongst an ovef l operat ion;

a quick react ion force (QI{F) niust be prcpared to extract or reir lbrce thepat ro l ;

l the pa t ro l may assume add i t rona l respons ib i l i t i es as oppor tun i t i cs p reser tthcmse lves , such as thc conduct o f snap veh ic le chcc I po in ts

17 ' S tand ing Pat ro ls . The es tab l i shn ien t o f a ne t rvork o1 'over t and co , , ,e r t s tandnrgl la t ro )s occupy ing key pos i t ions prov ides an i rnponant rneans o f acc lu i lng in fo rmat io 'l rnd f t t rn ish ing a secur i ty fo rce presence. l -h is rn t r - r rn w i l l ass is t i r r c iomin l t ing an ar .ea .' f

hc tasks a l loca ted to s tand ing pa t ro ls may inc lude.

( . h a p 6 : l 2 i i l

DII.AFT

a obta in ing in fo r i ra t ron on insu lge n t ac t i v r ty and no t ing pa l ie fns .

b observir- ig the moverlent and act iv i ty o1-cr.rr1 'ew brcakers and crorvcis:

c rdent i i y ing r ing- leaders and law-breakers ;

d . d i rec t ing pa t ro ls , po l i cc , reserye un i ts o r he l i cop ters to inc idcn ts ;

c . g iv ing cover ing f i re to veh ic le and Ibo t pa t ro ls shou ld they comc u t tdcr a

levc l o f a t tack wh ich ncccss i ta tcs the L tse o f f i rearms;

f ' , ass is t ing in t l ie d ispersa l o iL rn lawfu i asse mbl ies and c rowd couf io t t ta t tons

by pass ing in fo rmat ion to e lements o f the secur i ty fo rces invo lvcd in

crorvd control . and

g. engag ing sn ipcrs who open f i re in the i r v ic in i ty , and dominat ing arcas to

prevent .snipers from taking Lrp l i re posit ions.

.18. Framework Patrols. Framework patrols provide a force presence that helps to

cre ate the secure environmenl. I t provides a mixture of information and protect ion. Thcy

operi l te on a mult iple systemo that var ies in accordance with the environment (urban or

ru ra l ) . the th rea t . the i r task and the invo lvement o f o ther secur i ty fo rce e lemer r ts . ' lhc

patrols ntay work frorn f i rm bases and from temporari ly establ ished patrol bases Thcy

rutay be mounted or lnove on foot. Framework patrol l ing should avoid creat ing a pattern

of predictable habits. In broad tcrms their tasks are to:

a . p rov ide loca l p ro tec t ion fo r secur i ty fo rce bases by compl iment ing o therprotect ive measurcs such as standing patrols, OPs and sensors;

b. inhibi t insurgents' f reedorn of movement by random deployment at

cl i f ferent t imes in di l ferent areas. lh is supports t i re dislocat ion o1' the

insurgent . ;

c . inc rease the chances o i ' in te lcep t ing guntnan. bonrbers o r weapon runners :

c l . conc iuc t snap veh ic le check po in ts o r "cordon and knock" opera t ions : .

' I r r a r n u l r i p L e p a t r o l s y s t e m , t h e b a s i c t a c t i c a l e l e m e n t i s t h e f o u r m a n b r i c k H e t i c e a r i l l e s e c t i o n r v r , ,

c o p s i s t o f t w o b r i c k s . A m u l t i p l e r v i l l n o r r n a l l y c o n s t s t o f t h r e e b r i c k s a n d t h u s a p l a t o o n c a n J b r t r t r v o

n r u J t r p l e s , o n e c o r n r n a n d e d b y t h e p i c o m d . t h e o t h e r b y t h e p l 2 l C . B r i c k s p a t r o l i n s u p p o r t o f o n e a n o t h c r ,

r r o r n r a l l y r v i t l t i n v i s u a l , o r a t I c a s t r a d i o c o n t a c t , a n d a r e t h u s a b l e t o s u p p o r t o n e a n o t h e r b u t f l e x i b l e

e n o u g h t o o u t - r n a n o e u v r e a n y i n s u r g e n t s e n c o u n t e r e d'

[ t a t r o l s u i l l o f t e n e n c o u n t e r s u s p i c i o u s a c t i v i t y , n o t i c e a n i r r e g u l a r a c t i o n o r t t o t i c e s o t n e t h i r t g o u t o f i t s

t t r d i n a r y p l a c e , o r s i m p l y r e c e i v e a t i p f r o m a l o c a l . T h e p a t r o l c o t n t n a n d e r n t u s t b e p r e p a r e d t o s t o p a n d

s c a r c h s u s p i c i o u s v e h i c l e s , A d d i t i o n a l l y , h e n t u s t b e p r e p a r c d t o c o n d u c t a i o w - l e v c l c o r d o n a n d s e a r c h

\ \ , i t h r h e c o n t b a t p o r v e r a v a i l a b l e , o r r v i t l r a d d i t i o n a l r e i r t f o r c e r t t e n t s , h e r r a y s i r n p l y s e t a n i r r m e d i a t e

C h a p 6 : l 3 / 3 l

Lntnt l .4 4 -4 ?-nnnnR?

During the deployment to Haiti in2004, intelligence sources at the USMC regimental levelindicated that a hardware store in the west end of Port auPrince was a possibie weaponscachc as the store was owndd by a known gang leader. This was added to u.o-puny ,u.g.,list and framework patrols assigned to this arei wereifasked to search for and identifv thisstore. Eventually, after about 20 days later, a patrol located the store. The patrolcommander conducted his combat estimate and after receiving authority to do so from theCoy CP, the patrol conducted a cordon and knock operation. Nothing was found and twolocks had to be cut during the operation. It was explained to the store manager that if theowner wished, he could report to the company location and his locks woulJbe replaced.Three days later, the owner and other man arrived at the camp seeking new iocks, The twomen were, and had been, posing as Haitian National Police,(HNP) officers and were listedon the HNP most wanted list, a copy of which was held in the company cp. They weredetained and tumed over to FINIP authorities.

DIIAI,-T

b e r n p o s i t r o n t o r e a c t t o a t h r e a t o r d c v c i o p i n g . s r t L r a L i o n i n a p a r t i c L r l a rarea or to re in fo rce o lhcr pa t ro ls ;

ce lc r an rnsurgcn l a f iack or sn ip ing opcra t ion by sa tura t ing an area andthrea ten ing the escape roL l te o t 'a bombcr o r sn iper ; and

gather in fo rmat ion and in te l l igencc th loLrgh the issue o f s tand inq andun iqLrc IRs

'19 . F igh t ing Pat ro ls ' The purpose o f f igh t ing pa t ro ls i s to d is rup t rhe insurgenr a ldhis airns. As in other forms of warfare success cannot be obtained b/ def 'ensiv.

"n1.oru.. ,

aione . - l 'hc

aim is to br ing troops into contact with the insurgents on favourablc tcrms.' fhe essent ia l p re- requ is i te i s good, accura te and specr f rc in fo rmat ion resard inc the

p lanned ob jec t i i ' c , wh ich may be ob ta ined f rom a var ie ty o f sources inc luc l ing"po l i ce andnr i l i ta ry co l lec t ion , techn ica i sensors inc lud ing i rnagerv , I IUMINT sources .re conna issance, s tand ing and f ramcrvork pa t ro ls , t rack ing and, somet i rne s . a luckyco l l tac t . In c lose te r ra in , where i t i s se ldom poss ib le to se t in a s tea l thy manner a cordor . rs t tcccss i r " r l l y , a f igh t ing pa t ro l has a be t te r chance o f scor ing a sL lccess . ' l ' he pa t ro l may beab le to sc t a has ty ambush or rush an insurgent base. Uscd jud ic ious ly o f fens ivepat ro l l ing i t i s an exce l len t way o f keep ing smal l g roups o f enemy on the move. inducr rga scnse o f insecur i ty and d is loca t ing insurgent p lans .

There were occasions in Malaya during the Bri t ish Army CON, when talking and cooking gaveaway communist terror istposi t ions and on the JebelAkhdar in the late 1950s, the smei l of bad

L insLugent sanitation provided a timely ..varning of the enemy's proximity for approachrngnatrols.

DI].AFT

Q U I C K R E A C T I O N F O R C E S

50. QLrick react ion forccs (QI{Fs) are formed at the tact ical Ieveis in order to: react to

the unexpectcd ; exp lo i t oppor tun i t ies and succcss , and suppor t / re in fo rcc th rea tenec i a reas

and l i iend ly fb rces .

51 . In add i t ion to suppor t ing rn i l i ta ry fo rces , there rv i l l be a requ i re t len t to p rov ide

rapid support through a QRF to local securi ty forces and inst i tut ions. I lven in denser-rrban areas, c iv i l ian pol ice stat ions and other off ices of local authori t ies can l 'eel isolated

arrd lhrcatcned. In rural areas, pol ice outposts and border stat ions are vulnerable to attack

dLrc to their isolat ion. I t is i rnportant that such local forces be rnade aware the mi l i taryl i r rccs arc wi l l ing to, and capable ol ' , coming to their aid, rapidly and eff 'ect iveiY' .Without this conf idence, they wi l l be unwil l ing to undertake operat ions and nray f lee

f iorn their posts, thereby al lowing insr:rgents to destabi l ise an area and undermine the

government cont ro l .

52. L, ikewise, coal i t ion mi l i tary forces, operat ing from smal l platoon-sized bases or

patrol l ing at the sect ion and mult iple level, wi l l at certain t imes require reinforcement or

extract ion. QRFs must be ready to respond to such cal ls for support . QRFs may also be

rused to exp lo i t b r ie f oppor tun i t ies to s t r i ke a t insurgents o r to secure in te l l igence f inds .

5 i . . l -hus ,

QRFs must be ident i i led and he ld in

c lc tachmcnts o r to exp lo i t poss ib le successes . - [he

shou id cons ider the fo l lo rv ing :

read iness to go to the a id o f th rea tenedp lann ing o f QRFs in a COIN opcra t ion

the establ ishment of f ixed comrnunicat ions l r le ans betwccn the lbrcc and

those loca l secur i ty e lemen ls (such as po l i ce pos ts ) tha t a re w i th in thc

un i t ' s AO and fo r wh ich ihe un i ts a re respons ib le .

a l te rna t ive rou tes must be prac t ised in o rder to reduce the r i sk o1 'a rnb i rshl ' rom insurgcnts who have del ibcrately planned to attack the rel ievingforcc:

the a l loca t ion o f a rmoured veh ic les (LAVs, e tc ) to the QRF wi l l inc reasernob i l i t y and 1 'o rcc p ro tec t io r r .

- l -here is a poss ib i l i t y tha t the y n ta l 'b re

b locked on au approach rou te o r ambushed w i th an t i -a r t rour u /e apons:

C i h a p 6 1 5 i 3 l

an,) i )2,4, t _4 E_nnnnnq

DI{AFT

the use o f hc l l coprc rs fb r rap id mo\ ,enren t i s o f ten the bes t op i ion fb r ra r : j c linse f t io . bu t a re 'u l re rab le to a l l t1 ,pcs o i f i r c anc l n ray no t be ab le t , l ia r i li n dense urban env i ronmenrs ,

{ M B U S I I E S A N D R A I D S

' t " i Ambr- rshes ar rd ra ids take lhc ba t t l c to the insurgcnt and can have s ign i f rcan tc i t -ec ts i r r p re-ernp t ing and c l i s rup t ing the insurgent . l t must be kept in rn ind tha t a l thoLrcht t r i t t t . \ ' o1- the pr inc ip )es and tac t i cs o f ambi ishcs ancJ ra ids w i l l app ly in a COiN. res l r i c t i veI tO[ : rnay prec lude the in i t ia t ion o f dcad ly fo rce w i thoLr t spec ihc cause anc l thus thel .s l l rgents wor-r ld have to be given thc opporluni ty to surrender.

' i i Anrbushcs are usua i ly de l ibera te bu t c jn i l s rnus t be dcve loped to enab le a sec t ro l ror patrol to tnove rapidly and quiet ly into an ambush posit ion when i ts lead elements sporInsurgent force s moving Ambushes may bc conducted in areas uncler gove1nlrentcont ro l o r in a reas s t i l l under the cont ro l o f insurgents . Ra ids w i l l bc conductcc l aga insri t lsurgent camps or strong points in areas not yet under the control of govcrnm.ni?o,. . . ,

i6 . I - .ncounters a re usua l ly b r ie f anc l a t c lose range. Undcr the most favourab lec i rcu lns ta t l ces . where the en t i rc insurgent fo rce is caught exposed rn the opep, i t n ray bcl l r l ss ib lc to ca l l on them to sur rcndcr , in wh ich case pr isoners may prov ide va luab lci t l l o r tna t io t r . ' l ' h is

may bc the case i f an insurgent pos i t ion is i so la ted anc j can becornp J ete ly surrounded.

)7 ' A tnbushcs and ra ids may bc conductec l w i th any combina t ion o f the fo l lo rv inL ,a i r n s :

the des t ruc t ion o fan insurgent fo rce ;

the capture or ki l l ing of a wantccj insurgent;

the capturc or destruct ion of weapons and ccluiprncnt;

ga in ing o f in tc l l ige nce ;

detcrr ing the insLrrgent 1 'rom Lrsing an area; and

prevcnt ing thc insurgents l iom approachi 'g i i icnci l .v posi trons.

L A R C E S C A L E O P E R A T I O N S

iS l t l cases u 'he re an i nsu rgency con t ro l s l a rge a reas o f ' t hc coun t r ys i c l e t 6e rebc i sI l t a r " r a i sc and dep ioy a s i zeab ie f b r cc . SL rch a s i t ua t i on i s n ros t l i k c l y t o occu r whc r .e t hcvh rLve access to a f l i e r rd i l . , ne tghboL r r i ng coun t r y wh i ch they use as a havcn to assen rb le .t r a i r r a n c l e q u i n .

C h a o 6 : 1 6 / i I

- i 9 l d c a l l r . s u c hrc la t i ve ' l y ' s r la l I andr r r , rn rbe r oJ ' re asor - rs .

DRAF-T

l b rces shou ld be engaged and des t royed in ba t t i c rvh i l c thc t 'a rcbefore they pose a major threat. ' l -his rnay not be feasible for a

6 0 .

the th rea t i s l i ke ly to deve lop in a remote area wh i le the hos t sovernmentfbcLrscs on secur ing v i ta l a reas c lose to the cap i ta l , the main towns andt h e i r s u r r o u n d i n g u e l l - p o p u l a t e d a n d c c o l t o m i c a l i y i r r t p , r r t t n t r t L r a l a r c t s :

thc hos t na t ion may have ne i ther the l roops ava i lab le nor thc mcans o fpro jec t ing fo rce over a cons iderab le d is tance in to a remote and poss ib iy

ru iounta inous , jung le rcg ion ; and

there may a lso be a r i sk tha t operar t ions on the border o f a s t ro t lger . hos t r le

ne ighbour may provokc an unwantcd in te rvcn t ion on the pre ter t th : r t the

r-re ighbouring country 's borders have bcen violated or i ts securi tythrcatened.

- l - i rere are a number of pre-requisi tes lbr the success of a large-scale operat ion:

a . Good In te l l igence. The loca t ions o f un i ts , headquar te rs and kcy leaders i s

as impor tan t as the knowledge o f the enemy 's pos i t ions and secur i tyscrccn. Equal ly i rnportant is good intel [gence on the insurgent 's

suppon ing po l i t i ca l and Iog is t i c o rgan iza t ion ;

lsolat ion. The area chosen for the operat ion must be isolated as much as

possible to prevcnt insurgent reinforcement or exf i l t rat ion. I f the escape ol '

smal l part ies cannot be stopped, the enemy should not be able to evacuatelbrmed units. Enemy escapc routcs shouid, as far as possible, be blocked;and

Surpr ise and Dccept ion . Obta in ing surpr ise pre sents the grea tcs tp rob lem. Prepara t io r rs and prc l im inary tnoves tha t cannot be h iddcn rnLrs t

be d isgu ised. Pat ro l l ing to ob ta in in fo r tna t ion shou ld be car r ied ou t i t r asmany areas as poss ib le , r . r , i th no obv ious e tuphas is on thc sc lcc ted area .Rumours o f poss ib le opcra t ions p lanned to take p lace e lsewi - re re may bef-ed into the insurgent intel l igence organizat ion through channels which theinsurgents are known to trust. I reints may be launched in such a lnanncr asnot to a rouse susp ic ions as to the loca t ion o f the rea l opera t io t t , i t s a i t rsand i t s ob jec t ivcs .

( r5 , Thc exccut ion o f such an opcra l ion requ i res rap id dep loyrnent to enc i rc lc thc u ra i r re nen lv fb rccs . lnsurgent fo rce s shou ld no t jus t be sur rounded by a cordon, wh ich isl i ke lv to p ro \ re poroLrs in lhc bes t c i rcurns tances , bu t loca ted and p inned down. Oncesur rounc lcd . d rsorgan iz -cd and brokcn up . thc insurgents tnus t be pursucd re lcn t )ess ly ,

( ' h a p 6 . 1 1 1 3 1

A.O20231 1 -17-000087

( t6 . Sr :ccess must be fb l lo r i ,ed by ,sLrpnor t o rganrz .a t ton and rep lac ing i tpeop le in the area must be pro tec tedc c l l s o r b y i n s u r g e n t r r a i n f o r c e s

DIlAF'f

r o o t i n q o L t t t h e r n s u r g e n t s ' p o L i t i c a l a n d l o g r s t i crv i th the hos t govcrnment 's adnr in is t ra t ion . ' l -he

f ronr fu tu re covcr t rebe l in f i j t ra t ion by i t s po l i t i ca l

SECTION 7 ; STABIL ITY OpEITATIONS

GENT' I {AL

68. S tab i l i t y opera t ions are a key e lement o f the Cont in r lum o f Opera t ions cops t r l rc t .ar ld t t lgethcr with ol ' f -ensive and defensivc opcrat ions, arc pert of thaiebb and f le, .r . ,bctr ' r 'cen di f ferent types of tact ical tasks that const i tute the campaign.6 TSey rnay bedef l r re d as fb i lows:

i ln opera/ion /hat imposes',s'ecurity und c'on/rol over un ctrcrr v,hile empl6yingnril irury capahil it ie,s ro resrore .servica.s ctnd .supporl civil ictn ugcrcies,,:, or

()7-taru/ions in u'hich 'security.forces (combining military, pcrramiliturl.,, un4 pglicc/tttt 'c.11 carry oul operalion.s fbr lhe re.storation and maintenance of'ordar unl.s tubi / i tv .o

6L). Stabi l i ty tasks often include requirements fbr reconstruct ion and humanitar ian aid.a t td a rc no t un ique to COIN campaigns . Idea l l y , m i l i ta ry resources and capab i l i t ies a rel i r r no t rcc l r - r i rcd fo r thcse respons ib i l i t i es , bu t they may have to be so Lrscd . Wi tS respcc tIo the spec i f i c employment o f m i l i ta ry fo rces dur ing a COiN. The fo l low ing s tab i l i i ytasks are key to the conduct o f COIN:

a cont ro l o f movement ;

c rowd cont ro l opcra t ions ; and

search opera t ions .

CO: \ 'TROt , OF MOVEMENT

71. lLequ i rement fo r the Cont ro l o f Movcmcnt . Cont ro i o l movement r -s a v i ta laspec t o iCOIN opera t ions . A l though i t can be h igh ly d is rup t ive and panpower in tens ivc .I t l s l lecessary to d is loca te and d is rup t insurgcnt ac t i v i t ies and re -assure the pLrb l i c\ Io l ' cment con l ro l measL l res can be h igh ly inconven ien t to the genera l pLrb l i c a ld a porn to f con ter l t ion . There fbre . the nccd fo r thenr must be c lear and rve l l adver t i sed ( in rc rms o1purp( )se , v ice loca t ion and t ime) th rough the IO p lan ldea l i y , they arc conc luc ted incor r - j t inc t ion rv i th the loca l po l i ce .

S e e C h a p r e r ir \ B ( ' A P r c . c c t ' l - c a r - - r , A C T C a p a b i l i t y C r - o u p , d r a i t r i e i n i r i o . , J u l y 2 O O 5I ) r o p o s e d C a n a i t i a n d r a f t d e f l n i t j o n . J u n e 2 0 0 5

( hap 6 : I 8 , -1 1

DRAFT

1) . Pr inc ip lc NIc thods . Before they are i rnposec l n teas l r res must be d iscLrssed

bet r i , ccn thc c iv i l au thor i t res , the po i i ce and the mi i i ta ry to make sure the en forcemenl i s a

p lac t ica l p ropos i t ion and tha t the nccessar l ,po l i ce and so id ie rs a re ava i lab le to pu l lhenr

in to e f f 'ec t . - l -he

pr inc ip le methods o f movement cont ro i a re :

a r o a d b l o c k s ;

b . check po in ts (bo th snap and de i ibera te) ;

c tral ' f ic control points; and

d. cur fews.

73 . A ims. Cont ro l l ing moveurent may have any o f the fb l lo rv ing a i rns :

a. pe rrni t securi ty forces to cnforce thc law, thus increasing publ ic

conf idence in the government 's abi l i ty to protect them;

b disrupt insurgent groups and plans by rnaking movelrrent di f f icul t and

precluding co-ordinat ion betrveen insurgent cel ls and groups;

c. dominate an area to prevent crowds f iorn gathering and to deter l rost i le

ac t ron ;

ci . control the movement of crowds that do [orm and prevent their reinforce-

m e n t ;

c . in tc rcept and d iscourage the i l l ega l n love tnent o f a rms, exp los ives .med ica l supp l ies and food;

f ' seal of f an area to prevent the introduct ion of weapons, cxplosivcs and

subvers ive propaganda mate r la l ;

g . a r res t wanted persons ;

h record movemer l t to de tec t pa t te rns and ob ta in in fo rmat ion ; and

fac i l i ta te the movement and opera t ions o f the secur i ty fo rces . I ro r exa tnp le .par t o f 'an ou ter cordon o f a de l ibera te oper l t ion may inc lL rdc a tcmporaryroad-b lock .

i 1 . \ ' e h i c l c C h c c k P o i n t s ( V C P s ) , I n r . h e c o n c l u c t o f V C P s i n a C O I N o p e r a t i o n . t h cl i r l l o v v i n c p o i n t s s h o u i d b e c o n s i d e r e c i :

C h a p 6 : l 9 / l l

A n o n t a , t , l i o n n n n Q o

.:

I )RAFT

modern comn. ] LL l t i c a t i ou dev ice s , par t i cu l a r l l , cc l l u j a r r :c lcphones. rv i l l a lc r tinsurgents seek ing to avo id thc VCp to i t s p rcsence w i t l i i n minu tes o i . i t ses tab l i shment Thus t l - re use o f snap vcps a t the sec t ion leve l pu t inloca t ion fo r ve r ; ' shor t per iods and the s imp lc s topp ing o f susp ic iousveh ic les and i r rd iv idLra ls wr l l do morc to p re-empt an i l d is rup i insurgenrsthan long- te rm VCPs, and

VCPs prov idc mcmbers o f thc pub l i c thc oppor tun i ty to pass in lo rmat io 'to lhe sccur r tv lo rces rv i thout ra is ing the sLrsp ic ion o f insurgents 1 - roopsconduct ing VCPs rn i - rs t be prepared to rcce ive such in fb rmat ion or toprovrde the in fo rnant rv i th a con lac t .

75 ' P l : rnn ing the Cont ro l o f Movement . Largc sca le o r con t lnL loL ls t rovc l ren tcont l 'o i l -neasurcs w i l l requ i re much cons idera t ion , p lann ing and co-ord ina t ron . l - i ke lypub l ic rcac t ion must be taken in to account dunng the p lann ing s tage . Ag l ta to rs rv i l l bcquick to erploi t any adverse react ion and the necd for any una'voidable i rksonre|cslr ict ions should be ant ic ipated ancl explained to weaken host i le propaganda. 1l-concc ived m€asures tha t l cad to the co l lapse o1 'pub l i c sc rv ices must be avo ided. J 'hec t lmtn i t tee sys tcm ex is ts to d iscuss these p lans ancJ thc i r l i ke ly conscquences . A s rundl l lan tnL ts t be based on good in te l l igence, wh ich invo ives c lose l ,a 'son wr th the po l i ce .- fhe

concept l xus t be suppor ted by a spec i f - rc IO p lan .

CROWD CONTROL OPERATIONS

76' ( l rowds and violent dernonstrat ions are often a feature oI insurgencies arc] arec'asi ly exploi ted by insurgents for thcir own cnds. Crowds anci resr.r l t ing r iots underminethe r l ver i t l l secur i ty s i lua t ion . rveaken the governmcnt 's cont ro l and des t roy c iv r li n l iastruct r . rre.

77 ' In sp i tc o f mcasure s to p rcvent i t , c rowds u iav ra l l y a round a par t i cu la r rssue anoa'ssemble, usual ly in urban areas, in f iont of governnrent off ices, securrty forcc carnps orin pLrb l i c spaces . The c iv i l po l i ce may bc unab le to cope w i th the s i tua t ion and mi l i ta ryass is tancc lna) / be requ i red . The s ize o f a c ror .vd is no ind ica t ion o i ' i t s a t t i tuc le . A ia rgct r t . t c con ta tn inQ man; 'c r - t r lous on lookers may bc c loc i l c , L rn t i l ag i ta to rs beg in to in f lL renccr t A smai lc rou 'd r ray be peacefu l o r i t rnay be a cor rcent ra t io ] r o f those w i th cx t re rneVic$ 's . ' l ' hc I r i l i ta ry commander on the spot must usc h is own juc lgment as to hor .v to dea lr r i t l r l r r ) p l r r l i c u l l r s i t r u t i o n .

78 ( l rowd cont ro l opera t ions (CCO) requ i re specra l t ra in ing in spcc i f i c l . ' l l ) s andc( lu lpmsnt . ' l -hese

shou ld no t be acqr : i red on- the- job anc l must be inc lyded in a l l p re -dcp loymcr l t t ra in ing . In theat re . regu la r t ra in ing schedu les shoLr ld inc lude cco re f iesher .l - i kewise . CCo spec i f i c equ ipment mLrs t be pos i t ioned fo rward w i th tac t i ca l sLrb-un i rs ,l i r r v io lcn l c ro rvds can ga thcr u , i th l i t t le no l i ce . FLr r thern tore , rvhen therc i s a th rea t o t .e ro lvd conf l -on ta t ion , the mcre appearance o f p roper l l ' p repa led t foops can 6e lp d issLradethe c ror^ , .c1 f l ' our tu rn ine v rc lcn i .

( h a p 6 : 2 0 / 3 1

, i : r : _ : i

DRAFT

S I i A R C t I O P E R A T I O N S

79. Gcncra l , As secur i ty fb rces impose cont ro l over u rban and ru ra l a reas , searchr )pcra t ions become a mains tay o f the secur i ty env i ronment A l though they havc 1o beconduced w i th due cons idera t ion , they can reap rewards in te rms o f f i r s t , second and th i rc io rder e f fec ts .

3 ( ) . Purposc . ' l -hc

purposc o f search opcra t ions is to rso la te a se lcc tcd area b1 ,

dcp loy ing a cordon, e i ther by s tea l th o r a t such speed tha t the in tended quar r ) i has t io

chance to esczrpc , and then search ing i t thorough ly . ' fhc

ta rge t a rea may be a s ing le housc

r ) l 'an c r . t t i re c i ty b lock . Obv ious ly , the more prcc ise the ta rge t a rea can be , the be t te r .

8 l . A i rns . Search opera t ions arc conduc lcd whenever poss ib le w i th po l i ceauthor i t ies . [ 'he y may be conductcd in o rder to :

a. capt l l re r .r ,anted persons, wcapons, communicat ion devices, propagandamaterials and means. explosives or documents;

b. disrupt insurgent act iv i t ies;

c. el i rninate insurgent act iv i ty in a specif ic local i ty, part icular ly with a vieiv

to expanding a control led area;

d. gain evidence to suppoft prose cut ions or to prove l inks with expatr iatecomtnunit ics and fraudulent fund raising schemes, and

e. gain information to supporl futurc operat ions.

87 . in conduct ing such opera t ions w i th the loca l po l i ce and o ther fo rces , OPSEC is

csse nt ial . I t rs not uncontrnon for local securi ty forces to be inf i l t rated by insurgents or to

c o n t a i n i n f b r m a n t s w h o p a s s t h e i n s u r g e n t s i n f o r m a t i o n . I f t h i s i s a c o n c e r n f o r m i l i t a r y

cornmanders, methods should be used to conccal thc nature and area of the operrt ionLrn t i l the las t minu te ,

8U ' l ' he

es tab l i s i rment o f ' the cordon ar rd the search arc two separa te ac t iv i t i cs bu t a rcrnounted as onc operat ion. Becausc the search part of the operat ion is r ,rsual ly a lcngthy

t f la i r rha t d rs rup ts the i r fe o f a loca l i t y , cordons and searchcs shou ld on ly be n tounted o t rre L iab le in fo rmat ion , A ser ies o f f ru i t less opera t ions mere ly a l iena tes the popu la t ion f ro r . t - rt l r c government and prov ides the insurger r t w i th unnecessary p ropaganda.

8( ) . C lo rdon and search opera t ions are no t easy to execute , due in good par t to t i red i f ' l i cu l ty o f c los ing the cordon so qu ick l l tha t lhe insurgcnts have no chance to escape, l tis easier 1o posit ion a cordon in oper-r colurtry rvi th a good road network ancl r . l i th the helpo 1 ' h e l i c o p t c r s . I n c l o s e t e r r a i n ( j L r n g i c . u r b a n ) r t i s v i r t u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e t o p o s i t i o n a n d

A020231 1 -21 -000091

I)ItAI.-T

I t r r k L tD a cc r r i o t r bccausc t . t ' r ove r ren t i s res t i i c t ed . bu r l d i ngs a re connec teC . r va t chc rs L ravscc t l l c f o r ccs com ing and a le i l i he t a rge t a rea . and obse rva t i e rn n ray be r cs t r j c ted i o a f ' c r ii n e t r e s ,

90. DLr r ing COiN, cordon and search opera t ions r ,v i l l o f tcn be conducted based onII t ,JN'4lNT sources. Information from infbrmants nrLlst be treated r.r , i th caut ion l t is alrvai ,sposs ib le tha t an in fo rmant may s imp ly r .v ish to "se t up" a loca l r i va l o r may wrsh lo leac ithc sccu l i l v fb rccs in to an ambLrsh .

S E C T I 0 N 8 : M E A S U R I I S O F S U C C B S S

93. Wi th in the Cont inuum o i 'Opera t ions , overa l l success is genera l l y measured byprogfcss a long the spec t rum o f con f l i c t towards the end o f less v io lence. Whi ls t th is ho lc lstruc lbr COIN' thcrc can be much f iner indicat ions of success as operat ions are concluctcdovcr a per iod o f ' t i rne . Even though thc measurement o f overa l l success is o f i r r t c res t to a l ll cvc ls , s t ra tcg ic to tac t i ca l , many o f the inc l i ca t ions w i l l be rneasured a t the tac t i ca l l cve l .

()4. At the star l of an operat ionand rdeat ly . recorded s ta t i s t i ca l l y .r n e I u d c t h c f o l l o w i r r g

the start-state of the securi ty si tuat ion shoLrlc l bc notcd.Indicators to be examined in a spcci f . ic area rr iay

nunrber o f murde rs o r k i l l i ngs ,

number o f ins r - r rgent a t tacks on governmcnt bu i ld ings , persons a .dsecur i ty fo rces ;

c . number o f -v io len t inc idents and genera l Leve ls o f c r rme.

number and in tens i ty o f 'pub l i c dcn tons t ra t ions ;

s ta te anc l p rov is ions o f -c iv i l serv ices such as san i ta ry co l lec t ion scrv ices .schools open, government off ices open;

po l i cc s ta l io r r mann ing and equrpp ing and the pro f i le o f 'po l i ce p lesence inp u b l r c ;

g commerc ia l ac t i v i t i cs . par t i cu la r ly smal l shops and open marke ts : and

h. pub l i c ac t i v i t ies in u rban areas . pa f t i cu la r ly a t n igh t .

9 - i . As thc r r i ss ion progresses , iu rp rovenrcr r ts in the above ind ica tors rv i l l i nd icarc thcr lTeas t t re o f s t tccess . CIMIC teams and pa t ro is can be a l loca ted spcc i f i c IRs tha t l reasL l res L r c h i n d i c a t o r s .

C hap 6 22 , /3 1

40202311-22-OOOOq2

I )RAFT

96. Succcss , tha t i s , improvements iu the c iv r l s i tua t ion u ' i i l no t occur cvcn l ) o \ /c r ar .eg ion . ln rp rovements rnay occur in one area , vvh i le an area in rvh ich the ins r - r rgents haver lo rc in l luence and power w i l l be s lower to improve. L ikewrse , improveurents lnay co lnernore rap id ly in the day ' t ime. bu t the s i tua t ion w i l l be worse a t n igh t Such ind ica to ls wr l la l lo iv the securi ty forces to focus thei l resource s nrore eff 'ect ively

S E C T I O N 9 : C O N D I T I O N I N G T H E T A C I . I C A L L E V E L F O R C O U N T E R -I N S L I R G E N C Y O P E R A T I O N S

9J. ( lommanders and so ld ie rs a i i ke mus l be made to apprec ia te the d i f f c rcncesbc t rvcen COIN and convent iona l opera t ions . ' fh is must beg in in the t ra in ing fo rt l e p l r , y m c n t a n d c o n t i n u e t h r o u g l r o u t t h e o p c r r t i o n . l t i s v e r y m u c h a n i n t e l l c c t u l lcha l lenge tha t must accompany the t ra in ing in TTPs spec i f i c to COIN. ' Po in ts tha t mustbc cons idered in educat ins iun io r leaders and so ld ie rs in COIN wi i l inc lude thelb l lou , ins :

cu l tu ra l t ra in ing tha t w i l l in fb r rn a t t i tudes towards the c iv i l ian popLr la t ion .Soldiers rnust be made to appreciate the fear, stress and frustral ion that thecivi l ian populace wi l l feel in t i rnes of an insurgency, Furthermorc, theymust appreciate the affect that their tact ical operat ions wi l l havc on theloca l popu la t ions ;

junior leaders and soldiers must be madc to real ise the key imporlancc thatthey have in the information gathering and intel l igencc process. Everyso ld ie r must be made to rea l i se tha t he h imse l f i s a scnsor asset . Pa t ro lcornmanders must conduct detai led patrol dcbriefs with thcir t roops andprovide detai led patrol reports to the intel l igence and operat ions staf f .Addit ional ly, soldiers require regular feedback regarding the value andusefulness of the information they provide;

commanders and so ld ie rs rnus t have measured expec ta t ions regard ing thequa l i t y and ca l ib re o f the Ioca l secur i ty fo rces . In rnany fa i led or fa i i ings ta tes , the loca l po l i ce and rn rL i ta ry w i l i no t be o f a s tandard comrron tomany so ld ie rs . The y must rea l i se tha t these assets , desp i te someshortconrings, have great knowledge of the local issues, threats andinsurgents ' methods . Fur thcrmore , so ld ie rs and jun io r leaders rnus t bemade to rea l i se tha t par l o f the i r m iss ion is to edr " rca te and improve loca lto rces wne re necessary ;

lL rn io r leaders and so ld ie rs must be madc to rea l i se tha t success inu f rc ra t ions comes a f te r a long t in re and cannot be measured b ; ,o f feus ivcac t ion and the number o f insurgents made to depar t the tempora l p lane.They must unders tand tha t success comes th rough the ga in ing anCrna in ta in ing o f the pub i ic r . r , i l 1 over thc lo r rg te rm; and

S t e C r r a l t e r l 0 f b r g u i d a n c e o n C O I N t r a r n i n g

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a l l l a n k s m u s t r e a l i s e t h e o p e r a t r o n a l a n c l s t r a t e g i c i m p L i c a t i o n s t h a rrnd iv idua l ac t ions a t the tac t i ca l levc i can have across the cn t i ; c opcra t io r rAn over - reac t ion to a th rca t o r fa i iu re to reac t to a s rna l l c iv r l ianemerge ncy can c r r t rca l l v undermine the opera t ion and the es te e m o f thesecur i ty 1 'o rces rn the rn inds o f the pub l ic . na t rona l l y anc l in te rnar io ra l l y

S E C T I O N l 0 : C U L I ' U R A L A w A I t E N t i S S

98 Gcnera l . Recent exper ience has conf l rn red tha t an unders tand ing o{ ' the i IN ,scu l tu re i s c r i t i ca l to miss ion success . Cu l tu ra l Awareness (CA) can rec luce ba t t le f ie lc ll i i c t ion and the fog o f wardur ing COIN, and thus improve the ab i l i t y to accompl rsh theni ission. CA gives insight into the intent of insurgenis and other groups in thc batt le-f Page', whi le reducing cul tural f r ict ion with the HN peoples. Addit ional ly CA assists inbu i ld ing rappor t wh i ie p revent ing misunders tand ings tha t undcrmlnc suppor t fb r thesccuri ty fbrces.

99 Def in i t ions . Cu l tu re i s a b road anddcf ln i t ions de f ine the key aspec ts o f cu l tu re

encompassrng te rm, The fo l low ingi 0

cu l tu ra l ' fe r ra in . cu l tu re i s s imp ly another e lement o f te r ra in . Cu l tu ra l

te r ra in para l le ls geograph ic te r ra in Ib r mi l i ta ry cons idera t ion as bo thinf ' luence decisions. cul tural tcrrain presents batt le -space obstacles ancloppoftunit ie s;

b Cu l tu ra l Fac tors ' Cu l tu ra l Fac tors a re dynamic aspec ts o f soc ic ty tha thave the capac i ty to a f fec t mi l i ta ry opera t ions . They inc lude re l ig lon .e thn ic i ty , ranguage, cus toms, varues , p rac t ices and percept ions i r i th . r .factors affcct thc thinking and motivat ion of the individual or urouo ancjmake up the cu l tu ra l te r ra in o l ' the ba t t le -space. Not a l l fac lo rs a reappl icable to al l operat ions, and addit ional factors may be consicicrecj asnecessary. A cross sect ion of lactors that should be consiclered 1br rni l r raryoperat ions is contained in Annex A to Chapter 2; and

c Cultural Awarenes.s (CA). CIA is the knowledge of Cultural Facrors arclan unders tand ing o f the i r impact on the p lann in ! and conduct o f rn i l i t i i r voperat ions. CA resuits from both stanclardized and specif ic t raining.

l ( )0 Opera t ions . Cu l tu ra l cons idera t ions n- rL rs l be f i r l l y incorpora ted in to the conducro1 'opcr i i t ious . Commanders must unders tand the i rnpac t o f cu l tu rc on the exe cLrL ion o l 'ther r opera t ions and p lans and the i rnp l i ca t ions inherent in the f lu id na ture o f thc cornp lcxc l l v i ronmet r t p resented by the Cu l tu ra l

' f c r ra in . A l l personne l must cons ic le r CLr l tL r ra l' l ' e r ra in

c lL lnng lhe rcassessment o f the ba t t le -space, the amendn ien t o f ex is t i rq p la rs . andt rans i t ion o f ' au thor i t y lba t t l c handover ,

' Exce rp t f r om A tscA cu r tu ra Awareness p ro lec t Team F ina l Repo r t Nov2004

C 'hap 6 : 221131

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1 ( l l C A D u r i n g R e l i e f i n P l a c e . A k e y ' p i e c e o f t h e s u c c e s s f u l L e l i e f i n p i a c e b e l u ' e e i r

rac t i ca l L tn i ts i s the cxchange o f cu l tu ra l in fon la t ton A Cu l tu raL In io rmat ion tcmpla te

l i r r use dur rng TOA is a1 Anncx A.

l (12 . Tra in ing . Any pre-dep loyment t ra in ing fo r a spec i f i c miss ion area must inc lude

br ic f ings .o , - r . . * ing the cu l tu re i ssues re ievant to the opera t tona i a rea . I f a specr f i c AO rs

kr. iorvr-r pr ior to deploymcnt. then CA training should include any aspects that are Linlque

tg tha t par t i cu la r reg ion . Aspec ts o f t l i e cu l tu re shou ld be fo lded in to p re-dep lov tne t r t

l la in rng exerc iscs . (See Chapter I 0 . )

SECTION 1l : TI {B T 'ACTICAL LEVt iL COMMIT' [E 'E SYSTEM

I IS-TABL ISFI ING THE, COMMITTEES

103 Gcnera l . The rnu l t i -age ncy aspec t o f the COIN campaign demands c lose c ross-

agcncy planning and co-ordinat ion down to the lowest levels. l 'hc committec systern o1'

cg-ordinat ion provides fbr such co-operat ion in the mult i - faceted approach to defeat ing

the irrsurgcncy in both the short and long terms.

l{14. Roles. The comrnit tee system wi i l mirror that which is bui l t a1 the opcrat ional

level. bl t wi l l be affected at an appropriate level of c iv i l ian and pol ice authori ty. In tranl '

cases. thc committees wi l l be based on geographical and civi l ian l ines of organisat ion,

sLrch as rnun ic ipa l i t ies and count ies . A t t l i e tac t i ca l leve l , the ro le o f the commi t tee svs tc lx

rcmains the same as tha t o f o f ;e ra t iona l l cve l o r na t iona l commi t tees .

establ ishment of pr ior i t ies;

co-ord ina t ion o f in te l l igence and secur i ty ;

co-ord ina t ion be tween secur i ty and c iv i l ac t i v i t ies ;

jo in t consu l ta t ion and, as Ia r as secur i ty w i l l permi t , jo in t p lann lng ;

r j o in t d i rec t ion o1 ' opera t ions ;

utrrangements for publ ic safety and protect ion of publ ic inst i tut ions; and

d i rec t ion o f t i re IO po l i cy a r rd p ian .

105 Reg iona l , Prov inc ia l And D is t r i c t Commi t tees . Fu l l y in tcgra ted co-ord ina t ing

cgmr l i t tees are necessary a t var ious subord ina te , tac t i ca l levc ls . - fhese rv i l l compr ise o f '

rhc ;cg iona l reprcsenta t ives o f the agenc ies co-opcra t ing in the conduct o f the COIN.

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I 'he comnr t tees rv i l l o f ien be based on boLrnc la r iesl r )ca l gover r lment boundar ies rn reg ions . p r -o r , inces

t h a t r e f l e c t c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n dcoL in t l cs and/or d is t l c ts

1 ( 1 6 C l o m m i t t e e F c a t u r e s a n d M e m b e r s h i p . I n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t a n d c o p d L r c l 9 1 l h etac t i ca l l evc l commi t t ee sys tem, t he fo l l o , , v i ng shou id be no te c l :

these lo iver le vc l commi t tees and any sLrbord ina te co-ord ina t ing boc i i cs a reusr - ra l l y re fened to as opera t ions or ac t ion comnt i t tees ;

the c l ia i rman is usr - ra l l v the se n io r o f l l cc r /ad : r in is t ra ror o i ' the loca l c iv i l ianadrninistrat ion in whose support the se cur i ty forces are , ,vorkinqDepend ing on the s ize o f thc a rea , hc cou ld be a rn in is te r apporn te t l fb r thepuryose, a p rov inc ia l governor . the cha i rnan o f a cour ] ty cor :nc i i . a c iv i lch ie f execut ive o f f i cer o r a mayor o f a la rge c i ry ;

thc Ioca l po i i cc and mi l i ta ry cornmanders and the rn te l l igence and secLr r i t yorganisat ion representat ives wi l l forrn the membership. Local c iv i l ianexper ts may e i therbe fu l l members or ' in a t tendance ' , as the occas iondemands. coal i t ion 1'ormation commanders of the appropriate level woLrldnormal l y a t tend the appropr ia te hos t count ry 's commi t tees ;

scnior adrninistrators from various NGos operat ing in the region may srton the commi t tee or be in a t tcndance.

depend ing upon the cu l tu rc concerned. loca la t tcnd thc commrt tees .

r e l i g i o u s l c a d e r s m a y a l s o

I 07 ' To tvn , Ward and V i l lage Leve l . Smal le r , less fo rmal comrn l t tces are neec lcd t .co-o l 'd tna te c iv i l , po l i ce , rn i l i ta ry and in te l l igence opera t ions a t the lower leve ls , w , i thoutlcopardizing se cur i ty or creat ing a cumbe rsome bureaucracy. fhis is the level at wl i rchthe campargn p lan is in tp lementcd as tac t i ca l leve l ac t ion . I i must be seen to succecd torc ta j t t lhe loya l ty and suppor t o f the peop le . I t i s impor tan t tha t Ioca l in te res ts a refcprescnted and tha t the peop le can rc la te to governn lcn t po l i cy . Fa i lp re a t th is levc l wr l lmean de f 'ea t . The char rman is normal ly the heac l o f the c iv i l adrn in is t ra t ion , poss ib ly t l relocal Inayor, the chicf adrnirr istrat ive of l lcer or the rural cor-rnci l chairman. Ther lcn tbersh ip re i lec ts the po l i ce , rn r l r ta ry and o ther in lc res ts a t th is leve l . l -hc rn i l i ta rvrcprcsenta t lve lnay bc a ba t ta l ion o f company cornmandcr , dcpenc l ing on the sca le i inc jueograph ica l a rea concerned.

CO}1 M I 'TTEE STRUCTURE LEVELS

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crvrLr],--al- f- cIvILPOLICL, A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

C h i e f c o n s t a b l eo f n a t i o n a lpo l i ce andparam r I i tarypo l i ceco rnmand e rs .

Mayo r o r d i s t r i c trepresentat ive.

OTHEI lS

U n ' S p e c i a lE .nvoy o r o t l r e ri n t e r n a t i o n a Ipa r t i es .N a t i o n a Ir e l i g i o L r sI c ade rs.

Figure 6- l : Exarnp le S t ruc ture o f Commi t tee Sys tem

CI{ALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTA' I ION OF THB CAMPAIGN PLAN ANI )

C O I N P R I N C I P L E S

lg8. I t \ \ , i l l be impor tan t tha t a l l lnc lnbers o f ' t l i e commi t tees , a t w l la tever leve l , l ' u l l ; '

u ;dcrs tand the ro le and capabr l i t ies o t ' thc rn i l i ta ry e lcn ten t . '1 'hey must a lso undcrs tand

the i r l im i ta t ions in te rms o f resources , sk i l l s and ROE. Fur thermore ' they must

r . ruders ranc i the na t iona l s t ra tegy and campaign p lan , inc lud ing the i r ind iv idua l ro les and

tha t 9 f ' thc commi t tee i t se l f . Many members o f the commi t tee w i l l no t be fami l ia r o r even

e gmlbrtable with these issues and mil i tary personal i t ies must be prepared to take a

, . \ r r h r s I e r e L . f o r m a l c o m m i t t e e s m a y n o t e x i s t , b u t t h e n t r i i t a r y c o m m a n d e r w i l l c o n d u c t i n d i v i d u a l

L r ; : i s . r n a n d c c - c r d i n a t i o n , a n d c a l l t o g e t h e r u t l h o c m e e t r t r g s a s l n l s s L : e l n a y w a r r a n t .t f l . 1 e s a , r , e m a l n e r o l a d h o c c o - o r c r n a t i o n n r a y b e r e q u r r e d a t t h e p l a t o o n l e v e l s h o u l d a p l a t o o n b e

! , p e r a t i n g a r v a y f r o m t h e s u b - u l j t r v i t h r t s o i v n A O .

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Sen io r gove rn t r l en to f f i c i a i o r r n i n i s te r o fde fence o r i n te rna laffa i rs,

C h i e f o f c i t y I S e n i o r p r o v i n c i a l Adm in i s t ra to rslor rnajorN C O sL o c a l r e l i g i o t r s1 e aoe rs.

po l i ce o r I I n i n i s te r o r f ede ra lp r o v r r r c r a l I c r c l I r c p r e s e t t t a t i v e . M a y o r

po l i cc f o r cc . I o f l a rge c r r y .

[ J r r i t comd . I Loca l po l i ce I Mayo r o r se r l l o l l - oca l NCoo f f icers.L o c a l r e l i g i o u sa u l h o r i l i c s ,

f -oouf NCOLoca l r e l i g i o r r sa ut l r o r i ty .

ch ie f . 1 ) i v i s ron ac in r i n i s t ra t i ve o f f i ce rconrd of I tbr c i ty / towrr or

; pa ram i l i t a r i I coun ty ad r r t i n i s t ra to r .

Sub -un i tco rnd ' .

( P o s s i b l y P ll eve l i n remo teu teas . ' t ;

Fo rma t i onComd

Sta t i on po l i cec h i e f ( s ) .

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lcac le rsh ip ro le in w 'ha t may bc , in i t ia l r l , , ,a i leasr . a co l lec t j ve educar iont r r l i ta r l 'membeis o f the cornmr t tees n , i l l have to become fami l ia r r ^ . , r thl i rn i ta t ions o f the i r cor :n te rpa f i agcnc ics .

p r o c e s s , l , i k e r v i s e ,the ab i l i i i es and

l ( )9 . N4r l i ta ry coumanders ml rs t remember tha t p r inc ip les a re eas ie r to a f f j rm than roapp l ) ' . pan tcu la r ly ln a COiN campaign w i th i t s inhercn t var iab les , tens io rs and rnu l t ip lerscnc ies The comrr - r j t tee sys tem wi l l he lp co-ord ina te ac t io r - i s and har rnon isc n reansacross the var ious agenc ies . In man\ , {a r led or ia i l ing s ta tes wherc insurgenc ics rv r l li ) ccur . the te w i l l be a iack o f p ro f 'ess iona l l y t ra incd adnr in is t ra to rs a r rc l oL l i c r p ro f 'ess iona lsvr i l l l ack depth and ex tens ive t ra in ing . Hence. p fogress and in rp lementa t ion o f thcl l r rnc ip lcs and p lan w i i l be s low and requ i re pa t ience on the pa f i o f the rn i l i ta ry .

I l0 l ' here w i l l be a necd fo r tac t , unc le rs tand ing and conrpromise as ind iv idua ls anc lt l t€anizat ions are persuaded to give up some of their power and inf luence in thc interestso l 'g re a te r e f f i c iency and c loser co-opera t ion .

I . 'ACIL I ' I 'ATION OF TI IE COMMITTEE SYSTEM

I l l Boundar ies . C iv i l admin is t ra t ion , po l i ce and rn i l i ta ry un i t boLrndar ies shou ld bcthc s i tme in the in te res ts o f I ia ison , p lann ing and co-ord ina t ion , and to avo id opera t iona liLnd in te l l igencc conf l i c ts and confus ion . Po l rce bor - rnc la r ies usua l ly co inc ide w i th thoseo l ' thc c iv i ladrn in is t ra t ion . in cases o f d isagrecment , rn i l i ra ry boundar ies shou ld confb ' .to thc c iv i l /po l i ce ones because the la t te rare usua l ly we l l es tab l i shed and w i l l rcmai 'r |hen thc: arrny withdraws. Occasional ly. i t may be expedient to ac1. j ust boundarics i r ,order to br ing a known insurgcnt organizat iorr r 'v i thrn t i re area of reiponsibr l i tv of onecornrnande r .

| 12 ' Locat ion o f Headquar te rs and Jo in t Opera t ions Ccnt re . A lo in t opera t io rscc ' l l t re a t each Leve l o f command in suppor t o f thc commi t tee sys lem, p rov ides the foca lPo in t fo r the conduct and co-ord ina t ion o l 'opera t ions and fb r the co i lec t ion o fin f 'onnat ion . I t a lso prov ides a sccL l re meet ing p lace fo r thc c iv i l au thor i t ies , po l i ce andrr l r l i tary cotr l tnanders and has the staff machinery for disseminat ing decision, fn, . i , . , . ,p1.-l l l en ta t lon by a l l the var io l ts fo rces and organ isa t ions rv i th in the loca l boundary . Otherpo in ts to no te in the es tab l i shrnent o f the He and3o in t opcra t ions cent re a re :

i t shoLr ld be loca ted i f poss ib ie a t the po l i ce I Ie where po l i cc l i l es a 'din te l l i gence are read i l y access ib le ;

i f the mi l i ta ry HQ is no t co- loca ted , communica t ions must be cs tabr ishedbetr.veen the two locat ions;

oPSEC wi l l remain ar impor tan t cons idera t ion when w,ork ing w i th loca lgo \ "cn tment and po l i ce lo rce s ;

I X I ] C U T I O N O F T H E C O } I M I T T E E S Y S ' I ' E I I I - C O M M A N D A N D C O N T R O L

( l r ; iP r : 28/3 I

DRAFl '

I l l Commi t tee D i rec t ives and Opera t iona l Orders , - fhe

commi i tee f ia tner t 'o rk

r r i l l v a n w i t h e a c h s i t u a t i o n , b u t s h o u l d r u n a l o n g t h e f o l i o w i n g l i n e s :

the comrn i t tee cha i rman or d i rec to r o f opera t ions w i l l i ssue a po l rcy

d i rec t rve fo r the imp lementa t ion o f ' the r - ra t iona i and campaign p lan a t tha t

reg iona l leveL. Mr l i ta ry ass is tance in d ra f t ing th is document maY bc

requ i red . The d i rec t i ve shou ld t ie together the l ines o f opera t ion [o r a ] l

agenc ics invo lved a t tha t leve l and in tha t reg ion . I t i s i ssued in i t ia l l y as a

gLr id ing documet t t and rcv ic rved pe r iod ica l l l ' ;

formation and unit cotnmaudcrs issue operat lonal orders that ref- lect and

implement the commi t tee po l i cy d i rec t i ve and h igh l igh t the rn i l i ta ry 's

suppor l to each o f the l ines o f opcra t io r r . I t t rans la tes thc genera l po l i cy

d i rec t ion in to tac t i ca l tasks . I t n tay need regu la r rev iew and updat ing .

regu la r , and a t some leve ls da i l y , opera t iona l mect ings w i l l p rov ide

feedback between agencies and al low for co-ordinat ion and r-rpdate d

direct ion as required, and

d. at the unit ievel, the operat ional order should guide the day-to-day

framework operat ions of the sub-units, however i t wi l l require rcgular

updat ing part icular ly the PlRs and IRs. Specif ic orders are then issued for

individual del iberate operat ions.

l l4 . Command and Cont ro l . Much emphas is has been la id on the need lo r

central ized direct ion and decision-making. However, the funct ion of the commrttee

s),stelr is essent ial ly to provide a forum for planning and coordinat ion. The cotnmand

f i rnc l ion re mains the prerogat ive and respons ib i l i t y o f cach mi l i ta ry and po l i ce

c t rmnrande r o r c iv i l depar tment head. These o f f i cers and o f f i c ia ls w i l l be expec ted to

consu l t one another be fore takrng any in i t ia t i ves or tnak ing any changcs to p rev ious ly

agrccd po l i cy o r p lans .

1 1 5 . R a p i d C o m m a n d R e a c t i o n . T h e r e r , v i l l b e o c c a s i o n s w h e n a q u i c k d e c i s i o n i s

needed. perhaps to exp lo i t a f lee t ing oppo(un i ty o r to fo i l an ur lcxpec tcd insurgent

i l i t i a t i ve . I f ' there is no t ime fo r a mi l i ta ry commander to consu l t h is supcr io r o r h is

comrnit tee rnembers he wi l l have to take a t i rnely decision and act upon i t . Provided that

a good undcrs tand ing ex is ts amongst the members o f the loca l commi t tee and u ' i th in thc

cha in o f command, and tha t son te thought has been g iven on how to reac t to lo reseeab le

cont ingenc ies , the comrnander 's dec is ion shou ld be a sens ib ie one. A commander who

rc l l s h is s r - tper io r , the po l i ce o f f i cer and, i f necessary , the cha i rman o f h is commi t tee w l ia t

I re 5as done aud rvhy hc has donc i t shou ld expec t rap id suppof i and co-opera t io r t .

S I I C T I O \ I 2 : E M P L O Y M B N T O F C O M B A T A R M S A N D S U P P O I I T A R I V I S

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l l 6 C c n e r a l , A s p r e v i o L r s l l ' d i s c L r s s e d . t h e A r m l , w , l l l p l a , v t h c k e y r c l e i n t l eccr l ld r - tc t o f 'a COIN As w i th anv type o f r l i l i ta ry campaign , the combat a rnrs a i rd sL l i rpor ra r t l s r ' v i l l a l ihar "e separa te bu t mutua l l y s r - rppor t ing ro ics to p lay . Mi l i ta ry fo rccs .rcnc l 'a l l ; ' l hce a lo rver th rea t f rom insurgen ls than they do u ,hen fac ing a conve; t t iopa lc l l c l l l \ / . F r r r ther tnore , the na ture o f a COIN opcra t ion c rca tes a h igh dcmand fb r so ld je rpa t ro i l ing an . io l tgs t the c iv i lpopr - r ia t ron and cor . in t11 , , tha t i s typ ica l l y in fan t ry tasksI lc t l cc . nor r - in lan t rv a rms n ' lay bc rcqur red re - ro le to undcr take these j ian- rcworkope ra t ions . Regard iess o f thc s r tua t ion . sLrch un i ts rnus t be prepared to conc lL rc t the i rr torr lal cornbat i r-rnct ions should the threat \varranl- i1.

l l7 In f 'an t ry . G iven the t ta tu re o f a COIN, vv i th i t s requ i rement fo r pe l ,as ive , rv ic jc -s; l read f ' rarnework operat ions, in lantry units wi l l be in high demand. Both rnechanisecja r rd I igh t in fan t ry comple te the i r m iss ions d is rnounted ( in a l l operar ions , nor s inp l i ,CON). Vlechanised infantry have the advantage of protect ion, rnobi l i ty and f i repor.ve r\ lh i le I igh t in fan t ry adapt more read i l y to c lose te r ra in such as urban areas , jung lc andI l loLlntainous terrain. Given the nature oiCOIN, thc need to move rapidly to react. thcsiz-e r l f AOs and the doctr ine of cont inual ly extendrng the inf luenc. of th. securi ty lbrccs.cvcrr l ighl i r -r far-r try wi i l requirc integral lneans of t ransport for the condnct of f rame workopera t ions . I tegard less o f the means o f t ranspor t , a l l jun io r leaders and so ld ie rs mustLr t lders tand tha t success in COIN wi l l on ly be rea l i sec l by d ismount ing and spend ing t in rcarnongst the loca l popu lace .

The 2 RCR deployment to Haiti in2004limited the mechanised rifle company to onlyfour LAV III vehicles (enough for one rifle platoon) and to several light ruppo.t vehiclesto support patrolling (8 x LSVWs * enough foi the remaining platoons). Dispite the factthat Haiti (and especially its capital) is the most densely popiitated ,"gion in ihe world,the vehicles proved invaluable, B vehicles transported troops even short distances to theirpatrol areas so that despite the intense heat and heavy equipment, soldiers arrived restedand focused for their patrol. When the company's AO was made non-contisuous andcame to include two remote towns, the LAVs (in addition to being useful iri the city)provided a high profile presence and protection for remote platoon bases, and robuittransportation over routes not always suitable for B vehicies.

I 18 . Armour . Arn tour , and a l l heavy i i repower , must bc used most jud ic ious ly ipC'OIN so as to avoid the "David versus Gol iath" PSYOPS aclvantage this could give rothc enenty . Nonethe less , par t i cu la r ly in h igh in tens i ty COIN opera t ions , a rmoLr ip lays ara lL rab ie ro le w i th i t s charac ter is t i cs o f f i repower and pro tec t ion . As rnos l COlN w i l lt l ccL t r in u rban areas , the employment o f a rmour in o f fens ive ac t ions w i l l be ak i r r to tha ti r l u rbar t combat opera t ions . I t w i l i ass is t in b reach ing s t ruc tL l res , neut ra l i s ing s t rongpr l in ts and suppot l ing in fan t ry fo rces . When not e rnp ioyed in th is capac i ty , in . t rooptI lay be ernp loved in f ramework opera t ions such as pa t ro ls and movement cont fo l

I 19 . Armoured Reconna issancc , The rnob i l i t y , p ro tec t ion , f i reporve r andsL l rvc i l lancc capa l - ' i l i t i es tha t a re o f fc red by armoured rcconna issancc fb rces nrakes ther l

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DI{AI "T

Lrse fu l tb i a i ,a r ie t ) ,o f tasks . Apar t f rom sun,e i l lance and mountec i reconna issance pa t roLs

they 'can per fo rm area secur i t l , , l i nes o f communica t ion secur i t l ' , rou te p icke l ing . convo,v

cscol- t . and form part of a QR.F, amongst other tasks Nonetheless. armoured

rcconna issance personne l must be prepared to d lsmount and in te rac t rv i th the loca i

popLr )a t ion in onCer to max imise the i r use fu lness as in fo rmat ion co l l cc to rs and conf idencc

b L r i l d e r s .

l l0 D ismounted Reconna issance anc l Sn ipers . G iven the rcqu i rement tb r

i r r t c l l i g c n c e g a t h c r i n g a n d t h e n e e d t o c o n d u c t c o v c r t o p c l e t i o n s i n c l o s e t e r r a l n .

reconnatssauce and sn iper de tachrnents wr l l p love very use fu l . Apar t f rom gather lng

in {br rna t ron , they can es tab l i sh and man cover t OPs tha t w i i i t r igger the dep loyment o f

. the r forces to ki l l or capture insurgents and disrupt their act ions. They can also provrde

ovcr-u,atcl t ancl protect ion for del iberate operat ions such as cordons and searches'

l l l A v i a t i o n . A v r a t i o n a s s e t s d e p l o y e d i n a C O l N w i l l p r o v c r n o s t u s e f u l i n t h e s a m e

lnanner as conventronal operat ions. Apart l iom troop movement and sensor tasks, thcy

prov ide va luab le over -watch dur ing de l ibera te opera t ions . T imings become cruc ia l as

i 6 e i r a p p e a r a n c e b e f b r e t h e s t a r t o f a d e l i b e r a t e o p c r a t i o n w i l l i n d i c a t e g i v e c a r l y

rvarn ing to insurgents .

l?2 . Ar t i l l e ry . Prcc is ion capab i l i t ies w i l l a l low the i r employment aga ins t p i r lpo in t

targcts. When not providing observat ion and f i re support , their forward observat ion tealns

can act as Iraison cel ls for r i f le companies and assist in rnanning command posts. The

batter ies rnay be employed in framework operat ions including assistance with tact ical

level IO and providing force protect ion fbr f i rm bases;

113 Eng incers . Dur ing a COIN, eng inee rs w i l l con t inue to p rov ide the i r mob i l i t y ,

. , runr.r- ,- , - ,obi l i ty and general engineer support to al l forces in theatre. This wi l l include a

j i rcus on r l ie de tec t ion and c lear ing o f IEDs. Thc i r capab i l i t ies w i l l be a mains tay 'o l

. t i l i ta ry led CIMIC tasks and the i r impact can be subs tan t ia l . Commandcrs n rus t g ive

carc fu l cons idera t ion to the ba lance o f resource and t in le a l loca ted be tween CIMIC and

sLrpport to the fbrce i tse l f . A heavy weight ing of resources to support for the force vicc

( ' lMtC l p ro jec ts may send the wrong lnessage to t l re loca l popu la t ion .

124. S igna ls . In add i t ion to p rov id ing co tn tnun ica t ions to the fb rce r tse l f , thc mi l r ta ry

g i l l l te requ i rcd to esrab l i sh communica t ions w i th o ther agenc ies , such as po l i ce . ' fh is

l ray cn ta i i the prov is ion o f s igna ls de tachments to those loca t ions , par t i cu la r ly i f

cornrnr . tn ica t icns are to be securc

l l5 1 , l i l i ta ry Po l i ce . Mi l i ta ry po l i ce w i l l p rov ide d i rcc t l ia ison to c iv i i ian po l i ce

sL- ry ices a l i c in do ing so w i l l be ab le to p rov ide an accL l ra te assessment o f the capab i l i t ies

rnd r t t i tuc les o I those po l i ce fo rces .

t h e p 6 : 3 1 i 3 1

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(r)

0)

(l) Is there an extant

(m) I f so, what is rhe

' Excerpt f rom ABCA Cul tura l Awareness

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CULTURAL INFORMATION

l General . This tempLate provides commanders and staff with a guide/checkl ist thatident i f ies key quest ions, pertaining to cul tural information that must be addressed duringa TOA This tempiate may also be useful as a reference document during the conduct ofa CON. It should be used in conjunction with annex A to Chapter 2 (Cultural Factors).

2. Transfer of Cultural Information, Cultural Information included in this templateshould be made available to units, down to the lowest level, preparing to enter the battle-space. As a minimum, the fol iowing should be addressed during theloA:

Leadershirr

i. Who are the leaders in your battle-space?

(a) What groups or interests do they represent?

(b) What are their personality types?

(c) What is your unit history with each leader?

(d) What is your personal assessment of each leader?

(e) What level of control does each leader exert on his group?

(f) What level of influence does each leader have within the battle-space?

What strategies have you used to interact with each leader?

Do some leaders have more or less power than it appears?

How often do you meet with each leader and why?

What meeting format do you use, what works best?

(k) what negotiating srrategie s do you find most effective witheach leader?

(g)

(h)

succession plan?

plan to manage this change?

Pro jec t Team F ina l Repor t , March 2C05

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Chapter 6

t n t \ A h : t s n e c i f l c j n c i d e n t s w : t h v . ' t ' ' r : l q d r t r i n ^ \ i ^ ' r r + n r * l - " . .- - u ^ , J L J p ! r l r r ! r r l u r r v r r L J v Y t L I r

) v u r u r r r L r u w r 1 1 6

i r v u r r v u r r r q r !

impacted your relat ionship with each leader and u'hat have you

done to al ter percept ions based on that rmpact?

(o) What are the reiat ionships between leaders and how have thosere la t ionsh ips impacted your miss ion?

(p) How have you aftempted/how do you plan to inf luencerelat ionships between leaders to al ter the batt le-space environment?

(q) What outstanding issues do you have with each leader that ma; 'impact the mission/batt le-space? What current contracts are inforce with each leader?

(r) Handover ail meeting reports from meetings with leaders as available

(s) Handover ali biographical reports on each leader as available.

(t) Handover all intelligence assessmcnts on each leader as available.

2. What are the influential groups in your battle-space?

(a) How influential is each grouP?

(b) How does each group influence the battle-space?

(c) Has each group had a helpful, neutral, or hostile relationshipwith your unit and how has that impacted your mission?

(d) What strategy have you employed to influence the behaviour ofeach group?

(e) What specific incidents with your units during your tour haveimpacted your relationship with each group and what have youdone to alter perceptions based on that impact?

(f) How does each group interact with other groups and whatimpact have those interactions had on your mission/thebatt le-space?

(g) What is the source of power for each group and how can youinfluence that source of power to accomplish your mission?

(h) What outstanding issues do you have with each group that may impactthe mission? What current contracts are in force with each group and how do thosecontracts influence the group to support the mission?

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( i ) IJorv does cach group f i t into the campaign plan?

(j) What non-tradjt ional "shadow" groups inf luence the batt ie-space butmay not be readi ly apparent to an outsider?

(k) Handover al l meet ing reports and intel l igence repof is on each group

Government

L What is the current government structure in theslructure diff'er from historical data?

batt le-space and hor.v does this

2. Which elements of government arefunctioning well and which are functioninqpoorly? Why?

3. What actions have youyour batt le-space?

taken to alter, improve, or change the govemment in

4' What govemment services do you consider vital to mission success and wharactions have you taken to ensure they continue?

5 How much influence does each government leader have and from where is theirpower derived? (appointed? elected? took power through force?)

6' What financial, suppon, or construction contracts are currently in force orsigned with the govemment and how do those contracts influence your relationship withthe government, people, and groups within the battie-space?

L In what key ways does the battre-space differ from your pre-deproymentimpressions and studies and how can we uuold th.r . mispercept ions?

Batt le-space Environment

1. What are the atmospherics ("sense of the community") of each vi l iage, tow.,cit1r, province, region, or other key areas within your battle-space and how do thoseatmospherics impact your mission?

2. Where have your units encountered the most culturalreact ions l ike open host i l i ty, host i le gestures, sul len looks. etc.)to deal with this friction?

3' What are the percept ions of your soldiers/personnel of the people, groups, ancileaders in each area and why?

lriction? (may includeHow have you a t tempred

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4. What are the percept ions of people, groups, and leaders of yourq n l d i e r c / n e r < n n n e J i n e a c h : r e a a n d w h v '

5. What are generaI percept ions or mispercept ions of your unit that have hindered

or heiped your abi l i ty to accomplish the mission? How have you attempted to discourage

or encourage these percept ions?

6. What are the cul tural "hot spots" within your batt le-space? Include any si te

rvhere cultural friction could lead to a negative incident that would detract from mission

accomplishment. How can these hot spots be dealt with to reduce fr ict ion?

7. What patterns are common on the streets and how do changes in those patterns

indrcate shifls in hostility, supportiveness?

8. What other cultural factors may impact our mission? What are the normal

working hours, working days? What days are children in school and from what age?

Etc. Ilow does this information differ from pre-deployment assessments?

9. What extemal cultural forces, such as religious influence, impact behaviour in

your battle-space and how have you reacted to that influence? What is the cultural

significance of outside groups and or ieaders on the groups and leaders in the battle-

space?

Rel ieion. Lansuage and Customs

l. What are the key religions in your battle-space and how do you perceive

religious influence? How do your culrent perceptions differ from pre-deployment

assessments and how do you account for these differences?

2. Where are the key religious sites within your battle-space? How does each

rel igious si te inf luence your mission? (e.g. "no-go" area to reduce fr ict ion)

3. What influence does religion have on each group and/or leader within the

battle-space? How are religious groups and leaders linked with secular groups and

leaders and how does that relationship impact the battle-space?

4. What political influence does each religious group have within the battle-space

and how do they exercise that influence?

5. How does rel igion inf luence the everyday behaviour, act ion and react ion ofpeople within the batt le-space?

6 How do rel igious percept ions and bel iefs effect the relat ionship between your

soldiers, 'personnei and the people? How have you attempted to inf luence thosepcrcept ions and bel iefs?

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7. What rel ig ious minori t ie s l ive within your batt le_space,to they interact with majonty rel tgious groupsJ and what has

how are they treated,y 'our re la t ionsh ip been

these groups?

8. Have youminori ty r ights) andgroup?

been forced to inter. lect yourself into any rel igious issues (e.g.how did that act ion effect the percept ion of your unit with e;ch

r un g, o g?,Xi::iilJl:, ff Hl;,T i:i$::iTJ jil"Jffi ,:,^tt I e - s p ac e and ho w do es

l0 What major stumbling blocks has language caused between your unrt and thepe opl e/groups/leaders ?

11. What is the availability of local translators and have you found them to betrustworthy' effective, biased/unbiased? What tactics can you recommend for recruitins.employing, and monitor ing local t ranslators?

- - - -- ---- ' -D'

12' How effective was your pre-deployment language training? What did you doto improve the language capability of your personnel auling operations? what phrases ortranslation tools did you find the most useful to reduce cultu.ul friction

"uusecl by

Ianguage barriers?

13' What local customs have cause the most friction between your personnel andthe people? How have you adjusted operations to reduce this friction?

l4 Recommend strategies to fol iow local customs without compromising missronrequirements.

15. Which local customs do you recommend must be fol lowed without except ionand which can be ignored without causing undue friction?

16. What customs have your personnel followed that have given you the mostdividend in improved perception/atmospherics?

Ongoins Cultural Ini t iat ives

1. What cultural initiatives have you undertaken to improve perceptrons, reducefriction, and gain compliance or neutrality? What initiatives would you ,L"o-nlend forthe future and what would you recommend against?

2. what cul tural exchange have you attempted with groups, people, leaders?Have these exchanges been effective?

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3. l{ou,effect ive have civi l af fairs projects been in inf luencing the batt le-space?\\ /hat strategies and tact ics wouLd ),ou recommend to improve or make best use of ctvi laf fairs projccts and missions?

4. Where do you recommend applyrng civ i l af fairs projects in the nearterrn toachieve the greatest effect?

Securi fy and Armed Groups

1. What cul tural inf luence have you used, or is avai lable, to coerce host i le forceswithin your batt le-space?

2. What cul tural tact ics (rel ig ious hatred, etc,) have host i le forces within your

batt le-space used against you? How effect ive were these tact ics? How did you try tocounter them?

3. What are the cultural vulnerabilities of hostile, non-hostile, and supportivegroups within the battle-space? Are there inherent cultural frictions that can be leveraged

to reduce their effectiveness? How have you exploited these vuinerabilities to ensuremission success?

4. If you are training or working with local security forces, what cultural issueshave helped/hindered your relationships? What training strategies work best within thisculture?

5. What cultural frictions exist within the security forces that undermine theirability to accomplish their missions? How can we reduce that friction?

6. How do locals view the security services? How do those perceptions impact

their effectiveness and how can we reduce frictions/improve effectiveness?

7. When and on what day do hostile forces conduct attacks and why? Is there anyreligious or cultural significance to these patterns that can be exploited or used inassessments?

8. What are the crime levels, what types of crime are committed, and what are thereasons behind crime trends? Are there cultural factors that we can influence to reducecrime or ident i fy cr iminals or cr iminal groups? How do people accept or reject cr iminalactivity and how have you used that perception to impact crtme?

Other Issues

1 . What are the cultural differences between rurai and urban populations and isthere any result ing cul tural f r ict ion? How does this effect your mission?

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2' Are there any outstanding debts or.ved to any group, leader. or indivrdual in tnebatt ie-space? what do we owe and why? Are we overdue on u,ry debts such as bloodnloney or contract fees?

3 what have we promised (money, contracts, support , mecrical aid, etc.) togroups, leaders, or individuals within our batt le-space? What benef i t wi l l we receivefrom fol lowing through on these promises and what are the consequences of notfollowing through?

4. Which relat ionships (with leaders, groups, incl iv iduals) shouid we maintainrvhich ones should we end, and which ones should we al ter and why?

5. What culturalopportunities do you see in this transition? Where can a ,,freshstart" help and where would it hurt?

6' Which groups, leaders, and individuals will try to take advantage of our relativeignorance of the battle-space environment? What actions are they likelyio take andwhy? IJow can we counter these actions or use them to our advantage?

7' What are the greatest cultural challenges and dangers to our mission? Howshould we overcome these chal lenges?

8' What has been your most successful-cultural tactic (e.g. frequent meetings,meals, ard del ivery)? What would you l ike to have tr ied but didn' t because of a lack ofresources?

Chap 6 : A - l l l

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CHAPTER 7

INTELLIGENCE

On the t rans format ton fac ing the in te l l igence serv ices pos t September 11 , 2001 ' . 'They

have already learned lo regret the emergence of new intelligence largets thut lack anyconcrete form; aggressive belief systems not subject to central authorily, shiftingalliances of dangerous malcontenls, stateless migrants disloyal to any country ofsettlentent It is from those backgrounds lhal lhe agents of anti-Western lerrorism arerecruiled. "

John Keegan, lntelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-Qaeda. London. Key Porter Books, 2003: 364

S e c t i o n l : G c n e r a l

l . The Need for Intei l ieence. Good rntel i igence is vi tal in any phase of war. Incounterinsurgency operations it will be in constant and continuous demand. Soundintelligence supports continuing success in operations require steady success, which willwear down the insurgent movement, restricting its capability and reducing its morale,Accurate intelligence will permit commanders to conduct operations with precision,reducing the detrimental effect on the HN population and minimizing casualties amongfriendly forces. The combined effect will be to secure and maintain the morale among thesecurity forces and raise their standing with the civilian population. Effective and preciseuse of kinetic and nonkinetic means will earn respect; vital in the campaign for hearts andminds. Ill-directed and indiscriminate use of force will merely serve to alienate any FINpopulat ion. I t may be appreciated, therefore, that sound intel l igence is a precursor to al lcounterinsurgency operations; it must be built up quickly and sustained efficiently fromthe starc of a campaign. A glossary of abbreviat ions used in this Chapter is at Annex A.

2. Intel l igence Support to Operat ions. Thorough knowledge of the extent of theinsurgency and the pol i t ical and mil i tary aims, command structures and logist ic networkof the insurgents should allow the host nation (HN) government and coalition force tcrdevelop a long-term overal l strategy and sensible mi l i tary pol ic ies to defeat theinsurgency on the physical and moral planes. At al l levels, intel l igence wi l l permitcommanders to put the strategy and pol ic ies into pract ice to al low the defeat in detai l ofthe insurgents by ki l l ing, captur ing or arrest ing individuals and depriv ing them of targets,intel l igence, the means of command and communicat ion, weapons, ammunit ion, food andother suppl ies. Attr i t ion of al i these elements wi l l reduce the insurgents'abi l i ty tor la in ta in the campaign . Gu ide l ines on In te l l igence Suppor t fo r C2W are g iven inAnnexes B and C.

I In te l l iq ,ence in Counter - lnsureency Opera t ions There is no th ing rad ica l in theappL ica t ion o f the fundamenta is o f in te l l igence to a counter - insurgency campaign . There

1 , 2 3

DR,AFT

are , however , th ree aspec ts t i ra t rv i i l canv grea ter emphas is than mrght be the case inconvent iona l opera t ions :

a . The predominance of human rntel l igence

The inf luence of the crvr l ian authori ty onoperat ions and the consequent constraintsintei l rgence gathering.

(r{UMTNT);

co unter- i ns urgencyand compl ica t rons on

The appearance that, at t imes, operat ions are in support of intcr l rgcncerather than the reverse.

3' The Importance of I {UM|Nf. T'he purpose of intelr igence, in any phase of war, isto determine the enemy threat by accurate andt imely assess"ment of both capabi l i ty andintent ions, so that the commander may develop a pran to br ing about i ts defeat. Incounter- insurgency operat ions, this is equal ly ih. .u. . ; the insurgent must be defeated,mil i tar i ly or pol i t ical ly, and this can be done only i f commanders are given suff ic ientknowledge of the enemy bythe intel l igencc staff . In si tuat ions where the insurgent l ivesamong the population, pcrhaps without uniform or a recogniruur. military structure, hiscapabilities and intentions are likely to be determinea tarfetf from informatlo,,prouia.aby the populat ion and those individuals abre to move in . lor ' . pro*,- i ty to him.Sophist icated intel l igence scnsors, crucial in general *u., no.*ul ly cannot match theHUMINT agent, informer, informantl, surveillance from observation posts or thc reponsf iom rout ine pol ice or army patrols.- l ' ime-consuming col lat ion of detai land painstakinganalysis may then prove the key to unravelingi,npo,iun, urf..t, ortn" insurgcnt,sactivity' Processing HUMINT is enhanced with the use of r..ent software applicationssuch as l ink analysis and spreadsheets.

4' c iv i l ian conlra-!- lntel l igence gathering in a counter- insurgency campaign wi l l , inal l probabi l i ty, lack the freedom that may be e-njoycd in convent ional operat ions. Theprimacy of c iv i l ian pol i t ical control , theialance between efforts to defeat the insurgcncyand those expcnded on cr ime prevent ion and resolut ion,Ihe rute of law and the need fbradmissible evidence for prosecut ion, wi l l a l l constrain t i t . guth.. ing of intei l igence.Mil i tary intel l igence staffs may wel l f ind themselves in uniamil iar c ircumstances,subordinated to civ i l ian control and methods of operat ing trrai--av have conf l ict ing aimsand pr ior i t ies.

5 Patrolline. In operations where the reliance on HUMIN.f is paramount, thedismounted soldier becomes the eyes and ears of an intel l igence organisat ion. The valueof extensive patroi l ing and subsequent de-br ief ing may not". .uai ty be apparent to thes o l d i e r ' F o r e x a m p l e ' t h e . t r u e a i m m i g h t b e t o d w e l o p a p i c t u r e o f ' p a t t e r n s o f i n s u r g e n tbehavior over a protracted period, rather than short- t . i . i . "orrnuissance for immediareoffensive act ion The need to win the hearts ancl minds of the popuiat ion rn order torveaken sympathy for insurgents and thus increase the potent iat now of information, r 'ayalso try the soldier 's pat ience and morale as he f inds himself adopt ing a less aggressrvestance than he might otherwise have chosen.

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7 . Pr inciples of intel l ieence. The four stages of the Intel [gence Cycle (directron,

co l lec r ion . p rocess ing and d isseminat ion) and the app l ica t ion o f the e igh t p r inc ip les o I

intel l igence cont inue to be appropriate in CON and provides the structure within whrch

the in te l l igence organ isa t ion opera tes . The e igh t p r inc ip les o f in te i l igcnce are :

a .bc ,d .c .fgo '

h.

central ised control ;t ime l iness ;systematic exploi tat ion;object iv i ty;accessibi l i ty;responsiveness;sorrrce protection; andcont inuous review.

SECTION 2 . DIRECTION

Intel l igence Architecture and the Organisat ion of Intel l igence

8. Design of lntel l iqence Architecture, Early in a counter- insurgency campaign, i t

wi l l be necessary to establ ish a chain of operat ional command which ref lects the pol i t ical

and military requirements of the Hlrl and assisting coalition. When this has been

established, there will be a need for a supporting structure of intelligence staffs placed at

appropriate levels in order to provide timely, responsive intelligence for commanders. It

is inevitable that the intelligence structure will develop with the campaign. The

architecture must anticipate this and deploy progressive stages of capability which are

readily linked together. In parallel with these staffs, a communications network must be

established that permits the rapid, efficient passage of intelligence data of different types,

upwards, downwards and sideways. In a coalition operation, it will need to cross national,

military/ civilian and service boundaries so that it can link staffs and agencies at every

leve l .

9. Unl ike the mi l i tary chain of command, which is purely hierarchical , this network

should be constructed on the pr inciple of providing intel l igence from where i t is avai lable

to wherever i t is required. This may result in i t bypassing some levels of command in

order that i t reach the appropriate user. This "skip-echelon" system l ike col laborat ive

paral lel planning wi l l ensure information is avai lable on the "pul l" , rather than the "push"

pr inciple at whatever level of command may need i t . The intel l igence architecture is not

simply a communicat ions network; i t includes the al locat ion of Areas of Intel l igence

Responsibi l i ty (AiR), to each level of command. I t specif ies precisely the authori ty to

task individual col lect ion assets and al locates the reporl ing authori ty, ( ie, who is

responsibie for the provision of fused intel l igence reports ) based on information fromcol lectors. The intel l igence architecture should form an annex rn the nncrat innal , l i rgql ivs

under the t i t le of the intel l igence plan.

10. Constraints, There wi l l be constraints on this free f low of data caused by the

Anl r l22 .1Q-?-nnn4 4 4

DRAFT

necess i tY to app ly ihe "nee d to knor .v " pnnc ip le Th is i s v i ta l fo r F IUM6;T source -p ro tec t ion ' Some in te l l igence, perhaps tha t p rov ided f rom s t ra teg ic sources , rnay no t bemade avaiLable to al l inte l l igence staffs at every level. For example, mater ial with the"Canadian Eyes Only" caveat may be made avai lable from Canada exclusively forCanadian comtnanders. There wi l l be a need for special handl ing procedures for thrs, andother , mater ia l . In such c i rcumstances , as a min imum, a Nat iona l In te l l igence Cc l l (N IC)may be establ ished. In support of fui l operat ions i t is nccessary to fbrm an Al i SouroeIntei l igence centre (ASIC) within which rhere may be a HUMINT support GroupFsc) ' a cryptological Support Group (CSG), providing sIGNT, or. un tvnvr suppo.Group ( lSG). Special ist intel l igence should ui*uyt be kJpt under close review wherroperat ing with al l ies as they can encourage exclusivi ty and reduce the mutual t rust sonccessary for e f fect i ve cooperat ion.

I l Straininq Communicat ions Networks. Inevi tabiy, extensive intel l igence data net-works wi l l p lace a large burden on the communicat ions avai lable. This should be bornc inmind when designing the intel l igence architecture with as much use being made ofexist ing systems as possible. In a coIN campaign, the usage by intei l igenceorganizations of available bandwidth will ouistrip that of ail other users due to the needfor access to nationa.l databases, imagery producis and the output of national agencies.This is particularly the case when satellite communications are established in the theatre.

Central ised Control

I I The Need for Central ised Control . Intel l igence assets are normal ly central ised atthe highest appropriate level of command in order to be available across thc widestpossible area ofoperations. In counter-insurgency operations there are furthertmperat ives for central ised control . Where several intel l igence organisat ions are workingagainst a common target, there is the danger of overlap. Some auptication is alwaysnecessary in order to improve the evaiuation of information by its being confi.-ed frommore than a single source. 'fhe

danger lies in there being a single ,our.". exploireJbymore than one agcncy each in ignorance of one-anoth.r . Thi, ian lead to falseconfirmation and, in tum, gives the sourcc greater credibility than may be its worth.There is also the undesirability of wastage of effort and resourc.s.

l3 The Director of Intel l ieence. In designing the intel l igence organisat ion, a decisionmust be made to coordinate al l intel l igence staff i , mi l i tary ind . iu i l iun, HN and coalr t ion,central ly Ideal ly a single Director of Intel l igen.. ' ,houl j be establ ished at nat ional ievelwith simi lar posts at each lower revel of command, perhaps those of c iv i l ianadministrat ive authori ty or mi i i tary command aepending upon trre circumstances.

In tegra t ion - The Commi t tee Sys tem

.14 , Establ ishing an Intet l igence Committee. The Director of Intel l igence at nat ionallevel should, ideal ly ' . chair an intel l igence commirtee. Subordinate intel i i !encecommlttees r 'vould then meet at each lower level. Each committee would orve al iegranceto thc next higher level whtch in tum would be responsible for the effect iveness and

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coordrnat ion of the intel i igence efforts of those belor.v them Committees should meetregu la r l r r f thc re i s to be a use fu i exchange and d iscussron o f in te l l igence and a goodrvork ing re l r t ionsh ip be tween c iv i l au thor i t ies . po l i ce and mi l i ta ry in te l l igcnce s ta f l ses tab i i shed.

15 . Membersh ip o f the In te l l igence Commi t tee . Membersh ip o f the in te l l igencecommi f tee shou ld be ar ranged mutua l l y be tween the I - lN in te l l igence serv iccs .c iv i l ian and mi l i ta ry . and those o f Canad ian and o ther a l l ied in te i l igencestaffs.

16. Coordinat ion. The intel l isence committees should ensure that:

a. Civii, police and army boundaries are the same and accord more with thecivil authority and security force command system. This may not alwaysbe possible;

b. Information and intel l igence f low downwards as wel l as upwards andsideways to neighbouring committees where appropriate;

c. Representatives of government departments and HN experts are co-optedfor special advice, with due regard for security. They might come fronrcustoms services and coastguards, such fields as the highways department,rail services, inland water transport, civil engineering,telecommunications, power and water suppliers and from a wider circle ofthe HN community which might include farmers, businessmen and othertraders.

5t23

an?n?3'13-5-0001 1 3

DR.AI-T

' I ' he Commi t tee Sys tem

11' I i lustrat ion. Figure 1((.saa "ur)di troru! t r ictgrunr.s ' / i ru for l tgt tra r)) i i lustrates thekind of committee system which might be developed in a' theatre of operat ions. canadianintel l igence personnel may f ind themselves runring committees at br igade level and

i: ; ; ' Individual canadian off icers should expect, l u. puni. ipants iniommitrecs a1 any

lS Funct ions of an Intel l igence committee. The funct ions of intel i igence committeesare as fol iows:

a' At the FrN rever, 1o kecp the government, the civ i l and mir i tarycommanders, or chiefs of stafl, and operations staffs informed o1.all aspects ofintelligence and security operations und to facilitate th.

"-.rr*!. ."aprovision ofthe intel l igence necessary for the prosecut ion ofa stratesrc

campaign .

b. At subordinate levels, to keep their paral lel operat ions commrttees andthe next higher intei l igence committees fur iy inform.a * i ,n , . i .uon,intcl l igence for operat ional planning.

c To advise operational staffs on security and protective measures.

To develop the coi lect ion pran against which the col lect ion agencieswi l l be tasked.

In te l l igenceal locat ing tasks andobtained.

staffs through the G3, to direct the col lect ion agencies,pr ior i t ies and trme within which the information must be

f. Where possible, to establ ish commonintel l igence and securi ty organisat ions.

procedurcs for al l IN and al l ied

g. To provide an appropriate disseminat ion service to commanders.

19' central Intel l ieence Staffs. In a canadian force, subordinate to the committees,there should be a central ised, integratetr staff capabie oip.r io.r ,ng col lect ioncoordinat ion and Intel l ig€nce Requirements Management (ccrRM), databasemanagement and fusion funct ions on behalf of al l the intel l igence staffs of that part icularmission' For this reason' the concept of the ASIC was d"uet6f.a. e, the outset, as parl ofthe intel l igence plan, c lear orders should be given on the ievei at which responsibi l i ty formaintenance of a master database wi l l be performed. I t is essent ial to prevent every leveio f in te l l igence s ta f f runn ing da tabases in para l le l . A l though i , * i l t never be poss ib le toavoid some dupl icat ion.of record-keeping, there should b! a minimum of databases rvi tha single, prcbably the highest HN. level maintaining the master database rvi thsubordrnate. and other levels submitt ing changes to i t in the form of 'data-change requests.

6t23

DR-AFT

N{aintenance of a single database is faci l i tated b1' the "pul l" rather than the "push"

method of information retr ieval and by close cooperat lon between al l col iectors and^ - ^ I . + i - ^ 1 - + ^ f f -d l l a l j L l L a l J L 4 L L J ,

20. Command and Cont ro l . Whi le in te l i igence commi f tees g ive genera l d i rec t ion . Iay -ing down po l i cy and a l lo t r ing genera l a ims. co l lec t ion tasks and pr io r i t ies , thev do no texercise command. Command and controi remains the prerogat ive of the commanders,civ i l ian and mil i tary, over both their respect ive intel l igence staffs and their col lect ionagenc ies .

Factors Affectin g O rganization

23. Whatever the design of the intel l igence architecture, the organisatron and the

sources and agencies deployed, there are a number of factors which wi l l be common.

These must be considered at the outset and plans made for their inclusion in the

structures.

a. Cont inui ty. Units should be kept in the same area of responsibi l i ty (AOR)

for as long as possibie. This ensures that they become familiar with the HN

inhabitants, the other security forces, the terrain and infrastructure. They are better

able to get the measure of their opponents and they acquire the ability to develop

information into intelligence. In short, they get a feel for what is normal as a

background against which to observe the abnormal.

b. Flexibi l i ty. An intel l igence organizat ion is designed to meet a specif ic

situation, but it must be receptive to the adjustments needed when the insurgent

threat develops in new directions, themes, strategies and tactics, or the situationchanges in some other way, Such changes in the situation may make fresh

demands upon specialist services, such as imagery interpretation or intenogation.Commanders, and their intelligence staffs, must be able to respond quickly to new

needs by redeploying resources and, where necessary, adjusting the functions they

fulfil1.

c. Information Handl ing. The intcl l igence system, whatever i ts shape, mustbe able to cope with an increasing amount of information as units, with growing

experience, become more product ive and better focused. With t ime, i t is to behoped, the populat ion becomes suff ic ient ly conf ident to pass more information tothe securi ty forces. As this happens, suff ic ient intel l igence-trained personnel mustbe made available to collate the additionai information, analyze and fuse it,interpret its meaning and disseminate the resulting intelligence in time for it to beused operat ional ly.

(1) Special ists. The training of analysts, source handlers, survei l lanceoperators. imagery interpreters, I inguists, interrogators and otherinte l l igence special ists must be developed as early as possible i f the

7 /23

Lot nt'aJ| ?-7-nnn { . l \

DRAFT

rnev i tab le shof iage o f such sk i r led personne l , whrch ex is ts a i thebegin' ing of any campargn, is to be overcome . The care ful husbandr;vo f scarce sk i l l s i s necessary th roughour a campaign , b ' t par t i cLr la r lyessent ia l a t the beg inn ing un t i l more t ra ined spec ia l i s ts becomeava i lab le .

(2) Liaison. I f the intel l igence organizat ion is to u,ork effect ively andeff ic ient ly, good l ia ison between a1l intel l igence organisat ions anclagencies, F{N, al l ied, c iv i l ian and mil i tary, is paramount. Thespecial ists referred to above, are vi tal elements in establ ishingeffect ive l ia ison with FIN intel l igence agencies. The sensit iv i t ies ofsuch intel l igence l ia ison dut ies require the l ia ison off icer to have wideexperience of mi l i tary capabi l i t ies and knowledge of intel l igence.

(3) Securi t l l ' The need for securi ty, especial ly source protect ion, must beful ly understood within the intci l igence organisat ion and among thoseto whom i t is disseminated. The "need to know', pr inciple has to beenforced and clear guidei ines given on disseminat ion, part icular ly toHN, civil ian authorities.

Compos i t ion o f an In te l l igence Organ iza t ion

24' Intel l ieence Staff Organisat ion. There is no f ixed estabi ishment for an intel l igenceorganisat ion, nor is there any pre-determined scale on which to base i ts composit ion. I t ,size will be determined by the extent and nature of the threat, the commander'srequirements, the architecture necessary to support operat ions and the tntel l igencecol lect ion agencies that can be made avai lable. As no two campaigns are evJr fought inquite the same circutnstances, i t fo l iou,s that the intel l igence oiganizat ion fo. each"ne*commitment should be custom-designed, al though pasl campaigns wi l l provide gr-r idanceand general pr inciples where there are useful paral lels. tne size of any Canadian"contr ibut ion to a ColN campaign wi l l have to be designcd in consultat ion with the senror

8t23

In the immediate era of canadian confederation, l g64-1g70, the first canadianlnteliigence service was formed under one Gilbert McMicken, a stinendiarvmagistrate based in Windsor, Ontario, This period saw nurnerous und confusingalarms brought on by the American civil war and the subsequent Fenianinsurrectionary movement (an extreme Irish nationalist movement) that raided Canadawith the aim to inJluence gritiitr policy on Ireland. McMicken ,fruO o.gun12.O ur'

--

excellent detective force along the frontier, and who hqd a wide acquaiitance of spiesand informers' (Prime Minister Sir John Alexander) Macdonald usually t n"* ,oi"-about the plans of the Fenians than the Fenians did themselves."

Extract and quote from Donald Creighton, John A. Macdonald; The young politician.Toronto: the Macmil ian company of canada, Ltd; 1956: 3g3,421and 43g_439.

DI{AFT

rntel i igence off icerand the intel l igence staff of the FIN. Almost certainly, the size of

intel l rgence staffs wi l l grow as the campaign develops. The probable funct ions i t would

rnaintain for a counter- insurgency dcployment are shown diagrammatical ly in Figure ?-

r (sca ' add i t iono l d iagrun ts ' . / i l e ) )

l 5 l n t e l l i e e n c e S u p p o n O r q a n i z a t i o n .intel l igence staff would need was coveredposs ib ie in te l l igence suppor t o rgan iza t ion

F-acto rs Affect in g Integrat ion.

The k ind o f spec ia l i s t suppor t tha t thcin paragraph 21 above , A diagram showing a

is shown in Figure 3./ (TBD)

26. Although a single, central ly control led, integrated intel l igence organizat iot t

answering to a Director of Intelligence is the ideal, the circumstances prevailing in a HN

may not be conducive to such a system, particularly if a Canadian contingent is part of an

international, allied force in which the senior Canadian officer may have limited

influence. Where it cannot be achieved, a compromise solution must be brokered between

the interested parties. The establishment of a centralized system may be affected bi' any

or all of the following factors:

a. The effectiveness, reliability and vulnerability of the HN's security forces

and its intelligence and security organization.

b. Willingness by all parties to cooperate, to share information and details

of, perhaps sensit ive, FIN sources, other intel l igence detai ls and,part icular ly at the higher ievels, matters of pol i t ical sensit iv i ty.

The different points of view and doctrine of the security forces, HN and

al l ied, Because the HN's securi ty forces, in part icular the pol ice, must

continue to live and work among the population after the eventual

departure of the allies, they will be subject to greater internal pressures

and constraints. It is important that intelligence staffs overcome this

problem as failure to integrate will seriously impede the intelligence

effort.

The degree of authority delegated to officials at each level of thecommand structure, national, provincial, regional and district.

2 '1. ASIC. Whether or not an intel l igence committee is establ ished, the normai focus

for intel l igence for Canadian forces wi l l be the ASIC or i f a joint operat ion, the Joint

ASIC (JASIC), which wi l l be located alongside the Joint Operat ions Cel l (JOC), forrning

the hub of an1' Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). Within the ASIC wi l l be the

senior intcl l igence off icer and his staff , This vvi l l inciude CCIRM and the AII Sources

Cel l (ASC) . in w,h ich fus ion and bu lk o f the ana lys is w i l l be condL ic ted Representa t ives

of rhe agenc ies , fo r example HSG, CSG and ISG, w i l l be loca ted in the ASC. In some

cases i t rv i l l be necessary for these elements to be afforded their own segregated area with

9 2 3

Ln2nt' l ' ,4 ?-q-nnn4 17

DRATT

niore str lngenl access controls than pertain rnabo i 'e . ) S imi la r consr ra in ts may app ly i f a NIC,

Task ing

the res t o f the ASC (Sec paragraph 10(co l loqu ia i l y , a CANIC) , rs dep loyed.

28. . Direct ion wi l l begin with a determi_nat ion of the commander's intel l igence requirements or as they are more commonlytenned pr ior i ty intel l igence requirements (PIR). These wi l l be the product of his missionanalysis and should be discussed with the senior intel l igence off icei who wi l l be able toensure that they are accurately focused. I t may not be possible, in the early stages of acampalgn' to state clear ly the commander's intel l igence requirements as insuff ic ienroperational information may be available on which to plan. Where this is the case, theintel l igence staffs have the responsibi l i ty of giv ing gui iance to commanders on the kindof intel l igence that they wi l l require. This may be done by means of an intei l igenceest lmate. An intel l igence est imate takes the commander's plan, no matter how broadlydefined, and compares it with existing intelligence on the insurgency. concurrent withthe intel l igence est imate, the staff should apply Intel l igence preparat ion of the Batt lef ield

l lpel The intel l igence est imate and IPB together wi l l g ive the intel l igence sraff a goodidea of the gaps in their knowledge of the iniurgency anld these can fbrm the basis of theini t ia l col lect ion plan. I t is l ikely, par l icular ly in the ini t ia l stages, that there wi l l be ashortfall in intelligence. rhe probability is that there will be m"ore basic intelligcnceavai lable than current intel l igence. The preparat ion of an ini t ia icol lect ion plaiwi l la lsogive some indicat ion of the necessary col lect ion assets, and intel l igen.. ur ihi t . . ture thatwi l l bc needed for the campaign.

29' Direct ion to the Col lectors. Even when an intet l igence organizat ion has beenestablished, information does not flow automatically into the hands of the intelligencestaff' and then to the commander. If direction is poor, the intelligence organisation maybe in danger of collecting large quantities of irreievant information. A commander musrgive his intelligence staff clear direction and a firm indication of the priorities to beal lot ted to his intel l igence requirements. on receipt of the commander,s intel l igencerequirements, the intelligence staff will first, with the aid of the intelligence esimate ancjIPB, idcnt i fy gaps in the intel l igence already_held. - l 'hese

gaps should [e f i l led by iaskingcol lect ion agencies to col lect against them. fhe quest ions-put to the col iectors are knownas Information Requirements (lR) and their collettion is piamed carefully by the ,.nio'.intel l igence offrcer in conjunct ion with his CCIRM staff who wi l l coordinate thecol lect ion plan and IRs and manage the intel l igence requirements. The resultantcol lect ion plan must, in turn, be approved by the commander pr ior to col lectors re ceivrngtheir direct ion from the intel l igence staffs. The col lectron plan wi l l normal ly bemaintained on a col lect ion worksheet which wi l l show theal locatron of ' tasks, in order ofprtor i ty, to individual col lect ion agencies and the t ime, and form in which information isIo De reported.

SECTION 3 - COLLECTION

30 Aspects of Col lect ion. There are two aspects of col lect ion; exploi tat ion, by

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DRAFT

Lntc l l igcnce s ta t ts o f the i r sources and agenc ies and the t ime ly 'de l i verv o f co lLec tedin fo rmat ion to in tc l l rgence s t l f f s fo r s r rbseqr ren t p rocess tnc i t t t c

r 1t23

A020231 3-1 1 -0001 1 I

--:: .r,. i ir-t i l l

r , ! i l r ' : :

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DR-AFT

Itrt--.r-

Jorn t In te l l rgence Ce l l(See F ig 2 fo r deb i ts )

I N T E L L I G E N C EP R C D U C T I O N

CClRlv ' l

MILITARYI N T E L L I G E N C ECompany

5

WeaponsIntel l i igenceUni t

2

1. Joint ly manned. Responsible for the product ion of al l a ir photography and imagerysupport .2 Provides Special ist support including ATOs for jFHQ and Iptel l igence Staff 's.3 Electronic warfare Support Measures (ESM) unit provides sIGINT suppoft for J lrHQ.4 Provides and administers HTJMINT'support eg: Agent Handlers, Survei i lancepersonnel. Joint Forward Interrogat ion Teams (JFITfcountry Liaison Teams (ct .T)including de-br iefers, Mi l i tary lntel i igence Liaison off icers i r tarr-ol nleta rntet lgenceNCOs (FNCO) e tc .5' Provides intel l igence and Field Securi ty staff for JFHe and sectrons and de-tachmenrsat subordinate level, cont inui ty NCos coNCos at Unit level.

F igure 3 In te l l igence Suppor t Organ isa t ion

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40202313-12-000120

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i n re l l igence. o r , when appropr ia te . d i rec t l y to wcapon sys tems. Co l lec t ion w i l l be based

on the coi lect ion pian drawn up by the intel l igence staffs, under the direct ion of

commanders and the intel l igence comminees during the Direct ion phase. The CCIRM

staff wi l l manage col lect ion.

Sources and Agenc ies

31. LIUMINT. As out l ined above, the most effect ive source of intel l igence wi l l be

that der ived from the direct quest ioning of persons whether formal ly or informal ly. This

is l ikely to include the fol lowing:

a. Canadian and Coal i t ion Mi l i tary Sources, This wi l l include al l ranks of the

securi ty forces especial ly those whose dut ies require them to move among the I{N

popuiat ion, on patrois, on col lect ion of local iy-produced suppl ies, on l ia ison with

HN authorities, dockers, airport workers, aid workers and the like. It is vital that

all such personnel are thoroughly briefed on the gaps in intelligence which their

duties might enable them to fil l. They should be made "intelligence aware" so that

they are always prepared to report information which may appear trivial but

which, when added to other pieces, may be irnportant. Dismounted patrols are

critical to collection in COIN operations and all soldiers are sensors;

b. HN Securi ty Forces. This wi l l include mil i tary, paramil i tary, auxi l iar ies

and reserves. They wi l l be of value both on duty and when on leave. Like therr

Canadian and Allied counterparts, they should be encouraged to become

intelligence aware. Attempts should be made systematically to brief those going

on leave locally and debrief them on return.

c. Military Surveiilance. AII the usuai conventional war surveillance sources

such as Observation Posts (OP), mounted and dismounted patrols, reconnaissancc

units, air reconnaissance, and troops supplemented by special ist survei l lance

equipment, are equally useful in counter-insurgency operations. They must be

tasked and briefed with great care because insurgents operate more covertly than a

convent ional enemy. Units wi l l f requent ly be tasked to mount operat ions

specif ical ly to obtain information or to give cover to other intel l igence-gathering

operat ions, for example, the insert ion or retr ieval of covert OPs.

d. Covert Survei l lance. Special Forces (SF) have a long history of success in

the role of stat ic covert survei l lance and the exploi tat ion of the information which

they obtain. The use of SF for intelligence-gathering and direct action must be

careful ly coordinated. When SF are deployed, i t wi l l be normal for there to be SF

l iaison off icers inthe HQ of the formation to which they are assigned.

e. I rregularForces. Units may also be raised local ly from the pol ice, the

Fl l r l 's army and from fr iendly sect ions of the civ i l ian populat ion for the purpose of

de lens ive or o l fens ive opera t ions asa ins : insurgents . Defens ive opcra t ions inc lude

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the guard ing o f key po in ts . s to ragc areas and vcr r jmpof lan t ly . to r , ' ' r s and r i l l agesr h a t h a v e c o m e t o t h e H N - - . g o v e r n m e n l ' s s i d e . 1 n M a l a y a , s u c h : r r c g u l a r s w e r er rsed to in f i l t ra te the insurgents command s t ruc tu re by comple te ly rcp lac ing : ro r n r r n i n n - e n a r t i c r r l A r A r e A T h e v ' h e r n n e r a t e d t o u n r a v e l t h e c h a i n o f c o m m a n d

f rom the ins ide . In Kenya, dur ing the Mau Mau campaign o f the ear ly 1950s ,"pseudo-gangs" were use d to attack insurgents in their own tenrtory. Such use ofi r rcpu la r t roons i5 . ISwever re i r l i ve ]v snnh is t i ca ted and thesc onera t ions can hel l l l S g l q l t l v v P J

deve loped on ly over a p ro t rac ted pcr rod in an cnv i ro ruxcnt wh ich is vc ry uc l lunderstood by the intel l igence organisat ion.

f . Intenogat ion. Pr isoners can be an imponant source of information.ln tc r rogat ion in a counter - insurgency campalgn can. however . be a sens l t i vcmatter pol i t ical ly and is l ikely to be subject to r igorous oversight, both off ic ial iy,and, unof f i c ia l l y . f rom the med ia . l t i s impor tan t to bc fu l l y aware o f the lega lbasis under which interrogat ion takes place. Systematic interrogat ion of capturedinsurgents can have excel lent results, part icular ly in bui lding a picture ofcommand structures, communications and other aspects of the insurgents'infrastructure. In low-ievel conflict, intenogation is less likeiy to produceintel l igence of immediate tact ical value, s imply because insurgent methods ofoperating, normally involve a very restricted circle within which future plans arediscussed. In general terms, but not always so, interrogat ion should be capable ofproducing evidence that will be acceptable in court. It is vital, therefore, that it isconducted, str ict ly in accordance with rules laid down by the host-nat ion'sjudiciary and the Law of Armed Conflict.

g. De-briefing. Arrangements must be made to provide a Defence De-br ief ing Team (DDT), personnel ski l led in de-br ief ing wi l l ing subjects. These wi l lnormal ly include Canadian ci t izens with recent knowledge of the I{N si tuat ionand environment. Such people might include travelers, air l ine crews, expatr iateworkers and members of Canadian diplomatic missions. I f the cr is is has resultedin an exodus of such people from the country, then debrief ing wi i l be establ ishedin Canada. If such people have remained in the country, then a de-briefing teammay deploy for de-briefing operations in the FI\I.

h. IlUMll.lT Support. Both interrogation and de-briefing require closesteerage and extensive intel l igence support i f they are to be effect ive. Liaisonrepresentat ives wi l l be establ ished at appropriate ASICs and wi l l need extensiveanalyical and research support.

i . Captured Documents, Equipment and Stores. These are valuable sources.Troops must be trained to realize their worth and encouraged to make themavailable to intelligence staffs at the earliest opportunity. Documents found orrsuspects may assist in the quest ioning of pr isoners by providing interrogators,.v i t l - rin fo rmat ion thar they can exp lo i t dur ing in ten iews. In cer ta in ins tanccs . i t may bcnecessary to employ special ly t raincd personnel to undertake sensit ive si teexploi tat ion (SSE) when rules of evidence or human r ights invest igat ions ma1, be

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J LfN Pol ice Forces. HN Pol icc are an exceLlent source of information butthey must be hand ied w i th g rea t sens i r i v i t r . Care must be taken no t to dup l i ca tcthe information col lect ion from pol ice off icers being undertaken by their ownin te l l igence s ta f f . Po l i ce equ iva len ts a re very l i ke ly to be hand l ing the i r ownsources among the popu la t ion . I t i s p robab le tha t there w i l l be a s t rong re luc tanceto disclose these sources to intel l igence staffs, but their tasking, and thein lb rmat ion they prov ide , shou ld be coord inared and fused by the cent ra l i sedintel l igence machinery.

k. HN Populat ion. Undoubtedly, the HN populat ion wi l l , i f systematical lyexploited, be the best source of HUMINT. Great care must be taken in developingthe HN populat ion as sources and close coordinat ion with HN intel l igenceagencies, the Pol ice Intel l igence Branch in part icular, must be ananged i fdifficulties are to be avoided. The insurgents may use bogus informants to plantfalse information or uncover the source-handling network, HN informants shouldbe given the opportunity to contact the security forces confidentially. This can bedone by making confidential telephone lines or Post Office Box numbersavaiiable and by keeping routine miiitary patrols in ciose proximity to thepopulation. Doing so will permit a budding informant to pass information withoutunduly drawing attention to himself. All military patrois must be trained to talk toHN people as a matter of course. People who have good cause to fear reprisalsshould be given the opportunity to contact the security force with information, forexample, at road blocks or on cordon and search operations, where theirinterviews can be concealed under the guise of interrogation, The intelligenceorganisation will be capable of developing a system for making contact with, orbeing contacted by. sympathizers.

l. Informers and Agents. Much of the useful information, which reaches theinteliigence staff, will come lrom informers and agents. A srnall number of well-placed and rel iable agents can provide information of value wel l beyond theircost, part icular ly i f a imed at the pivotal points in the insurgents'command. I fagents are able to penetrate the top level of the insurgents' command and controlorganizat ion, informal ion may be provided on the development of their strategies,the ident i f icat ion of important leaders, the system of l ia ison between the mi l i tarywing and the insurgent poi i t ical leadership and the methods of acquir ingresources. At lower echelons, informers are useful in providing information on,for exarnple, personal i t ies, tact ical plans and weapon caches. At these levels, i fcontinuity is to be rnaintained, it is important that the agent network expands at asimilar rate to that of the insurgent movement, otherwrse their relative value willd iminish, The problem with act ing on information suppl ied by an individual issource-protect ion. In an insurgent organisat ion the circ ie of knowledge is keptsmal l . I f an informer repo(s the move of a weapon to a new hide, for example,perhaps only three insurgents have been made aware, the courier, the commanderand thc quar te rmaster . A subsequent , immedia te opera t ion by rhe secur i ty fo rccs

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to recover the weapon might ra ise Th is cou ldthe souice, Care must, therefore, be exercisedthe HSG sought when plaming operat ions.

ser ious ly jeopard ize the secur i l y o frn such matters and the advice of

m' In HUMINT terms, an agent is a person specif icai ly recrui ted and trained,placed in a host i ie organizat ion and who is tasked wit l i information gathering onthe organizat ion of which he is pan - a control ied source. An informer is a personwho, perhaps uninvi ted, passes information to an opponent about his organiz ' t ion- an uncontrol led source. An informant is one who giues informatron _ a casualsoulce.

32. Coordination. Whenever HUMINT sources are to bethat al i HUMINT collection agencies operating in the theatreeach other. This l iaison is vital to ensure:

exploi ted i t is imperat ivecffect l ia ison closely with

a. De-conf l ict ion. No source shourd ever be run by more than a singreagency' If a singie source works for more than one agency, it is possiblJthat hisreports can' unwittingly, confirm themselves. This false confirmation, sometimescalled false collateral, as well as being a danger to the intellig.n.. p.o..rr, .uncause the source to gain greater credence than his worth, puri ..ror., i itn"situation becomes known to the insurgents, they can exploit the false collateral atthe expense of the security forces.

b. veracity. There is always the risk of a source, if not properly handred,producing information which is unreliable, or even acting us' u ,loubl. agent.Tasking must be rigidly controlled to reduce the likelihood of this iruppJningReliability of sources must always be evaluated with great care and recordsmaintained by rhe HUMINT agency.

c ' Securi ty. The smal ler the circ le of people knowing the ident i ty of a source,the safer he can operate. If sources are to be maintained, and confiden.. ,fr.na,source-protection must be effective, and be seen to be effective

33' Open Source lntel l iqence. Intel l igencc derived from open sources (OSNT) isplaying an increasingly important role. Nowhere, however, * i t t t t . role of the media bemore lmportant than in counter- insurgency. The act ions of the securi ty forces wi l l bescrut inrsed closely and wi l l p lay a major par l in forming publ ic opinion. Relat ions withthe media are not rhe direct responsibir i ty of the intel l ig; ;ce staff . they shouldremember, however, that reporters can get access where security forces often cannot.Furthermore, press teams are often out and about for protracted pe'ods. A warmrelat ionship, bui l t up between intel l igence staffs and individual members of the presscorps can reap dividends in the form of low-level information Many Canadian journal istswi l l cover the campaign for an extended period, v is i t ing the country for, perhaps sixweeks at a t ime before returning to Canada for one or two months. I f an intel l igence staffdevelops a suff ic ient relat ionship with individual members of a media team, informationmight be forthcoming in retum for, perhaps, a sanit ized update, or a securi ty br ief on their

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rerurn ro the thear re o Iopera t ions Med ia repor is shou ld a luays be reparded w i th cauLton

Thev r re l i ke ly ro inc lude a b ias to some pan icu la r purpose ra ther than be a s t ra rgh trepon ing o f unabr iCged or une labora ted fac ts . Commanders may have seen the morn ing

news on television about the campaign immediately before being br iefed by the staff .T h i c e r n i . e r r i 1 " h l , , r ^ ^ r , ^ ^ ' ^ f f - L ^ , i - ^ 1 6 r e c n n n d t r - l n r e q q r e n o r t q r a t h e r t h a n l e a d, , e a o t o s l a l l s n a v l n g . - . - . - r . - - - . , - - l n g

n r r s r r h i e c r s n f r h e i r c L ^ - - : ^ ^ " i + L " - c ^ r ' ' p 3 1 s r e s u l t s . I n t e l l i p e n c e o f f i c e r s s h o u l d t a k eu r r J U U J I v L J w l L r l u I t l l l U U J l l l B w l L l l U l r r U r L u r r s s u

steps to avoid br ief ings developing in this way. HN media, in part icular, wi l l have a r , ' i ta i

role to play in the hearts and minds campaign and intel l igcnce staff can expect to piay apart in this with the Info Ops and PSYOPS staff

34. Open-Source Publ icat ions. In addit ion to the current report ing of news teams lntheat re , rhere is l i ke ly to be cons iderab le open-source matc r ia l p roduced pr io r to thecampaign which wi l l go some way to meeting intel i igence staffs ' requirements for basrcintel l igence, This can include internet, at lases, encyclopedias, t ravel books, stat ist icalsummaries and a host of other references produced by the special ist- interest presscovering the armed forces, the pol i t ical , economic, geographical s i tuat ions inside thecountry.

35. Insurgent Use of the Media. i t must be remembered that the insurgent movementwill also attempt to make use of the media to spread its own views and discredit those ofthe government and thc security forces, Intelligence staffs should attempt to catalogueinsurgent publications; they can sometimes reveal aspects of the insurgents that areotherwise unknown.

Imagery Intel l igence

36. Imasery Intel l iqence as a Source. Intel l igence derived from imagery, ( IMINT),

w,ill play an important roie in counter-insurgency operations. Coverage will include

imagery, ranging from map-quality prints from airborne platforms, both satellite andaircraft , some of very high resolut ion, to thermal imagery (TI) , and Infra-red (IR),

pictures. TI i rnagery is excel lent at detect ing bodies whrch are warmer than their

surroundings, such as people concealed in dense fol iage, or a warrn vehicle engine. I I {

imagery is capable of detect ing disturbed soi l ; valuable for detect ing buried arms caches,command wires for booby traps and IEDs. Col lect ion platforms wi l l include satel l i tes,strategic aircraft , tact ical air reconnaissance (TAR), hel icopters and UninhabitedAirborne Vehicles (UAV). OPs and other reconnaissance troops can expect to beequipped with hand-held cameras, v ideo recorders, TI equipment, radar and Imageintensifiers (ll). Coordination of IMINT is the task of an ISG, normally found fromw,ithin the resources of the J2 Imagery at NDHQ There will be a constant demand forphotographic coverage of areas of operat ions. The ISG wi l l be able to provideintel l igence derived from the analysis of al l k inds of imagery. Much analysis wi l l bedone, however, not on "wet f i1m", that is photographic negat ive or pr int . but on ' 'sof1

copy", images on a computer scrccn. Although pr ints of images can be made avai lable,care should be taken to ensure that they are demanded only when necessary, for exampleas br ie f ing a ids . Pr in ts shou ld no t be demanded as proo f o f in te l l igence repor ts as a

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nlatter of course. The t ime taken to interpret results of an IMNT task is consrdcrablrle ngthened when pr ints of the imagery, are recuired,

S igna ls In te l l igence

37. Signals intel l igence (SIGINT). Insurgcnt groups wi l l , however, have a need tocommunicate and when they do via any electronic medium they arevulnerable to intercept, Besides deriv ing intel l igence from communicat iols(COMNT), SIGIN'f analysts wi l l exploi t emissions from radars and otherclectronic emit ters. This ciectronic intel l igence (ELN'f) , can enable thedetect ion of, for example, radio-control devrces and missi ie control , guidanceand target-seeking radars. Where SIGNT col lect ion is envisaged, u iSG *i l lbe avai lable to coordinate i ts col lect ion and to interpret the results within theA S C .

EW Detachments. EW Detachments wiil provide useful information andintel l igence by exploi t ing insurgent weakness in modern civ i l and tact icalcommunicat ions.

Special ised Funct ions

38 Batt le Damage Assessment (BDA). BDA provides an assessment of the degree ofeffectiveness of Canadian operations and engagements against the enemy. It is useiul tosupport the est imation and IPB processes by enabl ing updates to enemy order of batt le(ORBAT) and the state of enemy infrastructure. I talso uidr in determining the effect ofthc PSYOPS campaisn.

39. Sensit ive Site Exploi tat ion (SSE). SSEpersonnel. SSE supports a number of funct ionsMP by ident i fy ing and recovering evidence.

is an act iv i ty that requires special ly t rainedsuch as Legal and CIMIC. I t also suDDorts

SECTION 4 - PROCESSING

40' Processins as a Discipl ine. The processing stage of the intel l igence cycle incor-porates thc work of the intel l igence staff in col lat ion, analysis, integratron or synthesrs,and interpretation of information. The processing staff wiil normally be trainedintel l igence operators, of ten from ai l three serylces, supported by special ists in thecol lect ion discipl ines. Where appropriate, special ists from other arms and services wi l ljo in the anaiyt ical staff , for example, engineer intel i igence operators, with their specialrstknowledge of' particularly, terrain, explosives and route constructron. Ammunitiontechnicians with their t raining in explosives, f inng devices and weapon inspect ion are1! le to develop weapons intel l igence in conjunct ion with the pol ice forensic scient ists.This discipl ine, based on such techriques as weapon matching, wi l l be able to tracewcapons to their sources of supply, to rounds they have f i red, explosives and detonatorsto their or igin and so on.

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41 ' l ' he

ASIC. The bes t resu l ts rv r l l be ob ta ined f rom those in te l l igence organ isa t ionsnh ich are fu l l y in tegra ted , work to a cent ra l l y -agreed co i l cc t ion p lan . employ e f fecr rveCCIRM per .sonne l . fus ion and da tabase managers , ana iys ts and o ther in te l l igencespec ia l i s ts and approach the i r task in a s t ruc tu red . ob jec t ive and sysremat ic way.

42. Fusion, One of the cr i t ical tasks performed in the ASC is that of fusion. This is thecol lat ion of reports and information from the separate, s ingle-source agencies, HUMNT,SIGINT and IMINT, into a single assessment. Each agency produces i ts own view o1'anevent o r ac t i v i t y and repons i t to the in te l ) igcnce s ta f [ Th is i s known as "s ing le -sourcep ic tu re compi la t ion" . The fused assessment , tha t i s , rhe assessment made by thecomparison of more than one single-source report , becomes the "recognised tact icalground, (or mari t ime, or air) , picture". The recognised prcture wi l l be produced at thelevel with responsibility for reporting, usually the levei maintaining the database as it isthere that the broadest view will be. This then becomes the authoritative view whichforms the basis forassessments by al l subordinate intel l igence staff and wi l l bedisseminated upwards, downwards and to the flanks in the form of intelligencesummaries ( INTSUMs), which are often pictor ial .

43 . Databases . One o f the fundamenta ls o f e f fec t i ve p rocess ing is themain tenance o f an e f f i c ien t da tabase. In a COIN campaign there w i l l be ap le thora o f smal l , apparent ly ins ign i f i can t and unconnected da ta . On ly e f fec t i veco l la t ion and c ross- re fe renc ing w i l l enab le ana lys ts to assess the s ignr f i cance o find iv idua l p ieces and make bes t use o f them.SECTION 5 - DISSEMINATION

44. Responsibi l i ty. Disseminat ion of intel l igence to subordinate commanders is theresponsibility of the Director of Intelligence at the highest level and of the seniorintel l igence off icers at subordinate levels. Where intel l igence committees are establ ished,individual intel l igence chiefs of the separate services represented wi l l acceptresponsibi l i ty for br ief ing their own commanders.

45. Use of Intel l igence Architecture. I t should be emphasised that intel l igence shouldflow, not necessarily in a hierarchical manner, as is the case with orders along anoperational chain of command, but quickly and efficiently, from whomever holds it towhomever needs i t . This wi l l mean that, on occasion, i t wi l l bypass some levels ofcommand. This is great ly aided by the use of information technology. iNTSUMs shouldbe disseminated at regular intervals. These can be supplemented by detai led reports onspecif ic topics, for example, insurgent ORBATs or incidents, as required. As withintel l igence reporl ing in any phase of war, care must be taken to avoid "circularreport ing" in which parts of a summary from one intel l igence staff are plagiar ised inanother and returned to the or iginator as apparent conf irmation of the or iginal . Thisprob lcm is par l i cu ia r ly acu tc in combined opera t ions where the d i f fe ren t nar iona lauthori t ies include reports from third part ies in their own summaries. The best defenceagainst this is c lcar orders for reporl ing authori ty and a thorough knowledge, on the parto f in te l l igence o f f i cers , o f the sources and agenc ies ava i lab le to a l l the in te l l igence s ta f fs

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providlng repcf is for the theatre,

17 . Secur i tv . Whi le in te l l igence is o f use on ly in the hands o f opera t iona l decrs ron-makers, i ts disseminat ion should be closely control led. Source-protect ion must aiways bea proir i ty. I f a source is at r isk, intel i igence should be sanit ised or disguiseci in such away as to concea l i t s source , Access to in te l l igence in such c i rcumstances shou ld berestr icted to those with a real need to know. Securi ty of intei l igence must always bebalanced against the value to be gained from i ts disseminat jon, Agencies general ly havestr ict guidel ines for disseminat ion of intel l igence in an emergency, perhaps r.r ,hen l ivesare at r isk ' Intel l igence off icers need to acquaint themselves with these ' ,act ion on' ,procedures so that emergency disseminat ion can take place with the minimum of delav.

SECTION 6 - TRAINING

48 Pre-Deployment Training. Al l personnel involved in the Direct ion, Col lect ion,Processing and Disseminat ion of intel l igence should deploy to the theatre having madethorough preparation. They must be ciear on their role in the intelligence organiiation andhave had the opportunity to rehearse the issues with which they will be dealing, withthose to whom they will be working. Senior intelligence officers, in particular, shouldtake the time to examine the forthcoming operation against the fundamentals ofintel l igence, which are the same for any phase of war. I t is necessary to order theirthoughts on architectures and inteiligence support in such a way thai they can see clearlywhat infrastructure will be necessary to meet their aim of supporting the commander,splan. Those personnel with a role which willrequire them to effect iiaison with otherauthorities in Canada should have had the opportunity to make contact with them, todiscuss the issues and, particulariy, agree on the means with which they willcommunicate. Ideal ly, they should have the opportunity to exercise usins simi larcommunications systems before departure.

49. Backeround Intel l igence. Mi l i tary staff should be as thoroughly br iefed aspossible on the si tuat ion in the theatre of operat ions before deployment. HN MIcompanies wi l l be able to assist with individual and unit t raining on intel l igence matters,current affairs and other aspects ofthe insurgency.

50. Speciai ist Ski l ls. Mi l i tary staff with special ist ski l ls should ensure that as muchtraining as possible is done pr ior to arr ival in theatre, Problems are much easier to solve,part icular ly those involving technical equipment, in a benign environment whereextensrve support faci l i t ies exist than after deniovment.

51. Intel l isence at Unit Level. Further aspects of uni t intel l igence and securi tytraining are covered in other Parts of the Army Field Manual,

SECTION 7. DIFFICULTIES FACING AN INTELLIGENCE ORGANISAl ' I0N

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52 Non-Operat ional R.equire ment. Al though the immediate requirement al the staf i of

a campatgn w i l i be fo r the ex is t ing in tc l l igencc organ isa t ion to expand and prc - rduce

intel l igence to supporl commanders for mrl i tary and poi ice operat ions, i t wi l l have toconr inue to p rov ide orher s t ra teg ic , po l i t i ca l and economic in te i l igence. The in te l l igenceorganisat ion wi l l be severely stretched in the expansion phase and the recrui tment ofaddir ional staff may give the insurgents an opportunity to inf i l t rate their agents,

53. Securi t -y of the Expanded Organizat ion. Finding, and vett ing, sui table personneland prevent ing insurgent penetrat ion of a rapidly enlarging intel l igence system wi l lpresent difficulties and risks. The difficulties may be overcome by effort and cooperation.The r isks have to be accepted with open eyes and minimized by good securi ty.

54. Pol i t ical Direct ion. Pol i t ical direct ion of intel l igence is a sensit ive matter in a

democracy because of publicly demanded checks and balances to ensure that it is not

abused to promote personal, party or factional interests. In a more authoritarian regime

the government 's control of intel l igence is closely guarded to ensure that i t retains a

monopoly of power. In ei ther case, a senior member of the government usual ly exercises

direct ion. Whi le at a pol icy or higher command level, the pr inciple is to central izeintel l igence. At the tact ical level, where sub-unit commanders are expected to exerciseinitiative, the complex nature of operations will have a "dispersing effect" which will

appear i ike a form of decentral izat ion. Applying the pr inciple of mission command, the

central ized direct ion of intel l igence pol icy and overarching plans need not st i f le the

ini t iat ive necessary to counter an insurgency. Company or Combat Team Commanders

will have to be very aware of local politics and in future will probably require an

intel l igence processing capabi l i ty within their headquarters element. Nonetheless, i f not

central ly directed, this manifestat ion of tact ical in i t iat ive may erode control in three

respects.

a. Disseminat ion of lntel l igence. The number of people who have access to

sensit ive issues wi l l increase, thus central ised control of the intel l igence is more

difficult. There will be created opportunities for subordinates, newly in receipt of

intelligence to take advantage of it or to be suborned

b. Col lect ion Methods. Methods used to col lect information can no longer becontrol led r igidly from central government. HUMINT must be handled at thelowest level. Agent handlers require the kind of FiN knowledge which demandsthat they l ive in close proximity to those with whom they work.

c. Decisions on the Threat. Morc important iy, there is the increase in anindividual 's opportunit ies to exercise value judgements as to which people andwhat groups are to be considered a threat to the HN and who should or should notbe targeted. Often there is not only a legal div iding l ine between a proscr ibedinsurgent organizat ion and i ts legi t imate pol i t ical party but also between theinsurgents and their sympathisers.

55. Increase in Mi l i tary Inf luence. A funher di f f icul t l ' , which insurgent propagandists

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exp lo i t , i s tha t the d i lu t ron o f h igh- leve l po l i t i ca l con t ro l i s exacerbated by the rncreasedinf luence exercised over the rntei l igence system by the securi ty forces, The charge,however unjust i f ied, that the securi ty forces are thereby involved in pol i t ics .un L. udamagtng one. The obvious retort , that the Army is already invoived to the extent that i tsupporls a legi t imate government against lawless insurgents, wi l l not convince al l Therelat ionship between the government, the judiciary, the securi ty forces and rntel l igenceshould be indrvrsible A si tuat ion in which the intel l igence organisat ion and the secustyfbrces are answerable to separate authori t ies; government, regional, al l ied or fact ionaihas to be avoided.

56 lnf luence of Forcign Al l ies. In combined operat ions, the charge may be made, andexploi ted by the insurgents, that the government is under the control of foreigners. l 'heresultant sensitivity may cause the government to place greater restrictions on thefreedom of act ion by the al l ies than might otherwise be the casc. This might incluclerestr ict ions on intel l igence-gathering, part icular ly sensit ive col lect ion in the HUMIN'pand SIGINT f ields.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

Al i Area o f in te l l igence In reresrAIO Ass is tan t ln te l i igence Of f i cerAIR Area of Intel l igence Responsibi l i tyAOR Area of Responsrbi l i tyASC A l l Sources Ce l lASIC Al l Source Intel l igence CentreATO Ammunition Technical OfficerCCIRM Col lect ionCoordinat ionandlntel l igenceRequirements ManagementCB Cit izens'Band (radio)CLT Country Liaison TeamCNR Combat Net RadioCONCO Continui ty NCOCPS Covert Passive Survei l lanceCSG Cryptological Support GroupDDl' Defence De-briefing TeamDIS Defence Intelligence StaffDISC Defence Intelligence & Security SchoolESM Electronic Warfare Support MeasuresFINCO Field Intei l igence NCOFS F ie ld Secur i tyHCI Human-Computer InterfaceHSG HUMINT Support GroupI{UMIN'| Human IntelligenceIDB Integrated DatabaseII Image Intensif icat ionIMINT Imagery intel l igenceIO Intel l igence Off icerIR Infra-Red/lnformation RequirementIRLS Infra-red LinescanISG IMINT Support GroupJFHQ Joint Forces Fleadquarters.IFIT Joint Forward Interrogation TeamJIC Jo in t In te l l igence Ce l lJOC Joint Operat ions Cel lJSIO Joint Services Interrogat ion Organisat ionLAN IJN Area NetworkMI Mi l i tary Intel i igenceMILO Mrl i tary Intel l igence Liaison Off icerMIO V i l i ra ry In re l l igcnce Of f i cer

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MSTAR Manportable Sun'ei l lance and'farget Acqursi t ionRadar

NIC Nat iona l in re i l igence Ce l l

N IST Nat iona l In te l l igence Suppor t Team

OSNT Open-Source Intel l igencePIR Prior i ty Intel l igence Requirement

PW Pr isoner o f War

RII Request For Infonnation

RIC Reconnaissance Intei l igence Cel l

SAM Surface-to-Air Missi le

SITS Secondary Image Transmission System

SF Special ForcesSIGINT Signals Intel l igenceSIW Speciai ist Intei i igence Wing

TAR Tactical Air Reconnaissance

TI Thermal ImagerY

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehiclc

UGS Unattended Ground SensorsI Inited Kingdom Military Intelligence Support

CANADAMIST :I ermlnalWIS Weapons Intelligence Staff

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ANNEX B TO CHAPTER 7

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR C2W IN A COIN CAMPAIGN

In t roduc t ion

1 The components of Command and Control (C2) are the Commander and his staff .including his support ing intel l igence organisat ion, communjcat ions andinformation systems. Al l eiements of the C2 process are important, largeiyinseparable and contr ibute to the successful outcome of the Commander's-plan; they are also vulnerable to attack, By prevent ing an insurgentcommander from effect ively control l ing his organisat ion contr ibutcs direct lyto the colN principle of separating the insurgent from his support.

2' -fhe nature and extent of all source intelligence required for the planning and

execution of c2w operations is shown in the subsequent paragraphs.

Intel l igence to Support OPSEC.

2. Intelligence support for OPSEC planning must focus on the capabilities andlimitations of the insurgents intelligence gathering system, in order to reducethe vulnerability of friendly C2 assets and installations to attack. Counter-intelligence resources will be concentrated on the security threat. HumanIntelligence (HUMINT), signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and ImageryIntelligence (IMNT) are important to assess the effectiveness of the OpSECplan.

Key information/intelligence requirements to support opSEC are at ArLnex C.

ln te l l igence to Suppor t PSYOPS

A PSYOPS team should work very closely with the Al l Source Intel l igence Cel lto plan PSYOPS and to integrate these with the other C2W funct ions. As partof PSYOPS i t may be necessary to conceal aspects of f r iendly disposit ions,capabi l i t ies and intent ions. OPSEC may therefore be essent ial to the pSyopSplan. Equal ly, i t may be desirable in support of pSyopS to reveai certainaspects of f r iendiy disposit ions, capabi l i t ies and intent ions. PSyOpS can alsobe used to support Deception.

Basic psychological intel l igence - on the cul tural , rel ig ious, social and economicaspects of the target country/population and its governmenvieadership,communicat ions and media - is produced during peacerime in the fonn ofBasic Psychological Studies (BPS). During operat ions the BpS aresupplemented by current psychological intel l igence, which is provided bv

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PSYOPS ana lys ts work ing in a G2 lJ2 ce l l '

The resultant psychological assessments are di f ferent from intel l igence

assessments because they use information and intelligence to identify target

audiences within the opposing force, and those factors that are most iikeiy to

influence their attitudes and behaviour in favour of the Commander's mission

The conditions and attitudes of target groups are likely to change as the

si tuat ion develops. Current Al l Source Intel l igence, in paf l icular FIUMNT

and SIGINT, is therefore vital, both in the planning phase, and then

throughout the execution of PSYOPS, to assess the effectiveness of current

campatgns, to relnforce success and to re-allocate limited resources, if the

desired effect is not being achieved.

Key information/intelligence requirements - both for planning and executing

PSYOPS and for ensuring that the insurgent's psychological operations are

ineffective - are at Annex C.

Intel l igence to Support Decept ion

5. Deception aims to present a deliberately false picture to those in an insurgency.

Deception is highly complex, in particular those aspects which seek to exploit

insurgent C2 assets, and it demands security at the highest level. OPSEC is

essential to Deception in order to conceal those aspects and indicators that

would allow the insurgent to determine the reality behind the Deception.

6, EW plays an important role in support of Deception both by targeting hostile

communications and by identifying those Electronic Support Measures (ESM)

elements - the ability to intercept and analyse our own communications -

which it may be essential to leave intact as the conduit for electronic

decePt ion .

1 . Intelligence supports deception planners by analysing an insurgent's

reconnaissance capabilities and identifying hrs perception of the 'battlefield,

including his own deception doctrine, tactics/procedures, capabilities and

intentions. This requires an insight into an insurgent commander's way of

thinking, including the estimate process'

8. During the execution of deception operations, All Source Intelligence, particularly

oninsurgent movemenVdeployments, is required to monitor the insurgents

response and to determine whether the deception operation is achieving its

aim. In analysing this intel l igence, attent ion must also be paid to possible

insurgent deception plans to protect his own operattons'

9. Ke1, information/ intel i igence rcquirements to plan/execute decept ion operat ions

and to reduce the effects of insurgent decept ion act ions against f r iendly C2

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assets are at Annex C.

ln te l l igence to Suppor t EW.

10. Ew has appl icat ions in providing early waming of insurgent act ion, in sel f-p ro tec t ion . in loca t ing and ident i fo ing hos t i le eminers and in exp lo i ra t ion . l tdepends on t imely, directed Al i Source Intel l igence, but communicat ionsIntel l igence (COMINT) and Electronic Intel l igence (ELIN-f) and IMINT areespecial ly useful to c2w planners to locate an insurgents c2 means, toidenttfy any communications architecture, including offensive EW capability,and to highlight any critical/vulnerable C2 systems

I I . I t is essent ial to establ ish target acquisi t ion pr ior i t ies, based on a commander'sconcept for future operations. The decision to target insurgent C2 assets mustbe based on an assessment of the balance between destruction/neutralisationand exploitation, and between hard-kill and soft-kill methods. It may, forexample, be necessary to ensure that certain hostile ESM systems areprotected from attack, in support of the electronic deception plan. Such keydecisions must be made at the highest level and should be included in anycommander's Directive. Decisions on targeting wiil also have to becoordinated with allies, where this is appropriate.

12. Key information/intelligence requirements to support EW - both to degrade aninsurgent commander's C2 cycle and to nullify the effects of hostile EWactions against friendly C2 assets are at Annex C.

Intel l igence to Support Physical Destruct ion

13. The physical destruct ion, or at least neutral isat ion, of host i le C2 and counter-C2assets is a central obiect ive in any C2W operat ions.

14. Intel l igence for physical destruct ion is focused on support ing the target ingprocess. There is a requirement for close integration with national targetingpriorities. An assessment must also be made, with G2lI2 advice, on thebalance of advantage of destruction against expioitation, including thepossible development of a No-Str ike (both passive and act ive measures)tarset inp l ist .

15. As C2 systems can be reconst i tuted, i t is essent ial that t imely Batt ie DamageAssessment (BDA) - based pr imari ly on IMNT and slGrNT - is avai lable.

16. Key information/intelligence requirements to support targeting,physicalDestruction and to reduce the vulnerability of friendly c2 assets andrnstal lat ions to attack are at Annex C,

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ANNEX C TO CF{APTER 1

KEY INFORMATIONINTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

FOR C2W OPSEC1. Capabi l i t iesof insurgentstocol lecVprocess/analyseinte l l igence.2. Intel l igence (in parl icuiar SIGINT, HUMINT) on insurgent intel l igence objectivesand achievements.3, Factors, such as culturalbias, that could inf luence the insurgent's interpretation ofi n t e l l i o p n c e o e i n e d

4. Assessment of host i le counter-C2 capabi l i t ies to al low C2W planners to makepriorities for targetin gl C2-pr otection measures.5. Counter-intelligence on the security threat posed by agents of foreign intelligencescrvices.6. HUMINT (from counterintelligence, the interrogation of prisoners or capturedinsurgents) and SIGINT on the effectiveness of OPSEC.

PSYOPS

7. Detailed information on cultural, religious, social, economic and politicalpeculiarities of the country and region.8. Insurgent C2 architecture. (possibly linked with hostile forces outside the countryitheatre).9. Background information on popular radio/TV programmes and personalities,periodicals and cartoons, and important holidays, historical dates and religious anniversa-r ies .I 0. Assessment of the systems, especially communications and broadcast systems,used by the insurgent to elicit support from the populace, and mechanisms for politicalcontrol .I l. HUMINT is frequently the key to successful PSYOPS, focusing on the targetgroup's attitudes, alliances, and behaviour to identify:a. Vulnerabi l i t ies and suscept ibi l i t ies.b. The leadership structure, key communicators and their relationship with the targetgroup.c. Psychological prof i les of key pol i t icai and mil i tary leaders. Much of this can beobtained in peacet ime by FAClDefence Attaches,d. Al i agencies sui table for conveying messages to selected audiences and br ingingmaximum psychological pressure to bear.e. Impact on unintended audiences.f . Flost i le propaganda, analysing i t for counter-propaganda and defensive PSYOPS.g. Ascertain the react ion of the insurgent to fr iendly PSYOPS.

12. Assessment of any insurgent PSYOPS doctr ine/capabi l i ty and propaganda/publ icinformation techrioues.

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Decept ion

13' Assessment of the capabi l r t ies and i imitat ions of the insurgent intel l igence coi lec-tron/analysis system.I4' Prof i les of key leaders/mi l i tary commanders, inciuding analysis of their decisron-making processes and ident i f i cat ion of bias es/preconceived pJ.ceprions.l5 Assessment of the host i le decept ion doctr ine, tact icslprocedures and capabi l i ry.l6 ' Current intel l igence on the insurgent 's ORBAT, force dispori t ions and any chang-es/redeployment as a result of decept ion operat ions ( to gauge suC..r , of the decept ion).

E W

l7 Ident i fy cr i t ical communicat ions and non-communicat ions c2 nodes for exploi ta-tion (ESM) or electronic attack - jarnming/Directed Energy we apons (DEw),l8 ' Ident i fy any host i le electronic air defence systemii that are crucial to the successof airlaviation operations) for eiectronic attack 6ammingn)nW;.19' Identify hostile ESM systems that are exploitablJ in support of the deception plan.

Physical Destruct ion

20' Identification of hostile C2 systems (in particular intelligence collection assets),the communications architecture of those systems andthe facilities that house them..fhisshould include an assessment ofthe degree ofredundancy.2l ' Assessment of the vulnerabi l i ty of host i le C2 ryrt" . , including the role they playtn supporting the leadership and military capabilities, in order to identify critical/vulnerable systems as potential targets.22' Identification and location of the defensive means used to protect hostile C2systems23' Inteliigence (in particular IMINT or SIGINT) to assist in any battlefield damageassessment of insurgent c2 targets once they have been subjected to attack.24' Intelligence on any insurgent offensive capability and targeting priorities.

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Defens ive C2W

25. Intel l igence on any insurgent C2W organisat ion, doctr ine/operat ing procedures,capabi l i t ies and potent iai vulnerabi l i t ies dunng di f ferent stages of mi l i tary operat ions(both in peace and war).26. Counter- intel l igence on foreign intel l igence services.27. Target ing intel l igence on host i le offensive C2W assets.28. HUMINI- on insursent C2W intent ions.

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CHAPTER 8

TNFORMATION O PERATIOI.]S

Insurgency is ultimately e war of ideas,,.Recognizing this fact, successfulcounterinsurgents have devoted as much ffirt to defeating the enemy'spropoganda as they have to defeating his fghters. Lltinning the war of ideas hasoften been the decisive line of operations in successful counterinsurgencycampaigns.'

Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, (/SA

SECTIbN I: INTRODUCTION

I . The centre of gravity of any COIN campaign is the indigenous population. History hasshown that insurgents require only the indifference of a population to operate successfully. Thusthe primary target of info ops in COIN operations is that portion of the population that is mildlysupportive, neutral, or hostile to the insurgent movement. Absent a neutral or friendlyenvironment, insurgents cannot operate or thrive.

2 ' COIN operations are less about the application of physical force than the influence ofperceptions' The use of Counter-Command Activity (CCA) in COIN operations will remainimportant, particularly in an environment where the interdiction of eleitronic signals to IEDs iscritical to force protection. However, it is the influence activities of info ops, deined as .anyactivity, be it physical or cognitive, whose primary purpose is to influence will'that willcomprise the bulk of info ops in a COIN campaign.

3. Influence activities seek to predispose, penuade, convince, deter, disrupt, compel or coerceapproved target audiences by promoting desired themes and messages, These actiiities may useone or more capabilities dependent upon the desired effect, All activities create influence; everyaction, however innocuous seeming, will have an influence on the target audience in a COINcampaign- the population.

4. The government's overall information campaign will concentrate on the two broad aims ofwinning the population's support and confidence, and conversely, lowering the morale andeffectiveness of the insurgents and their supporters, Some degree of succeJs with the frrst aimmay be a prerequisite for progress with the second. t-eadenhip at all command levels must beaware of the psychological implications of and the correlation between the political, the militaryand the moral aspects of the campaign. In particular they should take care that action in onesphere, despite promising a quick retum, does not jeopardise the success of the other two spheresand so of the campaign as a whole, An opporrunity to ambush a particular insurgent leader mayhave serious negative repercussions if the attack includes unacceptable collateral damaee.

I john Nagi, "A Bener War in lraq,- Armed Forces Journal,August 2006

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5, The primary influence activity capabilities are PsyOps, PA, Presence Posture and Profile(ppp), CINIIC, Deception, and physiial destruction. All activities must be mutually supporting'The complexity of the rnfo ops campaign will be significant and is a continuous set ofoperations, As such, the G3 is responsible for info ops planning and coordination. Moreover,bicause all successful COIN campaigns have possessed detailed thematic direction from the

strategic and political levels, the info ops campaign must be integrated horizontally and vertically

acrosJ and up and down the chain of command. Thus, the destruction of an insurgent safe house

and seizure of a munitions cache may be combined with a CIMIC coordinated project thatprovides resources to an NGO, publicised by PsyOps in-theatre, and PA intemationally,protected by a robust security eiement displaying a strong deterrent posturc to the enemy but a

irienOly.nO n.lpful pmfile to the population in an effort to increase host govemment legitimacyand establish a safe environment for economic development. Obviously, such a series ofoperations requires substantiat inter-agency cooperation in both planning and execution to besuccessful.

SECTION 2: PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION

1. Commander's Direction and Personal Involvement

6. The commander's penonal involvement drives Info Ops, and exercises control over all lnfoOps activity within a framework of timely decision-making and consultation up and down thechain of command. Following mission analysis the commander formulates his unifying theme,articulated in his stated intent. Tactical level planning is based on that intent, with its definedend-state and supporting effects, and harmonises Info Ops activities with other activities.Without the guidance of the commander's unifying theme and intent, the lnfo Ops effort willlack focus and will not achieve the desired effects in harmony with other activities. Messageswill become confused and contradictory.

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7. The importance of info ops must be understood and comrnunicated by the commander to hissubotdinates. Placing faith in influence activities may seem counter-intuitive to the commander,however, it is essential that this cognitive leap is made; no successful COIN campaign has beenconducted without a sophisticated and integrated info ops campaign (even though it may nothave been described as such at the time), Moreover, the commander must undentand thatinfluence activities may reside outside of some soldier's 'comfort zone,' The confidence to trustin and properly empioy influence activities will only occur if the commander demonstrates hisown faith in non-physical activities. Because of this, the commander wili need to be intimatelyinvolved in the info ops campaign.

2, Centralised Planning and Decentralised Execution

8. The principles of centralised planning and decentralised execution apply to Info Ops at allcommand levels. However, centnlised execution may be required for certain types of targetedinformation activities, when all involved force elements are required to adhere rigidly to a plan,or when strategic assets are used, The approval level and process for PsyOps messages must beas low and streamlined as possible in order ensure messages are timely and relevant to theenvironment at hand.

3. Early Involvement and Timely Preparation

9 ' Info Ops planning must start early, because both planning and execution take time and resultscan be slow to emerge. Hence, a Commander's intent and direction must be viewed right fromthe start in relation to Info Ops capabilities and be maintained throughout the planning process.Targeting staff and advison, such as PsyOps detachment commanden, need to Ue Rrttyinvolvedin the planning process to integrate Info ops within the overall plan.

10. Conceprualizing and providing resources for influence activities is as complicated as theplanning work required for physical activities. Recent COIN experiences of our alliesdemonstrate that info ops campaigns are far more effective when info ops plannen are amongsrthe fint on the ground in-theatre. Whenever the security environment allows, key penonnelinvolved in info ops planning should be amongst the earliest elements deployed as ttrls enablesan early and accurate assessment of the general mood of the population. This fact should bereflected in logistics planning.

4. Close Co-Ordination and Sequencing

11. The very nature of Info Ops and the large, divene target set means that there needs to be veryclose integration, vertically and horizontally, within a command in terms of creatingcomplernentary effects in support of common objectives. The principle of close co-ordinationand sequencing is arguably of greater import in a COIN campaign than in any other type ofmission because there is an adversary who's sole purpose is the de-legitimisation of the hostgovemment and friendly forces. Contradictory messages or inaccurate information will

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undermine credibi i i ty and legit imacy and do great hann, A11 Info Ops plans and activrt ies must

be coordinated, de-conflicted and synchronised up, down and across the chain of command with

other military, political and civil activities in order that one activity does not compromise, negate

or diminish the desired effect of another. This is the responsibilify of the commander, assisted by

targeting staff and subordinate commanden. The smooth integration of influence and physical

activities is criticai to maintaining rnessage and theme continuity across all government and

cooperating agencies.

5. Timely Counter-Info Ops

12. Even the most effective Info Ops plans will be frustnted in execution if deliberate actions are

not taken to counter the Info Ops actions of the adversary. A significant portion of the planning

should be dedicated to the preparation for reaction to enemy tnfo Ops. There are numerousrecent examples of a militarily weaker opponent effectively conducting an Info Ops campaignthat has influenced foreign and indigenous populations. Failure to adequately counter theenemy's story in a timely and credible fashion can undermine not only a public's morale, it canalso bolster an enemy's popularity, and rally public opinion against the mission. lnfo opsplanning must dedicate rcsources to monitoring enemy Info Ops and remain flexible enough tocounter erroneous information disseminated by an adversary. Timeliness is paramount becausethe fint story released is often the story that gets the greatest distribution and attention. Measuresmust be taken to counter the propaganda of adversaries and to reveal their falsehoods.

r3. A number of factors serve to leave the initiative of Info Ops in the hands of the insurgent.First, the insurgent will have no rnonl or legal compunction to use only the truth in an Info Ops

campaign. Second, modem information technologies enable the rapid and broad dissemination oftext, audio, video, and photographic material. This means that the news cycle is now muchshorter than in previous eras and therefore reaction to enemy propaganda cannot wait even 24houn. Third, because the insurgent will be operating on 'home turfl his sources of intelligencewill be superb. Combined, this serves to leave friendly forces in a defensive stance, forced tomonitor local and intemational media and other sources of information in order that false storiescan be rapidly countered with accurate information. This will likely be an unfamiliar stance forfriendly forces accustomed and trained to seize the initiative in operations. Despite this,offensive Info Ops targeting the key lines of operations of the insurgent must take placesimultaneous with defensive Info Ops. Only by careful identification and analysis of the enemy'sCentres of Gravity and tngical Lines of Operation can friendly forces conduct offensive Infoops.

tq. Given the pewasiveness of the intemational media and information technology that enablesthe real-time dissemination of information, PA will play a substantial role in helping to limit thedegree of intemational suppofi an insurgent force requires to gain legitimacy and resources.N{oreover, PA will piay a critical role in countering insurgent propaganda targeting the will ofthe Canadian public in the hope of undermining domestic political support for a mission, This iscritical: intemational opinion can be unduly and immediately influenced by enemy propaganda,PA must therefore be considered an intrinsic part of the info ops campaign plan.

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6, Accurate Intelligence and Information

t5' Like all COIN activities, accurate and timeiy intelligence is critical to a successful Info Opscampaign, This intelligence must include timely, accurate, and relevant information aboutpotential advenaries, the other approved pafties, and the operating environment. The Info Opsstaff should work closely with the intelligence staff to define oquire..nts necessary to plan,execute, and assess the effectiveness of lnfo Ops. Inteiligence preparation of the battlespace(IPB) should include analysis of human factors (including culrure, religion,languages, etc.),1T,decision-making infrastructure and processes and network vulnenbiliiies. Thisiortion of IpBforms the basis of the Info ops contribution to the command estimate.

]0' The enemy will be operating on familiar ground and will be able to gather accurateintelligence with comparative ease as long as the population is not openly hostile to his activities.It will require a signihcant amount of work for friendly forces to gain a si.nilar amount ofaccurate intelligence. Human intelligence is critical. For exampl., in rany societies rumour isconsidered a credible and legitimate conmunication. Rumours are spread between personalcontacts, not formal med.iums. The only way to determine what stories, positive or negative, arebeing spread by rumour is to have a dependable human intelligence network.

7. Comprehensive Targeting

17. At the operational level, targeting starts with a detailed undentanding of the operationalenvironment, its constituent systems and entities, and the commander's objectives. Commandersand targeting staff identify Info Ops effects required to achieve the desired objectives and arange of activities that, when integrated into the overall operation plan, will aJhieve tloseeffects ' It is important to realise that any eiement of targeiing actiiity may influence a range oftarget audiences and create unintended effects. The targeting stam therefore must analyse theimpact of such activity and propose appropriate rneas,rrer to-avoid unintended effects. lnfo Opstargeting is not planned separately from the targeting of fires process, but in conjunction with itso that created effects are complementary.

18. Influence activities will comprise the bulk of a COIN campaign. The use of f,rres will beseverely circumscribed because of the possibility of unintended effects. This is not to say that theopportunity to physically destroy the insurgent will not play a role in the campaign; nthlr, it ismeant to reinforce the fact that the primary centre of gravity for both the insuigeits anO friendlyforces is the indigenous population. Thus the bulk of iargeting in a CoIN ca-iaign will focus onthe neutral and indifferent portions of the populace.

tl. Although there are historic examples where the undermining of insurgent will has broughtabout the collapse of an insurgency, the commined insuqgent will be resistant to direct influence.Particularly in groups motivated by fundamentalist religious ideology, the core members of aninsurgent movement are likely highly motivated, dedicited, and unafraid of mortal consequencesof their actions, It is far more effective to target the neutral or indifferent memben of a

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population that indirectly enabie the survival, movement, and actions of an insurgency tn an

effort to rum these into active supporten of the govemment. The result wili be a hostile

operating environment for the insurgent. A second order effect of this may be the undermining of

an insurgent's will due to the inability to increase pubiic support forthe cause,

8. Establishing and Maintaining Credibility

20. In order for Info Ops to be successful in creating influences, that is, in operating on the

moral/cognitive plane, the source of the Info Ops must have signifrcant credibility in the eyes of

the targeiaudienie. Poor or non-existent credibility has been identified as a primary cause of

failure of Info Ops from Kosovo to Afghanistan. Whether a source is seeking to generate support

from an indigenous population or convince enemy troops to surrender, the lack of credibility will

hinder success. For eximple, an indigenous population with strong religious and cultural bias

against western troops may distrust messages created by westerners.

2r. Credibility will take time to develop and is intimately tied to the actions of a military force

and the host govemment. The presence, posture, and profrle (PPP) of a force will have a

significant impact on credibility. Depending on the specific context, a force may need to show

strength, deciiiveness, friendliness, or a limited footprint, or several of these at once. The

credibitity of a force may have to be established in a planned, incremental fashion. Even when

possessing credibility, indigenous proxies such as social, religious, or political leaders who have

iredibiliti with target audiences and are sympathetic to the mission should be used to broadcast

desired messages. it *ust be remembered that allactions should reinforce the perception of host

goverrrment legitimacy, credibility and competence; the use of indigenous voices will further this

soal.

Every action of the soldier must be considered part of Information Operations and must bejudged for potential unintended effects. The simple act of picking fnrits from an orchard orvegitables from a field by resting soldiers can alienate a village dependent on that produce forwinter survival. rWithout asking pemrission of the farner and offering suitable compensation,this seemingly harmless act could be misconstrued and used by an advenary for propagandapurposes (ie. 'the wealthy westem invaden care little for the average person and steal yourfood'). Every action has effects and all soldien must undentand the repercussions of even themost benign act.

9, Performance and Effects Monitoring and Assessment

22. A,s with any military activity, the results of information operations are assessed usingmeasur€s of performance (are things done right?) and measures of effectiveness (are the right

things being done, to create the desired effects?) are employed,

23. Measures of performance (MoP) for info ops are relatively straightforward as they are with

other operations and activities. They refer to the mechanisms of planning and implementation.They can be viewed in the same manner as the delivery of indirect fire: reaction times; quality of

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product: correct identif ication and assessment of target; and suitabi l i ty of engagement means, toname a few. Measures of Effectiveness refer to the desired effects and whether or not theactrvities conducted created the effects.

24. The successful prosecution of Info Ops relies 0n continuous monitoring and assessment ofthe short and long-term effects of inter-related activities. This is achieved by collection of all-source intelligence and other feedback on the Info Ops activities. Measures of Effectiveness(MoE) must be included in the Info Ops plan and are integrated in the inteiligence collectionactivities. Particular attention should be paid to changes in the adversrry', oi other audience'swiil and actions, including such items as changes in the attirude of the civilian population,poiiticai activity, and expressions of unrest. Also, changes in an adversary's .rpuUitity may beused as a MoE, such as reduced efficiency, disorganisation and slower reactions to events andspecific actions in response to deception or destruction,

25. It must be clearly undentood that influence activities may take a significant amount of timeto take effect. In some cases, effects may not become apparent until well after an individual unitor colrlmander's tour has ended. Short-term support and friendliness should not be mistaken forconfidence in the govemment. Winning over the trust of the target audience will take time andconsiderable effort, Changes in behaviour may take place over a lengthy period of time and beimperceptible. For example, the effects of a radio broadcast campaign may take years to becomeapparent. Additionally, it is very difficult to develop a causal link between a single info opsaction and target behaviour, even when direct messages are used at the tactical level. Forexample, changes in driving behaviour around military convoys may be due to severalconcomitant facton: PsyOps products , previous use of waming shots, or past incidents ofcivilian casualties when proximity to a suicide bombing targeting coalition forces resulted incollateral damage. Despite these diffrculties MoE are critical to gauging the usefulness of Infoops.

26, MoE are relatively simple, objective and measurable for Counter-Command Activity andInformation Protection Activities based on the stated aim or desired effect of the activityplanned. For example, if an attack successfully destroys a targeted advenary C2 system yet theadvenary commander can still effectively control his subordinates, then the effectiveness of theactivity was poor even though the attack.rr *.y have conducted a sound attack that destrovedthe targeted system.

zz. With influence activities, MoE are applied to activities and changes on the cognitive plane.Given all of the individual and environmental variables in the human decision-making process,developing measures of effectiveness (MoE) for info ops on the cognitive plane mry ti one ofthe most daunting intellectual tasks facing a commander. Influence activitles seek to workthrough extemal and internal filten in order to either penuade or dissuade and thus affectbehaviour and action. Hence, the planning and conduct of these activities is an art requiring thecommander's subjective feel for their potential affect, The results of these influence activitiesrequire as defined a set of indicaton as possible in order to detect changes in perceptions,attitudes and behaviours and need to account for the effect of the information-filters.28. MoE will vary significantly between missions and even within missions. Commanders mustclearly define the end-state and ideally any milestones on the path to that end-state. MoE, usingwhatever means are most appropriate, measure and indicate progress in the target audiencetowards that end-state. MoEs must be tailored to the specifics of not only the overall change

Ch 8 : 7 /18

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desired, but to the environmenl, that is, the conmander's area of operations (AO)' Because of

the intangible facton involved and the subjective nature of influencing, the MoE may very well

be subjective, at least in part, and because behaviour influence is the aim, they require a

significant amount of tirne to determine effectiveness. Therefore, they must be assessed as a set

routine to attempt to recognise changes, trends and slight yet significant indicaton. The

commander exercises judgement as io when an adjustment or change to an activity against a

target must be made in reaction to behaviounl changes in the target audience.

29, Some basic fundarnentals exist that can aid in the development of useful MoE:

a. Causality,2 A dehnitive cause and effect relationship must be established

between ihe activity and the effect attempting to be measured. There has to be a

reasonable likelihood that the planned activity will create the desired effect.

Secondly, commanders and info ops staff must be able to assess any other extant

facton tirat may be causing the effect other than their own activities, Likewise,

they must ascertain if the measured effect is merely coincidental '

b. euantifiable.3 An MoE that can be counted helps to remove some of the

subjectivity that plagues MoEs on the moral plane. Quantihcation allows accurate

trend measurement. For example, during a tour in Iraq,2 BCT, lt'Armoured

Division monitored and counted local and intemational media covemge of events

in 2 BCT's AO as a MoE. This allowed positive and negative trends to be

identified which helped to discern the effectiveness of ongoing info ops'a

c. Observable and Attributable. This principle may seem obvious, however, when

dnfting MoEs consideration should be given to the possibility that all of the

variables influencing an activity and change in behaviour cannot be observed. The

MoE must be able to recognise a trend or change and conftrm the connection or

attribution to the activity, For example, if the presence or absence of negative

graffiti is being used as an informal indicator of support for a campaign and

military force in an urban area, observen will ideally be able to ascertain: its

timing, that is, when it was done; its attribution to a particular group (political,

criminal, military) and their motive, and whether it represents a minority or

majority viewpoint; its attribution in terms of cause, particularly if it appears as a

reaction to a specific event or action; and, its location in relation to the culfural

make-up of the environment.

d. Correlated to Decisive Points and Objectives. Just as activities are planned to

reach sequential decisive points along a line of operation, MoEs should be

selected to correlate to the achievement of each decisive point and should be

reflective of the level of employment. Although strategic info ops require

2 For a detailed discussion of causality see Will iam S. Murray, "A Wili to Measure," Parameters, Vol.31, No'3'

Aurumn 2001. Carlisle PA: USAWC.Pp.134-14'7 '3 The quantifiable, observable, and timeliness principles are adapted from LtCo1. David Grohoski, Steven Seybert,

ard Marc Romanych, "Measures of Effectiveness in the Information Environment," Military Intelligence

ProfesstonalBul ler tn, Voi .29, No.3,July-September2003. For t Huachuca AZ:US Army Inte l l igence Center .pp l2-

1 6 .'Bake., Col. Ralph O., 'The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Combat Team Commander's Perspective on Information

Operations," i l I i l i tary Review, May-June 2006. Fort Lravenworth KS: US Combined Arms CenterfuSCGSC' pp.13-

32 .

C h 8 : 8 / 1 8

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measures that occur throughout the iength of a campaign, many MoEs at theoperational and tactical level will measure the incremental pr'ogress throughsequential decisive points.

e. Flexibilfy. Although MoEs should be drafted at the planning stage they shouldremain under regular review and commanden must be prepared to adjust them asrequirtd. MoEs must reflect mutable conditions in an AO. They must evolve as amission progrcsses, particularly as decisive points are reached and secured.Similarly, MoEs are likely not transferable from mission to mission. Even if amission takes place in the same AO the passage of time will force reconsiderationof MoEs previously employed.

f. Collection. The commander must possess the capabilities to collect theintelligence necessary to employ a MoE and provide the direction and guidance todo so. Plans must be made to collect and assess MoEs through all units in theaffect AO. Secondly, collection may be assisted by other agencies, however,absent a formal command relationship this may have to be done informally.Notwithstanding this, non-military agencies may prove to be an effective gauge ofprcgress through info ops.

g. Relativity. Improvements sought in a given environment rnust be relative to thespecific environment and to what is considered nomral for that particularenvironment and culfure. Expectations for situational improvement must bereasonable given the starting state and the normal state of that particularenvironment. It is imperative that a baseline measurement of the overallenvironment in the AO be established as early as practicable in the campaignplanning. Absent a comparative baseline it may be impossible to accuratelydetennine the effectiveness of lnfo Ops. Some change in the environmenr mayoccur quickly; for example an immediate drop in crime in a particularneighbourhood may result from the presence of regular patrols. However,systemic improvements may require a substantial amount of time and bemeasured in multiple yeam or even decades. Thus measuring an ovenll drop ingang and criminal activity throughout a theatre must be measured in relation tothe levels that existed under pre-campaign circumstances and could take yean toachieve. Furthermore, systemic change will be the result of numerousconcomitant factors. Expectations for change and the related MoE should be setas incremental milestones so that improvement can be measured anddemonstrated as tangible progress over time.

30' Developing appropriate measures of effectiveness to assess info ops on the cognitive plane isa very difficult task. Willpower, perceptions, and beliefs are intangible variables that defy simplemeasurement. Observing and measuring trends is one of the surest ways of gauging a target'satirude. Trends, however, require a definable baseline and this will be a coiptJx but crucialinitial task. Difficulties aside, accurate MoEs can make the difference between meetine desiredobjectives or ending a mission in frustration.

Ch 8 : 9 /18

n-Rarrr

SECTION 3: Characterist ics of Propaganda'

: t . A substantial proportion of a COIN info ops campaign will concentrate on refuting insurgent

propaganda, TluJ it is useful to illustrate the major characterislics of hsurgent propaganda to

better infbnn the commander of how to construct themes and messages that will support the

desired outcome while undermining the messages and themes of the enemy. Deconstructing the

themes of enemy propaganda allows the commander and staff a better undentanding of the

enemy's lines of operation and what counter-measures will best undennine the enemy campaign'

The characteristics illustnted below are broadly applicable to all insurgencies'

32. Insurgencies are supported by a closely coordinated and mutually suppofiing triad of political

goals, propaganda, tnO titit"ry action. Like info ops, propaganda can take several forms and

will be reinforced with action. Words will be supported by deeds and vice versa. The insurgent

cause is advanced predominantly by discrediting the government and security forces, reducing

public morale, and vilifying pro-govenrment media. lnsurgents will utilize any government

mistake, especially inciOents in which the police and military may be seen to have over-reacted.

DemocratiC govemments are thus more vulnerable to hostile propaganda because of the value

placed on freedom of speech,

3r, Propaganda must be effectively countered if a COIN campaign is to be successful. Like all

info opi, Jounter-propaganda t"qui*r a unified multi-agency approach throughout the levels of

command and must inciude political direction on approved themes and messages. Pnrpaganda is

effective and cannot be ignored. It is through propaganda that the adversary bolsten his popular

support, gains recruits and material resources, and ultimately seeks legitimacy and credibility.

34. All propaganda contains some kernel of truth, however miniscule, which is distorted to play

upon the preconceived notions, attifudes, and perceptions of the target audience as well as socio-

pbtiticat trends that have led to discontent. Advenary info ops target the same segments of the

indigenous population as friendly info ops-the neutral or wavering portions from which

supporten can be drawn,

35, There are a number of overarching themes that characterise insurgent propaganda. Although

some of these themes become more prevalent as an insurgency evolves, the themes will likely be

used simultaneously, targeting different specific audiences, tailored to suit the ebb and flow of

the struggle.

Righteousness. The insurgent cause is right and just and supported by the divine.This theme is founded in faith and ideas rather than fact'

Hatred. The government or opposing international force is painted as heretical ormorally and spirirually cornrpt. Since the govemment opposes the righteousness ofthe insurgent cause and has sought to suppress the people, it and its agents aredesewing of hatred and death.

5 The term 'propaganda' is used here in the pejorative sense. The vast majoriry of this section is adapted from

Brigadier Maurice Tugwell 's doctoral dissertation Revolutionary Propaganda and Possible Counler-Measures(l-ondon: King's College, University of London, March 1979).

Ch 8 : 10 /18

A.

B .

Inevitable Triumph, Becauseaffair, the iruurgency can onlyachieve victory. This theme isideologies.

,DRAF-T

the struggle is portrayed as a moral and righteousend ir triumph, regardless of the time required tohi ghlighted in con{l icts involvins fu ndarnental ist

D. Allegirnce' "You are with us or against us." Although insurgencies only require theambivalence of the population to exist and thrive, propaganda will leave nouncertainty about the ultimate requirement to support the cause. This theme seeks topaint those opposing the insurgency as traiton, cowards, or unfaithfui,

E. Moral Certainty. Used to bolster active supporters of an insurgency, this themeseeks to implant the notion that the moral high-ground lies with th.i*urgrnt and thatall acts committed by supporten are just, both legally and spirirually.

F. Terror. Although tenorism is a tactic, the therne of terror is used in insurgentpropaganda to coerce assistance from the civilian population and to enforce disciplinewithin an insurgency. This theme must be supported by violent action which may U"limited in scope but can cause terror out of all proportibn to the act itself.

G' Martyrdom. Also known as glorification of heroes, this theme will highlight theactions of insurgents and glorify the fallen to bolster internal morale ariA iripress tirecivilian population.

H. Praise of violence. violence is portrayed as a spiritually cleansing.

I. Justified Reaction. All actions are justified as necessary and just reaction togovemment suppression.

J' Long War. lnsurgencies do not succeed ovemight and in order to sustain support, itis necessary to reinforce the notion of inevitable triumph by communicating that thestruggle will be long and difficult and may span sevenll generations. This ii oftenportrayed in religious terms to exploit belief in the transcendental nature of the divineand the afterlife to give strength to religiously motivated insurgents.

K. Guilt. This theme is directed at the enemy govemment and supporters.It will playupon the sensitivities of the populations of liberal democracier.^Today, this theme isheavily exploited using modern communications technologies to pubiicise real andcontrived incidents.

L. Bad Faith. This theme seeks to undermine attempts by the govemment to reach outto insurgent supporters and to portray govemment efforts tolmprove the lot of nepeople as a fagade meant to dupe the people.

M' Security Force Incompetence. This theme will try to demonstrate an inabilitv of thegovemment to provide a safe and secure environment as well as an impot.n.a to ,,opthe insurgency. This theme will be supported with violent actions targeting securityforces themselves as well as segments of the population.

Ch 8 : 11 /18

i 1 , )

N, Legit imacy.Insurgencies wil lult imately attempt to develop legit imacy through both

deeds and words. An example of this is Hezbollah's intemattonal propaganda

campalgn in the Summer of 2006 and the immediate infusion of reconstruction aid in

war-devastated neighbourhoods in Lrbanon immediale to the cessation of hostilities

with Israel. The goal was to demonstrate both the illelitimacy of.the enemy,Israel,

and the powerlessness of the secular govemment to prolide for the needs of the

peoPle.

O. Credibility. The ultimate purpose of propaganda is to establish credibility in the eyes

of the civiiian population which will inevitably lead to outright support'

36. The goal of counter-propaganda is the refutation of insurgent propaganda and to present the

truthful jirstification for inelegiti*u.y and credibility of the host government. Effective counter-

propaganda is required to convince both domestic and intemational neutrals and supporters that

ihe mirsion is legltimate. Public opinion must be considered throughout the campaign by all

levels of command, including the political element. Clearly, PA will play a leading role in

communicating the truth to tie intemational public. The effort to counter enemy propaganda

must explain government strategy and goalsfpresent facts, and expose the fallacies or the enemy

message and the illegitimacy of enemy motives'

SECTION 4: Information Operations Activities in COIN

37. The primary influence activities grouped under the Info ops moniker are: psychological

operations (psyOps), public affain (FA),^civit-military cooperation (CIMIC), presence-profile-

pbrru.. (ppp), and ij"c.ption. PsyOps, PA, and Deception have offensive and defensive uses'

All, save for ppp are discusseO in Aetait in their respective manuals, which should be read in

conjunction with this chapter. The specific uses of each activity in a COIN campaign are

discussed in this section.

A. Psychological Operations (PsyOps)

:8. The primary purpose of PsyOps is to influence the perceptions, attitudes and behaviour of

selected individuals o, group, in iccordance with Info Ops objectives' PsyOps is one of the few

tools within lnfo Ops ttiat nas 'influence' as a first order effect on the cognitive plane. Unlike

pA, which simply irovides information for dissemination by others, PsyOps retains direct

control over content and dissemination of a message and focuses on a specific target audience'

psyOps is not propaganda in the pejorative sense; CF PsyOps only disseminates truthful

rrrr.g.r. Bffective"PsyOps r.qui*, timely provision of resources such as linguistic, support,

graptrics and print.up.bitity, and various electronic broadcasting means. Mediums for the

broadcast of messages include face-to-face contact, print, radio, television, loudspeakeN, the

intemet, faxes, pagers, and mobile phones.

39, psyOps is one of the most cost-effective components of a COIN campaign' Coordinated with

other info Ops activities and anti-insurgent operations, PsyOps, properly appiied, can ensure that

rhe indigenous popuiation receives and comprehends the activities of the CF and the host

gou.**rnt. Strategic level direction, and close coordination between all command levels are

Lquired to seamies-sly integrate themes, messages, and actions. All messages must be reinforced

with action because deeds and words must not be contradictory. Close coordination does not

Ch 8: 12118

DR-{tf'I,

indicate a requirement for rigid control; the need for consistency in theme and message must notbe regarded as a requirement for micromanagement of subodinates. Although the distributivemeans rnay be similar, the purposes of operational and tactical level PsyOps differ, It is onlythrough seamless integration and coordination of PsyOps into the ovenil iampaign plan that'information fratricide' can be avoided.

+o Canada does not conduct.strategic level PsyOps. PA is used at the strategic level tocommunicate information. The inabiliry to limit the target audience precludJs the use of psyOpsat the strategic Ievel. At the operational level, PsyOps are typically directed at modifying generalattitude sets geared towards long-term behaviour modification. Typically, this will involve someform of rational argument that may be forcefully or subtly presented. An example of a forcefulmessage would be continued publicising of public infiastructure projects in a province. Anexample of a subtle message would be the brcadcast of popular music targeting 15-25 year oldsto emphasise that religious ideals and liberal societies are not incompatibli.In m"ny ways,operational level PsyOps can be viewed in marketing terms as building brand recognition. Inessence, the message is trying to build a relationship between the target audience and the brand.4r. At the tactical level, PsyOps will prcsent a concise message geared towards modifyingspecific behaviours. The target audience will be more specific than at the operational level andemotive and rational arguments may be used in the message. The goal is to cause a targetaudience to act, rather than to think about and rationalize a message. Examples of tactical levelpsyops are leaflets informing a village of an impending operation or posten hung along popularthoroughfares demonstrating safe driving behaviour around a military convoy.42. A nuanced understanding of the socio-cultural environment in which PsyOps are conductedis essential to success. Mere awareness of the socio-cultural milieu is imufficient for thoseinvolved in the conception, design, and approval of PsyOps products. Tribal relations are also anecessary consideration. Urban operations hold the potential for vastly different socio-culturalconstructs in different neighbourhoods. PsyOps products must be speiificalty tailored to thetarget audience. The potential for unintended effects is great if an error in taiget audienceanalysis is made. A poor product is worse than no product at all.

hnmediately prior t9 the f.*planned to communicate the purpose of the mission to the Atgnan- pgople. The'nisi leaflet ttratwas to be used pictured B-52s bombing a green valley. The teaflet, alrnost identical to oor ur.Oin the 1991 Gulf War against lraq was deleted from the caurpaign at the last minute out ofconcem that the.pamphlet would create the peryeption that the Afghan peo,pte were beingtargeted for retribution for 9/1 1 . Further confusion over the propei use of Uotn tnedissemination method (leaflet bomblets) and the urget audiinci (p5yops planhen designed theleaflet for a tactical, not strategic application) highhghts the requirement for coorUi*UJo

"oOthe need to tailor kyOps products to specifrc audienies,Source: Christopher L'an\'levlav of Psychological Opoattons Lessons Learned From Recent OperattonalExperience, wasbinglon DC: National Defense University press, september 2005, p.71.

Ch 8 : 13 /18

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43. Time is an uncertain aily. On the one hand PsyOps themes and messages need to be lasting

and continuous to make an impression. On the other hand, over-prolonged exposure to a single

message may result in boredom and initation. Consider the annoyance of a commercial that one

views too often on television; it is as likeiy to provoke an avenion to the advertised product as

much as it will induce a desire to purchase that product. Fine judgment is needed to draw the line

between the advantages to be gained from the consistent exploitation of a fact or theme and the

dangers of saturation. The audience is not srupid.

+q. Political and military ovenight must ensurc that PSYOPS and supporting activities are

consistent with the host nation and Canadian policies and conform to any specific political

guidance. The psychologicai dimension of counter-insurgency is so important that a PSYOPS

itaff officer should be nomirnted in all formation headquarten and indeed any Canadian battle

grcup working within a Multirutional Brigade. Within a Canadian Brigade-Group, this

ippointment *ill no.-ally fall to a mernber of the operations staff, who will work directly with

the intelligence staff. This staff offrcer must be a permanent member of the headquafters, as

opposed to an augmentee, who has a thorough understanding of the commander's intentions, be

conversant with staff procedures,

B. Public Affairs (PA)

45. The aim of Public Affairs is to protect the credibility and legitimacy of operations and

promote widespread undentanding, thereby gaining support for military operations while not

tompromising-Essential Elements of Friendly lnformation (EEFI).It communicates information

to audiences, through the medium of local, national and intemational media and other

cornmunication means. An imporlant facet of any military operation is to communicate the

principal themes and rnessages while providing a clear and complete undentanding of the

bperation, whilst maintaining OPSEC, Although PA is primarily focused on informing and

educating audiences, its impict is much wider. It is thercfore essential that PA staff and those of

other Info Ops capabilities work closely together to ensure that a coordinated message is

delivered to the intended audiences. Particular attention must be paid to local and regional media

and to other media sources that are influential with indigenous populations. To avoid giving the

false impression that the media are being manipulated in any way, a distinction must be

maintained between PSYOPS and PA, however, this does not obviate the requirement of PA to

be fully integrated into the Info Ops campaign.

46. In COIN operations it is essential to conduct rnedia relations in a positive manner. They must

project an accurate and balanced picfure of the role of the security forces in general and of the

CF in particular, and demonstrate the practical contribution Canadian soldien are making to the

solution of a diffrcult and frequently hazardous conflict. Creating and maintaining a positive

public image of the Anny includes countering potentially hostile media activity.

+7, Operational public affairs is a G3 staff function and should be coordinated at the level of the

highest formation headquarten in the theatre of operations. hrblic Affain Officen (PAffO) are

responsible for all aspects concerning the authorization of suitable facilities for the media, the

nomination of units to host visitors, and the requirement for escorts and other resources.

48. In periods of intense operational activity or during major incidents the PAf0 section may

need additional support, particularly in urban areas. Sub-units should be prepared to help the

PAfro personnel in terms of escorts, movement and the control of the media. If the PAffO off,rce

Ch 8: 14/18

is to provide an authoritative, considered, consistent and credible information sewice, the pressoffice must receive prompt and accurate infonnation from subordinate headquarten and units. Itmust also receive early warning of projected operations together with clear irutructions on howto deal with media enquiries, preferably in the form of a question and answer brief.49. In many aspects, dealing with the media is no different in a COIN campaign than in any otheroperation. When speaking to the media, and in accordance with security regutations, individualsshould restrict themselves to matters of fact at their own level. No statemerus should be madeconceming government policies, political decisions, or on topics likely to be politically sensitive.Similarly, no speculative statements should be made.

50. A large number of journalists representing the prcss, radio, and television can be expected toreP9.t on COIN operations. To facilitate an effective two-way passage of information and tominimize unnecessary media queries, standing orders should giur guiOance on the limits of theinformation that may be disclosed. Before any information is passed to the media it must becleared for release by the appropriate military agency, e.g., G2, G3, and the appropriate hostnation authorities, or police authorities where this is applicable.

51. No unnecessary hindrance is to be offered to a joumalist's freedom to operate.It is in theintercsts of law and order that the press should have facilities to expose tenorism, acts ofviolence, and the intimidation of civilians. A member of the media has the same rights, libertiesand obligations under the law as any other citizen.

52' If an on-scene commander believes that the media are prejudicing security during anoperation, the matter should be dealt with by persuasion, admonition, o, ur a last resort, and onlyif a criminal offence is suspected, by physical restraint or arrest. It is possible that reponers maydelibentely wish to expose themselves to danger against the advice oitr. security forces. If thiydo not yield to persuasion, a clear waming must be given, in front of witnesser, oi th. possibleconsequences of their actions and that they must accept responsibility for themselves.

o Taken from AAP 6, The us military refen to CIMIC as Civil Affain (cA).

Ch 8: 15/18

"You have no influerrce with the press if you do not talk to them... Not talking to the press is the '

equivalent of ceding the initiatiVe qo pre insurgents, who [were] quite aOept aispinniog , -

mromutlon rn adverse ways to further their,objectives." ,

C. Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

53. Civil-Military Cooperation is defined as: "coordination and cooperation in support of themission, between commanders and civil actors, including the national population anC tocatauthorities, as well as intemational, national and non-govemmental organizations and agencies.fCIMIC is a coordination and liaison function that facilitates operations in relation to civilauthorities and non-military organisations and leads to activities that support local authorities.

i l . r = i i / - , . i - , l i r : t l i - i i , ] , . I l . - . . ] t j i , i r l i i l i : , ; r 1 p - 1 1 . , ,

' , ' , - - I i , , ' l ' , _ , i t ' l : : - i , - l l . . r ! i r l : a l D n a F t

Because of their ability to tnform, demonstrate and influence and even co-opt, CIMIC related

activit ies are a key ,rp.rt to the infonnation operations plan' CIMIC is centnl to any COIN

campaign becausi the perception of host government competence must be reinforced' The

perception of competence is tied to securiiy and the ability to provide for the day-to-day needs of

the populace. Improving the social, physical, and economic weli-being of the populace is a

..ni*i goal of any COIN mission. Thus, CIMIC actions aimed at infrastructure development,

reconstruction and assislance to governance are crucial to achieving SuccesS'

54. CIMIC provides information in the form of physical evidence of the legitimacy, credibility,

and competlnce of the host government. CIMIa will comprise a significant proportion of the,deeds' that must support thJ 'words' of a campaign. Failure to follow through on promises made

will alienate the population and damage credibility, Care must be taken that expectations are not

created in the population that cannot be met. CIMIC related activities therefore need to be

coordinated within the overall tnfo Ops plan, in terms of impacts upon civil audiences, their

leaders and their information systems in-order to ensure that activities work to support overall

objectives. CIMIC facilitates iooperation between military forces and the civilian environment

by:

(l) Considering and assessing social, political, cultural, religious, economic,

infrastrucfural and environmental facton in support of military operations

and objectives. CIMIC staff should be a valuable source of information to

intelligence staff in creating a knowledge base of the environment' but

CIMIC cannot be perceived as intelligence gathering assets.

(Z) Liaison and coordination with domestic agencies, government officials

and elements of power, intemational organisations (Ios), and non-

goverrlmental organisations (NGOs).

(3) Forging an effective relationship between military and civilian authorities,

organisations, agencies and populations'

55. It is critical that CIMIC projects reflect the needs and desires of the population' Moreover' it

is pointless to build a schoof ormedical facility that cannot be staffed or funded. A satisfied

population is a benign population. CIMIC is a most useful tool to address the underlying causes

bf in insurgency asit has^the potential to directly influence the day-to-day lives of the people'

During the 1899-1902 Philippine War, CIMIC formed a significant portion of the US Army

rtot.fy to gain the supportblttt" population on southern l,uzon. The improvement of civil

gou.rirrr.ri, the building and operation of schools and the provision of medical services enticed

ihe population back to tft'. viliages from jungle refuges. The strategy integnted native police

and viilage presidentes (r*yorr) into the effort. This increased support for the US mission and

isolated tnJi^u.g.nts from the population. Sepanted from their sources of food and other

provisions and harassed by consiant US patrols, the insurgents were robbed of the initiative and

iorced to attack US occupied towns and villages in a desperate and ultimately unsuccessful

attempt to defeat the US strategy. Although not termed'CIMIC' at the time, the improvement

of the day-to-day lives of the populace was instnrmental to the success of this COIN campaign'Source: Brian McAliister Linn, rhi us ,l,rmy and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine ll/ar, 1899-1902' Chapel

Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989, p.164'

Ch 8: 16/18

-1 ;: ql

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D. Presence, Posture, profi le

56' The appearance, presence and anirude of a force may have significant impact on perceptionsand attirudes, particularly on neutral or potentially advenarial audiences. Deiloying even limitedcapability to the right place at the right time can add substantial credibillry to messiges beingdelivered through other channels and provide a major contribution to detemence. Siriilariy, iooheavy a footprint may cause misperceptions and mistrust as to the purpose of a mission. Theposfure of troops on the ground can demonstrate both commitment and intent and must beconsidered and balanced with the requirements of force protection. The decision to wear beretsinstead of combat helmets and body armour can make a ionsiderable difference to theperceptions of both the adversary and local people. The public profile of commanden at alllevels will impact on perceptions and therefore the public role of the commander must becarefully analysed and opporfunities used to tnnsmit key messages. Commanders mustundentand and assess the attendant risk that accompanies any decision regarding posrure andprofile against the need to send a particular message.

one of the priorities of the Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands was to present asjrong' competent, yet friendly posture that would reassure the populace while intimidatingth9-w-allords and gangs which had undermined lawful order on Guadalcanal. Initial planningcalled for the landing of C-130s loaded with infantry simultaneous to the arrival offshore ofthe HMAS Manoora' Soldien disembarking from the C-130s were fully armed and ready toengage any resistancg.but held their weapons in a relaxed, non-threatening manner.Significantly, the soldiers were accompanied by police and civilian members of the mission.The posture of the soldien and presenie orpotice and civilians successfully crgted acompetent, non-threatening, and reassuring presence to the populace, while the presence ofHWls Manoora and otherpatrolling navaive-ssels clearly communicated a decftive militarysuperiority and commitment to the mission. Moreover, througho"irrrr rirri"",

"ii<rrvsoldien were allowed only limited freedom on the island to minimize disnrption to t11e localeconomy. The early consideration of presence, posture, and profile in the pl^anning processproved instrumental to displacing a developing insurgency.source: Russell Glenn, counterinsurgency in a rei ribe, ,lnalyzing the success of the Regional AssistanceMission Solomon Islands (MMSI). Santa Monica CA: Rand. 2ffi7.-

E. DECEPTION

57' Deception involves measures designed to mislead advenaries by manipulation, distortion orfalsification etc' Deception is a complex art, which demands considerable effort, a high level ofsecurity and a sound undentanding of an advenary's way of thinking. It is normally used todislocate the attention and combat power of an advenary. In operations it can directly contributeto the achievement of surprise and indirectly, to security and economy of effort. Deception willlikely use a combination of physical means (such as a feint or demonitration) supported by orherinformation cues. Info ops planners must be involved in deception planning in o.d.. to ensurethat Info ops objectives suppoft deception objectives and Info ops iupportlng activities areemployed in support of deception operations.

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: I l : i l i l - l D: I : i | + ?El . i l l r - i l i . l r ' r . l i : i \ r [S i ] i - l ' i :DRAFT

SS. Deception is a broad concept that spans tactical camouflage to sophisticated strategic level

operations, Deception also includes the planting of infonnation' Deception is defined as those

measures designed to mrsiead the opponent by-marupulation,.distortion' or falsification of

evidence to induce him to react in a manner that is prejudicial to his Lnterests' Insurgents

constantly attempt to cause an over-reaction by goue"ntntnt forces' For example' an insurgent

could plant false intbrmation which could cause an ovelTeaction or inaccurate targeting'

SS, While deception aims to gain surprise and maintain security, its main purposes are to give a

commander freedom of actioir to operate by deluding an opponent aS to CF actions' and to

mislead the insurgent into adopting a disadvantageous course of action, which can be exploited'

All types of deception ui,n to impt"a't a false idea in the opponents mind and all deception

presupposes effective counter surveillance and OPSEC to prevent the enemy from observing

genuine activity.

SECTION 5: Conclusion

60. The success of any counterinsurgency campaign h.inge; 9l tht support of the indigenous

population. The primary centre of gravity is ttre neutnl and friendly portions of the populace'

Info Ops influence u.riuirl., witl c-omprise a significant amount of the activities that a military

force undertakes in a camPaign

6t. Information operations form an integral part of any operational plan in all of its constituent

activity areas. aff activity areas requireiur"-ttt planning. The most complex planning occurs

with inJluence activitier, tnrt is, those activities that require consideration of the effects across a

wide spectrum of target audiences and environmental systems' undentanding how to influence

those audierrr., ."ffis careful consideration by commanden and staff' All activities create

influences and thus commanders at all levels, even down to the lowest tactical levels' must

undentand me tastini impresrions and ramiircations, be they positive or negative, intentional or

unintentional, that aliactivities create on target audiences'

Ch 8 : 18 /18

DRAFT

CHAPTER 9

SUSTAINMENT

SECTION 1: SUSTAINMENT PRINCIPLES AND PLANNING

1' Princioles. Sustainment doctrine is explained in Land Force sustainment. The plncrplesof sustainment in coIN arg no different fiornlhose in other types of operations, aithough thereare changes of emphasis in their applicatron. fhe principies are.

a. Foresight;b. Economy;c. Flexibi l i ty;d. Simplicity;e. Cooperation;f. Self-sufficiency;g. Visibi l i ty;h. Responsiveness; andi. Survivabil i ty.

2' Factors Affecting Sustainment. Some modifications to normal CSS practice andll:t_tdut.t

are necessary to allow for the circumstances under which COIN operations takeDrace :

a . Disoersion. Non-contiguous deployment of the security forces in smalldetachments over a wide area increases difficulty in the provision of support.There may be a tendency to fragment and disperse cSS units to support widerydeployed security force elements. However, th. ,upport of isolated sub-units andplatoons may be a problem better solved by increai ing the revel of serf-sufficiency. Nevertheless, some dispersion of cSS ,riit, rnuy be inevitable undcrthe "hub and spoke" system.

Securi tv. There wi l l be a host of securi ty threats:

(1) A surface to air missi ie and smal l arms threat may compl icate theprovision of replenishment by air .

(2) Dependence on local resources/ labour for such things as, construct ion,purchase, storage and perhaps distribution, adds to ihe overall securityproblem,

b .

The National Support Element (NSE) and i ts stat ic instal lat ions should besited in an area secured and protected, commensurate with operat ional andgeographical factors. I f the scale and intensity of the opcrat ion wanant theestablishment of forward support groups (FSG) their e]ements are likelv to

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be more at risk and will require more security force effort to defend them

While a safe area is desirable, ease of access to the NSE, points of entry(POE) or convenience for onward distr ibut ion may be the detenniningfactors.

Air Supporl. The greater the amount of air and helicopter lift that is

available the more it will be possible to cut out intermediate bases with the

advantage ofeconomies in ground resources, guards and theatre transport.

Where possible the use of a sea based NSE would ease the physical

security and protection of these vulnerable instaliations

Operational Securitv. Care must be taken that CSS preparations do not

prejudice the security of information and pians. Sudden increases in stock

levels, exceptional amounts of road, rail and air movement, the arrival of

new CSS units in certain areas and the localpurchase of unusual items arejust some exampies of changes in a normai pattern of replenishment which

might betray a future operation. A combination of secrecy, insofar as it is

possible to hide CSS preparations, and convincing deception plans help to

preserve security. Discretion in dealing with contractors and taking care

not to discuss operational matters, especially future plans, in the hearing of

local labour are essential, if elementary precautions are to keep our

intentions secret.

Manpower. Because COIN operations are manpower intensive there will be

pressure for economy in CSS manpower. While, on the one hand, low rates of

expenditure of combat supplies reduce the CSS burden, the dispersed deployment

mentioned in sub- paraa above increases it. Manpower iimitations may increase

dependence on local labour.

Multi-national Forces. Canada will most likely deploy as part of a multi-nationai

security force. This could lead to potential coordination and standardizationproblems.

CSS Reconnaissance Plan

3 . Reconnaissance Party. Points to note are that:

b .

The recoruraissance party sent to a new theatre wil1be organized on a joint service

basis. The party will aim to make early contact with the HN government through

the local diplomatic representative in order to assess the resources available in the

theatre and to provide an estimate of the requirements, which must be sent outfrom Canada.

The reconnaissance party must include a strong CSS element headed by asufficiently senior officer, who is fully aware of the kind of operation envisagedand of rhe CSS requirements to support i t . He should have the authonty to arrange

(4)

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liaison with the I IN and al l ies, to take decisions and to make recomniendat ions rothe Task Force Commander and, through the diplomatic staf l to the HN ministryof defence

c' The earl ier the reconnaissance parly is sent out and the sooner CSS preparat ionsfor the arrival of our forces are made the bener.

4 ' S t r a t e g i c R e c c e ' J 4 L o g s t a f f a n d t h e J S G w i l l c o n d u c t t h e s t r a t e g i c r e c c e . T h e C S Selement of the reconnaissance party must make arrangements with the hJst govemment forfac i l i t i esandprocedureswi th regard to therecept ionand log is t i csuppor to four fo rces . Thefol lowing points must be considered:

b .

Liaison. Liaison procedures for coordinat ing cSS requirements with the IN, anyother al l ies and CEFCOM must be establ ished.

Accommodation and Real Estate. The estimated requirement for operational andlogistic accommodation and real estate must be given to the FIN's ministry ofdefence as soon as possible. The procedures for obtaining accommodation onioan, by requisi t ion, by leasing or by purchase must simi lar ly be worked out withthe FfN's authorities with all possible speed. fhe availability of local labour,building material, services (eiectricity, warer, sewage, etc) must be ascertainedquickly.

Provision of Resources. The capacities of the HN or Coalition partners to providecombat supplies, services and consumer items must be determined beforefrnalizing what must be brought in from canada or neighbouring countries.

Infrastructure. Availability and capacity of HN infrastructure including:

(1) Port Faci l i t ies.. Alongside berthing, discharge rates using exist ingunloading facilities and storage accommodation at and near the main nortof entry' Unloading and lighterage facilities at small ports. Inland watertransport. Road and rail exits. Liaison with the harbour authorities.

(2) Airports. Agreement on the main entry airfield and availability of forwardairfields or airstrips_in conjunction with the air force element of therecomalssance party. Agreement on aircraft schedules leadins to aplanned flow of reinforcements and supplies.

(3) Rai l roads.

(4) Road System.

Anival of cSS Units. The bui ld up of cSS units must be planned to support thecombat elements as they arrive, taking into account the assistance available fromthe FIN.

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f . Account ing. There wi i l be a need for f inancial staff on any aovance party.

Agreement with the host government wi l l be needed on the fol iowing topics:

( 1) Cost sharing.

(2) Account ing Procedures.

(3) The need for banking faci l i t ies.

5. Operational Recce. The Task Force J4lG4 will conduct an operational level recce to

detcrmine the fol lowing:

a. Bases, Detailed planning for the establishment of CSS installations, rnedical

facilities and the siting of unit camps needs to be concurrent. In conjunctiorr with

the intelligence and operations staffs it will be necessary to draw up a plan for the

provision of protection from blast, mortar bombs, RPGs and shells for key or

exposed headquarters, installations, isolated bases and positions.

b. Allocation of Main Supply Routes. ln a country with a limited road network it

may be necessary to allot time blocks for the road movement of resupply convoys

and routine troop movements.

c. Level of self-sufficiency required. Based on the deployment of the Task Force

elements, basic load quantities must be established'

d. Equipment Support. The equipment support plan must be geared to providing

special requirements:

( I ) Enhanced electronic repair facilities to deal with extra radios, CCTV

systems, alarms and EW equiPment.

(2) Modifications to vehicles, t$, armouring'

(3) Operational stocks must be estimated and maintained as, unlike PKO,

there will be vehicle casualties in significant numbers,

Security. The G4 must work with the G2 and G3 to establish the security plan for

CSS elements, convoys and act iv i t ies.

Labour. Detai led requirements must be developed for each instal lat ion and area in

terms of ski l led and unski l led labour.

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SECTION 2: SUSTAINMENT AND RESoURCES

Sustainment Svstem. In developing the sustainment system the G4 staff must:

Decide on the stock levels to be held in the support group locatrons and the sel f-sufficiency level of units to provide for:

( l ) The predicted intensity of operat ions;

(2) A cushion of reserves to meet intenupt ions in the replenishment system byrnsurgent action and; and

(3) The changing dependency ofunits.

Demand commodities through the national Loc or contract through the IN andwork out a movement and distribution plan to transport material fiom the entrypoints to the base installations.

organize distribution for commodities in the operationai areas and ailocatedependency for units based on the nearest or most appropriate source ofsupply.

Arrange rail transport, road convoys, inland and coastal water transport, fixed orrotary wing airlift or air dropping.

Traffic control and route protection; it will be necessary, in conjunction with theG3 staff, to arrange:

(1) Escorts and pickets;

(2) "Road open days', in high risk areas; and

(3) Avoidance of a routine and predictable pattem of convoy movements inareas where there is high risk of insurgent attack.

f' Unit responsibility for the movement of material from the distribution pornts orCSS instal lat ions to their own areas. Units may require hel icopter l i f t or even packanimals in difficult country.

1. . SA is cr i t icai to sustainment in COINoperat ions. Enemy forces wi l l l ikely put a high pr ior i ty on destroying or disrupt ing CSSelements. CSS units down to the lowest level must have the abi l i ty to react immedlately toenemy action or changing support requirements.

8' Air Replenishment. Fixed or rotary wing aircraft may become the method of choice forreplenishment for the fol lowine reasons:

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a Forces can be suppL ied in inaccessrb le a reas avo id ing the necess i ty fo r a

vulnerable surface suPplv route;

b. Troops are befter able to move with l ight scales of equipment, unencumbered with

echelon transport , thus exploi t ing the pr inciple of f lexibi l i ty to give them a good

level of tact icai mobi l i ty;

c. Subject to the capacity of the air l i f t resources, weather and terrain air replenish-

ment is quicker than overland resupply;

d. Reserve stocks can be reduced and held centrally allowing the establishment of

fewer but larser bases situated in more secure areas;

e. Reducing the dependency on surface routes lessens the risk of ambush and cuts

the convoY Protection commitment;

e. Rapid casualty evacuation improves a wounded soldiers chances of survival,

improving morale;

g. The urgent needs of the civilian popuiation in isolated areas can be met quickly;

h. Air Dropping. This method is less economic than air landed resupply but is often

necessary in very broken country where there are no landing zones, even for

helicopters, without engineer work. The penalties for air dropping are that the

recovery of parachute equipment may be difficult or impossible and there may be a

risk that the supplies fall into enemy hands;

i. Landinq Strips and Helicopter Pads. These should be constructed whenever

possible and as soon as possible to economise in airlift;

j Cooperation, There is a need for close cooperation between the CSS, operations

and air staffs; and

k. Anti-Aircraft Threat. SAMs and small arms may pose a serious threat restricting

the use of air suPPlY.

9 . Sea Based Log is t i cs . TBD.

10. Use of Local Resources. Whi le the maximum use must be made of local resources to

reduce the CSS lift resources deployed from Canada,care must be taken not to cause shortages

in the host country's home market and consequent price rises, although this may have to be

balanced againi t the advantages to be gained by boost ing the local economy, I f the civ i l

population suffers from shortages and inflation the tnsurgents wiil be handed a ready propaganda

weapon.

1 1 . S e c u r i t y .

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b.

Insurgent Inf i l t rat ion of Labour, I t must be assumed that host i le intel l igenceagents wi l l inf i i t rate local labour. I t wi l l be di f f icul t for incoming units andsecuri ty sect ions to dist inguish between Ioyal and disloyal elements. To reducethe porent ial threat to base instal lar ions, ports, airports, roads and rai lwaysreliance must be placed on good unit and installation security and an efficientlocalvett ing system. The method of veft ing must bc agreed with the hostgovernment whose police and security units may be largely responsible for itsi m n l e m e n l a f i n . T h orrrrprurrrvr lLolrurr ' r rrc SlStem may never be foolproof and measures must be takento guard vulnerable instailations fiom tenorist attack and to prevent thc leakase ofp lans and in ten t ions . A l l so ld ie rs , espec ia l l y cSS t roops employ ing c iv i l jans .must be carefully briefed on sccurity matters;

Protection of Labour. Labour must be protected from insurgent attack andint imidat ion. I f the LIN cannot provide sui table protect ion, addit ional combat unitsmay have to be deployed in an escort and protection role; ancl

Instal lat ions. CSS instal lat ions must be sui tably si ted for securi ty and defence.and effectiveiy guarded. In the best case the HN willprovide protection. f f this isnot possible, extra combat troops may have to be provided because CSS units donot have sufficient personnel to carry out their functions and guard themselvesexcept against the lightest of threats. Nevertheless, cSS trooDs must besuff ic ient iy wel l t rained in combat ski l ls to be able to defendthemselves.

PERSONNELSECTION 3:

Moraie

12. Soldiers and their Families. Troops will often be operating in small groups for longperiods in try ing condit ions. Soldier 's famil ies may be wonied by press cov-erage of act ion andcasualties in the areas where the soldier is stationed. When u cu*piign lasts foia considerabletime, lack of progress may discourage soldiers and their families. Thi insurgents may rry roaggravate a discouraging situation with a propaganda campaign. With or wiihout hostilcpropaganda' rumours spread and may be difficult to dispel or refute when troops are deployed insmal l detachments over a wide area.

l3 Promoting Good Morale, Whi le motivat ing soldiers with good and sound reasons fbr theArmy's intervent ion into the CON operat ion and the need for cont inued, pat ient commitment isthe duty of the commander and a function of leadership at all levels, certarn other measures canbe taken to help maintain morale. They include:

a. Reliable information services, internet and national and local newspapers;

b. A quick and frequent mail service to and from home;

c. welfare telephones and internet cafes at reasonable rates or free:

78

d. Satei i t te television and radio receivers plus DVD and videos;

e. Gymnasium equipment in protected areas where outdoor recreat ion is not

feasible:

f. Local leave centres in secure and attractive surroundings, if possible in a

temperate climate, and periodic home leave; and

g. A rapid and efficient system fornotifying relatives of deaths and casualties as

they occur.

Medicai

14. Small Detachments and Wide Deployment Providing medical support for small and

widely scatiereO d.tu.h.n*tt places a strain on the medical services' The problem can be

al leviated by:

a. Refresher training for all ranks in first aid;

b. Training at least one member of isolated detachments on the TCCC course and

providiig TCCC trained soldiers with additional medicai supplies;

b. Providing sufficient combat medical technicians;

c. provision for quick casualty evacuation on all operations, including armoured

ambulances, eipecially in urban areas or on routes subject to sniping and IEDs;

d. Using helicopters to evacuate casualties direct to hospital; and

e. Ensuring that all ranks receive a comprehensive health briefing before deploy-

ment.

15. Acclimatization. Units despatched on operations overseas must be acclimatized to the

local conditions and their workloa-d adjusted on initial deployment. See Land Force sustainment

Chapter g for the adjustments needed io meet particular speciai environments, such as jungle and

desert.

Manning and Miscel laneous

16. Interpreter Support. In a theatre where English is not the primary language, it will be

necessary to engage interpreters to communicate with allied forces and the civil population.

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DR-AFT

CHAPTER 1O

CO UNTER-INSURGENCY TRAINING

SECTION 1 : INTRODUCTION

I . Training for convent ional warfare provides a sound basis for the conduct of CONoperations. However, in preparation for COIJrl, there is a requirement for additiontraining that is campaign or mission specif ic. fhe training and preparat ions across al lranks is as much intellectual as it is physical. Not only do units and sub-units have toundertake skill training in preparation for the likely tactical tasks (urban patrolling,cordon and searches, vehicle check points) but they have to be trained in the principlesunique to coIN, the importance of the support of the civilian popuiace and theimportance of local culture and social dynamics.

2. It must be remembcred that doctrine for COIN operations will provide guidingprinciples and methods for the conduct. The most successful armies in COIN ooerationshave not treated doctrine as dogma but have afforded commanders trust and confidence ,and freedom of action within the allocated mission, Sound TTPs can be identified andpractised prior to any deployment, but TTPs will changed rapidly in a theatre ofoperations, as the insurgents come to learn the TTPs used by security forces, and viceversa. Commanders at all levels must be flexible and dynamic and lessons learned at thelowest levels passed quickly for wider implementat ion.

SBCTION 2: OPERATIONAL LEVEL, JOINT AND COMBINED TRAININGAND PREPARATIONS

3. The mil i tary is only one of potent ial ly many agencies that wi l l be used in theconduct of a COIN. At thc earl iest opportunity, al lagencies, c iv i l ian and securi ty forces,should come together to conduct. ioint t raining. In some cases the mi l i tary may have totake the lead in the education of agencies less knowledgeable in the conduct of COIN.This training can begin with seminars and conferences and develop to actual fieldexercises. Standing points of contact and positions for liaison teams can be iclentified rnmuch of this traininq.

4. All security force elements designated for COIN operations should come togetherat the earliest opportunity. Training should begin with seminars and wargames for Gadersand progress to tact icai f ie ld exercises for al l levels.

5. Training in simulated environments and in the field shouid encompass fullspectrum operat ions. Hence, FTXs should, whenever sui table, ensure that scenariosref lect the cont inuum ofoperat ions and the required changes to force structures, tact icsand intel lectual chal lenges. For example, a scenario may begin wrth entry into a majorcombat campaign and then progress to an insurgency si tuat ion that wi l l require a greater

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balance between offensive, defensive and stabi l i ty operat ions. This rvi l l forcec o m m a n d e r s a n d s o l d i e r s a t a l i l e v e l s t o a d i r r s t t h e i r n l a n s . o r d e ' s T T P s a n d m : n d s e t s i norder to re f lec t the scenar io .

6. Training with coalition partners wiLi readily identify differences in approachesand methods in a COIN operat ion and wi i l ident i fy potent ial for l ia ison posit ions,part icular ly in the eariy stages of a campaign.

SECTION 3: LESSONS IDEI.{TIFIED DURING CAMPAIGNS

7 . It is vital that as actual campaigns progress, lessons identified, often at the cost oflives, are captured, assessed by doctrine staffs, schools and training systems, and are thenimplemented pervasively. This will require formal and informal reporting methods, thesubmission of detarled after-action reports, their widest dissemination, and staff visits tooperational theatres. Formal links between lessons-learned staffs, doctrine writers,training authorities and trainers need to be established and exploited.

SECTION 4: TRAINING PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING COIN OPERATIONS:

8. Training plans in preparation for a COIN operation should consider inclusion ofthe fol lowins:

a. training in TTPs for COIN operations, with great emphasis on the sub-unitlevel, probably in a non-contiguous battle-space. There must be anemphasis on junior leader training. Computer based training in simulatedenvironments offers very little benefit for section and platooncommanders. Their skills will only be truly developed when leading theirsubordinates through physical and intellectuai challenges, ranging quickiyacross the full spectrum ofoperations;

b. instruction in the causes and conditions of the insurgency and links to themotivations of the non-committed populace;

c. instruction in the insurgent operational techniques, their TTPs, structuresand equipments. Al l forces, part icular ly those of the echelons, must bemade aware of, and trained in, the pervasive, asymmetric threat that isposed by insurgent forces;

d. accl imatisat ion and environmental t raining, ref lect ive of the plannedoperat ional theatre;

e. cul tural t raining regarding the indigenous populat ions to be encountered,their customs, laws, beliefs, etc, including their motivations for supportingor not-support ing the insurgency;

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special ist t raining required to expand the force capabi l i t ies in urbano p e r a t i o n s . i n r e l l i g e n c e o p e r a r i o n s , P S y o p S , C I M I C , t h e l o c alanguage(s), health aspects, IEDs and mines;

the sk i l l s requ i red fo r HUMNT co l lec t ion th rough f ramework par ro l l ing .Soldiers and their commanders must understand the important role thatthey play in gathering infonnation and intelligence for the development ofTAIs and measures of success;

intensive training to ensure physical fitness, as troops acclimatise morequickly i f they are in good physical condit ion upon arr ival in the theatre ;

intellectual training for all ranks to ensure that they all understand theunique aspects of a colN campaign, the potential operational andstrategic impacts that low level decisions and actions can have, and theneed to influence the will of the Iocal population;

ROE training;

media training;

crowd control operations. The use of cco equipment (which can causedeath if not used correctly) and cco rrps cannot be learned in theatre, atthe time of its employment. It must be part of pre-deployment trg andrefreshed in theatre: and

J .

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m. training teams from units already in theatre, reverse technical assistansevisits (TAVs) or just retumed from theatre should be used to train on thelocal situation and up-to-date TTps and threats.

SBCTION 5: IN-THEATRE TRAINING

9 ' When deployed on operations, training must continue and commanders mustensure that they aliocate appropriate time, resources and supervision to it. Commanciersshould ensure that regular refresher training of TTPs and equipment is conducted intheatre, throughout the mission. In addition, commanders anditaff should consider thefol lowing:

reconnaissance and advance part ies must quickly assess the operat ionaland tactical situation and identify any aspects in training that troops mayh e v e n n t v c t e n r r e r o d n r f h q t . p n l i " o f t r o o t d r - * * l ^ ^ ^ ; ^ t i . t ^ ^ - ^ . 'r r d v e u u r ) c r r u v c l c u u r r r r d , r r s r l r r i l c B r t r a r c r e m p h a s i s . I f t h g s e t r a i n i n grequirements cannot be met pr ior to deployment, then they must seektraining venues for the units to use following their arrival but prior tooperat ional commitment. Temporary batt le schools may be esiabl ished bythe in theatre force to provide training to troops, on new enemy TTps orequipment, which was not avai lable in canada. Staff planners mustbalance the training need with the need to at ieast begin to underlake

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tact ical operat ions in support of the besieged authonty and a coai i t ion

commander .

b. commanders may precede their main bodies and be attached to units

aiready.committed to operat ions. The lessons they learn can then be used

to hone final training or guide in-theatre training,

c. physical f i tness training should cont inue in theatre;

d. troops should be given regular situation updates in terms of the overall

mission and campaign. They shouid be briefed on what measures are

proving successful and they should be given feedback as to the usefulness

of the intelligence that their patrols are providing. This will keep the

troops motivated and focused on the success of the mission.

10. Units engaged in counterinsurgency operations should undergo continuous

training at all levels, to ensure that basic individual and collective skills are maintained to

a high itandard. Particular attention should be paid to the maintenance of individual skills

during periods of low activitY.

SBCTION 6: CONCLUSION

I i. Good tactical training will prepare soidiers well in the conduct of a COIN

operation. At the same time however, commanders must ensure that all ranks, particularly

those in daily contact with the populace, understand the pervasive threat posed by

insurgents, and the vital importance of gaining and holding the support of the local

populace.

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S UGGESTED READNG IN COTNTER-INSURGENCY

1. Bard E, O'Nei l , 1990, Insurgency and Terror ism - Inside Modern Revolut ionaryWarfare, Brassey's, New York.

2. Galula David., 1964, Counterinsurgency llafure; Theory and practice, NewYork: Praeger.

3. Jul ian Paget. , 7967, Counter- lnsurgency Campaigning,Faber and Faber Limited,London.

4. Ki tson, General Sir Frank., 19J7, .Bunch of Five, Faber and Faber Limited,London,

5. Kitson, Frank., 1971, Low Intensity operarions. subversion, Insurgency,Peacekeeping, London: Faber and Faber.Limited, London

6. Nagei, John A., 2002, counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to vietnam;Learning to Eat soup with a Knife, westport, conn., and London: praeger.

7. Thompson, sir Robert., 1966, Defeating communist Insurgency; The Lessons ofMalaya and Vietnam, New York: Praeger.

8. Trinquier Roger, 1964, Modern Warfare. A French View of Counterinsurgency,Ncw York: Praeser.