Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia

J.K.Cilliers

GROOM HELMLondon • Sydney • Dover, New Hampshire

CONTENTS

©1985J.K. CiUiersCroom Helm Ltd, Provident House, Burrell RowBeckenham, Kent BR3 1ATCroom Helm Australia Pty Ltd, First Floor,139 King Street, Sydney, NSW 2001, Australia

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Cilliers, J.K.Counter-insurgency in Rhodesia.1. Zimbabwe - HistoryI. Title968.91 DT962.5

ISBN 0-7099-3412-2

Croom Helm, 51 Washington Street,Dover, New Hampshire 03820.USA

Cataloging in Publication Data applied for.Library of Congress Catalog Card Number:84-45702

List of Tables and FiguresList of Abbreviations and TerminologyAcknowledgementIntroduction

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE:1890 TO 1979

1.1 The Early Years1.2 The Establishment of a Strategic

Base Area in the North-east1 , 3 Operation Hurricane1.4 1974: Security Force Reaction ...

Detente1976 and Dr Henry KissingerThe Patriotic Front1977: ZPRA Intensifies the War ..The Internal Settlement

1 .51 .61 .71 .81 .91.10 Lancaster House

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1

2.22.32.42.5

The Rhodesian Security Force'sapproach to command and control ...JOC's, JPS and Operation Hurricane.War Council, COMOPS and NATJOCSpecial ForcesConclusion

PROTECTED AND CONSOLIDATED VILLAGES

Printed and bound in Great Britain byBiddies Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn

3.1 The Concept3.2 Initial Attempts at Creating

Protected Areas

1

1 11418222733354455

6061667376

79

82

3.3 Operations Overload and OverloadTwo

3.4 Extension of the Protected VillageScheme

3.5 Opening of Protected Villages3.6 Guarding Forces ,3.7 The Rhodesian Approach and Condi-

tions in Protected Villages ,Conclusion ,3.8

4* BORDER MINEFIELD OBSTACLES

4.1 Cordon Sanitaire4.2 Rhodesian Cordons Sanitaires4 . 3 Border Minefields4. 4 Conclusion

PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS

5.1 The Concept5.2 The Formation of the Selous Scouts.5. 3 Pseudo Modus Operand!5 . 4 Conclusion

INTERNAL DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT:PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, POPULATION ANDRESOURCE CONTROL, CIVIC ACTION

6.1 The American Concept of StabilityOperations

6.2 Population and Resources Control,Psychological Operations and CivicAction

6 . 3 The Sheppard Group6.4 Branch of Special Duties (BOSD) and

the Formation of 1 POU6.5 The Directorate of Psychological

Warfare6.6 Rewards6.7 Safe Returns and Amnesty Offers ...6.8 Interface and Manila Interface ....6.9 Food Control: Operation Turkey ....6.10 Psyop: Operation Splitshot6.11 Use of Spirit Mediums6.12 Conclusion

EXTERNAL OPERATIONS

7.1 Strategic Base Areas and InsurgentSanctuaries

83

9093

9699

104105112115

118120124131

135

137139

145

146149150153158160165167

172

7.27.37.47.57.6

MozambiqueZambiaBotswana ..AngolaConclusion

8. OPERATION FAVOUR: SECURITY FORCEAUXILIARIES

8.1 Introduction: The Concept8.2 Operation Favour8.3 Conclusion

9.

10.

11 .

INTELLIGENCE

9 .1 Introduction9.2 Organisation and Major Characteris-

tics of the Rhodesian IntelligenceCommunity prior to 1973

9.3 Revolutionary War and SpecialBranch Intelligence

9.4 The Development of Military Intel-ligence Organisations

9.5 The Role of COMOPS9.6 Special Air Service, Selous Scouts

and the Special Forces IntelligenceCentre (SFIC)

9.7 Security and Counter-intelligence .9 . 8 Conclusion

THE SECURITY SITUATION BY LATE 1979 ....

CONCLUSION

Selected Bibliography

Index

175185193196196

202203213

218

218

221

223230

231232234

238

243

255

258

TABLES AND FIGURES

Tables

1.1 Casualty Figures per Operational Areaup to 30 Jan. 1977 36

10.1 Casualty Figures 1973-78 242

Figures

1.1 Land Apportionment 1968 . 21.2 Major Tribal Groupings in Zimbabwe ... 81.3 Delimitation of Operational Areas .... 291.4 Insurgent Infiltration Routes 381.5 Increase in Insurgent Numbers: Dec.

1978 to Jan. 1979 513.1 Existing and Planned Protected

Villages: 6 Jan. 1978 914.1 Cordon Sanitaire 1064.2 Modified Cordon Sanitaire 1094.3 Modified Modified Cordon Sanitaire ... 1114.4 Border Minefield Obstacles 1166.1 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 1626.2 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 1636.3 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet 1647.1 Mozambique 1767.2 Zambia 186

11.1 Vital Assets Ground 251

ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

Air Force

ANCArmy

BOSDBSAP

CESC

CIOCorsanCOMOPSCVFPLM

FRELIMO

Frontline States

GTIinsurgents

Internal Affairs

JOGJPSJSPIS

JSTC

MIDmujibasNATJOCOCC

Rhodesian Air Force/Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Air ForceAfrican National CongressRhodesian Army/Zimbabwe-RhodesianArmyBureau of Special DutiesBritish South Africa Police, nowthe Zimbabwe Republic PoliceCivil Executive to the SecurityCouncilCentral Intelligence OrganisationCordon SanitaireCombined Operations HeadquartersConsolidated VillageArmy of Mozambique, now known asFAMFront for the Liberation ofMozambiqueZambia, Botswana, Mozambique,Angola, TanzaniaGround of Tactical Importancearmed, trained members of eitherZANLA or ZPRADepartment of Internal Affairs,now the Department of HomeAffairsJoint Operational CentreJoint Planning StaffJoint Services PhotographicInterpretation StaffJoint Services Targetting Commit-teeMilitary Intelligence Directorateinsurgent local youth supportersNational Joint Operational CentreOperations Co-ordinating Committee

PACC

PF

PolicePOUPROVOPSPsywar CommitteePVRARRhodesia

Rhodesian Front

Rh$RICRLI

SAANC

SASSecurity Forces

SFASFIC

situpa

TPDFUANCUDI

VAGZANLA

ZANUZANU(S)

ZANU(PF)

ZAPU

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia

ZIPA

Psychological Action Co-ordina-ting CommitteeZimbabwe Patriotic Front. At pre-sent the PF refers to the formerZAPU. As used in this study itrefers to the ZANU/ZAPU pact for-med in 1976British South Africa PolicePsychological Operation UnitProvincial Operation CentrePsychological Warfare CommitteeProtected VillageRhodesia African RiflesZimbabwe. Name used for period upto 1 June 1979Rhodesian Front party. Now theRepublican Front PartyRhodesian dollarRhodesian Intelligence CorpsRhodesian Light Infantry, 1stBattalion ofSouth African African NationalCongressSpecial Air ServiceRhodesian/Zimbabwe-RhodesianArmy, Air Force, BSAP, GuardForce, Security Force Auxiliariesand para-military InternalAffairs forcesSecurity Force AuxiliariesSpecial Forces Intelligence Cen-treregistration card carried byadult black malesTanzania People's Defence ForceUnited African National CouncilUnilateral Declaration of Inde-pendenceVital Asset GroundZimbabwe African National Libera-tion ArmyZimbabwe Africa National UnionFaction of ZANU headed by theRev. N. SitholePresent name of ZANU. PF refersto the Zimbabwe Patriotic FrontZimbabwe African Peoples Union,now known as the Patriotic FrontZimbabwe. Refers to the period1 June 1979, to April 1980Zimbabwe Peoples Army

ZNDFZPRA

Zambian National Defence ForceZimbabwe Peoples RevolutionaryArmy. Also known as ZIPRA

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This book is based on a dissertation submittedin 1981 for a Masters Degree in Strategic Studies atthe University of South Africa. The title of thethesis was A Critique on Selected Aspects of theRhodesian Security Forces Counter-insurgency Stra-tegy, 1972-1980. Additional information drawn fromsubsequent publications has been included whereappropriate but the content remains largelyunchanged.

Grateful acknowledgement is due to Prof D.F.S.Fourie for supervising the original study, Mr M.A.Curr for valuable criticism and Mrs A Basson fortyping the manuscript.

J K CilliersTsumeb

INTRODUCTION

On 11 November 1965 the British colony of SouthernRhodesia unilaterally declared its independence.Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith made this declara-tion fully confident that his Rhodesian Front Partycould maintain power indefinitely for the whiteminority group it represented. Only fifteen yearslater on 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe emerged as an inde-pendent country under majority rule with internatio-nal recognition. Mr Smith's major adversory, RobertMbellarmine Mugabe, became the new prime minister ofthis fledgeling state. During the intervening yearsa relentless war had been waged. The two blacknationalist armies, ZANLA and ZPRA gained ascendencyover the smaller but technically superior armed for-ces of Rhodesia. This bitter struggle can be seen asa classic model of insurgent versus counter-insurgent strategies. The final outcome permanentlyaltered the balance of power in the sub-continent ofSouthern Africa.

This general study is an interpretative analy-sis of the counter-insurgency strategy during theeight crucial years of the war, 1972 tot 1979. Since1981 a small number of books have been published oncertain aspects of the war, notably D. Martin and P.Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe (Faber and Faber,London, 1981), J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves:Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe (RavenPress, Johannesburg, 1982) and P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Galago, Alber-ton, 1982). Considering the scope of the conflict,comparatively little that is available to the publichas been written on the war itself.

A large number of primary sources were consul-ted to obtain the basic historical data for thisstudy, but the Africa Research Bulletin series wasthe single most important reference work used. The

information presented by the media was often distor-ted and based on rumours and speculation divorcedfrom reality. Details regarding specific operations,projects, organisations and general modus operandiof the Security Forces gathered for this study werecollected and cross-checked through numerous and in-depth interviews conducted both in the Republic ofSouth Africa where many expatriate Rhodesians nowreside and in Zimbabwe. The subject files at theoffices of the Herald newspaper in Harare also pro-ved valuable in this research. Numerous officiallyclassified documents obtained from former SecurityForce members were used as well.

Chapter 1 provides a resume of events over theperiod 1890 to 1979 with an emphasis on the intensi-fied confrontation from 1972 to 1979. This is a cen-tral chapter for evaluating and co-ordinatingaspects of the struggle discussed in subsequentchapters. Each of the following eight chapters isconcerned with specific organisations or counter-insurgency strategies which had direct bearing onthe development of the conflict. The second andninth chapters are, in particular, devoted to orga-nisations and systems. Chapter 2 examines the com-mand and control structures employed by the Rhode-sian Security Forces, and Chapter 9 discusses theintelligence organisations and methods employed.Both aspects are vital for a complete picture of theRhodesian Security Forces' counter actions, as thesuccess of other counter-insurgency activitiesdepended to a large extent on the successes andfailures achieved in these fields. Chapters 3 to 8analyse in turn a number of specific counter-insurgency strategies as employed in Zimbabwe,namely those of protected villages (strategic ham-lets) , border minefield obstacles, pseudo-insurgentactivities, internal defence and development,external operations and the institution of a self-defence militia system. Chapter 10 briefly describesthe general security situation that had developed by1979. Only at this point is it possible to commenton the conduct of the war in general.

dedicated to my parents

Chapter 1

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WAR FOR ZIMBABWE 1965-1979

1.1 The Early Years

By 1890 there were already a number of white sett-lers inhabiting what was later known as the Britishcolony of Southern Rhodesia. The impingement ofwhite interests upon indigenous black customs andproperty, however, led to racial tension. So, in1893 and again in 1895, the Matabele regiments roseup under their king, Lobengula, in the first free-dom struggles or Chimurenga against the whites. Al-though the black warriors were overwhelmingly defea-ted this did not secure the position of the whitesettlers, who remained ill at ease in their isola-ted outposts across Mashonaland. White militarypreparedness was consequently directed towardssecuring internal security and remained so for anumber of years.

Gradually, as European influence grew, racialprejudice against the blacks increased as well,became established and institutionalized. It wasexpressed clearly in the Land Apportionment Act of1930 by which the country was divided into distinctareas for black and white habitation. Areas assignedfor black habitation were known as Reserves until1969 and after that as Tribal Trust Lands untilindependence in 1981. Generally these areas lay inthe more arid reaches surrounding the more fertilewhite controlled region which ran from southwest tonortheast (see Figure 1.1). This division of land wasmade possible by the white referendum of 1922 afterwhich Britain granted self-government to SouthernRhodesia in 1923. Faint awareness of a threat otherthan that from the indigenous black peoples aroseafter 1926, and in response to this a small stan-ding army was formed. This force was expandedduring the troubled years preceding the Second World

1

History of War

African Purchase Area

Unreserved Area

National Land

Figure 1.1 Land Apportionment 1968

History of War

War. During this war Rhodesian squadrons servedwith distinction in the Royal Air Force. After1945 the armed forces were demobilized. However,during 1947 a largely black unit, the RhodesianAfrican Rifles, was constituted as the core of aregular Army. The territorial force, on the otherhand, was almost entirely white and comprised theIsL and 2nd Battalions of the Royal Rhodesian Regi-ment. The Rhodesian African Rifles saw service inMalaya from 1956 to 1958.

After the general strike in Bulawayo during1948, a revision of military policy apparentlyoccurred, since three additional white territorialbattalions were formed. Recruits into No. 1Training Unit were formed into the Rhodesian LightInfantry Battalion in 1961. Two other units esta-blished were C Squadron of the Special Air Serviceand an armoured car unit, the Selous Scouts, namedafter Courtney Selous, a nineteenth century explo-rer. (This name was relinquished by the armouredcar unit and given to a pseudo-insurgent infantryunit in 1973.)

During 1963 an attempted federation withNorthern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (nowMalawi) ended in failure. This politically ambi-tious scheme was launched in 1953. its failurecould largely be ascribed to the internal racialpolicies of Southern Rhodesia and the realisationthat these policies were incompatible with a closerrelationship to neighbouring black states. Blackriots during 1960 increased white intransigence andmade them less willing than ever to consider reform.Unrest first broke out in the black townships ofSalisbury (now renamed Harare) when three leadersof the National Democratic Party were detained.Over twenty thousand people gathered in protest atStodart Hall. Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead respon-ded by ordering the distribution of leaflets fromthe air announcing a ban on all similar meetings.He also ordered the partial mobilisation of theArmy. Further disturbances in Bulawayo were alsodispersed and gatherings were banned.

During December 1962 the new Rhodesian Frontparty was elected to power. Since its inception theparty had been committed to the entrenchment andmaintenance of white supremacy without the involve-ment of a distant colonial mother. The leader of theRhodesian Front, Ian Douglas Smith, was electedPrime Minister on 14 April 1964. He was initiallyelected to the Southern Rhodesia legislative assem-bly as a Liberal Party member in 1948 but became

History of Mar

a founder member of the Rhodesian Front party in1962. He was a dour speaker who had won littlepublic attention before the formation of the Front.Once elected Prime Minister, however, he gainedunprecedented popularity among the white population.This support even endured beyond the war against theinsurgents. Two events in particular strengthenedthe resolve of an increasing!" isolated SouthernRhodesia to 'go it alone1 in an attempt to maintainwhite supremacy: the massacre of whites in Kenyaduring the Mau Mau uprising of the early sixtiesand the election to power of an unsympathetic Labourgovernment in Britain in 1964. So, on Armistice day,11 November 1965, Rhodesia unilaterally declaredits independence (UDI). Although aware of the immi-nent declaration, Rhodesian black nationalists weretotally unprepared to offer any form of organizedprotest. The small number of blacks sent fortraining in insurgency warfare by emerging nationa-list movements at the time were apparently intendedfor political propaganda rather than to wage a realrevolutionary campaign. Arguably the major nationa-list insurgent incident before UDI occurred duringJuly 1964: a group calling itself the CrocodileGang killed a white farmer at a roadblock in theMelsetter area.

Recruitment and training for an insurgent cam-paign against the Rhodesian Front government star-ted in 1963. The formation of the Zimbabwe AfricanNational Union (ZANU) in that year in competitionwith the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)acted as a catalyst for armed confrontation betweenthe black nationalist forces and the white control-led Rhodesian Security Forces.

The undisputed father and leader of Rhodesiannationalist movements in the late fifties and formany years afterwards, was Joshua Nqabuko NyangoloNkomo.He had been elected president of^the newlyformed African National Congress on 1i September1957, after the Southern Rhodesian African Nationa-list Congress and the City Youth League had united.The African National Congress was subsequently ban-ned in February 1959, but re-emerged on 1 January1960 as the National Democratic Party. This party,in turn, was banned on 9 December 1961. It reap-peared on 17 December 1961, as the Zimbabwe AfricanPeoples Union or ZAPU.

For some months before the formation of ZAPU,Nkomo's leadership had come under increased criti-cism. It was alleged that he spent more time abroad,canvassing for the nationalist cause, than in

History of War

Southern Rhodesia leading it. Further dissensionbroke out among black nationalists after theNational Democratic Party executives agreed to theproposals of the 1961 London constitutional conferencewhereby only 15 out of 65 parliamentry seats wereallocated to blacks. African nationalists reactedangrily to this agreement and forced the NationalDeiuocraLic Party lias Lily Lo repudiate the agreement,but the damage to the unity of Rhodesian African na-tionalism had been done. When ZAPU was banned on 20September 1962, Nkomo was again absent from Rhodesia.He was persuaded to return only after considerablepressure from his own followers as well as from Pre-sident Julius Nyerere of Tanzania. After his releasefrom 3 months' restriction, Nkomo persuaded the for-mer ZAPU executive to flee with him to Tanzania andthere form a government in exile. Bitter dissensionabout the leadership of the Rhodesian nationalistmovement now arose amongst prominent black nationa-lists including the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole andRobert Mbellarmine Mugabe. In response, ZAPU Presi-dent Nkomo suspended his executive council andreturned to Rhodesia to form the interim People'sCaretaker Council. Outside Rhodesia the People'sCaretaker Council retained the name ZAPU. Nkomowas rearrested and detained until 1974. In spiteof his long detention, he was never again seriouslychallenged as ZAPU president.Nkomo's foremost cri-tics formed the Zimbabwe African National Union(ZANU) on 8 August 1963 with the Reverend Sitholeas interim president and Robert Mugabe as SecretaryGeneral. Both ZANU and the People's Caretaker Coun-cil were banned in Rhodesia on 26 August 1964. Mugabeand Sithole we're arrested. Although he was relea-sed during June of the following year, Mugabe wasrestricted to Sikombela until his rearrest inNovember 1965. Both Mugabe and Sithole remained indetention until December 1974.

ZANU sent its first contingent of five men ledby Emmerson Mnangagwa to the People's Republic ofChina for military training in September 1963. Theyformed the nucleus of ZANU's armed wing, theZimbabwe African National Liberation Army, or ZANLA.Having been actively involved in operations againstthe Rhodesian regime since 1964 it was thus under-standable that Sithole precipitated his own fallfrom the ZANU presidency during 1969 when he statedin the dock

History of War

I wish publicly to dissociate my name in word,thought or deed from any subversive activities,from any terrorist activities and from anyform of violence.'''

Internal dissension within the ranks of the blacknations!isfcs thus brought about the formation ofZANU. Although Nkomo's vacillation had discreditedhim among a large section of the Rhodesian nationa-list leaders, he still appeared to commandmajority black nationalist support within the coun-try at the turn of the decade. At this stage thetribal bias of both ZANU and ZAPU was not asstrongly manifested as from 1972 onward.

ZANU and ZAPU, however, increasingly competedin revolutionary zeal and recruitment. The ZAPUarmed forces later became known as the ZimbabwePeople's Revolutionary Army (ZPRA or ZIPRA)(2)

The insurgents' strategy at this stage wasbased on two false assumptions. First, thatBritain could be induced to intervene forcibly inRhodesia should law and order seem in imminent dan-ger of collapsing, and second that

... all that was necessary to end white domina-tion was to train some guerrillas and send themhome with guns: this would not only scare thewhites but would ignite a wave of civil disobe-dience by blacks. (')

By 1966, however, ZAPU, still the major black natio-nalist movement, had realized that the Britishgovernment could not be induced to interveneactively in Rhodesia. ZAPU's armed wing, ZPRA, alsorecognized that it did not have the ability to forcea collapse of law and order. The major task of theinsurgent forces existing at this early stage wastherefore to convince the Organisation of AfricanUnity and the world at large that the forces tooverthrow the regime of Ian Smith really did exist.This was vitally important if financial and politi-cal support was to be forthcoming. It was also appa-rent that if Rhodesia was to become Zimbabwe,Zimbabweans themselves would have to take up armsand fight for it. While leaders of ZANLA and ZPRAwere convinced of this, black Rhodesians asyet were not. Rhodesian citizens resident in Zambiaand Tanzania were thus forcibly recruited to swellZANLA and ZPRA ranks until the trickle of refugeesand recruits turned into a flood.

While ZPRA bore almost the full weight of the

History of War

war effort in these initial years, ZAPU remained atthe same time the major exponent of the 'externalmanoeuvre' designed to obtain maximum internationalsupport. ZANLA, trained by China, played a verylimited military role during this period. Both move-ments also increasingly appeared to represent a majortribal grouping in Rhodesia. ZAPU had the backing ofthe Matabeles, who constitute some 19% of Zimbabwe'sblack population, while ZANU had that of theloosely grouped Shona nations (77%). (See Figure 1.2)

Following UDI the first military engagementrecognised officially by Rhodesia occurred on 28April 1966 between Security Forces and seven ZANLAinsurgents near Sinoia, 100 km northwest of Harare.

That day is now commemorated in Zimbabweas Chimurenga Day - the start of the war.The group eliminated was in fact one of three teamsthat had entered Rhodesia with the aim of cuttingpower lines and attacking white farmsteads. Asecond of the groups murdered a white couple withthe surname of Viljoen on their farm near Hartleyon the night of 16 May 1966. The insurgents weresubsequently captured by Security Forces. In totalall but one of the original fourteen insurgents wereeither killed or captured.

Shortly afterwards a second ZANLA infiltrationwas detected near Sinoia. In the ensuing battleseven insurgents were killed and a numbercaptured.

During August 1967 a combined force of 90insurgents from ZPRA and the South African AfricanNational Congress entered Rhodesia near the VictoriaFalls. They miscalculated the attitude of the localblack population and the Security Forces soon knew oftheir presence there, in the first major operationof the war 47 insurgents were killed within threeweeks and more than 20 were captured. The remainderfled to Botswana in disarray. Fourteen of the Securi-ty Force members were wounded and seven others killed.

Early in 1968 a second force of 123 insurgentsfrom ZPRA and the South African African NationalCongress crossed the Zambezi River from Zambia intonorthern Mashonaland. The group remained undetectedfor three months, setting up a series of six basecamps at intervals of 30 kilometers before beingreported by a game ranger. On 18 March Security For-ces attacked and destroyed all of the six camps.During the ensuing month 60 insurgents were killedfor the loss of six members of the Security Forces.

During July 1968 a third joint incursion tookplace. The 91 insurgents involved formed into three groups.

History of War

BEIT BRIDGE

NDEBELE ORIENTATED TRIBES SHONA ORIENTATED TRIBES

Ndebe'leKalanga 5%

RozwiKorekoreZezuruManyikaKarangaNdau

9%12%18%13%22%3%

OTHERS

I TongaJ VendaK Shangaan

2*1%1*

Figure 1.2 Major Tribal Groupings in Zimbabwe

Hi story of War

About 80 insurgents were either killed or captured atthat time and significantly, the first member of theSouth African Police deployed in Rhodesia also diedthen. Following the entrance of the South AfricanAfrican National Congress into Rhodesia, members ofSouth African Police counter-insurgency units weredetached to the Rhodesian Security Forces. In theensuing years the Republic of south Africa involveditself increasingly with the security situation onthe borders of its northern neighbour.

These first insurgent incursions into Rhodesiaall originated from Zambia across the floor of theZambezi River valley. This sparsely populated areawas deemed the natural infiltration route as mobili-sation of the masses did not yet constitute an impor-tant principle in insurgent strategy. Security Forcecounter-measures were thus largely track and killtype operations. Furthermore infiltrations tookplace in relatively large groups, which SecurityForces located more easily.

After a peak during 1968, almost no incur-sions took place the following year. By the end of1969 both ZANU and ZAPU had realized that theirmilitary strategy had serious shortcomings. Theseproblems proved to have less impact on ZANLA thanon ZPRA, for since the latter had borne the brunt ofthe insurgency effort up to that stage, the defeatssuffered in the field resulted in a collapse ofmorale and the withdrawal of ZPRA from the conflictfor a number of years. On the other hand, Rhodesianauthorities were satisfied with the performance oftheir small Security Forces. This later had theeffect of lulling Rhodesia into a false sense ofsecurity, as reflected in the figures for defenceexpenditure which remained relatively constant overthis period. It also tended to strengthen theimpression amongst Rhodesians that military action,to the exclusion of political and other non-militaryaction, would be sufficient to destroy the insur-gency threat, for, at this stage, the insurgentgroups had not yet resorted to internal subversionas a major element in their strategy. This sense ofcomplacency was further increased by the apparenteconomic success of UDI. The economic upswing led toan influx of white immigrants and increased optimism.This was in stark contrast to the defeatism and lowmorale among insurgent forces.

By 1970 ZANU, under the external leadershipof Herbert Chitepo, emerged as leader of what wasregarded as a liberation struggle. Althoughthe ZANU president. Reverend Sithole, was

History of War History of War

still imprisoned in Rhodesia, this did not have thedivisive and eventual disruptive effect on ZANU thatthe concurrent imprisonment of ZAPU leader, Nkomo,had on his organisation. Within ZAPU a strugglehad been waged between James Chikerema and JasonMoyo for external leadership. The infighting soonled to a split between ZAPU as a political wing andZPRA as a military wing. In a document entitledlObservations on our Struggle' Moyo summarized thesituation as follows: ~

Since 1969 there has been a steady decline ofserious (sic) nature in our Military Adminis-tration and Army. Military rules have beencast overboard. Relations between some membersof the War Council and the Military Administra-tion are strained. Accusations of a seriousnature have been made. Military Administrationand War Council meetings are no longer beingheld. Planning of strategy is seriously lacking.There is no co-ordination in the deployment ofcadres in Zimbabwe.(4)

The clash between Moyo and Chikerema reached a cli-max in April 1970. From the total number of appro-ximately four hundred ZPRA insurgents some decidedto side with one of the two faction leaders whileothers either stayed in a small neutral group, ordeserted altogether. Chikerema subsequently formedFROLIZI (Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe)inOctober 1971 with a splinter ZANU group led byNathan Shamuyarira. The original objective behindthe creation of FROLIZI was to reunite ZANU and ZAPUinto a single nationalist movement but neither partywas prepared to do so. In 1973 FROLIZI itself split and conse-quently played an insignificant part in the insurgency campaign.

Even at this early stage the basic differencesin strategic concept between ZANLA and ZPRA werereadily discernable.

By 1971, ZANU's emphasis was on the politicaleducation of the Zimbabwe workers and peasants.The purpose of this was to elicit support fromthe masses and to recruit more people forguerrilla warfare training. Another significantfactor for this change in strategy was to widenthe areas of combat.(5)

As regards ZPRA, the general strategy adopted reliedprincipally on military action. As expressed byW.W. Nyangoni:

10

Since 1970 we have analysed the basis of theenemy strength and revised our strategy andtactics so as to be able to strike where ithurts most.(6)

and further

The strategy pursued by the liberation forcesof ZAPU was that of engaging the enemy largely—

"~~ with series of landmines accompanied by limitedand calculated armed attacks.(7)

From 1970 onwards ZANLA placed a higher premium onpoliticizing the population than ZPRA. Rhodesianintelligence reports indicated that it was only asfrom 1978 that ZPRA turned to the politicization ofthe local population to the same degree that ZANLAhad been doing. Probably with Russian backing andinstruction ZPRA forces also tended to be more con-ventionally orientated and trained than those ofZANLA. The latter took its doctrine from Chinathat the main object of such a protracted waris to gain the support of the local popula-tion.

Regarding the politicization of the Rhodesianblack population in general, the single most signi-ficant event was the formation of the AfricanNational Council on 16 October 1971, led by BishopAbel Muzurewa. In December of the following year theAfrican National Council succeeded in helping to per-suade the Pearce Commission to report adversely onthe acceptability of the Anglo-Rhodesian proposalsfor a settlement. Possibly for the first time, therural and urban black population of Rhodesia hadbeen made politically aware en masse. In its report,the Pearce Commission inter alia noted:

Mistrust of the intentions and motives of theGovernment transcended all other considerations.Apprehension for the future stemmed from resent-ment of what they felt to be the humiliationsof the past and at the limitations on policieson land, education, and personal advancement.One summed it up in saying, 'We do not rejectthe Proposals, we reject the Government'.(8)

1.2 The Establishment of a Strategic Base Area inthe North-East

ZANLA chose the Tete province in Mozambique

11

History of War

as approach route to Rhodesia more by force ofcircumstance than by conscious analysis. Both ZANLAand ZPRA were still based in Zambia, and were forcedto operate from that country as Mozambique was aPortuguese colony at the time. Yet the Front for theLiberation of Mozambique, FRELIMO, who had beenfighting against the Portuguese for a number ofyears, had been gaining ground steadily in the Teteprovince and initially offered ZPRA the use of thisfront as an alternative entry route into Rhodesia.Not least as a result of the continual small scaleRhodesian operations in support of the Portugueseforces, FRELIMO had become convinced of the neces-sity to 'liberate' Rhodesia as well, if the libera-tion of Mozambique was to be effected. Low moraleand internal strife caused ZPRA to show little inte-rest in this route. Furthermore it would take ZPRA, amovement under Matabele control into an area of thecountry under Shona control. The use of the route wasthus offered to ZANLA, who eagerly grasped this opportunity.(9)

A number of demographic, historic and geogra-phical factors favoured the North-eastern border ofRhodesia for insurgency. The rugged Mavuradonhamountains presented numerous obstacles to SecurityForces in locating and eliminating known insurgentgroups, while dense vegetation hindered .observation,especially during the summer rainy season (Novemberto March). Owing to its vast expanse and relatively loweconomic value, the area had furthermore suffereddecades of administrative neglect. The traditionaltribal way of life had been allowed to continue, withlittle active interference from Harare. The Shonatribe in the area, the Korekore, also spilt acrossthe border into the Tete province of Mozambique,thus easing the infiltration of insurgents from thatcountry into the North-east. A final factor was thelack of a physical impediment comparable to theZambezi river on the common national border. Withactive FRELIMO cooperation ZANLA was presented withan excellent opportunity. d°)

As indicated above, ZANLA strategy had shiftedits emphasis markedly since the sixties. In accor-dance with the teaching of Mao Zedong greater atten-tion was now given to the politicization and mobili-zation of the local population before mounting anyattacks on Rhodesian Security Forces or white farms.Yet at this early stage ZANLA had, in total, onlyabout 300 trained insurgents. Of these,60 men moun-ted the infiltrations in the north-east.

Noel Mukona, the head of ZANLA from 1969 to1973 could later claim with little hyperbole:

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History of War

In 1969 it was decided to operate silently ...We worked underground, training, stockingequipment and regrouping inside the country.Special Branch could not find out what wasgoing on and that we were preparing for a con-tinuation of the struggle. Much contact wasmaintained with the local population to reviewthe terrain ... In July 1972 ZANU calledtogether all its forces and met in the bush inMozambique and reviewed the situation. We weresatisfied that the preparations were enough andthat enough arms and food had been stashed inthe bush and that we could restart theonslaught. (11)

In the early hours of 21 December 1972, ZANLA insur-gents attacked the white homestead of Marc deBorchgrave in the Centenary district, marking theresurgence of the insurgent onslaught, indeed of anew campaign. Most Rhodesians, however, accepted thenews philosophically. Official concern over the dete-riorating situation in the area had been expressedsome weeks earlier by Prime Minister Ian Smith whenhe stated on the radio that the security situationwas

... far more serious than it appears on thesurface, and if the man in the street couldhave access to the security information whichI and my colleagues in government have, then Ithink he would be a lot more worried than he istoday.(12)

Yet the information available to the government atthis stage was somewhat incomplete. All of the fourtraditional intelligence sources, Army, uniformedPolice, Special Branch and the Department of Inter-nal Affairs (subsequently renamed Home Affairs) hadlimited representation in the area, and in the caseof the Army had maintained little more than a tokenpresence.

At a later stage Prime Minister Smith explainedhow the insurgents were able to remain undetectedfor such a period of time:

... they were able to move backwards and for-wards across the border from their so-calledbase camps and were thereby able to avoiddetection for long enough to enable them tosubvert pockets of local tribesmen. Thereaftertheir task was made easy through shelter, food

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and assistance they received from the locals.This situation has complicated the position asfar as our security forces are concerned. (13)

Not only had ZANLA succeeded in establishing a rela-tively secure base area inside Rhodesia, but hadalso succeeded in obtaining the full co-operationand support of the black rural population within thearea. This proved a crucial factor in their latersuccess and in the way the Rhodesian governmentattempted to eradicate the threat.

1.3 Operation Hurricane

Before the formation of the operational area in theNorth-east that was to become known as OperationHurricane, Rhodesian Security Force authorities hadbecome increasingly anxious about the securitysituation in the neigbouring province of Tete inMozambique. Although the Security Forces was largelyunaware of the extent of insurgent activities insideRhodesia itself, they had, since early 1972, conside-rably stepped up co-operation with the Portugueseforces who were then still in control of Mozambique.The two elite Rhodesian Army units, C Squadronof the Special Air Service and the 1st Battalion ofthe Rhodesian Light Infantry, were operating in Teteitself on an almost continuous basis. Yet wheninsurgent operations inside Rhodesia resumed in late1972, Army presence in an area of more than 1 000square kilometers was only at company strength.

The extent of the insurgent penetration at theturn of 1972 was widespread, ranging from Sipolilo,west of Centenary, across to Mutoko in the east, andsouthwards to the Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal TrustLands. In contrast to the Security Force operationsof the sixties, the war for Rhodesia had now entereda new phase. Previously members of the local popula-tion had willingly come forward to supply informationon the presence and activities of insurgents, butwithin a matter of weeks all intelligence sources inthe North-east dried up. Security Force morale plum-meted as they failed to meet the enemy face to face.After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote

For the first time the Rhodesian Security For-ces were faced with a seemingly insoluble pro-blem ... after carrying out their attacks theterrorists had not gone to ground in bush-camps in uninhabited areas where they could

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eventually be tracked down ... neither had theygone to ground in inhabited areas where infor-mation from the local population to the Policeor Special Branch had indicated their where-abouts. This time there was nothing. No tracks... no information.(14)

A Joint Operation Centre (JOC) , code-named Hurricane,(see Figure 1.3} was formed at Army brigade level ofcommand to counter the internal threat that haddeveloped. JOC Hurricane was initially situated atCentenary, was then moved to Bindura and eventually toHarare as its area of responsibility increased. Itconstituted the formalization of a committee systemapproach that had already been used to counter theinsurgency threats of the sixties.

With the limited scope of active operationsduring 1973-74, JOC Hurricane benefitted from almostall the available forces of the Army, Air Force andBritish South Africa Police. The latter alone couldcontribute some 16 companies to the counter-insur-gency effort. This enabled the Army, nominally incontrol of Hurricane, to formulate a strategy basedon two fundamental requirements; first, the necessity.of stemming the flow of insurgents from Mozambique andsecond, that of population control. The vital ele-ments of JOC Hurricane strategy as developed by 1974were succinctly summarized by the then brigade majoras follows:

Large external operations to turn off the tap;a cordon sanitaire with warning devices, patrol-led and backed by a 20 km wide no-go area;population control consisting of Protected Vil-lages, food control, curfews and (eventually)martial law, and massive psychologicalaction.(15)

The object was to channel insurgents into designatedareas from which the local population had been remo-ved. Here the Security Forces could easily track andeliminate the insurgents before they reachedpopulated areas. In areas adjoining these depopula-ted or 'no-go' areas, movement of the local popula-tion was to be restricted by placing them in Protec-ted and Consolidated Villages. Strict curfews wereto be enforced within these areas with the aim ofcutting the link between the local population andthe insurgents. Largely due to the limited availabi-lity of manpower and other resources, and the increa-sing demands made upon them, the strategy described

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was not employed in full.In an attempt to reassert control over rural

areas, four new districts were proclaimed in thenorth-eastern and eastern highlands, at Centenary,Rushinga, Mudzi and Mutasa. In an attempt to per-suade Zambia to desist from aiding both ZANLA andZPRA, Rhodesia closed its border at Chirundu,Kariba, and Victoria Falls to all Zambian traffic on9 January 1973. Although Zambian copper exports wereexempted from this embargo shortly afterwards, Pre-sident Kaunda refused to use any of these routes.Officially the border remained closed until 1978,when Rhodesian external raids into Zambia forcedPresident Kaunda to reopen his southern exportroutes'.

When the campaign began in 1973 it seemed thatthe Rhodesian government was not yet convinced ofthe political character of the threat facing it.Heedless of the possible consequences of suchaction,government then empowered Provincial Commis-sioners on 19 January 1973 to impose collective punish-ment on tribal communities assisting the insurgent forces inaccordance with the Emergency Powers (CollectiveFines) Regulations. The most extreme case of collec-tive punishment documented was the resettlement ofnearly 200 members of the local population fromMadziwa Tribal Trust land in the Beit bridge area in1974 "... as punishment for assisting terrorists."(16)The extent to which collective punishment was to beenforced is apparent from the following extractionfrom a poster distributed in Marante Tribal TrustLand and Mukumi African Purchase Area duringJanuary 1978:

as from dawn on the 20th January 1978 the fol-lowing restrictions will be posed upon all ofyou and your TTL (Tribal Trust Land) and Purchase Land1. Human curfew from last light to 12 o'clock

daily2. Cattle, yolked oxen, goats and sheep curfew

from last light to 12 o'clock daily3. No vehicles, including bicycles and buses to

run either (in) the TTL or the APL (AfricanPurchase Land)

4. No person will either go on or near any highground or they will be shot

5. All dogs to be tied up 24 hours each day orthey will be shot

6. Cattle, sheep and goats, after 12 o'clock,are only to be herded by adults

7. No juveniles (to the age of 16 years) will

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be allowed out of the kraal area at any timeeither day or night, or they will be shot

8. No schools will be open9. All stores and grinding mills will be clo-

sed. (17)

Specifically during the period up to 1976 collectivepunishment measures such as those quoted above couldonly have had serious negative effects on the atti-tude of the black rural massas for at this stage themajority of the local population were not neccessa-rily supporters of either ZANU or ZAPU.

In execution of the strategy devised for Opera-tion Hurricane, the first 'no-go' area was proclai-med along the Mozambique border on 17 May 1973. Inone way or another 'no-go' areas were extended alongvast stretches of Rhodesian border in an attempt toestablish depopulated 'free-fire' zones for SecurityForce operations. Government attitude to the infrin-gement of curfews and 'no-go' areas was well summa-rised by P.K. van der Byl, Rhodesian Minister ofInformation on 31 July 1975 in Parliament when hestated that "... as far as I am concerned the morecurfew breakers that are shot the better".(18) On 21June the-Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Mr Wickusde Kock, told Parliament that there were indicationsthat the removal of tribesmen from parts of thenorth-eastern border to form a cordon sanitaire wasbeginning to have the desired effect. The use of thename cordon sanitaire was however misleading andshould not be confused with attempts to establish aproper cordon sanitaire some months later (see Chap-ter 4) .

In July 1973 the first major abduction ofschoolchildren by insurgents occurred. St Albert'sMission, on the Zambezi Valley escarpment, was ente-red by a group which abducted 292 pupils and membersof staff, who were then forced to march into theZambezi Valley and north towards Mozambique. Secu-rity Forces intercepted the column and rescued allbut eight of the abductees. Similar abductions wererepeated in years to come and Security Forces wereincreasingly unable to prevent these actions.

At the start of the summer rainy season towardsthe close of 1973, the insurgent forces intensifiedtheir efforts. In an attempt to cut all links withthe insurgents in subverted areas, Deputy Ministerde Kock announced the initiation of the ProtectedVillage programme. Four villages were in various stages ofcompletion as part of a pilot scheme. It was estima-ted that more than 8 000 blacks would be resettled

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History of War

in the Zambezi Valley by the end of December. Thusstarted one of the essential elements of Rhodesianmilitary strategy which eventually led to the forma-tion of an independent arm of the Security Forces,the Guard Force, to man and protect these villages.It placed a heavy strain on the limited resourcesavailable to the war effort, but some 750 000 ruralblacks were eventually resettled in over 200 Protec-ted Villages. Geographically, the distribution ofthese villages gave a very clear impression of thespread of insurgency, but even when the scheme hadreached its most extended phase, the vast majorityof Protected Villages were still found in the North-east where ZANLA had set up its original base area.In general the strategy was not consistently executedand, as a result, success varied. Eventually theSecurity Force punitive approach to the scheme,limited manpower and finance and bad execution wasto lead to the failure of Protected Villages ingeneral. (This strategy is evaluated in Chapter 3.)

But by the close of 1973 the number of insur-gents in Hurricane was estimated at a mere 145 men.Insurgent casualties for the year stood at 179 while44 members of the Security Forces and 12 white civi-lians had lost their lives. All in all the RhodesianSecurity Forces had barely succeeded in holdingtheir own. As a result Government announced duringDecember that the period of national service wouldbe extended from that of nine months instituted in1966 to one year. Prior to 1966 national servicehad consisted of a short 4£ months.

1.4 1974: Security Force Reaction

During 1974 the Rhodesian authorities made a concer-ted effort to restore law and order. The Minister ofDefence announced in February:

The Government is embarking on a call-up pro-gramme in which the first phase will be todouble the national service intake. A secondbattalion of the Rhodesian African Rifles willbe raised to augment the Army ... These arran-gements by the Ministry of Defence, togetherwith other actions are designed to eliminatethe terrorists in the shortest possibletime.(19)

Measures introduced included extensing the powers ofprotecting authorities in the north-eastern area.

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These authorities had previously consisted of com-sioned police officers, but legislation was extendedto include certain District Commissioners from the Depart-ment of Internal Affairs. Protecting authorities couldnow order residents to do specified public securitywork, which included the building or maintenance ofbridges,, roads, fences, and darns. Detention withouttrial was extended to sixty days. A governmentstatement during April set out a scale of fixedrewards ranging from Rh$ 300 to Rh$ 5 000 for infor-mation. This included information leading to thedeath or capture of a senior insurgent leader or tothe recovery of insurgent weaponry.

Already, at this early stage of the conflict,logistics played a major role in the insurgents'strategy. All weaponry had to be carried in fromeither Mozambique or Zambia. While food was readilyobtainable from the local population, the insurgentforces were not able to capture and thereby arm andresupply themselves with weaponry from the SecurityForces. In the case of ZANLA, which was supplied bythe People's Republic of China, this problem was fur-ther complicated by the erratic and limited supplyof arms. ZPRA, in contrast, tended to be better andmore heavily armed by the USSR. Awareness of theZANLA problems influenced Army and Air Force plan-ning for external operations in the years to come.

Operations were almost exclusively confined tothe North-east at this stage. During March 1974,however, it was becoming clear that the ZPRA reope-ning of the Zambian front in the North-west was immi-nent. This was officially confirmed on 6 October ina government statement which lodged a formal com-plaint with Zambia over the use of its territory byinsurgents.

On 25 April 1974, the armed forces of Portugalstaged a successful coup d'' etat and overthrew Pre-sident Ceatano. General Antonio de Spinola becamethe new President. On 27 July he recognised theright of Portugal's overseas provincesof Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea to inde-pendence. June 1975, was set as date for the trans-fer of power in Mozambique to FRELIMO. A month afterthe coup the revolutionary junta in Lisbon askedHarare to halt all cross-border operations intoMozambique. Rhodesia did not immediately feel themilitary impact, for it was some months beforeFRELIMO leader, Samora Machel, moved south to Maputothen still known as Lourenco Marques, and assumed thepresidency. Once in power, however, his commitment tothe 'liberation' of Rhodesia was clear. As a result

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History of War

construction of the Rutenga-Beit bridge rail link toSouth Africa was hastily begun: during the years tofollow it developed into a Rhodesian life-line andimportant, insurgent target. The collapse of Portu-guese colonial control in Mozambique also had a dis-tinct effect on politically conscious black Rhode-

sians.

In 1974, particularly following the collapse ofPortuguese colonialism, and the impending inde-pendence of neighbouring Mozambique, sent (sic)an euphoric wave of high revolutionary hopesamong the masses who now voluntarily sought andfollowed the ZANU-ZANLA 'freedom trail' intothe training camps.(20)

A team of Security Force pseudo insurgents, whenposing as members of ZANLA were '... shocked anddisillusioned at the wild sometimes ecstatic,receptions that ZANLA was getting (amongst the localpopulation)1 (21)

Not only did the independence of Mozambiquehave a profound effect on the war in Rhodesia, butalso on the independence of Angola, which was prepa-red to play a large role in the training of ZPRA

forces.During May 1974, construction began on the

first border minefield obstacle. Known as the CordonSanitaire it was completed in April 1976 and stret-ched from the Musengedzi to the Mazoe river. As thename implies, it was planned to establish an impas-sable obstacle to prevent all cross-border movementin the areas in which it was erected. Despite thefact that this soon proved impractical, however, by1978 border obstacles of various descriptions hadbeen constructed along virtually the entire easternborder with Mozambique, as was the section of Rhode-sian border with Zambia from Victoria Falls eastwardto Milibezi. While all the initial efforts entailedthe use of an electronic alarm system and a reactionforce, these were phased out. Eventually the CordonSanitaire merely became a border minefield obstacle.Owing to restrictions in manpower and finance, Secu-rity Forces were unable to cover it by observation orfire, patrol or even maintain it. In planning and exe-cution these border minefield obstacles bore clea-rest witness to a lack of a coherent national stra-tegy to counter the insurgency, as discussed in

Chapter 5.The pressures of the war were now increasingly

exerted upon white farmers in the affected areas.

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History of War

During June a scheme was announced which includedgrants of up to Rh$ 3 000 for establishing protectedcompounds for labourers. The compounds were to havefloodlighting and wire fences. It was envisaged thatthe Department of Internal Affairs would providearmed guards at a later stage, yet manpower limita-tions precluded any such plans.

In the latter half of 1974 the first two majoroperations to move the total black population of aTribal Trust Land into Protected Villages tookplace. On 25 July Operation Overload was announcedby Army Headquarters and consisted of moving the46 960 people of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land simulta-neously within 6 weeks into 21 Protected Villages.Although this objective was achieved, it totallyfailed to provide the local population with improvedliving conditions. Operation Overload Two followedin Madziwa Tribal Trust Land in August/September/October and proved to be a substantial improvement.Both Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands wereseen as key areas in halting the insurgent advanceon Harare. Contrary to established principles it wasdecided to relocate the most subverted areas first,instead of consolidating government controlled areasas a secure base. As documented in Chapter 4 the Armyviewed the Protected and Consolidated villagespurely as population control measures. Where membersof the local population were concentrated in arestricted area, the Security Forces could movefreely in the vast depopulated areas. This approachnegated any advantages achieved by the whole schemein the long run, although both Operations OverloadOne and Two temporarily broke contact between localpopulation and insurgent forces in the areas concer-ned. This break enabled Security Forces to regainthe initiative in these heavily infiltrated areas.

Government estimates of defence expendituretabled in Parliament on 24 August for the financialyear 1974/75, provided for greatly increased spen-ding in all the related ministries for the periodending 30 June 1975. The defence vote was increasedby Rh$ 6,7 mil to a total of Rh$ 46,176 mil.

Intelligence estimates released towards the endof 1974 put the number of insurgents inside Rhodesiaat between three and four hundred. Nevertheless,despite the opening of the Zambian Front, SecurityForce morale was high and prospects seemed betterthan a mere twelve months previously. Since December1972, 468 insurgents had been killed and only 48members of the Security Forces lost - a ratio ofnearly 10 to 1. This high kill ratio was also the

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History of War

result of a new tactic adopted by the Security For-ces known as Fire Force. Largely as a result of suc-cesses obtained by pseudo insurgents in Madziwa andKandeya Tribal Trust Lands during which armed heli-copters delivered fighting troops directly onto orclose to the enemy. The concept was formalized andhoned to a vital element of Security Force action.The first Fire Forces were formed at Mount Darwinand Centenary during June 1974. Initially they con-sisted of three elements: G-cars, K-cars and membersof the Rhodesian Light Infantry as fighting force onthe ground. G-cars were normally helicopters armedwith twin.Browning machine guns and each carriedfour troops. K- or kill-cars were Allouette helicop-ters armed with 20 mm canon to provide fire support.At a later stage Lynx fixed wing aircraft wereincluded to provide further close support as well asa DC-3 Dakota aircraft which could carry twentyparatroopers to be deployed as stop-groups. FireForce call-ups normally originated from SecurityForce operation posts on high ground which then'talked1 the aircraft onto the target. Yet the highkill ratio achieved could at best have pointed totactical superiority, for insurgent numbers insidethe country continued to rise.

1 .5 Detente

When Rhodesia was pressured to accept the SouthAfrican proposals for a detente on 11 Desember 1974,Security Forces claimed that there were a total of only 70active insurgents on Rhodesian soil. Although notroops had been withdrawn from active operations,offensive and aggressive actions were temporarilyhalted. Troops were in fact ordered to desist fromattacking insurgents leaving Rhodesia - although howthis intention was to be measured remained uncertain.For the hard-pressed insurgents this presented awelcome reprieve and they stood only to gain psycho-logically from reduced Security Force actions in thecountryside. Many left Rhodesia to regroup, reple-nish and retrain.

During the preceding months there had beenintense turmoil within the ranks of ZANU. In Novem-ber 1974 what was to become known as the Nharirebellion had taken place in reaction to the highstandard of living enjoyed by most of the ZANU HighCommand members in Lusaka. Although ZANU defencechief Josiah Tongogara had forcibly repressed therebellion, the effects of the Nhari rebellion later

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History of War

culminated in the assassination of High Commandchairman Herbert Chitepo on 18 March 1975. This thenled to the imprisonment of all ZANU High Commandmembers in Zambia. They were released shortly beforethe Geneva talks in 1976, The combination of theseconfused events rather hamstrung the offensiveefforts of ZANLA for some months. The disruptionwithin ZANLA ranks presented the Security Forceswith an excellent opportunity to disrupt the insur-gent effort further. Strangely enough Rhodesianpoliticians dreamed of an accord with FRELIMO where-by access to the ports of Beira and Maputo would beretained indefinitely. The result was that bothZANLA and FRELIMO were allowed time to consolidatetheir forces without active Rhodesian interference.This was possibly the major result of the detenteforced onto Rhodesia by its South African ally.

President Kaunda,together with President Machel,had grown increasingly impatient of the disunityamong nationalist forces both within the movementsthemselves as well as between the various partiesand armed forces. Prior to the constitutional talksin Lusaka during December 1974, the two presidentshad been able to induce ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and theAfrican National Council to join in a united Afri-can National Congress. The signatories to thisLusaka Unity Accord of 8 December 1974, were Sithole,Nkomo, Chikerema and Bishop Abel Muzorewa. BishopMuzorewa was leader of the only internally basednationalist movement, the African National Council.Launched in November 1971 to organize a massivenegative vote against the Pearce proposals, theAfrican National Council (ANC) was essentially aninternal coalition between ZANU and ZAPU. Followingthe rejection of the Pearce proposals, the ANC tookon a more formal political structure. In the yearsleading up to the Lusaka Unity Accord BishopMuzorewa had been involved in repeated talks withthe Smith regime. The most serious weakness asregards the African National Council was its lackof military strength. The latter was an obvious pre-condition to legal recognition inside Rhodesia.Although thousands of youths in fact left the coun-try to fight 'in the Bishop's army' they invariablyended up fighting for either ZANLA or ZPRA.

Several weeks before the Lusaka Unity Accord,the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole had still been theundisputed leader of both ZANU and ZANLA. Even as thedetente initiative was gaining momentum, however,his fellow prisoner at Que Que, Robert Mugabe, waselected to the ZANU presidency in a palace coup.

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History of War

When South Africa coerced Rhodesia to release impri-soned nationalist leaders in order to attend theconstitutional conference in Lusaka, both Sitholeand Mugabe then claimed to represent ZANU. (At thisstage Frontline states had, in confusion, refused torecognize Mugabe as ZANU president.) ZAPU leaderNkomo was also released on 15 December 1974.

The first sign that there was an imminent col-lapse of the proposed constitutional talks came on10 January 1975. The Minister of Justice, Law andOrder, Mr Lardner-Burke, announced that he had stop-ped the further release of political detainees onthe grounds that neither ZANLA nor ZPRA was obser-ving the negotiated ceasefire. On average,six inci-dents were being reported daily during that month.Furthermore, Martin Meredith could write that

The ceasefire and the release of African lea-ders had had the effect of convincing the localpopulation that the guerillas had won a victorysimilar to the one which the ceasefire hadbrought FRELIMO in Mozambique. All intelligencesources had dried up and the army's position onthe ground was weaker than it had been sincethe beginning of the war in 1972. (22)

The momentum of dStente had now slowed down consi-derably. The first contact between the AfricanNational Council and the Rhodesian government,since agreement had been reached in Lusaka on conve-ning a constitutional conference took place withinRhodesia on 20 January. Nevertheless, Prime MinisterSmith's reluctance to press ahead with any meaning-ful agreement with the nationalist forces now led tothe withdrawal of some 2 000 South African Policemenfrom forward bases in Rhodesia as a prelude to theirtotal withdrawal from Rhodesia, which was completedby August 1975. With the arrest and renewed deten-tion of the Reverend Sithole in early March, talkswith the Rhodesian government temporarily collapsed.As stated above, however, it was at this stage thatthe assassination of Herbert Chitepo threw ZANU intoa new crisis. Mainly as a result of South Africanpressure, Sithole was released during April, osten-sibly to attend the OAU Ministerial Council meetingin Dar-es-Salaam. Talks with the African NationalCongress were thus resumed. Simultaneously RobertMugabe escaped into neighbouring Mozambique in anattempt to consolidate his supremacy within bothZANU and ZANLA.

The Chitepo murder and related incidents finally

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History of War

tried the patience of Zambian president KennethKaunda and Tanzania's president Julius Nyerere tobreaking point. Both leaders outlawed ZANU and ZAPU,recognising only the Lusaka Unity Accord AfricanNational Council as the single and united voice ofall Rhodesian nationalist movements. Yet as theprospect of meaningful talks with Harare dimmed, sodid the unity of the African National Council.

As Security Forces slowly re-established theirauthority and regained lost ground, detente reachedits high water mark during talks held at the VictoriaFalls bridge on 25 August 1975. When this attempt failed,further dissension within the ranks of the AfricanNational Council was inevitable. Nkomo was nowleader of the Internal ANC and Bishop Muzorewa, inself-imposed exile,was leader of the External ANC.Both were competing for control over the middle andlower structure of the original African NationalCouncil. Externally, Muzorewa, Sithole andChikerema formed the African National Congress -Zimbabwe Liberation Council (ANC-ZLC) with minimumZAPU participation. Attempts to obtain control ofZANLA forces in Mozambique and Tanzania failed, andthe ANC-ZLC finally collapsed when the ReverendSithole withdrew his ZANU faction in September 1976.By then Mugabe could claim effective control of boththe original ZANU and ZANLA. The collapse of yetanother attempt at unity prompted Bishop Muzorewa toreturn to a tumultuous welcome in Harare.

On 17 September 1975, Security Force Headquar-ters in Harare announced that 651 insurgents hadbeen killed since December 1972. Security Forceslost 73 members. Although the summer rainy sea-son was approaching, Army commanders were confidentthat the insurgency threat could be contained.During the rainy season insurgent movement was lar-gely screened by the thick foilage. At the same timewater was more plentiful. But this was against thebackground of reports of increased ZANLA and ZPRArecruitment, both voluntary and compulsory. Besidesthe ongoing Protected Village programme, SecurityForce efforts were mainly aimed at easing the acutemanpower shortages facing them.

Government estimates of expenditure tabled inParliament on 25 June 1975 for the financial yearending 30 June 1976, represented the largestincrease in expenditure accountable to Defence yet,from Rh$ 46 mil to Rh$ 57 mil: an increase of 23,5%.Security spending was also included in some othervotes. The estimates of the Ministry of InternalAffairs was increased from Rh$ 4,3 mil to Rh$ 30,94

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History of War

mil which included allocations of Rh$ 1,09 mil foradministration of security measures in border areas,and Rh$ 3,72 mil for counter-insurgency programmes,including administrative bases, Protected Villagesand a security corridor. Of the Rh$ 2,11 mil alloca-ted for road traffic, Rh$ 7,75 mil was earmarked for•special road and bridge works in border areas'.

A final round of talks between Prime MinisterIan Smith and Joshua Nkomo commenced in December1975. These recurrent talks with the ZAPU presidenthad placed a premium on Security Force operationsagainst ZPRA bases in Zambia, as well as on the num-bers of ZPRA insurgents infiltrating Rhodesia. Itwas becoming increasingly apparent that ZAPU wouldsoon have to choose between a political settlementand full-scale war. On the other hand, the Nharirebellion, the death of Herbert Chitepo and theeviction of ZANLA from Zambia seriously affected theZANU war effort during 1975.

At this stage, however, Rhodesia was still on awar footing. Security chiefs and the white popula-tion as a whole refused to believe that the nationa-lists could in any way pose a real threat to 'thebest counter-insurgency force in the world'. Natio-nalist leaders seemed inept in their dealings withPrime Minister Smith and were in general held incontempt by their white counterparts. On the otherhand, the lack of combat sense and skills amongstinsurgent forces when faced by Security Forces ledby white officers, caused an even greater underesti-mation of the nationalist forces in the field. Rho-desian Security Forces had not yet realized that agood kill ratio and tactical ability were not theonly determinants for success.

A factor that was discernable at this stage wasthe lack of central direction and co-ordination ofthe war. The threat was contained on a day-to-daybasis. Few regular Security Force members, and cer-tainly no Rhodesian Front politicians appreciatedthe necessity for a real political settlement as ameans of regaining the initiative on all fronts andthus towards restoring peace. Nevertheless, thefinal stage of the war was fast approaching, forPresident Machel had consolidated his hold on Mozam-bique and totally backed ZANLA. In Zambia, PresidentKaunda had finally concluded that force alone couldsolve the problem. In the west, Botswana, althoughnot actively committed to the struggle, could nothalt the use of its soil as a transit route to andfrom western Rhodesia under Matabele domination. In SouthAfrica the spirit of detente had gained general

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History of War

support, and Prime Minister Vorster had decided topressure his ally into a settlement in theinterests of a peaceful and stable sub-continent.

Although not yet evident, the relative quiet of1975 was at an end. The military intervention of theRepublic of South Africa into Angola early in 1976had foreshadowed the end of detente. As expressed byAnthony Wilkinson:

The effect of South Africa's military involve-ment was to undermine the limited basis oftrust which had been achieved by her apparentlyready acceptance of Mozambique's independenceand which had paved the way for the joint ini-tiative with Zambia on Rhodesia.(23)

1.6 1976 and Dr Henry Kissinger

The extent to which President Machel was committedto the 'liberation' of Rhodesia was soon evident.Rhodesian Security Forces continued to conduct hotpursuit raids into Mozambique. In addition,Rhodesiaeffectively halted all rail traffic into thatcountry in retaliation against the arrest ofRhodesian employees at Malvernia. On 3 March 1976,President Machel closed the borders of his countrywith Rhodesia, banned all land, air and communica-tion links, confiscated Rhodesian property andassets in his country and in effect prepared forwar. Prime Minister Smith had again underestimatedthe commitment of the Frontline states to thestruggle.

Security Forces had already been confronted bya series of renewed incursions from Mozambique,which reportedly included approximately 150 men. Iffinal proof of the extent of the Mozambican commit-ment was still needed, it was provided a mere threemonths later when Harare confirmed on 27 July thatSecurity Forces had clashed with FRELIMO troopsinside Rhodesia. In response, a government officialdisclosed on 28 January that call-ups would beextended to bring force levels up to their formerhigh levels in the North-east. During January toApril 1976, three waves of insurgents crossed intoRhodesia. The first group of about 90 crossed theborder south of Nyamapanda. A second group infiltra-ted the Melsetter area and a third group the south-east.

In a broadcast on 6 February Prime Minister IanSmith warned that Rhodesia was facing the most

27

History of War

serious insurgent threat since the start of the warin 1972. He also warned of the increased burden thatwould have to be placed on the civilian sector asskilled manpower had to be withdrawn for longperiods of operational duty. Some indication of thiswas received three days later when a Security Forcecommunique disclosed that a total of 32 insurgentshad been killed inside Rhodesia during the precee-ding few days. To the public at large it was alsobecoming clear that 1976 would be a difficult year.Reports indicated that 1 000 insurgents were activeinside the country with a further 15 000 in variousstages of preparedness in Mozambique. A second ope-rational area, Operation Thrasher, was designated inFebruary, followed by a third, Operation Repulse, inMay. (See Figure 1.3)

For some time ZANLA had been engaged in expan-ding its area of operations, and had slowly shiftedits offensive southwards. The main infiltrationroutes now ran through the Gona Re Zhou game park inthe South-east. Partly as a result of the CordonSanitaire in the North-east that was now nearingcompletion, ZANLA needed to extent its operationsover as large an area of Rhodesia as possible.Severely hampered by white manpower shortage andpolitically hesitant to increase the black contin-gent of the Army, Rhodesian forces lacked themanpower resources to consolidate their authority inthe ever-increasingly subverted areas. ZANLA also hadother, more specific, objectives. These includedthreatening the main Rhodesian rail link across Beitbridge, which would also have great symbolic value.A second objective was the ZANLA attempt to encroachon the traditional ZAPU power base in Matabeleland.During April it was evident that a second wave ofZANLA insurgents, some 450 in total, had followedthis route. Both the Rutenga-Beit Bridge railway andthe Fort Victoria-Beit Bridge road link were attac-ked. These attacks came as an acute blow to Harare,which had remained relatively complacent, eventhough rife with rumours. The introduction of selec-tive censorship on 26 April and the imposition ofstrict controls on visiting foreign journalists inJuly indicated the extent of government concernabout the effect that a deteriorating securitysituation could have on white morale.

On 15 April 1976, Finance Minister David Smith,announced an interim budget to raise Rh$ 60 mil byhigher taxes on luxury items to help meet the risingcosts of the war. This followed supplementary defenceestimates of Rh$ 3,245 mil tabled in the House of

28

Uistovy of War

Figure 1.3 Delimitation of Operational Areas

29

Hi-story of War

Assembly on 12 February 1976, which had raised thetotal defence vote by 5,7% to Rh$ 60,259 mil for thefinancial year 1975/76.

Between 1971/72 and 1975/76 direct defenceexpenditure had risen by 280%, while related expen-diture also rose dramatically - that of the Depart-ment of Internal Affairs by 320%, the British SouthAfrican Police by 199%, Roads and Traffic by 357%.By 1976/77 defence related expenditure accounted for23% of the total expenditure.

Extended call-up and the extension of the ini-tial period of uninterrupted national service from12 to 18 months with immediate effect signalled thestart of a counter-offensive. But April had shown amarked increase in the number of whites leaving thecountry with a nett loss of 817 for the month, com-pared to 40 for March. In Lusaka, President Kaundawas threatening to open a new front in the nearfuture. By the end of May, the total death toll forthat month stood at a record 231. ZANLA forces werereported to number 1 500 internally and the pre-vious record 11 to 1 kill ratio had dropped to arelatively poor 6 to 1. It almost seemed that theSecurity Forces had also lost their tactical edgeover the insurgents.

It had become clear that white morale was theprimary target of the insurgents, while the militaryaim was to overtax the capabilities of the RhodesianSecurity Forces. The continued call-ups were alreadyhaving a distinctly detrimental effect on whitemorale. Attacks on politically sensitive targetssuch as the southern rail and road links forced thegovernment in Harare to divert further forcestowards protecting these key installations. A fur-ther strain was consequently placed upon the alreadylimited manpower available. A total of 63 Army com-panies were already deployed at this stage (7 560 men)together with about 10 000 members of the BritishSouth African Police.(24) Escalating attacks on theestates and plantations in the Eastern Highlandswere part of this onslaught. By striking at whitecommercial farmers, insurgents were given the addedincentive of hitting the Rhodesian economy at itsmost vulnerable point.

An attack on the Bumi Hills airstrip in north-western Rhodesia on 5 June made it known that ZPRAforces were ready to reopen the long dormant Zambianfront in all earnest. Since talks between the leaderof the Internal ANC, Joshua Nkomo, and Prime Minis-ter Smith had failed, the last restraint on ZAPU waslifted. For some years ZPRA had been bitterly

30

History of Mar

accused by ZANU of intentionally holding its forcesat bay and leaving ZANLA to do all the fighting.While the talks between the Rhodesian Front and ZAPUhad been in progress, ZPRA recruitment and infiltra-tion into Rhodesia had been curtailed, while Hararerefrained from striking at the main ZPRA base campsin Zambia. Now that this tacit agreement had failed,there were signs that the whole western front withBotswana was gradually being activated after nearly18 months of relative peace and quiet.

For some months Security Force commanders hadbeen deeply concerned about intelligence reportsthat indicated a mass of 6 000 ZANLA insurgents pre-paring for an offensive of between 1 000 and 2 000men into Rhodesia at the start of the annual summerrainy season. This would have been the third largeinflux of insurgents within a period of ten months.Some doubt existed as to whether the Security Forceshad the ability to contain this threat. Within theranks of the military there had long been supportfor external raids to eliminate insurgents, wherethey presented a viable target in base and transitcamps. Political caution had tended to forestall anysuch large scale raids which could not reasonably becategorized as 'hot pursuit'. Zambia's membership ofthe Commonwealth further complicated the problem.Already hard pressed to contain the 1 200 insurgentsoperating inside the country, the security chiefswere not confident of their ability to deal with afurther influx of several thousand. Largely as aresult of the visit of the American Secretary ofState, Dr Henry Kissinger, and his peace initiativein general the South African government was vehe-mently opposed to Rhodesia launching external opera-tions against its neighbours. Nevertheless theSelous Scouts were ordered to go ahead with thefirst attack of this kind on the Nyadzonia trainingbase in Mozambique on 8 August 1976. This unit,which specialized in pseudo tactics, had been formedin 1973. It adopted the name Selous Scouts which hadbeen relinquished by the Armoured Car Regiment. TheNyadzonia raid marked the start of a new phase inthe struggle for Rhodesia. Later it spread toZambia, Angola and Botswana ending as a limitedinterdiction campaign during 1979. Besides imme-diate relief to the security situation, externaloperations proved an important factor in bolsteringwhite morale. White emigration for November wasalready running at 1 200.

South African Prime Minister Vorster was, however

31

History of War

not amused.Similar attacks could only serve to finallyscuttle all attempts at reducing tension in the sub-continent. As a result South African military air-craft were withdrawn from Rhodesia while inexplica-ble congestion hampered the railway line to thesouth.

Daring the final months of 1976, food controlmeasures were instituted on an experimental basis asa further element of total population control. Thesemeasures were known as Operation Turkey and werefirst introduced in the Mtepatepa farming areabetween Chiweshe and Madziwa Tribal Trust Lands.Although emergency regulations empowering the con-trol of food supplies were only introduced on 28January 1977, the concept had gained relatively widesupport. Owing to lack of manpower and the absence ofconcurrent population control measures such as totalmovement control, Operation Turkey was, however,limited to white farming areas where the farmercould ration the supply of food to his black workersin the compounds. The rationale behind food controlwas closely related to that of Protected Villages.Food in the Tribal Trust Lands had become less rea-dily available to insurgent forces owing to a gene-ral drought and the movement of locals into Protec-ted Villages. The insurgents had in some areas thusresorted to obtaining sustenance from farm com-pounds. The intention was to further limit eventhese supplies by rationing the farm labourers tothat which was needed, and no more. In general thescheme was ineffective as it relied almost exclu-sively on farmer compliance and regulation, which insome areas such as the ranching farms of Matabele-land, white farmers found impossible to implement.

During a twenty-minute nationwide broadcast on24 September 1976 Rhodesian Prime Minister IanSmith calmly announced the acceptance by hisgovernment of majority rule within two years. Thismarked the high water mark of the Kissinger peaceinitiative. That Smith's acceptance was less thantotal is clearly illustrated in a classified psycho-logical directive issued on 15 October 1976

The National Aim remains unchanged ('To sustaina united and sovereign Rhodesia which guaran-tees a permanent home and equal opportunitiesfor all its communities, which maintainsresponsible government and civilized stan-dards.) (25)

32

History of War

Only a few days previously South African PrimeMinister John Vorster, had reprimanded his Rhodesiancounterpart in Pretoria. The extent of South Africanpressure is best illustrated by the confidentialnotes of a speech given to a closed white audienceby Ted Sutton-Pryce then Deputy Minister in theRhodesian Prime Minister's Office. Inter aliathese read:

Vorster is the bad guy. The reason for the RF(Rhodesian Front) failure was because of pres-sure put on Rhodesia ... Fifty percent of theRhodesian defence bill was paid by South Africaup until June. A reply had not been given sincethen as to whether they would support it for afurther year. There has been a delay on waritems for as long as 2i years. The railway sys-tem is moving very few goods - reported conges-tion. The border was closed over the period ofthe Kissinger talks, 1-4 days. Fuel supply downto 196 days. It is difficult to prove thesefacts as we cannot afford to antagonize SouthAfrica by exposing her ... Against this back-ground they had no alternative but to acceptthe Kissinger package deal.(26)

The Kissinger initiative soon ran into difficulties;chiefly as a result of the American Secretary ofState's high risk diplomacy in promising everythingto everyone, simply to break the deadlock, whilesimultaneously wielding as much political and econo-mic pressure as possible. The various parties star-ted voicing their respective interpretations of theproposals before settling down to talk, thus preju-dicing the Geneva conference that was to conveneunder the chairmanship of Britain's Ivor Richardson 28 October 1976.

1.7 The Patriotic Front

As a prelude to the negotiations, various nationa-list leaders went through what was by now an almostritualistic scramble for power in an effort to com-bine personal ambitions with the strategic necessityof presenting at least a facade of unity in the inter-national area. The unity now achieved under the ban-ner of the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front (PF), however,proved more enduring than any previous attempt.Although both ZANU and ZAPU changed their namesseveral times they had remained essentially

33

History of War

unaltered. As recounted above ZAPU had alreadyattempted to establish an internal base within Rho-desia by attempting to gain control of the middlerank structure of the African National Council.Having less of a single tribal basis than eitherZANU or ZAPU, the Council was still the party mostrepresentative of the black Rhodesian population asa whole. ZANU had become increasingly dominated bythe Karanga tribe - a process completed in the HighCommand by March 1975, when all five of the elected memberswere from the Karanga tribe. ZAPU, on the otherhand, had fallen almost completely under Ndebeledominance. To both Nkomo and Mugabe the PatrioticFront was thus a unity of convenience. For, whileRobert Mugabe lacked his co-leader's internationalpolitical standing, ZANLA had by far the largestarmed force. As each party represented a major powerblock within Rhodesia, the Patriotic Front wasstructurally complementary. Nkomo had in fact beentaking part in tentative talks with the external ANCin Botswana on the establishment of a united front.The tumultuous welcome accorded Bishop Muzorewa atHarare airport by some 100 000 blacks on 3 Octoberled to Nkomo leaving Rhodesia for Lusaka and thenDar-es-Salaam, where the formation of the PatrioticFront was jointly announced on 9 October. WithinRhodesia Nkomo desperately needed to improve histarnished nationalist political image which had beendamaged after his talks with Ian Smith ended infailure during March.

Unified in name only, ZANLA and ZPRA werejointly to be known as ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army)which had already been formed during November 1975by the so-called Frontline states (Zambia, Angola,Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana) and the Organiza-tion of Africa Unity's African Liberation Committee.This was an attempt to bypass the nationalist poli-tical leaders and unify the armed struggle. ZIPA wasalso known as the Third Force.

As explained by Dr Masipula Sithole,

Originally, ZIPA had a High Command of 18 men,9 from ZANU and 9 from ZAPU. Clashes ensued.After a few weeks of joint operations, the sur-viving ZAPU men withdrew from ZIPA in Mozambi-que and fled to Zambia, where they have largelyremained. Thus, ZIPA, as a joint ZANU-ZAPUenterprise remained in name only. The frontlinestates and the Liberation Committee encouragedand endorsed the creation of the PatrioticFront with (sic) the hope that political

34

History of War

leadership would cement ZANU-ZAPU guerrillas inZIPA. But this did not work. The ZAPU army ...(ZPRA) remained in Zambia, while the ZANU army(ZANLA) remained in Mozambique.(27)

Even as the ill-fated Geneva talks continued intoDecember, it was clear that the insurgent onslaughton Rhodesia was intensifying. During October 131insurgents had been killed, one of the highestmonthly totals since 1972. Once again it had becomeobvious that a concerted effort was being made toundermine white morale as white farms and governmentbuildings had become prime targets for insurgents.

On 4 November Ian Smith returned to Harare,stating that if the Geneva talks failed, he wouldattempt an internal settlement with moderate blackleaders. Geneva had already failed, however, and theofficial Christmas recess which started on 14 Decem-ber only served to confirm the impasse.

1 .8 1977: ZPRA intensifies the War

Within weeks the new year provided evidence that thewar was rapidly intensifying. Incidents along boththe Botswana and Mozambique borders gave a clearindication that 1977 would be particularly difficult.The five Frontlines states met in Luanda on 9January and declared their full and unqualified sup-port for the Patriotic Front. In effect this endor-sed the armed struggle as a vehicle for settlementand forced Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the ReverendNdabaningi Sithole into political obscurity. As theyear progressed it became clear that Nkomo was des-perately trying to match his political stature withan equal military capability. ZANU's armed wing,ZANLA, had been carrying by far the greater burdenof the war effort against the Smith regime, as canclearly be seen when comparing casualty figures forthe various operational areas (see Table 1.1). Thefigures for ZANLA's traditional areas of influence,Hurricane, Thrasher and Repulse are much higherthan those for Tangent, ZPRA's established domain.

35

History of War

Insurgents• Operation Security Forces. Hurricane Civilians

Total

InsurgentsOperation Security ForcesThrasher Civilians

Total

InsurgentsOperation Security ForcesRepulse Civilians

Total

InsurgentsOperation Security ForcesTangent Civilians

Total

Kil

led

1 033106525

1 664

35941269669

2622996387

18143668

Mis

sin

g

44

1

1

77

33

Wou

nded

769740

1 509

324263587

138104242

303767

Ca

ptu

red

372

372

46

46

53

53

13

13T

ota

l

1 405875

1 2693 549

405366532

1 303

315167207689

314476151

TABLE 1.1; Casualty figures per Operational Area upto 30 January 1977

Note: Operation Tangent was only officially designa-ted during August 1977.

The disparity between their respective war effortshad led to considerable friction between ZANU andZAPU. The attitude of the Frontline states had madeit clear to ZAPU president Nkomo that any politicalfuture and power had to lie within the confines ofthe Patriotic Front, as such armed forces were thedecisive factor. Nkomo thus forfeited his negotia-ting power vis-a-vis Harare and wasted littletime in building up the ZPRA armed forces from anembryo liberation movement into a fully trained andcapable army of a largely conventional nature.February saw the first sign of this; reports indica-ted increased recruitment by ZAPU in western

36

History of War

Rhodesia, via Botswana. The most dramatic examplewas the abduction of approximately 400 pupils fromthe Manama Secondary School in south-western Rhode-sia. Only 51 of the 384 students elected to returnto Rhodesia after personal appeals by their parents.This was followed on 16 February by the proclamationof the first 'no-go' area along the border withBotswana. Although Botswana did not become an activetraining area for insurgents as did Zambia, Mozambi-que, Angola and Tanzania, it was slowly developinginto an established transit area from which recruitsand abductees were forwarded (mostly by air) totraining camps in Zambia and Angola. The returnroute into Rhodesia was usually back through Bots-wana, down the Grove road and into western Rhodesia.Although Sir Seretse Khama did not choose to bringBotswana from Frontline status into the front lineitself, his commitment to the armed strugglestrengthened perceptibly. While there was no primafacie case to be made against Botswana as to theharbouring and training of insurgents, Rhodesianauthorities hesitated to open an active third frontin view of the burden already imposed upon theirSecurity Forces.

Until 1978, ZPRA infiltration into Matabelelandhad been relatively limited, for Nkomo had decidedon a risky strategy. As from 1977, ZPRA wasdivided into two forces, a smaller insurgentforce, and a large, mostly external, conventionalarmy stationed in Zambia. The relative cohesion ofthe Matabele ethnic grouping was reflected in thecohesion of ZAPU as against the divisions withinZANU. Nkomo's traditional tribal base was secureand, aware of the historical animosity that existedbetween Shona and Matabele, he appreciated the dif-ficulty of making inroads into Shona territory.Since the Matabele represented only twenty percentof the Rhodesian black population, it seemedobvious that ZAPU would have to resort to othermeans to reassert its dominance over the Shona majo-rity. This could only be effected by force of arms.

In contrast to ZANU, which had committed all itsforces to Rhodesia, consolidating its power base andeven attempting to infringe on that of ZAPU, Nkomo'sforces were training and waiting en masse in Zambiaand Angola. Had the war reached the final stage ofinsurgency, that of mobile warfare, the outcome ofthe Lancaster House talks might have been quite dif-ferent. By early 1978 ZPRA was reported to be 8 000strong, and growing, with Cuban instructors basedin Angola responsible for much of the training. In

37

History of War

SUBDIVISION OF ZPRA OPS AREAS

AREA 1 - BeiraKaribaChirundu

AREA 2 - BingaVictoria Falls

- Mupane

AREA 3 - Bulawayo- Gwanda

Nuanetsi

SUBDIVISION OF ZANLA OPS AREAS

TETE - NehandaChamnukaTakawiraChitepo

MANICA

Confirmed Insurgent InfiltrationRoutes

TangwenaMonomotapaMusikavanhu

Sector 1Sector 2Sector 3Sector 4

Figure 1.4 Insurgent Infiltration Routes

38

History of War

Lusaka a number of high ranking Soviet offi-cers had,taken control of ZPRA strategy.

Prime Minister Ian Smith was apparently influen-ced by the strong stand taken by his security chiefs andrejected Ivor Richards' final proposals on 24January 1977, which effectively ended the Kissingerinitiative. The British envoy had already given anindication of future trends the previous day byruling out British recognition of any internal set-tlement - even one elected by means of a landslidevictory. Both Nkomo and Mugabe had also made itclear that they were no longer interested in theproposals made by Richards and the latter had nochoice but to end his mission. In the meantime,across the Atlantic, the rise to power of PresidentJimmy Carter and that of his United Nations repre-sentative, Andrew Young, indicated a significantshift in American foreign policy concerning the sur-viving white regimes in Black Africa.

Within Rhodesia the bush war had reached a newintensity with the massacre of Roman Catholic mis-sionaries on 6 February at St Paul's mission,Musami. The onslaught against the morale of thewhites was about to be intensified to an unpreceden-ted level bringing the war closer to the urban whitecommunities than at any time before.

For the first time since the start of the war,cracks seemed to appear in the cohesion of the Rho-desian Front Party as a result of the intensifyingwar. During February Minister of Defence ReginaldCowper resigned,ostensibly as a result of the con-troversy surrounding new call-up measures. The tightrein kept on the running of the war by the PrimeMinister, sometimes to the exclusion of his Ministerof Defence, later proved to be the real reason forCowper's resignation. Further dissension occurredwhen Prime Minister Smith forced through the LandTenure Amendment Bill during March, whereby whiteagricultural land was opened for purchase by allraces. A group of twelve dissident Rhodesian Frontmembers opposed the Bill and Smith had to rely on thevotes of six African Members of Parliament to have itpassed. Predictably this led to a cabinet reshuffleon 10 March.

By late March 1977 the Rhodesian governmentadmitted that the insurgency had developed into afull scale revolutionary onslaught. This was confir-med by the formation of Combined Operations Head-quarters (COMOPS) and the announcement on 23 Marchthat the senior army officer at each Joint Opera-tions Centre (JOC) would assume command of counter-

39

History of

insurgency operations in his designated area.Against a background of strenuous efforts to tightenthe call-up system, the announcement was made thatthe death toll in the four year campaign had passedthe four thousand mark and stood at 4 044. Of these,79 were white civilians, 1 394 black civilians, 292Security Force members and 2 279 insurgent fatali-ties (inside Rhodesia only) . By 6 April officialestimates totalled some 2 500 insurgents operatinginside Rhodesia with 520 in Operation Hurricane,1 000 in Thrasher, 650 in Repulse and 220 in Tan-gent. The latter operational area encompassed thesouth-western and much of the western area of Rho-desia. It was officially proclaimed during August1977, to counter ZPRA infiltration from Botswana.

The Protected Village programme was graduallyextended along the eastern border with Mozambique.Meanwhile, in a nationwide address on 3 April thenew commander COMOPS , Lieutenant-General Peter Wallsannounced the start of a fresh 'hearts and minds'campaign among the black population. Although asmall number of territorial officers had been enga-ged in promoting both civil action and psychologicalaction, very little success could be claimed withinthe ranks of either regular or territorial members.Their efforts, however, were formalized in the crea-tion of 1 Psychological Operations Unit on 1 July1977. In general, however, psychological operationsexecuted in Rhodesia proved a failure. They wereaimed at convincing the blacks to support the whiteregime instead of attempting to change white racialviews as a prelude to any such support. That Rhodesiaentirely lacked any grasp of the dynamics of therevolutionary threat facing her is nowhere more per-fectly evidenced than by the statement of the thenMinister of Information P. K. van der Byl in which he,in hindsight, said

I wanted to step up the use of the bayonetthat's the most effective propaganda - thebayonet . (28)

Van der Byl was, as Minister of Information, in con-trol of the majority of psychological operations.

In the meanwhile the roving Owen-Young settle-ment initiative had been gaining momentum. Despitesome alarmingly naive political views, AmbassadorAndrew Young did, however, see that: 'if you want tostop the fighting you have to talk to the peoplewith the guns .'(30)

Both Young and British Foreign Secretary Dr

40

History of War

David Owen had toured the Frontline states to gainimpressions and to gather support for their propo-sals. Dr Owen arrived in Harare on 15 April to pre-pare for the Anglo-American consultative team whichwas to arrive on 26 May. These talks soon ran intodifficulties. As the year progressed it became appa-rent that neither Ian Smith nor the Patriotic Frontwas interested in what could be offered. Smithfavoured an internal settlement with moderate blacknationalist leaders. To this end the ReverendNdabaningi Sithole was allowed to return to Rhodesiaon 10 July. This followed talks with RhodesianGovernment officials in Malawi regarding a coalitionbetween himself and Bishop Muzorewa.

It seemed that Prime Minister Smith had at lastbecome convinced of the necessity for a politicalsettlement, although with defunct black nationalistfigures. By now the Reverend Sithole had lost alleffective control over both ZANU and ZANLA, as wellas any backing he might have had from members of theFrontline states. Following both Organisation ofAfrica Unity and Frontline endorsement of thePatriotic Front and its leadership, Bishop Muzorewahad also been left without any external support. Thewhite general election fought in Rhodesia on 31August was also aimed at obtaining a mandate for apossible internal settlement, as well as crushingthe right wing Rhodesian Action Party.

In a White Paper dated 1 September 1977, theBritish government published Anglo-American propo-sals for a Rhodesian settlement. Field Marshal LordCarver was nominated as resident commissioner desig-nate for the transition period. Prime MinisterSmith's response was characteristic:'We have hadcrazy proposals before and managed to shrug them offand go on.1 (31 )

Yet the proposed internal settlement wasdelayed in view of the new proposals. At the sametime a third prominent black nationalist leaderreturned to Rhodesia, the veteran James Chikerema.He subsequently became Vice-president of BishopMuzorewa's United African National Council (UANC).In an effort both to divide the Patriotic Front andto obtain the concurrence of 'the men with the guns'a highly secretive approach by Smith to Nkomo failedduring October.

During this time Lord Carver and the UnitedNations appointee, General Prem Chand, had run intodistinct difficulties on their tour of Southern Africa.Finally disillusioned with the Anglo-American propo-sals, Prime Minister Smith announced on 26 November

41

History of War

that he accepted majority rule as a preliminary tobeginning internal settlement negotiation. Thusended the last attempt at a negotiated internationalsettlement before the Lancaster House deliberations.

Inevitably, the war for Rhodesia had forcedSmith's hand in the intervening months. By the mid-dle of 1977 it had spread across the entire country.Although large scale external operations into Zambiaonly began during 1978, Smith had, to PresidentKaunda's extreme chagrin, used the 'good offices' ofthe British government to warn Zambia, some monthsearlier, that pre-emptive strikes could be laun-ched against insurgent bases in his country. TheZambian leader promptly responded on 16 May 1977, byplacing his country on a war footing. Tension alongthe common Rhodesian-Zambian border rose dramati-cally, as was also the case along Rhodesia's easternborder. In the case of Mozambique, external opera-tions had now come to be accepted as a primary ele-ment in Security Force strategy. As with the Mapaiand Tembue raids on 24 and 25 November the main jus-tification from a military point of view was theelimination of the potential threat before the startof the annual summer rains. In the case of bothcountries, the initially spectacular results obtai-ned from external operations did not last indefi-nitely. After the first Chimoio raid into Mozambique(1976), and as from late 1978 in Zambia, insurgentforces were quick to adapt their base camp strategyto counter the methods used by Rhodesian Army andAir Force elements during these raids.

Internally, sporadic insurgent activity surfa-ced around the central plateau towns of Que Que,Gweru and Shangani, and even the major urban centresof Harare and Bulawayo no longer seemed entirelysafe. Facing the grim prospect of urban terrorism,precautionary measures became a way of life. Newoperational areas flourished. The great touristattraction and holiday resort of Lake Kariba wasdesignated Operation Splinter, for ZPRA infiltrationacross the lake in rubber dingies had become toowidespread to ignore. During August the central pro-vince of Midlands officially became Operation Grap-ple, bearing silent witness to the spread of insur-gency across the country. Largely as an administra-tive and logistic unit, the urban area surroundingHarare was designated Salops (Salisbury Operations).In rural areas the local administration was fastapproaching almost total collapse. Insurgent forceshad launched a concerted campaign to close allschools, hospitals, clinics, and in fact all local

42

History of hfar

representation or symbols of government authority.By July some 300 schools, mostly in Operation Hurri-cane, had already been forced to close, leaving morethan 40 000 children without schools. The most deva-stating success by ZANLA unsurgents was a bombexplosion at a Woolworth store in Harare on 7 August1977. Eleven people were killed and more than 70injured. Although nearly all casualties were black,the war had become a sudden reality to people in thecities. As a barometer of white morale, white emigra-tion during August exceeded immigration by 1 006.

By November 1977, insurgent strengths withinthe various operational areas were as follows:

Operation Hurricane 904Operation Thrasher 1 500Operation Repulse 1 650Operation Tangent 932Operation Grapple 180Salops 50Total Insurgents 5 216

With the onset of the annual summer rainy season,monthly incidents had risen from 479 (October), to540 (November) to 642 (December) and 763 (January1978). During February 1978 the monthly tally fellto 579 and stabilized at well over 500 incidents permonth. While the total number of trained insurgentsboth inside and outside Rhodesia had almost trebledbetween early 1976 and late 1977, internal insurgentcasualties for 1976 were 1 244 killed and 160 cap-tured against 1 770 killed and 219 captured for1977. Purely statistically, the security situationwas deteriorating with each passing month. The mostcritical Security Force commodity was manpower andthat seemed dangerously limited. The major source ofmanpower remained the mobilisation of reserves. Thecall-up eventually encompassed all able-bodied whitemen between 18 and 60 years of age. All white youthsbetween 18 and 25 were liable for conscription whichincreased from 12 to 18 months. Eventually the eightbattalions of the Rhodesia Regiment with a strengthon paper of 15 000 provided the backbone of the Ter-ritorial Army. Its counterpart in the British SouthAfrica Police, the Police Reserve, became a reposi-tory for less able and older men.

In April 1977 conscription was extended to the38 to 50 age group and exemptions were severelyreduced. The maximum call-up for those under 38 wasincreased to 190 days a year: those older than 50were asked to volunteer for police duties. In

43

History of War

September of the same year a short service schemewas introduced whereby the government encouragednational servicemen to stay on for another year byoffering a Rh$ 100 a month bonus. But even suchinducements could not solve the problem of a dwind-ling white reservoir of manpower and an ever increa-sing enemy.

The year 1977 ended in a spectacular way for theinsurgent forces with a bold although unsuccessfulattack on Grand Reef Air Base near Mutare on 18December.

1.9 The Internal Settlement

Meanwhile internal settlement talks had duly begunon 9 December 1977, against a background succinctlydescribed in the Financial Times:

Yet a combination of factors now makes aninternal settlement appear more possible thanat any time in the past ... perhaps most impor-tant of all, the four parties engaged in thediscussions fear that if they fail, they willbecome increasingly irrelevant to the out-come. (32)

The internal talks in Harare resumed on 3 January1978, after a Christmas recess and the PatrioticFront sought desperately to thwart the momentum thatseemed to be building up from Prime Minister Smith'sprojected settlement with moderate black leaders.Talks ensued in Malta with both British and Americanrepresentatives, while the threat of losing theinternational initiative led to attempts by bothNkomo and Mugabe to solidify their two factionswithin a single political and military structure. Asbefore, however, politics, personalities, tribalismand ambition precluded any really integrated struc-ture.

On 15 February Harare announced that an eightpoint agreement had been reached as a basis for amajority rule government. This was followed by fur-ther discussions concerning the composition of thefuture defence force and the structure of the con-stitutional government. Against the background ofBritish scepticism, American comdemnation andPatriotic Front rejection, Ian Smith, Bishop AbelMuzorewa, the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and Cheri-miah Chirau signed on 3 March 1978, what was tobecome known as the Internal Settlement Agreement.

44

History of War

White minority rule effectively came to an end inRhodesia with a Transitional Government ruling thecountry until majority rule was instituted on 31December 1978. In the interim an Executive Councilconsisting of the four signatories governed thecountry with black/white parity in the MinisterialCouncil. Although the internal leaders had left thedoor to negotiations with the Patriotic Front ajar,it was evident that a final effort was under waytowards a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute.

The Agreement of 3 March was based on two pri-mary objectives: the first was the achievement ofinternational recognition; the second an end to thewar. Recognition was to be achieved by presenting theoutside world with the results from a free and fairelection which bore witness to the support these threeblack parties had amongst the black population.

On the one hand an end to the war flowed fromthe internal political initiative, and on the otherfrom the support Bishop Muzorewa and ReverendSithole claimed to have within the ranks of theinsurgents. The two aims were closely linked. Whenthe one failed to materialize so did the other.

In an attempt to benefit at an early stage fromthe momentum of the settlement talks, the first fullscale safe return programme, including an amnestyoffer, was announced by Harare on 20 January to berepeated on 2 May. Both proved futile gestures.Intelligence reports indicated that the achievementof majority rule under an internal settlement couldlead to possibly hundreds of insurgents making useof the amnesty offer. It soon became apparent thatconclusive proof would first have to be given thatthe agreement was to achieve international recogni-tion and the lifting of sanctions. Any suchoffer of leniency had of necessity to be made from aposition of strength and at a time that insurgentdefeat seemed only a matter of time. This was hardlythe case within Rhodesia at the time. DuringFebruary, when the eight point plan agreement wasannounced, insurgent strengths were as follows:

OperationOperationOperationOperationOperationSalops

Total

HurricaneThrasherRepulseTangentGrapple

ZANLA

11

4

71092061024014025

645

ZPRA110-10

57023825

953

TOTAL

11

5

82092062081037850

598

45

History of War

By March, the total stood at 6 456. At the same timeblack nationalists, who had now obtained both execu-tive and Cabinet status, realized that having linkedtheir fortunes to that of their former enemies, theforces of their external nationalist 'allies' wouldat least have to be held at bay until the politicalinitiative overtook events. To this end externaloperations against Botswana and Zambia were steppedup, and it almost seemed that the new black/whitegovernment in Harare was set to fight an even moreruthless war than had the previous all-white regime.Nevertheless, reports indicated that ZAPU recruit-ment in western Matabeleland was continuing unaba-ted, with more than 10 000 recruits airlifted fromBotswana to Zambia. The abduction of 420 black chil-dren from the Methodist School at Tegwani onceagain provided substantiating evidence to thiseffect. By June, Prime Minister Smith was publiclyexpressing his disappointment over the resultsachieved by the Internal Settlement, and appealed toBritain for recognition.

Despite the repeated demands of the internalblack leaders, very little was done for five crucialmonths towards the removal of discriminatory measu-res, owing to Rhodesian Front resistance. Much ofthe international momentum gained towards recogni-tion of events in Harare was thus lost. Only on 10October was an announcement made, envisaging an endto racial discrimination in schools, hospitals andresidential areas. In the first of yet anotherseries of shocks to white morale, twelve missiona-ries were massacred by ZANLA insurgents at the ElimPentecostal Mission on 3 June. In what seemed partof a concerted campaign, officials from BishopMuzorewa's United Africa National Council attemp-ting to explain the internal agreement to the ruralblack population were also killed. In the periodJanuary to June alone, some 20 000 black Rhodesiansfled into Botswana, while figures released duringSeptember indicated that 4 664 insurgents had beenkilled since the start of the war in December 1972.Nearly 550 members of the Security Forces had alsolost their lives during the same period. On 4 Sep-tember white morale received its second shock whenit was reported that an Air Rhodesia Viscount hadbeen shot down by a SA-7 ground-to-air missile andthat ten of the eighteen survivors had subsequentlybeen massacred by ZPRA insurgents.

This incident had two direct results. On 12 Sep-tember it was announced that martial law was to beintroduced. People in the affected areas had hence-

46

History of War

forth to comply with and obey all regulations,orders and instructions issued by officers ofgovernment and the Security Forces. Special militarycourts-martial were empowered to impose any sentence,including capital punishment, on any person who com-mitted an act relating to what was simply describedas 'terrorism1 within the martial law areas. Thisalso applied to those who impeded the suppressionof insurgency or the maintenance of law, order andpublic safety.

Executive officers of the Government, the mili-tary forces and other security forces of theGovernment and its other servants employed toassist the Government are hereby vested withfull and complete powers and authority to doall things in their judgement proper and neces-sary. (33)

By early November almost a half of Rhodesia had beenplaced under martial law. Three weeks later this hadbeen extended to roughly 70% of the country. By Sep-tember 1979, 90% of the country was under this law.

Although Security Forces were accorded widediscretionary powers by the institution of martiallaw, the Rhodesian armed forces were no longer ableto enforce compliance. Having delayed the institu-tion of martial law, the security situation had beenallowed to deteriorate to such an extent that theavailable manpower was totally inadequate to copewith the threat.

The second, and potentially the most seriousresult of the Viscount massacre, was that resentmentamongst the white population forced Prime MinisterIan Smith to halt all talks with Joshua Nkomo, lea-der of ZAPU, at a time that these had seemed on theverge of success. An agreement with Nkomo at thiscritical stage could possibly have tilted thebalance of international recognition in favour ofthe Transitional Government. The massacre had occur-red the day after Smith and Nkomo admitted they hadmet in secret.

Internally, the momentum gained from the inter-nal settlement seemed to be slipping away slowly asan increasing number of reports told of a generalblack apathy towards the Transitional Government. Ascheme to open Protected Villages soon ran into dif-ficulties as it became evident that this only servedto further loosen the precarious grip the governmenthad on the rural populace. The latter, in fact, boresilent witness to the general failure of the

47

History of

Protected Village programme. Standards of livingamong the local population had declined instead ofrising while they were concentrated in these villa-ges, resulting in a general belief that life outsidethe Protected Village was better. The reverse wasthe only guarantee for the success of the ProtectedVillage scheme as a whole. The inability of the newgovernment to abide by the 31 December target forthe achievement of majority rule seemed further tounderline the relatively leisurely pace at whichRhodesia's leaders were seeking an internationallyrecognised settlement. On 29 October an officialannouncement was made setting a new timetable forachieving majority rule. Black elections were nowscheduled for April 1979. According to Ian Smith thedelay was entirely due to 'mechanical problems'. But1978 had seen one promising development, that of theSecurity Force Auxiliaries. Although not in accordwith the initial idea, the Auxiliary scheme encom-passed the formation of private political forcesloyal to Bishop Muzerewa and the Reverend Sitholerespectively. When Special Branch initiated thescheme the idea was to provide villages with theirown local militia for protection. After a pilotscheme started in Msana Tribal Trust Lands early in1978 proved highly successful the scheme was expan-ded. By the end of that year the Security ForceAuxiliaries numbered over 2 000 men.

Although some serious mistakes were made duringthe execution of the Security Force Auxiliary scheme,this represented the first broad attempt by theauthorities to regain and consolidate their hold onthe Tribal Trust Lands. This vital element of provi-ding permanent and participatory protection at locallevel had always been lacking in Security Forcestrategy. Numerous 'search and destroy' operationswere conducted, but a 'clear and hold '-type opera-tion had never been introduced in a satisfactorymanner. In the months preceding the April 1979 elec-tions, every possible effort was made to field,recruit, train and deploy as many Security ForceAuxiliaries as possible. Their success was validatedin no uncertain terms by the April 1979 electionresults.

Those insurgents considering support for theinternal settlement were encouraged to join theSecurity Forces. To facilitate this, an intensivepropaganda campaign was launched to present theseforces as consisting of ex-insurgents that had deci-ded to support the Transitional Government. Whilethis was initially the case to a certain extent, the

48

History of

majority of Auxiliary members were recruited by thepolitical parties themselves.

Following the Viscount massacre any agreementwith ZAPU was now ruled out and amidst increasedreports of an alarming build-up of ZPRA forces withinZambia as from 21 October. Rhodesian armed forceslaunched their deepest air raid yet on insurgentbases at Chikunbi, Mkushi, Old Mkushi and Mborama.The reasons for these operations before the summerrains lay in the extension of martial law announcedon 31 October to include most of Matabeleland, thetraditional ZAPU power base. These areas were beinginfiltrated on an increased scale from the basesmentioned above.

White morale was obviously declining rapidly.During December white emigration recorded a nettloss of 2 771 emigrants, while the total loss for1978 stood at 13 709. On 11 December ZANLA insur-gents attacked the central oil storage depot in theheart of Harare's industrial site. The resultingfire lasted six days and destroyed tens of millionlitres of precious fuel. Harare was aghast. Guaran-tees as to white pensions, property, jobs and thelike that Prime Minister Smith had extracted fromhis three black co-leaders and detailed within theproposed constitution for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia seemedof little consequence to a white population havingto fight an increasingly desperate war.

A concise statement of the eminently successfulinsurgent strategy that had been followed during1978 reads as follows:

The PF strategy is to undermine government con-trol over the population in three ways. Firstis disruption of internal administration andgovernmental services ... The second ... iscomplete intimidation of the populace. Oneobjective is to break down the traditionalauthority, with its implied replacement, ulti-mately by some new form of social organisation.The other objective is to demonstrate govern-ment inability to provide security ... The'third part of PF strategy is to render theentire counterinsurgency effort of the govern-ment cost ineffective.(34)

The year 1979 held little hope for the whites inRhodesia. Black conscription produced a poor 300recruits out of 1 544 drafted. Call-ups for whiteswere extended to all men aged between 50 and 59,each of whom had to serve 42 days of the year, while

49

History of War

History of

government announced at it was examining^wa^ tightening deferment and exempt F fc Qf yiew

only promising news from the se * Auxiliarieswas the success that the Securi y ^ Manyeniwere having in M"na'C^nSruary a second Air RhoTribal Trust Lands . On l£ ** * gA_7 missiledesia Viscount was brought down y ^ board>

resulting in the_death of all F *8 to Januaryin the short period from Decem had risen1979 insurgent numbers msa.de Kno %) _

Jrom 8 954 to 11 1J3 an x ncr ease Jf indicated .below, the whole o± * insurgentdivided into °Pera ° Lr

rhad the highest densityforces. Operation Thrasher haa u5)

of insurgents at *J" ***9vis-a-vis the newly publi-shed cons ion af wfll- iTHed by Martin

Meredith:

The welfare of the whit es wa, .Smiths cancan-He did not perceive <* fche tim black

the internal se ttlement P f f^urable enoughleaders needed to win term biack popu_for them to be *ble to conv ™f was takinglation that a real transf er °£ P Instead heplace which merited their supp & Q^_

rone-vote it'wasthe turn of the nationa-lists to make concessions. (35)

This wasseats

=5dhfd Scur fa a e t o for white power for

3 Sifst hfbackground of aattack

gon the ZPRA training basethe Security rce apparatu « J had witnes-gest build-up ofD

f°" 1c Front threats to disruptsed. To counter Patriotic^ rron duled for Aprii,the elections tnat nau ^ " :ged to unprecedentedSecurity Force number s w ere r in fche six yearslevels, in fact for the £ir whifce populatlon

of war, at least in terms or regulars andRhodesia was mobilized Leave r ts was can-civilians with Security Force co 6() Q00

Curfews were extended . oy ^ MarchPersonnel were in th e d

o£fer was onceS March provided

\ ,•* GWANDA ~* \tec-JanS\^ ^^. — ^\ Dec-Jan 5,0-50 "" SECTOR 2 \

1 340-230 ^ ""- -*Dec-Jan, ^^^SECTOR 3 A624_11

""-- SECTOR 4 ^%^;Jf^4 \ /( Dec-Jan ^b4-l<; 4 ^ /

*^v 340-230 \ J>

ZPRAZANLA

TOTAL

TOTALDEC

1 6967 256

8 952

TOTALJAN

1 9069 277

11 183

INCREASE

2102 021

2 231

Figure 1.5 Increase in Insurgent Numbers:

Dec. 1978 to Jan. 1979

51

50

History of WarHistory of War

a rare public example of the personality clashesthat were so prevalent within the ranks of thesenior Security Force commanders. The Commander ofthe Army, Lieutenant-General Hickman was dismissedfor 'disciplinary1 reasons. Ostensibly this was asthe result of a clash between General Hickman andLieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly, the commander of theSelous Scouts. In fact, however, the reasons wererooted more deeply than the bugging of the colonel'stelephone as part of investigations on an allegedcharge of game poaching. This kind of clash wasquite common among senior Army commanders as wellas amongst Internal Affairs, Special Branch and Bri-tish South African Police officials. This bickeringhampered the smooth functioning of the defence appa-ratus as a whole.

Prior to the elections, Rhodesian forces laun-ched a daring Land Rover raid into Lusaka on 13April. Although Nkomo was not killed in the attackon his home, the operation was a definite blow toboth ZPRA and Zambia. At the same time the KasangulaFerry, the only link between Botswana and Zambia, wassunk in the most audacious raid yet into Botswana.Then, during the first days of April, having delayedthe announcement for as long as possible for secu-rity reasons, Harare announced that polling wouldbegin on 17 April. Although Patriotic Front forcesattacked 18 of the 932 polling stations, none wasclosed.

When the final results of the election wereannounced on 24 April Bishop Muzorewa's United Afri-can National Council had taken 67% of the totalvote, the Reverend Sithole's ZANU 16,5% and ChiefChirau's ZUPO, 6%. An astounding 64,45% of thevoting population had cast their votes. (35) Inter-national recognition seemed only a hairsbreath away.Insurgent casualties internally had shot up from 208during February 1979, to 423 for March and nearlyreaching 650 during April. Intelligence reportsindicated that the massive electoral support obtai-ned by Bishop Muzorewa had led to literally hundredsof insurgcntc v.'aiting for an indication of interna-tional recognition before making use of the amnestyoffer. Yet the momentum that had been restored tothe floundering internal solution slowed down almostimmediately. With nearly all available white man-power mobilized, the Rhodesian economy was approach-ing stagnation. The result was that demobilizationof forces commenced very soon after the elections.The intense pressure that had been brought to bearon insurgent forces eased, and as it did, so did the

incentive to make use of any amnesty offer. TheSecurity Forces were, however, themselves totallymisled by the election results. Instead of realizingthat essentially the black people had voted forpeace, a classified Army briefing document simplis-tically stated:

Subversion. The high election poll (63,9%)indicates that the terrorists have not subver-ted the African population to the degree some-times believed. As 65% of the African popula-tion live in the rural areas, and 60% of thetotal vote came from rural areas, the indica-tion is that only 5% of adults in the ruralareas support, or are totally dominated by theterrorists. Most of their support in ruralareas seems to come from irresponsible youths(Mujibas).

The Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, astounded by thelack of support for his party, condemned the elec- -tion as a fraud and refused to participate in thegovernment. Prior to the elections, Special Branchhad predicted the number of seats he would win withamazing precision. Convinced, however, of his ownprowess and stature as nationalist leader, ReverendSithole had rejected these alarming findings. TheReverend saw himself as the natural alternative tothe rather inept and bumbling Bishop, but in realityhe had lost all control over both ZANU and ZANLA.His sole support was amongst that of his own tribe,the Ndau, along the eastern border.

In reaction to the election results, the lea-ders of the two most committed Frontline countries,Presidents Kaunda and Machel met in Maputo to dis-cuss the fragile unity of the Patriotic Front. Lit-tle resulted, although the two Patriotic Front co-leaders did announce in Addis Ababa during May theformation of a single constitution and joint commandfor military operations.

Once political initiative had started to ebb,the weight of the 2 500 to 3 000 ZPRA and 10 000 toi i uuu ZANLA insurgents inside the country againbegan to take its toll. To counter this, COMOPSstepped up the frequency of external operations.Raids into the heart of Lusaka and deep into Mozam-bique appeared to become an almost weekly occurrence.

While the election of President Carter hadannounced a US foreign policy severely hostile tothe Smith regime, the election of Mrs MargaretThatcher as British Prime Minister on 3 May, seemed

52 53

History of War

to indicate a less hostile British policy. Thechoice, however, of Lord Carrington as ForeignSecretary instead of Francis Pyra was the first signthat a Conservative Government of Britain might notnecessarily be sympathetic to Rhodesia. Furtherindication of this was received during the Common-wealth Heads of State Conference held in Lusakaduring August. It soon became apparent that Conser-vative government policy regarding the government ofNational Unity in Rhodesia was based on expediencyrather than principle. Yet the release of the Boydand Drinkwater reports on the Rhodesian electionsencouraged optimism as to the chances of Britishrecognition. Meanwhile, at one minute past midnighton 1 June, the Republic of Rhodesia ceased to existas the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Constitution came intoeffect, to last a total of 195 days.

Other internal developments were also havingtheir own effects. Disciplinary problems withinSecurity Force Auxiliaries loyal to the ReverendSithole led to Security Forces killing 183 Auxilia-ries in Gokwe Tribal Trust Land during June. Withinthe ruling United African National Council (UANC)Prime Minister Muzorewa had also run into difficul-ties. During July James Chikerema and 7 UANC Membersof Parliament broke away to form the Zimbabwe Demo-cratic Party (ZDP) as a Zezuru tribal grouping. Thiseffectively stripped the UANC of Parliamentry con-trol, reducing its share of the total 100 seats to44. Prime Minister Muzorewa was once again dependenton the 28 white Members of Parliament as the secondlargest voting block. The Reverend Sithole had occu-pied his 12 seats after his Security Force Auxilia-ries power base had been shut down by a UANC govern-ment. By favouring his own Manyika tribe in the com-position of the Cabinet, Bishop Muzorewa furtherhastened the loss of united political and local sup-port.

The security situation in the post electionperiod had deteriorated. During July 1979 the deploy-ment figures for Security Forces were roughly as follows:

33 Infantry companies deployed(8 companies each in Hurricane,Repulse and Tangent, 7 in Thrasherand 2 in Grapple)3 Rhodesian Light Infantrycommando's as reaction force2 squadrons Grey ScoutsSpecial Air ServiceSelous Scouts

3 300

24080

250420

54

History of War

Security Force AuxiliariesGuard ForceInternal AffairsDefence UnitsBritish South Africa PoliceBritish South Africa PoliceReservists

8 0007 0005 0006 9009 000

30 000

Note: The figures indicate actual deployment and nottotal strength of unit(s).

The total number of officially recorded monthlyincidents had increased from an average of under 600in late 1979 to 935 during March 1979. By April thisfigure increased to 1 110, and totalled 1 706 forMay. The majority of these incidents consisted ofreported cases of intimidation and contacts betweenSecurity Forces and the insurgents. The latter,especially in the case of ZANLA, were exacting aterrible revenge for the local support given toBishop Muzorewa. By September 1979 the UANC popularbase had vanished.

1.10 Lancaster House

British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, had bynow decided on a last attempt at resolving the Rho-desian problem. Not very confident of success, hisapproach differed in one important aspect from pre-vious British initiatives. He was prepared to reas-sert Britain's responsibility for devising a solu-tion, including active British participation in theprocess. The basis of the Tory solution was agreedupon through discussions among Britain, Zambia,Tanzania, Nigeria, Jamaica and Australia during theCommonwealth conference in August. Instead of prima-rily talking to the Patriotic Front as was the casewith the Owen-Young initiative, the proposals firstwere directed at Mozambique and Zambia as the coun-tries serving as hosts to the insurgents. Both coun-tries were economically desperate for an end to awar that was threatening to engulf them. With inter-nal dissension rife in Mozambique, President Machelwas in particularly dire straits.

Thus the first Rhodesian constitutional confe-rence on British home soil opened on 10 September1979. As if to underline the Zambian need for a set-tlement, Zimbabwe-Rhodesian forces bombed threebridges on the Beira-Moatize railway line in Mozam-bique and blew up the Chambeshi railway bridge in

55

History of War

northern Zambia. Both Zambia's eastern outlets tothe Indian Ocean had thus been severed. The Benguelarailway line through the west was also closed by UNITAinsurgents operating in Angola, with the result that Zambia wasvirtually strangled. To forestall any possible con-ventional ZPRA attack from Zambia, four bridges onthe Lusaka-Chirundu and Lusaka-Victoria Falls werealso destroyed. In effect Zambia was denied the useof road or rail to move their imports or exports.Even the Kasangula ferry had been sunk the previousyear. Zambia was now almost totally dependant forall her imports and exports on the remaining linkthrough the south.

By a shrewd combination of brinkmanship anddiplomacy, Lord Carrington forced through his set-tlement plan. With the majority of his forces stillbased in Zambia, ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo orderedhis ZPRA forces to infiltrate Rhodesia in an effortto consolidate his internal power base to the extentthat had already been achieved by the ZANLA forcesof Robert Mugabe. COMOPS still pursued a forwarddefence posture as regards Zambia. Special Air Ser-vice, Selous Scouts and Rhodesian Light Infantryforces were pushed across the Zambezi river with theaim of halting all movement southwards from Lusaka.Some success was achieved but British pressurebrought to bear on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian delegationat Lancaster House forced the withdrawal of theseforces from Zambian soil. With the vast majority ofhis forces already committed, Mugabe and ZANLA werepotentially in a much stronger position than Nkomo.Although the negotiated ceasefire calledfor the movement of all insurgents inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to 16 selected assembly points and a stopto all cross-border movement, neither ZANLA nor ZPRAwere to pay much more than lip service to the latter.Against the background of continual external raidsby Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forces, Lord Carring-ton, in a desperate gamble, sent British appointedgovernor Lord Soames to Harare on 11 December. Hisappointment and despatch to Harare were directedmore towards supplying momentum to the stop-starttalks at Lancaster House than at the exercise of anyreal authority, for on 15 December Mugabe had walkedout. Pressure mainly brought to bear by Mozambiqueforced him to return to the negotiating table. Thus,at midnight, 21 December, all cross-border movementwas to stop and efforts were initiated towardsinforming all insurgents of the ceasefire arrange-ments. A Commonwealth monitoring force under commandof General John Acland was to supervise the movement

56

History of War

of all Patriotic Front insurgents to 16 AssemblyPoints and then keep them there. Only 1 300 menstrong, by 6 January 1980 the force had assembled15 730 insurgents. Within days this number swelledto about 22 000, Of these about 16 500 were ZANLAand the remainder ZPRA. Several thousand distrustfulinsurgents chose, however, to remain outside theAssembly Points and sent mujiba's instead. Officiallythis marked the end of the war, yet the poli-tical war was only finalized with the announcementduring April 1980 that ZANU, now known as ZANU(PF),had against all predictions had an overwhelming vic-tory of 63% of the national vote; Mugabe's party wasthus entitled to 57 of the 80 black seats in Parlia-ment. Voting was clearly divided between the Shonaand Matabele groupings, with Nkomo receiving theoverwhelming vote in the latter areas. (37) On 18April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent with RobertMugabe as its premier.

The war that had been fought so tenaciously bythe whites in Rhodesia for almost 15 years endedwith their worst fears being realized. Robert GabrielMugabe, a self-avowed Marxist, was undisputably thenext Prime Minister. The Rhodesian Front was reducedfrom a position of strength to one of impoverishmentand impotence in which they no longer had the powerto effect a compromise. Ian Smith and his inflexiblecolleagues had been entirely circumvented in a revo-lutionary struggle of classic proportions fought ona total frontage. It could be proudly asserted thatRhodesia had never lost a single battle but had mostignominously lost the war.

NOTES

1. P.L. Moorecraft and P. McLaughlin, Chimu-renga The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980 (Sygma/Collins,Marshalltown, 1982), p. 100.

2. Two authoritative studies on ethnicity with-in the Zimbabwean nationalist movements are: W.W.Nyangoni, African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Univer-sity Press of America, Washington D.C., 1978) and M.Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within the StruggleRujeko, Harare, 1979).

3. D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle forZimbabwe (Faber and Faber, London, 1981), p. 10.

4. Sithole, Struggles within the Struggle, pp.34-35.

5. W.W. Nyangoni, 'Revolutionary Strategies forNational Liberation in Zimbabwe', (paper presented

57

History of War

to the African Studies Association Conference, Chi-cago, 31 Oct. - 3 Nov. 1974), p. 10.

6. Ibid, p. 11.7. Ibid.8. As quoted by J. Fredrikse, None but Oursel-

ves: Masses vs the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe,(Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 1982), p. 35.

9. The circumstances leading to ZANU acceptenceof FRELIMO's offer are well documented in Martin andJohnson, Struggle for Zimbabwe, pp. 14-20.

10. The northeast suited the requirements laiddown by Maozedong to a large degree. The followingquotation from ZANLA documents captured by the Secu-rity Forces at Mororo on 30 and 31 July, 1978,illustrate this clearly

Selection of Base Areaa. Mass condition must be favourable.b. Organisation condition (of insurgents) must

be good . . .c. Enemy condition must be weak. Where the

enemy is ruling not so efficiently like places faraway from the cities and his strongholds.

d. Where we can expand our forces and developan organisation and political influence.

e. Good terrein features.f. Economic strength to support us and the mas-

ses for the long period ...11. From an interview conducted between Mukona

and Maj. P.C. Erasmus.12. As quoted by A. Wilkinson in his introduc-

tion to M. Reaburn, Black Fire (Julian Friedman,London, 1978), pp. 12-13.

13. 'Zambezi Konfrontasie', Africa InstituteBulletin, vol.XIII, no. 2 (1973), p. 47.

14. P. Stiff and R. Reid Daly, Selous Scouts:Top Secret War, (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 16.

15. Interview with Lieutenant-Colonel I. Bates.16. Africa Research Bulletin (1-30 Apr. 1974),

p. 3212.17. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves, p. 85.18. Ibid., p. 88.19. Africa Research Bulletin, (1-28 Feb. 1974),

p. 3144.20. Sithole, Struggles within the Struggle, pp.

75-76.21. Stiff and Reid Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 84.22. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country,

revised and extended edition (Pan Books, London,1980) , p. 171.

23. Wilkinson in Raeburn, Black Fire, p. 41.24. According to classified Army documentation

58

History of

total Rhodesian mobilisation figures at this stagewere

Army Regulars 3 650National Servicemen 2 000Active Territorial Army 4 100Territorial Army Reserve 7 000Colours and Asians 1 500

Total 18 250Air Force * 1 200BSAP Regulars 8 000

Reservists 35 000Total 43 000

25. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves, p. 132.26. Wilkinson in Raeburn, Black Fire, pp. 42-

27. Sithole, Struggles within the Struggle, p.123.

28. .This law updated the land Tenure Act of1969, whereby 45 million acres of land was set asidefor blacks and whites respectively. In the whitearea 38,5 million acres was allocated for farmingpurposes. Of the 45 million acres reserved forblacks, 39,9 million acres was categorised as TribalLands, previously called Reserves. Here a system ofcommunal tenure operated, in contrast to the 3,7million acres designated as African Purchase Areaswhere the more wealthy black farmers could purchaseland.

29. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves, p. 126.30. Africa Research Bulletin (1-28 Feb. 1977),

43.

4334.31 ,32.33.34.

Ibid. (1-30 Sep. 1977), p.(1-31 Dec. 1977), p.

4575.4681 .Ibid.

Rhodesia Herald,26 Sep. 1978.J.K. Burton, Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia;

Military Review (Apr., 1980), p. 31.35. Meredith, Past Another Country, p. 325.36. Fifty one percent, using World Bank projec-

ted figures.37. Mugabe's victory was gained despite a mas-

sive propaganda and disinformation campaign launchedagainst him. Entitled 'Operation Welfare' it inclu-ded false information spread within Mozambique, Zam-bia, and Zimbabwe, forgery of the weekly Moto news-paper and thousands of pamflets dropped by air with-in the rural black areas.

59

Chapter 2

COMMAND AND CONTROL

2.1 The Rhodesian Security Force's approach to Com-mand and Control

At the start of insurgency activities immediatelyafter the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in1965, the British South Africa Police quite correctlyinsisted that the Army was in support of the Policeand not vice versa. The type of operation conductedduring this period tended, however, to emphasisemilitary rather than police actions. Since incur-sions were conducted in large groups across rela-tively uninhabited areas, counter-insurgency opera-tions required tracking and pursuit operations thatseemed to fail more within the military domain thanwithin that of the Police. The attitude, particu-larly amongst middle and lower ranking RhodesianArmy officers, as well as that of the Department ofInternal Affairs (now Home Affairs), was not condu-cive to an effective, total counter-insurgencyeffort.

Within the Army more than fifty percent ofsmall-unit training was devoted to counter-insurgencytactics such as patrolling, ambushes, cordon andsearch and pursuit (follow-up) operations. All of theserepresent an adaptation of conventional military doc-trine to meet the threat of armed insurgency. Whilethe above tactics constitute a vital element ofcounter-insurgency operations, both in eliminatinginsurgent forces and in dominating an area, theemphasis of Army operations have to change. Sincethe majority of military forces become involved inoperations amongst the inhabitants of variousregions, and probably in population control measures,they represent a further extension of administration,thus assuming a partly policing rather than a strict-ly military role. Obedience to both the spirit and

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the letter of the law is essential for the executionof this role within a balanced counter-insurgencycampaign. Training and the total approach to coun-ter-insurgency should be supportive rather thanpunative. From their experience of the war up to1972 white Rhodesians believed that the insurgencyproblem was primarily a military threat. This per-ception remained a hallmark of the Rhodesian approachto counter-insurgency. Coupled with a sincere beliefthat the unsophisticated black African was incapableof choosing between alternative political systems,Rhodesian Security Forces and in particular offi-cials from the Department of Internal Affairs con-tinued a paternalistic tradition irksome to anincreasing section of the black population.

The whole Rhodesian concept of counter-insur-gency warfare suffered greatly as a result of thepre-1972 phase of isolated terrorism and banditry.This image was perpetuated in the command and con-trol structures and mechanisms that were developedto counter the insurgent threat of post 1972. Theywere largely unsuited to meet the serious threat.

2.2 JOG's , JPS and Operation Hurricane

Before 1972 the Army had divided Rhodesia into threetemporary brigade areas. These corresponded withMatabeleland, Mashonaland and Manicaland/victoria/Harare Police Provinces respectively. The school ofInfantry at Gweru was responsible for the initialplanning and co-ordinating of operations in MidlandsProvince. Were an insurgent threat to develop in any ofthese areas, Joint Operations Centres were formed atthe appropriate level to counter the threat. Thiscould either be at company, battalion or even bri-gade level of command. It consisted of the seniorArmy British South Africa Police, Special Branch andAir Force officers, and the appropriate Commissionerof the Department of Internal Affairs.

According to the official Rhodesian Army defi-nition, a Joint Operational Centre is:

A joint agency set up by the Security Forces onthe authority of Government'for the conduct ofoperations when no single service is solelyresponsible.(1)

Since the Army representative was normally the high-est ranking officer, he assumed chairmanship of theJoint Operational Centre at the start of operations.

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Discussions of counter-insurgency measures and plan-ning of action were essentially done on a committeebasis. Execution remained strictly departmental.Split decisions, or those possibly in conflict withexisting policy, were referred to higher authorityfor decision. Lower Joint Operational Centres repor-ted to one of the Provincial Joint Operation Centres(PROVOPS), namely SALOPS (for Salisbury Operations),MASHOPS (for Mashonaland), MANOPS (for Manicaland),MIDOPS (for Midlands), MATOPS (for Matabeleland) orVICOPS (for Victoria). PROVOPS roughly correspondedto Army Brigade levels of command but were effec-tively controlled by the Police. When operationswere not being conducted in the specific province,they were usually dormant.

Within the Security Forces, co-ordination waseffected via Joint Planning Staffs (JPS) which con-sisted of a small secretariat and the Operations Co-ordination Committee (OCC). The latter was thesenior security planning council immediately belowpolitical level. Its members included commanders ofthe Army and Air Force, the Commissioner of Policeand the Director of the Central Intelligence Organi-sation (CIO). (2) The secretariat to the OperationCo-ordination Committee was supplied by the JointPlanning Staffs and members usually met in person,which lent it considerable weight. As a joint deci-sion-making body, however, the Operation Co-ordina-tion Committee had little authority. An impassecould only be resolved at a higher (political) level.

The chairman of the Joint Planning Staffs wasalso the secretary of the Operation Co-ordinationCommittee. This appointment alternated between theArmy and Air Force. Initially the post carried therank of colonel, but was later upgraded to that ofbrigadier.

At the political level the Deputy Minister inthe Department of the Prime Minister was responsiblefor co-ordinating the civil side of the war and forliaising with the military (i.e. Joint PlanningStaffs) on matters of mutual concern. This post wasinitially held by Wickus de Kock, but on appointmentas Minister of Information in 1974, he was succeededby Ted Sutton-Pryce. The Deputy Minister was chair-man of an increasing number of committees, the mostimportant of which were the following: Civil Execu-tive to the Security Council (CESC); Roads; Air-fields; Anti-Mine Measures; Psychological Warfare;Protective Forces and Cordon Sanitaire. The CivilExecutive to the Security Council was the mostimportant of these, dealing with all matters relating

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Command and Control

to the protection of the civilian population ingeneral, but particularly with white farmers withinoperational areas. It included responsibility forcivil/military co-ordination of Protected Villages.(See Chapter 3)

The Prime Minister headed the Security Councilat cabinet level. Members included the Ministers ofFinance, Internal Affairs, Law and Order, Defence,Information, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs,Commanders of Army and Air Force, Commissioner ofPolice and Director of the Central IntelligenceOrganisation. Upon the formation of the Guard Forceits commander became a member of both the SecurityCouncil and Operation Co-ordination Committee. In1977 Combined Operations Headquarters (COMOPS)replaced the Joint Planning Staffs and the name ofthe Security Council was changed to that of WarCouncil. The newly appointed Commander COMOPS alsogained representation on the War Council.

The fact that senior officials were able to siton the Security Council, enjoying equal status withtheir political superiors gave these officialsdirect access to the Prime Minister. This allowedIan Smith to exert direct control over the war butweakened the Operations Co-ordination Committee.This lack of real authority rather than a controver-sial call-up system led to the resignation of Minis-ter of Defence Reginal Cowper in 1977.

As long as the Army commander was sufficientlycapable the Joint Operations Centre system at bri-gade level (PROVOPS) worked effectively, but atlower levels some friction developed. This wasmainly due to Police resentment of the senior role ofArmy officers. Initially, Joint Operation Centres atthe lowest level included the local Army companycommander, an Air Force pilot or flight commanderand the local Police station commander. Normallyrank would determine that the Army representativeassumed chairmanship.

British South Africa Police and Army approachesto the problem of insurgency, as well as law andorder in general, differed. As a result the Policeattempted to match the rank of the senior Army offi-cer present to avoid Army domination. Thus districtpolicemen came to represent Police at these JointOperation Centres. It was soon found, however, thatthis 'over and above' task was too time consuming.British South Africa Police officers, whose soletask was Joint Operation Centre liaison, were thenprovided. The Police eventually fielded assistantcommissioners equavalent to the Army rank of

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colonel, but did not succeed in obtaining gene-ral Joint Operation Centre control before1977 when Army chairmanship was formalised. To pro-tect their own interests, and in reaction to whatwas seen to be Army domination of a Police problem(at least initially), the British South AfricaPolice representatives at some Joint Operation Cen-tres insisted on referring decisions taken by theJoint Operation Centres to Police headquarters forratification.

Permanent Air Force representation at thevarious levels of the Joint Operation Centres alsoreplaced initial ad hoc representation by pilots.Thus, by the time the Army took over the dominantrole in Operation Hurricane in 1973, the concept ofjoint planning and co-ordinated execution hadalready been established, if somewhat tentatively.

With the launching of Operation Hurricane in1973, it became necessary to establish a permanentJoint Operation Centre at brigade level. Two BrigadeHeadquarters had shifted from Harare, first to Cen-tenary and then to Bindura. The Joint Operation Cen-tre (JOC) at brigade headquarters became JOC Hurri-cane while the brigade commander retained the nomi-nal function of MASHOPS chairman in Harare. As theoperational areas were established, PROVOPS wassuperseded by brigade Joint Operation Centres andfell into disuse by the end of the war.

By 1979 Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was divided into fourmajor operational areas, namely Hurricane, Thrasher,Repulse, Tangent and Grapple (see Figure 1.3, Chap-ter 1}. For a number of years the insurgent threatwas confined to Operation Hurricane (Two Brigade)area, making it the most well known sector.

During 1972 the only Joint Operation Centreexisted within Two Brigade at Centenary (RhodesianLight Infantry). As a result the first birgade-levelJoint Operation Centre was also stationed there withtwo sub-centres at Mount Darwin (Rhodesian Light In-fantry) and Guruve, formerly Sipolilo (Rhodesian Af-rican Rifles). At the end of 1973 the Rhodesia Afri-can Rifles took over the sub-centre at Centenary, theRhodesia Light Infantry stayed at Mount Darwin andthe main Joint Operation Centre moved to Bindura. Sub-Joint Operation Centres were also later formed at Mu-toko, Chinhoyi (formerly Sinoia), Bindura, Karoi,Guruve, Lomangundi and Marondera (formerly Marandellas).The headquarters of Two Brigade later shifted toHarare. The battalion responsible had its main headquar-ters within the sub-centre while the rear battalionheadquarters remained at the units training base.

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Operation Thrasher (Three Brigade) was proclaimedin February 1976 with headquarters at Mutare (for-merly Umtali) and sub-centres at various stages atRusape, Nyanga (formerly Inyanga-) and Chipinge.Operation Repulse (Four Brigade),was launched duringMay, initially as 'One Brigade Tactical Headquarters,Operation Repulse' with headquarters at Masvingo(Fort Victoria). It was officially designated asFour Brigade at the end of 1977. Repulse sub-centreswere at Masvingo, Chiredzi and briefly at Rutengaand Beit Bridge. Their main responsibility was tocombat the threat in the South-east. Operation Tan-gent (One Brigade) was formed in August 1977. Bri-gade headquarters was at Bulawayo and sub-centreswere at Hurange (Wankie), Bulawayo, Gwanda and Gweru(Gwelo). Operation Grapple was constituted concur-rently with Tangent and covered the Midlands area.Sub-Joint Operation Centre Gweru was subsequentlytransferred to Grapple. Midlands was initially com-manded by an Army colonel and when the latter wastransferred, by the officer commanding, School ofInfantry, Gweru.

The two final operational areas, SALOPS (forSalisbury Operations) and Splinter differed fromthose mentioned above: SALOPS was controlled by thePolice and formed mainly for logistical andadministrative reasons. Operation Splinter was amaritime command to counter ZPRA infiltration acrossLake Kariba.By 1978, however, ZANLA and ZPRA incursions acrossthe length and breadth of Rhodesia were threateningto destroy the system of Joint Operation Centres.In a secret document entitled 'Hurricane Strategy1

prepared in June of that year, the following recom-mendations were made inter alia:

With the spread of operations and the decreasedforce levels the sub JOC system no longer worksefficiently. Commanders are not able effec-tively to influence operations in their exten-ded areas. The local control of operations incertain areas is now a fact and has become theresponsibility of the OIC (Officer in Command)and DC (District Commissioner) in that particu-lar area ... JOC members are unanimous inrecommending that Hurricane aim at a DistrictJOC system for future command and control. Dis-tricts should operate directly to Hurricane.

Above all, the preceding also bears silent witnessto the lack of central direction in the war.

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While the system of joint Planning Staffs hadworked well during more stable conditions, theintensifying war demanded a more authoritariancommand structure with powers over all civilianagencies involved in activities related to security.

2.3 War Council, COMOPS and NATJOC

•When the extent of insurgent penetration in theNorth-east had become clear, Army Commanders realisedthe need for a Director of Operations. Veterans ofthe Rhodesian forces who had fought in Malaya werefamiliar with the idea. Lacking an overall strategyto combat the threat at national level SecurityForces badly needed somebody in a post powerfuland influential enough to direct their efforts.This need was nowhere deemed more important thanin the lack of enforceable co-operation betweendifferent government departments.

During the comparative peace of the sixtiesthe leisurely pace of co-ordination and discussionat various ministerial levels aimed at achievinga uniform approach to counter-insurgency had ledto a history of wavering and indecisive action.Thus each ministry took a different view both ofthe threat itself and any countermeasures to betaken. A system of unempowered committees hadtherefore led to slow and apathetic attitudes to aproblem in need of urgent and speedy decisions andexecution.

Since the Department of Internal Affairs hadresisted attempts in 1972 by the Army to step upits force levels along the Rhodesian border of theTete province in Mozambique, much blame for thesituation that had developed was placed on InternalAffairs. (3) Army commanders and Special Branch offi-cers felt vindicated only months later when Opera-tion Hurricane was launched. At a fairly early stagethe need was thus recognised for a strong, centralexecutive with power to enforce compliance from allservices related to security. To the Army thisbecame further apparent in their efforts to obtainsufficient numbers of territorial soldiers oncall-up.

The calls for a 'supremo' became loud enough toforce Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, then Army Com-mander, to draft a signal to all units towardsthe end of 1973 forbidding the use of the word.(4)Yet as the war intensified, these calls were repea-ted from both inside the military as well as from

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prominent Rhodesian Front politicians. The idea wasalso mooted in a number of Joint Planning Staff pa-pers. When put forward to Prime Minister Ian Smithit was rejected on the grounds that he, as the PrimeMinister, was the "supremo1 who would make policydecisions and enforce compliance. The Operations Co-ordination Committee could thus refer controversialdecisions to him if necessary.

This response was given at an early stage whenthe need for a supreme commander was not as obviousas it was to become at a later stage. Yet Smithfailed to appreciate the complexities of this typeof command. It was impossible to refer a large num-ber of decisions to him in addition to his exactingtask as head of government. On the other hand, theRhodesian Prime Minister was reluctant todelegate the running of the war to someone else whocould possibly become a challenge to his own autho-rity. This had apparently already started to happenwith the appointment of P.K. van der Byl as Ministerof Defence during August 1974. He was subsequentlyrelieved of his defence portfolio in September 1976after the execution of the Nyadzonia raid into Mozam-bique. This operation had caused both Prime Minister Smith andPrime Minister Vorster from South Africa some acuteembarrassment at the height of the Kissinger initia-tive. To a number of politicians and senior govern-ment officials there seemed a lack of suitable can-didates for such an appointment, while the PrimeMinister was wary of the political ambitions of themost likely candidate, Lieutenant-General Walls.

Eventually bowing to both military and Rhode-sian Front pressure, Smith took a first step towardsbetter co-ordination of the Rhodesian war effort.Having relieved Van der Byl of the Defence port-folio, he approved Reginal Cowper as the new incum-bent, while also announcing the formation of a WarCouncil in charge of defence matters on 9 September1976. As discussed,this was largely limited to therenaming of the existing Security Council.

The next step was taken some months later on 3March 1977, when Roger Hawkins was appointed to thenewly created post of Minister of Combined Opera-tions.

On 23 March 1977, Smith announced that, inaccordance with the recommendation of his securitychiefs, a unified command was to be formed to stream-line the control of Security Forces in the field.

Accordingly it has now been decided to appointa Commander, Combined Operations, who will be

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responsible to the Minister of Combined Opera-tions and will have the authority to exercisecommand over all elements of the security for-ces, as well as civil agencies directly invol-ved in the prosecution of operations againstterrorists. This will be implemented with mini-mal disruption of the command functions ofindividual service headquarters. He will havethe assistance of a Deputy Commander, who willbe the executive officer responsible for thecontrol of a small Combined Operations Head-quarters staff, all of whom will be drawn fromexisting organisations. In order to completethe chain of command under this system thesenior army officer at each joint operationscentre will assume command of counter-insur-gency operations in his designated militaryarea.(5)

The authority, functions and intentions underlyingthe formation of COMOPS are best illustrated by thefollowing quotations from an extensive article thatappeared in the Rhodesia Herald on 8 May 1977.

This means that again all problems affectingthe sub-JOC's and JOC's will flow to a singlesource and not, as previously from the repre-sentatives of the various components of the JOCsuch as Army and Air Force, Police, Intelli-gence and Internal Affairs having first to befed into their separate Ministerial channels ..Included in the General's authority will be allsuch matters as the allocation of force levelsto main JOC's and considerations of the changesin force levels coming from them. Also, he willhave the direction and co-ordination of SpecialForce Operations such as the Selous Scouts,Grey's Scouts and PATU.(6)

The most important of these, central authority, wasnever vested in COMOPS.

In terms of rank, Lieutenant-General Walls heldno superiority over his counterparts in the Army,Air Force, Police and the Central Intelligence Orga-nisation. He had not been promoted to full generaland the post that he held amounted to little morethan chairmanship of the National Joint OperationsCentre (NATJOC). The composition of NATJOC was simi-lar to that of the now defunct Operations Co-ordina-tion Committee with no real authority conferred onthe Commander COMOPS to enforce compliance from his

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NATJOC members. All COMOPS directives had to beissued in the name of NATJOC and not COMOPS (i.e.endorsed by the relevant head of the department) toensure compliance. In the case of the Departments ofInternal Affairs and Law and Order, COMOPS made noprovision for either control or inclusion of theirplanning staffs. Each continued to plan and executewithin traditional departmental constraints.

By way of comparison, NATJOC became a looserorganisation than the Operations Co-ordination Com-mittee had been. Commissioner of Police Peter Allumdid not attend in person (as had been thecase with the Operations Co-ordination Committee) butsent one of his two deputy commissioners. TheDirector General of the Central Intelligence Organi-sation sent his Director External Affairs, a retiredCommissioner. Although those seconded were givenwide discretion and delegated much power, this ten-ded to weaken COMOPS in comparison with the Opera-tions Co-ordination Committee, rather than streng-then the central co-ordination. Lieutenant-GeneralWalls approached the Prime Minister on repeatedoccasions to obtain clarification on his own autho-rity but never met with any success.

In very broad terms COMOPS was organised asfollows:

NATJOC

iCOMOPS

COMMANDERDEPUTY COMMANDER

Operations Staff

Director General Operations

Operations Intelligence

Secretariat andPlanning Staff

Projects Secretariat

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Initially the services of Air Marshal M.H. McLarenwere retained as Deputy Commander COMOPS after hisretirement from the Rhodesian Air Force. Lieutenant-General John Hickman succeeded Lieutenant-GeneralPeter Walls as Commander of the Army, while Major-General A.L.C. Maclean became Army Chief of StaffOperations. Brigadier Herbert Barnard became COMOPSDirector General Operations. Air Commodore JohnRodgers was appointed Director Operations. The Bri-tish South Africa Police was represented by SeniorAssistant Commissioner Gardner while the CentralIntelligence Organisation and Special Branch wereboth represented by Assistant Commissioner Edden.Internal Affairs was represented by Provincial Com-missioner J. H. Tapsen.

The task of the operations staff was to prepareoperation orders for operations that fell underCOMOPS authority, i.e. involving the use of so-called Special Forces (Special Air Service troops,Selous Scouts, etc.). The intelligence section exis-ted only to gather all relevant intelligence andinformation from members of the intelligence commu-nity, but initially had no evaluative or otherintelligence function. As from 1979 the Army Chiefof Staff also fulfilled the functions of the Direc-tor General Operations at COMOPS, and thus had adual role. The secretariat was mainly concerned withproviding secretarial services and with representingCOMOPS in other government departments. While theplanning staff was earmarked for long term militarystrategic planning, this remained a paper function.

Organisationally COMOPS did not meet thedemands of the war. Although Comops and Army head-quarters were two separate entities, Army headquar-ters was almost solely involved with the administra-tion and logistics of COMOPS1 decisions. While thiswas an unavoidable side-effect of the co-ordinatingmachine decided upon, it was exacerbated by personalanimosity between Lieutenant-General Walls and ArmyCommander-Lieutenant General Hickman. The latter hadlost many of his command functions, but retained hisstaff.

COMOPS thus obtained control over the opera-tional planning functions of the various services(Army, Air Force and to a lesser extent Police andInternal Affairs) without incorporating theirvarious planning staffs. For example, in the case ofthe Army and Air Force, the G (operations) staffswere not incorporated. Planning was thus done with-out the necessary supportive staff work. By exclu-ding these various staffs, COMOPS should have limited

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itself to the determination of broad planning guide-lines. The resulting problems were especially nota-ble as regards logistics, intelligence and mostimportant, broad strategic planning.

The initial COMOPS organisation made no provi-sion for a logistic staff component to be incorpora-ted into the planning process. Each service in ques-tion was relied upon to do its own logistical plan-ning. With the shortage of personnel and material,it invariably led to serious problems and to a lessthan optimum use of available resources. In a fewselect cases external operations had to be cancelledowing to the logistical problems encountered in theexecution of COMOPS planning. But as the war pro-gressed, both COMOPS and the logistical staff atArmy Headquarters became more adept at meeting eachothers' needs.

The lack of a central body for co-ordinatingintelligence at COMOPS also had a decidedly negativeeffect on the total intelligence effort. Initiallythe section consisted of a single member, providingfurther evidence regarding the perpetuation of gene-ral military neglect of intelligence inherited fromthe Joint Planning Staffs (see Chapter 9). This neg-lect had also led to an almost total lack of mili-tary intelligence officers capable of control andco-ordination of intelligence at top level and tothe neglect of military intelligence as a seriouschallenge at lower levels.

Largely as a result of the lack of a SpecialForces Headquarters on the one hand, and the removalof the Rhodesian Special Force units from Army con-trol on the other, COMOPS involved itself both inthe detailed planning and in the execution of exter-nal operations. It became practice towards the con-clusion of the war for Lieutenant-General Walls tocommand external operations from his distinctivecommand Dakota, instead of leaving it to the fieldor sub-ordinate formation or unit commanders. Thetradition started during the first raid on Chimoio.It almost led to disaster during the attack onFreedom Camp at Westlands Farm in Zambia duringOctober 1978, when enemy aircraft were scrambled andin a position to attack the command Dakota. Suchpractices led to repeated complaints by the variousJoint Operation Centres that while COMOPS involveditself to a great extent with the everyday conductof the war, no formal war strategy ever saw thelight.

After much prompting, COMOPS eventually formu-lated a national strategy in the period prior to the

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3 March Agreement. For security reasons it was neverput before the whole national executive, but appro-ved by Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the whiteCo-minister for Defence, Hilary Squires. The ReverendSithole and James Chikerema only received the natio-nal objective and were not given the guidelines forexecution. After his triumphant election, PrimeMinister Muzorewa ratified this strategy. Internally,it revolved around the Security Force Auxiliariesand an offer of amnesty to any insurgents preparedto lay down arras now that a black majority govern-ment had been achieved. Externally it held the eco-nomies of the insurgent host countries hostage as ameans of ending the war.

The final step in an attempt to co-ordinate theRhodesian war effort was the combination of theDefence and Combined Operations portfolios underMinister of Combined Operations Roger Hawkins on 18September 1977. Henceforth the portfolios mostinvolved in the war were Defence and Combined Opera-tions, Justice, Law and Order, and Internal Affairs.

Throughout the period 1972 to 1980, neither theOperations Co-ordination Committee nor COMOPS gaineda free hand in the running of the war. At all stagesPrime Minister Ian Smith kept a tight rein espe-cially on external operations: this led to conside-rable friction between the Prime Minister and Lieu-tenant-General Walls and was seemingly perpetuatedafter Bishop Muzorewa!s election to power. In hiscabinet announcement of 30 May 1979, he reserved theportfolios of Combined Operations and Defence forhimself. In practice, however, he had little realauthority over the Armed Forces for all seniorappointments were still held by whites who owedallegiance to the Rhodesian Front party rather thanto a black government.

Under the Transitional Government effectivecontrol of the military was retained in white lands.On the same day that Bishop Muzorewa, the ReverendSithole and Senator Chirau were sworn into govern-ment, Smith quietly created his own unofficial WarCouncil. It had six permanent members, namely Walls,Chiefs of the Army and Air Force, the Commissionerof Police, the Director-General of the CentralIntelligence Organisation and co-opted ministers asthe need arose. After Bishop Muzerewa became PrimeMinister COMOPS increasingly ran the war withdecreasing reference to the politicians.

In the final months of the war and in the bit-ter post-Mugabe election period, many military com-manders pointed to the undue limitations on external

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raids into neighbouring insurgent host countriesthat emanated from the War Council, and, to a lesserextent, NATJOC. In both cases criticism was oftendirected at the influence of the Director General ofthe Central Intelligence Organisation, Ken Flower,As member of both bodies he played a major role indecisions and would point to the political problemsinvolved in external operations. Yet in many casesthe veto for external operations was as a result ofpressure from South Africa, especially as regardsGaza, the southern province of Mozambique. Inside Rho-desia there were very few political constraints.(7)

Although this element of national strategy wasvery important, it tended to overshadow the moremundane and less dramatic task of consolidating inter-nal security. Apparently the initial intelligencefailures (detailed in Chapter 9) of the 1972 to 1976period were major factors in limiting external ope-rations and attacks on insurgent base camps.

In the final instance the smooth functioning ofNATJOC was also hindered by personality clashesbetween the Commissioner of Police, Commander COMOPSand Secretary for Internal Affairs. This providedfurther evidence of the lack of forced co-operationand compliance that was a hallmark of Rhodesiancounter-insurgency efforts.

2 . 4 special Forces

Within the Rhodesian context, Special Forces consti-tuted what was initially known as the offensive com-ponent or cutting edge of Army troops. These unitsincluded Special Air Service, Selous Scouts, Rhode-sian Light Infantry and in some cases even the GreyScouts (a mounted unit). Initially, they owed alle-giance only to the Commander of the Army. When Lieu-tenant-General Walls was appointed as CommanderCOMOPS, he retained this relation. The newly appoin-ted Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Hickman, onlyretained command of black regular units such as theRhodesia African Rifles and units of the TerritorialArmy.

Largely as a result of the need for absolutesecurity in the planning and execution of SpecialForces operations, planning must be centralised atthe highest level, with strict limitation on thedistribution of information. In the case of Rhodesiathe operations section at COMOPS, and the battalionheadquarters of Special Force units involved, jointlyplanned external and other Special Force operations.

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As the war progressed, COMOPS became ever increa-singly involved in the detailed planning of an increa-sing number of operations, particularly externaloperations.

Owing to the limited staff available within theoperations section, the detailed planning of externaloperations precluded any other activity, such as theformulation of a coherent military strategy for thecountry as a whole. This was to become possibly themajor criticism that the four brigade commanderslevelled at COMOPS; the lack of overall strategyguidelines to combat the worsening internal securitysituation .on a country-wide basis. Lieutenant-Colo-nel Reid-Daly would subsequently state

It was indefensibly ridiculous for GeneralWalls or his Staff to concern themselves withwhich village in the bush, a three-man stickfrom the Special Air Service, or the SelousScouts should be deployed, and who shouldrelease the helicopters to support them. Thiswas, and should have stayed the sole responsi-bility of the Army and Air Force Commanders andtheir Staffs, whose plans would have been thelogical follow-on from the strategical guidelines put out by COMOPS. The immediate resultof COMOPS taking overall physical, as well asthe detailed day to day control of the Army'srunning of the war, was that the Army Commander,General Hickman, lost his rightful operationalcommand. ... The only command left to him waspurely an administrative one. ... His staff atArmy Headquarters, particularly the G-Staff,were allowed nothing further to do with hisplanning of the war and were only able to con-cern themselves with new organisations, amend-ments to staff tables and training matters.(8)

A second, and almost equally important problemregarding Special Force operations was the lack of asection that could gather and process all the rele-vant intelligence and information that had a bearingon external operations. This problem had been evi-dent for a number of years as a result of the lackof intelligence fed back to brigade Joint OperationCentres prior to and after Special Force operationswithin a Joint Operation Centre area. In the case ofthe Selous Scouts this was especially significant.The latter were arguably the major source of opera-tional intelligence inside Rhodesia, yet the flow ofintelligence from the Selous Scouts to local Army

commanders was very limited. At this stage (prior to1978) development of military intelligence as embo-died by the Directorate of Military Intelligence wasstill in its infancy.

At various stages the establishment of a SpecialForces headquarters had been proposed to NATJOC andCOMOPS. It was eventually approved by the issue ofFormation Order No 4: Headquarters Special Forces,which read:

AIM1 . The aim of this order is to lay down theformation and roles of Headquarters SpecialForces.TITLE2. This headquarters is to be known as Head-quarters Special Forces. Its abbreviated titleis HQ Spec Forces.FORMATION3. HQ Spec Forces was formed on 1 July 1978.ROLES4. The roles of HQ Spec Forces areas follows:a. To formulate Special Forces strategyb. The planning, execution and co-ordinationof Special Forces operationsc. The operational command and control ofSpecial Forcesd. Co-ordination of Special Forces training.ESTABLISHMENTFIThe establishment for HQ Spec Forces hasbeen issued under Establishment Table No 20/4.

As will 'be.noted, no mention was made of intelli-gence co-ordination, although a Special ForcesIntelligence Centre, (SFIC), started at Inkomo Bar-racks, had lasted a total of 4-6 months before beingclosed down.

When nominations were made for headquartersSpecial Forces posts, there were immediate difficul-ties. Competition and mutual dislike between thecommanding officers of the Selous Scouts and theSpecial Air Service represented the first problems.The latter refused to shift his battalion headquar-ters to Inkomo Barracks where the Selous Scouts werestationed. A further problem was the appointmentof a Commander, Special Forces, who provedunacceptable to both the Selous Scouts and the Spe-cial Air Service. Finally, the concept did not havethe support of the Commander, COMOPS, who would con-sequently have lost his direct control over theseforces.

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Special Forces Intelligence Centre, the brainchildof the Commander of the Selous Scouts, also flounde-red. The Director General of the Central Intelli-gence Organisation was thus threatened with theeventual loss of the Scouts, who were one of hisprime sources of operational intelligence. In thesecond place, the Special Forces Intelligence Centrewould have been in direct competition to the fledge-ling Directorate of Military Intelligence which hada lack of suitable personnel. It was only after thecollapse of the Centre and the transfer of itsofficers to Military Intelligence that the latterdeveloped into an intelligence section of realvalue. (Also see Chapter 9)

After only seven weeks in total, headquar-ters Special Forces became the headquar-ters of the Security Force Auxiliaries. No satisfac-tory solution was found for the planning and co-operation of Special Force operations, nor for longterm strategic planning.

2.5 Conclusion

A number of officers who attained key positionswithin the Rhodesian Security Forces had served inMalaya during the Emergency. When insurgency rearedits head in Rhodesia after UDI,the isolated terrorismexperienced prior to 1975 did not seem to constitutea comparable revolutionary threat. In the years tofollow the Malaya clique belatedly realized that thethreat was essentially the same.

But lower ranking men in the field and thosenot experienced in the subtelties of a coherentcounter-insurgency campaign, did not come to thisrealization at all. History and combat experience ina different continent hardly seemed applicable toBlack Africa. The majority of whites refused tobelieve that 'their' black populace was capableof a general nationalism and political awareness.A communication gap developed between high com-mand in Harare, and men in the field. Equallyimportant was the fact that experience before1972 led to an over emphasis of the role of themilitary. This became ingrained in the thinking ofSecurity Force members and influenced their politi-cal superiors who were dependant on the former'sadvice for policy decisions regarding the conduct ofthe war. , .

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The foregoing approach to a problem that isessentially not military, but rather socio-economicand political, had a decisive influence on the Rho-desian military strategy. Some of these effects havebeen dealt with, but the major one is the lack of acoherent total national strategy. Without a viablepolitical objective and at least rudimentary policyguidelines a vast number of counter-insurgency mea-sures become difficult to execute coherently. Twospecific examples discussed at length are psycholo-gical operations (Chapter 6) and the recruitment andtraining of an own politically orientated localmilitia for defence purposes (Chapter 8) .

Possibly the major shortcoming within the Rho-desian structure of command was the lack of firm,decisive command at the highest level. This was notlimited to the military, but also included thePolice and Department of Internal Affairs. The lackof a unified high level command that could enforcecompliance over the total range of counter-insurgencyactivities was a severe limitation indeed. The Rho-desian Front politicians who took the decisionsregarding the employment of existing resources canhardly be blamed for this deficiency. Yet the ratherinformal approach adopted to the war was merely aproduct of the preceding years. From the start ofincursions in the sixties, no formalised co-ordina-ting machine was established. Local commanders andofficials were left to 'sort out' co-ordinationbetween themselves on an informal basis, which oftenled to inter-service clashes and personal animosity.In effect, the Joint Operations Centre system asemployed relied heavily on the personal rapport thatwas established between its members, and it is toRhodesia's credit that there was close co-ordinationand support in the majority of areas.

NOTES /

1. Rhodesian Army, Military Support to theCivil Power (MCP), (restricted, as amended, dated 1May 1976), p. xvi.

2. Later to become the Director General of theCentral Intelligence Organisation.

3. Special Branch had reported a build up ofFRELIMO and ZANLA insurgents in the area.

4. See, for example, the report on the Commit-tee of Supply debate in the revenue vote for defenceRhodesia Herald (25 Aug. 1976) and the editorialcomment of the same newspaper dated the 26 Aug. 1976.

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5. Africa Research Bulletin (1-31 Mar. 1977),p. 4372.

6. Rhodesia Herald (18 May 1977).7. With little exception, senior and middle

ranking military officers remain convinced that aserious security leak existed at COMOPS, and, mostpossibly, within NATJOC itself.

8..P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts:Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), pp. 272-273.

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Chapter 3

PROTECTED AND CONSOLIDATED VILLAGES

3 . 1 The Concept

Recourse to the use of Protected Villages isclosely aligned to the concept of a total revolu-tionary war. It entails the concentration and reset-tlement of the local population into defendable vil-lages . The theory of insurgency divides a countryinto three categories: first those base areas con-trolled by the insurgent forces, second the areasunder firm counter-insurgent control, and finallythe intermediate or 'grey' areas contested by bothsides. The two opposing forces each seek to expandtheir base areas. Such expansion not only providesvisible proof of success, but forces the contestantto disperse his available manpower over increa-singly threatened areas. The case for the insurgentforces is adequately summarised by John J. McCuen:

By slow, creeping expansion, the territoriesheld by the governing power are converted intoguerrilla areas, and the guerrilla areas intobase areas until the entire country has beenwon. (1)

This is termed the 'oil spot' approach and holdstrue for both insurgent and counter-insurgent stra-tegy. Specifically of importance to government for-ces is the consolidation of control over its ownbase areas as a firm foothold from whence it canencroach onto the grey areas. This governmental basenormally corresponds to the more urbanized and eco-nomically active areas where counter-insurgent controlis not only more evident but easier to maintain. Theconsolidation of this area is almost exclusivelyachieved by political, socio-economic, administra-tive and policing measures.

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The second factor of importance regarding the employ-ment of a strategy of population concentration andresettlement is closely aligned to physical controlof the rural population. Sir Robert Thompson statedit thus:

The government must give priority to defeatingthe political subversion, not the guerrillas ...Unless communist subversive political organisa-tion in the towns and villages is broken andeliminated, the insurgent guerrilla units willnot be defeated. If the guerrillas can be iso-lated from the population ... then their even-tual destruction becomes automatic. (2 )

The emphasis is thus not towards providing depopula-ted areas in which Security Forces can roam freely insearch of insurgents, but in denying the insurgentsaccess to the local population. This is criticalsince the war is essentially waged for control ofthe population. If contact between the rural popula-tion and the insurgent forces is effectively cut,the latter are denied food, intelligence, recruitsand access to their primary objective, people. Inpractical terms this leads to a number of conclusions.In the first place it is not possible for ProtectedVillages to be particularly successful in thoseareas falling within an insurgent base area. Intheory it is possible for heavily armed and welltrained Security Forces to enter these areas instrength with relative impunity, but they can expectto meet with little more than sullen hostility fromthe local population. Placing these people in Pro-tected Villages is then akin to concentrating analready subverted population with its establishedclandestine insurgent organisation into select loca-lities. 'Foreign' Security Forces, are then requiredas guards to prevent the inmates physically fromeither overt acts of subversion, support of theinsurgents or simply disobedience. In such circum-stances Protected Villagers are neither willing nor,in fact, able to provide intelligence or co-opera-tion under the threat of death or pubishment.

It is further imperative that the insurgentorganisation within a community is broken before orconcurrently with such a programme. Should this nothappen and what is termed the insurgent parallelhierarchies continue to function relatively unsca-thed within the villages, the authorities would havepartially failed in their objective.

In the third place it should be evident that

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effective control of the population placed withinthe Protected Villages is essential if contact withthe insurgents is to be broken and not restored. Inpractical terms this indicates strict control ofmovement. This can be obtained only by a foolproofidentity system, the institution of no-go areas, andcurfews, to name but a few of the more traditionalmethods of population control.

There are, however, a number of further factorsthat have proved enduring in the efforts towardsmaking a Protected Village programme advantageous inthe long term. In the first instance it should berecognised that, with limited exceptions, the insti-tution of such a programme meets with at least ameasure of passive resistance from the majority ofthe local population. In many cases even activeresistance is encountered.

It is thus vitally important that such a schemeis seen to be to the personal benefit of the localpopulation as a whole. In short, living conditionsin Protected Villages should be demonstrably betterthan outside them. This could either entail the pro-vision of running water, electricity, access toschools and clinics or even the private ownership ofland. Failing such advantages the whole programmecould easily rebound to the government's detriment.Instead of providing at least a neutral community,it results in one which is actively hostile andsympathetic to the insurgent cause. Simply herdingpeople behind barbed wire and uprooting their tradi-tional lifestyle with no material compensation pro-vides an extremely fertile area for insurgentrecruitment. Unfortunately, this seemed to have beenthe Rhodesian practice.

A further factor is protection, security andpersonal safety. In spite of the propaganda campaignwaged by both insurgents and counter-insurgents forthe capture of their 'hearts and minds', the localmembers of the population are less concerned withgrandiose theories and promises than with personalsafety and protection. This concern is largelydependent on the real physical pressure brought tobear on them by the insurgents, i.e. intimidation andon the government's capability or ability to defendthe local inhabitants against these dangers. To alarge extent both entail the perception, or convic-tion, as to who will eventually 'win1. In the con-text of a strategy of Protected Villages it is thusvitally important that the local population is pro-vided with adequate protection against insurgentattacks. This should preferably entail self-defence

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by means of militia type units which involve thelocal populace in their own security. In all cases,a quick-reaction force should bo available to pro-vide the hard muscle behind the protection of Pro-tected Villages within any specific area. The ele-ment of involvement is of specific importance andthe Security Forces should thus endeavour to obtainlocal participation to the maximum extent. Not onlydoes this provide additional manpower but once com-mitted to such a scheme, the local members are infact committed to the government cause.

What then, should be the aim of any ProtectedVillage strategy? According to Sir Robert Thompsonit is threefold:

The first ... is the protection of the popula-tion ... the most vital aspect of protection,however, is the elimination within the hamletof the insurgent underground organisation ...The second objective ... is to unite the peopleand involve them in positive action on the sideof the government ... This can only be done byinvolving the people in a small way in nationalpolitics which both affect and benefit them,first in the defence of their community andsecondly in its development ... The thirdobjective ... is ... development in the social,economic and political fields ... It is at thisstage that the regrouping of houses, which atfirst sight might have seemed a hardship, hascompensating advantages.(3)

Let us now turn to the events in former Rhodesia.

3.2 Initial attempts at creating Protected Areas

The first official public indication of a strategyof Protected Villages in Rhodesia was given byDeputy Minister of Law and Order Wickus de Kockduring December 1973. Significantly, the need forthe establishment of these villages was given asarising out of the policy of creating 'no-go'areas.(4) The proclamation of the first such area waspromulgated on 17 May 1973. It ran along 300 km of Rhode-sia's northern border with Mozambique in the Cente-nary and Mount Darwin districts. The majority of thelocal population living in these areas were to beevacuated, screened and resettled in other areas. Anumber of people were also moved to a new area aspunishment for assisting insurgents. In the nearby

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Mzarabani area, however, the local population wereallowed to stay in their traditional villages. Fol-lowing the- evacuation, the Commissioner of Police hadthe power to confiscate, seize or destroy any pro-perty in these areas that could possibly be of useto the insurgent forces. Within such designated no-go areas, Security Forces were empowered to shoot onsight. Bulldozed strips of clear ground were used asaids to demarcation. Regular patrols along thesestrips searched for indications of tracks leadinginto or out of the no-go zones.

Four protected areas were established fromOctober 1973 onwards in Gudza and Mukumbura TribalTrust Lands in the Zambezi Valley. By 10 January1974, it was reported that more than 8 000 peoplehad been moved, of whom 1 607 were resettled in pro-tected areas. The rest of the valley became a no-goarea. These first protected areas were not constitu-ted as proper Protected Villages, but entailed theconcentration of the local population around themain centres of each reserve to facilitate freedom ofmovement for the Security Forces.

The armed forces were not involved in theseschemes, as it was the Department of Internal Affairswhich first proposed the concept of concentratingthe local population in specific areas for ease ofcontrol and protection.

3.3 Operations Overload and Overload Two

The military justification given for both OperationOverload in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land and OperationOverload Two which followed in Madziwa TribalTrust Land,was that the insurgent threat seemed tobe approaching Harare itself. Chiweshe Tribal TrustLand specifically thrusts deep into the white farmingareas of the Umvukwes, Centenary and Mount Darwin.

ZANLA forces had succeeded in establishingthemselves solidly to the north of Bindura. From thisbase they were increasingly subverting the areassouthwards into Msana and Masembura Tribal TrustLands and from there to Chinamore Tribal Trust Landjust north of Harare. Drastic action was apparentlyrequired to block this thrust. The major ZANLAinfiltration route ran directly through the Madziwaand Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands which lay to thenorth and north-west of Bindura. The local popula-tion in these areas were known to be actively assis-ting the insurgent effort. During March 1974 thesituation in Chiweshe was already serious enough to

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prompt Lieutenant Colonel Reid-Daly to write later

The apparent support for the ZANLA cause inChiweshe though was, without doubt, overwhelm-ing and while this made things easy for SelousScouts pseudo operations, it was very distur-bing in a broader sense.(5)

Previously, a large scale attempt to punish thelocal population and dissuade them from aiding theinsurgents had failed in 1973.

Largely on Rhodesian Army insistance, the firstmajor operation towards the establishment of Pro-tected Villages, code named Operation Overload, wasofficially announced on 25 July 1974. Four weeks ofplanning preceded the simultaneous movement of49 960 people into 21 Protected Villages in ChiwesheTribal Trust Land within a period of six weeks.According to an official statement the intention ofthe operation was

to deprive terrorists of their vital contactwith the civilian population, particularly atnight, when they force tribesmen to accommodateand feed them as they move through the area. (6)

Particular emphasis was placed on the retention oftribal groupings during the resettlement of thelocal population into Protected Villages. As far aspossible,villages were sited near to existing agri-cultural fields. Each family was allocated a plot offifteen square metres on which to construct a home.Rhodesian Army and Police units supplied transportto the new villages.(7) Families had to constructtheir new homes from those materials that they hadremoved from their old ones. Following their move-ment Security Forces destroyed all remaining huts inthe Tribal Trust Land.(8) As the people living inthe northern part of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land hadbeen subject to a considerable degree of intimida-tion by insurgent forces, many moved into ProtectedVillages voluntarily. This was not the case to thesouth, however, where resistance to the move wasencountered.

The resettlement of Chiweshe Tribal Trust Landwas preceded by a High Density Force operation las-ting 4 to 5 days.About 17 companies of troops weredeployed clandestinely through the adjacent whitecommercial farming lands to seal off the TribalTrust Land. Although the operation was not an unqua-lified success, it was an attempt to saturate

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Chiweshe with Security Forces, thus either elimina-ting or forcing the flight of all insurgent forcesin the area. Following this, 21 construction teamswere moved in to construct the villages. They werefollowed by transportation, intelligence and fencingteams that enabled the total resettlement to be exe-cuted simultaneously. This was concluded on 15August 1974, according to schedule.

Deputy Secretary of Internal Affairs Louis deBruin, subsequently admitted that the speed of theoperation had caused many problems. At first theProtected Villages merely consisted of security fen-cing around an area that had been marked out insmaller plots, one per family. At the centre of theProtected Village was a second security fence andsheltered housing for armed guards. This was the'keep' upon which the defence of the village wasbased. Some of the 21 villages were, however, toobig and lack of sanitation and facilities led todisease. De Bruin also said that conditions hadsometimes been hard, which he explained as follows:'All I can say is that the operation was extremelyurgent. ' (9) In fact the Department of InternalAffairs had provided no sanitation facilities. Thelocal population had to rely on open latrines whichproved an obvious health hazard.-An adequate supplyof fresh water had been provided in only one or twovillages prior to completion of the resettlement. (10)Little aid had been extended by the governmenttowards the building of new homes except for thetransportation already mentioned.

Although criticism regarding Operation Overloadmust have been both foreseen and expected, the majo-rity of this criticism tended to be emotional ratherthan based on counter-insurgency theory. A black mem-ber of Parliament, Aaron Mungate did, however, pointto a number of valid shortcomings in the executionof the operation. His major objections were as fol-lows :

1. The only people who were protected werethose in the keep itself (i.e. the guards).

2. In the majority of Protected Villages notimely and adequate water supply had been installed.

3. People had been forced from their tradi-tional, and in some instances, substantial homeswith no compensation and no aid towards buying mate-rials to erect new ones.

4. Because only the gates of the Protected Vil-lages were quarded, the fences around the villagedid not prevent communication between the villagersand the insurgents.

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To a number of Security Force personnel the opera-tion seemed an immediate panic reaction to insurgentsuccess in 1973. In the short term, benefits seemedsubstantial as insurgent activities were severelydisrupted in Chiweshe for the following six months.In the medium and long term the lack of emphasis onconcurrent socio-economic conditions within the Pro-tected Villages proved a decisively negative factor.

Based on the experience gained during OperationOverload, Operation Overload Two in Madziwa TribalTrust Land, some weeks later proved to be an improve-ment in a number of respects. Instead of the massedmovement of the total population into Protected Vil-lages, the movement was extended over several weeks.The operation consisted of four phases. Phase oneentailed a High Density Force operation, duringwhich a single contact resulted in the eliminationof virtually the total insurgent presence (16 insur-gent casualties out of a total group of about 18).Phase two ensured that the local population couldmove about freely and thus accomplish the resettle-ment with little insurgent harassment. To this endroads were patrolled and cleared of mines. Phasethree entailed the provision of rudimentry sheltersand amenities within the envisaged Protected Villa-ges. Phase four covered the period 9 September 1974,to 31 October 1974, which was the compulsory movingperiod.

A total of 13 500 ad to be moved into8 Protected Villages. Two villages had already beenvoluntarily completed by the local population whilethe Salvation Army's educational centre, the BradleyInstitute, became the eleventh Protected Village.The total number of people in Protected Villages wasabout 16 500, with an average village population ofbetween 1 300 and 1 900 (in Chewishe a ProtectedVillage contained as many as 5 000 inhabitants).Madziwa Tribal Trust Land was, however, smaller thanChiweshe and had its population already concentratedaround developing centres. These conditions facili-tated the execution of the project as a whole. Inplace of those schools that had to be closed, 10 newschools, one each in or adjacent to a Protected Vil-lage were opened. In contrast to Chiweshe, 23 000head of cattle were also moved into protected pensoutside each village. At the time reports also sur-faced regarding blacks obtaining title to residen-tial stands and permanent right of occupation withinand adjacent to Protected Villages. This idea hadspecifically been forwarded by the so-called Shep-pard group who were the fore-runners of the later

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1 Psychological Operations Unit as detailed in Chap-ter 6. In a scheme presented to the Deputy Ministerin the Department to the Prime Minister they calledfor the division of Chiweshe, Madziwa and all subse-quent Protected Village areas into acre or evenhalf-acre plots to which a family could obtain free-hold title. Any such scheme was strongly resisted bythe traditional black chiefs as it would have erodedtheir main source of authority, the allocation anddistribution of land. Since Rhodesian Front policyplaced great emphasis on the role of the chief in ruralblack life, this resistance proved a crucial factor. Even-tually very little came of these attempts that couldhave contributed significantly towards making Pro-tected Villages more acceptable to the local blackpopulation.

For its part the Department of Internal Affairsseemed unable to adjust from a rural administrationto the increased demands being made by a suddenlyurban situation. In both cases finance remained asevere limitation. By the end of the war, however,Chiweshe and Madziwa had both stabilized and provi-ded facilities of a generally higher standard thanwas to be the case elsewhere. In broad strategicterms Operations Overload and Overload Two did pro-vide a number of precedents. The first was theemphasis on the physical isolation of the localpopulation from the insurgents as an end in itself.The second was the establishment of Protected Villa-ges in areas that had already been subverted as animpediment to insurgent logistics. The third was thelack of sustained development projects to betterliving conditions within Protected Villages and topromote these as viable growth centres. Lastly, thelack of attempts to involve the local population intheir own defence and developments, includingattempts to counter the negative influences thatcrowded urban existence, had a negative effect on thesocial cohesion of formerly rural black African communities.

Partly as a result of the initial success ofboth operations, Security Forces.could claim that amere 70 insurgents were still active inside Rhodesiaby early 1974. Since these Protected Villages wereconstructed at a time when maximum military andother public sector resources could be directedtowards their implementation, they were to be themost successful and effective in the country.

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3.4 Extension of the Protected Village scheme

In the year following the execution of OperationsOverload and Overload Two, Consolidated Villages,that were to form a second line of defence to Pro-tected Villages were introduced. Consolidated Vil-lages were formed by simply grouping 4 to 8 kraalstogether. No security fence, lighting, control ofmovement or armed detachments were provided. Curfewswere only enforced where necessary. The financialburden imposed by the Protected Village programmeseems to be the major motivation for the introduc-tion of this concept.

Movement of about 4 500 permanent residents and3 000 occasional residents in Maramba Tribal TrustLand, Mrewa district officially began on 2 June 1975as a first experiment. Although Consolidated Villa-ges were only to be established in areas of 'inci-pient insurrection' continuity planning entailedtheir conversion to Protected Villages should thisbe warranted by the security situation.(11) In manycases, in fact, the first phase in the establishmentof Protected Villages entailed the concentration ofthe people into Consolidated Villages. Followingthis, protective measures were added thus convertingthe Consolidated Villages into Protected Villages.

By May 1976, Consolidated Villages had, amongstothers, been established in Uzumba and Pfungwe Tri-bal Trust Lands as well as near Chipinga.

Having no protection, Consolidated Villageswere prime targets for insurgents. Both ZANLA and ZPRAforces burnt huts and forced the local population toabandon the new villages. One such act occurred onNew Year's Eve, 1977, when about 20 insurgentsburned 212 of the 380 huts of Kandeya ConsolidatedVillage in the North-east. Forcing the local popula-tion to resettle in these unprotected areas couldonly have resulted in extremely negative reactionson their part since the move entailed the disruptionof an established community with no material orsecurity benefit.

Apparently the policy of establishing Consoli-dated Villages was discontinued in the followingyear. Although heralded as a 'new concept' thesevillages were very similar in the final analysis tothe 'protected areas' that had been established bythe Department of Internal Affairs in 1973.

On 9 March 1976, Deputy Minister in the PrimeMinister's Office Ted Sutton-Pryce stated thatbetween 175 000 and 200 000 members of the localpopulation had been resettled in Protected and

Protected. Villages

Consolidated Villages. Throughout the eastern opera-tional areas the extension of Protected Villagescontinued unabated. The entire population of HondeValley was placed in Protected Villages early in1977. On 30 May 1977, the Rhodesia Herald reportedthat since the beginning of that year there had beenmore than 70 insurgent attacks on Protected Villa-ges. The number of villages were claimed to be inthe region of 200, housing 250 000 people. Each Pro-tected Village was reported to cost betweenRh$ 35 000 and Rh$ 45 000 to construct. Furtherreports indicated that the population of Kandeya,Chiswito Tribal Trust Lands and Karuyana PurchaseArea as well as Chiredzi and Makoni had been placedin Protected Villages.

At this time the Catholic Commission for Jus-tice and Peace published Rhodesia: the PropagandaWar which contained a detailed but inaccurate break-down of Protected Villages in Rhodesia, claiming theexistence of 203 villages housing 580 832 people.Replying to the publication, the Minister of Inter-nal Affairs stated that there were, in fact, 178villages housing 260 000 people.

A report in the Sunday Mail of 9 October 1977,provided an indication as to the effectiveness ofboth Protected and Consolidated Villages. It statedthat about ten percent of all such villages had beenburnt down by insurgent forces. The main areasaffected were Mrewa and Mtoko with a few cases inthe Mount Darwin area. The majority of burnings hadtaken place in the preceding ten months as a resultof which thousands of former inhabitants fled intothe bush. Insurgent forces actively attempted toprevent the local population from being placed inProtected Villages as in Sengwe Trust Tribal Landwhere only 60% of the 12 000 people had moved intothe six villages designated. The Chiredzi DistrictCommissioner stated at the time

There is a strong terrorist presence in thisarea. The people are being intimidated againstgoing into the villages.(12)

When fully extended, the introduction of both Pro-tected and Consolidated Villages represented thebasic approach to the strategy already mentioned,i.e. aimed at disrupting insurgent logistics. Pro-tected Villages were established in those populatedareas as near to Rhodesian borders as possiblethrough which insurgent infiltration routes ran.Large stretches of the border were eventually

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covered by means of border minefield obstacles (seeChapter 4); the object being that insurgents ente-ring Rhodesia would first have to negotiate theseand then cross no-go areas where Security Forces hadabsolute freedom of movement and action to pursueand eliminate them. In those areas bordering on no-go zones, the local population would be placed inProtected Villages thus still affording SecurityForces a large degree of freedom. Insurgent forceswould in this way be denied food, water and informa-tion, forcing them to be continually on the move andfacilitating their location.

This broad strategic approach was put to besteffect in the Operation Repulse area. Entering Rho-desia from the Gaza Province in Mozambique, ZANLAforces had to cross the Gona Re Zhou game park andthe border minefield obstacles erected along thesouth-eastern border. In this relatively arid areathe local population in the Tribal Trust Lands sur-rounding the game park had all been placed in Pro-tected Villages (Diti, Chipese, Sengwe, Matibi No 2,and Sangwe Tribal Trust Lands). The majority of thesources of water outside the Protected Villages weredestroyed. Insurgent forces wanting to penetrate tothe populated areas around Masvingo (formerly FortVictoria) were thus faced with a formidable physicalobstacle consisting of depopulated and semi-depopu-lated areas with little access to food and water.

Eventually about three quarters of a millionblacks were concentrated in Protected Villages. Alist of all planned and existing Protected and Con-solidated Villages as on 6 January 1978, amounted toa total of 234 villages.(13) The salient points men-tioned above regarding the geographical distributionof Protected Villages are illustrated in Figure 3.1.

3.5 Opening of Protected Villages

Since the strategy of Protected Villages was intro-duced in 1973 it had been a particular point of con-tention between black leaders and the RhodesianFront government. The social disruption resultingfrom forced resettlement led to highly emotionalreactions to the strategy on the part of moderateblack nationalist leaders. This attitude changedradically when, as members of the TransitionalGovernment, they came to grips with the counter-insurgency problems facing Rhodesia.

Once Bishop Muzorewa, Chief Chirau and theReverend Sithole had reached agreement with Prime

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Protected Villages

AREAS WHERE THE LOCAL POPULATIONHAD BEEN CONCENTRATED IN PV'S

TRIBAL TRUST LANDS

Figure 3.1 Existing and Planned Protected Villages:

, 6 Jan. 1978

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Minister Smith on an internal settlement in March1978, substantive proof had to be provided to boththe black people at large and the insurgent forcesin the country that majority rule had been achieved.The president of the Chiweshe Residents' Associa-tion, Mathias Chitauro, made this quite clear whenhe stated that

Unless the Transitional Government quicklydismantled protected villages, residents ofkeeps would never take the internal settlementseriously. (14)

The black 'members of the Executive Council were con-vinced of their majority support amongst the ruralpopulation. They were adamant that substantive proofhad only to be provided that the war was over toinduce numerous insurgents to lay down their weapons.Although the war was still continuing unabated inthe rural areas, it was judged that the symbolicreopening of Protected Villages could provide justthe 'substantive proof needed. It was also judgedthat it would influence the attitude of the localpopulation to support moderate black nationalistleaders. Thus, on 8 September 1978, the first threeProtected Villages were declared open in Mutoko Tri-bal Trust Land. The inhabitants were free to leaveand return to their previous locations.

The opening of Protected Villages, however,also reflected the failure of the socio-economicdevelopment of these villages. Chief Mutoko had toldthe co-Minister of Finance, Commerce and Industry,Ernest Bulle, that 'More of us are dying inside thevillages than outside.'(15) This was a sentimentthat had also been expressed by Mr Chitauro somemonths earlier when he stated that people in theProtected Villages were poorer than they were beforethe establishment of the villages. By 11 September1978, 70 Protected Villages had been opened in theNorth-east.

By October it was clear that the opening ofProtected Villages had failed to achieve the objec-tives set. Opening a further 9 Protected Villages inMount Darwin area. Bishop Muzorewa encountered sul-len resentment. The attitude was well reflected byan elderly male inhabitant as reported in the Rhode-sia Herald who stated that

. .. The government had forced the people intothe PV's in the first place, and now turnedaround and expected them to return to their

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homes'where the terrorist threat was still areal.thing.(16)

Reports indicated that insurgents were fining peoplereturning from Protected Villages Rh$20 for deser-ting the struggle. By 8 December 1978, all ProtectedVillages in the Murewra, Mutoko and Mudzi districtsand 20 villages in the Mount Darwin district hadbeen opened.

By October of the following year Herbert Zimuto,Minister of Home Affairs (formerly known as InternalAffairs) said the following in reply to questionsput to him by The National Observer

In the early part of last year there was muchcriticism of the protected villages which hadresulted in the Government agreeing to disman-tle PV's in the Mtoko area. But a sad lessonwas learnt at Mtoko (now Mutoko) ... a lot ofpeople lost their lives because of that deci-sion. They fell victim to terrorism becausethey were no longer protected.(17)

The opening of Protected Villages had been stoppedsome months earlier, but had resulted in a deterio-rating security situation in those areas affected,as well as in public humiliation of the vauntedInternal Settlement. In some cases Protected Villa-ges were opened after having functioned for only 15months; hardly enough time to become established aspotential growth points. Such practices could onlyhave led to the total alienation of the rural popu-lation affected.

In fact, admitting their failure to consolidatethe support of the local population, Security Forceslifted all restrictions on the movement of inhabi-tants in those Protected Villages where they hadpreviously proved least successful. (This was gene-rally termed as 'opening PV's1) This was in contrastto the normal practice of relaxing population con-trol measures in white or government base areas. Afeasibility study conducted by Joint Operation Cen-tre Hurricane prior to the opening of Protected Vil-lages had in fact recommended the relaxation of mea-sures in Madziwa and Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands asa first step.

3.6 Guarding Forces

At the start of the Protected Village scheme, the

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Protected Villages

Department of Internal Affairs was given the respon-sibility of defending these villages. At this stagethe department had no military or paramilitary func-tion and had to draw personnel from other areas toassist in manning Protected Villages. Villages inChiweshe Tribal Trust Land were in some instancesalso manned by members of the South African Police.To meet this new commitment, the Department ofInternal Affairs established a new category of offi-cial termed District Security Assistants who weredistinct from the career District Assistants that-performed normal administrative duties. Furthermore,the Department was ill-prepared to train DistrictSecurity Assistants. Early training programmes werethus carried out by the British South Africa Policeand the Prison Service. In time the Army took overthe training of District Security Assistants at theDepartment of Internal Affairs training depot atChikurubi near Salisbury. The first intake of Dis-trict Security Assistants concluded their trainingat Chikurubi in July 1975 and were subsequentlydeployed in Protected Villages.

As the need for protection forces grew, theDepartment of Internal Affairs was allocated a num-ber of National Servicemen for their normal 18 monthperiod of service. The first intake passed out earlyin 1975. Known as 'vedettes' upon completion oftheir training, they were posted out to ProtectedVillages as superintendents-in-charge. In many casesa vedette was the only white official within a Pro-tected Village. His major responsibilities entailedthe welfare and discipline of his 15 to 20 DistrictSecurity Assistants, and the safety and protection ofthe Protected Village. Youth and inexperience playeda major role in the problems that these first vedet-tes encountered. Thus, in late 1975, it was decidedto extend call-ups to those men who had no securitycommitment in the age group 25 to 38. Henceforth menin this category performed their call-up dutieswithin the Department of Internal Affairs. The matu-rity of these men led to an improvement in the roleof the first intake that graduated in November 1975.

In spite of the increased manpower made availa-ble to Internal Affairs, it was apparent that thedepartment's primary administrative role was incom-patible with protective or paramilitary activities.Furthermore, during 1975 and 1976 large areas ofRhodesia were being resettled, placing an increasedstrain on Internal Affairs as regards training, com-

, mand and control, and logistics. Since the Army andPolice were loath to perform this function as part

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Protected Villages

of their normal operations, it was eventually deci-ded to form an autonomous force, the Guard Force.This force was to be exclusively responsible for thesecurity of Protected Villages. First officersand senior non-commissioned officers were recruitedduring August/September 1975. The Guard Force wasofficially gazetted as an autonomous Force under theMinistry of Defence on 1 February 1976.

Half of the Department of Internal AffairsNational Service allocation and the Chikurubi train-ing base was transferred to the Guard Force.(18)Some District Security Assistants also joined theforce, although Internal Affairs retained responsi-bility for the protection of a number of ProtectedVillages such as in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land.During May 1977, the Guard Force was given a 'newlook1. From a previously static and defensive rolethe force henceforth engaged in active patrolling,ambush and anti-ainbush techniques, night patrols,etc. From 1978 the duties of the Guard Force werefurther extended to the protection of white farms.At a later stage the protection of key installationsand lines of communication was also taken over fromthe Police. In May 1978, the 1st Battalion of theGuard Force was formed and committed to an infantryrole. By late 1979 the total Guard Force establish-ment numbered 7 000 men.

Up to September 1978, the newly formed SecurityForce Auxiliaries (see Chapter 8} had only beendeployed in areas where the local population had notbeen resettled. Largely as a result of the increaseddeployment of the Guard Force to protect railwaylines and white farming areas, it was decided that thenumbers of Security Force Auxiliaries would be increa-sed to take charge of a number of Protected Villages.By early October 1978, villages were taken over inthe Beit Bridge, Chiredzi, Chipinga, Mutasa andMount Darwin areas. The success achieved differedwidely from area to area, and even from village tovillage. Although the concept of Auxiliaries wassound, it was hampered by training and recruitmentpolicies employed in the execution of the strategy.

When the war ended in 1979, a number of forceshad thus been involved in guarding Protected Villa-ges, South African Police, Internal Affairs, GuardForce and Security Force Auxiliaries. In the majo-rity of cases these forces were foreign to the localpopulation and did not involve them in their owndefence on a planned basis. The short trainingperiod, calibre of manpower recruited and the staticrole initially accorded the Guard Force also led to

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Protested Villages

morale and disciplinary problems. Acts of lawless-ness towards the local population did not endearthese forces to the people. The proliferation offorces also led to personnel management problemssince conditions of service differed. (19) In the caseof the Guard Force that had specifically been formedto defend Protected Villages, a number of additionalduties had been added. The result was widely diffe-ring standards of efficiency between villages guar-ded by different forces. No uniform approach existed ona countrywide basis. Proof of this is provided bythe fact that Joint Operation Centre Hurricanerecommended the creation of a "protection brigade1

during June 1978. This force was to comprisea combination of Rhodesia Defence Regiment (i.e ter-ritorial) troops and members of Guard Force in aneffort to utilize more mature leadership in the formergroup to improve the standard within the GuardForce.

3.7 The Rhodesian Approach and Conditions in Protec-ted Villages

The Rhodesian government approach to the resettle-ment of people into Protected Villages is containedin the following extracts from an interview withInternal Affairs Minister, Jack Mussett in late 1974

By taking tribesmen to protected villages weare saving their lives. I don't think we can beexpected to do more than help them to helpthemselves.(20)

After stating that difficulties had been met regar-ding the implementation of farming schemes in Chiwe-she Tribal Trust Land, Mussett added

But we are not going to feed these people. Theymust grow their own crops ... those who havehad to leave permanent buildings or propertywill be able to move back when the terroristthreat is over.(21)

The major problem confronting Security Forces andother ministries involved in the execution of thisstrategy was lack of funds. Although various effortswere launched to develop Protected Villages asgrowth points, manpower, finance, political con-straints and lack of imagination led to their earlydemise.

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Protected Villages '

Conditions in Protected Villages differed fromarea to area. Malnutrition and disease had alwaysbeen features in black rural life for numerousdecades.' The concentration of people into such vil-lages tended to exacerbate these problems. To theblacks, resettlement into these villages entailed amove from a rural to an urban community, with aconcurrent increase in prostitution, delinquency,vagrancy and malnutrition.

The physical uncertainty of turmoil upset thetraditional family basis of community life. Youngmen carrying arms entered these villages and chal-lenged the authority of tribal elders so disturbingthe established hierarchy. Within families thelocal insurgent youth supporters, or mujibas,started to challenge the authority of thetraditional senior members.

Commenting on the increase of malnutrition inProtected Villages, Dr Jim Watt, superintendent atthe Salvation Army's Howard Hospital in ChiwesheTribal Trust Land, stated that several factors con-tributed to this

The protected villages were too large to beself-supporting, the tribesmen had to walk toofar to get to their fields every day, peoplecould not keep guard on their crops because ofthis and cattle, its and other animals wereeating their crops and vegetables.(22)

As stated, Chiweshe and Madziwa Protected Villageswere the most effective in the country due to theresources that initially could be allocated to theirestablishment and development. Yet by 1978 only 60%of the arable land in those Tribal Trust Lands wasbeing cultivated again.(23) On the other hand, DrWatt was also to admit that certain advantages hadbecome apparent. Health care was much easier, whilethe Ministry of Education had succeeded in maintai-ning continuity of education.

An official classified Rhodesian Army study onthe effectiveness of Protected Villages in Chiwesheand Madziwa stated that

The "growth point" concept is showing definitesigns of development ... The civil populationin the PV' s (Protected Villages) appear reaso-nably adjusted. The unpopularity of the PV's isdirectly related to the restrictions placed onthe population, eg. food control, curfews, etc.

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Protected Villages

While Chiweshe and Madziwa represented the most suc-'cessful schemes, the majority of Protected Villageswere in a worse state. Two case studies within Ope-ration Hurricane serve as illustrations.

The same Army document quoted above states thefollowing as regards Kandeya and Bushu Tribal TrustLands, and Chesa African Purchase Area (52 villages)

Kandeya was the hub of the war (in the North-east) and major killing ground from the begin-ning of Hurricane ... With the implementationof the PV's (Protected Villages) and the main-tenance of a reasonable force level, CT (Commu-nist Terrorist) activity was de-escalated con-siderably. Because of the speed in which thePV's were erected in this area, social reper-cussions on the population were considerable.Again because of the speed ... manpower require-ments for the programme have not kept pace andthe training of INTAF staff has been minimal.Command and control has almost collapsed due tothe poor standard of junior leadership. Becauseof the inadequate manpower and junior leader-ship the CT's have regained freedom of movementincluding easy access to the population andfood. Chesa has reverted to a traditional R & R(rest and recreation) and RV (meeting) area forCT groups.

A final lengthy quotation from this study representsa typical example from the worst cases. The areasconcerned were Mudzi Tribal Trust Land (15 villages),Mutoko Tribal Trust Land (22 villages) and MurewaTribal Trust Land (23 villages).

PV's (protected Villages) in these TTL's (Tri-bal Trust Lands) have generally failed toachieve their objectives for the followingreasons:

i. Lack of manpowerii. Lack of equipmentiii. Dissipation of effortOn average 40% of the population are living inPV's. The remainder are living in the bush,other TTL's or Salisbury (Harare). The CT's(Communist Terrorists) have total control overthe population and because they have to controlit is virtually impossible to move the people,who are living in the bush, back into PV's,without a major military exercise. This wouldbe costly in manpower and equipment. To enforce

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Protected Villages

the move back into the PV's, drastic measureswould have to be taken, eg. the complete kil-ling of isolated pockets of the population. Toensure the retention of the people in the PV'sit would require a sustained military effort inthe area for at least six months. The militaryproblems of the area are magnified in that onemust find the local population first before onecan find the CT. Intelligence gathering is vir-tually impossible. The civilian population istotally alienated against the Government. Nor-mal civil administration had collapsed withconsequent breakdown of law and order.

The "drastic measures' referred to and illustratedabove bear witness not only to a basically punitiveapproach to the Protected Village programme, butalso to a dismissive attitude amongst the whitepopulation in general towards the rural black popu-lation .

3.8 Conclusion

Although evidence has been presented as to the broadfailure of the strategy of Protected Villages, thisis not to suggest that Rhodesian officials were perse insensitive to the medium and long term goals ofthese villages. In a planning document issued by theDepartment of Internal Affairs it was concluded that

The short term objective is the removal of theAfrican people from terrorist influence for thesake of national security, but the full attain-ment of this short term aim must surely resultin our reaching the ultimate goal of more con-centrated and more rapid development of theAfrican people and the areas which they inhabit.

The balance of available evidence rather suggeststhe execution of the strategy of Protected Villagessuffered two major shortcomings. First there wasan over-emphasis on the short term goal of physi-cally concentrating the local population and thefreedom of action this would give the Security For-ces. In the second place there was a lack of sus-tained effort in the allocation of resources to thedevelopment of Protected Villages and the increaseof the general standard of living in them. In thoseareas such as Madziwa and Chiweshe Tribal TrustLands where such a sustained effort had occurred,

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Protected Villages

the results were correspondingly better than else-where .

As stated in the introductory remarks to thisChapter, and borne out by an examination of the geo-graphical distribution of Protected Villages, thesevillages were erected across insurgent infiltrationroutes as near to the border as possible. The aimwas to deny insurgent forces food, intelligence andcontact with the local population during the firststages of their infiltration into Rhodesia. Littleevidence could be found regarding the objective ofgaining the support of the local population byresettlement and development, or of involving thelocal population in their own defence. In the lightof the acute Rhodesian manpower and budget con-straints the lack of attempts to involve the localsin defence of Protected Villages is especially note-worthy.

At a time when the insurgent onslaught on Rho-desia was nearing its final intensification (mid1977) it did appear to government officials thatProtected Villages had been successful in a numberof respects. In a document entitled Value of Protec-ted and Consolidated Villages the advantages provi-ded by the strategy were listed as follows (June1977)

(a) release of operational forces for use inother areas;

(b) protection of Government supporters fromterrorist attack ...

(c) the opportunity (of) having a captiveaudience, to mobilise the masses on Govern-ment 's side ...

(d) the chance for planned development of theTribal Trust Lands concerned together withthe people through their tribal leaders, inorder to get the economic return to helppay for the vast security bill and to speedup the move into the cash economy ...

(e) closer contact between the people and theadministration and between the people andsecurity forces such as the Police ...

(f) provision of facilities for the people ...within easy reach ...

Disadvantages included:

(a) complete disruption of the normal kraallife ...

(b) tying up of large numbers of European and

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Protected Villages

African staff on protective and administra-tive duties ...

(c) great drain on Government resources finan-cially and materially.

The document concludes

... protected villages have1 not been completelysuccessful because we have not gone all theway; we have not detained the troublemakers; wedo not completely control the movements of theinhabitants by day and night; we do not controlagricultural activity and our protective mea-sures are limited. The same applies even moreso to consolidated villages . . .

As the insurgent onslaught developed from early 1978onwards, the effectiveness of Protected Villagesdeclined further to the extent described in the'worst case1 example of Mudzi, Mutoko and MurewaTribal Trust Lands.

In broad terms the strategy of Protected Villa-ges as employed in Rhodesia was not a success. Theinitial results obtained by operation Overload andOverload Two were encouraging, but the subsequentexecution was found wanting. The primary short-termobjective, isolation of the insurgent forces, wasnot achieved. This was not only the result of poorlytrained and unmotivated protecting forces manningthe keeps, but also as a result of the fact that theinsurgent parallel hierachies mentioned previouslywere not broken prior to or concurrently with theresettlement of people in Protected Villages.

Although Special Branch did screen the localpopulation during relocation, this was executed in arudimentary fashion. As the war intensified andresettlement became widespread this limited screen-ing was reduced even further.

In the final instance protective measuresemployed in Protected Villages proved inadequate.Not only were the physical security devices rudimen-tary, but the manpower allocated to each ProtectedVillage was the bare minimum. In combination theycould not prevent intimidation of the people byinsurgent forces. Under these circumstances the sup-port of the local population for the Security Forcescould not easily be obtained.

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NOTES

1. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutio-nary War (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p. 53.

2. R. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency(Chatto and Windus, London, 1966), p. 56.

3. Ibid, pp. 124-5.4. According to the Rhodesian Army manual Mili-

tary Support to the Civil Power (MCP) (restricted,as amended, dated 1 May 1976), p. xvi, a no-go areawas

... one from which all civilians are excludedby an order of the Protecting Authority, interms of Section 4(1)(b) of the EmergencyPowers (Maintenance of Law and Order) regula-tions as published in Government Notice 739/73,as amended in order to ensure that they do notbecome involved in operations conducted bySecurity Forces against terrorists.Only authorised members of the Security Forces,on duty, will move in no-go areas and no actionmay be instituted against them for any death orinjury caused to any persons within the area byany act performed in good faith in the courseof operations conducted during the time whilstthe order is in force.

5. P. Stiff and R. Reid Daly, Selous Scouts:Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 89.

6. Africa Research Bulletin (1-31 Jul. 1974),p. 3311.

7. According to District Commissioner BillJohnstone 63 000 truckloads of personal possessionsin 5 ton lorries were used. Rhodesia Herald (13 Dec.1974).

8. It is interesting to compare the approachused by the British in Malaya, where squatter fami-lies were compensated for their movement. For buil-ding new homes, each family received a cash granteventually totalling $100 (US) with the timber andthatch for new huts being supplied at cost price.Transportation was free. In addition each familyreceived a subsistence allowance. J.J. McCuen, Artof War, p. 157.

9. Rhodesia Herald (4 Oct. 1974).10. See for example the statement made by Inter-

nal Affairs Minister Jack Mussett as reported in theSunday Mail of 1 December 1976.

11. During 1975 the District Commissioner respon-sible for Kandeya Tribal Trust Land, Jim Herd,attempted a new approach. He established a system of

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Protected Villages

protected patrol bases throughout the Trust Landwhich would enable Department of Internal Affairspatrols to maintain contact with the local popula-tion. Patrols were made on horseback between thesebases. The system was maintained until such time asKandeya was resettled. The effectiveness of theseattempts could not be ascertained.

12. Rhodesia Herald (10 Oct. 1977),13. A breakdown of Protected Villages (PV's)

and Consolidated Villages (CV's) is as follows:Maramba TTL, 3 PV's; Uzuinba TTL, 17 PV's; KandeyaTTL, 39 PV's; Masoso TTL, 5 PV's; Karutana AfricanPurchase Land, 1 PV; Mukumbura TTL, 3 PV's; ShisuitiTTL, 6 PV's; Chesa African Purchase Land, 9 PV's;Pfungwe TTL, 3 CV's and 1 PV; Mzarabani TTL, 3 PV's;Mutoko TTL, 26 PV's; Ngarwe TTL, 7 PV's; Mudzi TTL,2 PV's; Chikuizo TTL, 2 PV's; Chiweshe TTL, 21 PV's;Madziwa TTL, 10 PV's; Bushu TTL, 4 PV's; MtentengweTTL, 4 PV's; Diti TTL, 2 PV's; Chipisc TTL, 2 PV's;Wankie TTL, 1 PV; Sangwe TTL, 2 PV's; Sengwe TTL, 5PV's; Matibi No 2 TTL, 8 PV's; Holdenby TTL, 9 PV's;Mutusa North TTL, 5 PV's; Manga TTL, 1 PV; MutemaTTL, 8 PV's; Musikavanhu TTL, 4 PV's; Chikore Mis-sion, 4 PV's and Ndpwayo TTL, 9 PV's.

14. Rhodesia Herald (24 Jun. 1978).15. Rhodesia Herald (9 Sep. 1978).16. Rhodesia Herald (10 Oct. 1978).17. Sunday Mail (4 Oct. 1979).18. The other half was used for district admi-

nistrative duties.19. The Guard Force, for example, received no

pension fund benefits, while the regular Police,Army and Air Force members received better pay thantheir Guard Force, Auxiliary and Internal Affairsequivalents.

20. Sunday Mail (1 Dec. 1974).21. Ibid.22. Sunday Mail (2 Feb. 1977). Distances to

fields were up to 12 km.23. Before resettlement Chiweshe produced half

of the Rhodesian Burley and 18% of the total tobaccocrop. Rhodesia Herald (1 Nov. 1981).

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Minefield Obstacles

Chapter 4

BORDER MINEFIELD OBSTACLES

In the period 1974 to 1979, Rhodesia investednearly Rh$ 10 million in capital expenditure aloneto establish border minefield obstacles. Althoughthe strategy was only vaguely defined at nationallevel, it did constitute an important element ofmilitary strategy at Joint Operational Centre andArmy brigade level of command. At these levels theconstruction of such obstacles was linked, in vary-ing degrees, to the establishment of no-go areas,curfews and the resettlement of the local populationinto Protected Villages. This was specifically the .case in 'Operations Hurricane and Repulse alongRhodesia's eastern borders with Mozambique.(2)

L

4 . 1 Cordon Sanitaire

To be effective any border control system must ful-fill three related functions, namely detection,delay and neutralization.

Simply stated, border control operations shouldimpede movement of insurgents across the areaunder surveillance and cause them to commitacts that will lead to detection. During thedelay, firepower and intercepting forces candestroy the insurgents.(1)

Undoubtedly the creation of an impenetrable cordonsanitaire is almost impossible. More recent examplesthat have, however, proved effective are thosedividing the Federal Republic of Germany and theGerman Democratic Republic, and along the Israeliborders with Lebanon and Syria. As was the case inAlgeria with the Morice line these barriers repre-sented a major undertaking and massive capitalexpenditure.

The basic characteristics of such cordons are1. Physical obstacles that delay any breaching

operation.2. An alarm system indicating the location of

any attempt at breaching the cordon.3. Quick reaction forces that react immediate-

ly to any alarm.4. Constant patrolling and vigilance along the

total length of the cordon, day and night.5. Finally, these cordons were typically con-

structed along the entire length of a border. Theaim was thus to halt all cross-border movement, andnot to channel or limit any such occurences.

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4.2 Rhodesian Cordons Sanitaires

The origin of the Rhodesian strategy for the crea-tion of a cordon sanitaire remains uncertain. Even morevague is the initial concept and empirical data that theoperation was based on. A single fact that is, how-ever, self-evident can be deduced from the date ofthe first such attempt. During 1974 the insurgentthreat to Rhodesia was confined to the North-east,and to all intents and purposes provided no evidencethat suggested its rapid spread to the rest of thecountry. Events in far-away Portugal could, similar-ly, at this stage not have implied the rapid trans-fer of power in Mozambique.lt would thus seem thatwhen construction began on the first attempt at acordon sanitaire, the scope planned was strictlylimited to the North-eastern border.

Construction on this first Rhodesian attempt,officially termed the Cordon Sanitaire (Corsan) ,started during May 1974. It took 24 months to com-plete the 179 km of Corsan at a cost of Rh$ 27 000per kilometer.

According to official classified documentation:

The original Cordon Sanitaire was designed toact as an obstacle which would provide warningof people crossing in either direction, and initself be a deterrent to crossings taking place.Timely warning would theoretically enabletroops to react and eliminate the group.

The design of the Corsan is shown diagrammatically inFigure 4.1. It consists of two game fences approxi-mately 25 metres apart within which was enclosed aminefield. Blast mines were laid in the minefield ata density of 1 to 3 mines for every meter of Corsan

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Minefield Obstacles

25m2,1m Game

Fence

3 Rows of mines with ratioof 1-3 blast mines permetre of front

Alarm Fencex x

Drag Road

Figure 4.1: Cordon Sanitaire

length. (Blast mines rely on the force of theexplosion rather than on shrapnel for their effect) .A 'drag1 road was constructed along the Rhodesianside of the inner fence to facilitate the locationof tracks. (Drag roads are constituted by bulldozingareas of bush to create strips of cleared groundregularly swept and examined for footprints left bytransgressors).

The 25 metres of minefield were treated with adefoliant known as HYVAR-X which totally destroyedall vegetation. Attempts to further defoliate stripsof 150 metres each on either side of the Corsan metwith lesser degrees of success, largely as a resultof the cheaper herbicide used as TORDON 225.(3)

At a later stage an alarm fence was fitted t'othe inner fence. The original system installed was aYEAL system, but proved too sensitive and unreliable.After a high level delegation had studied boththe YEAL and DTR 78 systems in Israel, the lat-ter was chosen for further installation.Although initial planning provided for the installa-tion of an alarm system along the total length ofthe Corsan, this objective was not achieved.

In theory the system was linked to controlpoints every 10 km along the Corsan where an alarmwas sounded. From here reaction forces could bedirected to the point of violation. From the start in-adequate force levels and the demands of other,urgent, tasks precluded the effective deployment ofsuch reaction forces along the length of the Corsan.Even at this early stage security forces relied in-creasingly upon regular patrols along the Corsan in place

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Minefield Obstacles

of highly mobile reaction forces. A variation entai-led the direction of artillery fire for immediateretaliation. This was attempted for a short period inthe Mjunibura area during 1975. The large number ofCorsan violations that occurred, however, resultedin an inordinate expenditure of ammunition and theoperation was abandoned.

Further cover of the Corsan was provided byregular patrols of mounted infantry. These forceswere specifically aimed at picking up tracks andsigns of interference with the Corsan.

Although the initial concept had seeminglyoriginated from the Army, in an almost panic reac-tion to the insurgent threat of 1973, a Corsan com-mittee was set up at inter-departmental level to co-ordinate all civil/military aspects of the project.Chaired by the Deputy Minister in the Office of thePrime Minister, it consisted of senior representa-tives from the Army, Air Force, Police, Treasury,Internal Affairs and the Department of Tsetse andTrypanosomiases Control. This last department hadwide experience in the construction of game fencesand was initially made responsible for all Corsanfencing.

Within the Army the Corps of Engineers laythe minefield while the Signal Corps installedand maintained the alarm system. A civilian firm,Agricura (SA) Pty Ltd, was contracted for thedefoliation.

Some initial success was achieved by the Corsan,but this came from casualties caused by blast minesand not from Security Force reaction to violations.Very few of the casualties were captured, most lea-ving only a blood spoor leading into Mozambique. Thelack of concrete evidence regarding the effective-ness of the Corsan soon led to a loss of confidencein the obstacle and even less effective policing ofit.

The configuration of the Corsan had, in effect,determined its own failure. There were several majorcontributing factors: the limited width of the mined stripthe ineffective type of mine used; the effects ofthe heavy sub-tropical rains on these mines; theplacements of the alarm system on the inner fence,and the difficulty encountered in maintaining theminefield.

Since these factors constantly recurred in sub-sequent additions and extensions to the Corsan, eachwill be discussed in turn.

Within weeks of construction, the narrowness ofthe minefield became the first evident shortcoming

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Minefield Obstacles

in the obstacle. The Rhodesian Corps of Engineerslater assessed it as follows:

The depth of 25 metres for a barrier minefieldwas somewhat ludicrous,, as with normal breach-ing techniques this could be breached withintwo hours.

The method of breaching developed by the insurgentswas in fact even less time-consuming. They simplydug holes at stride length, thus avoiding the detai-led breaching of the total width of the minefield.Breaching could furthermore take place at nightacross a clearly demarcated, defoliated, strip.Defoliation and the heavy annual summer rains further significantly reduced the effectiveness ofthese mines. Heavy rains exposed mines, tumbled andshifted them. It also buried a number deep enough toavoid their detonation through the pressure exertedon the ground by the weight of a man. Furthermore,the Rhodesian Engineers were later to state:

Maintenance was impossible. The conditionsdescribed above made the minefield more dange-rous to breach than to walk over.

In the final instance, placement of the alarmsystem on the inner fence, and the lack of__depth and density of mines mentioned already ensuredthe ineffectiveness of the Corsan. Insurgent membersleaving Rhodesia could, in the first place, trip thealarm and still have enough time to breach the mine-field before the reaction force arrived. In thesecond place, insurgents entering Rhodesia onlyactivated the alarm as a last obstacle. In this casethe alarm merely indicated that a breach had occur-red The insurgents were thus already a distanceinto the country before the reaction force arrived. Inthe absence of sufficient and effective quick reac-tion forces the installation of the alarm system initself was questionable.

The advantages mentioned above regarding tneinsurgents, were further increased by the slow reac-tion of Security Forces to any indications ofbreaches. Yet this was largely due to the large num-ber of false alarms caused by wild game either acti-vating the alarm system or detonating mines.

The lessons learnt from the Corsan led to theexperimental construction of a Modified Cordon Sani-taire (Mod Corsan). Only 18 km of this version wereconstructed at a total cost of Rh$ 288 000, or

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Minefield Obstacles

Rh$ 16 000 per kilometer (see Fig 4.2). Due tovarious delays the Mod Corsan took 4 months to com-plete. It was, however, largely a further develop-ment and extension of a tract of existing Corsan.

The Mod Corsan consisted of a modified doubleapron fence (rows of semi-coiled> barbed wire on topof each other) constructed about' 300m inside theexisting Corsan with a drag road on the inward side.Three rows of mines were laid in the strip betweenthe apron fence and the Corsan at a total density of2 mines per meter of front (ie. a lesser densitythan in the 25 metres of the Corsan).

Original Corsan with Alarm Fence

- 300m3 Rows consisting of

1 Ploughshare per 100m1 POMZ 10 per 100mV3 Anti-pers. mines per metre

Modified Double Apron FenceX ~~~~ X ~~~ X ~~~ X ~~~ X ~~ X HIZI X

Drag Road

Figure 4.2: Modified Cordon Sanitaire

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Minefield Obstacles

The use of directional shrapnel mines termedploughshares was instituted, however, as well asomni-directional POMZ 10 shrapnel mines. Both wereattached to trip wires and had to be placed aboveground level. To conceal these mines and to lessenthe effect of rain the 300m of minefield weretreated with herbicide.

The natural camouflage proved to be an advan-tage while also lessening the effect of rain on thepressure mines, but the devices were now susceptibleto the regular veld fires that occur in the area. Afurther advantage was that the Corsan alarm fencewas now on the enemy (ie. Mozambique) side of theminefield. On the other hand, maintenance of thealarm system, and close investigation of it, couldnot easily be undertaken owing to access problems.Little attention had apparently been given to theproblem of maintenance during the planning stage ofthe obstacle.

The construction and maintenance teams that hadcompleted the task were redeployed immediately aftercompletion and the Mod Corsan subsequently rapidlydeteriorated to ineffectiveness.

The Mod Corsan was mainly an Army project, withthe Engineers responsible for construction of themodified double apron fence. After evaluating theeffectiveness of this fence it was decided that theDepartment of Tsetse and Trypanosomiases Controlwould again construct all future fences. These, inturn, were more of the conventional game fencetypes.

Furthermore, it once again became clear thatgreater emphasis had to be placed on maintenance. Afinal conclusion was reached concerning doubts aboutthe cost effectiveness of the alarm system in theabsence of sufficient/effective reaction forces.

At this stage 6 Composite Squadron, consistingof infantry, engineers and signallers was responsi-ble for patrolling and maintaining both the Corsanand Mod Corsan. Owing to the ineffectiveness of theobstacles that had been erected and the concurrentlack of maintenance, the squadron was achieving verylittle success.

In reaction to the threat of a possible FRELIMO(Army of Mozambique) attack on Mutare (formerlyUmtali), the construction and maintenance teamsengaged on the Mod Corsan were hastily redeployed.It was decided to install a further improvement onthe Mod Corsan, known as the Mod Mod Corsan (see Fig4.3) in the area.

The design used entailed the construction of a

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Minefield Obstacles

game fence with a fitted alarm system parallel tothe existing border fence, 300 metres in depth, onthe Rhodesian side. An all-weather road was cutthrough the mountains surrounding Mutare, parallelto the game fence.

Border fence

- 300m 3 Rows consisting of

2 Ploughshares per 100mY3 Ant-pers. mines per metre

Game Fence with Alarm System

All-weather Road

Figure 4.3: Modified Modified Cordon Sanitaire

The minefield laid between the two fences consistedof three rows. Only ploughshare and pressure mineswere used to a total density of slightly over twomines per meter of frontage.

At a later stage about 50 so-called Radio Acti-vated Devices were also installed to strengthen the

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minefield. These 'devices' consisted of 44 gallondrums filled with explosives and shrapnel that couldbe detonated by radio link.

The Mod Mod Corsan was probably the closestthat Rhodesia came to the construction of a cordonsanitaire in the accepted sense of the term. Untillack of maintenance nullified its effectiveness, itwas the most successful attempt undertaken by theSecurity Forces. In terms of cost, however, it wasalso the most expensive. Only 20 km of Mod Mod Cor-san were constructed, but at a total cost of approxi-mately Rh$ 600 000 or Rh$ 30 000 per kilometre. Thehigh cost- was mainly due to the expense of road andfence construction.

In spite of previous expense maintenance pro-blems were immediately apparent. This was largelythe result of bad minelaying practices and, onceagain, the lack of a pre-planned maintenance scheme.Again an urgent request had led to hasty and ill-planned execution.

Following the construction of the Mod Mod Cor-san, an analysis of the results achieved, in rela-tion to the costs involved, was undertaken. The fol-lowing conclusions were reached:

1. Local production of pressure mines wouldcontribute meaningfully to the lowering of costs.

2. The limited effectiveness of the alarm sys-tem was not cost-beneficial.

3. The cost of constructing game fences and anall-weather road was deemed too high.

4.3 Border Minefields

Following the conclusions reached regarding the ModMod Corsan, the following principles were officiallyformulated for the future construction of borderobstacles:

1. The alarm system would be discarded.2. The imported pressure mines (Rh$ 7,00 per

unit) would be replaced by a locally produced ver-sion (Rh$ 2,60 per unit).

3. Minefields would be constructed along exis-ting roads as far as possible to reduce costs fur-ther.

4. No further game fences would be constructed.A normal cattle fence for demarcation of the mine-field would henceforth be erected on the homewardside of the minefield only.

5. Minefields would be a minimum of 300 metreswide.

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Minefield Obstacles

6. The minefield itself would largely consistof ploughshare mines. Pressure mines would only beused to protect the more effective ploughshare mines.

When implemented, these measures reduced thecost per kilometer to Rh$ 2 300. A total of 864 kmof Border Minefield was eventually constructed at acost of ± Rh$ 2,298 million (ie. Rh$ 2 660 per km).

The Border Minefield that was laid consisted of3 rows each containing a combination of pressure andploughshare mines. During the final stages of con-struction, the density of pressure mines was increa-sed. A pull/release switch was also incorporated(ie. the mine was detonated by either an increase ora decrease in tension of the trip wire).

By August 1978, when 700 km of the total mine-field had been completed, the Rhodesian Corps ofEngineers stated that

... terrorists are now crossing the minefieldrelatively easily ...

This was in spite of the fact that the Border Mine-field had again been added to the existing stretchesof Corsan, Mod Corsan and Mod Mod Corsan. A factorthat could have been used to Security Force advan-tage was that all insurgent crossings were nowtaking place by day. But by this stage crossingswere only

... normally discovered within 24 hours ofoccurrence.

Border minefield obstacles were rapidly becomingexpensive history lessons.

Having moved away from the concept of a tradi-tional cordon sanitaire, the Rhodesian SecurityForces were attempting to construct obstacles thatin themselves would result in insurgent casualties.Again these could not be of real value since theywere not patrolled and guarded effectively.

As with all previous attempts, maintenance wasa further serious problem. This was most evident inthose areas where the minefield bordered on gameparks such as Gona Re Zhou and Hurange (formerlyWankie). Since only cattle fences were now used todemarcate the obstacle, both larger and smaller gamedetonated mines to the extent that a 30% replacementrate was required to prevent the rapid deteriorationof the obstacle.

In belated recognition of the over-ambitiousschemes that had been executed up to that stage, the

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Minefield Obstacles

majority of funds allocated for the construction ofborder minefields during 1978-9 (Rh$ 4 million) wasnow used for maintenance purposes. Furthermore pro-jected extension of minefields along almost thetotal length of the border with Mozambique was post-poned. Indifferent to the lessons of the first Cor-sans, the Engineer's themselves, as well as thevarious Joint Operation Centres were once again allcalling for the further extension of these fields invarying degrees.

The official Engineer's study (referred toabove) concluded during August 1978 that

Finally, the Border Minefield can be said to bethe battle of Engineers in this war. Wheresuperiority by own forces was gained in 1977and the early part of 1978, parity now exists.In order to regain the superiority once held itis necessary to:a. Increase the sophistication of the existing

minefield to try and eliminate their specia-lists.

b. Increase the sensity (sic) of existing mine-fields to ensure maximum kills.

c. To construct as many new minefields as pos-sible to:i. Further limit terrorist crossing pointsii. Stretch their Engineer resources as far

as possible and eliminate him (sic)iii. Gain further intelligence on routes used

and methods of crossing.d. The implementation of the above can only

hamper their ability to conduct the wareffectively.

A single corps in the Rhodesian Army thus saw itselfas fighting its own war. The corsan and minefieldshad by now gained a life of their own, independentof broad military strategic planning. Furtherefforts were all based on these dubious concepts.

Two attempts to strengthen the Border Minefieldwere known as the Reinforced and Superimposed BorderMinefields.

T>e Reinforced Border Minefield entailed theaddition of pressure mines to a stretch of 110 to120 km of Border Minefield in the South-east. It wascompleted during April 1979, but revealed a need foreven further depth in the minefield.

The Superimposed Border Minefield constitutedthe final addition to the system of border minefieldobstacles. It was completed during November 1979 and

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Minefield Obstacles

entailed a further extension of the Reinforced Bor-der Minefields. The latter had been laid between twoto five km inside the border. To this were added fourbelts of marked ploughshares and unmarked pressuremines. The total density of pressure mines per metreof minefield thus constituted four, with a plough-share every 15m.

As clearly indicated by these final attempts,the Security Forces were now attempting to establisha barrier that in itself would be a formidableobstacle, without the addition of large numbers ofpolicing forces. Obviously neither own lessonslearnt, nor those of other countries were deemed tobe valid.

4.4 Conclusion

When the first Corsan was constructed Mozambique wasstill for most parts firmly in Portuguese hands.Geographically the Rhodesian border, across whichinsurgent infiltration was taking place, was thuslimited to that in the North-east. It is conceivablethat at that stage, Joint Operation Centre Hurricaneaimed at establishing a Corsan along the whole fron-tage facing Tete province. As soon as Mozambique hadgained its independence, however, the situationchanged dramatically. The entire eastern borderbecame a potential infiltration route.

Whereas previously, the Security Forces, witha major commitment of both material resources andmanpower, could have reasonably attempted to createa cordon sanitaire in the North-east, the task nowbecame virtually impossible given Rhodesia's limitedresources.

Although the initial strategic concept wasnever clearly formulated, it would seem that JointOperation Centre Hurricane did not envisage a Corsanalong its total north-eastern frontier. Apparentlythe idea was rather to deny insurgent forces certainroutes and to force them to use others, bettersuited to Security Forces countermeasures. Yet asinsurgent infiltration spread across the easternfrontier, this rationale changed. Through successiveextensions of the existing obstacles the aim even-tually became totally unrealistic to seal the easternborder. Ample evidence in this regard is provided bythe requests for further border minefields receivedfrom Joint Operation Centres in 1978-9.

Extension of border obstacles was undertaken onrequest from Joint Operation Centre within the

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Minefield Obstacles

x—X—x Border Minefield Obstacles

Figure 4.4 Border Minefield Obstacles

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Minefield Obstaclet

eastern border. As such, this strategy provides

-=

patrolled and policedeneither aVailabl( further necessitated that

rtion n' °f sound strategic conside-

o-continua?To strategic guidance resulted in thecontinuatxon of an ineffective scheme.

NOTES

a ribrhos Trt ^ T Mozamb^- and bSs'o "tribe hostile to the Shona insurgent.3. This later led to a claim by the former Rho-

desian government against the firm responsible A

Jtatef rehS°n f°r thS failUre °f TOR°ON 225 w4sov^r? ? a rSSUlt Of not maintaining a 90%overlap in each strip sprayed.

117

Chapter 5

PSEUDO OPERATIONS AND THE SELOUS SCOUTS

5.1 The Concept

The concept of 'pseudo' insurgents, i.e. members ofthe counter-insurgency forces posing as insurgents,is a well established, if lesser known, method ofgathering intelligence and one often used by policeunits involved in crime detection.

In practice select members of the Security For-ces are trained in the habits and modus operandi oftheir enemy down to the smallest detail. Groups theninfiltrate known insurgent areas, attempting toestablish themselves as genuine insurgents. In coun-ter-insurgency terminology this phase of the opera-tion is known as 'validification' and is aimed bothat convincing insurgents and members of the localpopulation of the authenticity of the group.

Once a pseudo team has established its creden-tials as insurgent forces, the focus shifts togathering all available information on insurgentsand local support for them in the area. In this waypseudo operations can contribute substantially tothe total Security Force intelligence picture. In anarea where insurgent presence has already been esta-blished, as was the case in north-eastern Rhodesiain 1973, and where traditional Security Force intel-ligence sources have been eliminated through popularsupport for the insurgent cause, pseudo operationsmay prove to be the only reliable source of intelli-gence.

Within the cycle of any pseudo operation, vali-dification and the acceptance of both local popula-tion and insurgents of the pseudo team, invariablyproves to be the most difficult. To succeed, pseudoteams need to emulate insurgent forces in everyrespect. Furthermore, the insertion of these teamsinto an area is in itself a very delicate operation.

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In most cases success is only possible if the pseudoteam contains a number of former insurgents, recent-ly captured by Security Forces and persuaded tochange sides ('turned', in counter-insurgency jar-gon) .

Again, this need not go hand-in-hand with physi-cal intimidation as might seem necessary. Numerousstudies on the motivation of 'revolutionary' forcesindicate that ideological commitment to the cause of'liberation' plays a far less important role inmotivation than is generally believed.(1)

Research has substantiated that there is a wil-lingness among captured insurgent personnel tochange sides in the traumatic post-contact and ini-tial period of capture. Should a captured insurgentnot be presented with obvious means of escape and bephysically involved in counter-insurgency operationson the side of Government forces he, in effect,becomes committed to the latter cause.

With the aid of these former insurgents, pseudoteams are able to establish contact with the esta-blished insurgent support structures within localcommunities. Through the local population, furthercontact with insurgent groups could also follow.Information gleaned in this way is passed on to thetraditional elements of the Security Forces foraction. Only in very exceptional circumstances woulda pseudo team itself use intelligence obtained toeliminate insurgent forces. For, if in the lattercase, the operation is not entirely successful, thepseudo team would immediately risk being exposed asgovernment forces and thus lose all prospect ofgaining intelligence.

But pseudo operations are not exclusively aimedat obtaining intelligence leading to insurgentcasualties. The aim of these operations can also bemuch less subtle. By passing themselves off asinsurgents, pseudo teams could sow distrust betweenthe local population and insurgent forces in gene-ral. Such actions could include acts of indiscretiontowards property, women and cattle, or local customsand tribal beliefs. If, as was the case in Rhodesia,competing insurgent forces (ZANLA and ZPRA) arevying for local support, pseudo practices could fanany friction between such forces into open armedhostility. Ethnic affiliation could aid in thisregard.

However, if the strategy is to survive, itneeds to be tightly controlled and limited in prac-tice. Once members of the local population andinsurgents become aware of the strategy, their

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security becomes stricter and further validificationand establishment of pseudo teams becomes increa-singly difficult. There is the danger, also, thatpseudo operations may be used as licence for trans-gression of the law. If the two factors are combinedand members of the local population become aware ofSecurity Forces posing as insurgents and committingcrimes in this guise, the real insurgent forces arepresented with an ideal propaganda weapon. At suchtime both Security Forces and the Government arelikely to lose some of their claim to legitimacythat seems a natural product of their position asenforcers of, and compilers with, the law.

In recent counter-insurgency history, pseudooperations were first conducted by Special Branch inMalaya. Since the concept was only introducedtowards the latter stages of the campaign, theimpact was limited. The idea was, however, regenera-ted and expanded during the Mau-Mau emergency inKenya under the driving leadership of Capt (laterGeneral Sir) Frank Kitson.(2) It was from theseexperiences that Rhodesian pseudo operations wereborn.

5.2 The Formation of the Selous Scouts

In the period after the Unilateral Declaration ofIndependence Special Branch was the first to employmethods of gathering intelligence that could be ter-med as pseudo operations. These were first conductedin the Zwimba and Chirau Tribal Trust Lands during1966 and were continued in these areas on an infor-mal basis up to 1973. These first attempts wereunsophisticated and mainly aimed at determining theloyalties of members of the local population.

Within Rhodesian Army circles pseudo operationswere apparently first suggested by the second incommand of the Rhodesian Light Infantry,Major JohnHickman. Sometime before 1966 he forwarded a paperto Army headquarters outlining the possible imple-mentation of such a scheme. Subsequently aftermuch delay, a pilot scheme was jointly run during1966 by the Army, Special Branch and the BritishSouth Africa Police. This met with little success,for, at the time, the vast majority of the localpopulation could still be considered passive, ifnot hostile to the insurgent cause. Little intelli-gence could thus be gained by posing as insurgents.Moreover, pseudo modus operand! was at an early andrudimentary stage of development. For the time being

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serious Army interest abated.While the traditional sources of Security Force

intelligence had been functioning adequately insideRhodesia up to 1971, a drastic change resulted fromZANLA penetration into the North-east during 1972.Security Forces suddenly found themselves in anactively hostile environment late in 1972.

By the end of that year Rhodesian authoritieswere fast becoming aware that the security situationin the North-east was deteriorating rapidly. Whathad seemed, to be an effective and sound network ofinformers dried up in a matter of weeks. Althoughaware of insurgent presence and intimidation, lackof operational intelligence forestalled effectivecounter-measures. This lack of detailed and accurateinformation now led to the regeneration of the con-cept of pseudo insurgents.

The former second-in-command of the RhodesianLight Infantry was by this stage Officer Commanding2 Brigade. Against the background of an almost totallack of operational intelligence and declining Armymorale, Brigadier Hickman obtained permission torestart a pilot pseudo scheme. Similar interest hadbeen revived in Special Branch.

With the approval of Joint Operation CentreHurricane, Superintendent Peterson of Special BranchHarare formed an all-black pseudp team on 26January 1973. The team of six men, two AfricanDetective Constables and four former insurgents wereplaced under the command of the Special Branch offi-cer at Bindura. Following rudimentary training theteam was alternatively deployed in Bushu and MadziwaTribal Trust Lands, near Saint Albert's Mission andin Chinamora Tribal Trust Land near Harare. Whilesome useful information was gathered, these opera-tions led to no insurgent casaulties. At the timethe lack of white leadership an'd expertise in theteam was identified as the major problem. For a fewmonths the team was disbanded, but eventually reor-ganized - this time to include white members.

A few weeks after the formation of the SpecialBranch team, the Army commenced with two pseudoteams of their own. These consisted of two SpecialAir Service non-commissioned officers who had beenattached to the Army Tracking Wing at Lake Karibaand a number of black soldiers from the RhodesiaAfrican Rifles. Finally, former insurgents wereadded to the teams.

With the benefit of some weeks of operationaldeployment with their own pseudo team, SpecialBranch could train the Army teams in much greater

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detail - as well as provide them with vital anddetailed intelligence.

Subsequently a third Army team was deployedwith the result that operations could be conductedin the Mtepatepa farming area and in Chiweshe TribalTrust Land. However, Army disillusionment soon redu-ced the number of teams to two. By this stage effec-tive control of all teams had passed to SpecialBranch. .

The first tangible success attributed to theseteams occurred during August 1973 when a ZANLAinsurgent was captured along the Ruya River. Duringthe same operation the concept of 'frozen areas' wasdeveloped to minimize the chances of a clash betweenmembers of the Security Forces and a pseudo team.The official definition of such areas read as fol-lows:

A Frozen Area is a clearly defined area, inwhich Security Forces are precluded from opera-ting, other than along main roads. Army Secu-rity Forces already in an area to be declared"Frozen" will be withdrawn from such an area bythe time stipulated in the signal intimatingthat such an area is to be "Frozen". This sig-nal must be acknowledged by the recipient. Theabove ruling also applies to all armed membersof the Services and Government Departments withthe exception of:a. Those personnel tasked to operate exclusive-

ly along the Cordon Sanitaire.b. Those personnel stationed at Protective or

Consolidated Villages and establishmentsprovided with a permanent guard in whichcase they are restricted to 1 000 metresfrom the perimeter of such establishments.

c. In the event of a vehicle breakdown, ambushor mine deterioration on the main road withina Frozen Area those personnel involved areto remain in close proximity of their trans-port. (3)

On 31 August 1973, a pseudo team effected the firstZANLA casualty to result from these operations.

Within both the Army and Special Branch thesepseudo operations were being conducted under thetightest security. Co-ordination between pseudo andregular Army units was achieved on an informal basis.As a result, a map reading error led to a clashbetween the pseudo team and an Army patrol duringwhich the pseudo team commander,Sergeant Rabie,was

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killed. Temporarily all pseudo operations were hal-ted.

By this stage the senior Army and SpecialBranch members involved were convinced of the use ofpseudo operations. The death of Andre Rabie had,however, indicated that pseudo operations had to beconducted within a formalised structure and co-ordinated with other Security Force actions in anarea.

During November 1973 a former Regimental Ser-geant Major of the Rhodesian Light Infantry, CaptainRon Reid-Daly, was recruited and promoted to Majoras Officer Commanding the pseudo insurgent unit tobecome known as the Selous Scouts. The personalinvolvement of Lieutenant-General Walls in thisappointment suggests that pseudo operations hadreceived official blessing. Henceforth pseudo opera-tions fell directly under the control of SpecialBranch. Officially part of Army Tracker Wing, thetraining camp moved to a secluded venue at Makutinear Lake Kariba where a number of vigorous selec-tion courses were conducted, eventually swellingthe unit to about 25 members. The regimental baseeventually came to be situated at Inkomo nearDarwendale.

When the first troop of pseudo operators wasready in January 1974, they were deployed from Bin-dura, where their Special Branch officer was loca-ted, into Chiweshe, Madziwa and Bindura Tribal TrustLands. By the end of February a second troop becameoperational and a third during March. All threetroops operated in Shona-speaking areas againstZANLA. Each troop was divided into three operatingsections of nine to twelve men, a number of whomwere former insurgents. Depending on their number,however, sections increased in strength to twenty andthirty men strong in some cases. Although the unit was nomi-nally under Army control, control of intelligence,deployment and in some instances training was in thehands of Special Branch. At no stage were even themilitary intelligence organisations allowed to exertany influence over the unit.

Security, however, remained a problem, for evenat this early stage it was becoming common know-ledge in the operational area that the Security For-ces were masquerading as insurgents.(4)

Following operations in Omay Tribal Trust Landbordering Lake Kariba during December 1974 the needfor Matabele pseudo teams to operate against ZPRAwithin Matabeleland became apparent. These opera-tions co-incided with the discovery that ZPRA had

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started using rubber dingies to cross the lake andenter the neighbouring areas. For the first timeSecurity Forces also encountered insurgent forcesusing radio's inside Rhodesia. As a result a ZPRAorientated pseudo troop was formed and stationednear Bulawayo.

During the first half of 1974 the success ofthe Selous Scouts had reached such proportions thatLieutenant-General Walls instructed the unit duringMay to double its strength from three to six troops.By December this had been achieved with an additionof about 50 former insurgents.

Although the existence of the unit, and to alesser extent its type of operations had by nowbecome an open secret, official notification of theSelous Scouts was only served during 1977. DuringApril of that year the magazine To the Point repor-ted that:

Rhodesian army chiefs have taken the wraps offa legendary anti-terrorist unit that for twoyears has played a vital and almost totallysecret role in the war ... According to theircommanding officer, Major Ron Reid-Daly, theyhave been directly and indirectly responsiblefor the elimination of 1 203 of the 2 500 ter-rorists who have died in the four-year-oldwar. (5)

In fact, the majority of insurgent casualties insideRhodesia were the direct result of intelligenceobtained during pseudo operations.

5.3 Pseudo Modus Operand!

Depending on the specific circumstances that enableda pseudo team to enter an area as insurgent forces,pseudo methods and the deception employed variedwidely from one area to the next.

According to then Major Reid-Daly the role ofthe Selous Scouts was to infiltrate the tribal popu-lation and the terrorist networks, pinpoint the ter-rorist camps and bases and then direct conventionalforces in to carry out the actual attacks. Thendepending on the skill of the particular SelousScouts' pseudo group concerned, their cover shouldremain intact which would enable them to continueoperating in a particular area ... perhaps indefi-nitely. (6)

As already indicated, validification was a

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prerequisite for success. Detailed operationalintelligence was required to enable a team to enteran area without arousing suspicion. The next stepwas to establish contact with the local population,and specifically with the insurgent agents withinlocal villages. As a final step these agents or con-tact men were used as go-betweens with the pseudoteam and any other insurgent team in the area.Having made contact a meeting was arranged whichwould be used finally to establish the credentialsof the pseudo team.

Patience is essential in almost all types ofpseudo operations. Arranging a meeting with a realinsurgent group could entail several weeks duringwhich numerous letters were passed back and forthvia mujibas (insurgents' youth supporters) and con-tact men. If successful, a meeting would be arrangedbetween the two groups at a neutral spot in whichthe senior group was approached by the juniors. Fol-lowing this, the members of the two groups met andmingled. Information would be exchanged, beer drunkand possibly some revolutionary songs sung. Informa-tion gleaned at such meetings, as well as from othersources was then passed back to Special Branch ordirectly to Fire Force, the helicopter-borne reac-tion force, for action. One such specific type ofoperation that proved to be highly effective, wastermed the Observation Post tactic.

For obvious reasons white pseudo team memberscould not come into direct contact with members ofthe local population or insurgents. When a pseudoteam thus entered a village, the white(s) remainedoutside and as close as possible. After contact hadbeen made between village members and a pseudo team,for example, the village would be kept under closeobservation. The reaction of villagers very oftengave a good indication of the presence and locationof other insurgent groups. Upon confirmation of suchsuspicion, the Selous Scouts team leader would callin an air strike or Fire Force on the insurgentgroup. To facilitate this, observation posts weremanned on high ground close to the village. Formerinsurgent members with a detailed knowledge of bothlocal customs and insurgent practices proved inva-luable in picking up the most minute indications ofinsurgent presence. The use of observation posts wasespecially suited to the rugged terrain in the North-east of Rhodesia and proved highly successful inthese areas.

The modus operand! of the Selous Scouts wasparticularly well suited for engaging the services

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of captured or wounded insurgents. It often happenedthat Fire Force attacked an insurgent group, elimi-nating most of them and capturing the remainder.

Immediately following capture and the traumaticmemory of the preceding fire-fight, these insurgentswould be 'turned1 by promise and threat. Alongwith a number of Scouts these prisoners would adoptthe identity of the former insurgent group and func-tion as they had done in an adjacent area suffi-ciently far enough from the local population whocould identify them. In this instance the newly-turned insurgents would introduce the group to con-tact men and in general establish their bona fideswith the local population. This method, however,relied upon total security, specifically in the areaof the contact. But even where a prisoner had becomecompromised he could still be used as advisor orsource of detailed local information -

A further variation of pseudo work entailedwhat were termed "hunter-killer1 groups. In contrastto a purely defensive, intelligence-gathering role,these teams were used aggressively. Having located aspecific insurgent infiltration route, pseudo teamswere despatched along it on the pretext of returningfrom Rhodesia for resupply and retraining after anextensive operation. En route further informationwas collected while the group,in contrast to itsnormal intelligence function, eliminated all insur-gents on the way.

Hunter-killer groups were first used north ofMount Darwin in the Mavuradonha area where the rug-ged terrain inhibited normal Security Force opera-tions .

In relation to their numbers, the success ofthe Selous Scouts became an important element inRhodesian counter-insurgency operations. Both seniorArmy and Special Branch officers continuously calledfor the further expansion of the unit. Once theSelous Scouts had two platoons trained for deploy-ment, their tactical headquarters shifted to Bindura.As the war spread accross the country, deployment ofSelous Scouts was no longer limited to the North-east. The first Scouts troops moved to Inkamo Bar-racks on 12 July 1974, which became the regimentalrear base. During January 1977 it was renamed theAndre Rabie Barracks.

In general, the Selous Scouts achieved lesssuccess in penetrating the tighter, more disciplinedranks of ZPRA than was the case in the unstructuredcommand and control groupings of ZANLA. Three Groupdid, however, achieve considerable success in a

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number of clandestine operations into Botswana andFrancistown itself.

Employment of the observation post tactic whichhad been so successful in the North-east provedineffective in the rolling savannah plains and lessdensely populated areas of Matabeleland.

Rhodesian external operations commenced on alarge scale during 1976 and were mainly aimed atZANLA bases in Mozambique. A major limitation untilthen had been the lack of detailed operationalintelligence on the location and lay-out of such abase. As will be shown in Chapter 7, it was a SelousScouts pseudo operation in Holdenby Tribal TrustLand which led to the capture of a ZANLA insurgentwho could compensate for this need. This led to theNyadzonia raid of August 1976.

ZPRA pseudo teams were almost constantly invol-ved in small-unit operations along the Grove road ineastern Botswana. The group was also responsible forthe capture of important ZAPU officials in Francis-town. The intelligence obtained from these men ledto daring Land Rover raids into Lusaka, which tempo-rarily paralysed the ZPRA conventional threat.

In yet other instances, pseudo team memberswere deployed deep into Mozambique and Zambia onone- or two-man, reconnaissance missions to deter-mine physically the exact locations of bases, or ofspecific installations in such bases. For this pur-pose a Reconnaissance Troop was formed during thelatter half of 1976. With a maximum strength oftwelve men they specialized in deep penetration inpreparation for larger external operations.

To facilitate security, the Selous Scouts con-structed prefabricated corrugated iron 'forts' attheir forward deployment bases at Bindura. Bulawayo,Mount Darwin, Chiredzi, Mutoko, Rusapi, etc. Whenoperating in an area, the fort would be occupied asforward tactical headquarters from which deployment(at night) was undertaken, and where all capturedinsurgents were interrogated. All captives werehooded and flown into a landing zone in the fort. Ifthe captives were important enough, eg. a politicalcommissar, section leader and one or two other mem-bers of a group, the group would be reconstitutedwith pseudo operators and returned to the area. Inthis way the team had a sound knowledge of thearea from the start while the former insurgentsknew who their contact man in each village was andhow to contact other groups.

Should a pseudo team establish itself in anarea as an insurgent group in its own right, the

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process of validification could entail extraordinarymeasures. It could entail calling in an air strikeby Security Forces on their own position or close toit. Alternatively it could consist of select aggres-sion against Security Forces or civilians. One suchexample was documented in Africa Confidential

After a white farmstead about forty milesnorth-west of Salisbury had been attacked, itwas discovered that one of the two groups inthe assault were Selous Scouts ... (7)

In some cases attempts at validification did moreharm than'good, as was the case with the firstattack on a Protected Village. This was carried outby a pseudo team in the Mount Darwin area in KandeyaTribal Trust Land during 1974 and precipitated arash of similar attacks by real insurgent groups. Asecond example occurred in Nyanga North where aresident pseudo team trained and briefed the localpopulation so well in aiding them that by the timereal insurgents penetrated the area, a clandestineorganisation had been firmly established for them.

Especially during the initial years, manypseudo operations were conducted to sow dis-trust between members of the local population andthe insurgents. Rudimentary attempts towards achie-ving this objective consisted for instance of theftor offending local customs. Numerous furtherrefinements were added. One such practice entailedcalling in an air strike or Fire Force on the insur-gent group after they had left a specific kraal.After two or three such occurrences the insurgentsinvariably suspected the kraal members of informingSecurity Forces of their presence. In revenge, and toforestall any repetition, innocent kraal members wereexecuted. This would normally put an end to anyvoluntary support that the insurgents could expectfrom the kraal. (At the same time such punishmentcould also intimidate the inhabitants from helpingthe Security Forces).

A second method used relatively widely once aninsurgent contact man had been identified, was for apseudo team to eliminate him publicly after label-ling him a traitor to the insurgent cause. Since therest of the kraal members knew the contact man to bea loyal and staunch insurgent supporter, such a deathwould lead to considerable disillusionment andbewilderment. This practice had become so common bythe end of the war that the Rhodesian CriminalInvestigation Department had opened a number of

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L'scudo Opera 1,'Lom

murder dossiers on Selous Scouts and Special Branchmembers. Invariably poor security led to a generalknowledge of these measures. As the war progressedand Selous Scouts operations increased and intensi-fied, this knowledge also spread to the local popu-lation and insurgent forces in the field.

Although the short term benefits that wereachieved by such illegal actions were substantial,once the local population became aware of thesepractices, it could only have had a distinctly nega-tive effect on their attitude vis a vis the govern-ment in general. The task of government, i.e. judi-cious law enforcement and maintenance of law andorder, is incompatible with substantial transgres-sion of the law. Under these circumstances itbecomes extremely difficult for any such regime toclaim legitimacy.

Once insurgent forces and their supportersbecame aware of pseudo activities, various measureswere instituted to identify any such teams. Specificbangles and pieces of clothing were worn which wouldprovide positive proof of identification. On speci-fic instruction, members of the local populationchanged their method of aiding insurgent forces.Instead of leaving nightly food parcels at predeter-mined spots, each insurgent received his food indi-vidually during daylight. Any white member of such ateam would thus be identified. It was only during1979 that the Selous Scouts succeeded in fieldingall-black teams to eliminate this problem.

In reaction to these changing means of identi-fication, the Selous Scouts launched an intensiveintelligence effort to remain constantly aware ofwhat these entailed in any specific area.

A major success that did result from these ope-rations was the mutual suspicion and distrustbetween insurgent forces in the field. Contactbetween such groups was increasingly preceded bylengthy exchanges of oral and written messages andco-ordination of forces for a single operation pre-sented acute problems. This was even more so inthose areas where both ZANLA and ZPRA forces wereoperating. Within ZANLA, groups frequently attackedone another. To increase this breach even further,pseudo ZANLA teams began attacking ZPRA insurgents,thus ensuring that the next encounter between ZANLAand ZPRA would turn into an armed clash. During theperiod between 1976 and 1978 when ZANLA attempted toencroach on Matabeleland, the success of this methodwas such that a captured ZANLA commander confessedto having been shocked by the fact that his first

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eight contacts were with ZPRA forces. He was captu-red by the Security Forces in the ninth.

A further method employed in the Mount Darwinarea entailed the intimidation of known contact mento aid the Selous Scouts. Shortly after having cal-led in Fire Force on a group of insurgents in thearea, the pseudo team visited the contact man. Itwas made clear to him that failure to co-operatewith Security Forces would lead to his death. There-after his kraal was kept under constant surveillancefrom an observation post. Each time an insurgentgroup entered the area, the contact man would, forexample, hang up a certain blanket after which hewould meet the Selous Scouts at a predetermined spotto exchange information. Fire Force would then nor-mally eliminate the insurgent group.

The contact men recruited in this manner werecode-named 'Lemon1 and 'Orange' and collectivelyknown as 'Fruit Salad'. Since they were also paidfor their services, the sudden appearance of richesin both cases led to insurgent suspicion and retri-bution. In his book Selous Scouts - Top Secret WarLieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly describes a similaroperation code-named Market Garden with the two com-promised contact men known as Apple and Banana. Thisincident occurred at the foot of the Mavuradanha moun-tains in the North-east. (8)

As stated above, the Selous Scouts eventuallycould claim the highest kill ratio of all RhodesianSecurity Forces. Although Fire Force, and First Bat-talion Rhodesian Light Infantry, which constitutedthe quick deployment troops of Fire Force, were phy-sically responsible for most of these insurgentcasualties, the intelligence that had led them tothe insurgents originated from the Selous Scouts.

Yet, the very success of pseudo operations ledto constant demands for the further expansion of theunit. Originally a single platoon of highly skilledmen, the Selous Scouts grew into a disproportionate-ly large unit of 1 800 men. A substantive portionwere, however, territorial soldiers and thus notpermanently attached to the unit. The rapid increasein numbers in itself led to a number of problems. Inthe first instance the unit was forced to lower itsentry standards to obtain enough personnel to complywith Combined Operation demands. This led to a gene-ral lowering of operational standards in the pseudorole as did the widespread use of the less-demandingobservation post tactic. The latter did not requireas high a standard of training and experience as didnormal pseudo operations. On the other hand, these

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recruits were not all suitable for pseudo-type ope-rations, while their training could not be as tho-rough.

As a result pseudo operations again shifted inemphasis away from that of gathering intelligence toa more aggressive role where insurgent casualtyfigures became all-important. This process was aidedinitially when substantial bonusses were paid forinsurgent casualties.

5.4 Conclusion

The major problem touched on above, that of thewidespread use of pseudo operations and the illegalnature of some of these practices, relates to a muchwider problem, namely that of legitimate politicalauthority. Without a legitimate claim to authorityin the eyes of a substantial portion of its popula-tion, a government would have to rely on coercionalone to enforce compliance to its laws.

Legitimacy is a political necessity, for itreduces ... dependence on naked power by allow-ing (the government) ... to rely onauthority. (9)

Furthermore, Claude E. Welch points to an importantfactor in relation to government resorting to force

inconsistent use of coercion can both speedilyalienate individuals and focus their discontentupon political institutions. (10)

As a legitimate institution, authorities lay downand enforce compliance to laws that govern humanactivity in any country. Should this same governmentprovide evidence of not abiding by these same laws,it stands to lose much of its legitimacy in the eyesof those affected. Such loss of legitimacy of neces-sity focusses on the political structures and insti-tutions of the country. Within rural areas such dis-satisfaction is aimed at the manifestations ofgovernment, i.e. local administration, the policeand other government institutions and agencies.

In the following quotation Frank Kitson addres-ses the same problem, if more directly relevant topseudo operations

... there is absolutely no need for specialoperations to be carried out in an illegal or

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immoral way and indeed there is every reason toensure that they are not, because they are justas much part of the government's programme asany of its other measures and the governmentmust be prepared to take responsibility forthem. (11)

Pseudo operations were used extensively in Rhodesiaand in the long term proved to be counter-productive.In such operations the population inevitably becomethe battleground. If adequate protection from theinsurgents is not provided, pseudo operations causethe local population to be yet further alienatedfrom the Security Forces. In fact, the widespreaduse of such operations in Rhodesia trapped the localpopulation between the two opposing sides: theinsurgents on the one hand and the Security Forcesposing as insurgents on the other. Both sides wereready to exact retribution should the local inhabi-tants assist the enemy. Yet, purely as a militarymeasure pseudo operations were probably the mosteffective means of effecting insurgent casualties.According to a study by the Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence in 1978 a full sixty eight percent ofall insurgent fatalities inside Rhodesia could beattributed to the Selous Scouts.

Casualty figures in themselves, however, arenot a sure indication either of success or failurein a counter-insurgency campaign. This is particu-larly true in pseudo operations: although numerousinsurgents were killed, Security Forces failed togain any permanent hold over rural areas. Such ope-rations did succeed in creating distrust and confu-sion both amongst the insurgents themselves andbetween the insurgent forces and the local popula-tion. At the same time the punitive approach to sub-verted and potentially subverted rural people ledto the simultaneous creation of distrust and confu-sion between the rural population and Security For-ces. Security Forces completely lacked a strategy bywhich they could steadily gain control over increa-singly subverted rural areas. Therefore, the SelousScouts were merely the instruments of an overlyaggressive and punitive strategy, simply directed atkilling as many insurgents as possible and punishingthe rural black population to force them to desistfrom support for the insurgent forces.

Security Forces should not have attempted toexert an uncertain control over all contested areas.The most seriously subverted Tribal Trust Landsshould have been temporarily abandoned. Those areas

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securely under government control should have beenidentified. Working outwards from these secure bases,Security Forces would then have been able to concen-trate their resources on adjoining areas which wereas yet only partially subverted. These threatenedareas could have been consolidated by means ofstrict population control and by involving the localpopulation in their own defence and development.

Within the structure of the Rhodesian SecurityForce apparatus the affiliation of the Selous Scoutspresented problems of its own. Army control of theunit was initially vested in the Commander of theArmy, Lieutenant-General Walls. When appointed asGeneral Officer Commanding, Combined Operations,General Walls retained this relationship. COMOPSinvolvement in the planning of special force opera-tions has been discussed in Chapter 2, 'Command andControl'. In addition friction developed between theSelous Scouts and the Special Air Service each vyingfor the status as primary special forces unit.

A particular problem resulting from SpecialBranch's control over all pseudo intelligence acti-vities was the almost total absence of co-operationwith the Directorate of Military Intelligence. TheSelous Scouts were in fact under specific SpecialBranch instructions not to divulge any informationto the Directorate of Military Intelligence. Itwould seem that professional jealousy and personalanimosity played a major role in these co-ordinationproblems. When the concept of pseudo operations wasinitially put into practice, military intelligenceorganisations were by their own admission, incapableof controlling them.

Selous Scouts liaison with brigades also leftmuch to be desired. An area would be frozen, pseudoteams would move in, complete their task and bewithdrawn with very little intelligence passed on tothe brigade headquarters in whose area it had takenplace. Again Frank Kitson has very definite ideas onthe subject

... special operations must be organised andimplemented under the auspices of the normalmachine for directing the campaign and theadvantages to be gained from them weighedagainst the psychological implications of thembecoming known. Furthermore normal SecurityForce units should be informed as to the natureand purpose of special operations as far as itis consistent with the requirements of securityso that they come to regard Special Forces as

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helpful colleagues and not as wild, irresponsible people whose one purpose is to steal thecredit from those who carry out more humdrum,but necessary roles. (12)

In the final analysis the technique of pseudo ope-rations in Rhodesia proved highly successful and reern^hasised its value as a method of rtathsrinrT intelligence. The problems encountered and deviationsfrom the concept were less the result of the SelousScouts and Special Branch than they were the resultof the absence of a coherent Security Force counter-insurgency strategy and a punitive approach to thewhole problem of the insurgency.

NOTES

1. See for example A.R. Molnar et al, HumanFactors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgen-cies (Department of the Army Pamphlet No 550-104,Washington DC, 1965).

2. See F. Kitson, Gangs and Counter-gangs(Barrie and Rockcliff, London, 1960); Bunch of Five(Faber and Faber, London 1977 and Low Intensity Ope-rations , (Faber and Faber, London, 1971).

3. Rhodesian Army, Military Support to theCivil Power (MCP), (restricted, as amended, dated1 May 1976), p. xvi.

4. P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts:Top Secret War, (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 84.

5. To the Point, (1 Apr. 1977), p. 53.6. Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 76.7. Africa Confidential (20 Oct. 1978), p. 3.

For an earlier example see Stiff and Reid-Daly,Selous Scouts, pp. 90-94.

8. Ibid., pp. 125-129.9. R.M. Momboise, Blueprint of Revolution,

(Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, 1970), pp. 6-7.10. C.E. Welch Jr. and M.B. Taunter (eds.) Revo-

lution and Political Change (Duxbury Press, Belmont,1972), p. 11.

11. F. Kitson, Bunch of Fives, p. 298.12. Ibid.

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Chapter 6

INTERNAL DEFENCE AND DEVELOPMENT: PSYCHOLOGICALOPERATIONS, POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL, CIVICACTION

6.1 The American Concept of Stability Operations

The first Western armed force in modern history todevelop and employ a counter-insurgency approachdirected at the political and socio-economic rootsof an insurgency was the British Army, but it wasleft to the US Army to formalize and structure theseideas within a coherent doctrine.

Even before his presidency, John F. Kennedyheld strong personal convictions concerning theworld-wide threat of communist-inspired insurgency.Challenging the fundamental views held by his coun-try's professional military establishment, PresidentKennedy actively intervened in the formulation of anew American military doctrine. This high level con-cern, together with an increasing military involve-ment in South Vietnam in the ensuing years, led to arapid evolvement of counter-insurgency doctrinewithin the US armed forces. A number of new conceptswhich have proved enduring in counter-insurgencytheory were developed. The first of these is the useof the term 'stability operations' in place ofcounter-insurgency.

That type of internal defence and developmentoperations and assistance provided by the armedforces to maintain, restore, or establish aclimate of order within which responsiblegovernment can function effectively and withoutwhich progress cannot be achieved. (1)

This view was a departure from previous militaryconceptions which regarded the strategy to defeatinsurgencies mainly, if not entirely, as a counter-guerilla problem undertaken largely by military andpolice actions. Viewed as part of the broader,

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national problem of internal development, the pre-vention of insurgency came to be recognised asincluding measures for internal political, economicand social development. Therefore, the total counter-insurgency effort should thus entail a combinationof both effective military operations and socio-economic reform comprising three primary elements.

1. .Environmental improvement A program designedto eliminate the causes of popular discon-tent and restore confidence in the establi-shed government.

2. Resources control A program designed toisolate the guerrillas from the people andtheir resources.

3. Counter-guerrilla operations A programdesigned to neutralize and eliminate theguerrilla organisation. (2)

Stability operations combine two mutually interde-pendant and supportive concepts: defence and develop-ment. Internal defence is intended to create a cli-mate of internal security and relative peace withinwhich internal development can assure national growththrough controlled social, economic and politicalimprovement and change.

US Army doctrine identifies a number ofobjectives in the execution of stability operations.

As regards the insurgent forces the objectivesare:

1. The elimination of neutralization of theinsurgent leadership and its infrastructure.

2. The defeat of the insurgent armed forces.3. The separation of the insurgent from the

population.Regarding the population the objectives are:1. To obtain the support of the population by,

in the first instance, providing protection.2. Removal of the conditions exploited by the

insurgents to foster the threat.3. Instilling the psychological conviction that

the government will win and that it presents a bet-ter alternative to that of the insurgent forces.

A number of the objectives outlined above are alsodiscussed in other chapters. As was the case withinternal development, internal defence was, however,not executed within a broad strategic framework within Rhodesia.Stategies of internal defence that are discussedalsewhere include population resettlement and con-centration discussed in Chapter 3, attempts at

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providing security for the rural population discus-sed in Chapter 8 and operations aimed at destroyingthe insurgent armed forces and their logisticalinfrastructure in Chapter 7.

6.2 Population and Resources Control, PsychologicalOperations and Civic Action

Psychological operations (Psyop) constitute an inte-gral part of all internal defence and developmentactivities. They are conducted in support of theobjectives outlined in the previous section and aretailored to meet the specific requirements of eacharea and operation. Psychological operation targetgroups and objectives are broadly the following:

Insurgents Psyop objectives are to createdissension, disorganisation, low morale, sub-version, sabotage, and defection within insur-gent forces ...Civilian Population Psyop objectives are togain, preserve, and strengthen civilian sup-port for the ... government and its internaldefence and internal development objectives.(3)

In their attainment of these broad objectives, psyoptechniques appear not unlike those used in marketingand advertising. They involve the planned use ofcommunications through words, symbols and actions toinfluence the behaviour of selected target audiencesin order to promote the achievement of nationalobjectives. The media most often used for psycholo-gical operations are face-to-face communication,radio, loudspeakers and printed material. All ofthese were used in Rhodesia and warrant close exami-nation.

A further aspect of internal defence that hasalso been discussed in the chapter on Protected Vil-lages is that of population and resource control.While the ultimate aim of this control is to assistin preserving or re-establishing a state of law andorder within an area, its immediate objective is todeny the insurgent forces access to the populationand its resources. The Rhodesian Security Forcesattempted to institute a number of measures comple-mentary to that of resettlement, particularly asregards food control, the establishment of no-goareas and enforcement of curfews. These measures,too, warrant investigation within the context ofstability operations.

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The remaining aspect of non-military stability ope-rations is that of civic action. The objectives ofcivic action are the organisation and motivation ofthe local population in assisting the governmentaland military forces through the elimination orreduction of poiitcai, economic and sociologicalproblems. Civic action to a degree, aims at bringingthe population and armed forces closer to eachother, so enhancing civil-military relations. Theactive involvement of Security Forces in aiding thelocal population is a prerequisite in 'helping thepeople to help themselves1. In its broader context,civic action refers to the co-operation betweenmilitary and other government agencies in develop-ment projects. (4)

Two important results desired from civic actionare firstly the positive commitment to the govern-ment cause obtained by actively involving the localpopulation in government projects. In the secondplace the involvement of the local population intheir own development assures that the schemesjointly undertaken meet real local needs and fitinto the specific environment.

... destruction of the revolutionary organisa-tion must be followed by construction of acounter-revolutionary substitute. In otherwords, police action and territorial consolida-tion must be followed by civic action tocounter-organise the population - the real goalof all other counter-revolutionary opera-tions. (5)

The military unit established in Rhodesia and prima-rily concerned with the planning and execution ofthe measures outlined above was known as 1 Psycholo-gical Operations Unit. In the context of stabilityoperations it is necessary first to trace the ori-gins and history of this unit and the concurrentdevelopment of psychological operations and relatedmeasures before even a select overview of Rhodesianstability-related activities can be attempted.

Chronologically, the history is divided intothree periods, the so-called Sheppard group, Branchof Special Duties and the formation of the PsychologicalOperations Unit , and the establishment of a Direc-torate of Psychological Warfare.

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6.3 The Sheppard Group

The committee system approach adopted by the Rhode-sian government at political, military and seniorpublic official level to co-ordinate all public sec-tor activities related to the insurgent threat hasbeen discussed in Chapter 2. One of the senior com-mittees formed was the National Psvcholoaical War-fare Committee (Psywar Committee) under the chair-manship of the Deputy Minister in the Office of thePrime Minister, This was the only inter-departmentalorganisation with psychological operations functionsin the period immediately after the commencement ofthe insurgency in 1972.

The Psywar Committee included Commanders of theArmy and Air Force, Director of the Central Intelli-gence Organisation, Minister or Secretary of Infor-mation and Commissioner of Police. No PsychologicalOperations organisation as such existed at lowerlevels and Psywar Committee decisions had to beexecuted via the normal departmental channels (aswas the case with decisions of the Joint OperationCentres). Disseminating propaganda is an essentialpart of psychological operations. The establishmentof any separate psychological operations organisa-tion was strongly resisted by the Ministry of Infor-mation which viewed this as a departmental functionto be executed by its Provincial Population Attaches.The Psywar Committee made recommendations to theOperations Co-ordinating Committee of the JointPlanning Staff (prior to the formation of CombinedOperations Headquarters) and reported to the Secu-rity Council (later called the War Council). Sinceit was only concerned with the co-ordination ofpsychological operations, the Psywar Committee func-tioned on an ad hoc basis.

Initially no organisation aimed at psychologi-cal operations or civic action existed within theSecurity Forces. The need for such an approach cameto be recognised by members of the Territorial Armyrather than by regular soldiers. The initial ideacame from an ex-regular officer and Sandhurst gra-duate, Ian Sheppard. At the time (1973/4) he perfor-med his Territorial duties at 1 Brigade Headquartersat Centenary.

Sheppard approached the brigade commander, Bri-gadier Hickman, with the idea of applying basicmarketing and advertising principles to the warsituation. The aim was to enhance communicationbetween the armed forces, in particular the Army,and the local black population. These talks led to a

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presentation given to the senior Joint OperationCentre Hurricane officers on 8 May 1974, on a psycho-logical component for Operation Overload (the reset-tlement of the population of Chiweshe Tribal TrustLand into Protected Villages). Although this opera-tion was only completed during August, the Sheppardgroup, as it was later known, became involved in theplanning for Operation Overload Two which commencedin Madziwa Tribal Trust Land during the same month.

The informal psychological operations groupthat had been formed consisted of six members. Allsix had either a marketing, public relations orpublic media background. The first recruit into thegroup was Tony Dalton, at the time employed by anadvertising agency and thus having first-hand know-ledge of methods suitable for schemes under theDirectorate of Psychological Operations.

The senior Joint Operation Centre Hurricanemembers were largely convinced of the necessity fora 'softer1 approach to resettlement than had beenevidenced in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. The activi-ties of the Sheppard group thus initially revolvedaround 'selling1 Protected Villages in Madziwa Tri-bal Trust Land to the local population. Sincegovernment revenue for rural development was severelylimited, the idea was to obtain commercial sectorinvolvement in the development of resettled areas.

The group also attempted to involve the localpopulation in their own development. A major schemeprepared for this purpose was called the AfricanDevelopment Bank, which was to serve as a financehouse for the people in Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land.It was planned that funds should be obtained fromrevenue which the government had held and frozenfrom international companies operating in Rhode-sia. (6) The African Development Bank would then haveserved as an institute receiving deposits to whichthe local population could go in groups to buy trac-tors, etc. The scheme was eventually presented tothe Secretary for Finance, but the government refu-sed to underwrite it. The refusal was largely theresult of differing perceptions, at Joint OperationCentre Hurricane and central governmental level,of the threat that had developed in the North-east.While the brigade commander and members of his JointOperation Centre had come to realize the extent ofsubversion and the nature of their problem, this hadnot yet permeated to other government departmentheadquarters in Harare. A second unsuccessful schemepresented to the Deputy Minister in the Prime Minis-ter's Office entailed the division of Protected

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Villages into plots to which blacks could obtainfree-hold title, as recounted in the chapter on Pro-tected Villages.

The majority of schemes with which the Sheppardgroup involved itself were self-initiated. However,Joint Operation Centre Hurricane staff also involvedthe group in two specific projects in an attempt todetermine the feasibility and viability of Psycholo-gical Operations in general. The first concernedOperation Needle in Masoso and Chinanda Trible TrustLands during May and June 1974, Both areas wereknown to be subverted and local administration hadbeen disrupted to such a degree that the members ofthe local population no longer had their cattleinoculated. Since there was a drips problem on thearea, the Department of Veterinary Services was con-cerned that the disease could spread further south.The Department of Internal Affairs had recommended apunitive operation to shoot all cattle in the area(possibly in line with the policy of collectivepunishment introduced in the North-east). The Shep-pard group, however, succeeded in presenting analternative scheme by which teams would enter theTribal Trust Lands under armed escort in order toinoculate the cattle. Army troops would infiltratethe area beforehand in the hope that insurgentgroups would attack these teams.

The operation was approved by both the new bri-gade commander of Operation Hurricane, BrigadierShaw, and the Operations Co-ordinating Council,simply because it proved to be a means of inflictinginsurgent casualties. The Sheppard group plan wasthus executed despite strong opposition from theDepartment of Internal Affairs. Although the inocu-lation of the cattle was successfully concluded,very little contact with insurgents resulted, despitethe use of pseudo teams from the unit that even-tually became known as the Selous Scouts. It was,however, probably the first civic action attemptundertaken by the military since the 1972 campaignbegan.

The .second project concerned a booklet entitledAnatomy of Terror. It had been prepared by theMinistry of Information for both internal and exter-nal distribution. The galley proofs for the bookletwere .sent to Joint Operation Centre Hurricane forcomment which passed it on to the Sheppard group.The contents were intended to illustrate the atroci-ties perpetrated by insurgent forces. Although thegroup saw it as a sound idea, it was thought to bepoorly founded, presenting only the nature and degree

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of insurgent intimidation with little coverage ofSecurity Force counter-measures and successes.

A comprehensive critique on Anatomy of Terrorwas prepared, presented to the Joint Operation Cen-tre and forwarded to the Department of Information.Minister of Information P.K. van der Byl did nottake kindly to this interference in his department'sdomain. For the first time both the Departments ofInformation and of Internal Affairs noted with alarmthat the activities of a military group wereinfringing upon the functions of another governmentdepartment. Internal Affairs exercised almost totalcontrol over all governmental activities withinrural black areas and was loath to accept that itsefforts in this regard were insufficient to gainthe support of the population.

Minister Van der Byl summoned the Sheppardgroup to Salisbury for an interview which ended in astalemate. The Anatomy of Terror was published inits original form on 21 May 1974. A similar publica-tion, Harvest of Fear, was also published subse-quently. (7) Following this incident, the Commanderof the Army, Lieutenant-General Walls, was placedunder intense pressure to ensure that the Ministryof Defence did not involve itself in an area inwhich other ministries were already engaged. Minis-ter Van der Byl's attitude towards PsychologicalOperations was well summarized in his statement toJulie Frederickse

I wanted to step up the use of the bayonet.That's the most effective propaganda - thebayonet.(8)

Despite this, Psychological Operations had come tobe accepted as a relevant factor in planning opera-tions at Joint Operation Centre Hurricane and withinthe Joint Planning Staff.

By September 1974, the activities of the Shep-pard group were placing an increasing strain on itsmembers acting in a part-time capacity. An opera-tional briefing at the headquarters of OperationHurricane was arranged for the group members' com-mercial heads. This resulted in their full-timesecondment to the Army with retention of company payand benefits. The group continued to function onthis basis until December.

Although the core group still consisted of onlysix members, a large number of experts were used ona part-time basis to aid in the preparation of aboutthirty-eight schemes that were forwarded to Joint

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Operation Centre Hurricane for approval and then tothe Deputy Minister in the Office of the PrimeMinister, Ted Sutton-Pryce, in his capacity aschairman of the Psywar Committee. These schemesincluded papers on

- the provision of communal tobacco sheds inChiweshe Tribal Trust Land

- a national pension plan for black farm labou-rers

- rabbit farms- family unit farms- a bakery for Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land- use of members of the Territorial Army totrain local blacks in farming and other tech-niques and crafts

- a Radio Chiweshe

All the proposed projects failed through vested inte-rests and lack of finance once attempts were made toput them into practice. Since neither the PsywarCommittee nor the Sheppard group had any access tofunds for financing such schemes on their own thesehad to be obtained directly from the Treasury,Department of Internal Affairs or the Army. None waswilling to provide funds. (9)

In an attempt to provide continuity and betterco-ordination, the Psywar Committee had in the inte-rim established a working committee entitled thePsychological Action Co-ordinating Committee (PACC)within the Ministry of Information.

The permanent secretary of PACC was a formerDistrict Commissioner, Dick Ploughden, who had beeninvolved in limited attempts by the Department ofInternal Affairs at Psychological Operations forsome years as Director of the Branch of InternalDuties. (10) The involvement of this department wasconsidered to be of prime importance as a result ofits intimate knowledge of the black psychology,habits and fears. PACC further consisted of repre-sentatives of the Central Intelligence Organisation,Army, Police and Department of Information. It metat least once a month with the aim of co-ordinatingexisting Psychological Operations within the diffe-rent departments.

By this time the Sheppard group had run into anumber of obstacles, of which the lack of financeand resistance from the Department of Informationhave already been mentioned. Further resistance wasencountered from Internal Affairs whose approach tothe rural black population differed from that of the

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Sheppard group. The general belief held by thatdepartment was that black people respected force inthe first instance and that any attempt at 'winningtheir hearts and minds' did not take the simplisticblack African mind into account. Both Department ofInformation and Internal Affairs officials were fur-ther suspicious of the political persuasions ofSheppard and Daiton. (The former was publicly label-led a communist by Sutton-Pryce at a Joint OperationCentre.) Indeed a number of the schemes proposed bythe Sheppard group were perceived to be in directcontradiction to Rhodesian Front policies. In thefinal instance, the accusation was made that thegroup treated psychological operations as a consumerarticle to be sold, and not as a serious attempt atdeveloping rural areas.

Viewed collectively, the projects put forwardby the group, could have contributed a great dealtowards easing acceptance of Protected Villages andgovernment security measures in the North-east, butran into political and bureaucratic resistance toinnovation and change.

To members of the Sheppard group it wasbecoming increasingly apparent that their effortswere yielding few, if any, concrete results. TheRhodesian government response to the 1974 detenteinitiative spelt the final collapse of the group.During November 1974, at the request of the DeputyMinister in the Office of the Prime Minister, thenewly appointed Minister of Information, Wickus deKock, ordered the group to maintain a low profilehenceforth. Some of the ideas propounded by the Shep-pard group were considered as possible politicalbargaining points that could be forfeited ifincluded in Security Force planning. With nothing to'sell', this effectively shut down the group. Havingthemselves become disillusioned with the resultsachieved, the commercial heads withdrew their sup-port for the individual members of the Sheppardgroup.

Thus ended the first attempts at civic actionand psychological operations within the armed for-ces. Furthermore, by December 1974, the SecurityForces had succeeded in stabilizing the threat, andthe need for any kind of long term internal develop-ment appeared less urgent than it had done sixmonths previously.

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6.4 Branch of Special Duties (BOSD) and the Forma-tion of 1 POU

By this stage it had become evident to the PsywarCommittee and PACC that they were operating in avacuum. An executive arm was needed to executepolicy at the level of the Joint Operational Centres.Such an organisation was subsequently formed withinthe Department of Information and eventually becameknown as Branch of Special Duties (BOSD). In accor-dance with the primary responsibility of the minis-try, BOSD concentrated upon urban and semi-urbancommunities but initially also attempted to gaincredibility within the Security Forces.

After the dissolution of the Sheppard group,the Commander of the Army had ordered Tony Daiton(at this stage a lieutenant in the Territorial Army)to attach himself to PACC and gain its confidence.(He was the only remaining member of the originalgroup still involved with military psychologicaloperations). The failure of military psychologicaloperations increased the necessity for militarypsychological operations personnel to remain asinconspicious as possible and so avoid objections fromthe Ministry of Information. During April 1975,Lieutenant Daiton joined BOSD which then launched acountrywide tour to explain its functions to Secu-rity Force commanders in the field.

BOSD was a small working group and it reportedto a committee (PACC) which in turn reported to acommittee (Psywar) whose functions were limited toco-ordination: it could therefore attempt littlemore than a change of attitude. It was clear thatboth Psychological Operations and civic action with-in the armed forces had ceased to exist even inname, while any permanent establishment of an orga-nisation was resisted by the Department of Informa-tion. As a compromise, the Commander of the Armysuggested that Daiton recruit and deploy TerritorialArmy soldiers. After rudimentary training these mendressed in civilian clothing could be posted toJoint Operation Centres. The first three recruitswere deployed in October 1975, but could establishlittle more than contact with local Army, Police andSpecial Branch officers. The size of the informalunit slowly increased during the following months,but the reliance on part-time soldiers had aseverely restrictive effect on any continuity thatcould be achieved.

The major activities of these 'sensors', asthey were called, concerned attempts to influence

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the attitude of Army personnel in particular.This pro-ved almost impossible since the only 'influence'that could be exerted was through briefings and lec-tures. At senior level Security Force officersrecognised the necessity for both psychological ope-rations and civic action, but at lower level suchaction was regarded as unnecessary. Here insurgentcasualties were considered the determinant of suc-cess. A number of leaflets were also distributed,but since the unit had no formal structure it couldobtain no facilities to reproduce such material.Morale declined and the final collapse of this effortby psychological operations seemed imminent.

The extent of the establishment of Protectedand Consolidated Villages provided the opportunityto revitalise both psychological operations andcivic action. During 1974 Security Forces wereable to concentrate both the force levels and exper-tise needed to plan and establish Protected Villagesin the limited areas. The vastly increased opera-tional areas that had been established by late 1976inhibited the collection of such resources, whileJoint Operation Centres at brigade level were cal-ling for the employment of the strategy of ProtectedVillages in increased areas such as Uzumba andMaramba Tribal Trust Lands in the North-east.

Computer printouts of personnel records forterritorial soldiers assisted in a recruitment drivelaunched to collect expertise within the informalpsychological operations unit which in turn helped inthe planning of Protected Villages. Designated CivilAction Teams (CAT), almost 90% of all Protected Vil-lages were henceforth planned by these teams in theensuing two years as from late 1976.

When Lieutenant-General Hickman took over asArmy Chief of Staff early in 1977 the first stepswere taken to formalize psychological operations andcivil action in the Rhodesian Army. One Psychologi-cal Operations Unit, (1 POU), was formed on 1 July1977 as part of the Corps of Infantry with CaptainDalton as commanding officer. Within an establishedstructure the unit was able to obtain its own prin-ting facilities, sky-shout equipment, vehicles, etc.The unit was stationed at the Old Cranborne Barracksin Harare.

6.5 The Directorate of Psychological Warfare

Although late in the day, both Treasury and theNational JOC (NATJOC) had finally recognised the

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need for a central body capable of initiating andco-ordinating all aspects of psychological opera-tions and civic action with day-to-day operations.Early in 1979, a Directorate of Psychological War-fare was thus established within the Central Intel-ligence Organisation. Major-General Rawlins, pre-viously commander of Guard Force, was appointeddirector and became a member of NATJOC. Both 1 Psy-chological Operations Unit and BOSD were placedunder the operational command of this directorate.

The directorate consisted of the director, adeputy director and a secretary. Attached were Cap-tain Dalton as officer commanding 1 PsychologicalOperation Unit and John Lewis as Director of theBranch of Special Duties (BOSD). A major objectivehad thus been achieved: the involvement and partici-pation of a psychological operations structure with-in COMOPS itself. Within the Cen.tral IntelligenceOrganisation, however, the directorate was notaccepted as an integral part of the intelligencecommunity. Furthermore, the senior Central Intelli-gence Organisation personnel involved with it hadlittle knowledge or practical experience of eitherPsychological Operations or civic action. Frictionbetween BOSD and 1 Psychological Operation Unitfurther aggravated the lack of co-operation with theresult that the directorate survived as an ineffec-tual body.

Major-General Rawlins eventually resigned asdirector and at the request of the Commander, COMOPS,Tony Dalton, now a Major, attended NATJOC and Spe-cial Operations meetings. During June 1979, theDeputy Commander COMOPS, Air Marshal McLaren, wasappointed as Director Psychological Warfare. In anattempt to obtain closer co-operation with BOSD, theSecretary for Information was also appointed asDeputy Director, but this attempt was not successful.It was, by now, late 1979 and not long before theLancaster House agreement brought the war to a close.

At the time of the elections that were to leadto Mugabe's landslide victory both 1 PsychologicalOperations Unit and BOSD launched a massive campaignto discredit ZANU (then known as ZANU (PF)). Code-named Operation Welfare, an American presidentialstyle campaign swung into operation, backed by nume-rous 'unexplained' pamphlets, bombs, newspaperreports - and even totally false newspaper issuessuch as in the case of the black newspaper Moto.

Both the advertising accounts for the UANC andthe Transitional Government were handled by the firmof De Villiers and Shonfeldt. Although Bishop

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Muzorewa's account was strictly on a cash basis andseparate from the government account for the promo-tion of the election, both projects were co-ordina-ted by the Branch of Special Duties. The slogan,adopted was 'That is what the people want1.

The campaign provided clear evidence of thelack of grass-roots contact between Rhodesian psy-chological operations and the target population theywere attempting to influence. Despite hundreds ofthousands of leaflets and millions of Rhodesian dol-lars spent on the Bishop's campaign, it was theZANU (PF) campaign, however poorly orchestrated,that proved victorious.

The organisation that had been established bythe end of the war proved to be an improvement onthat existing before the formation of the Directo-rate of Psychological Warfare: but the reliance onmembers of the Territorial Army led to a lack ofcontunuity. This was possibly the major problem atJoint Operation Centre and sub-Joint Operation Cen-tre level. Because 1 Psychological Operation Unitwas formalised at such a late stage, the militaryPsychological Operations organisation was unable toobtain either the funds or the equipment necessaryto execute their task before 1977. In particular,commanders and troops at lower level were not inte-rested in either psychological operations or civicaction. For at this level success was seen as adirect function of insurgent casualty rates. Asindicated, Rhodesian Psychological Operations wasalso in general, out of touch with rural realities.

Against the above historical resume of Psycho-logical Operations (psyop) organisations, a numberof psyop and population control operations under-taken can be discussed briefly. The aim is to pro-vide typical examples of Rhodesian psyop and civicaction projects within the theoretical frameworkoutlined in sections 1 and 2 of this chapter. Aswill become evident, the projects referred to werenot all executed on 1 Psychological Operations Unitinitiation, nor necessarily with the major involve-ment of that unit.

Mention needs to be made of a number of impor-tant projects, not subsequently discussed. The majorproject was possibly regarding the Security ForceAuxiliaries. One Psychological Operations Unitplayed an important role in the propaganda surroun-ding these forces, and in the mental orientation ofthe Security Force Auxiliaries themselves. (SeeChapter 8)

A second major scheme involved the training of

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envoys. In short, these formed the Security Forceequivalent to political commissars. In a sense, itentailed the preparation of men for use in an Inter-face type role (see section 8). Envoy training com-menced in 1978 and included Police, Internal Affairsand Security Force Auxiliaries.

Finally, as briefly recounted, both 1 Psycholo-gical Operations Unit and BOSD were also involved innumerous disinformation operations, especiallyduring the build-up to the April 1980 elections.

6.6 Rewards

A system of rewards for information regarding insur-gent activities and equipment was instituted at arelatively early stage of the war. In accordancewith a request from the Operations Co-ordinatingCommittee, the Psywar Committee approved a posterand leaflet outlining the system. These were distri-buted at intervals with the first 900 000 leafletsand 2 000 posters distributed during April and May1974. The leaflets read as follows:

Government will pay substantial rewards to any-one who volunteers secret information whichleads to the death or capture of terrorists ortheir supporters and the capture of theirweapons.The names of anyone giving information willremain secret.The amounts of the rewards offered by Govern-ment are:Five thousand dollars for a- senior terroristleader.Two thousand five hundred dollars for a terro-rist group leader.One thousand dollars for a terrorist.One thousand dollars for each terrorist vehiclemine.One thousand dollars for each terrorist heavyweapon of war.Five hundred dollars for each terrorist machinegun.Three hundred dollars for each terrorist lightpersonal weapon.Three hundred dollars for each full box ofterrorist ammunition.Three hundred dollars for each full box of ter-rorist grenades.Three hundred dollars for each full box of

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terrorist anti-personnel mines.The rewards will not be payable to a civil ser-vant who is engaged on duties concerned withanti-terrorist activities or to a member of theSecurity Forces, unless he obtained the infor-mation while he was off-duty.(11)

Later a pictorial depiction of weaponry found repla-ced the earlier verbal description. In a finalrefinement two pictures were shown: tribesmen werethus encouraged to co-operate either by the promiseof reward or the threat of punishment.

6 .7 Safe Returns and Amnesty Offers

A distinction should be made between an offer of'safe return1 to insurgent forces after which thenormal legal process would continue, and that ofamnesty. The latter entails an offer of safe returnas well as a guarantee against any possible prosecu-tion that might arise from insurgent participation.Both were instituted in Rhodesia, although that ofamnesty remained a politically controversial issuefor a number of. years.

The Operations Co-ordinating Council recommen-ded instituting offers of safe return during1973. However, execution of the policy on a nationalbasis was delayed until the 1974 South African andZambian detente initiative, which was considered theideal opportunity.

On 11 December 1973, Prime Minister Smithannounced that he had '... received assurances tothe effect that terrorist activities in Rhodesiawill cease immediately ...'(12) in preparation for aconstitutional conference. These assurances that hadbeen given, in fact, implied merely a cessation ofhostilities, but the opportunity seemed to have pre-sented itself to convince insurgent forces in thefield that a political settlement had been achieved.Despite furious broadcasts to the contrary by RadioLusaka, leaflets were printed and distributed to theeffect that insurgents should either leave the coun-try in a northerly direction,or hide their weaponsand report to Security Forces. Both measures wouldhave removed the insurgents from the North-east. Noreports of the latter were received, but four SouthAfrican policemen were killed by insurgents preten-ding to make use of the offer. Following this, thePsywar Committee agreed that leaflets offering safe

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return should be printed and made available tolocal commanders for use in support of successfulmilitary operations as the opportunity arose.

The first national offer of safe return was madeduring the period of December 1977 and January 1978.The idea stemmed from Operation Maxply that had beenlaunched in the Repulse area. It was an attempt tocapitalise on the successes achieved by food control(Operation Turkey) and resettlement programmes (inSangwe, Matibi No 2, Sengwe, Chipise and Diti TribalTrust Lands) in the South-east. Intelligence reportsindicated that ZANLA morale in the area was on theverge of collapse because of their inability toobtain either food from the local population orwater from points outside Protected Villages. Thesehad largely been destroyed by Security Forces Opera-tions. Maxply entailed, inter alia, the preparationand aerial distribution of two leaflets. The firstdescribed the strength of the Security Forces andthe weaknesses of the insurgent forces; the secondconsisted of a safe return offer. From this, COMOPSdecided to enlarge the scheme to a national attemptbut excluding Matabeleland where ZPRA was not con-sidered susceptible to such an offer. By Januarymore than 1 000 000 such leaflets had been distri-buted.

The results were disappointing. Intelligencereports had again over-estimated the effect of Secu-rity Force operations on insurgent morale. Althoughthe Internal Settlement talks leading to theAgreement of 3 March were already underway, concreteresults had not yet been achieved. Thus the offercould only rely on Security Force pressure on ZANLAas inducement.

Following the Internal Settlement Agreement,repeated calls were made by the black members of theExecutive Council for insurgents to stop fighting.In preparation for the April 1979 black majorityelections, a direct amnesty offer was contained in1 500 000 leaflets distributed from mid-March 1979,onwards. The offer was signed by the four members ofthe Council as well as by the Commander, COMOPS.

Any member of the ZANLA/ZPRA forces who returnshome in peace before the election will be welltreated. They will be fed, clothed and givenproper medical treatment. They will be integra-ted with the Interim Government Auxiliaries(SFA) under the command of .Combined Operationsand will be armed for this purpose. On noaccount will those returning members of the

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ZANLA/ZPRA forces be stopped from voting in theelection in April, should they wish to doso.(13)

Of the total number, 1 150 000 leaflets were printedin Shona and 350 000 in Sindibele. A maximum of 50insurgents availed themselves of this offer whichwas apparently made from a position of weaknessrather than from one of strength.

An Amnesty Directorate was also set up on 7June 1979. The amnesty call included the exhortationto phone a series of numbers accross the country forinformation on the offer of amnesty.

While the schemes mentioned above were atnational level, 1 Psychological Operations Unit wasinvolved in a number of localised attempts at safereturn. These attempts were more akin to what isknown as 'instant psyop'.

When access was gained to a captured insurgent(normally via the Selous Scouts), leaflets with apicture and a message from the victim would be prin-ted and distributed in the area where the remainderof the insurgent group was thought to be. On a fewoccasions a second member would also defect. Thismethod was also used utilising skyshout equipment,with the added advantage of broadcasting a personalmessage from the captured insurgent which could berecognised as such. These methods attempted to capi-talize on the immediate shock of contact with Secu-rity Forces and the strain of follow-up operationsbut results were limited.

In general the success of the defection program-mes is related to long-range factors such as theinsurgents' perception of the probable outcome ofthe insurgency. More situational factors such asbeing wounded or membership of a minority group alsoplay a role. (14) The efforts at 'instant psyop1 wereaimed at the latter.

At no stage would the military pressure beintensified to a level at which defeat of the insur-gency seemed inevitable. It was primarily as aresult of this factor that Rhodesian offers of safereturn and amnesty were not fully made use of. Yetit should be noted that even the limited number ofinsurgents who did avail themselves of these offersmade the offers of safe return cost-effective interms of the intelligence thus gained.

6.8 Interface and Manila Interface

Interface Operations were commenced on a trial basisin Madziwa Tribal Trust Land during April 1974. Theconcept was initiated by the fledgeling militaryintelligence organisation in an attempt to gainoperational intelligence,for at this stage SpecialBranch controlled the full spectrum of operationalintelligence sources, with no parallel militarynetwork.

The operation was based on insurgent modusoperandi. Small teams of mixed black and white Secu-rity Force members moved clandestinely into an areaand subsequently made unexpected nightly visits tokraals. All inhabitants of the kraal were called tothese meetings which were crucial to the strategy.According to official documentation, meetings nor-mally followed seven steps, i.e.

Step 1: An explanation was given providing the rea-son for the visit, viz the maintenance of a SecurityForce presence and concern for the local population.

Step 2: Warnings regarding the negative effects ofthe insurgent presence, namely curfews, food control,no-go areas, etc.

Step 3: Localised propaganda emphasising the hard-ships caused by the presence of insurgents, asagainst the harmony before their arrival.

Step 4: A comparison between the Security Forcesand the insurgents, specifically regarding the mate-rial aid and services that could be/were provided bygovernment.

Step j>: A 'message to terrorists' using local inha-bitants as a communication medium to notify thecadres in the field of insurgent casualties andSecurity Force 'victories'.

Step 6: The offer to all present to pose questionsand raise problems. Those issues that could not beexplained or answered satisfactorily by the teamwere passed on to the local District Commissioner.

Step 7: The conclusion of the meeting with thesinging of songs.

Initial attempts by the military to obtain informa-tion through closer contact with the rural black

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population did not prove very successful. Theattempts were subsequently superceded by the identi-fication of the psyop potential inherent in suchactions.

From mid 1975 onwards, the forerunners of1 Psychological Operations Unit attempted to sellpsyop to the military by means of Interface Opera-tions. Little success was achieved until it was rea-lized that Interface had to be presented as a meansby which insurgents could be eliminated. Only underthis guise was it believed that Security Forcescould be persuaded to implement their programmes.

As officially formulated, the aim of Interfacewas thus twofold:

... to kill and capture terrorists and to winover the local population. The first part ofthe aim is achieved in two ways:a. Because of the method of operations the

chance of contact with the ter is increased,and;

b. Due to improved intelligence reporting fromthe local population.

The second aim of Interface is somewhat moredifficult, and at no time should we allow our-selves to be fooled into thinking that the mereintroduction of Interface will immediately winover the local population.

At various stages, and with little continuity.Interface operations were conducted by the Army,Police and Department of Internal Affairs. As a com-munication operation it had great potential, but onits own had a number of limitations. Firstly thelocal population was not presented with a viablealternative to enforced co-operation with the insur-gents. Although Interface led to increased SecurityForce activity by night, the type of operation wasbest suited for use in areas in which insurgent for-ces were physically prevented from obtaining accessto the people. Such conditions only existed in thoseareas in which the local population had been reset-tled in Protected Villages. In other areas it provedviable when used by the Security Force Auxiliaries.

A second problem encountered in the executionof Interface Operations was the lack of continuity.The allocation of troops for these operations depen-ded mainly on the attitude of the local commanderdespite the fact that early in 1977, LieutenantGeneral Walls had personally endorsed the programmeto all Army company commanders. Security Force

commanders were nevertheless loath to deploy theirlimited manpower resources for such operationsbecause they did not obviously increase insurgentcasualties.

In the third place, Interface Operations hadfailed to identify the need to aid the rural popula-tion in material terms as one of their primary aimsand it could therefore do little more than improvecommunication. Although local grievances were repor-ted to District Commissioners, these were not neces-sarily redressed. Neither did Interface teams pro-vide immediate aid such as medical or veterinaryservices which were possibly within their capabili-ties. The general attitude of the Security Forces isamply illustrated by a further quotation from thedocument referred to above:

... peasant populations the world over have thesame thing in common: they simply want to beleft alone.

Concurrent with the Internal Settlement Agreementand the decision to open a number of Protected Vil-lages in Operation Hurricane, Interface operationswere modified. The new approach was termed OperationManila Interface. A document compiled by 1 Psycholo-gical Operation Unit presented the general outlineas follows (August 1978):

Op Manila Interface would largely be modelled onInterface Operations but would be broadened toincorporate a day-time presence on the groundat which an all-out effort would be made - on asustained and ongoing basis - to win over thelocal population.

The introduction of Manila Interface in Joint Opera-tion Centre Hurricane was in direct support of theprojected opening of Protected Villages. The aim wasto lessen the negative psychological effects thatthe opening of these villages was expected to have.The opening was planned to take place in 4 phases.

Phase 1 entailed the psychological preparation ofboth rural blacks and white farmers in the areasaffected.

Phase 2 was the official opening which was to beconducted by black nationalist members of the tran-sitional government.

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Phase 3 comprised the introduction of OperationManila Interface.

Phase 4 entailed what was termed 'follow-up inter-face operations', i.e. the long-term extension ofthe effort.

As a concept, Manila Interface held much pro-mise. In a short summary of the 1 Psychological Ope-rations Unit paper on the operation, Joint OperationCentre Hurricane stated the following:

It must be emphasised that this is essentiallya broadened version of Interface, the majordifferences being:a. Carefully selected areas of operation.b. Resident Interface teams deploying to selec-

ted kraal heads/leaders' kraals (with shadowsticks remaining clandestine) and establi-shing presence on an ever-changing patternsomewhere in the vicinity of that kraal.

c. Interface "swans" (i.e. working out from)away from the selected kraal will continueto harass, confound and confuse the terro-rists , and to expand our own sphere ofinfluence, making sure that we return eachtime to the selected kraal (these "swans"away (sic) and subsequent meetings might beconducted by the Shadow Sticks).

d. "Massive" propaganda support for the termswill be forthcoming in the form of conti-nuous supplies of new, up-dated leaflets,notes, posters, etc.

e. Set plans must be made for the progressivere-opening of schools, clinics, etc., in oursphere of influence.

f. Aid. Whether this simply takes the form ofadvice to locals or something more tangible,it must be forthcoming.

g. Everyone must be totally committed to theneed to pull out all the stops to win overthe locals.

Unfortunately very little came of the two vital com-ponents contained in Manila Interface, namely perma-nent presence and aid. The modus operandi presentedabove in fact bore a number of similarities to thatof the Security Force Auxiliaries (see Chapter 8).The major difference was that the Auxiliaries were(supposed to be) a local militia, armed to protectthe rural population on a permanent basis.

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The central reasons for the failure to imple-ment Manila Interface were, first, the same resis-tance that had been encountered regarding the type ofoperation and manpower allocation of Interface. Inthe second place, as discussed in Chapter 3, openingProtected Villages proved to be counter-productiveto the extent that Manila Interface operationswere not sufficient to overcome the negative effectsthat resulted. As with Interface, but possibly evenmore so, Manila Interface operations were more sui-ted to the general improvement of established Pro-tected Villages than to the opening of these villages.

The factors complicating both Interface andManila Interface operations within a subverted areaare well illustrated in the case of Chiota TribalTrust Land.

During 1978 1 Psychological Operations Unitstarted to receive regular black soldiers from theoverflow of Rhodesian African Rifle recruits at BalaBala training depot. The number obtained eventuallytotalled 300 men. On request, 1 Psychological Opera-tions Unit was authorized to use Chiota Tribal TrustLand near Marandellas for intensified Interface andManila Interface operations. Although the localpopulation was subverted, resettlement had not beenimplemented.

1 Psychological Operations Unit operated inChiota Tribal Trust Land for the remaining 15 monthsof the war. More than 186 insurgents were killed andby the end of 1979 intelligence reports indicatedthat only a single group of 30 insurgents was stillactive in the northern part of the Tribal TrustLand. Two members of the group had remained in thesouth of Chiota in an attempt to retain the logisticlink through the Operation Thrasher area to Mozambi-que. Judged superficially it appeared that the unithad achieved considerable success. The insurgentcommand and control structure had been severely dis-rupted, large caches of weaponry had been discoveredand the local population appeared to be in supportof the Security Forces. As part of Manila Interfacesmall irrigation schemes were further initiated,schools reopened and cattle dipped regularly. Therole and functions of various government departmentswere also re-established.

However, once the Lancaster House ceasefire wasimplemented in December 1979, nearly 200 insurgentsemerged from Chiota Tribal Trust Land to gather atthe Mahusekwa Collection Point. Much weaponry wasevident and the local population openly supported theinsurgents. Needless to say, the change in attitude

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came as an acute shock to 1 Psychological OperationsUnit.

At the same time it should be stressed that therural population could not have viewed the cease-fire as anything but an insurgency victory. Once anunderground subversive group, the insurgent forcescould now openly flaunt their success and theirweaponry. The perception as to who will eventuallycontrol the country is in the long term an importantfactor in the attitude and support of the localpopulation. The 'support1 of the people of ChiotaTribal Trust Land for the insurgent forces musttherefore be qualified. Despite the above two fac-tors it still seems as if Interface and ManilaInterface had not been successful in Chiota.

In retrospect Interface and Manila Interfacehad two further shortcomings, namely failure toredress specific local grievances, and failure toinvolve the people in the solution of them:

Fundamental to stability operations in thenature of cross-cultural communication itself ...it was found that the type of communicationmade no difference to its outcome, but thatwhere the objective was definite rather thanvague, and where the recipients were involvedrather than just given aid, the communicationswere far more effective. (15)

6.9 Food Control: Operation Turkey

On 28 January 1977, Government introduced anamendment to the Emergency Powers (Maintenance ofLaw and Order Regulations (no 8 of 1977)) wherebycontrol of food supplies was instituted in certainareas. The order provided for controlling the deli-very of food, growing of maize, sale and supply offood and milling of grain. It also directed that'security devices' be fitted to places where foodwas stored. The regulations further made provisionfor the closure of beerhalls at certain hours. Ifpersons were found contravening the order, a Policeofficer or any other authorised person was empoweredto confiscate or destroy the food in question.

During 1976 intelligence reports indicated thatZANLA forces in the Hurricane operational area wereincreasingly able to obtain food from labour com-pounds on white commercial farms. Both the movementof the local population into Protected Villages andthe general drought had reduced the available food

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within the Tribal Trust Lands. The concept of foodcontrol was presented to the Joint Operation Centreby a sensor and subsequently instituted in theMtepatepa farming area between Chiweshe and MadziwaTribal Trust Lands at the end of the year.

Sensors had persuaded white farmers to acceptthe concept on the understanding that the success ofthe scheme depended almost entirely on the co-opera-tion of the farmers themselves. Farmers were toration their labourers on a day-to-day basis withonly sufficient food for a particular day. No sur-plus would therefore be available to feed insurgentforces, even were this demanded by force of arms.Tight food control would force insurgents to spendmuch time seeking sustenance, which would hastentheir location and eventual elimination. A furtheradvantage could result from hostility between thelocal population and insurgents as demands on limitedavailable foodstuffs increased.

When instituted, Operation Turkey, as it becameknown, was relatively effective. Because food con-trol was not extended to the black rural areas, itcould, however, be no more than a hindrance toinsurgent forces in general. After the initiation ofthe effort with Operation Hurricane, Operation Tur-key was extended to Mashonaland East and West andin operational areas Thrasher and Repulse. Exten-ded cattle farming within Repulse dictated that suchattempts would be very difficult to implement. Foodcontrol measures were more effective within majorcrop producing areas and were totally dependent onthe supervision of the farmers. As the war progres-sed reports received from Selous Scout pseudo teamsindicated that the limited results initially obtai-ned were diminishing.

At a later stage attempts were made to enforcefood control within the Tribal Trust Lands themsel-ves by placing legal limitations on the amount offoodstuffs being held in stock by stores, as well ason the amounts sold. Ration cards were printed andissued. Store-owners had to apply for permits fromDistrict Commissioners to buy food supplies in bulk.These measures would theoretically have furtherreduced the availability of food supplies for insur-gent forces in the rural areas.

To institute and effectively enforce such mea-sures, however, total control over population move-ment was needed to prevent members of the localpopulation from obtaining food from the nearest vil-lage or town if unavailable from the local store.Although curfews and no-go areas had been established

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by this time across wide areas of Rhodesia, thesemeasures were intended to facilitate freedom ofmovement for the Security Forces. The only way inwhich members of the local population could be pre-vented from visiting nearby towns and from buyingunlimited amounts of food, was by total and detailedmovement control of the local population. A pre-requisite for any such control was an inviolableidentification system. The lack of such a system hadalready inhibited the extent of population controlthat could be obtained by the institution of Protec-ted Villages.

The single method of identification withinrural areas was the situpa or registration card.These cards were carried only by adult black males.As a means of positive identification they werealmost totally useless since the situpa contained nophotograph, fingerprint or description of thebearer.

A registration wing was, however, set up withinthe Department of Internal Affairs to conduct anational registration scheme. The metallic identitycard that was approved for use, was virtually unal-terable and very difficult to forge, but by the endof the war completion of the project was still anumber of years distant. As an interim measuremobile photographic teams were fielded in opera-tional areas. Their task was to attach photographsto situpas, but even this measure proved to be oflittle real advantage. Photographs were easily fal-sified or exchanged. But even more important, nomethod of identification was extended to females andyoung boys.

To a large extent the mujiba network establi-shed by these adolescents was the 'eyes and ears' ofthe insurgent forces. The control of their movementwas of cardinal importance within any system ofpopulation and resource control.

Although restriction was initially a hinderance,insurgent forces could circumvent the measuresimposed in terms of Operation Turkey. Food con-trol measures instituted in farming areas adjacentto Protected Villages were largely unsuccessful.Furthermore, as Protected Villages became lesseffective so did food control within and adjacent tothese villages.

6.10 Psyop: Operation Splitshot

Operation Splitshot was executed by 1 Psychological

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Operations Unit on a larger scale than most similarattempts. At the time it also attracted both localand international attention.

From April 1977 onwards, the operation entailedthe distribution of a series of one page leaflets.Typically a leaflet contained a drawing and Englishtext on the one side with the same text in Shona andSindibele on the reverse side. The central themedepicted was that insurgents were communist terro-rists trained in Mozambique who brought only terrorand death. (See Figures 6.1 to 6.3 as examples.) Thepamphlets were distributed largely by Security For-ces in Protected Villages, at schools, and posted inshops and public buildings in the rural areas. Insome areas insurgent reaction was violent, entailingcrude counter-propaganda slogans, but in most areaslittle visible reaction was elicited.

Although the accuracy of the sketches depictinginsurgents and their ways was technically verifiedby captured ZANLA members beforehand, this was arelatively crude and unsuccessful propaganda attempt.The major problem was that the operation had beenbased on false intelligence. A senior member of 1Psychological Operations Unit stated during aninterview that the unit

... was being fed information to the effectthat the terrorist was unwillingly abductedfrom Rhodesia, forced to undergo training inMozambique, been given dreadfully bad training,fed badly, beaten into submission, maltreated,forced back into the country...

whilst the vast majority of insurgent trainees infact left Rhodesia voluntarily to undergo trainingand returned of their own accord. Since theserecruits had direct family ties with the local popu-lation in Rhodesia, it seems unlikely that thegovernment would have been able to persuade thelocal population otherwise. Both the insurgents andthe rural black population in effect knew that themessage conveyed was false.

Within a broader context, Operation Splitshotwas typical of psychological operations attempt by 1Psychological Operations Unit. It tended to vindi-cate the general criticism levelled at the unitregarding its commercial approach to such attemptsin general.

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Terror and dealh is Ike way oft Ihecommunist Ccvnp Instructors in, Mo cam biqut

' ' '

bMqbedten.fr/OWOI- WCOmmwilU wm^/ivuuuvu.ni ntu,u ,*Hfotfk for the. education hi m^pmrnm/n wiocamjae-.rfowiie.ti w>~y' • • '•• -'—> -•- ™-*rmt]-,it art beaten because th/ykcDtne.

. _, r_ _ _ /. / -TL *. *~~,J.. i*. / f- m™,

in iht Communist._ y focomcdfrai

and l/vi in thr. Jhe. comunu,intfrutforJ art evil men ""fhe evil ways of communism on

COMIWnisi camp inrtrutfors.

Figure 6.1 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet

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Terror and death isihe mwunlsi -terror is ft M RhodesiaSec fm/ihe,K.

Figure 6.2 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet

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Do not let 1he coinmunitftororitls spokesmendeceive you with more lies and smooth 1alkSe&fhe. spokesman forihe. rnddmcunivunist ierror/dgang How many prowsesi—„ ,.,,//„ a,,.i "2?«/* tfddt, io "cd? HOW tytSr?'$;fy~i r3fW,<??S'!gyf> jfei/l/rr£?' ' " " ' ' '• '

MIS -ey hwt,fici/er done.- Tfcyfisvti'Wihc. security forces/till hundreds of comMUMsi Tt-rronsh every won in.Me. who art vcurfejlfncncljJfMktowuininilti H/ifti leaflets like, -these -Mist you shni/sixbluflcbtoftic.coiwuMHcri'tnsIs they wlHfybdettyi you with MM lies auf&K&fh

- 'kcfr K> not MM&ivid. fic,aoMMcorwwnrf co'and death . "We- fHore.vou

.' tz.l&e toe, lies cf -fat, CcmmunsHertonsK -ftv,

Wort terror and death tad -h -foe

Figure 6.3 Example of Operation Splitshot Leaflet

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6.11 Use of Spirit Mediums

In large parts of rural Rhodesia tribal life hadbeen allowed to continue unhindered. Rhodesian Frontpolicy emphasised this reliance on the system ofchiefs and the continuation of the traditional ruralblack way of life. In these circumstances spiritmediums continued Lo play an integral role in thetribal way of life.

Traditionally blacks tended to believe impli-citly in the power of spirits to control life onearth. As with the tribal hierarchy, a spiritualhierarchy existed: some spirits were more powerfulthan others. Spirit mediums took the name of thedeceased person with whom they could communicate. Ineffect they represented the spirit of that personwho 'possessed' the medium.

Close contact between rural blacks and govern-ment local administration had led to an awareness ofthe continued dominance of spirit mediums withinrural existence. In the execution of their duties,District Commissioners were specifically aware ofthis and attempted to gain the confidence of promi-nent mediums in the area. Consequently the potentialto manipulate spirit mediums to government advantagehad been recognised long before 1972. This potentialfor manipulation and need to gain confidence werealso recognised by black nationalist organisations.With little, if any exception,all insurgent incur-sions that took place during the sixties entailed,inter alia, advice on spirits.

The Director for the Branch for Special DutiesDick Plowden in fact alerted the military in theearly 1970's to the fact that African spirit mediumswere moving across the north-eastern border with theinsurgents. Following this a series of pamphlets,purporting to come from local spirit mediums weredropped by air over the affected area advising thelocal population against aid to insurgents. Havingnot previously received such messages from theirancestors, the rural blacks paid little attention tothe advice.

During the first seven months of 1973 Internal Affairscompiled a register of all spirit mediums in Rhode-sia. It contained an alphabetical index of allmediums, witchdoctors, separatist church leaders,sacred places and tribal rallying points. A paperwas also completed outlining the five major cultorganisations and their associates. (16) At this timethe majority of mediums were still either neutral orsupported the government. ZANLA insurgents had

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abducted an old woman claiming to be the 'legs' ofthe dual spirit Nehanda from Dande Tribal Trust Landduring November 1972. Various mediums claiming torepresent the other half, the 'head' remained insidethe country. The old woman ('legs') subsequentlydied in Mozambique. Government propaganda was madeof her abduction and a subsequent drought, but thiswas abandoned as it became apparent that she was avolunteer to the insurgent cause.(17)

Military Psychological Operations regarding theinfluence of spirit mediums was relatively limited.The obvious agency for these operations was theDepartment of Internal Affairs due to their closercontact with and better knowledge of the ruralblack. 1 Psychological Operations Unit did, how-ever, use a girl claiming to be posessed by the'head' of Nehanda together with a medium claiming tobe possessed by the spirit of Chaminuka. (18) A reportin the Rhodesia Herald indicated that these effortswere intensified during late 1975 when the twomediums travelled through the North-east denouncingZANLA. In some cases the talks delivered were prece-ded by weaponry, air force and band displays by theSecurity Forces.

During the existence of the Sheppard groupInternal Affairs had also used a tame lion and hyenato indicate to the local population that these spi-ritually powerful animals were on the side of thegovernment. Two films were also made to illustratethis, and subsequently shown countrywide by theMobile Cinema Teams.

In general, 1 Psychological Operations Unit weremore involved with the overt use of mediums such asin the case of Bushu Tribal Trust Land in 1976.

Although the insurgent penetration throughMadziwa and Chiweshe Tribal Trust Lands had beenslowed down, ZANLA were still infiltrating fromKandeya Tribal Trust Land through Chesa African Pur-chase Land, the Umfurudzi Game Park and into BushuTribal Trust Land. Their aim was evidently to sub-vert Masembura, Msana and Chinamore Tribal TrustLands. A sensor from 1 Psycholigcal Operations Unitand a number of Security Force members visited thedominant spirit medium in Bushu Tribal Trust Land.It was made quite clear that should insurgents movethrough Bushu, Security Forces would kill themedium. This proved effective for about threemonths. ZANLA, who were aware of the visit, even-tually intimidated the medium to leave the area.

Other attempts included substantial gifts towin the favour of either the local chief, or spirit

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medium, (e.g. Chief Makoni in Makoni Tribal TrustLand, was presented with a black bull which hepromptly slaughtered).

A further refinement was added using ground-shout equipment. With the active involvement ofSelous Scouts pseudo teams in the area, false spoorof hyena and lion were laid, while the sounds of alaughing hyena and roaring lion were broadcast bymeans of ground-shout. Both animals are highlyesteemed in spiritual matters and purported to havemagical charms. Leaflets were subsequently distribu-ted stating that the spirits were offended at theinsurgent presence. Although groups of insurgentsleft the area, they returned after a few weeks.Locals were later to remark that the project hadlittle effect since spirits were not believed tohave access to a printing press.

As regards 1 Psychological Operations Unititself, the unit did not have the expertise to dab-ble in this very sensitive field. On the other hand,the Department of Internal Affairs tended to over-emphasise the established tribal structure that hadexisted during and prior to the sixties. As the warprogressed these traditions were continuously beingweakened until such time as a chief who did notactively support the insurgent forces found hisauthority usurped by the clandestine insurgent orga-nisations .

6.12 Conclusion

In section 1 of this chapter, three primary elementsof counter-insurgency strategy were identified,namely environmental improvement, resources controland operations aimed at the physical elimination ofthe insurgent forces. The above pages indicate that,as a whole, Rhodesian authorities placed greatestemphasis on the last of these. In practical termsthe major counter-insurgency effort was aimed atobtaining maximum insurgent fatalities. Theleast attention was given to environ-mental improvement. In short, Rhodesia attempted tore-establish government authority by means ofresources and population control and counter-insur-gency operations aimed at eliminating the insur-gents. Psychological operations, isolated as it was,and lacking the support of environmental improvementand local protection could under these circumstancesachieve very little.

Evidence has been given that there was

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organisational insecurity, lack of effective popula-tion and resource control, and a lack of civicaction. Rhodesia went through the motions of a vastnumber of psychological operations, population andresource control measures, but with few concreteresults to show for it all.

Possibly one factor that played a role is thatof involvement. As A.R. Molnar wrote:

the most effective way to alter the indivi-dual's perception of the situation is to directhim into constructive action, rather than sim-ply -to lecture him. (19)

As was the case regarding the protection of Protec-ted Villages and the resistance encountered to theformation and extension of the Security Force Auxi-liaries, Security Force approach to the rural blackpopulation was a continuation of Rhodesia's colonialheritage. It was characterised by paternalism ratherthan by seeking involvement of the locals. This wasmost evident in the attitude of officials from theDepartment of Internal Affairs.

A second major factor pertaining specificallyto psychological operations, is that these actionscould only enhance Security Force actions or reducethe effectiveness of insurgent activities. It couldnot, however, convince a people that the governmentwas 'winning' the war when all other indicationswere to the contrary. This, of course, was in con-trast to population and resource control, both ofwhich could contribute directly to the success ofcounter-insurgency strategy.

Stability operations can be divided into twocomplementary sections.On the one hand it entailsinternal defence, which consists of the SecurityForce actions necessary to defeat the insurgent for-ces in a specific area. On the other hand, internaldevelopment is aimed at consolidating the area underfirm government control, i.e. capitalising andexploiting on the success of internal defence.Should defence thus fail, development would alsofail.

Within Rhodesia the cliche that counter-insur-gency in Africa entailed a "judicious mixture of theiron fist in a velvet glove1 could be heard repea-tedly. Unfortunately the emphasis rather seemed tobe on the fist to the exclusion of the glove.

When attempts were made to focus attention onthe lessons that had been learnt in other insurgen-cies, the response, more often than not, was that

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those wars had not been fought in the unsophistica-ted African environment. The vast majority of whites did in factbelieve that the black African only understood andrespected force.Thus proof had to be given as to whowas the stronger, the government or the insurgents.Invariably the local population were caught in themiddle. To a large degree, the Rhodesian approach tointernal defence and development was thus a productof the racial preconceptions of white Rhodesians ingeneral.

That the top echelon of the Rhodesian Frontparty failed to understand the real nature of their dilemmais well illustrated by remarks made by former Minis-ter of Information and Defence, P.K. van der Bylafter the war

South Africans will not - hopefully! - be inhi-bited by the ridiculous considerations that wewere, of being overconsiderate about the enemy.There was far too much influence of Sandhurstand the Metropolitan Police here. The lesson ofthe Rhodesian war - and Vietnam showed this aswell - is that you can't fight by the Queens-berry rules.(20)

The lesson was, in fact, that in 15 years of armedrevolution, Rhodesian whites had learnt no lesson.

NOTES

1. U.S. Army, Stability Operations: U.S. ArmyDoctrine (Field Manual No. 31-23, 1967), p. 150.

2. U.S. Marine Corps, Small Unit Leader's Coun-ter-insurgency Handbook (NAVMC, 1972), pp. 2-2 and2-3.

3. U.S. Army, Stability Operations, p. 69.4. At this level civic action is termed civil

affairs.5. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutio-

nary War (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p. 152.6. These companies could not remit their pro-

fits during UDI and the money had been placed in agovernment fund at an interest rate of 2%. Rhodesianbanks proved willing to form a consortium to managethe facilities. In return for access to the fundsthe finance houses would have offered 4£% interest.

7. Publication announced on 28 October 1976 inthe Rhodesia Herald.

8. J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves: Masses vsthe Media in the Making of Zimbabwe (Ravan Press,

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Johannesburg, 1982), p. 126.9. In the case of the rabbit farms, for example,

the Treasury was unwilling to supply the Rh$ 3 000needed to start the scheme. Further resistance wasencountered from the Cold Storage Commission regar-ding the establishment of an abattoir for this pro-ject.

10. The Internal Duties Branch was establishedduring 1966 'to counteract subversive propaganda1

and 'to expose the false policies of so-called Afri-can nationalism'. Among other projects the Branchpublished a weekly newspaper aimed at black reader-ship called The African Times. Mobile cinema teamswere also deployed and supplied with suitable filmsfor rural black viewing.

11. Catholic Institute for International Rela-tions, Rhodesia: the Propaganda War (London, Sep.1977), p. 42.

12. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country,revised and extended edition, (Pan Books, London,1980), p. 166.

13. Sunday Mail, 18 Mar. 1979.14. See, for example, A.R. Molnar (et. al.),

Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds inInsurgencies (Special Operations Research Office,Washington D.C., 1965), p. 253.

15. U.S. Army, Operations of Army Forces in theField, (Army Manual No. 100-5, 1968), pp. 13-19.

16. The 5 major cult organisations are:1. Mwari/Mlime cult in the Matopos;2. Mutota/Nehande cult; centres in Sipolilo,

Mount Darwin and Concession;3. Musikavanhu/Chapo cult at Chipinga;4. Dzivaguru cult at Mount Darwin;5. Nevana cult at Gokwe.

In addition there are hundreds of ancestral spiritsfor the various tribes throughout the country. Onaverage there is one major and two or three minorspirits for each chiefdom in the Mashonaland area.The Matabele chiefs do not have revered tribalancestors who are worshipped in the specific spiritmedium manner. They depend on witchdoctors for day-to-day purposes.

17. Nehanda, according to legend, was the daugh-ter of Monopotapa. She was seduced by her halfbrother, and went to bed with him. Upon discoveringwhom he was, she ran into a rock in her anger. Theimpact was so great that her spirit broke in half, a'head' and 'legs'.

18. During the uprisings of 1896, Chaminuka hadprophesied that the Shona would be able to preserve

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their independence only if they resisted the tempta-tion to acquire the goods of the whites.

19. Molnar (et. al.), Human Factors, p. 27520. Fredrikse, None but Ourselve"s^~p. 333

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Chapter 7

EXTERNAL OPERATIONS

7.1 Strategic Base Areas and Insurgent Sanctuaries

The father of modern rural insurgency theory,Maozedong (Mao tse Tung) identified the followingsix fundamental principles of insurgency:

1. The relation between offensive and defensiveactions within the total revolutionary conflict.

2. Strategic defence and strategic offensive.3. The establishment of strategic base areas.4. The co-ordination of guerrilla warfare with

conventional warfare.5. The development of guerrilla warfare into

mobile warfare.6. The link between the various levels of com-

mand.

It is with the third of these principles namely theestablishment of strategic base areas that we areconcerned.

Mao defined strategic bases as those areas

... on which a guerrilla war relies for carry-ing out its strategic tasks as well as forachieving the goals of preserving and expandingoneself and annihilating or expelling theenemy ... (1)

While he viewed these bases within a political andideological context, the major thrust of Mao's deli-berations in this regard focusses on geographicalfeatures. His emphasis to this effect led him tostate that

... guerrillas without base areas are rovinginsurgents and can have no connection with the

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political aspirations of the indigenous popula-tion. (2)

In accordance with the above, strategic base areasmay be established either within the borders of theendangered state, or adjacent to them. The latterare generally termed sanctuaries. In both cases thearea should provide the insurgent forces with adegree of physical security. This can be obtained byterrain features such as inaccessability, or bypolitical and diplomatic measures. Should the basearea for an insurgency be established with an adja-cent country, i.e. across an international boundary,the insurgent forces might obtain security by diplo-matic means.

The necessity for the establishment of suchareas is contained in the following definition byBernard Fall:

... an active sanctuary is a territory conti-guous to a rebellious area which, though osten-sibly not involved in the conflict provides therebel side with shelter, training facilities,equipment, and - if he can get away with it -troops.(3)

For the purposes of this chapter contiguous terri-tory may be regarded as another sovereign state.

Some writers on insurgency such as Walter Lipp-man, Peter Paret and John Shy claim that insurgencyforces with a privileged sanctuary cannot be defea-ted. These views are undoubtedly influenced by theimportant role that sanctuaries, or lack of them,have played in Vietnam, Algeria, Malaya, Greece,etc. Although the view expressed is possibly extreme,there is little doubt that

... history shows that if guerrillas are provi-ded with the freedom to move across nationalborders, enabling them to receive material aid anda sanctuary privileged from attack, then theirchances for overthrowing target governmentsseem greatly enhanced.(4)

It should be clear at this stage that the status ofa sanctuary and the degree of 'privilege fromattack1 it affords directly influences the impor-tance of this factor in counter-insurgency strategy.However, political constraints are the primarydeterminants of both.

To John D. Deiner the results of case studies

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done on Algeria, Greece and Vietnam indicate theexistence of two strategies as counter to activesanctuaries. The first is border control and thesecond armed incursions. John J. McCuen indicates athird strategy, the organisation and support of'counter-insurgent insurgents' operating from thetarget country into that country serving as host tothe insurgent forces; in other words, fighting firewith fire.

Physical border control on the frontier is pro-bably exemplified by the construction of a cordonsanitaire as discussed in Chapter 4. The secondstrategy,, that of armed incursions to destroy ordislocate insurgent sanctuaries, is the subject ofthis chapter.

Even in the case of a country such as Rhodesiawhich was, since 1975 and up to the end of the war,virtually surrounded by potential sanctuaries, careshould be exercised to avoid over-emphasising theimportance of a strategy of external operations. AsDeiner cautioned:

... while border sanctuaries may be significantfactors affecting the military aspects of guer-rilla wars, they are not determinant factors ofthe ultimate outcomes of such struggles. (5)

Clearly such operations constitute an important ele-ment of military strategy, but only in the case oftotal military preponderance can external operationseliminate the external insurgent threat. Even shouldthis be possible, the political costs involved insuch actions will be the final sanction for theirexecution.

After UDI in 1965, Zambia was Rhodesia's onlyneighbour providing active assistance and succour toinsurgent forces. Infiltrators from that countryeither had to cross the Zambezi river (or Karibalake) to the south, or attempt to enter Rhodesiathrough the territories of Botswana and Mozambique.Once the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique,FRELIMO, had come to power in Mozambique during 1974,the Rhodesian strategic situation changed drastical-ly for the worse. The whole north-eastern, easternand south-eastern border was thrown open to penetra-tion and infiltration. When ZPRA infiltration viaBotswana increased from 1976 onwards, a similarsituation developed along the western and south-western borders. The number of recruits and refugeesleaving the war-torn country during those years fur-ther provided both ZANLA and ZPRA with more than an

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ample supply of trainees. Therefore, by the end ofthe war Rhodesia had an active hostile border stret-ching for nearly 3 000km. Only 200km of southernborder adjacent to the Republic of South Africaremained in hands not hostile to the country.

As indicated in Chapter 4 (Border MinefieldObstacles) Rhodesia had neither the manpower nor theresources to even attempt an effective system ofborder control. The obvious military alternativeentailed a forward defence in depth. Such a strategywould imply that insurgent forces could be elimina-ted en masse within their strategic base areas.

A further extension of this strategy entailedpunishing countries giving sanctuary for passive and/or active aid rendered to the insurgent forces. Inthis regard Zambia and Mozambique provided evidenceof an almost unrestricted commitment to the 'decolo-nialisation' of Rhodesia.

Lastly, Rhodesian creation and support of theMozambique Resistance Movement had great potentialas a destabilising factor. It is, however, notdirectly relevant to this chapter.

The Rhodesian strategy of cross-border assaultsdeveloped rapidly in the period 1976 to 1979. Themajor characteristics of this strategy can only beascertained from an account of external operationsinto neighbouring countries.

7.2 Mozambique

In spite of Prime Minister Ian Smith's public denialon 4 December 1972, Rhodesian military units hadbeen operating continually in Mozambique since 1969.After the initiation of Operation Hurricane, co-operation with Portuguese armed forces was increased.Permission was granted for Special Air Service (SAS)and Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) operations inlarge areas north and south of the Zambezi river, toa line running North-South through the village ofCarnde 100km into Mozambique.

Co-operation lasted until 1974, and even forsome months after the coup in Lisbon. Operations bysection and platoon size units into Mozambique con-tinued after Portugal had handed over power toFRELIMO, for it was some months before PresidentSamora Machel was able to consolidate power.

Co-operation between ZANLA and FRELIMO datedfrom 1969, when ZANLA was offered the use of theTete province to infiltrate insurgents into north-eastern Rhodesia. This co-operation had strengthened

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Figure 7.1. Mozambique

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during the intervening years to such an extent thatthe two movements had a largely integrated logisticssystem. Once FRELIMO was in power, command, controland training were also to be integrated. PresidentMachel's commitment to the 'liberation' of Rhodesiawas total.

By 1979 the Directorate of Military Intelli-gence estimated that a total of 1 000 FAM (Army ofMozambique,formerly known as FPLM) troops were trai-ned for use in support of ZANLA forces inside Rhode-sia. The total number actually deployed within Rho-desia was estimated at between 150 and 300 troops.

Initially political constraints and the inte-gration of ZANLA and FAM discouraged large Rhodesianoperations into Mozambique. Strict constraints wereplaced on raids into that country. Only during thelatter half of 1975, for example, were the SelousScouts given permission to penetrate into Mozambique.Penetration was, however, limited to a maximum offive kilometres and attacks on FAM or camps jointlyoccupied by FAM and ZANLA were strictly prohibited.The first Selous Scouts operation into Mozambiquewas executed on 7 January 1976 when fifteen Scoutsattacked a ZANLA transit camp situated near Chicom-bidzi. Although a number of insurgents were wounded,no fatal casualties could be confirmed.

During 1976, as the trickle of ZANLA insurgentsinto Rhodesia turned into a flood. Combined Head-quarters, (COMOPS), was able to convince the Secu-rity Council that attacks against ZANLA training andholding camps in Mozambique was vitally important tolimit the number of insurgents inside Rhodesia tomanageable levels. In spite of the continuous small-unit operations that had taken place, Rhodesianintelligence concerning these bases had previouslynot been detailed enough to ensure success.

First use of the Selous Scouts' so-called 'Fly-ing Column' occurred during June 1976. Code-namedOperation Long John it entailed an attack on theZANLA transit camp at Mapai and staging-post knownas Chicualacuala. The operation was greatly assistedby the capture of a ZANLA liaison officer fromMalvernia opposite Vila Salazar.. Under cover of anartillery barrage the column of six vehicles cros-sed into Mozambique and in succession attacked Mapaiand Chicualacuala. Although only a small number ofinsurgents were killed a large quantity of arms andammunition was destroyed.

The first major success resulted from pseudooperations in Holdenby Tribal Trust Land duringwhich a ZANLA captive gave detailed information

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regarding a major base in Mozambique. According toall reports this base was the major staging area forZANLA infiltration into Operation Thrasher. Theexact location of the camp followed from a visualsighting by a Canberra pilot. Detailed preparationled to the execution of Operation Eland on 8 August1976. Eighty-four members of the Selous Scouts,dressed as FAM soldiers, swept into the Nyadzoniacamp about 40km from the Rhodesian border in Manicaprovince with ten Unimogs and four Ferret armouredscout cars. Entering the camp via a circular routeduring muster parade, the Scouts killed about 300ZANLA and'30 FAM troops according to the officialSecurity Force communique released after the raid.At the time of the attack Nyadzonia was reported tocontain about 5 000 ZANLA insurgents and 50 FAM sol-diers. According to the results of an FAM board ofinquiry subsequently found at Chimoio, total ZANLAdeaths at Nyadzonia were estimated at over 1 000.During the raid the Pungwe river bridge linking Teteto Chimoio was also blown up to prevent any inter-vention by the FAM brigade stationed at Chimoio.

Although this has not been confirmed, it wouldseem that the Selous Scouts launched a simultaneousattack on a camp in the region of Vila Machadonearly 200km from the Rhodesian border on the Umtali-Beira railway line. FAM and ZANLA casualties werereported to be between 800 and 1 000. (6)

Code-named Operation Mardon, the Selous Scoutslaunched a second flying column attack into the Gazaprovince on 31 October 1976. The columns main objec-tive was to disrupt the ZANLA logistical system.After the attack on the Mapai base in June 1976,ZANLA had shifted their base to Jorge do Limpopo,fourteen kilometers away, but still referred to itas Mapai. As part of the operation the railwaybetween Jorge do Limpopo, Malvernia and Massangerawas also disrupted.

At the time there was considerable doubt as toFAM reaction to such raids. As it turned out, thiswas less of a danger than originally feared and evenafter Rhodesian Security Forces launched overtattacks on FAM targets, the armed forces of Mozambi-que remained hesitant to close with them.

During this early stage deployment of insurgentbase camps was found to assist rather than hinderRhodesian operations. Camps were permanent establish-ments in which hundreds of trainees were concentra-ted in a very small area. Active air defence measu-res such as missile sites and anti-aircraft gunswere very few while passive measures such as

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camouflage, bunkers and track discipline were intheir infancy.

These practices changed drastically, and from1978 onwards ZANLA camps were spread over severalsquare kilometres. Permanent sites gave way to nume-rous temporary camps. Locations were rotated betweenthese sites at irregular intervals, while camouflageand concealment were highly sophisticated. By the endof the war, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly

To avoid detection, ZANLA transit camps hadbecome little more than mere resting places,with stocks of ammunition, food and suppliesconcealed, often by burying, in wide areas ofthe surrounding bush. There were no huts orgrass shelters and the camping areas were gene-rally sited amongst thick bush or under largetrees, to comouflage the terrorist presencefrom our reconnaissance aircraft. They werenormally manned by a small garrison who lived,if they were fortunate, in nearby villages.Their job was to ration and resupply the groupspassing through on route to the war and to pro-vide guides to take them to the next stagingpost. (7)

Where the Joint Services Photographic InterpretationStaff, JSPIS, originally had little difficulty inidentifying camps and their lay-out from aerialphotographs, this was no longer possible. The deter-mination of whether a camp was occupied or notbecame a'major problem. Since final confirmationcould only be obtained by physical ground reconnais-sance, Special Air Service or Selous Scout teams ofone to four men in strength had to be sent in. With-in camps spread over large areas they were alsoneeded to determine the precise location of keyinstallations such as anti-aircraft sites. Thenature of the task in hand led to the discovery ofsome of these reconnaissance teams and comprisedensuing operations.

The Mapai raid of May/June 1977, was one suchattack. Official Security Force figures releasedclaimed only 32 insurgent casualties. The camp dis-persal also played a role during this raid. Co-ordi-nated with an external area operation by 2nd Batta-lion of the Rhodesia Regiment in the Vila Salazararea, elements of the Rhodesian Light Infantry wereemplaced into the Rio base on the Nuanetsi river aswell as. into Madulo Pan. Similarly a Selous Scouts

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column attacked Jorge do Limpopo, only to discoverthat the main ZANLA camp had shifted back to Mapai.During the ensuing attack on the latter a RhodesianAir Force Dakota was shot down. This operation alsofinally destroyed what remained of the Mozambiquerailway system in the Gaza province. The previouslarge external raid into Mozambique, OperationMiracle, had encountered similar problems duringOctober/November 1976, when the targets in Tete pro-vince received early warning as a result of thedetection of the approaching vehicle column.

In spite of these problems the destruction andcapture of arms, ammunition and other materialincreasingly played a role in Security Force strate-gy. Where the initial objective had always been pri-marily to obtain maximum insurgent casualties, itwas moderated to give logistical damage an almostequal status.

The first operation aimed at destroying logis-tical targets, albeit for mainly military reasons,was code-named Operation Virile. It entailed thedestruction of five road bridges on the road betweenDombe and Espungabera during November 1977. Espunga-bera is located on the Mozambique side of the borderto Mount Silinda. As a result, Espungabera was cutoff from the main FAM and ZANLA base at Chimoio andthe garrison stationed there denied all substantialmeans of support. As a transit base for infiltrationinto Rhodesia it subsequently lost much of itsvalue.

The pattern of Security Force external opera-tions was closely linked to seasonal fluctuations.The annual summer rainy season brought about thegrowth of thick, green vegetation which provided thebest natural cover for insurgent infiltration andactivity. Such was the case on 23 November 1977,when ZANLA suffered heavy losses of 1 200 casualtiesduring Security Force attacks on the ZANLA headquar-ters north of Chimoio, and against the holding campat Tembue. The attacks were executed by the sameforce of Special Air Service and Rhodesian LightInfantry troops who were air-lifted from Chimoio toTembue. In preparing for the massed infiltration ofinsurgents, ZANLA had taken to concentrating them inforward holding camps at the start of the annualsummer rains. Needless to say, this strategy was notrepeated indefinitely.

ZANLA base camp deployment, as it had developedby 1978, presented the Rhodesian Security Forceswith a number of interrelated problems. The methodemployed to attack an insurgent base was known as

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vertical envelopment. This consisted of an airstrike by bombers followed by the delivery of troopson the perimeters of the camp and across the mostlikely enemy escape routes by helicopters or para-chute. The latter forces adopted ambush positionswhile the perimeter forces fought inwards, cleaningthe camp progressively from one side as the battleprogressed. This had originally been made possibleby the development adopted by ZANLA in its basecamps, as well as the absence of organised resis-tence to Security Forces during the operations.

While the lack of offensive action remainedspecifically a hallmark of ZANLA forces when facedwith a conventional attack, passive counter measuressuch as the dispersal and extensive use of bunkerspresented a serious challenge to the cost-effective-ness of such attacks. These problems were furtheraccentuated when the insurgents resorted to buildingtheir bunkers on higher ground. As a result theiranti-aircraft cover was both better placed and moreeffective, improving the somewhat restrictive capa-bilities of SA-7 missiles and the fields of fireboth of missiles and other anti-aircraft weaponry.The FAM in particular were becoming more adept inthe use of SA-7's. During the later Chimoio raidsthey positioned these missiles along the Vandusi-Catandica road, firing on all aircraft in transit.

Air strikes and close air support graduallybecame more costly and dangerous. Since the Rhode-sian Army relied on antiquated Second World War 25pounder field guns, artillery fire support would notdislodge insurgents from bunkers built to withstanda near miss by a 350kg bomb.(8) Artillery fire sup-port was only used during Operation Miracle pre-viously mentioned. During this operation FAM attemp-ted one of its few interventions, while a ZANLAanti-aircraft machine gun company put up fierceresistance in the face of concerted Rhodesian airand ground attacks. (9)

Throughout the period in question, although theFAM never became involved against the Rhodesian for-ces in any meaningful way, FAM intervention was moreactive than that of the Zambian National DefenceForce (ZNDF). The most serious Rhodesian fear was apossible attack on their Forward AdministrativeAreas (FAA). These were established as logisticalresupply points within Mozambique (or Zambia) whendeep strikes were made into enemy territory. Anyattack against the FAA would endanger the entireoperation. As a result many of the Rhodesian attackson FAM forces should be viewed in the light of the

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danger these forces posed vis-a-vis the FAA.Occasionally the Rhodesian Air Force also acci-

dentally bombed either FAM or members of the TanzanianPeoples Defence Force (TPDF). A maximum of 2 000TPDF troops were deployed at Massingwe in Tete pro-vince but did not actively involve themselves in thewar against Rhodesia. Such accidental bombings werenormally the result of faulty intelligence reportsand related to the problem of distinguishing betweenZANLA, FAM and TPDF forces within the various carnps.Restrictions on action against FAM forces were lif-ted during 1978. Prior to this these forces had beenengaged only in self-defence. One example of theaccidental bombing of TPDF forces occurred late in1978/early 1979. The Directorate of Military Intel-ligence had identified two possible area locationsof a ZANLA base with the knowledge that there wasalso a TPDF camp in the area. When Selous Scoutsteams discovered a base in the Songo area near LakeCahora Bassa, and air strike was carried out on thelocation. The base subsequently proved to have beenoccupied by TPDF forces. As an insurgent trainingarea Tanzania had played an active role in providingZANLA training facilities since August 1968. Thesewere initially situated at Itumbi in south-westernTanzania and as from 1971 at Mgagoo.

Although not as widely publisized, air strikeswithout ground support proved an important factor ininsurgent casualties. One such raid that was neverofficially disclosed occurred in mid to late 1979when a ZANLA holding camp at Nhangau, north of Beirawas bombed, resulting in about 600 casualties.

As ZANLA started its build-up of conventionalforces and armaments in 1978-1979, it was alsobecoming clear that Rhodesian weaponry could notdeal with the base camp deployment that was evolving,especially as regards dispersal and the extensiveuse of bunkers. In terms of casualties and effortthe cost of traditional vertical envelopment methodswas rising, but no ready alternative seemed appa-rent.

During 1978 it was also becoming increasinglyevident that purely as a method of inflicting insur-gent casualties, external operations were not aseffective as they seemed to be initially. In theperiod 1977 to 1978 ZANLA casualties resulting fromsuch raids totalled 3 500, while the number ofactive insurgents in eastern Rhodesia had risen from1 200 to more than 8 000. This led to a shift inemphasis from causing casualties to disrupting theZANLA logistical system. One example of such a change

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in emphasis is the air attack on combined ZANLA andFAM armouries at Chingodzi and Dendo. Henceforth,ZANLA arms were mainly stored in Maputo itself,where political considerations prevented their massdestruction by air. Alternatively they were disper-sed in forward areas. ZANLA was, however, forced tostay in the vicinity of Chimoio since the latter wasthe main FAM administrative centre for Manica Pro-vince, and, subsequently, for ZANLA. ZANLA was thusforced to alternate their camps within an approxi-mate radius of sixty kilometers of Chimoio. To theSecurity Forces this area became known as theChimoio Circle.

As the war entered its final stages, logisticswere increasingly seen as a primary factor in easingthe onslaught from outside Rhodesia. A target studyof the Mozambiquan communication and transport sys-tem as part of the ZANLA logistical chain was com-pleted by the Directorate of Military Intelligenceearly in 1979. The result presented to NATJOC sug-gested the destruction of eighteen major bridges,extensive mining of certain stretches of road andsinking of dredgers in the Makuti channel offSofala.

The War Council refused to agree to the execu-tion of this plan in a single operation. NATJOC pro-ceeded, however, to authorise piece-meal attacks onsome of these objectives during 1979. When the Lan-caster House constitutional talks began, a number ofthem had been attacked, but the desired result,total collapse of all traffic, and thus of ZANLAlogistics, was not achieved. The operations launchedwere too extended in time to be effective and theonly result achieved was the disruption of localmovement.

During the ensuing ceasefire, ZANLA was capableof concentrating its remaining external forces andthen infiltrating them into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia withlittle difficulty directly counter to the ceasefireagreement.

The attempts at what amounted to a limitedinterdiction campaign was the nearest that the Rho-desian Security Forces came to being allowed toattack strategic targets in Mozambique. At no stagedid NATJOC sanction operations against economic tar-gets that could not be justified on purely militarygrounds. Operation Uric (September 1979) into Gazaprovince bears witness to this.

Although this operation was the first to beofficially admitted as purposely aimed at FAM tar-gets (in the subsequent Security Forces communique)

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the real aim of Operation Uric was to destroy fivebridges and thus halt all rail and road movementnorth of Baragem. Military justification for theraid was provided by the arrival of large numbers ofEthiopian-trained ZANLA insurgents in Maputo intransit to holding camps near Zimbabwe-Rhodesia priorto infiltration. In view of the political negotia-tions underway that would eventually lead to Lancas-ter House, NATJOC feared that the FAM might be temp-ted to assist ZANLA either in seizing territory anddeclaring it a 'liberated' area, or in shorteningZANLA's logistical line. In an effort to halt allmovement in the area as well as to counter the FAMbuild-up there, an FAM brigade administrative areaat Mabalane near Mapai was also attacked. Only threeof the five bridges were effectively destroyed. Itis reasonable to assume that this operation had aneffect on the pressure exerted by President Machelon Mugabe at Lancaster House, for it represented afurther serious blow to the Mozambique economy.

In conclusion, Rhodesian Security Force raidsinto Mozambique had some distinct advantages in com-parison with those into Zambia. Vehicle columnscould be employed with little difficulty as a resultof the absence of a barrier comparable to the Zam-bezi river. This made the use of artillery possibleto provide close fire support, although only usedduring Operation Miracle. As a legacy of co-opera-tion with the Portuguese their detailed knowledge ofthe terrain was a further advantage. A strange fac-tor was the reliability of radio interceptions. Vastnumbers of these were made, but the loose, unco-ordinated command and control structure of ZANLA incontrast to that of ZPRA led to the interceptionsbeing of greater use in Zambia than in the case ofMozambique.

While the general strategic posture regardingZambia was forward and aggressive, the eastern ope-rational area commanders attempted to institute adefence in depth, with protection of vital economicareas as a vital component. Within the three easternoperational areas such a strategy entailed establi-shing border minefield obstacles as impediments tocross-border movement, with little manpower back-up.The majority of forces were involved in the protec-tion of farming areas and railway lines.

In the final year of the war an attempt wasmade towards a more forward strategic posture; withRhodesian Light Infantry and Special Air Serviceunits operating inside Mozambique on a continualbasis. The Special Air Service and Corps of Engineers

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laid extensive minefields in Manica, Gaza and Teteprovinces in a further attempt to hamper freedom ofmovement. The effectiveness of these measures isextremely difficult to determine.

7.3 Zambia

Zambia had been the traditional base for Rhodesiannationalist movements since UDI in 1965. Although indirect political and ethnic competition, both ZANUand ZAPU had no choice but to avail themselves of thehospitality of President Kaunda. This situation con-tinued until FRELIMO gained power in Mozambique. Thethird member of the Frontline states, Botswana, waseconomically too dependent on the Republic of SouthAfrica and Rhodesia and militarily too weak to playany major role in the war.

President Kaunda had played an active role innumerous attempts to obtain international actionagainst Rhodesia. These had cost Zambia dearly andculminated in the closure of the border with Rhode-sia on 9 January 1973. Zambian commitment to the'liberation' of Rhodesia is probably best illustra-ted in the well-known Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969which included the following statement:

On the objective of liberation ... we canneither surrender nor compromise. We havealways preferred and we still prefer, toachieve it without physical violence ... Butwhile peaceful progress is blocked by actionsof those at present in power in the states ofSouthern Africa, we have no choice but to giveto the people of those territories all the sup-port of which we are capable in their struggleagainst their oppressors.(10)

Despite having signed this, President Kaunda was notprepared to use Zambian forces to 'liberate' Rhode-sia. It was to be a struggle by a people for theircountry. A legacy similar to that of the commonstruggle by ZANLA and FRELIMO in Mozambique did notexist in Zambia between the Zambian National DefenceForce, ZNDF, and ZPRA. This led to a major distinct-tion regarding the support these two countriesaccorded ZAPU and ZANU.

While FAM and ZANLA forces were integrated atvarious levels those of the ZNDF and ZPRA remainedstrictly separate.(11) Each had its own command andcontrol functions as well as logistical chain. At no

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TANZANIA

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stage of the war did the ZNDF become actively invol-ved with insurgent operations inside Rhodesia.

As regards Rhodesian Security Force operationsin that country, separate bases and facilities forZNDF and ZPRA were advantageous. Therefore attackson insurgent bases could take place with little orno chance of ZNDF casualties. As in Mozambique, theZambian army did not involve itself further in Rho-desian external operations. It became evident thatthe ZNDF was intent on preventing any confrontationwith the Rhodesian armed forces. Three factors, how-ever, hampered large scale Security Force operationsinto Zambia at least until 1978.

The first of these was Zambian membership ofthe Commonwealth and its standing as a moderategovernment in the eyes of the West. While Mozambiquehad gained independence merely as a result of thecoup in Portugal, Zambia had gained its freedompeacefully from Britain during the era of de-coloni-sation. Large scale Rhodesian reprisals would atleast have prompted Britain to adopt a harsher Rho-desian policy. The distinct prospect of directinvolvement in the dispute could not be ruled out.

South Africa exercised a similar and possiblymore direct restraint on Rhodesian actions againstZambia since President Kaunda was the one majorblack leader prepared to take part in detente inSouthern Africa. The Republic of South Africa couldnot allow any Rhodesian actions that might endangerthis relationship.

In the years preceeding 1978, Security Forceexternal operations into Zambia consisted of small-scale clandestine activities such as sabotage andthe laying of mines. The operations were conductedin close secrecy and at a relatively low level ofintensity. As the war intensified, operationsagainst ZPRA also intensified but were still limitedin comparison with raids into Mozambique. Thus, forexample, a combined force of Special Air Service,Rhodesian Light Infantry and Rhodesia African Riflesattacked the ZPRA staging-post in Kavalananja on 6March 1978. The operation was code-named OperationTurmoil and the camp attacked was a mere four kilometersinside Zambia. Forty two ZPRA insurgents were killedand a quantity of equipment destroyed.

Until 1978, ZAPU leader Joshua Nkomo, hadrepeatedly proved ready to take part in negotiationswith the Rhodesian Front government. To a largeextent this willingness reflected the imbalance ofstrength between ZPRA and ZANLA, yet during thisperiod Nkomo was still widely regarded as the major

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nationalist leader. (During 1976 Nkomo was stillinside Rhodesia as leader of the Internal ANC.) Hisagreement to a constitutional settlement could havebeen a decisive blow to the insurgent onslaught. Thefirst Viscount disaster and the ensuing massacre ofthe survivors on 3 September 1978, however, haltedall contact between Ian Smith and Nkomo. Followingthis, and in the face of reports concerning a majorbuild-up of ZPRA forces in Zambia, the War Councilsanctioned attacks on major ZPRA bases in andaround Lusaka.

A final factor that tended to restrict SecurityForce raids was that of physical barriers such asthe Zambezi river and Kariba Lake. The initialstrike, emplacement of troops, fire support, logis-tical replenishment and evacuation of troops thusall had to be undertaken by air. As the RhodesianAir Force had a strictly limited number of aircraft,this was a severe limitation. Only on a single occa-sion did Rhodesia ferry vehicles across the Zambezito attack ZPRA targets inside Lusaka itself.

The first major external raid into Zambia tookplace during October 1978. During May of the pre-vious year, Prime Minister Smith had warned Presi-dent Kaunda that Harare might order pre-emptivestrikes against insurgent bases in Zambia in view ofthe increased ZPRA forces in that country. Thisfirst raid consisted of bombing raids on severaltargets, inter alia on the ZPRA headquarters atFreedom Camp (F.C.) near Lusaka on 20 October 1978.From here half-trained insurgents were forwarded toLuso in Angola for a final four month trainingperiod. As had been the case with the first large-scale raid into Mozambique, targets that had neitheractive nor passive defence systems were takenentirely by surprise. This was the well-known GreenLeader attack.

ZPRA quickly learned from the casualties theyhad suffered. As with ZANLA, they resorted to camou-flage and concealment, the use of bunkers and dis-persal of bases over large areas. Where ZPRA baseshad initially been limited to major camps close tourban areas, they were now divided into numeroussmaller bases and spread over remote areas, away fromLusaka. Within a matter of months air attacks againstZPRA bases were proving much less cost effectivethan was the case initially. Their training was moreconventionally orientated and in general more tho-rough. ZPRA forces also put up more resistance whenattacked than ZANLA did.

The effectiveness of ZPRA passive counter-

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measures is illustrated by the air strikes againstMulungushi camp north-east of Lusaka during 1979.Subjected to twelve Canberra and eighteen Huntersorties over a period of two days, ZPRA forcesremained dug-in throughout the attack, sustainingonly 7 deaths and 30-40 wounded despite the expen-diture of thousands of kilograms of explosives. Thiswas the second bombing attack on Mulungushi. It hadfirst been bombed on 22 December 1978. At the timeit contained two hundred and seventy conventionallytrained ZPRA insurgents. Thirty-three died duringthis first attack.

As in Mozambique, it soon became clear thatRhodesian Air Force armaments could not dislodge theenemy from hardened shelters. Various experimentswere conducted in an attempt to design some means ofdislodging or killing personnel in their bunkersover a wide area. These experiments met with littlesuccess. In the case of Zambia specifically this wasa serious limitation.

At a later stage Mulungushi base also providedproof of the effectiveness of insurgent camp routineand general security. Security Forces had planned anormal vertical envelopment operation on the camp inthe belief that total ZPRA strength amounted to asingle battalion. Owing to logistical problems andpossible ZNDF involvement the operation was cancel-led. After the war the Directorate of Military Intel-gence learned that ZPRA had encamped a further threebattalions in the surrounding area as counter attackforce against just such an eventuality.

The preparation and strength of ZPRA forces andcamps soon made it evident that attacks on maincamps were becoming too costly. The alternativeentailed the elimination of ZPRA communications,logistics and hierarchy. This decision was furtherprompted following a highly successful Selous Scoutsoperation into Francistown, during which a number ofhigh-ranking ZPRA officials were captured. Duringinterrogation they revealed the extent of the ZPRAconventional build-up in Zambia. It was planned toseize bridgeheads across the Zambezi after whicheither Wankie or Victoria Falls airfields would beused as air resupply points. Ground forces wouldestablish an anti-aircraft umbrella over the twoairfields.

The whole operation was intended as a severepsychological blow to white morale, as well as inter-national proof of the extent of insurgent activities.During May 1979 Intelligence Digest had reported:

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It is reliably reported from Zambia that thereis a large-scale build-up of Russian militaryforces and equipment in the country. Up to 50Russian transport planes daily have been seen onthe Lusaka runways ... The military equipmentis largely offensive ... mostly tanks, artil-lery and heavy machine guns. The troops aremainly East German 'instructors' and a fewYugoslav pilots ... There is much talk of anoffensive against Rhodesia, spearheaded byNkomo!s terrorist forces and some elements ofthe Zambian Army. (12)

It can be accepted that the planned ZPRA operationwas to be a concerted bid by Nkomo and his Sovietbacking to forestall ZANU (ie. Chinese) political ormilitary victory. Planning included Angola which wasto provide the aircraft for a typical Warsaw Pacttype operation. (Egyptian attacks across the Suezcanal in the Yom Kippur war during 1973 exemplifysuch an operation.)

In reaction, the Security Forces launched pre-emptive raids by Special Air Service troops into theheart of Lusaka during April and June 1979 to dis-rupt ZPRA command and control structures. ZPRA cen-tral command and communication facilities wereseverely damaged by these operations. The first ofthese raids on 14 and 15 April 1979 was the onlyoccasion during which a mobile column of seven LandRovers was used in Zambia. During the raid an abor-tive attempt on the life of Joshua Nkomo was carriedout.

Although large-scale external operations intoZambia had started only in 1978, two years aftersimilar operations against Mozambique, their scopeand intensity were soon to be of an equal magnitude.The same basic arguments that were used to justifyattacks on strategic targets in Mozambique were usedregarding Zambia.

Being a land-locked country, Zambia had limitedexport routes. In Angola the Union for the TotalIndependence of Angola, UNITA, had cut the rail linkto the port of Benguela. To the south lay Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The only viable routes remainingwere along the Chinese built railway line betweenTanzania and Zambia (TANZAM now called the TAZARA)and through Mozambique to the port of Beira. Hampe-red by inefficient management and handling problemsat the ports of Dar es Salaam and Beira, these linkswere hard pressed to move even the minimum ofexports and imports.

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As part of the limited interdiction campaignwaged against Mozambique, the first raids on strate-gic targets in Zambia took place on 11 and 12 Octo-ber 1979. Three bridges on the Beira-Moatize railwayline in Mozambique were bombed. Zambian links withthe port of Beira were effectively cut. At the sametime Special Air Service forces destroyed the Cham-beshi railway bridge in northern Zambia. The routecarrying 40% of all Zambian imports and exports wasthus cut. Since the initial appreciation of objec-tives to be attacked was incomplete, subsequentraids had to be complemented by further attacks someweeks later. A number of other bridges were alsodestroyed making Zambia almost entirely dependent onits southern rail link through Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.President Kaunda was forced to re-open this route infull to avoid total economic chaos.

The military justification for these raids wastowards halting the flow of military equipment toZPRA from Dar es Salaam. The rate and extent of sup-ply had reached alarming proportions.

As in the case of President Machel's pressureon Robert Mugabe at Lancaster House, it is difficultto gauge the resulting pressure that PresidentKaunda brought to bear on Joshua Nkomo.

In contrast to ZANLA, the majority of whoseforces were inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at the time ofthe Lancaster House talks, the larger part of ZPRAwas still in Zambia. As mentioned in the previoussection, Nkomo had been planning a conventionalonslaught to regain the military initiative he hadlost to ZANLA in 1969-1976. When it became evidentthat a Lancaster House ceasefire would prevent theexecution of any such plan in time, it should thenhave been clear to Nkomo that little doubt couldexist regarding the results of an election in viewof the imbalance (more ZANLA than ZPRA) of politicallymotivated insurgents inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,

Early in 1979 a high-powered Soviet militarydelegation arrived in Lusaka to reorganize the ZPRAstrategy. They emphasised the need to go onto a con-ventional war footing, but in the meantime makingthe maximum use of the existing ZPRA insurgents topave the way for entry into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia of theconventional forces. From then on ZPRA was dividedinto a conventional and an insurgent force.

The conventional plan involved having twobridgeheads across the Zambezi, one in the Chirundu/Kariba area and the other near Victoria Falls. Largenumbers of conventionally trained troops would thenadvance in armoured vehicles to seize the airfields

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at Hvange and Kariba into which they would airliftthe remainder of their troops.

However, as a settlement at Lancaster Housebecame a real possibility, it also became apparentthat the number of insurgents inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would play a major role in the electionsthat were to follow. Furthermore, ZANLA encroachmentinto traditional ZPRA areas was causing great alarm.To bolster their insurgent forces inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, ZPRA began deploying regular troops intoZimbabwe-Rhodesia. These forces operated in strengthsup to company level. Friction between ZPRA regularsand insurgents had a distinctly negative effect onthese operations. ZPRA regulars also suffered severereverses at the hands of the Security Forces at ornear infiltration points, such a-s Mlibizi, Lumbimbiand Lupane.

By mid-1979 ZPRA had concentrated close totwenty thousand regular soldiers at its CentralGuerrilla Training Camp No 2 (CGT-2). Further troopswere stationed in Angola. Unable to tackle thisforce head-on, COMOPS decided on a defensive stra-tegy. This strategy was aimed at preventing any ZPRAarmoured columns from arriving at the launch pointsalong the Kariba Lake and the Zambezi River, and toprevent a build-up of ZPRA troops and supplies foran attack into Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Accordingly the Special Air Service destroyedthe road and rail bridges along the Great North roadlinking Zambia with Tanzania over which the bulk ofZambian exports and imports had flowed. Nine roadbridges were also destroyed a few weeks later. Thiseffectively cut the Great East, the Chirundu and theLivingstone roads. The latter two constituted themajor two road approach routes to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.As further counter COMOPS deployed Special Air Ser-vice Selous Scouts and Rhodesia Light Infantry for-ces in southern and south-western Zambia on a con-tinual basis in operations designed to hinder dis-rupt and where possible, stop all ZPRA movement intoZimbabwe-Rhodesia. Pressure brought to bear onBishop Muzorewa in London forced the withdrawal ofthese forces late in 1979. ZPRA was thus enabled toconcentrate its forces from Luso in Angola at CGT-2and Mulungushi. From here they were transported byroad to infiltrate through bridgeheads held by fiveconventionally trained ZPRA battalions along LakeKariba and eastwards to the point where the borderbetween Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Rhodesiameet.

In general, Security Force operations into

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Zambia were influenced by a number of geographicalfeatures, the most obvious being the barrier of theZambezi river and Lake Kariba. A second was the vul-neribility of Zambia as a land-locked country whosemajor viable export routes ran through a country withwhich it was at war. It was mainly these factorsthat led to the use of Botswana as a ZPRA transitroute.

Strategically, ZAPU had a major problem in itsethnic representation; one fifth of the Rhodesianpopulation against the three quarters represented byZANU. In contrast, however, Nkomo could be assuredof the total support of the Matabele. Muzurewa,Sithole and Mugabe were all vying for Shona support,which led to the distinct possibility of ZAPU emergingas power-broker in any elected government.

Possibly as a result of the influence of itsSoviet-block backers, ZPRA's military strategy wasnot as closely aligned to the politization of therural masses as was ZANLA. ZPRA commanders believedthat the better military force would eventuallytriumph, if only by force of arms.

7.4 Botswana

During December 1972, the Rhodesian Minister ofDefence had stated that

We have always had to watch the Botswana bor-der, but now we have undoubted evidence of theexistence of terrorists in Botswana.(13)

As the war spread across the rural areas of Rhodesia,three operational areas were formed and activelyengaged in combating the threat from Mozambique andZambia (Hurricane, Thrasher, Repulse). Politicalconsideration forestalled the official declarationof 'war' against Botswana so that military comman-ders were hesitant to provoke an intensified strug-gle in the area that was eventually designated Ope-ration Tangent. A final factor was a mutual interestto limit the level of violence:

... in view of the fact that many guerrillaraids against Rhodesia have been mounted fromBotswana the Rhodesians have responded withnotable restraint. This may be related to thefact that one of Rhodesia's two remaining raillinks with South Africa runs throughBotswana.(14)

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Possibly the first external operation of realsignificance mounted into Botswana was executed by ateam of eight Selous Scouts on the night of 30 March1974. As a result four high level ZPRA officialswere captured. Numerous arrests were made and armscaches seized, resulting in a complete setback forboth ZPRA and ZAPU in Matabeleland.

During September a fifth ZPRA official who hadbeen attempting to reorganize the broken network inMatabeleland was also abducted by three members ofthe Selous Scouts. Both operations were substantialintelligence coups for the Security Forces.

Botswana had always been an unwilling partnerwith the other three black African countriesbordering on Rhodesia and actively involved inthe war against that country. Flanked on all sidesby white-controlled countries her economic survivalwas in the hands of Rhodesia and the Republic ofSouth Africa. Botswana's only link with any otherblack state was at a single point in the north whereSouth West Africa/Namibia and Zambian territory met.The Kasangula ferry across the Zambezi river was theonly external link which did not run through Rhode-sian or South African territory.

Largely as a result of the natural obstacleshindering direct infiltration into Rhodesia fromZambia, ZPRA had begun to enter Matabeleland viaBotswana. ZPRA forces cut across the western tip ofRhodesia, were transported down the Grove road ineastern Botswana from where they entered Rhodesia.Initially this did not occur with the active aid ofthe Botswana Defence Force (BDF)- but SirSeretse Khama became more sympathetic to ZPRA's useof Botswana terrain as the war in Rhodesia intensi-fied.

Until April 1977, Botswana had a very smallparamilitary Police Mobile Unit which proved totallyinadequate to police the long Rhodesian and Zambianborders. The BDF was then formed, at total strengthof two companies. ZPRA use of Botswana continuedunabated however, and although not officially condo-ned, the BDF provided limited aid to ZPRA forces.

An important factor in the Rhodesian attitudetowards Botswana was the absence of any armed insur-gent camps, in contrast to their approach to Mozam-bique and Zambia. In both these countries 'refugee1

camps listed as such by the resident United NationsHigh Commissioner for Refugees were actively beingused as training bases. Listed refugee camps inBotswana were a major source of ZPRA recruits, whowere flown out to Nyamapanda near Lusaka. From there

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recruits were transported in batches of 2 000 toLuso in Angola as well as to other training campswithin Zambia such as Mwembeshi, CGT and Mulungushi.Insurgents were not trained within Botswana iself.Botswana's role as a passive transit area, however,became vital in the years 1977-1978 when ZAPU laun-ched its massive recruitment drive in western Rho-desia in an attempt to build up an army comparableto that of ZANLA.

Teams of Selous Scouts and Special Air Servicetroops were now operating in Botswana virtually on apermanent, if small-scale, basis. These were espe-cially aimed at ambushes on the Grove road and metwith varying degrees of success resulting in bothZPRA and BDF casualties. During 1977 Africa Confi-dential stated

There is now also no doubt that members of theSelous Scouts counter-insurgency unit have beenoperating inside Botswana, primarily to kidnapmen wanted by the Smith regime and abduct themacross the border. Sometimes they have posed asrefugees in order to gain access to the refugeecamps at Francistown and Selebi-Pikwe.(15)

Possibly one of the largest single operations intoBotswana was the sinking of the Kasangula ferryduring April 1979, which effectively cut Botswana'smajor link with Zambia, and the concurrent attack onthe ZPRA headquarters in Francistown. Highly success-ful pseudo operations in Francistown by the SelousScouts further provided invaluable intelligence, asdocumented in the previous section on Zambia. Duringan ambush on the Grove road by members of ThreeGroup, Selous Scouts, Elliot Sibanda, the seniorZPRA Intelligence Officer for the South Front, waswounded and taken prisoner. The ambush team hadactually been waiting for Dumiso Dabengwa on 22March 1979 when Sibanda was captured. According toLieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly, 'he was the mostimportant prisoner of the whole war',(16) Informa-tion received from him resulted in a brilliant opera-tion by a team of Selous Scouts leading to the captureof the entire ZPRA command for the Southern Front.Under the guise of BDF soldiers, the Scouts gainedentry to the ZPRA command headquarters on 13 April1979 and ''arrested' all ZPRA insurgents present. Avast amount of documentation was also captured.

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For the greater part of the war, Rhodesian SecurityForces were largely unaware of the active roleplayed by Angola in training ZPRA forces and supply-ing them logistically.

The same ZPRA high-level capture whose informa-tion led to the raids on Lusaka during the firsthalf of 1979, also provided details of trainingundertaken at Luso in Angola. This was later confirmedby aerial photographs taken by the Rhodesian AirForce. On 26 February 1979, after delaying the raidfor two days as a result of bad weather, an extremlysuccessful air strike was carried out against theseries of twelve camps in the area. No ground forceswere involved while total surprise was achieved.ZPRA losses were considerable, not least as a resultof the fact that the attack took place early in themorning. Rain had further confined the majority ofthe recruits to their huts. According to capturedZPRA documents total casualties amounted to 160insurgents killed and 530 injured.

As with Tanzania, Angola played a much moreactive role in the war for Rhodesia than is generallyrecognised. Ample proof of this is provided by theplans to launch a conventional onslaught againstwestern Rhodesia. Angola was to provide theaircraft for this operation.

7.6 Conclusion

Although only a selected number of the larger andmore spectacular operations conducted in Mozambique,Zambia, Botswana and Angola have been mentioned, thesum total of these raids should not be underestima-ted. Interviewed in Cape Town during September 1978,Lieutenant-General Walls stated: 'There is nosingle day of the year when we are not operatingbeyond our borders ...'(17)

It should, of course, be emphasised that thesize of external operations varied from one manreconnaissance missions to almost brigade-sizeoperations.

External operations, however, need to be placedwithin a sound strategic framework, as has partiallybeen discussed in the introduction to this chapter.Before returning to this central theme, there are anumber of relevant factors that need to be mentionedto provide proper perspective.

In both planning and execution of external

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operations, senior military commanders were facedwith a number of severe planning restrictions. Thefirst of these was sensitivity concerning the numberof white casualties. With the singular exception ofthe Selous Scouts,the Rhodesian Light Infantry andthe Special Air Service were exclusively whiteunits. Repeated combat experience had indicated tothe Rhodesians that in aggressive operations, whitesoldiers were better, while black soldiers had theedge regarding bush- and fieldcraft. Inevitablyexternal operations involved the extensive use ofthe white units as attacking force. With a totalcommunity of 250 000, white casualties had a dis-proportionately large effect. In the words of T.E.Lawrence:

An individual death, like a pebble dropped inwater, might make a brief hole; yet rings ofsorrow widened out therefrom. We could notafford casualties. (18)

In practical terms this influences the type of ope-ration that could be carried out as well as thesecurity of the operation itself.

Initially external operations were primarilyaimed at inflicting the maximum number of insurgentcasualties before these forces entered Rhodesia. Aspointed out, in the early stages insurgent base campstrategy assisted this role. However, evolvinginsurgent strategy soon had a marked effect on Rho-desian military operations. On the one hand, thetargets presented were no longer as concentrated andlimited in size. On the other hand the facilitiesconstructed inside these camps proved very difficultto destroy. The emphasis thus slowly shifted to whathad been termed in Vietnam 'working the system'(the motto of General Abrams). Insurgent logisticsprobably became the primary rationale behind Rhode-sian military planning for these raids. This was,however, also the result of a realization that almostunlimited manpower resources available to both ZANLAand ZPRA prevented the long term effectiveness of astrategy simply aimed at eliminating these insurgentsprior to their entry into Rhodesia.

A further related factor was the threat of sig-nificant involvement by the Zambian and Mozambiquearmies during such raids. This was specifically ofimportance regarding the physical security of theRhodesian forces' return route to their country. Anypossible involvement by national defence forces thatcould jeopardise this had to be eliminated at an

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early stage. Equally important, Rhodesian forcescould not become involved in either long drawn outor running battles with any insurgent or foreignarmy. Although the armed forces of Mozambique andZambia only actively intervened on a small scale onfour occasions, adequate provision had to be madefor dealing with any such an eventuality.

From 1976, with the geographical spread of sub-verted areas and the increasing numbers of insur-gents inside Rhodesia, the availability of selectweaponry and weapon systems also became a severelyrestricting factor. Although the majority of insur-gent casualties inside Rhodesia resulted from intel-ligence provided by the Selous Scouts, the actualkilling force was the airborne Fire Force.

This consisted of Rhodesian Light Infantrytroops transported in helicopters and fixed-wingaircraft, supported by helicopter gunships. Owing tothe limited availability of helicopters in particu-lar, any large-scale external operation virtuallyimplied denuding internal operational areas of FireForce. With the most effective weapon temporarilyforfeited, the internal security situation deterio-rated dramatically to the extent that during thelast two years of the war, a single week provedalmost the maximum period for any external opera-tion. According to the officer commanding the SelousScouts, Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly:

Due to the small numbers of aircraft we posses-sed, any major attack on an external base meantthat the internal scene was denuded of helicop-ters and consequently their Fireforce passen-gers for periods of up to ten days at a timeand, without Fireforce around, the kill ratesdropped back to almost zero and the influenceof the terrorist increased.(19)

A procurement problem related to that of aircraftwas also encountered as regards sophisticated airdelivery weaponry. At the start of external opera-tions the only available counter to extensive bun-kers was the old 350kg (1 000 Ib) bomb which onlysucceeded in collapsing shelters in the immediatevicinity. Various experiments and projects wereinitiated to develop a counter to the use of bunkers.Possible solutions included the use of heavy gassesas well as the creation of a ring of fire by meansof the vortex effect. The war ended before any ofthese attempts could be realized. Attempts at nightbombing to counter insurgent movement during the

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hours of darkness had little more than a psychologi-cal effect.

The general implication was that the Security For-ces were not able to counter the evolving insurgentbase camp deployment strategies. The alternative tothe measures discussed above was to land groundtroops to clear such bases. Once on the ground, how-ever, and fighting through bases spread over severalsquare kilometres, Rhodesian forces ran into increa-singly strong resistance.

Within a base of 30km2, such as found in theTete Province, insurgent forces had space to regroupand break out of any possible encirclement. ZPRA inparticular became increasingly aggressive as the warprogressed. This was clearly illustrated during Ope-ration Tepid in Zambia, where ZPRA forces made aconventional night withdrawal from their well-prepared battalion defensive positions: whereas,lacking supportive weaponry, the Rhodesian forcesalmost suffered serious casualties. Availability andprocurement of both rotary and fixed-wing aircraftwas limited so that ground forces airlifted into anoperation could not be provided with close fire sup-port. For reasons that have already been discussedin sections 2 and 3 this problem was more serious inthe case of Zambia. If necessary, artillery couldprovide this support for operations into Mozambique.This support would undoubtedly have become necessaryhad the war continued for even a few months longer.

Two final factors worth mention are the repea-ted attempts to assassinate key ZANU and ZAPU leaders,as well as Rhodesian support of dissident movementssuch as the Mozambique National Resistance Movement,MRN, in Mozambique. The Resistencia Nacional Mocam-bicana (RNM) is also known as the Mozambique Natio-nal Resistance Movement (MNRM), the Mozambique Resis-tance Movement (MRM), and the Mozambique NationalResistance Front (FUMO). Following the coup in Por-tugal, the Rhodesian government decided to aidresistance against the Machel-regime in Mozambique.A 400 000 watt transmitter stationed at Gwero wasused to transmit the 'Voice of Free Africa1. Thiswas the same transmitter originally used from Plum-tree to block BBC broadcasts from Francistown inBotswana shortly after UDI. Transmissions in supportof the MNRM began early in 1976. For the first yearsof its existence, the MNRM had no distinct ideologi-cal stance other than the rejection of the FRELIMOregime. By. the end of the war this movement hadbecome a major factor in undermining the stabilityof Mozambique. "

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The elimination of key expatriate nationalistleaders was codenamed Operation Bouncer. In spite ofrepeated attempts it failed to remove leaders suchas Mugabe, Nkomo, Nhongo and Dubengwa. Rex Nhongowas wounded during one attempt, while DumisaDubengwa escaped death by a few minutes on the Groveroad. (20)

In sum, external operations had to be part ofRhodesian military strategy. Alone, they couldeither buy time for a political settlement or beaimed at the overthrow of the existing government todestroy that country's support for insurgent forces.If, as in.the case of Rhodesia, a political strategywas lacking, only the latter option remained.

Eventually Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forcesengaged in limited interdiction campaigns that ten-ded to be more punitive than preventative. The les-sons to be learnt from the American strategic bomb-ing of North Vietnam should have been heeded; Zambiaand Mozambique provided evidence of an almost limit-less commitment to the de-colonialisation of Rhode-sia. Neither country could lay claim to democraticstatus and as a result could sustain their commit-ment far beyond that which would have been the casehad the respective government been responsible to anelectorate. Furthermore, with largely subsistenceeconomies, neither country could be brought tototal political chaos by economic disruption.

NOTES

1. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-RevolutionaryWar (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p. 52.

2. W.D. Jacobs 'Mao Tse Tung as a Guerrilla - aSecond Look' in F.M. Osanka (ed.). Modern GuerrillaWarfare (Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962), p.170.

3. J.D. Deiner, 'Guerrilla (sic) Border Sanc-tuaries and Counter-insurgent Warfare' in The ArmyQuarterly, vol. 109, no. 2 (Apr. 1979), pp. 163-164.

4. Ibid.5. Ibid, p. 177.6. See the Rhodesia Herald, 18 August 1976. The

Mozambique Resistance Movement (MRM) was at thisstage in its infancy and could not have launchedsuch a raid without active Rhodesian assistance.

7. P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts:Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 248.

8. The use of artillery was further dependenton the existence of a suitable approach route for

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both guns and their logistical support vehicles.9. The FAM 'intervention1 was limited to an

advance during the night by one or more T34 tankssupported by infantry. Faced with artillery fire,they limited themselves to speculative fire andwithdrew well before first light. During all exter-nal operations two Hunters armed with 68mm SNEProckets were on constant standby for just this kindof eventuality.

10. M. Sithole, Zimbabwe: Struggles within theStruggle (Rujeko, Harare, 1979), pp. 130-131.

11. The only exceptions occurred at Mulungushicamp where ZPRA were trained by ZNDF instructors,and at the Kabwe officers school-.

12. Intelligence Digest (16 May 1979), p. 3 .Foreign Report had already referred to Cuban guardedconvoys of up to 50 trucks transporting weaponryfrom Angola to Zambia for ZPRA during September 1977.

Africa Research Bulletin (1-31 Dec. 1972),2702.1415,16.17.18,

Foreign Report (3 Aug. 1977), p. 4.Africa Confidential (22 Jul. 1977), p.3.Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 373.Rhodesia Herald (28 Sep. 1978).T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom

(Penguin, Harmondsworth"1977) , p. f9~9~T ~~19. Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts, p. 302.20. Reid-Daly provides a detailed account of one

such attempt against the life of Joshua Nkomo duringDecember 1978/January 1979 in Selous Scouts: TopSecret War. A radio-activated car bomb was to beused for the assassination, but as a result of Nkomo'sstudied lack of routine, the operation was aborted.

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Chapter 8

OPERATION FAVOUR: SECURITY FORCE AUXILIARIES

8.1 Introduction: The Concept

Within the theory of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary warfare the dictum that the battle isin effect one for the 'hearts and minds' has beenrepeatedly cited. Probably the major qualificationlacking, is that the Security Forces cannot "win thehearts and minds' of the local population if theyare unable to protect them from insurgent intimida-tion and reprisals.

On the one hand, the local population is facedwith an insurgent force that strives to establishitself within certain population concentrations andextends its influence from there. If the SecurityForces fail to protect the local population frominsurgent intimidation and influence, however, theywill be unable to retain any support they might havehad. The major object of the struggle between thetwo opposing forces is to obtain the active partici-pation of the majority of the uncommitted populace. Thiscan largely be gained by demonstrating whether ornot the Security Forces can provide physical secu-rity for the local population.

Within counter-insurgency doctrine, breakingthe hold of the insurgent forces and re-establishingcontrol by the authorities has generally been seento be attempted in two stages. The first is to breakcontact between the insurgents and the people, whilesimultaneously destroying the insurgent organisa-tion. The second stage is to obtain the activeparticipation of the population against the insur-gent forces. Strict population control includingprotected villages, curfews, martial law, food con-trol, identity systems, and related measures havebeen traditional methods of isolating insurgentsfrom the population. A number of these have already

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been discussed in previous chapters. Local militiawhereby the people are encouraged to defend themsel-ves against insurgent forces is a further importantelement in the second stage of the counter-insur-gency strategy. Normally these would be in the formof a local force within a protected village. Thelocal population thus become responsible for theirown defence. Mobile, quick-reaction Security Forcesshould back up this system. Both stages were suc-cintly summarized in the four objectives of the wellknown Briggs plan as employed in Malaya:

a. To dominate the populated areas and to buildup a feeling of complete security, whichwould in time result in a steady and increa-sing flow of information coming from allsources.

b. To breakdown the Communist organisation with-in the populated areas.

c. To isolate the bandits from their food andsupply organisations in the populated areas.

d. To destroy the bandits by forcing them toattack the Security Forces on their owngrounds. (1)

The Rhodesian exercise in the establishment of alocal self-protection force to consolidate and evenreassert government control, was unique in a numberof respects. It therefore merits closer examination,for it had great potential as a major element of theRhodesian counter-insurgency effort.

8.2 Operation Favour

As early as 1973, the idea of a local black militiawhich would enable the rural population to defendthemselves against insurgent attacks had been mootedboth in Special Branch and Department of InternalAffairs. Within Special Branch it was known as theImpi-idea, while the District Commissioner at Sipo-lilo prepared a paper on the subject late in 1973. Anumber of members of the local population were infact armed with old bolt-action rifles in SipoliloTribal Trust Land but these were stolen by insur-gents, finally leading to the failure of the scheme.

From the outset the concept ran into both mili-tary and political opposition. The former resultedfrom doubts as to the loyalty and effectiveness ofthousands of poorly trained and armed rural blacks,and the latter as result of white resistance to

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'arming tribesmen1. This opposition had already ledto delays in the formation of second and third bat-talions of the Rhodesia African Rifles. Before 1978recruitment and arming of District Assistants andDistrict Security Assistants by the Ministry ofInternal Affairs from 1974 onwards to defend Protec-ted and Consolidated Villages, was the sum total ofany official attempts in this direction.

In January/February 1978, the idea of a localmilitia based on the village family unit to provideprotection against all external threats was revisedwithin Special Branch.

As a.result a pilot scheme was launched inMsana Tribal Trust Land. Initially these forces weretermed the Interim Government Forces. As the nameindicates, the Interim Government Forces were initia-ted as an apolitical body in the sense that it wasnot linked to any one black political party. It was,however, linked with the majority rule talks beingheld in Harare between Prime Minister Smith,Bishop Muzorewa, the Reverend Sithole and ChiefChirau. With the active participation of the SelousScouts, Special Branch introduced 42 blacks intoMsana Tribal Trust Land. Of these, nearly half wereformer insurgents, but all originated from the spe-cific area. (2) Each man had been given an extra wea-pon which thus enabled him to recruit in turn soeffectively doubling the strength of the InterimGovernment Forces, By March 1978, Msana Tribal TrustLand was being permanently protected by about 90 men.From this humble beginning the programme was slowlybuilt up in the Tribal Trust Lands surroundingHarare, until by the end of the year, some 2 000 menwere in the field, living in the local villages aspart of the tribal structure, for the first timepermanently affording the local population protec-tion. The idea of an apolitical force, however, soonproved impractical against the background of thetribal affiliations that dominated political affi-nity. As soon as it was realised that the UANC andZANU {Sithole) were the two parties with the mostinternal black support, the Interim Government Forcewas renamed the Security Force Auxiliaries (SFA's)during June 1978.

Concurrent with the start of Operation Favour,as it was to be designated at a later stage, was theInternal Settlement Agreement of 3 March 1978. ToPrime Minister Ian Smith, the major rationale forhis talks with Bishop Muzorewa and the ReverendSithole was his belief that, as the most popularnationalist leaders, these two politicians would be

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in a position to call an end to the war. Muzorewahad been given a hero's welcome both on his returnfrom self-imposed exile on 3 October 1976 and afterhis return from overseas early in 1978. Close on200 000 people welcomed him at Harare airport andthis left an indelible impression on the minds ofPrime Minister Smith and Bishop Abel Muzorewa him-self. Ndabaningi Sithole was still adamant that hewas the true and popular leader of ZANU and held theallegiance of ZANLA cadres. In this regard the fled-geling Security Force Auxiliary scheme was receivedas evidence of the numbers of insurgents that hadgiven up the struggle in the bush and joined thegovernment forces. A vast amnesty programme suppor-ted the attempt to convince both ZANLA and ZPRA thatreal majority rule had finally been achieved. On 4November 1978, Lieutenant-General Walls claimed that

The Transitional Government has persuaded morethan 2 000 Patriotic Front terrorists to joinits side and they were now fighting under thecontrol of the Rhodesian Security Forces. (3)

This campaign reached its climax with the publicitygiven to 'Comrade Max' (actually a member of theSelous Scouts) who claimed authority of Msana TribalTrust Land. Although this was the first Tribal TrustLand circumscribed for exclusive Auxiliary control,the majority of Comrade Max's men were not true for-mer insurgents, but recently trained Security ForceAuxiliaries. During November 'Commander Lloyd1 clai-med similar authority in Maranda Tribal Trust Land.

Both Bishop Muzorewa and Reverend Sithole clai-med the allegiance of substantial numbers of insur-gents, but neither had any real influence over thecadres in the field. While General Walls had claimedthat 'more than 2 000' insurgents had joined theSecurity Forces, in fact a maximum of 50 had availedthemselves of the amnesty offer. The rest were Secu-rity Force Auxiliaries. According to Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly 'Muzorewa and Sithole only had aminimum of genuine terrorist support, and each wasusing the auxiliary concept and the money it genera-ted from Government ... as a means of producing pri-vate armies from nothing'.(4) This vast propagandaoperation could only have been aimed at internationalrecognition, for neither the local population northe insurgents themselves could be misled as to thetrue nature of the Auxiliaries. The only real insur-gent forces loyal to the UANC and ZANU (Sithole)were two groups that had been trained in Libya and

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Uganda and returned to Rhodesia during the latterpart of 1978. In total these numbered 140 men andwere subsequently included in the existing Auxiliarystructure. The 42 men that Sithole obtained fromUganda in fact constituted the initial group ofSecurity Force Auxiliaries loyal to him.(5) (Theywere deployed in Mphoengs Tribal Trust Land.) Reve-rend Sithole had, however, already told newsmen inMay 1978 that

By the end of the month it will be obvious thatthe military situation is under control. Mylieutenants are meeting with the guerrillas inthe bush. Increasingly, the guerrillas areexpressing their solidarity with us.(6)

Sithole was in fact trying to regain control overZANLA cadres in the field in a continuous attempt toreassert his leadership of ZANLA over that of RobertMugabe. This challenge only came to a head followingSithole's crushing defeat during the April 1979elections. Casualty figures seemed to provide ampleproof of both Muzorewa and Sithole's inability toinitiate the ceasefire they had promised Prime Minis-ter Smith. At the start of the year total casualtieswere at a daily figure of eight, rising to fifteen aday after the conclusion of the Agreement of 3 March1978. By September 1978, it was reported that anaverage of thirty people were killed daily.

At this time, and on the recommendation of 1Psychological Operations Unit, the Security ForceAuxiliaries were given the name 'Pfumo re Vanhu1 or'Spear of the People1 (Shona), and 'Umkonto waBantu' (Ndebele)

In an attempt to obtain COMOPS approval for theSFA scheme, Special Branch arranged an unauthorizedwell-reported visit by Bishop Muzorewa to Msana Tri-bal Trust Land on 12 August 1978. Neither the Chair-man of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation northe Minister of Information knew of the intendedmeeting. Special Branch had in fact broken intoCOMOPS and using official stamps, etc, falsifiedCOMOPS approval of the intended visit. Although thepress coverage of 'Commander Max' led to some resis-tance within the white community, and a hot debatein Parliament,the obvious success of the pilotscheme led to official COMOPS approval soon after-wards. In preparing for the April 1979 elections,COMOPS recognised the potential of the Auxiliaryscheme in securing block votes for its favouredcandidate, Bishop Muzorewa.

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By this stage the Army was involved with OperationFavour to a far greater extent than Special Branchwho had originated the scheme. General Walls had infact, personally ordered the Selous Scouts to under-take the training, administration and feeding of allinsurgents who handed themselves over and were pre-pared to join the Auxiliary forces. While this taskwas to take precedence over all operational respon-sibilities, the very limited numbers of insurgentsso disposed reduced the scope of the foreseen taskdramatically. The two services involved, held diffe-ring views on the concept: to the military the Auxi-liaries represented a distasteful method of regai-ning rural control, while Special Branch tended toview the project as a political weapon to regain thesupport of the subverted rural black population. ToCOMOPS it was directly linked to the April elec-tions. When briefing the responsible Special Branchofficers early in 1979, the Director General of theCentral Intelligence Organisation expounded the"Ground of Tactical Importance1 concept whereby theSecurity Force Auxiliaries would be used first toconsolidate the economic heartland. The accent latershifted towards ensuring key block votes,especiallyfor Bishop Muzorewa. The numbers of ZANU (Sithole)Auxiliaries were constantly limited by SpecialBranch as it became clear that it was the Bishop andnot Sithole who had majority support. (See Chapter11 for further detail on 'Ground of Tactical Impor-tance ' )

In view of the proven success of the smallSecurity Force Auxiliary scheme in stabilizing therural black areas in which they were deployed,COMOPS now demanded its immediate and vast extensionin preparation for the April 1979 elections. Boththe security chiefs, as well as black and whitepoliticians now began to realize that OperationFavour was possibly the one vehicle that could re-establish control in the Tribal Trust Lands. Thiswould ensure a high percentage poll for the electionwhich could possibly lead to international recogni-tion. However, instead of recruiting members of thelocal population from the Tribal Trust Lands andtraining them before returning them to their homevillages, as was the original idea, Operation Favourwas also seen as a solution to the large numbers ofblacks unemployed in the towns and cities. Thesewere now 'recruited' and after a rudimentary 4 weektraining course sent into the Tribal Trust Lands.The introduction of the 'townies' into an alienrural environment led to an increase in rape, murder -

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and general crime. According to official documenta-tion

Because of the urgent necessity to deploy theSFA into the Tribal Trust Lands to ensure agood vote at the April election, few of themreceived more than four weeks basic trainingwhilst their leadership was selected more bytrial and error than experience. There was, onaverage, one white liaison officer, normally ajunior NCO (Non-Commissioned Officer), to everyhundred and fifty SFA.

Towards the close of 1978 attempts were also made tostart an apolitical scheme in Matabeleland. Themajor incentive offered was financial, and detach-ments were started in Wankie, Belingwe, Godlwayo andLupane Tribal Trust Lands. Results seemed promisingbut soon proved false by a high desertion rateand the attempt was allowed to dissipate. Yet inspite of both manpower and time limitations, byMarch 1979:

There is growing evidence that in some TribalTrust Lands the irregulars known as SecurityForce Auxiliaries have pushed back the Patrio-tic Fronts' forces. (7)

UANC Auxiliaries were particularly successful inKaroi, Chinamore and Seki Tribal Trust Lands. (8)

A further problem related to recruitment wasconscription to fill the ranks. Some blacks reluc-tantly accepted arms, and once placed in a TribalTrust Land cohabited with the Patriotic Front forcesin the areas. This was once again a side effect ofthe expedient of using urban blacks to protect ruralblacks. Since UANC and ZANU (Sithole) had to providerecruits for Security Force Auxiliary training, bothhad the advantage of abetting the limited role thatwas accorded to Auxiliaries loyal to ZANU (Sithole) .As a result of its limited black support, this partycould not provide as many Auxiliary trainees as theUANC could. The limiting of Sithole's Auxiliaries isfurther to be seen in the context of intense whitesuspicion of his political ambitions and of the dan-ger of presenting Sithole with a large armed force.

In contrast to these problems discussed aboveand seen from a security point of view, the resultsof the internal elections of April 1979 couldlargely be attributed to the role played by the morethan 10 000 Auxiliaries deployed in the field. The

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high number of insurgents killed during the elec-tions and the increased Security Force levels,resulted in a considerable rise in the ratio ofsurrenders to kills.

After the war Mugabe in fact admitted thatZANLA had been experiencing difficulty in motivatingits forces to fight against a black government,especially in those areas in which the support ofthe people had swung in favour of the Security ForceAuxiliaries. But the Rhodesian economy was nowunder severe strain with the result that demobilisa-tion followed almost immediately' after the elections.Within the various Auxiliary allegiances the elec-tion results brought their own problems; as recoun-ted in official documentation:

a. The SFA orientated towards the UANC who num-bered about 8 000 were delighted with theresult, but there were immediate demands tostand down as they were now the 'Winners'.When they realised that this was not to be,as the war was continuing there was a markeddrop in morale in some areas and a number ofdesertions.

b. When the election results were announcedthere were slightly under 2 000 SFA's orien-tated towards ZANU (Sithole) in the field.The allegations of gross irregularities inthe election made by Sithole and others ofhis party had a marked effect on the ZANUdetachments who were convinced that they hadbeen cheated. A mistake in the addition ofthe votes cast in the Gokwe district, whichreversed a narrow ZANU majority into a lossof almost a thousand turned what was a modeldetachment at Nembudzia into virtual enemiesof the Government.

The election results ultimately led to the demise ofall of Sithole's Auxiliaries. Problems had alreadybeen encountered during the previous year when someof his forces began living a rapacious existence,especially in Gokwe Tribal Trust Land in centralRhodesia. Security Forces had been forced to inter-vene forcibly on at least two occasions (Dorowa inSabi Tribal Trust Land and Brunapeg Mission inMphoengs Tribal Trust Land to put an end to thesepractices. For some time ZANU (Sithole) Auxiliarieshad also been involved in attempts to make localcontact with ZANLA forces, eg. in Nyadjena TribalTrust Land, where they sided with ZANLA forces to

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combat ZPRA insurgents in the west of the TribalTrust Land. On advice from Special Branch, SpecialForces Headquarters, who were taking control of Ope-ration Favour, began to deploy ZANU (Sithole) Auxi-liaries in areas in which ZANLA and ZPRA were con-tending for control, such as Maramda Tribal TrustLand. This effectively limited the support thatSithole was able to draw from Shona areas in compe-tition with Bishop Muzorewa. Security Force doubtswere vindicated when efforts to round up ZANU(Sithole) Auxiliaries for 're-education1 at Gokwe(Nembudzia) met with armed resistance. During theensuing battle 183 members of the Auxiliaries werekilled on 20 June 1979. The remaining ZANU (Sithole)Auxiliaries were either jailed or allowed to joinUNAC Auxiliaries. No further ZANU (Sithole) Auxilia-ries were deployed.

Both finance and enthusiasm for OperationFavour waned in the post-election period. The Army,which had gradually been gaining control of thescheme saw it as a military instrument whose use haddiminished once Bishop Muzorewa had won the elec-tion. The total Security Force Auxiliary establish-ment was reduced from its maximum of 16 000, althoughthis was also as a result of the concurrent retrai-ning and retrenchment programme. For the first timethe role, tasks and structure of the Auxiliarieswere formalised. According to its standing OperatingProcedures for Operation Repulse area, these were asfollows

ROLE OF THE PRV (Pfumo re Vanhu)2. The role of the PRV is to win over the local

population and motivate it to support theGovernment of National Unity (GNU), theGovernment Administration and the SecurityForces.

TASKS OF THE PRV3. The PRV are responsible for carrying out the

following tasks in JOC Repulse area:a. Encouraging Communist Trained Terrorists

(CTTs) to accept the Amnesty offer.b. Protecting the local population by retai-

ning a constant presence in areas inwhich they are deployed.

c. Maintaining or re-establishing civiladministration.

d. Assisting Security Forces in preventingterrorists from re-establishing theirdomination over areas from which theyhave been driven.

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e.

g.h.

Establishing a pro-Government Mujibasystem for gathering intelligence.Acting as a link between tribesmen andSecurity Forces.Protecting villages.Through their local knowledge assistingthe Security Forces on operations in oradjacent to areas which they occupy.

More attention was paid to the political message inthe intensification of 1 Psychological TrainingUnit's training of envoys, the insurgent equivalentof the political commissar, while all Auxiliarieswere rearmed with G3 rifles (a standard NATO rifleat the time). This had two distinct advantages inthat it gave the Security Forces real control in thesupply of ammunition, while it also effectively cutoff the Auxiliaries as a source of arms and ammuni-tion for the cadres. For, in Rhodesia, the insur-gents were never able to live off the Governmentforces for arms and ammunition supplies, but had torely on supply lines back to their adjacent hostcountries. As a final step in this process SpecialBranch relinquished control over the Auxiliaries tothe Army on 1 July 1979. Special Forces Headquarters,originally formed to co-ordinate the operations ofthe Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and RhodesiaLight Infantry, was now responsible to Army Head-quarters for all aspects of Operation Favour, andnot directly to COMOPS as had been the case up tothis date. Each Joint Operations Centre thus gainedcontrol of the Auxiliaries forces deployed in itsarea. As an intelligence organisation Specia.1 Branchdid not have the organisation, facilities or manpowerto run the operation as it had developed by thisstage.

The transfer of authority created a number ofproblems. The direct link with their political lea-der, that had proved so crucial thus far, was weake-ned, as the Auxiliaries were now part of the hierar-chical Army command and control system. Normal Armylogistics now applied, replacing the (admittedlyexpensive) local procurement of supplies by cashtransactions. The latter had not only tended to sti-mulate the local economy but was a further link inAuxiliary involvement at local level.

Up to this stage Security Force Auxiliaries hadonly been deployed in Tribal Trust Lands where thelocal population had not been placed in ProtectedVillages. In September, COMOPS decided that theAuxiliaries should take over from Guard Force the

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responsibility for 74 Protected Villages so that thelatter could be deployed along railway lines and ina mobile role in the white farming areas. As aresult the Auxiliary establishment was raised, and,by the beginning of October, the Protected Villagesin the Beit Bridge, Chiredzi, Chipinga, Mutasa andMount Darwin areas had been taken over, with vary-ing degrees of success. Where possible,each Protec-ted Village was defended by a force of 40 men. Thiswas a logical development of the Auxiliary scheme,although it was essential that Auxiliaries used insuch an environment should have come from the Pro-tected Village itself.

On completion of the redeployment, expansiontook place again but was hastened considerably atthe start of the Lancaster House talks. Mr Smith infact issued orders from Britain to the effect thatthe Auxiliary numbers had to be increased to 26 000as soon as possible, while the Army had by now setan ultimate objective in the region of 60 - 70 000.

An indication of the priority that had beenallocated to the extension of Operation Favour wasthe Rh$ 4,3mil earmarked for the scheme during theNovember 1979 supplementary defence appropriationstabled in parliament for the period ending June 1980.Although the ceasefire and disbanding of the Secu-rity Force Auxiliaries cut this short, some 19 000Auxiliaries (for a total budget outlay of Rh$ 20 mil)were in existence at that stage. Yet funds were notthe limiting factor, for these were again beingchannelled in from South Africa and the Middle East.In fact Operation Favour was not granted a suffi-ciently high priority in the period after the elec-tion in April 1979. When it was finally given thishigh priority subsequent effectiveness was limitedby availability of Army instructors as wellas continuous attempts by the Army to produce Auxi-liary soldiers comparable to normal Army troops.Operation Favour had, however, been one of IanSmith's last hopes, for during February 1980, Finan-cial Mail had reported:

... when government forces went into an affec-ted TTL and "cleaned it out" the local populacewas grateful. However, once the hardpressedSecurity Forces left, the "terrs" would return.Now the Auxiliary Forces ... are staying in thecountryside. Allegations that they use theirposition to intimidate the rural folk to votefor the Bishop are probably true, but the auxi-liaries do represent a degree of stability

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which the TTL's have not known for some years.One way or another, they are bringing wholesections of the youth 'on sides'. (9)

However, when the ceasefire agreed to at LancasterHouse restricted the Security Forces to their bases,the Auxiliaries were not yet strong enough to facethe brunt of the ZANLA and ZPRA onslaught on thelocal population which followed. Their politicalmotivation had also been weakened, leading to increa-sed acts of terrorism and thus losing supportamongst the local population.

8.3 Conclusion

In the final months of the war, many members of theSecurity Forces saw the military solution in buil-ding up the Security Force Auxiliaries to dominateand stabilize the rural black areas, while directingthe full attention of the Security Forces firstly onMozambique and then on Zambia after President Machelhad effectively been removed from the war. TheMozambique economy and general security situationwas precarious at this stage, with the FRELIMO lea-dership increasingly desperate for an end to theRhodesian war that was threatening to engulf thewhole of the former Portuguese colony. Yet it ishardly conceivable that the aims set for the Auxi-liaries could possibly have been realised before theinstitution of black majority rule. Rhodesia hadbeen experiencing the classic "mobilization of themasses' and although probably very few members ofthe rural black population fully understood the con-cept of 'one man one vote1, it had become anational objective for them. To obtain local activeparticipation against the 'boys in the bush', sub-stantial proof had to be delivered that the politi-cal objectives that were being fought about had beenachieved by Muzorewa's government.

The essential difference between regular blacktroops, as in the various Rhodesia African Rifles(RAR) battalions, and a local self-defence militiashould be emphasised, for although there were to besome instances of disloyalty to the government with-in the ranks of the Rhodesia African Rifles,these were few. On the whole the RAR were as keen asany other fighting force in 'killing terrs', yet inthe final 1980 elections, black Rhodesia AfricanRifles soldiers apparently voted overwhelmingly forMugabe and were encouraging black civilians to do

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the same. The essential difference was that, as isthe case, though to a lesser degree, with whiteunits, the primary loyalty of the black soldiers laytowards his unit, for it represented status, moneyand job security in an immensely over-suppliedunskilled labour-force. But the most important factwas that, in spite of being overwhelmingly black,the Rhodesia African Rifles were led by whites, whohad a very good relationship with their black sub-ordinates. To a black 'troopie1 it was very diffi-cult to see his platoon leader as symbol and a partof the white regime that both ZANLA and ZAPU werefighting against. Yet in general, he still identi-fied with the political aspirations of his blackkin. Furthermore, in contrast, the Auxiliaries werepolitically motivated. In the present rural Africancontext, in which ethnic bonds are still primary indetermining political support, the two are closelylinked. Thus any militia-type force had to be apolitical and an ethnic representation. This was, ofcourse, not the case as regards the regular blacksoldiers of the Rhodesia African Rifles battalions.

From this it may be concluded that althoughRhodesia had no lack of volunteers to swell theranks of their regular black units in the fightagainst both ZANLA and ZPRA, this did not representblack support, or even condonation of the Smith-regime. Once efforts were made to involve the gene-ral mass of rural people into a self-defence scheme,the political quid pro quo had to be present. Whenthis was achieved by means of the 3 March Agreement,external political momentum had overtaken events. Bydelaying any major political concession until suchtime as his military bargaining power had been dras-tically curtailed. Prime Minister Smith was forcedto compromise from a position of weakness, insteadof making concessions from one of strength and thusretaining or even regaining political initiative.Thus, by the time the Auxiliaries were proving aviable scheme, the whites in Rhodesia had run out oftime.

As regards Operation Favour itself, a number ofmistakes were made, not least of which was the resortto conscript urban blacks to protect rural tribes-men. This was a serious deviation from the princi-ples that should govern any such attempts, and heldthe seeds of a complete breakdown of law and orderin view of the limited availability of controllingpersonnel. To a degree, as a result of the use ofurban blacks, but possibly more as a result of thepolitical taint that clung to the Auxiliaries as

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'private armies', serious resistance was encounteredwithin the ranks of the military who refused toaccept these informal soldiers as allies in the war.This attitude was as common at the highest level ofcommand as it was among the regular soldiers of thearmed forces and was largely the result of doubts asto the loyalty of these forces.

To the armed forces of Rhodesia, the securitythat the Security Force Auxiliaries afforded thelocals was only a means to an end, for once an areahad come under a semblance of control by the auxi-liaries there was a resurgence of intelligence: thelifeblood of any counter-insurgency campaign. Incertain instances in which Selous Scouts teams ope-rated in conjunction with Auxiliaries good co-operation was achieved.

The Army should have viewed the Auxiliary pro-ject within its broader political framework and notrestricted it to a limited military context. Thisbroader view would have enabled the Army to identifythe military advantages of self-defence schemes andbenefit from them at an earlier stage.

An important part - possibly the most importantpart - of counter-organisation of the popula-tion (as first phase of counter-insurgency) isthe organisation of its self-defence againstrevolutionary intimidation and exactions.Unless the people themselves have the means andcommitment to resist, their desire for personalsecurity is likely to overcome their loyalty tothe government or neutrality.(10)

For this single reason alone the history of theSecurity Force Auxiliaries is closely linked to thatof stability operations (Chapter 6). Neither projectheld immediate and direct security advantages appa-rent to the hard-pressed military forces. Bothrather seemed to place yet a further drain on analready over-extended Security Force. In contrastexternal operations into neighbouring insurgent hostcountries and the employment of a helicopter borneFire Force inside Rhodesian borders presented ameasurable tally of insurgent fatalities. Neitherthe number of poorly trained armed black Auxiliarieswithin the Tribal Trust Lands nor the aid divertedto the development of rural black areas undergovernment control could provide any such measurablerecord of success. Consequently both Auxiliaries andaid were accorded lower priority in terms of man-power and resources: had they been given greater

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priority they in fact should and could have beencrucial determinants in regaining control over sub-verted areas, for expounded by 1 PsychologicalTraining Unit, the basic concept was sound. The fol-lowing extract from an official document lists thecharacteristics of the Pfumo re Vanhu

a. Unsophisticated personnel in an unsophisti-cated organisation.

b. Reliance on the population for:(i) Security through the passage of infor-

mation(ii) Material assistance in terms of facili-

ties such as (indistinguishable) andcooking offered by the people

c. Total identification with the populationd. Strength through:

(i) Physical numbers in small areas(ii) Permanent and close contact with a

population baseThe characteristics dictate that the Pfumo reVanhu is not viewed as a soldier but as a coun-ter-guerrilla. In essence he should exhibit thesame basic characteristics as the terrorist withthe notable exceptions that:a. Once he has secured his population base he

is not at liberty to abandon it even tempora-rily as is the terrorist.

b. Because he is an adjunct to the SecurityForces, he is governed by the same code ofconduct which does not allow him to coerceor terrorise.

However brief, the considerations discussed abovepoint to a number of critical shortcomings in theconduct of the counter-insurgency campaign withinboth the Security Forces in general and the Rhode-sian authorities.

NOTES

1. J.J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-revolutionaryWar (Faber and Faber, London, 1966), p. 145.

2. Although the operation was not controlled bythe Selous Scouts, it was run by their SpecialBranch officer from Bindura. The latter had built upa vast network of informers and intelligence sourcesas well as having access to considerable financialresources. The Selous Scouts supplied weaponry,military expertise and a number of former insurgents

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as members of the Interim Government Forces. Theyused two farms as base camps, one near Beit Bridge,the other was Blackwater Farm in Plumtree area.Later a third camp was established at Mangula.

3. Sunday Mail (5 Nov. 1978).4. P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts:

Top Secret War (Galagom Alberton, 1982), p. 315.5. The UANC forces from Libya stemmed from the

period when Bishop Muzorewa had led the externalwing of the ANC and Nkomo led the internal wing.

6. Newsweek (8 May, 1978), p. 18.7. Africa Research Bulletin (1-31 Mar. 1979),

p. 5202.8. ZANU (Sithole) Auxiliary circumscribed areas

were Mphoengs, Maranda, Nyajena, Gokwe, Sabi,Nyamaropa and Muwushu Tribal Trust Lands.

9. Financial Mail (29 Feb. 1980), p. 814.10. McCuen, Counter Revolutionary War, p. 107.

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Chapter 9

INTELLIGENCE

9.1 Introduction

Intelligence, it is widely claimed, is the life-blood of any counter insurgency campaign. It shouldbe apparent that Security Forces need more thanchance and luck if they are to locate and eliminatetheir elusive foe. Since Security Forces normallyhave the edge on mobility and fire power, onceinsurgents have been located, their destructionbecomes relatively simple. Thus, the insurgent kill-rate, to name but one indication of success, is adirect result of the intelligence obtained.

In this final chapter on key aspects of theSecurity Forces counter insurgency strategy a brieflook will be taken at the Rhodesian intelligencecommunity as a whole. The problems encounteredhere were vital in determining the outcome of thestruggle as a whole.

9.2 Organisation and Major Characteristics of theRhodesian Intelligence Community prior to 1973

In the years preceding the outbreak of the December1972-1980 period of conflict, the responsibility forRhodesian intelligence was almost exclusively thatof the Central Intelligence Organisation of theDepartment of the Prime Minister. The Central Intel-ligence Organisation was divided into three branches,namely Branch One, Branch Two and the AdministrationBranch. Branch One, or Special Branch, was headed bythe Director of Internal Affairs. For administrativeand operational purposes it fell under the Commis-sioner of Police. Policy and all aspects related tointelligence were, however, under the control of theDirector of the Central Intelligence Organisation.

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Special Branch was mainly involved with internalintelligence and until the formation of a militaryintelligence section some years later, was alsoresponsible for military, or operational, intelli-gence (in contrast to strategic intelligence of aless detailed but wider ranging economic and poli-tical nature).

The Director of External Affairs headed BranchTwo. As indicated by his title, he dealt with exter-nal intelligence regarding foreign-based politicalactivities. The Branch was almost exclusively inte-rested in political intelligence and also responsi-ble for a number of psychological and propagandaprojects, including disinformation. For the greaterpart of its activities Branch Two worked indepen-dently of the rest of the intelligence community.

The third branch of the Central IntelligenceOrganisation was headed by the Director Administra-tion. Duties entailed administration and logistics.

Other less directly relevant members of theintelligence community included the Criminal Inves-tigation Department which had the normal police-supportive role in fighting crime, the GovernmentProtective Security Department and the GovernmentTelecommunication Agency. The latter produced thecodes and cyphers used by the government as well asmanufacturing telecommunication equipment.

The Department of Internal Affairs had thevital function of collecting detailed operationalintelligence through its system of District Adminis-trators. A monthly intelligence report was in factproduced by this department for internal use. As thewar progressed, however, and the local populationbecame less sympathetic to Government, InternalAffairs slowly lost contact with the localpopulation. This was to a certain degree due toparticular aspects of government policy (suchas collective punishment) that Internal Affairs hadto enforce. Constant friction between Special Branchand Internal Affairs further reduced any intelli-gence co-operation that might have existed. (1) Spe-cial Branch (and later military intelligence) evenhad difficulty in obtaining copies of the afore-mentioned intelligence reports for their own use.

The Department of Foreign Affairs also had alimited intelligence collection role through itsoffice in the United States of America. This officewas manned by a member of the Central IntelligenceOrganisation. It also had men in Lisbon, Mozambique,Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Greece, Spain and France.

Before 1973, Special Branch had a vast and very

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effective strategic network for gathering intelli-gence. Little difficulty was encountered in provi-ding relatively detailed intelligence to counterwhat had amounted to little more than unco-ordinatedacts of terrorism. Before early 1966 counter-insur-gency operations were almost exclusively Policeefforts with British South Africa Police and SpecialBranch co-operation presenting little problem. Thejoint Police and Army operations that followed ser-ved to cement this relationship, while the Army grewaccustomed to relying on Special Branch for itsintelligence requirements. Inside Rhodesia, and evento a limited extent outside it, Special Branchrelied on a system of paid informers and normalPolice contact with the local population for infor-mation. In the absence of any organized attempts byeither ZANLA or ZPRA to politicize and intimidatethe local population, this system had proved bothreliable and satisfactory.

Since both ZANLA and ZPRA resorted to press-ganging in the absence of sufficient revolutionaryrecruits during the above period, desertions andeven surrenders to the Rhodesian Security Forceswere commonplace. This presented Special Branch withsufficiently detailed information to counter theinsurgent incursions prior to 1972. At this stageinsurgent base-camp strategy and tactics were at anearly stage of development. External bases, forexample, were relatively permanent and fixed. Secu-rity Forces could thus rely on information somemonths old to plan external operations.

In general, the Rhodesian intelligence commu-nity was geared for peace-time operations. Althoughthe insurgent threat was very real, and recognizedby Special Branch as such, neither the organisationnor its methods of collecting information was suitedto the more specific needs of operational intelli-gence. The result was that it missed two crucialdevelopments involving ZANU and ZAPU. The first wasthe reassessment of insurgent strategy, that was totake place in the period 1969-1971. (See Chapter 1)The second was the development of ZANU links withthe Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)during the same period. FRELIMO had initially sup-ported ZAPU as the only true Rhodesian nationalistmovement. When Joshua Nkomo displayed little inte-rest upon being offered the use of the Tete provinceas infiltration route into Rhodesia in 1968, itturned its support to ZANU. The latter eagerlyaccepted the use of the Tete route.

Special Branch registered its alarm early in

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1972 with regard to the build-up of forces in Tete,and the generally deteriorating security situationin the province. This followed an attack by the SASon the Matimbe Base near Gungwa mountain in Mozambi-que. Although all casualties were dressed in FRELIMOuniform a vital notebook read in Shona 'Go and tellEvenesi that the Zimbabwe boys had arrived. This isa secret, don't tell anyone else'. (2) For the firsttime the evidence was more than circumstantial. CIO,however, was not convinced. Prior to this the gene-ral expectancy among Special Branch members wasstill that future infiltration would emanate direct-ly from Zambia as had been the case in the past.

9-3 Revolutionary War and Special Branch Intelli-g e n c e ' ' ~

With the outbreak of armed attacks in late 1972, theSpecial Branch network of paid informers and policepatrols in the North-east came close to total col-lapse within a matter of weeks. The first ZANLAinsurgents had already, according to the report,entered the Centenary and Mount Darwin areas on thenight of 4 December 1971. In accordance with theirnew revolutionary strategy, they remained undetectedin the area for nearly a year, engaging in intensepreparatory work among the local population. Avoi-ding the limited Army and Police patrols in an areaof more than one thousand square kilometres presen-ted no problem. (From 1969 one platoon of eitherRhodesian African Rifles or Rhodesian Light Infantrywas deployed to patrol this vast area. By 1972 thishad been increased to company-level. Martin Meredithdescribes the situation as follows:

Eventually the local population was won overto an extent which later astonished the Rhode-sian authorities. Intelligence sources, whichhad proved so useful to the authorities duringthe earlier incursions, dried up. For sixmonths, while the guerrillas were building upan extensive network in the north-east, noword of their activities reached the administra-tion. With local support the guerrillas locatedsafe infiltration routes and suitable spots forarms caches; they recruited hundreds of tribes-men as porters and sent others to Tete forcrash courses in guerrilla training; older menand women were enlisted to supply food. Hun-dreds of tons of arms and medical supplies were

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carried across the border and, until late in1972, the supply columns, on occasions morethan hundred strong, managed to avoid armypatrol.(3)

The character of the war and Special Branch methodof operation within this climate were incompatible.Apart from the fact that the source of paid infor-mants dried up almost immediately owing to a spateof insurgent 'disciplinary killings', the ambushingof normal Police patrols also severely curtailed thissource of information. Within a year of the activa-tion of Operation Hurricane it had become evidentthat the traditional Special Branch intelligencenetwork had run into serious trouble.

A number of other factors also contributed towhat was arguably one of the major intelligence andSecurity Force failures of the war. As mentioned,Special Branch had noted the deteriorating situationin Tete province, and pointed to the influence thismight have on the security situation in the North-east although remaining largely unaware of theextent of subversion inside the country itself.These 'alarmist1 reports were sharply contradictedby assurances from the Department of InternalAffairs that all was peaceful in the area. (4) Inactual fact, both Internal Affairs and SpecialBranch representation in the North-east was verysparse indeed. Two Special Branch offices (atBindura and Sipolilo) and two Internal Affairs offi-ces (at Mount Darwin and Sipolilo) were responsiblefor the whole area from Msengedzi right around toNyamapanda in the North-east.

Special Branch patrols had been blaming theDepartment of Internal Affairs for the administra-tive neglect of the area even prior to UDI in 1965.But its own cover of the area had also been neglec-ted. When Special Branch did press for the moreextensive cover of the area in the early seventies,it was vetoed by the Commisioner of Police. The lat-ter was further to follow a strict policy of rota-tion amongst Special Branch field officers through-out the war, resulting in a discontinuity of intel-ligence in some areas. During February 1973, PrimeMinister Ian Smith candidly admitted

We darn well know that tribesmen were subverted.We know, for example, that Chiefs have alsobeen playing with the terrorists and they aregoing to be dealt with, but this isn't anythingone can anticipate. It was the information that

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didn't come through. We have also known forsome time that we haven't got good enoughground cover in some of these remote areas. (5)

It should have been quite apparent to both the mili-tary and Special Branch that while there was no lackof strategic intelligence, the counter-insurgencyrequirements for operational intelligence were notbeing met. It was some years before this need wasmet.

9.4 The Development of Military Intelligence Organi-sations

The military were, on the whole, completely unpre-pared for the intelligence requirements of counter-insurgency. In the tradition of reliance on SpecialBranch, the Army intelligence organisation was, forall practical purposes, non-existent. No intelli-gence corps existed and no intelligence course waspresented. Senior military courses presented in Rho-desia placed little emphasis on the correct use ofintelligence. Prior to the formation of the MilitaryIntelligence Directorate (MID) in 1973, the militaryintelligence organisation liaising with the CentralIntelligence Organisation consisted of a militaryliaison officer known as either the Directory Mili-tary Intelligence (DMI) or as the Military Intelli-gence Liaison Officer, and a Director Air Intelli-gence (DAI). Both were located at the Central Intel-ligence Organisation. Their function was solely toprovide liaison and advice to Central Intelligenceregarding military aspects of intelligence (as thiswas still a Special Branch function).

On paper the total Army intelligence organisa-tion now consisted of a lieutenant-colonel as Direc-tor of Military Intelligence at the Central Intelli-gence Organisation, a G2 (major) at Army Headquar-ters and G3's (captain or lieutenant) at brigadelevels. The G3, in theory, had an intelligence sec-tion at his disposal and was responsible for opera-tional intelligence. The link between the Directo-rate of Military Intelligence and the brigade com-mander was supplied by a Military Intelligence Offi-cer (MIO) at the brigades. These officers weremainly orientated towards strategic intelligence.Below brigade level some units had an intelligenceofficer, but in most cases only a corporal. Invaria-bly the task of Intelligence Officer at unit levelwas seen as a 'soft job' to be filled by someone not

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suitable for any other post. It was also consideredthe first ready-use pool of officers and otherranks, should a shortage of personnel occur else-where. At brigade level the same attitude predomina-ted with the intelligence posts mostly filled byoperations staff members on an 'over-and-above'basis.

As a result the Army was almost totally relianton Special Branch for all its intelligence require-ments . Even Army captures were interrogated by Spe-cial Branch. As they controlled all sources withinan area as well as access to them, Army intelligencerequirements had to be routed through SpecialBranch. This situation grew intolerable after theformation of Joint Operational Centre Hurricane as apermanent operational centre early in 1973, since itwas the Army that was mainly involved in counteringthe insurgency. This eventually led to the formationof a Field Intelligence Detachment under the newly-formed Directorate of Military Intelligence, inwhich territorial soldiers were used on a regularbasis to gather intelligence.

The simple formation of an organisation withno-one to fill the posts, and with very little sup-port, both from the majority of middle- and lowerranking Army personnel, as well as from SpecialBranch, did not in itself solve the problem. SpecialBranch had traditionally been responsible for mili-tary intelligence in the field and saw the formationof an Army intelligence organisation as unnecessaryand a threat to its own existence. It was not until1975 that the Army was able to convince both theCentral Intelligence Organisation and the treasuryof the necessity for an Army intelligence organisa-tion. (6)

The tradition that existed (in some units rightthroughout the war) was for the local Army commanderto call on the Special Branch Officer in the area toprovide intelligence for the planning of operations.The result was that Special Branch members weregiving intelligence briefings up to brigade level.Even if capable, the Army Intelligence officer's jobwas reduced to the updating of maps and other mun-dane chores. Invariably these Special Branch brief-ings were a run-down of incidents over a givenperiod with few military appreciations being maderegarding the implications of these incidents or ofexpected enemy intentions. A vital element of themilitary planning cycle was thus overlooked. Thisproblem was perpetuated by the fact that the SpecialBranch officer at provincial or district level was

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without exception senior (both in rank and expe-rience) to the unit and brigade intelligence offi-cers. Furthermore, he exercised total control overall local sources. Extracting of relevant mili-tary information implied a rudimentary militaryknowledge foreign to Special Branch officers,schooled in Police tradition.

By and large, military commanders failed toappreciate the shortcomings in the intelligencereports they received. In select cases requestswere, however, put for closer Special Branch liaison.In many instances this included a request for theattachment of a Special Branch officer to the unitconcerned on a permanent basis. (Only in the some-what unique case of the Selous Scouts was thisallowed as the unit itself was to a large extentcreated by the Special Branch.) Had both the CentralIntelligence Organisation and the Army chosen thissolution many of the problems involved with the for-mation and growth of Army intelligence might havebeen avoided. Although the above solution had beenmooted by Central Intelligence and the Army, it wasrejected by the Commissioner of Police. (This wouldhave led to the possible accommodation of opera-tional and strategic intelligence within a single,expanded organisation.) Special Branch had, in theinterim, become increasingly concerned about theextent to which its internal intelligence sourceswere dwindling. This led to the regeneration of theconcept of pseudo operations and ultimately to theformation of the Selous Scouts as a unit as recoun-ted in Chapter 5.

The formation of the Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence (MID) in 1973 proved to be a step inthe right direction, since operational control ofthe territorial element of Army headquarters intel-ligence was also gained. To a limited extent theDirectorate was now able to provide IntelligenceOfficers at lower level. Since, however, these memberswere territorial soldiers any one unit was servedby three or four officers on a rotational basis,the interrupted flow of intelligence was byno means ideal, and served to perpetuatethe senior role played by Special Branch officerswho were at least fully informed. A further problemwas that the initial terms of reference of MID werelimited to the armed forces of neighbouring states,thus excluding ZANLA and ZPRA.(7) Owing to the largedegree of co-operation between ZPRA and the ZambianNational Defence Force and the nearly complete inte-gration between the Army of Mozambique, and ZANLA,

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this eventually led to the Directorate being respon-sible for external intelligence and thus ultimatelyfor the intelligence required for external opera-tions. Previously this function could possibly havebeen seen as the task of the Joint Services Target-ing Committee (JSTC) which formed part of the JointPlanning Staff which had existed prior to the forma-tion of COMOPS. The Joint Services Targeting Commit-tee was responsible for the compilation and updatingof a central register of all strategic targets.Except for the odd Special Air Service sabotageprior to the start of the external raids in 1976,Security Force targets were insurgent trainingcamps, holding camps, ammunition dumps, and thelike, with economic, or real strategic targets, onlybeing attacked in 1979. It thus seemed a largelyirrelevant organisation during the early stages ofthe war, especially as the Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence and its associated military intelli-gence sections were taking care of the targetsbeing attacked. With the ever present manpower shor-tage the Joint Services Targeting Committee was dis-solved when COMOPS was formed in 1977. All registerswere passed to Military Intelligence.

On 1 July 1975, the Rhodesian IntelligenceCorps (RIC) was formed and took over the limitedresponsibility of the Directorate of Military Intel-ligence for internal operational intelligence. Thelatter had been running both the intelligence forexternal operations as well as for the internal ope-rational areas through its territorial members atbrigade and unit level. However reluctantly, theCentral Intelligence Organisation thus made room formilitary intelligence within the intelligence commu-nity, although on the clear understanding that RICdeployment would be controlled by Special Branch.

RIC was formed at a late stage and hampered bymanpower shortages and the Army's dismissive atti-tude towards intelligence. After training, RIC mem-bers were posted to brigade headquarters and maderesponsible for intelligence at this level. This wasin contrast to their intended task: the formation ofintelligence detachments in the field for the collec-tion and processing of operational intelligence,although limited RIC/Special Branch combined groundcoverage was done at low level in some areas. Rota-ting Territorial (RIC) officers thus provided themilitary intelligence function at brigade and batta-lion level. Although suffering from a lack of conti-nuity, this was an improvement on the previoussituation. Owing to its formation at a late stage

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and the manpower situation, RIC could never developto its full potential.(8)

At brigade level the RIC Mapping Section didextremely good work in the updating of maps, as wellas regards the production of operational maps. Ori-ginally both mapping and operational research fellunder RIC. In the years immediately following theformation of RIC, a Mapping and Research Company wasadded to the organisation. The mapping section wasestablished during November 1976 and by the end ofthe war provided a very capable service. The origi-nal maps were produced by the Surveyor General afterwhich the RIC mapping section updated them by theuse of a silk screen. By 1979 operational maps werealso being produced for specific operations. Infor-mation for the updating of maps was obtained fromfield offices set up at Joint Operational Centreswho collected it, in turn, from normal infantry patrolreports.

The RIC Research Section was formed in February1977, and was involved in basic operational research,although none of its members had any operationalresearch qualifications. The computer of the Depart-ment of Agriculture's Research and Special ServicesSection was used for this purpose. A number of thestudies made included the ratio of gunships totrooping helicopters in Fire Force, the use of Rho-desia African Rifles or Rhodesia Light Infantryunits for use in Fire Force, and efficiency study onexternal operations; camouflage of aircraft, etc.While some of the results were accepted by the mili-tary (eg. the increase of trooping versus gunshiphelicopters in Fire Force), others were not (eg.light grey as camouflage colour for aircraft). Otherresults were later proved to be incorrect (eg. thatRhodesia African Rifles were better Fire Forcetroops than Rhodesia Light Infantry).

Throughout the war the Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence was never accepted as a complete andintegrated member of the intelligence community.Professional jealousy continued to hamper co-opera-tion in that some of the desks at the Central Intel-ligence Organisation retained a military functionwhile neither the Directorate of Military Intelli-gence nor RIC was allowed to build up its own inter-nal network of sources. It was only after the forma-tion of a joint interrogation team in late 1978 thatthe Directorate obtained direct access to capturedinsurgents. Prior to the formation of this team,Special Branch had compiled a standard list of Armyand Air Force intelligence requirements which, upon

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completion, was passed on to Military Intelligence.Central to the problem was that Special Branch con-sidered Military Intelligence generally to be of apoor standard and incapable of undertaking in depthinterrogations. As from 1978, however, the Directo-rate of Military Intelligence's external operationalintelligence coverage grew to be superior to that ofSpecial Branch (who concentrated on the internalsecurity situation) due to their relatively sophis-ticated radio intercepts and better interpretationof military information. Yet, even by 1978 Lieute-nant-Colonel Reid-Daly had the following to sayabout military intelligence

Military Intelligence was a misnomer in theRhodesian Army for, apart from the good work ofa few dedicated Territorial officers at JointOperational Command levels, they rarely produ-ced anything intelligent to work on. (9)

At the height of the war 8 Signal Squadron obtaineda monthly 12 000 radio interceptions for Mozambiquealone. The figure for Zambia was, however, muchlower.

The interrogation team that was now formed con-sisted of both Military Intelligence and SpecialBranch members and fell under the operational con-trol of COMOPS. All interrogation of important cap-tured personnel was undertaken by them. As the teamwas also included in external operations a distinctimprovement resulted in both the extraction of rele-vant intelligence as well as in its dissemination.

In the final years of the war, the Directorateof Military Intelligence thus tended to acceptresponsibility for the intelligence needed for theplanning of external operations, while SpecialBranch and RIG were in control of internal intelli-gence requirements. The nature of the war precludeda watertight distinction between military and non-military, yet in general the Directorate's opinionwas accepted as regards aspects related to security.However it was rarely accepted as regards decisionswith political implications. Although this was notto be faulted, Special Branch internal sources('ground cover') had slowly been dissipated as theestablished administration in the Tribal TrustLands broke down. In many areas Security Forcepatrols became the main source of regular and relia-ble intelligence, while ground cover traditionallyprovided by Special Branch was uncertain. That thishad other than purely military implications is

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probably best illustrated by the differing predic-tions presented by Military Intelligence and SpecialBranch regarding the outcome of the 1980 elections.While the latter gave Bishop Muzorewa's UANC atleast a blocking vote, the Directorate of MilitaryIntelligence predicted the possibility of a Mugabewin, although this prediction was made at a laterstage. It should, however, be pointed out that Spe-cial Branch analysis of the electoral vote was madeon the premise that in those areas where proof ofintimidation was overwhelming, the party responsiblewould be disqualified. Seventeen such areas wereidentified, but Lord Soames informed Ken Flower, theDirector General of the Central Intelligence Orga-nisation, only 48 hours before the elections were tostart that this would not be the case. At that latestage Bishop Muzorewa could no longer back out;mainly owing to lack of South African backing forany such action. A Special Branch officer lateradmitted that their 'ground cover had folded com-pletely1 under the weight of ZANU (Patriotic Front)intimidation. In her comprehensive account of thepropaganda war, Masses vs the Media in the Making ofZimbabwe, Julie Fredrikse gives a clear account ofhow out of touch the Security Forces were with theblack rural population. (10) Launching a massive andvery slick Western style political campaign toendorse Muzorewa as Prime Minister, the SecurityForces had lost all contact with rural reality.

The one military intelligence organisation thatseemed to function relatively smoothly during thewar was the Joint Services Photographic Interpreta-tion Staff (JSPIS). As the name indicates, JSPIS hadalready been in existence during the Joint PlanningStaff system and thus had the advantage of beingboth settled and accepted. This was clearly an advan-tage since most of the operational intelligence forexternal operations was derived from aerial photo-graphy.

As the insurgents adapted to the ever-increasingfrequency of external operations, however, even thissource proved to have its limitations. On more thanone occasion external attacks were launched on unoc-cupied bases. This meant Security Forces had to rely onphysial reconnaissance as final confirmation inselect instances. While this had certain distinctintelligence advantages it also tended to place thewhole operation in jeopardy, should the advancereconnaissance party be detected.

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Inte 1 ligence

9.5 The Role of COMOPS

Probably the single most decisive factor as regardsintelligence inside the military was the lack of acentral intelligence co-ordination body at COMOPS.To a large degree this could be seen as a furtherproduct of the military neglect of intelligence.

Since little allowance had been made within theJoint Planning Staffs for intelligence control andco-ordination, the same situation was perpetuatedwithin COMOPS, although to a lesser degree.(11) Yetit should also be added that at the time of COMOPSformation, March 1977, there seemed to be no seniorintelligence officer available to fill the post.Provision had been made in COMOPS Operations Stafffor both operations and intelligence sections, butthe incumbent initially was a single Army captainwith no intelligence training or experience, laterto be replaced by an Air Force squadron leader.Their major task was the preparation of COMOPS mapswhile the intelligence co-ordination that took placeconsisted in most instances of passing responsibi-lity to Military Intelligence.

There was a need at COMOPS level for an intel-ligence section with enough background to co-ordi-nate the work of the other Army and Air Force intel-ligence sections. At this level all the relevantintelligence from the total intelligence communityshould have been collated and on the basis of it anappreciation made for presentation to COMOPS at thestart of the planning cycle. In an attempt toachieve this, the COMOPS section was enlarged to twoofficers with the rank of major, one responsible forZambia and the other for Mozambique. Since neitherof these had any background knowledge of the coun-tries concerned, and Special Branch control of sour-ces and general co-operation again proved an obsta-cle, COMOPS reverted to working directly with MID inthe latter stages of the war. One example of thelack of central military intelligence co-ordinationis provided by the intelligence process that prece-ded the attack on the Mozambique bridges (OperationUric) during September 1979: at various stages,JSPIS, Military Intelligence, Special Air Service,Selous Scouts and finally the planning team atCOMOPS carried out duplicating analyses with no cen-tral co-ordination of the effort. Had co-ordinationexisted, a single organisation could have tasked allsources and after completion of the analysis distri-buted the result to all concerned.

As the war intensified, and especially from

230

Inte lligenae

1978 onwards, the Directorate of Military Intelli-gence began to meet the needs of COMOPS more effec-tively. A major criticism levelled at the operationsplanning section at COMOPS, was for shortening theplanning cycle that was followed to external opera-tions. This led to the repeated use of set-pieceplans which insurgent forces were quick to compre-hend and to counter.

9.6 Special Air Service, Selous Scouts and the Spe-cial Forces Intelligence Centre (SFIC)

Due to the singular nature of their operations, theSpecial Air Service and the Selous Scouts each hadtheir own intelligence sections at unit level. Asdiscussed in Chapter 2, Special Forces operationssuffered from a lack of central co-ordination. Thissituation was also evident as regards intelligenceco-ordination. The latter was arguably the majorincentive towards the formation of a Special Forcesheadquarters.

The major problem concerned the exchange ofoperational intelligence between Special Forceunits and Joint Operational Centres. The SelousScouts were initially established to gather suchintelligence and proved the most important source ofthis vital material. Their type of operation, andthe ever-present fear of compromising themselves,led to the minimum exchange of intelligence betweenthis unit and the Joint Operational Centre in whosearea they were operating. An area would be 'frozen1

fora Selous Scouts operation (ie. all other SecurityForces removed from it) the pseudo teams would movein, complete their operations, and withdraw withlittle if any co-ordinated exchange of intelligencetaking place with local Joint Operational Centre.Even the preceding operation of gathering intelli-gence in preparation for either a Selous Scouts orSpecial Air Service operation led to problems sincesecurity instructions normally precluded the dis-closure of the operational plan.

At the suggestion of the Commander of theSelous Scouts a Special Forces Intelligence Centre(SFIC) was established at Inkomo barracks (headquar-ters of the Selous Scouts) during August 1978. For theseven weeks of its duration, SFIC was largely involvedwith its own internal organisation. This culminatedin a presentation to, inter alia, the Commander,COMOPS and Director General of the Central Intelli-gence Organisation in an attempt to establish SFIC

231

Inte Iligence

as the prime co-ordinator or operational intelli-gence.

The concept was that the Selous Scouts and Spe-cial Branch would supply all available internaloperational intelligence, while the Special AirService and aerial photography would provide thesame for those countries affording shelter and aidto the insurgent forces. Special Forces IntelligenceCentre was to be divided into two wings; an externalwing manned principally by the Special Air Service,and an internal one manned by the Selous Scouts.Each wing would be divided into ZPRA and ZANLA sec-tions and.these again would be subdivided to suitthe insurgent operational areas. The Directorate ofMilitary Intelligence would thus have lost its majorfunction, external operational intelligence, toSFIC. But little came of the proposals, as neitherGeneral Walls nor Mr Flower saw the need for theSelous Scouts to gain effective control of all ope-rational intelligence at a location removed fromSecurity Force headquarters in Harare. SFIC was thusdisbanded and most of its intelligence personnelseconded to the Directorate of Military Intelli-gence. (12)

Suitable manpower having been its criticallimitation, the demise of SFIC led to a drasticimprovement of the Directorate of Military Intelli-gence as military intelligence organisation. Hence-forth Military Intelligence was called on almostexclusively to provide intelligence for externaloperations. This led to the formation of the jointinterrogation team (Mi3 itary Intelligence/SpecialBranch) mentioned previously.

While SFIC itself had thus proved to be still-born, its demise was to the distinct advantage ofthe Rhodesian intelligence community as a whole.

9.7 Security and Counter-intelligence

As a result of the limited number of aircraft avai-lable, the security of external raids presented agreat problem. Any relatively large external opera-tion necessitated denuding all internal operationalareas of aircraft some two days before the raid formaintenance purposes. These aircraft would be con-centrated at either Thornhill or New Sarum, whichwere used jointly by both civilian and military air-craft. Owing to the standard method of attack byvertical envelopment, the majority of external ope-rations were conducted by air and the concentration

232

of aircraft was thus a sure indication of a pendingattack.

A fact that never ceased to intrigue intelli-gence officers was that the defence forces of theinsurgent host countries were invariably put onalert before an external raid by Rhodesia, indica-ting at least prior knowledge of an impendingattack, even if not of the target itself.(13) Whilevarious decoys were attempted, the aircraft problemremained a sure indication throughout the war.

Within the small white Rhodesian communityrumours spread quickly and it was extremely diffi-cult to maintain security since all white familieshad some connection with the war effort. The generalattitude prevailing was that a white face was secureand a black one not. With this credulousattitude, senior Army and other commanders exercisedlittle caution in distributing classified informa-tion within the white community. With the influx offoreigners into the Security Forces, Special Branch,which was responsible for the security clearance ofpersonnel, was literally swamped and in any casefound it impossible to clear 'personnel1 from theUnited States of America, Portugal or elsewhere. Upto the formation of Army Counter Intelligence (ACI)in 1975, Special Branch was solely responsible forcounter-intelligence. Owing to the continuing lackof manpower as well as the lack of importanceattached to counter-intelligence and security ingeneral, Army Counter Intelligence never reallybecame fully operational but was limited to theinvestigation of small scale security breaches.

Throughout the war security as an element ofplanning was never taken into serious consideration,while it continued to be weakened by the employmentand placement of foreigners, some of whom were laterto be identified as CIA agents (in the Air Force,for example). One example of this ignorance of secu-rity was the failure to conceal the concentration ofdecision makers at COMOPS prior to an external ope-ration. A second example was the call-up of SpecialAir Service territorial members some days before anexternal operation.

It is difficult to determine the effect of theobvious lack of security, but little doubt existsthat the success of at least some operations wascompromised by it.

233

Intelligence

9 .8 Conclusion

The central problems surrounding the intelligenceservices of the Rhodesian Security Forces may besummarized in the following quotation:

The central purpose of the various control andintelligence activities must be directed towards.the destruction of the clandestine organisation,and towards nothing else. Thus it is absolutelyessential that all the intelligence-gatheringagencies should be co-ordinated and centrallycontrolled in such a way that the politicalobjective never becomes subordinated to themilitary.(14)

Although the formation of the Directorate of Mili-tary Intelligence and RIC was the result of analarming deficiency in operational intelligence,this tended to divide and weaken the unity of cen-tral co-ordination. Since the number of skilled menin Rhodesia was limited, it might have been morecost-effective to attempt to adapt Special Branch tothe challenges of a Revolutionary War and therequirements of operational intelligence.

The second, and fundamental problem was relatedto the lack of a national, mainly political, stra-tegy and thus also of a coherent military one. Thisaspect has already been discussed in Chapter 2.

When the network of agents and informers ofSpecial Branch was found to be disappearing, localadministration had also collapsed with the affectedareas. Julie Frederikse correctly states

While Internal Affairs had little control overthe military situation on the ground, it hadnear total control of the information flowfrom the rural areas.(15)

This removed all official permanent representationand contact with the local population. 'Securitycomes first, voluntary information comes later.'(16)

Without permanent protection at local level,insurgent forces were free to organise and intimi-date the local inhabitants at will. Security Forcepatrols provided little more than an immediate pre-sence. It was only with the introduction of SecurityForce Auxiliaries in 1978 that the Security Forcescould maintain any such presence. Had a generalstrategic concept been followed according to whichareas under government control were slowly extended

234

Intelligence .

by the use of massive population control measures,and the involvement of the local population in theirown defence and development, intelligence 'groundcover" would have been extended concurrently.Although military patrols within the Tribal TrustLands were numerous and maintained limited contactwith the local population, the existing militaryforces lacked the manpower, inclination and time tomaintain a permanent presence within these areas.Increasingly, therefore, Security Forces tended toextract information by force which could only becounter-productive in the medium and long term.

It is too seldom understood that an unwilling-ness to supply information to the government onthe part of villagers is not necessarily a signof political support of the guerrillas, asideologically or emotionally 'motivated' sympa-thizers in the West are apt to assume. It mayof course be the result of the success of theCommunist 'violence programme1; or it may be asign of a generalized local support for theguerrillas. But it may be much more basic andapolitical; an unwillingness to betray localboys ... to a central administration viewed asalien to the village community. Hence the enor-mous importance in counter-insurgency of invol-ving the locals in their own self-defenceunits.(17)

In spite of the criticism noted above, however, theestablishment of a single effective intelligenceorganisation able to meet the challenges of counter-insurgency warfare is no easy task. Not only areproblems of method and structure encountered, butalso more established ones of vested interest and aninability to grasp the complexities of revolutionarywar at an early enough stage.

NOTES

1 . To an extent the friction between InternalAffairs and Special Branch was due to Branch One'swarning that the revolutionary potential in theTribal Trust Lands was rising rapidly. SpecialBranch viewed this, in part, as a result of adminis-trative neglect.

2. P. Stiff and R. Reid Daly, Selous Scouts:Top Secret War (Galago, Alberton, 1982), p. 18.

3. M. Meredith, The Past is Another Country,

235

Inte 1 ligenoe

revised and extended edition (Pan Books, London,1980) , p. 109.

4. To a large extent the blame for the situa-tion that had developed was placed on the shouldersof Internal Affairs, see for example the RhodesiaHerald of 12 Feb. and 5 Apr. 1973.

5. D. Martin and P. Johnson, The Struggle forZimbabwe (Faber and Faber, London, 1981), p. 8.

6. The extent to which Special Branch was pre-pared to go in order to forestall the formation ofRIC provides substantive evidence to this effect.During 1973 Special Branch broke into offices toobtain copies of a presentation prepared by a seniorArmy officer towards the formation of RIC. Thisinformation enabled Special Branch to counter allarguments in detail the following day when the pre-sentation was given.

7. MID fell under the Army for administrativepurposes, but was responsible to CIO for all intel-ligence-related activities. DMI was the militaryintelligence adviser to both DG CIO and Commander ofthe Army.

8. A further factor that had a negative effecton the work done by RIC was the extension of opera-tional areas during 1977. Existing RIC personnel inOperation Hurricane were further thinned out toobtain candidates for service in Repulse andThrasher.

9. Stiff and Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts,- p, 330,10. J. Fredrikse, None but Ourselves: Masses vs

the Media in the Making of Zimbabwe. (Ravan Press,Johannesburg, 1982).

11. The DG CIO appointed an intelligence liaisonofficer of the rank of chief superintendant atCOMOPS (equivalent to Army rank of lieutenant-colo-nel) but since his was only a liaison function, hecould play no effective role within COMOPS itself.As a 'civilian1 among military there also tended tobe a communication gap.

12. Functionally a further problem related tothe formation of SFIC was the addition of yetanother intelligence organisation to the totalintelligence community. CIO had increasingly come toaccept MID as a member of this community, if notwholeheartedly. It was, however, hesitant to extendits co-operation to yet another military intelli-gence organisation.

13. This was more the case with operations intoZambia than was the case with Mozambique. The FAMwere on almost continual standby, presumably due tofaulty analysis of Russian signal interceptions.

236 ' ' " '

InteIligenoe

^ (Penguin? Ha ondS TSff ^13. Fredriksp M^V,~ v,,,j_ A.... , ' &• J I D .— — — v i-i A. u ; j_ V C^ O / fj O /

' Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare,

I?- Ibid., p. 304.

237

Chapter 10

THE SECURITY SITUATION BY LATE 1979

Insurgent activity had its primary material impactwithin the rural areas of Zimbabwe. Only the secon-dary results of this onslaught, such as increasedurban squatting, were felt in and around towns andcities. Much of the country, formerly known as theTribal Trust Lands (TTL's) was poorly developed bycomparison with the mainly white-controlled commer-cial and farming areas. This is'still the case today.It was within these often remote areas that ZANLAand ZPRA forces established their base areas whicheventually encircled the economic heartland of Zim-babwe .

By mid 1978 increasingly large areas of Rhode-sia were no longer provided with veterinary services,As a result, the spread of tsetse fly was uncheckedand the situation deteriorated to that state which had existedduring the previous century. Following a concertedinsurgent campaign, the rural bus services whichtransported about 95% of the country's black popula-tion between the main urban centres and the TTL'shad virtually collapsed by the end of 1978. Malaria,bilharzia and other endemic diseases, once undercontrol, now became widespread. An increasing numberof reports of malnutrition were reported by the fewdoctors that remained in rural areas.

After the Elim massacre of June 1978, medicalservices in these areas had declined further. Of thethirteen Catholic mission doctors in Rhodesiaduring 1975, only four remained by October 1978.Nine out of 31 Catholic clinics were closed duringthe same period.

During February 1979 the Financial Mail repor-ted that administration in the Tribal Trust Landsaround Mudzi and Mutoko in eastern Mashonaland, inthe Fort Victoria region and in parts of Matabele-land had ceased. White farming communities were dwindling in the

238

By 1979

Mutare region, in Cashel Valley and around Melsetter,Birchenough Bridge and Chipinga, around Rusape,Headlands, Macheke as well as to the north ofHarare around Centenary and Sipolilo. Addedto the economic disruption of the farming industry,which earned more than half of the country's foreignexchange, Rhodesia had suffered a negative realgrowth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 1975.By 1979 the real per capita GDP was virtually thesame as at the time of the Unilateral Declaration ofIndependence in 1965. In the period 1975 to 1978,employment had decreased by more than 60 000 while80 000 jobs were needed annually to accommodateadditions to the labour supply.

From the initial figure of a few hundred insur-gents that had entered the country during 1973/74,intelligence estimates for late 1977 put the combi-ned ZANLA/ZPRA figure at over five thousand. ByDecember 1978 the figure was close to nine thousand.

The internal settlement agreement of March 1978had been Prime Minister Smith's last real chance toobtain international recognition and relief fromsanctions while retaining much of the power in whitehands. Following the failure to obtain these objec-tives, both Bishop Muzorewa and Smith's bargainingwas increasingly weakened by the sharply rising num-ber of insurgents inside the country. At the time ofthe internal black majority elections in April 1979,ZANLA alone had 13 500 trained insurgents, of whom9 500 were deployed inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. A fur-ther 12 000 ZANLA recruits were under training inTanzania, Ethiopia and Libya, while the Directorateof Military Intelligence estimated that a further15 000 recruits were available in Mozambique. ZPRA,in contrast, had about 20 000 trained personnel ofwhom only 2 900 were deployed in the country. Theremainder were in camps in Zambia. A further 5 000men were under training in Angola and Zambia with anadditional 500 to 1 000 men undergoing advanced/specialist courses in Russia and other communistcountries. Potentially ZPRA had no lack of recruits.A total of 17 000 suitable men were calculated to beavailable in Zambia and Botswana. Added to thesefigures were, according to Martin and Johnson, anestimated 50 000 muj ibas inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The desperate situation facing the SecurityForces by mid 1979 was aptly summarized in a classi-fied Army briefing document:

There are at present 3 900 well trained troops... deployed against 12 400 CTs (Communist

239

By 1979

Terrorists): a ratio of 1:3,2. Adding of SFA(Security Force Auxiliaries) to troops, theratio becomes 1:1,15. In classical COIN (coun-ter-insurgency) terms, this is a no-win orrather, a sure lose equation.

Casualty figures for the period 1973-78 probablyprovide the clearest evidence of the sudden intensi-fication of the war from 1976 onwards (Table 10.1).This was in spite of an overall 'kill rate' of betterthan 1:10 in favour of the Security Forces. (Ifinsurgent fatalities during external raids areincluded.)

Further indication of the extent of insurgentactivities within rural areas is provided by anextensive classified Rhodesian Intelligence Corpsstudy entitled ZANLA and ZPRA Tactics and ModusOperand!. Selected extracts on ZANLA reads as fol-lows:

In some areas a well organised and securityconscious civil administration is working.Under this system a person is appointed who isknown as the supervisor. He controls twelvekraals and collects money for CT's (CommunistTerrorists) at the rate of 30 cents per headeach month. In farming areas the average taxcan be as high as $2,00 while teachers can payup to $30,00. Under him are three chairmen whoeach control four kraals and under them areadministrators who organize the supply of food,beer and cigarettes for the CT's. In additionthere is an intelligence branch consisting ofone man who controls the movement and activityof the mujibas in the area and finally there isa police system which consists of four men toevery village, and whose duties entail theseeking out and killing of sellouts ... Thesupervisors often have such powers over thearea that the Chief becomes only a figurehead.CT groups travelling through the area arerequired to carry a letter of introduction fromthe Chairman of one civilian cell to another.In some instances, the supervisors control thebusinessmen in order to obtain supplies as wellas the war and civil administration. They alsohold authority over the CT groups and directtheir movements and discipline them for infrin-gement of good behaviour ... In theory at least,every established ZANU area has a defence com-mittee that knows the number of CTs and local

240

By 2979

militia in the area. The committee trains themilitia in the basic use of arms ... Sometimeshealth committees are set up which are respon-sible for basic sanitation ... CTs have direc-ted that food crops, as opposed to cash crops,should be grown, and these are controlled bythe committees. PV's (Protected Villages) aresometimes raided specifically to abduct localsto grow these crops for CTs in chosen areas ...Schools have been reopened in some 'liberated'areas by the committees who have been issued anew marxist syllabus by CTs ... The committeesystem as a whole is now called Hurunwende,which means 'government1 ... Where committeesare not in force, locals have been instructedto run, in some areas, when they see SF (Secu-rity Forces), so as to avoid being moved toPVs ... All secondary schools are to be closedto prevent men from becoming elegible forNational Service. In some areas CTs have orde-red locals to do National Service when calledupon, but to desert after training to CTs andinform on SF training and tactics.

In spite of the localised success obtained by theSecurity Force Auxiliaries, the evidently highinsurgent casualty rates resulting from externaloperations and the demonstrated efficiency of FireForce inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, both ZANLA and ZPRAcould lay claim to physically controlling the majo-rity of the Zimbabwean population by 1980.

By the end of the war more than 30 000 peoplehad been killed. The International Red Cross estima-ted that 20 per cent of the population were suffe-ring from malnutrition. More than 80 000 people werehomeless. The maimed, blinded and crippled totalledat least 10 000. According to the Salvation Army, ofthe 100 mission hospitals and clinics in the ruralareas, 51 were closed, three destroyed and numerousothers badly damaged. More than 100 000 men in thetowns were unemployed. At least 250 000 refugeeswaited to be repatriated from camps in Botswana,Zambia and Mozambique. About 483000 children hadbeen displaced from their schools.

By the end of 1979 white Rhodesia had beendefeated.

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By 1979

GROUP 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 TOTAL

Insurgents

Killed* § 4Wounded

. Captured

Security Forces

Killed .Wounded

Civilians

KilledWounded

94611 179

2578

4923

263709112

26214

163217

14594291

12132

105138

1 244 18 086 11160

112786

548769 1

770505219

166855

984107

216

1

32

508302342

345520

187111

6391

3

54

024155003

686585

036365

TOTAL 959 2 704 1 565 11 705 16 606 26 315 59 854

TABLE 10.1: Casaulty Figures: 1973-1978

NOTES+ These figures only refer to insurgents killed and

captured inside Rhodesia* No statistics for wounded insurgents exist. These

figures were computed on a ratio of 6,5 woundedto every 1 killed, i.e. the same as that whichcan be deduced from ratios of Security Forcemembers wounded/killed.

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Chapter 1 1

CONCLUSION

Hurunwende, Shona for government, designated the newcommittee system already enforced by ZANLA in the'liberated' areas. This word stands out as the clea-rest proof of the inexorable progress of insurgency.In their psychology, sympathy and thinking, thelocal population, scattered over wide tracts of theRhodesian bush, had succumbed to the insidiousadvances of ZPRA from the West and ZANLA from theEast. Vast areas which had once been under the close con-trol of the white capital, were now regarded by thatsame administration as distant and alien quarters.Urban enclaves had remained secure in their ignorancewhile an assault was precisely marshalled and laun-ched from the remote borders inwards to the veryoutskirts of the cities. Reduced to this beleage-red state, whites in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia saw theirterritory bartered piece-meal in an anxiousattempt to gain time, but nothing else. Therenow no longer remained to them the groundto negotiate. In their concern to rid the land ofinsurgents they had forgotten the residents of thoselarge reaches who had slowly but inevitably beenalienated from white control. Hurunwende speltobservance to the dictates of a new regime.

When the war for Zimbabwe came to an officialclose at midnight, 21 December 1979, the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Security Forces had executed the mostimportant components of an effective counter-insur-gency strategy. Despite exhaustive efforts to imple-ment such measures, very few of these had in factproved successful.

To the white population, the threat facing Rho-desia was an external one rather than that of blacknationalism within their own borders. They failed tounderstand that although the initial threat origina-ted geographically from outside Rhodesian borders,

243

Conclusion

once these first insurgents had entered the countryand begun subverting the local population in therural areas, the insurgency gained a momentum fromwithin the Tribal Trust Lands themselves. SecurityForces continued to deal with the threat obliviousof the fact that the very fabric of government with-in these remote areas, the support and respect forlocal authorities, was disappearing. For all practi-cal purposes, government control within the TribalTrust Lands collapsed when the Department of Inter-nal Affairs and Police could no longer effectivelyadminister the area, for they were the only real linkbetween- the rural black population and Government inHarare. The restoration of government control toge-ther with the concurrent destruction of the insur-gent control mechanisms within these areas shouldhave been the real aim of Security Forces operatingin the black rural area on a permanent basis. Intheir single-minded determination to eliminateinsurgents or punish the local population forassisting insurgents, Security Forces lostsight of their essentially supportive role. TheSecurity Forces and even more important, the whitepoliticians, remained insensitive to the less tangi-ble aspects of the conflict. The local populationwere in fact the determining factor, not the insur-gents. Thomas Arbuckle addresses the same phenome-non when he writes

The real problem is that the Rhodesian militaryhave misunderstood the nature of the war whichthey are fighting. They have failed to realizethat the war is essentially political ratherthan military ...(1)

The attitude amongst middle and lower ranking Rhode-sian Army officers as well as that of InternalAffairs was not conducive to an effective totalcounter-insurgency effort. The general belief thatthe insurgency problem was primarily a militarythreat derived from experience during the sixtiesremained a hallmark of the Rhodesian approach tocounter-insurgency. Coupled with a sincere beliefthat the unsophisticated black African was incapableof choosing between alternative political systems,Rhodesian Security Forces continued a paternalistictradition irksome to the majority of the population.

What was required was an awareness that the warcould not be won only in terms of killing armed com-batants , but in gaining the active support andinvolvement or at least neutrality of increasing

244

Conclusion

numbers of the local black population. This couldonly have been achieved by first providing the blackrural population with permanent protection, orenabling these people to protect themselves.

Because they lacked any sound political basisfrom which to argue a viable alternative, theSecurity Forces, in general, were unable to con-vince the local population that the existing orderwas just, fair and worth defending. Paul Moorecraftexpressed it clearly when he wrote

Politicians proved more adept at explaining whyAfricans should not support the guerrillas thanat explaining why they did ... the initial aimof the war was to prevent power passing to anyblack government, no matter how moderate.(2)

In fact, the excessive use of aggressive and unlaw-ful practices rather led to loss of government legi-timacy thus easing the acceptance of an alternativevalue-system and authority.

Possibly the most important means by which theSecurity Forces could have disseminated the advanta-ges of their own form of government was by thedeployment of Security Force Auxiliaries. Theseauxiliaries stood in direct competition to theinsurgent forces, while at the same time providinglocal participation. Had any such scheme been attemp-ted earlier and not been restricted by shortsightedArmy attitudes regarding the loyalty and generaldisciplinary standards of such forces, the Auxilia-ries could have secured ever-increasing rural areasfor government control in the same slow invasivemanner so typical of insurgent forces. At the timeof the scheme's institution, however, the militaryand not the political advantages of such a projectwere evaluated and found wanting. In the light ofthese apparently limited Auxiliary cabilities, thescheme at best received stop-start and half-heartedsupport. But, most important of all, Army commandersrealized too late the potential of a politicallymatured local militia from the people themselves.

Instead increased emphasis was placed onthe elimination of insurgent forces in neighbouringcountries and eventually on the punishment of thesehost countries for the active assistance accorded toboth ZANLA and ZPRA. This tends to vindicate theargument that Security Forces perceived the threat

245

Conclusion

as being of an essentially external nature. Thegeneral viewpoint that insurgent fatalities held thekey to the successful conclusion of the conflictfitted in comfortably with this perception.Operations aimed at eliminating concentratednumbers of trained insurgents prior to their entryinto a target country do constitute a primaryelement in counter-insurgency strategy. However,these operations are no substitute for a totaland balanced counter-insurgency strategy. The warfor Zimbabwe was not lost in Zambia or Mozambique,but within the Tribal Trust Lands of Rhodesia. Itwas in these areas that the imbalance on the Rhode-sian counter-insurgency programme is best illustra-ted when measured against the comprehensive doctrineof stability operations.

As detailed in Chapter 6, American doctrineclearly states the need for a complete and balancedcombination of environmental improvement (i.e. ruraldevelopment), population and resources control andcounter-insurgent (i.e. military) operations. Whenmeasuring the Rhodesian performance against these, aclear assessment can be gained of the racial precon-ceptions that permeated all levels of white/blackinteraction, specifically in the rural areas. Coun-ter-insurgent operations were conducted to theexclusion rather than the support of environmentalimprovement. Population and resources control, ameans to the end of regaining and re-establishinggovernment control, became an end in itself: theobject simply being to facilitate counter-insurgentoperations. Stability operations, and specificallycivic action could have contributed immeasurably tothe consolidation of government controlled areas,yet the limited Rhodesian response could be termedno more than armed propaganda. At no stage wasattention at high level seriously directed towardsredressing grievances exploited by the insurgents to justifytheir criticism of the existing white administration. Had Rho-desian authorities been sensitive to the localized and mostdirectly relevant complaints within the Tribal TrustLands, and had all available forces been deployed inan expanding area defence, rather than a mobilecounter-offensive across the entire country, theconcept of stability operations would have contribu-ted significantly to the consolidation of governmentcontrol.

Instead, by the overly aggressive use of tac-tics such as the purely intelligence orientatedpseudo methods, Security Force actions tended ratherto be aimed against the local population than in defence

246

Cone lusion

of them. In the short term, pseudo operations weresuccessful in obtaining information leading to nume-rous insurgent fatalities, yet in the long term theextent to which these methods were used resulted inan undeniable loss of legitimacy and credibility by the Secu-rity Forces vis a vis the local inhabitants. Again the *aim, as in the case of Protected Villages, was tofacilitate the immediate detection and eliminationof armed insurgents to the exclusion of other, longterm, objectives.

In the case of Protected and Consolidated Vil-lages resources were allocated to the resettlementof rural inhabitants, but for the wrong reasons andin the wrong places. Instead of halting the furtherspread of subversion and thereafter slowly increa-sing those areas under government control, the esta-blishment of these villages was seen as an impedi-ment to insurgent logistical routes. Little longterm emphasis was placed on the 'provision of impro-ved living conditions as compensation for the dis-ruption of a rural existence. Aimed at increasingthe vulnerability of the insurgents, the strategylost sight of the real objective, protecting andgaining the support of the local population. Insteadof attempting to involve inhabitants of these villa-ges in their own defence, the strategy was primarilyseen as a method whereby depopulated areas could becreated for Security Force operations.

The same confusion regarding method and objectis even more readily discernable in the history ofRhodesian border minefield obstacles. The initialconcept, the erection of a barrier against cross-border movement along the border between OperationHurricane area and the Tete province of Mozambique,was itself ill-founded and frought with problems inexecution. The further extension of the scheme alongseveral hundred kilometres of virgin bush questionsthe existence of sound strategic analysis at JointOperation Centre level, and a national counter-insurgency strategy at the highest level. Particu-larly in view of the extremely limited resourcesavailable to Rhodesia in the defence of such exten-sive territories, the allocation of substantial man-power and financial priorities to the constructionof these obstacles was without sound motivation.Such resources would have been far better investedin environmental improvement of government control-led areas, itself an extremely expensive programme.

Similarly, efforts were seriously misdirectedwithin the Rhodesian intelligence community. Regret- " "

247

Cone lusion

table errors were made in identifying both the loca-tion and intensity of the insurgent threat duringthe period 1972 to 1973. Much of the blame is, how-ever, to be placed on political insensitivity towarnings pertaining to the gravity of the threat.Having determined their inability to meet the chal-lenges of gathering intelligence in a revolutionaryenvironment, sustained attempts were made, andresisted, to establish a new organisation that couldmeet these challenges. Rapid and determined increasein the functions, personnel and co-operation ofSpecial Branch with all Services involved in combat-ting the war, would possibly have resulted in a muchhigher standard of operational and strategic intel-ligence than resulted from the establishment of boththe Directorate of Military Intelligence and RIG. Inview of its broader approach to the problem of coun-ter-insurgency Special Branch was furthermore bettersuited to the revolutionary environment than a morerestrictive military intelligence service.

The lack of a coherent counter-insurgency stra-tegy at national level could be cited as an impor-tant reason for the absence of a unified high levelcommand structure. Only the latter could have enfor-ced compliance over all government activitiesdirectly related to the counter-insurgency campaign.Even had such a national strategy been formulated,COMOPS alone could not have enforced compliance.After the war Lieutenant-Colonel Reid-Daly wrote

... there was no laid down military strategyapplicable to every operational area. Brigadierswere given their operational areas to commandand thereafter each one did his own thing ...as did the Police ... as did the Special Branch... as did the Internal Affairs ... they allblamed the politicians for the disasterouslydeveloping state of affairs, and, needless tosay, the politicians blamed everyone else.(3)

Despite this lack of a national strategy by whichthe various Joint Operation Centres could fight thewar, it is, however, possible to typify the generalmilitary strategy as employed in Rhodesia.

Rhodesia had in fact opted for a mobile, coun-ter-offensive stategy rather than one of areadefence. Although large numbers of troops weredeployed in static or semi-static defensive roles,these forces were generally not deployed within theTribal Trust Lands.

The emphasis in Rhodesian Security Force

248

Conelusion

operations was placed on gaining the highest possi-ble kill ratio.

Rhodesian Security Forces strategy is shaped bya particular constraint, the lack of troopsmade available for deployment on offensive ope-rations in the bush. Consequently, the Rhode-sian strategy has consisted of finding anddestroying the larger guerrilla concentrations,breaking these up with small units of highlymobile troops, who, immediately after such anoperation, are shifted to other lucrative tar-get areas.(4)

The lack of Security Force consolidation of anyarea was a basic shortcoming in the strategy. Anystrategy aimed at keeping the enemy off-balance canonly be temporary, as in the case of external opera-tions, and must ultimately be an element towards abroader goal.

... lack of a Security Force permanent presencein many Rhodesian Tribal Trust Lands is proba-bly the most serious fault in the SecurityForce strategy, for it means small guerrillagroups are able to garner popular allegianceeasily as there is no alternative for the localpeople to turn to for protection. (5)

Thus, by following a mobile counter-offensive stra-tegy, Rhodesian Security Forces precluded the typeand numbers of recruits that could be trained forthis task within the strict budgetry restraints thatexisted throughout the war. In the second instance,the Security Forces, by own choice, could thus notcompete with the insurgents for the establishment ofbase areas inside the country. Only with the adventof the Security Force Auxiliaries in late 1978, didthis emphasis change.

In the final year of the war a number of middleranking Army officers in fact attempted to convinceCOMOPS to adopt an area defence strategy. During themilitary preparations for the April 1979 elections,a terrain appreciation was undertaken by the Direc-torate of Military Intelligence with the aim ofdetermining which areas of the country had to beheld in order to ensure a victory for BishopMuzorewa. Circulars were distributed to all inte-rested parties, specifically the farming and miningcommunities, and industry. The data received wastransposed on a map from which the key terrain that

249

Conclusion

had to be held was determined. (See Figure 11.1)Accordingly, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was classified

in three categories; vital Assets/Ground (VAG),Ground of Tactical Importance (GTI) and otherground.

a. VAG. Vital Assets are those, the capturedamage or control of which by the attackerwill result in, or significantly contributeto, national defeat. The ground on which theVital Assets are situated is known as VitalGround. .

b. GTI. GTI is Good Tactical Ground on which to"Fight the battle to defend the Vital Assets/Ground.

c Other Ground. Other Ground is those areaswhich are not classified as VAG or GTI. Thisdoes not include areas of GTI superimposedon VAG.

In practice VAG corresponded with the economicallyimportant terrain of the white population. All Tri-bal Trust Lands bordering on VAG fell into thiscategory. The remainder of the country was not con-sidered to be of immediate strategic importance andwas temporarily to be abandoned by Security Forces.

In the run-up to the internal elections SecurityForces were deployed internally as follows:

a. Domination of GTI to enable the election totake place

b. Protection of VAG, largely by domination ofadjacent/overlying GTI

c. Temporary abandonment/occupation of otherground, depending on the tactical situation.

Externally the following tasks were carried out

a. Disruption of terrorist reinforcements andresupply ...

b Dislocation of terrorist command and controlc! Destabilisation of host'countries to weaken

their support for terrorists.

The strategic concept as embodied in VAG and GTI wasin actual fact the product of a number of ideas oneof which was known as the corridor approach. Thishad envisaged the identification of insurgent infil-tration routes and the subsequent step-by-stepelimination of them. Instead of attempting to cutinsurgent infiltration routes into the country,

250

Conclusion

\

Vital Asset Ground

Figure 11.1 Vital Asset Ground

251

Conclusion

Security Forces would have worked their way down theinfiltration corridor from its deepest point in Rho-desia consolidating areas as the operation progres-sed.

Both VAG and GTI stood in sharp contrast to thestrategy of mobile counter-offensive which had fai-led. Although neither strategy was accepted earlyenough to significantly influence deployment pat-terns , they marked a total reappraisal Security Forcestrategy. The acceptance of VAG and GTI by COMOPS inDecember 1979/January 1980 for the first time led toa national military strategy whereby COMOPS influen-ced Joint .Operation Centre deployment in the broadernational interest.

The same problem addressed above can be viewedfrom a different angle, that of relative mobilityand the political/military impact of a strategy ofmobile defence. Insurgent strategy, specificallythat of ZANLA, was to infiltrate as many groups aspossible into Rhodesia, in the knowledge that largecasualties would be incurred. The aim, however, wasto enable hard-core cadre members to reach the Tri-bal Trust Lands where two-thirds of the black Afri-cans lived. Ultimately base areas were to be esta-blished in these areas from where the struggle wouldbe intensified.

Once ensconced in the TTL's (Tribal TrustLands) by means of an effective doctrine, theguerrillas use them as secure bases from whichto launch attacks on neighbouring white farms,road and rail communications, schools, counciloffices, black owned stores and beer halls,attacks which have the political purpose ofdestroying government authority. This guerrillastrategy is primarily a political one as oppo-sed to the Security Forces' mainly militarystrategy of search and destroy. An importantelement in the guerrilla strategy is utilisa-tion of the Rhodesian Achilles Heel, poor man-power distribution to short-circuit SecurityForce mobility.

As mentioned above, the country had been experien-cing a severe recession at the time that the warentered its most critical phase. Although the Repu-blic of South Africa aided Rhodesia on an increasingscale, this was not enough to offset the effects ofa troubled economy. Military strategies such as Pro-tected Villages, a cordon sanitaire and externaloperations required vast capital investment and

252

Cone lusion

expenditure. This capital was specifically neededfor socio-economic development projects in the ruralareas. Denied access to the world money markets,these projects were often beyond the means of arelatively small although sophisticated, economy.

Nevertheless, even had Rhodesia retained accessto these funds, had their approach to the war beenmore supportive than punitive, and had populationand resources control measures been instituted intime, at root white Rhodesians were circumvented bytheir own political creed.

The whites had no strategy other than beefingthe status quo and maintaining their privilegedposition.

Ndabaningi Sithole

By a determined refusal to effect any transfer ofreal power, and an inflexible assertion of whiteminority rule, the government of Ian Smith alienatedthe black majority, driving the populace to theexpedience of communist subversion. The RhodesianFront party in fact refused to accept that the threatof rural insurgency was serious enough to warrantrestructuring the distribution of political power.

Rhodesian strategy was shot through with afatal negativism. There was little real faithin positive political reform as a war-winner.(7)

Angola and Mozambique gained their independence in1974, and were then able to host insurgents directedagainst Zimbabwe. Rhodesia had not initiated ameaningful transfer of power before the independenceof these bordering countries precipitated the inten-sified onslaught from 1976. Had she done so thiswould have constituted a crucial initiative in pre-senting a defensible alternative to Marxist ideology.

Government was at first unprepared, and thentoo late, to take this decisive step forward so thatSecurity Forces lacked a far-sighted political stra-tegy that would have allowed them to formulate acentral military strategy. From this, in turn, theycould have defended the legitimacy of the existingorder to themselves, the local population and theenemy.

NOTES

1. T. Arbuckle, 'Rhodesian Bush War Strategies

253

Cone lusion

and Tactics: an Assessment1 in RUSI Journal (Dec.1979), vol. 124, no. 4, p. 32

2. P.L. Moorecraft and P. Mclaughlin, Chimu-renga: The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980 (Sygma/Collins,Marshalltown, 1982), p. 67

3. P. Stiff and R. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts;Top Secret War (Galago, Aberton, 1982), p. 281

4. Arbuckle in RUSI, p. 29. 5. Ibid.6. Ibid, p. 307. P.L. Moorecraft and P. Mclaughlin, Chimu-

renga: The War in Rhodesia 1965-1980 (Sygma/Collins,Marshalltpwn, 1982), p. 69

254

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BOOKS

The Counter-insurgencj:

_ _ , -.^. xiie; i_ounter-insurgency Era: US Doc-trine and Performance (The Free Press, New York,1977)

Brown, S. (ed) FightinForces of Rhodesia, no. 5 (Cent~, naj-aie;

Catholic Institute of International Relations Rhode-sia: The Propaganda War fr.nnri.-»-> <?—^ ..«--•

__ j_ international RelationsThe Propaganda War (London, Sept. 1977)rn, G. Rffvoim-i ~~. - '--- •--

... -— ^ a-wj-iaqctnaa war (London, Sept. 1977)Fairbairn, G. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare (Pen-guin, Harmondsworth, 1974)_ , — ...i iiuowurtn, 1974)

Fredrikse, J. None but Ourselves: Marses vs theMedia in the Mat-inn- /~.f m **--•<-

, _ . >.yy.. UUL. uursexves: Marses vs theMedia in the Making of Zimbabwe(Ravan, Johannes-burg, 1982)

Zimbabwe: The Short- and Lon•a 1 ra~. •

, u .uuu^cmwe: Tne Short- and Long TermSocio-Political Prospects of a New State (Unit forFutures Research. St-.pl ie»-,H~r-~u »-.

^ . . IJ-L fj.uapects of a New StateFutures Research, Stellenbosch, Apr. 1980)Imurry, J. (et a l l TH^ c^ -

._ 4. - , ocex-tenjaosch, Apr. 1980)Gilmurry, J. (et al) The Struggle for Health (Catho-

lic Institute for Internalinns.i D«I-^-^-.._j , -. » = i- ax; -me struggle for Health (Catho-

lic Institute for International Relations, London,1979)

Bunch_of_^ives (Faber and Faber, London,

(Barne and Rock-~~*»~3.j cmig ^<

cliff, London, 1960)

Low Intensity Operations (Faber and Faber,London, 1971)

Laurence, T.E. The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Penguin,Harmondsworth, 1977)

"ij-rUn r> ----- - •

„..« x utjcj., jjonaon, 1981)McCuen, J.J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War

(Faber and Faber. Lnnri^r, m^^>- ^ .j., jjuuuon , iyb6)Meredith, M. The Past is Another Countr

and F>vt-on/3o'3 ^j_ ' —, . ,v, J-Q rtiiouner Countiand extended edn, (Pan, London, 1981)Inar. a » 4. _•. . -

__ .. c cun, (Fan, London, 1981)Molnar, A.R. (et al) Human Factors Considerations ofUndergrounds in Insuraenr-i <=c /c^^-j--' -

, 1, a.j.1 numan Factors ConsiderationsUndergrounds in Insurgencies (Special Operations

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Bibliography

Research Office, Washington, 1965)Momboisse, R.M. Blueprint for Revolution (Charles C.Thomas, Springfield, 1970)

Morris, M. Armed Conflict in Southern Africa (JeremySpence, Cape Town, 1974)

Nyangoni, W.W. African Nationalism in Zimbabwe (Uni-versity Press of America, Washington DC, 1978)

Osanka, F.M. (ed) Modern Guerrilla Warfare (Free. Press of Glencoe, New York, 1962)Raeburn, M. Black Fire (Julian Friedman, London,' 1978)Rhodesian Army Military Support to the Civil Power

(MCP), 'restricted, as amended, (1 May 1967)Riddell, R. Education for Employment (CatholicInstitute for International Relations, London,1980)

Sarkesian, S.C. (ed) Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare(Precedent, Chicago, 1975)

Sithole, M. Struggles within the Struggle (Ruyeko,Harare, 1979)

Stiff, P. and Reid-Daly, R. Selous Scouts: TopSecret War (Galago,Alberton, 1982)

Thayer, C.W. Guerrilla (Harper and Row, New York,1963)

Thompson, R. Defeating Communist Insurgency (Cattoand Windus, London, 1966)

Trelour, H. (ed) Fighting Forces of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia . no. 6 (Amalgamated Publications, Harare,1976)

U.S. Army Stability Operations: US Army Doctrine(Field Manual, no. 31-23, 1976)

U.S. Marine Corps Small Unit Leader's Counter-insurgency Handbook (NAVMC 2641, 1972)

Welch, C.E. Jr and Taunter, M.B. (ed's) Revolutionand Political Change (Duxbury Press, Belmont,1972)

MAGAZINES

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256

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Royal United Services Institute JournalTimeTo the Point

NEWSPAPERS

Pretoria News, PretoriaRhodesian Herald, (now The Herald) HarareStar, JohannesburgSunday Mail, Harare

PAPERS

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.. ^.^m. xxcr , (prouncompleted MA Thesis, UNISAancrnni _ w M " '

... .0.1.0 , UW

W.W. Revolutionar_, , ...... ncvu-iucionary Strategies for NationLiberation in Zimbabwe, presented to the AfricanStudies Association rnn-Fa>-~-— -•-- — •

___.. .i. axuujctowe, presented to the AfricanStudies Association Conference in Chicago, 31 Oct.- 3 Nov. 1974)

NOTE

Most of the information collected for this study wasobtained by means of personal interviews with nume-rous members of

NATJOCCOMOPSMIDSBBranch TwoJSPISJOC'sSASSelous Scouts1 POUThe Sheppard GroupRhEHQ Spec Forces

RIC : • •Directorate of PsywarGuard Force

257

INDEX

abductionManama school 37Tegwani school 46St Alberts mission 17

African National Congressethnic base 34factionalism 25formation 4, 11, 23negotiations 24

amnesty 45, 150-2, 205Angola 19-20, 188, 190

192, 196see also external ope-rations

Anglo-Rhodesian propo-sals 11

Armybrigade areas 15, 61formation of 1 , 3functions 74training 60

border minefield obsta-cles 20, 247border minefield 112-5, 185maintenance 113-4minefields 185Reinforced BorderMinefield 114-5Superimposed BorderMinefield 114-5see also cordon sani-taire

Botswanainsurgent base area26, 185insurgent transitarea 7, 26, 193pseudo operations127, 189see also externaloperationssee also no-go areas

casaultiesduring 1966-8 7-8during 1972-7 36, 40during 1972-8 46during 1972-9 241during 1973 18, 242during 1974 21, 242during 1975 25, 242during 1976 28, 30,35,43, 189, 196, 242during 1977 43, 242during 1978 206, 242during 1979 210external operations177-80, 182, 187missionaries 39, 46,238Viscount crash andmassacre 46, 50, 188

censorship 28Central Intelligence

Organisation (CIO)73, 143, 147, 218-9

258

Index

Civil Executive to theSecurity Council (CESC)62

collective punishment16-7, 82, 84

Combined Operations(COMOPS)external operations71, 177, 192intelligence 228, 230-1, 236n11formation 39-40, 63,67-8functions 68, 70, 72national strategy 74,249, 252organisation 61, 70-1psychological opera-tions 147, 151Special Forces 73, 75Security Force Auxi-liaries 206, 211

command and control 60-77passim

Consolidated Villages88-9see also ProtectedVillages

cordon sanitaire 17, 20,115-6alarm system 106, 108,1 1 1Corsan 105-8defoliants 106, 108,110maintenance 107-8,110-1Mod Corsan 108-10Mod Mod Corsan 110-2theory of 104-5, 174see also border mine-field obstacles

Corsan Committee 62, 107curfews

collective punishment16-7cordon sanitaire 105food control 159-60Protected Villages 97

Dalton, Tony 140, 146see also psychologi-cal operations

defence expenditurecordon sanitaire 1051974/75 211975/76 25-6, 781976/77 29Security Force Auxi-liaries 212Republic of SouthAfrica aid 33

Directorate of Psycholo-gical Operations 147

electionsmajority rule 48, 51-2, 148, 206, 208-9,229Rhodesian Front 41 , 57

ethnicity and tribalism7, 12, 26, 119, 193

external operations 31 ,46, 172-4, 185-93Angola 50, 196Botswana 52, 189,193-5insurgent counter-measures 178-81intelligence 228-9,230-4Mozambique 31, 41-2,55, 127, 175-85, 199Zambia 26, 31, 42, 49,52, 55, 56, 71, 184-93 passim, 199see also casualtiessee also CombinedOperationssee also strategicbase areas

farm protection 21, 63Fire Force 22, 125, 128,

130, 198, 227food control 32, 97, 151,

153, 158-60Frelimo

assumption of power19

Index

inside Rhodesia 24,177Lusaka Unity Accord 23Rhodesian perceptionof 23ZANLA 12, 174-8, 180-4

Prolizi 10Frozen Area 122

see also pseudo opera-tions

Geneva talks 23, 33, 35Guard Force 63, 93-6

see also ProtectedVillages

insurgent infiltratedareas 7, 9, 12, 14,27, 43, 174-5, 238-41

insurgent numbers inRhodesia 18, 21 , 28,30, 40, 43, 45, 50,53, 57, 87, 183, 192,239

intelligence 218-235passimCOMOPS 71, 230failings 13-4, 189,220-1, 229, 234-5, 248importance of 218, 234pseudo operations 118-9, 130, 177-8, 225sharing of 133, 227-8see also CIOsee also militaryintelligencesee also pseudo opera-tionssee also Special Branch

Internal Affairs, Depart-ment ofattitude to rural blacks141, 168command and control 63,68-70, 73, 77local black militia 203farm protection 21identification system160intelligence 66, 219,222, 234

Protected Villages83-5, 87, 93-5, 98,204protecting authori-ties 18-9psychological opera-tions 143-4, 149, 154spirit mediums, useof 165

Internal Settlementattempts 41-2, 44, 47March 1978 agreement44-6, 91-2, 151, 155,204, 239Transitional Govern-ment 45 , 54

Joint Operation Centre15-6, 64-5, 68, 77,105, 114, 211

Joint Planning Staffs62, 66, 71, 142, 226

Kaunda, Kenneth 16, 23,25-6, 30, 191, 185,187

Kissinger, Henry 27, 31,33, 39, 67

Lancaster House negotia-tions 55-6, 157, 183-4, 191 , 212-3

London constitutionalconference (1961) 5

Machel, Samora 19, 23,26-7, 175

Martial law 46-7, 49,153

military intelligenceattitude to 223-4,228Directorate of Mili-tary Intelligence 75-6, 182-3, 189, 223-5Interface operations153Joint Services Photo-graphic Interpreta-tion Service (JSPIS)179, 229

260

Index

organisation 223, 232,236n7problems 224-6, 231Rhodesian IntelligenceCorps 226-8, 236n8radio interceptions184, 228see also COMOPSsee also intelligencesee also SFICsee also Special Branch

Mozambiqueclosure of border 27independence 20Gaza province 73pressure on ZANU 55-6, 184see also externaloperationssee also no-go areassee also Tete pro-vincesee also ZANLA logis-tics

Mozambique ResistanceMovement (MRM) 174-5,1 99

Mugabe, Robertdetention/imprison-ment 5, 23-4international sup-port 36Lancaster House 56president of ZANU 5,23-4secretary-general ofZANU 5

Muzorewa, AbelAfrican NationalCongress 11, 23External AfricanNational Congress 25internal majorityelections 46, 53lack of armed forces35, 41Lusaka Unity Accord 23Security Force Auxi-liaries 205-10

United African Natio-nal Council 41

National Joint OperationCentrecomposition 68-9external operations73, 183personality clashes73psychological opera-tions 146-7

national service system18, 30, 43-4, 49-50

Nkomo, Joshuaattempt on life 190detention 5, 10, 24final resort to armedstruggle 36international support34Internal AfricanNational Congress 25leadership 4-6negotiations 26, 30,47, 187-8

no-go areasBotswana 37cordon sanitaire 105definition of 102n4food control 159-60Mozambique 17, 82-3protected areas 83

Nyerere, Julius 5, 25

Operation Bouncer 199-200, 201n20

Operation Favour seeSecurity Force Auxi-liaries

Operation Grapple 42-3,45

Operation Hurricanecasualties 36command and control64cordon sanitaire 115food control 158-9formation 14-5, 64insurgent numbers 18,40, 43, 45

261

Index

strategy 15see also ProtectedVillagessee also psychologi-cal operations

Operation Interface 153-4, 157see also psychologi-cal operations

Operation Long John 177'Operation Manila Inter-

face 155-8Operation Mardon 178Operation Market Garden

130Operation Maxply 151Operation Miracle 180-1,

184Operation Needle 141Operation Overload 83-6,

101see also ProtectedVillages

Operation Overload Two83, 86, 101see also ProtectedVillages

Operation Repulsecasualties 36command and control65formation 28insurgent numbers40, 43, 45see also ProtectedVillagessee also food con-trol

Operation Splinter 42,65

Operation Splitshot160-1see also psychologi-cal operations

Operation Tangent 193casualties 36insurgent numbers40, 43, 45

Operation Thrashercasualties 36

command and control65formation 28insurgent numbers 40,43.- 45see also food controlsee also psychologi-cal operations

Operation Turkey seefood control

Operation Turmoil 187Operation Uric 183-4,

230Operation Virile 180Operation Welfare 59n37,

147Operations Co-ordinating

Council 62, 69, 72,139, 149, 150

Patriotic Frontcohesion 34, 44, 49endorsement by Front-line states 35formation 33-4

Pearce commission 11, 23Protected Areas 83Protected Villages 17-8,

48, 79-101 passim,247attitude to 96-99cordon sanitaire 105design 85initiation 17, 82insurgent reaction88-9opening 47, 90-3, 155protection 95-6, 203,211-2strategy 79-82see also food controlsee also OperationOverloadsee also OperationOverload Twosee also psychologi-cal operations

Provincial Operations(PROVOPS) 62-4

pseudo operations 118-34,passim, 246-7

262

Index

Botswana 126-7, 189Fire Force 22illegal actions 128-9, 131-2Protected Villages128start 120-3tactics 124-6theory of 118-20

Psychological Action Co-ordinating Committee(PACC) 143, 145

Psychological OperationsUnit 40, 138, 148,167amnesty 152formation 146Protected Villages87, 146Security Force Auxi-liaries 206, 211, 216see also Directorateof PsychologicalOperationssee also OperationInterfacesee also OperationManila Interfacesee also OperationSplitshotsee also spiritmediums

Psychological Warfare(Psywar) Committee62, 139, 143, 145,149-50

Refugees 46, 241Reid-Daly, Ron

command control 74external operations179, 195Fire Force 198insurgent support 84intelligence 14-5,228Security Force Auxi-liaries 205Selous Scouts 123-4see also pseudooperations

Republic of South Africa9, 20, 27, 31-2, 187,193

Rewards 19, 149-50Rhodesian Front 3, 39

safe return 45, 150-1Salisbury Operations

(SALOPS) 42-3, 45security 232-3Security Council 63, 67Security Forces

attitude to ruralblacks 98-9, 129, 132,168-9, 253bickering 52command and control60-77high density opera-tions 84, 86perception of threat76, 154-5, 168, 244-5strategy 9, 42, 48,53, 61, 71-2, 76-7,117, 132-3 175, 184-5,192, 197-8, 200,234-5strength 15, 43, 50,54-5, 59n24, 249-52see also Vital AssetsGround

Security Force Auxilia-ries 48, 50, 54, 72,168, 202-16, 245amnesty 151, 205command and control76, 211formation 203-4intelligence 234Interim GovernmentForces 204problems 207, 209-10,214-15Protected Villages95, 211-212Psychological Opera-tions Unit 148, 156,211 , 215recruitment 205, 208,214

263

Index Index

strength 55, 204-10,212theory 81-2, 202-3

Selous Scouts 118-34passimcommand and control75, 123, 126, 133external operations31 , 127, 177-80, 182,189, 194-5formation 123intelligence 74-5,127, 133, 159, 225,231name 3psychological opera-tions 141strength 54, 123-4126, 130tactics 124-131see also pseudo ope-rations

Sheppard, Ian 86-7, 139-44, 166

Sithole, Ndabaningidetention 5-6, 10, 24External AfricanNational Council 25Lusaka Unity Accord23ousted from ZANU 35,41 , 53returned to Rhodesia41Security Force Auxi-liaries 205-10ZANU president 5-6, 9,23

situpa 160Smith, Ian

accepts majority rule32, 41-2attitude to internalsolution 24, 50control of war 63, 67,72elected Prime Minis-ter 3negotiations withnationalists 24, 26,30, 41, 47

264

security situation in1973 13

Special Branchintelligence 13, 218-2,25, 228Internal Affairs,Department of 66military intelligence66, 133, 153, 224-5,227-8pseudo operations120-3, 126, 133, 225Security Force Auxi-liaries 203-4, 206,211see also intelligencesee also militaryintelligencesee also psuedo ope-rations

Special Forcescommand and control75Headquarters SpecialForces (HQ Spec For-ces) 75-6intelligence co-operation 73-4operational planning73-4Security Force Auxi-liaries 210-11Special Forces Intel-ligence Centre 75-6,231-2, 236n12see also SelousScouts

South African AfricanNational Congress(SAANC) 7, 9

South African Police(SAP) 9, 24, 150

spirit mediums 165-7,170n16-18see also psycholoci-cal operations

stability operations135, 167-9, 246civic action 138,140-4, 146

counter-organisation215population andresources control 137psychological opera-tions 137, 141-2145-6Protected Villages 146

strategic base areas 172-5see also externaloperations

Tanzania 5, 25, 182, 196Tete province

choice as infiltra-tion route 11-2, 175-6insurgent base campstrategy 199minefields 185security situation14-5

United African NationalCouncil 41, 46, 52, 54

Van der Byl, P.K.attitude towards useof force 142, 169Minister of Defence67Minister of Informa-tion 142no-go areas 17psychological opera-tions 40, 142

Vital Assets Ground 207,249-52

Vorster, B.J. 27, 31, 33,67

Walls, Petercalls for supremo66-7commander COMOPS 40,74external operations196psuedo operations 123psychological opera-tions 142, 154

Security Force Auxi-liaries 205

War Council 63, 72, 183

Young and Owen AngloAmerican proposals39-41

Zambiaborder closure 16,191border minefieldobstacles 20infiltration from 7,9, 12, 19insurgent logistics19, 185pseudo intelligence127ZNDF aid to ZPRA 185,187, 190see also externaloperations

Zimbabwe African Natio-nal Liberation Army(ZANLA)base camp strategy178-9encroachment intoZPRA area 129-30, 192factionalism 22-3food control 158formation 5Frelimo aid to 175,177, 184-5infiltration routes9, 12, 18, 83-4, 175,177logistics 19, 178,180, 183-4psychological opera-tions 161recruitment 6, 220spirit mediums 166start of war in 197213strategy 6, 7, 9-13,28, 31, 42-3, 56,58n10, 182, 184, 193,240-1strength 12, 34, 184

265

Index

support 20see also Mugabesee also Sithole

Zimbabwe African Natio-nal Union (ZANU)ethnicity 7, 34eviction from Zambia25-6factionalism 10, 22-3, 37formation 4-6strategy 6, 9, 37support 17

Zimbabwe African Natio-nal Union (PatrioticFront)(ZANU(PF)) 57

Zimbabwe African Peo-ples Union (ZAPU)ethnicity 7, 34, 37eviction from Zambia25factionalism 5, 10, 37formation 4, 23Frelimo 220strategy 6, 9, 11, 37support 17

Zimbabwe Peoples Army(ZIPA) 34

Zimbabwe Peoples Revolu-tionary Army (ZPRA)Angolan aid to 196base camp strategy 188-9factionalism 10formation 6, 23, 184infiltration routes 9,12, 19, 37, 192, 194,221logistics 19recruitment 6, 36-7, 46,194-5, 220strategy 6-7, 9-11, 30-1,37, 39, 42-3, 56, 191-3strength 37, 192training 20

• ZNDF aid to 185, 187

266