Haywood Hansell

8/8/2019 Haywood Hansell

1/236


2/236

The Ques t

Haywood Hansel l and American StrategicBombing in World War II

C HARLES G RIFFITH

Air University PressMaxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 1999


3/236

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of theauthor and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force,the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release:distribution unlimited.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Griffith, Charles, 1957 The quest : Haywood Hansel l and American strategic bombing in World War II /

Charles Griffith. p . cm.Includes bibl iographical references and index.1. World War, 19391945Aerial operations, American. 2. Bombing, AerialHistory.

3. Strategy. 4. Hansel l , Haywood S. 5. GeneralsUnited States Biography. 6. UnitedStates. Army Air Forces Biography. I. Title.D790.G732 1999940.54 4973dc21 99-43324

CIPISBN 1-58566-069-8

ii


4/236

T his book is dedicatedto my son, A lexander G riffith,

and to the memory of L t Col T heodore B . B rydges, U S A F .


5/236

ContentsChapter Page

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x i

1 THE PROBLEMS OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9

2 THE EARLY YEARS: EDUCATION AND ACTS . . . 23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3

3 PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5

4 THE FRICTIONS OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3

5 THE GLOBAL BOMBER FORCE . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2

6 TRIUMPH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4

7 TRAGEDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 0

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 3

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

v


6/236

Photographs Page

B-1 Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Z-1 Zeppelin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Bri t ish Handley-Page Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Boeing B-17 Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Boeing P-12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Mar t in B-10 Bombers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

B-29 Very Heavy Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

B-26 Medium Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

B-24 Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Douglas A-20 Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

Generals LeMay and Hansell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 7

B-2 Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 5

B-52 Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

C-47 Transpor t Airc ra f t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 08

vi


7/236

F or ewor d

Maj Gen Haywood Possum Hanse l l J r. was the f i r s tlegendary ai rman from the interwar years and World War I I Ih a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o m e e t o n a p e r s o n a l b a s i s . T h i shappened in 1972 when I was on the facul ty of the his torydepartment a t the Air Force Academy. From that exper ience I

became a l i fe long admirer of General Hansel l and his graciousw i f e , D o t t a . H e w a s a g e n t l e m a n o f g r e a t i n t e l l e c t w h ocon t inued th roughou t h i s l i f e t o be an ac t ive s tuden t o f

h i s to ry, a l ec tu re r, and a spokesman who a r t i cu l a t ed theadvantages of a i rpower.I f irst heard of Hansell 12 years earl ier when I was a cadet

s tudying the his tory of a i rpower. The Air Force had been anindependen t s e rv i ce fo r l e s s t han 15 yea r s . Much o f t hehis tory being taught focused on the contr ibut ions of a fewairmen who were vis ionary thinkers with an almost zealous

bel ief in the potent ial of ai rpower to change the nature of warfare. The key to achieving the promise was the abil i ty to

conduct a i r opera t ions independent o f g round forces wi th anobjective of taking the war directly to the enemy heartland indayl ight precis ion at tacks against key industr ia l and mil i taryta rge ts . The theory he ld tha t such a t tacks conducted aga ins ta s t ra tegic target array would destroy an enemys abi l i ty tofield and support mili tary forces by destroying his capacity tomanufac tu re and t r anspor t war ma te r i a l s .

In his book The Quest: Haywood Hansell and AmericanStrategic Bombing in World War II, Charles Griff i th makes a

major contribution in detail ing the role played by GeneralHansel l f rom his ear ly days as an inst ructor a t the Air CorpsTac t ica l School to the heady days and n ights as a young war

p lanner deve loping the a i r war p lan used by the Uni ted Sta tesdur ing Wor ld War I I to h i s t r iumphs and d isappoin tments as acommander in the field. While the book tells this story well, itdoes more than ju s t r e l a t e t he l i f e and t imes o f PossumHansel l . The book goes a long way toward explaining theorigins of many of the arguments about the ut i l i ty of a i rpower

in the closing decade of the twentieth century.

vii


8/236

The bot tom l ine is Hansel l had i t r ighttechnology and t imehave made his vis ion a real i ty as evidenced by Deser t Storm in1991, Bosnia in 1995, and most recent ly in Kosovo. At the

heart of his vision was the idea of airpower as a tool for prec i s ion engagement , no t an indiscr iminate weapon of massdestruct ion. A tool that , i f proper ly unders tood and employed,would allow the United States to prevail while greatl y reducingthe price of victory.

RONALD R. FOGLEMANGeneral , USAF, Retired

viii


9/236

A bout the A uthor

Charles Griffi th received a bachelor s and master s degree inhis tory f rom East Tennessee State Univers i ty and earned hisdoctorate in mili tary history from the University of Tennessee.He teaches advance p lacement Amer ican h is tory and serves aschairman of the social s tudies depar tment a t Science Hil l HighSchool in Johnson City, Tennessee. Dr. Griff i th a lso serves as

a d j u n c t p r o f e s s o r o f h i s t o r y a t E a s t Te n n e s s e e S t a t eUniversity.

CHARLES GRIFFITH

ix


10/236

I ntr oducti on

On the night of 24 November 1944, B-29 Superfor t resseslanded in the darkness of Saipan with only smudge pots along-side the runway to l ight their path. Inside the control tower ananxious Brig Gen Haywood Hansel l awai ted their re turn. The

bombers were re turning from the f i rs t bombing mission over Tokyo since Jimmy Doolit t les famous raid in 1942. This t imethe ra id consis ted of 111 heavy bombers . Their target was the

Nak a j i m a- M us a s h i n o a i r c r a f t f a c t o r y co m pl ex , no t t o ke n

targets to boost American morale . Hansel l had been warned by the chief of the Army Air Forces, Gen Henry H. HapArnold , tha t exper t s had pred ic ted tha t the ra id as Hanse l lhad p l anned i t was a lmos t ce r t a in ly doomed to f a i l , andArnold had placed full responsibility for the raid on Hansellsshoulders . In addi t ion to this ominous warning, Brig GenE m m e t t R o s i e O D o n n e l l , c o m m a n d e r o f t h e 7 3 dBombardment Wing , which was execut ing the miss ion , hadwr i t ten a le t te r to Hanse l l in which he advoca ted abandoning

the planned dayl ight miss ion in favor of a s afer night miss ion.Since the very idea of a night bombing mission ran counter toal l that Hansel l bel ieved about s t ra tegic bombing, Hansel lre jec ted the idea . Now, a f te r hours of sweat ing out them i s s i o n , H a n s e l l s d e c i s i o n w a s v i n d i c a t e d . O f t h e 111

b o m b e r s t h a t h a d l a u n c h e d e a r l y t h a t m o r n i n g , 8 8 h a da t tacked ta rge ts in Japan and only two B-29s fa i led to re turn ;H a n s e l l h a d p r o v e d t h a t A m e r i c a n h e a v y b o m b e r s c o u l dconduct day l igh t opera t ions over the Japanese home i s lands

wi thout p rohib i t ive losses . This was Hanse l l s moment of t r iumph. This t r iumph would al l too soon be fol lowed by thet r agedy o f h i s d i smis sa l , t he end o f h i s ca ree r, and thetemporary end of the s t ra tegic bombing doctr ine he had doneso much to formula te and execute .

Haywood Hanse l l i s a rguably the mos t impor tan t p roponentand pract i t ioner of high-al t i tude, dayl ight precis ion bombingin the United States Army Air Forces in World War II . Eventhough h is name i s no t as immedia te ly recognized as the

names of Chennaul t , Spaa tz , Dool i t t l e , LeMay, Eaker, o r

x i


11/236

A r n o l d , H a n s e l l s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t a n dimpressive. He f lew as a s tunt pi lot in the barnstorming dayswith Claire Chennaul t . He la ter a t tended and taught a t the Air

Corps Tactical School, where he helped formulate Americas prewar a i r doct r ine. He then took a leading role in prepar ingthe three great air war plans (AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and the

plan for the Combined Bomber Offensive) for the strategic bombing campaign aga ins t Naz i Germany. He commanded theonly opera t iona l B-17 wing in England f rom January to June1 9 4 3 a n d h a d t h u s d i r e c t e d t h e f i r s t A m e r i c a n b o m b i n gmiss ions ove r Germany. Then , a t t he r eques t o f Gene ra lArnold, he returned to Washington to create the worlds f irst

global striking force, the Twentieth Air Force. As chief of staff of the Twentieth Air Force, Hansell was given virtually a freeh a n d t o o v e r s e e t h e e a r l y m i s s i o n s o f t h e X X B o m b e r Command in d i s tan t China . Then as commander of the XXIBomber Command in the Mar ianas , Hanse l l overcame manyoperational difficulties to direct the first B-29 raids over Tokyoa n d s u c c e s s f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d t h e b a s i s f o r t h e s u s t a i n e ds t ra teg ic bombing campaign aga ins t Japan , which u l t imate lycontr ibuted great ly to the col lapse of the Japanese Empire .

Hansell was ahead of his t ime. In view of recent operationscarried out against Iraq and Serbia, i t is clear that Hansellsvision for American strategic air doctrine was ult imately made

possible by advances in technology. In the classrooms of theAir Corps Tact ical School in Alabama and in the old munit ions

bui lding in Washington, Hansel l and his col leagues HaroldGeorge, Kenneth Walker, and Laurence Kuter had l i teral lysweated out the details of what would become Americas uniquedoctrine of bombing predetermined, specific economic/military

targets using heavy bombers operat ing in broad dayl ight . Thisdoctr ine came to l i fe in Europe when the United States EighthAir Force began i ts legendary campaign against Hitler s war machine. Kenneth Walker was ki l led in act ion in a bombingraid over New Britain, and Harold George and Laurence Kuter were bo th ass igned to du t ies in the S ta tes dur ing mos t o f thewar. I t was up to Hansel l , the only one of the or iginal plannersto have the opportuni ty to inf luence actual operat ions , to seethat their doctr ine of dayl ight precis ion bombardment was

carried out during World War II.

xi i


12/236

In Europe the f r ic t ions of war meant that Hansel l would seehis vision of strategic air war altered by the needs of groundoperat ions in the Mediterranean and in Operat ion Overlord,

the fierce resistance of the Luftwaffe and German antiaircraftdefenses , and by o ther fac tors such as weather and an ever-changing target l ist . Once Hansells B-29s were operational inthe Pacific, he believed that he would have a free hand tofinally conduct the kind of strategic air war for which he had

prepared all his professional l ife. But frict ions arose in thePacific as well. New, unproven aircraft, lack of supplies andm a i n t e n a n c e f a c i l i t i e s , a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e w e a t h e r a l lcontr ibuted to a less than auspicious s tar t of Hansel l s a i r o ff ens ive aga ins t J apan . The r e su l t s o f h i s h igh -a l t i t ude ,d a y l i g h t b o m b i n g c a m p a i g n d i d n o t m e e t H a n s e l l s o w nexpec ta t ions , much less those of Genera l Arnold . Hanse l lres i s ted sugges t ions tha t he swi tch to n igh t a rea bombingtac t ics us ing incendiary bombs aga ins t Japanese c i t i es , and asa resu l t he was abrupt ly re l ieved of command in January1945. Maj Gen Cur t i s LeMay p icked up opera t ions whereHansell left off. He too failed to achieve the expected results,

bu t Tokyo and many other Japanese c i t i es burned .Hansell has been cri t icized as being one of the leaders in the

Bomber Mafia and for being inflexible concerning his belief inthe war-winning capabil i ty of strategic bombing. I t is perhapstrue that Hansell fai led to dist inguish the difference betweendoctr ine and dogma and that th is cost him his career. Yet , i t i simportant to note that todays American strategic air forceshave the technology to carry out the doctr ine Hansel l hadespoused with the zeal of an apost le . Perhaps too, Hansel l wasoverzea lous in h i s ques t , bu t he was no Don Quixote and hewas not joust ing windmil ls . I f today the United States has areputation for pinpoint accuracy in i ts bombing campaignsthat yield swift and easily discernable results and for avoidingc iv i l i an ca sua l t i e s , Hanse l l s e f fo r t s a r e a t l e a s t i n pa r tresponsible. Hansell did not lose or squander his career assome suppose; he sacrificed his career for a principle.

xiii


13/236

Chapter 1

The Problems of Airpower

In September 1987 Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansel l J r. and hisson, Col Haywood S. Hansell III, spoke before the Nuclear Strategy Symposium given by the Center for Aerospace Doc-tr ine, Research, and Educat ion at Maxwell Air Force Base(AFB), Alabama. The speech, Air Power in National Strategy,

p roposed a t hes i s t ha t m us t have t aken t he audi ence by su r- pr ise. The Hansel ls assumed that the Strategic Defense Ini t ia -

t ive (SDI or Star Wars) would be possible and operationalthus end ing the ominous th rea t o f mu tua l a s su red des t ruc -t ion, and for that reason convent ional a i rpower would emergeas the mos t impor tan t de te r ren t . The proposed de thronementof nuclear weapons as the corners tone of Uni ted States mil i -ta ry s t ra tegy a f te r more than four decades requi red carefu l

p lanning and a wi l l ingness to s tand in the face of cur ren t professional opinion. 1

The speech was divided into two parts: Then, delivered by

General Hansell , and Now, delivered by Colonel Hansell .General Hansell minced no words in extoll ing the virtues of the dayl ight precis ion bombing campaign of the United Stat esagainst Germany during World War I I . This campaign, whichlasted from August 1942 to April 1945, called for undermin -ing the enemy mil i tary capabi l i ty to f ight as wel l as the enemynational will by destroying the physical elements which sup-

port the mil i tary forces and the societal wi ll to wage war. 2

General Hansel l acknowledged the fact that the campaign

failed to accomplish the goals of the operational strategy as planned. However , he concluded that i f ai rpower had not beendiver ted to the Medi te r ranean and had been concent ra ted onessent ia l economic targets , the s t ra tegic a i r campaign couldhave been successful ly completed before the Normandy inva -s ion in June 1944. Had th i s been the case , Germany wouldhave col lapsed much ear l ier because Hit ler would have beenunable to sus ta in the war mater ia l ly. 3

Colonel Hansel l , bui lding upon his fa ther s thesis , main -

ta ined tha t a cons tan t force of 200 modern bombers (B-1 a nd

1


14/236

B-2) using convent ional , unguided bomb weapons could rea-sonably rep l ica te the en t i re des t ruc t ive e ffec t o f s t ra teg ic

bombing (area bombing included) of Germany in World War IIin just 21 operational days. Moreover, a force of 230 such

bombers us ing convent ional weapons could fa ta l ly weaken theSoviet Unions abil i ty to make war. This was predicated on theassumption that SDI would have been successful ly deployedand tha t the bomber force suffe red no more than a two per -cent at tr i t ion rate per day for 21 days. SDI would theoretically

protect the United States from missile at tacks while the Air Force would deploy the B-1B with i ts low radar profile, whichwould protect i t f rom being detected and shot down, and theB-2, which has almost no radar profile. In addition to the stealthaircraft, the Air Force would attack Soviet ground-based andair-based radar capabil i t ies, thus suppressing Soviet air de-fenses, which were heavily dependent upon radar direction. 4

I t i s appropria te that General Hansel l s las t publ ic appear-ance was a t the s i te of his f i rs t real Air Corps ass ignment

B-1 Bomber

THE QUEST

2


15/236

where he had taught the concepts of s t ra teg ic a i r war to fu turecommanders attending the Air Corps Tactical School (ACTS) a tMaxwell Field, Alabama. He died in November 1988 as he was

packing to del iver a var ia t ion of his speech to the CanadianWar College. His l ife had been devoted to the theory and prac-tice of strategic airpowerthe single most controversial mili-ta ry deba te of the twent ie th cen tury. S ince h i s dea th , thewor ld has wi tnessed the h igh ly success fu l a i r campaign in thePers ian Gulf War and the demise of the Soviet Union. Theseevents have caused a rad ica l reduc t ion in the Amer ican nu-clear t r iad and presented the world with a wide var ie ty of

potent ia l mil i tary scenarios . Yet the debate over the proper

use of s t ra tegic a i r war cont inues . I t i s a debate as old as theairplane itself. 5

Unl ike theor i s t s o f sur face warfare bo th on land and sea ,there could be no Clausewitz , Jomini , or Mahan to form atheory of air war based on historical precedent. At the begin -ning of the First World War the concept of air war was st i l lnovel and exis ted, i f a t a l l , in the realm of the fantast ic , bestexemplified by H. G. Wellss The War in the Air, first publishedin 1908. Wells described a German air at tack on New York

Ci ty, an a t tack that caused the c i ty to become a furnace of cr imson f lames. 6 Such fan tas ies domina ted the popular con -cept ion of a i rpower and brought with them effor ts to preventthe un leash ing of such a des t ruc t ive force upon mankind . The1907 Hague Convent ion included a prohibi t ion on the bom -

bardment of towns and vi l lages , dwel l ings , or bui ldings thatare not defended. 7 The fear o f aer ia l bombardment opened anent i re ly new debate concerning moral i ty and warfare .

The nineteenth century was a century of technological prog-

ress. Industrial facilities were mass producing everything fromsewing needles to machine-gun bul le t s ; advances in t ranspor -ta t ion had made the wor ld a much smal le r p lace ; and pol i t i ca ladvances had given rise to massive peoples armies. Novel-t ies such as heavier- than-air f l ight cer ta inly f i t in to the pat-tern of unl imited progress . Even af ter the terr ible AmericanCivi l War with i ts mass-produced weapons and large-scalekil l ing, Americans did not automatically equate new technol-ogy with increased deadl iness in warfare . Gen Wil l iam T.

Sherman s famed march to the sea did not have the ki l l ing of

THE PROBLEMS OF AIRPOWER

3


16/236

women and ch i ldren as i t s ob jec t , ye t Sherman wa s a imin g a teconomic targets that would indirectly affect civil ians. As thehis tor ian Michael Sherry observed, In America , a i rplanes

were seen as ins t ruments of progress , not terr ible weapons of destruct ion. 8 The use of airplanes to kil l civil ians indiscrimi-nately, including women and chi ldren, was beyond the Ameri-cans concept of morali ty in warfare. There was st i l l a dist inc-t ion be tween combatan t and noncombatan t , and even thoughAmericans agreed with Sherman that war is hell , i t should

be so only in an anci l lary waynot in the direct target ing of civil ians for mili tary purposes.

The Europeans took a much more mart ia l v iew of the uses

of the a i rp lane . To them preparedness was an impor tan t p re -requis i te to peace or war, and they viewed with favor anyweapon tha t could e i ther de te r aggress ion or win a qu ick ,decis ive victory. In 1911 the I ta l ians sent nine a i rplanes andtwo dirigibles to Libya for service in their war against theTurks . The a i rc ra f t par t ic ipa ted in reconnaissance and c rude

bombing missions, but without decisive effect . Aircraft also played a minor role in the Balkan wars of 191213. Eventhough these early efforts proved somewhat less effective thanexpec ted , the major European powers took not ice . In 1910 thecombined air s t rength of Germany, Austr ia-Hungary, France,Russ ia , and Grea t Br i ta in was a round 50 a i rp lanes . By 1914the i r combined a i r f l ee t s had reached the 700 mark . 9

The European vis ion of a i r war was revealed in 1913 byFrench aviator Pol Timonier in his book, How We Are Going toTorpedo Berl in with Our Squadron of Airplanes as Soon as theWar Begins . In th i s scenar io the Germans would a t tack Par i swith upwards of 132,000 pounds of explosives, which woulddecimate the populat ion amidst indescr ibable horrors , af ter w h i c h t h e F r e n c h w o u l d r e t a l i a t e w i t h a m a s s i v e a t t a c k against Berl in , unleashing 1,360 torpedoes, thus br ingingthe war to a success fu l and rap id conc lus ion . The Europeansnot only saw fit to prepare air fleets, some were willing (intheory at least ) to unleash that power on civi l ians in order towin wars in the shortes t , most decis ive manner. Referr ing toEurope, Sherry concluded, War i tse l f was not unthinkable ,

only endless and meaningless war.1 0

THE QUEST

4


17/236

In the popular imaginat ion, the destruct ive power of theairplane before the First World War was formidable. In spite of rul ings by the Hague Convent ion, i t was conceivable that un-

defended ci t ies and their inhabi tants could be targeted. Thearmies and navies that would have to deploy the a i r forceshad not yet formulated pract ical ways of using the a i rplanenor had they decided how the a i rplane would f i t in to exis t ingmili tary strategy. Air war doctrine would emerge from the ex-

per ience of war and the further development of the airplanestechnical capabi l i t ies .

Ai r war ex is t s in many forms , bu t has been mos t s imply broken down into two segmentstact ical and s t rategic. Tact i -

cal air warfare, simply defined, is combat support given toground or nava l un i t s e i ther in ac tua l a t tack on oppos ingsurface forces or in defending friendly surface forces from air a t tacks . Tact ical a i r forces are subservient to and serve theinterests and needs of the surface forces . Stra tegic a i r war , onthe o ther hand , cons is t s o f independent a i r a t tacks aga ins tthe enemys in f ras t ruc ture wi th the in ten t o f e ffec t ing theenemys surrender or, that fa i l ing, of weakening the enemy tothe point that he cannot carry out effect ive mil i tary opera-

t ions. Strategic air war is in keeping with Clausewitzs defin i-tion of war: War therefore is an act of violence intended tocompel our opponent to fulfill our will. Clausewitz, however,saw only the dispersion of an enemys army, the capture of hiscapital , or the elimination of his principal al ly as a means of

br inging about the enemys over throw. Strategic air war offersa more direct and, in some ways, more s imple means of over -throwing an enemy. But, as Clausewitz pointed out, Every-thing is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult . 1 1

The First World War offered the first chance to use aircraft ona large scale for military purposes, and the fears and fantasieswere proven to be incorrect or incomplete. No cities were setablaze in the opening phases of the war. In fact it was onlythrough much trial and error that the airplane finally took i ts

place among the weapons of war. None of the prewar predictionstook into account such factors as weather, navigation, bombingaccuracy, or the impac t the bombs would have if and when theyactually struck their intended targets. Strategic bombing existed

as an interesting possibil i ty in the Great War, but was used only


5


18/236

sparingly. Aircraft were used as tactical instruments in thisconflict , f irst for reconnaissance purposes, then for air supe-riori ty roles, and finally for ground attack and interdiction.Even though many his tor ians have branded the use of mil i taryaircraft a failure in the First World War, historian Lee Kennettholds another view. He maintains that the air war i tself fai ledto make a real di fference in the outcome of the war, but thatreconnaissance aircraft directed the awesome firepower of thear t i l lery, and bombing aircraf t added to the bombardments ,which in tu rn he lped perpe tua te the s ta lemate . 1 2

Strategic bombing in the Firs t World War was f i rs t prac-t iced in 1915 by Imper ia l Germany wi th the zeppe l in ra ids onEngland . The ra ids caused fear and cons te rna t ion among theBritish, but certainly did not knock Great Britain out of the wa r .The second phase of German s t ra tegic bombing was begun inMay 1917 and las ted unt i l May 1918. This phase ut i l ized whatthe aviation writer R. P. Hearne called the principle of psy-chological influence and saw the introduction of the newtwin-engine Gotha bombers and the multiengine Riesenflugzeug

Z-1 Zeppelin

THE QUEST

6


19/236


20/236

chains . The s teel faci l i t ies of the Saar, Luxembourg, and west -e rn Germany became the focus of French a t ten t ion . S ince thesteel mil ls produced f i res that could be seen for miles a t n ight ,

the French switched to night operat ions to ut i l ize most effec-t ively their l imited supply of bombers . 1 6

The British launched their attacks in the daylight, often withimpunity. But on occasion t heir losses could be as high as 3 per-cen t . Accuracy also suffered; the Bri t ish could count only a 25

percent accuracy ra te on targets as large as zeppe l in shedsand only a 2 percent accuracy ra te on ta rge ts such as ra i l

junct ions and rai l s tat ions . As the technology of ai r war im - proved, however , so did the s ize and purpose of the bombs .

Incendiary bombs were cons t ruc ted and used to des t roy Bul -ga r i an whea t f i e ld s and to bu rn g ra in f i e ld s i n s ide Germ a n -occupi ed F ran ce. There was even consideration by the Allies of

bombs containing poison gas to be dropped on German cit ies. 17

Despi te a l l the intent ions of adher ing to a s t ra tegic bombing pol icy that targeted only mil i tary targets , the absence of anable s t ra tegic bombing force and the need to re ta l ia te againstGerman at tacks on All ied c i t ies diver ted the a t tent ion of theAllied air campaign. In the late spring of 1918 the Royal Air

Force (RAF) was created as an independent branch of theBrit ish armed forces. I ts commander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Montague Trenchard , had a t h i s d i sposa l the means for ra ids in force over German terr i tory and succeeded in drop-

p ing 660 tons of bombs on German ta rge ts . But the p lans for s t ra teg ic bombing d id no t p lease the French because the Ger -mans occupied Belgium and a large port ion of France, thusmaking France more vu lnerab le than Germany to a i r a t tack .This fact of geography hindered the Allied hopes for a strategic

a i r campaign aga ins t Germany. Therefore , an in te rna t iona ls t r a t eg i c a i r fo rce i nc lud ing Br i t i sh , F rench , I t a l i an , andAmerican bombers was never organized. 1 8

The Amer icans d id no t l aunch a s t ra teg ic a i r campaignagainst Germany even though they made a s ignif icant contr i -

bution to the air war with the services of Brig Gen Wil l iamBilly Mitchell. Mitchell commanded the largest air effort of the war and envis ioned parachut ing an en t i re a rmy d iv is ion

behind enemy l ines , bu t these ac t ions , both rea l and pro -

posed, lay within the realm of the tactical , not the strategic. If

THE QUEST

8


21/236

the war had carried over into 1919, the Allies (particularly theAmer icans) could have amassed a formidable a i r a rmada , bu t

with the s igning of the Armist ice in November 1918, the heady plans for 1919 were never car r ied out . 1 9

The s t ra tegic bomber turned out to be only a shadow of thethreat i t was believed to pose prior to the First World War.Cities were attacked, but not one of the bell igerents was seri-ously damaged, much less induced to sue for peace because of

bomber attacks. Yet the lessons of the First World War workedin favor of strategic bombing. Tens of millions had been killedor wounded on the Western Front and o ther ba t t l egrounds ,

and victory for the Allies came only through bloody attritionafter four years of unimaginable horror and sacrifice. The staticstalemate of trench warfare cried out for an alternative to theterrible slaughter. Strategic bombing was to be that al ternative.As Kennett observed, Only strategic airpower seemed to offer areal alternative to the bloody, indecisive collisions along astatic front: the swift , deep, surgically precise stroke at just theright objectivewhat Clausewitz called the enemys center of

gravitywould ensure his rapid collapse.2 0

British Handley-Page Bomber


9


22/236

Other lessons were learned as well . The bombing of Londoncaused panic in the s t ree t s bu t a l so caused absentee ism andfall ing production in the citys war industries. Crowds stam-

peded, caus ing a number of deaths during ai r ra ids on Londonand Paris. These lessons seemed to teach that if the civil ian population was targeted on a massive scale , war product ionwould not be able to supply the army in the field. The popula -t ion , under in tense a i r a t tack , could perhaps be dr iven to the

point of civil disobedience, thereby either causing the collapseof the government or forcing the government to sue for peace to

prevent any such col lapse. The lessons were apparent ly mademore valid by the collapse of empires without invasion. Impe-

r ia l Russia had been forced out of the war because of aninternal revolut ion brought on by worsening wart ime condi-t ions. The Austrian Empire had also collapsed without a singleAllied soldier coming near Vienna. Finally, Imperial Germanyhad accepted an armist ice even though no All ied soldiers hadyet reached the Rhine. All had collapsed, to one degree or another, because their people could not or would not cont inuethe war. Therefore, if bombers could carry the war directly tothe people, a war might well end before an entire generati on of young men was sacr i f iced in the t renches . 2 1

Soon after the armistice, the World War I practi t ioners of air war became the prophets of s t ra tegic a i r war, should there bea second such confl ic t . The Bri t ish , I ta l ians , and Americanswere the most vocal in the realm of a i r prophecy. Firs t , theyhe ld tha t ano the r war i n t he t r enches was unaccep tab le andthat s t ra tegic a i rpower was the solut ion. Second, they main -ta ined that an independent a i r force, exclusive of ground or naval command, was essent ia l to es tabl ishing a s t ra tegic a i r force. Third, they were certain that strategic air forces woulda lways ge t t h rough enemy de fenses because no e ff ec t ivemeans of stopping them then existed. Finally, they all believedthat strategic air forces must hit vital centers well behindenemy l ines . There was an in t r ins ic d i sagreement among the

prophets on this l as t point . Should the vi ta l centers be s t r ic t lymil i tary and economic targets , or should the populat ion cen-ters be included on the target l i s ts? Indeed, should the people

themselves be the targets?

THE QUEST

10


23/236

Even before the Firs t World War ended, the Bri t ish hadcreated the worlds f i rs t independent a i r force. Gen Jan Smutsof Brit ish South Africa headed a commission to investigate air

o rganiza t ion and home defense . In a memorandum da ted Au -gust 1917, he s ta ted, As far as can at present be foreseenthere is absolutely no l imit to i ts [airpower s] independent war use . And the day may not be far off when aer ia l operat ionswith their devastat ion of enemy lands and destruct ion of in -dus t r ia l and populous cen te rs on a vas t sca le may become the

principal operations of war, to which the older forms of mili -ta ry and nava l opera t ions may become secondary and subor-dinate. 2 2 This report was an important factor in the creat ion

of the RAF and a for ce in i t s futur e develop ment .2 3

Trenchard bel ieved that the a i rplane could prevent the car-nage and s ta lemate of modern war. At f i rs t he advocated at -tacks a t the sources of an enemys s t rength ; bu t he grew moreand more to favor a t tacks on an enemys morale , bel ievingthat the psychological yield of the RAFs attacks on townsalong the Rhine during the Firs t World War was 20 t imesmore powerful than the mater ia l damage inf l ic ted. 2 4

Coun t Giova nni Cap roni was an early proponent of t he use of

airpower in the First World War. In October 1917, he and Lt ColGiulio Douhet wrot e a memorandum for the United States Arm yAir Service in which they proposed long-range bomber attackson German and Austr ian war industr ies . Douhet was a s taunchadvoca te of a i rpower, so much so tha t he spent t ime in anItalian prison for cri t icizing his superiors because of their lack of unders tanding of a i r warfare . His record was c leared, andhe la ter rose to the rank of general . In 1921 he publ ished Th eCommand of the Air, in which he expla ined h is be l ie f tha t an

independent a i r force could re turn decis iveness to war by at -tacking over an enemy army direct ly to his vi ta l centers . Theseat tacks would not be l imited s imply to t radi t ional mil i taryobject ives but would s t r ike f i rs t a t the enemys industr ies andcit ies, including the populations of those cit ies. 2 5

Based on the experience of the First World War, there could be no successful surface offensive, either on land or sea. If a de-cisive battle could be fought, it would have to be t hrough strate -gic airpower. Furthermore, modern warfare, by its very nature,

could no longer accept the distinction between combatant and


11


24/236

noncombatant . Civi l ians in the war factory were as much re-spons ib le for making war as were the so ld ie rs in the t renches .Therefore, civil ians were not only acceptable tar gets, they were

the preferred targets . The at tacks on the c ivi l ian centers would be carr ied out by an independent a i r force, which would makewar without mercy upon civi l ians in order to end the war decis ively with far fewer casual t ies than had been seen in theFirst World War. 2 6

Douhet s exper iences in the war had taught h im tha t an t i -aircraft artillery was mostly ineffective. He stated, No fortifica -t ions can possibly offset these new weapons, which can s t r ikemor t a l b lows in to t he hea r t o f t he enemy wi th l i gh tn ing

speed .2 7

P u r s u i t a i r c r a f t w e r e o f n o v a l u e , a c c o r d i n g t oDouhet . He main ta ined tha t f i repower was fa r more impor tan tthan speed, bel ieving that the former could a lways overcomethe la t ter. He advocated the creat ion of the bat t le plane, es-sent ia l ly a bombing aircraf t wi th enough defensive armamentto car ry an a t tacker sa fe ly over enemy te r r i to ry. In fac t ,Douhet fe l t tha t defens ive a rmament on h is ba t t l e p lane waschiefly for the morale of the aircrews, not to defend them fromany r ea l t h r ea t . 2 8

Targe t s e l ec t ion was ve ry impor t an t and , acco rd ing toDouhet, also very difficult . The selection of objectives and theorder in which they ought to be destroyed fell under the t i t le of aerial strategy . His first objective was not his opponents air f leet . On the contrary, bombers must avoid the prel iminar iesof aer ia l combat and ge t on wi th the bus iness of bombingstra tegic targets , because the chances are not only that i t [ theair fleet] will fail to find the enemy air force in the air, but alsotha t the la t te r i s a t tha t very moment car ry ing out uncha l -

lenged i ts operat ions against the home terr i tory.2 9

The onlychance at a i r super ior i ty lay not in dogfights high in thec louds , bu t in the des t ruc t ion of an enemys bases and meansof production. 3 0

For Douhet , means of production cou ld mean on ly oneth ingthe c i t i es . The a t tack mus t be swif t , ru th less , anddeadly. Within a few minutes some 20 tons of high-explosive,incendiary, and gas bombs would ra in down. F i r s t wouldcome explosives, then fires, then deadly gases floating on the

sur face and prevent ing any approach to the s t r icken a rea .3 1

THE QUEST

12


25/236

The scene is t ruly apocalypt ic , and i t was intended to be. Theobjective was to terrorize the survivors into capitulation throughmass ive a t tacks , no t on ly on one c i ty bu t on as many as 50 in

a s ingle day. I t i s a lso important to note that f rom the outset poison gas would be used ; Douhets strategy did not allow for threats or postur ing before his most deadly card was played. 3 2

Douhet based his view of s t ra tegic a i r war, of course , on theexper iences of the Grea t War. He had read newspaper ac-counts of the panic in London and could c i te many other examples of the effects of aerial bombardment on a civil ian

population: The reader who thinks I have overcolored the pic -tu re has only to recall the panic created at Brescia when, durin g

funeral services for the victims of an earl ier bombinga negli-gible one compared with the one I have pictured hereone of the mourners mis took a b i rd for an enemy p lane . 3 3

Gen Billy Mitchell, the Ameri can airpower adv ocate, com -manded the largest s ingle a i r operat ion of the Firs t World War when he d i rec ted near ly 1 ,500 combat a i rc ra f t in the Sa in tMihiel offensive in 1918. This operational experience gaveMitchel l a be t te r unders tandi ng t han Douhet had of the ex is t -ing technology. Mitchell had more res pect for a ntiairc raft art i l -

lery and knew that eff ic ient pursui t a i rcraf t patrols could in -deed intercept and blunt a i r a t tacks . Mitchel l would make hisimpact not through or iginal ideas but through his advocacy of the ideas of others re inforced by his own experiences . 3 4

During the war Mitchel l had been exposed to the ideas of Trenchard, Caproni, and Douhet. I t is difficult , however, tode te rmine jus t how much inf luence each had on h im. FromTrenchard i t is probable that Mitchell developed his advocacyfor an independent a i r force, which could mass i ts power and

be deployed offensively. He had a respect for the concept of s t r iking at an enemys vi ta l centers , but when i t came tocommanding h is own a i r un i t s , he dea l t in the rea lm of thetact ical . As an operat ional commander, he was forced to dealwi th such mundane t a sks a s de t a i l ed t r a in ing , un i t admin i -stration, and tactical directionall of which were essential for a i r opera t ions . 3 5 Also , un l ike Douhet , he p laced emphas isupon pursu i t , c la iming tha t the dayt ime use of bombardmentwithout the cooperat ion of pursui t i s not contemplated except

in ra re cases .3 6


13


26/236

With the war s end the Americans were content to abandonEurope and ret i re to the safety of their insular cont inent . Thismeant that advocacy of f irst-str ike strategic bombing would

have no place in postwar American doctr ine. Mitchel l wasforced by ci rcumstances to advocate a new, more comfort ingrole for the bomber. He contended that the bomber could be adefensive weapon, used to protect Americas sea-lanes fromenemy naval a t tack. When the Navy discounted the abi l i ty of the bomber to s ink a ba t t l esh ip , Mi tche l l took up the cha l -lenge and sank the former German ba t t lesh ip Ostfriesland a tanchor off the coast of Virginia . In la ter tes ts he sank other obsolete American bat t leships , but he fa i led to convince the

Navy that i t s ships were vulnerable to a i r a t tack. Nevertheless ,wi th these successes in hand , he became the ch ie f advoca te of American airpower. 3 7

A great deal of money would have to be spent to make theArmy Air Service the chief defender of Americas coasts, andthe leaders in Washingt on had no intent ion of spending i t . Thecondition of aircraft and facilities within the Army Air Servicewas deplorable and gett ing worse. Mitchell became so vocal inh is c r i t i c i sm tha t in March 1925 he los t h i s pos i t ion as ass is -

tant commander of the Army Air Services and was exiled toFort Sam Houston, Texas. When a f l ight of Navy seaplanesfailed to complete the tr ip from California to Hawaii and the

Navy dirigible Shenandoah crashed ki l l ing 14 people a l l in thespace of a week in the late summer of 1925, Mitchell took ac t ion . In a s ta tement to the press he accused the War and

Navy Departments of incompetency, criminal negl igence, andthe a lmos t t r ea sonab le admin i s t r a t i on o f ou r na t iona l de -fense . The gaunt le t was taken up by h is opponents , and the

ensuing bat t le resul ted in his court -mart ia l and forced res ig-nat ion from the Army as of 1 February 1926. 3 8 Mitchell hadwelcomed his tr ial as a platform for publicizing his views ona i rpower, bu t the resu l t had ended h is mi l i t a ry career.

Russell Weigley contends that there are two Billy Mitchells:the one f rom 191726, who was t i ed to the ex is t ing technol -ogy and ex i s t i ng t ac t i ca l and s t r a t eg i c knowledge ; and the

pos t -1926 Billy Mitchell, who increasingly advocated Douhetsvital center theory. Mitchell proposed attacking the vital cen-

ters with f i re , h igh explosives , and chemical weapons because

THE QUEST

14


27/236

it would be more cost-effective. Perhaps, once his official tieswere severed, he could express his own views more freely or,more probably, he had lost touch with the current technology

and tended to inflate exist ing capabil i t ies of mili tary aircraft .He did, however, inadvertently teach a generation of young avia -tors to be more circumspect in their advocacy of airpower. 3 9

After Mitchells departure from the Army Air Service, nosingle individual emerged to take his place as the outspokenadvocate of airpower. The function of formulating air war doc-trine fell to the Air Corps Tactical School. Begun as a trainingcenter for Air Corps field-grade officers, this institution servedas the unofficial center for forming United States Army air

policies. After resolving the conflict between pursuit and bom - bardment by concen t ra t ing on bombardmen t , ACTS ques -t ioned the idea of a t tacking civi l ians and ref ined the conceptof attacking the enemys vital centers to shatter the societyseconomic s t ructure . The civi l ians could be manipulated intoforcing their nat ions surrender, not by at tacking them direct ly

bu t by a t tack ing the economic sys t em tha t suppor ted them. 4 0

The Americans unwill ingness to target civil ians was a tech-nical as much as a publ ic re la t ions or moral decis i on. By 1935

a prototype of the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress had taken tothe a i r. Since i t could f ly fas ter than any exis t ing operat ional pursui t a i rcraf t of the t ime, i t was considered to be imperviousto intercept ion. I t was equipped with a precis ion bombsightthat would allow it to attack pinpoint targets. This technologygave new life to Americas strategic air war doctrine. The ArmyAir Corps advocated attacking specific economic targets indayl ight with massive numbers of bombers f lying in format ion.Histor ian Ronald Schaffer points out that se lect ive bombing

was better for publicity in America; i t f i t the kind of equipmentavailable, and i t represented the best way for Air Corps offi -cers to get the most out of a shr inking budget . This was, for the reasons s ta ted above, a c lear depar ture f rom Douhetsconcept of massive, violent at tacks directly against civil ians. 4 1

The new technology of the B-17 had been tr ied only in peacetime pract ice; i t had yet to experience the real i t ies of war. The unexpected is to be expected on the bat t lef ie ld .Clausewitz explained, Friction is the only conception which in

a genera l way cor responds to tha t which d is t inguishes rea l


15


28/236

war from war on paper. 4 2 I t had been a s sumed by those who popular ized s t ra tegic a i r war and by the se r ious t heo r i s t s t ha tthe bomber would always get through. Douhet had exam inedsome of the potent ia l problems of s t ra tegic a i r war, such asimproved safety, bet ter mater ia ls in a i rcraf t construct ion, in -c reased car ry ing capac i ty and rad ius of ac t ion , and morespeed with less fuel consumption. Yet , no one addressed thereal frictions of strategic air warfare. 4 3

Even after the experiences of the Great War, the theoristsviewed strategic bombing far too simplistically. The strategic

bombing campaign itself was seen merely as a problem of target -ing, but in order to select the most important targets, a complexsystem of specialized military intelligence must first be in place.

No provisions had been made for such an intel l igence network.In addi t ion to this , the very concept of frict ions h a d n o t b e e nser iously considered. Before s t ra tegic bombing could com-mence , fac tors such as weather, main tenance , t ra in ing , o rd-nance , and a i rc ra f t capabi l i t i es had to be taken in to account .Yet the simplist ic Douhetian concept of the self-defending bat-t le plane ref lected the f i rm bel ief by interwar theoris ts and thegenera l publ ic as wel l tha t the bomber could pene t ra te enemy

air space, s t r ike i ts target , and re turn safely. Only operat ional

Boeing B-17 Bombers

THE QUEST

16


29/236

experience in combat would reveal many of the problems s t ra -tegic bombers would face. Once World War I I had begun, thestra tegic a i r war took on a dynamic dr iven by exis t ing technol-

ogy and actual combat condi t ions , not by a preconceived ai r war doctrine. 4 4

Sherrys work i l lus t ra tes the development of s t ra tegic bomb-ing as dictated by the evolution of existing technology. Tech-nology and fr ic t ion became the masters , not the servants of strategic bombing practices. In the case of air war, the multi-

plici ty of motives involved, the lack of measurable cri teria, andthe par t icular remoteness of i ts consequences combined togive i t a pecul iar ly unchecked momentum. 4 5 Schaffer has a lso

recent ly examined the American s t ra tegic bombing pract icesduring World War I I and has concluded, even though vir tual lyevery figure involved in directing the American bombing cam-

paign expressed some views on the moral i ssue, that moralconsiderat ions a lmost invar iably bowed to what people de-scribed as mili tary necessity. 4 6

Daylight precis ion bombing would eventual ly be abandoned by the United States Army Air Forces because of the dicta tesof exis t ing technology, the demands of combat , and the fact

tha t the pass ions of war swept away any mora l concerns in -volving strategic bombing. The fire raids of Tokyo and other J apanese c i t i e s i n t he sp r ing and summer o f 1945 were theincarnat ion of the Douhet ian vis ion . This is no t to say th at the

po l i cy make r s and commander s were s imp ly swept up inevents and had no voice in the mat ter. As Sherry has noted,the dis tances involved, the lack of measurable cr i ter ia , andthe remoteness of the consequences combined with the pol i t i -cal real i t ies of the day served t o isolate the commanders f rom

the reali t ies of the bombing campaigns and fostered pragmatismrat her tha n id eology.Only about two dozen general officers were chiefly responsible

for the creation of the American air war strategy during WorldWar II. They came from a variety of backgrounds and from allacross America, yet they shared common characterist ics. Theywere young, with an average age of 42 at the t ime of PearlHarbor, and they were adventurous men who were menta l lyaler t and physical ly adept . Haywood S. Hansel l J r. shared al l

these character is t ics , a l though he differed in three respects :


17


30/236

he was a Southerner ; he was f rom an Army family; and, mostimportant ly, he was an ideal is t who was tota l ly commit ted tothe doctr ine of dayl ight precis ion bombardment . Most of his

fellow general officers in the Army Air Forces were pragmatists, but Hansel l c lear ly exhibi ted the temperament and wil l tochar t a par t icular course of act ion and then throw himself in tothe task of carrying i t out . The course he char ted was dayl ight

p recis ion bombardment , and he would r isk hi s l i fe and u l t i -mately sacr i f ice his mil i tary career for the sake of pursuingthis course in the face of the disapproval of his peers andsuper iors . 4 7

Hansells career serves as a microcosmic view of the course

of strategic bombing policy before and during World War II. Hetaught his concepts of strategic air war at ACTS , influencin ghundreds of fu ture a i r commanders . He then p ioneered ta rge tselection by sett ing up a one-man European air intell igencesection and by gathering intell igence during his observations of the RAF in England duri ng the summer o f 1941. His effo rtswere inst rumental in prepar ing the watershed document , Air War Plans DivisionPlan 1 (AWPD-1) whi ch s er ve d as th eUnited States militarys basic air war plan all through the war.

In fact , h is planning abi l i t ies were so i mportant that he was t heonly airman involved in formulating the AWPD-1, AWPD-42,and the plan for the combined bomber offensive. As a wingcommander in the Eighth Air Force f rom August 1942 to July1943, he se t the s tandards for bombing and a i r combat in tha ttheater of operations. After further planning duties in England,he re turned to Washington, where he planned the s t ra tegic a i r war aga ins t Japan and c rea ted and commanded the f i r s t inde-

pendent st rategic air force in history. From October 1944 to

January 1945 he overcame the many fr ic t ions of aer ia l combatto launch the f i r s t heavy bomber ra ids on Japan f rom theMarianas . During this t ime he was the vir tual equal of GenDougl as Mac Arth ur and Adm Chester W. Nimitz in the Pacific,answerable only to Gen Henry H. Arnold in Wa shing ton.

His career was meteoric unt i l h is pr inciples came into con -f l ic t wi th the demands of his super iors . He insis ted on deploy-ing the XXI Bomber Command against only precis ion targetsin dayl ight operat ions while General Arnold and others advo -

ca ted incendiary ra ids on Japanese c i t i es . In January 1945 he

THE QUEST

18


31/236

was suddenly re l ieved of command. American s t ra tegic bomb-ing doc t r ine had a lways main ta ined tha t indus t r ia l and mi l i -tary insta l la t ions would be the targets , not c ivi l ians . In 1945

this long-held doctr ine was suddenly abandoned, and Hansel lwas the only Air Force officer who forcefully opposed areaattacks on citi es. This opposition cost him his career. Hansell smain contr ibut ion to a i r doctr ine was his s t rong advocacy of the concept that through select ive target ing and an abi l i ty to

p lace the bombs on the ta rge t , a i rpower could win wars bycrippling an enemys abil i ty to supply his forces, without wan-ton death and destruct ion among civi l ians . He held this bel ief un t i l the day he d ied , defending i t in th ree books and a

number of a r t ic les .Ronald Schaffe r and Michae l Sher ry have examined thesl ide f rom Americas ins is tence upon precis ion bombardmentto the incendiary and a tomic ra ids on Japan . Accord ing tothem, there were two American strategic bombing policies inWorld War II: the prewar belief in precision bombardment asan almost abstract concept and the pol icy of a l l -out a t tacks oncit ies, a policy that seemed to be forced upon the Army Air Forces by necessity. Haywood Hansell represents the idealist ic

p rec i s ion bombardmen t concep t pu r sued t h roughou t t he war ,while Arnold and his staff were moving to the more expedientand pragmat ic po l icy of burn ing Japanese c i t i es .

Hansel l re t i red soon af ter his dismissal as commander of the XXI Bomber Command. His contemporar ies such as GenCurt is E. LeMay, Gen Lauris Norstad, and Gen Laurence S.Kuter became much more famous and each a t ta ined h ighrank in the new United States Air Force. Hansel l passed fromthe scene, his achievements and ideas largely ignored. Yet

Hansell clearly played a crucial role in the development of s t ra tegic a i r warfare . He may wel l have been, as Barry Wattsargues , the guiding conceptual thinker among that smal lgroup of generals who made major contributions to Americasair war doctrine during World War I I and beyond. 4 8

Notes

1. Col Haywood S. Hansell III to Charles Griffith, letter, 14 January

1992; and Haywood S. Hansell Jr. and Haywood S. Hansell III, Air Power in


19


32/236

N a t i o n a l S t r a t e g y , a s p e e c h d e l i v e r e d b e f o r e t h e N u c l e a r S t r a t e g ySymposium, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 1012 September 1987, Hansell familys

private collection.2. Air Power in National Strategy.

3. Ibid.4. Ibid.5. Col Haywood S. Hansel l I I I , interviewed by author, 16 February 1992.6. Michael S. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of

Armageddon (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 10 .7 . Lee Kennet t , A History of Stra tegic Bombing (New York: Charles

Scribner s Sons, 1982), 1011.8 . Sher ry, 4 .9 . Ib id . , 5 ; and Kennet t , 1216.10 . Sher ry, 6 ; and Kennet t , 17 .

11. Carl von Clausewitz , On War, ed . Anato l Rapopor t (New York:Penguin Books , 1982) , 23 , 101 , 390 .12. Lee Kennett , The First Air War, 19141918 (New York: Free Press,

1991) , 42 , 48 , 21621.13 . Kennet t , Strategic Bombing , 2226.14. Ibid. , 2226.15. Ibid. , 26.16. Ibid. , 2829.17 . Kennet t , The First Air War, 52 ; and Kennet t , Strategic Bombing,

3536 .18 . Kennet t , Strategic Bombing, 2627.19. Ibid. ; and Kennet t , The First Air War, 2 1 6 .20 . Kennet t , The First Air War, 2 2 1 .21 . Kennet t , Strategic Bombing, 26 , 5256 .22. David MacIsaac, Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power

Theorists, in Makers of Modern Strategy: Fro m Machiavelli to the Nuclear A g e , ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986),62829.

23. Haywood S. Hansel l Jr. , The Strategic Air War against Germany and Japan: A Memoir (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986),12.

24 . Kennet t , Strategic Bombing, 57; Hansel l , Strategic Air War, 2 ; a n dRonald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 20.

25. Russell Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana Universi ty Press ,1981), 226.

26 . Sher ry, 2728; MacIsaac , 630; and Schaffe r, 2123.27. Giul io Douhet , The Command of the Air (Washington, D.C.: Office of

Air Force History, 1942), 15; and Weigley, 227.28 . Douhet , 4044.

29. Ibid. , 5060.

THE QUEST

20


33/236

30. Stephen L. McFarland and Wesley P. Newton, To C o m m a n d t h e S k y :The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 19421944 (Washington, D.C.:Smi thsonian Ins t i tu t ion Press , 1991) , 1921.

31 . Douhet , 58 .

32. Ibid. , 5859.33. Ibid.34. Weigley, 22427.35. Hansel l , Strategic Air War, 45; Weigley, 226; and Sherry, 1819.36 . McFar land and Newton , 23 .37. Sherry, 29; and Weigley, 22728.38. Weigley, 232; and Gen James H. Jimmy Doolitt le with Carroll V.

Glines, I Could Never Be So Lucky Again (New York: Bantam Books, 1992),1023 .

39. Weigley, 233, 236; and Schaffer, 2627.40 . Schaffe r, 28 .41. Ibid. , 2830; David MacIsaac, Strategic Bombing in World War II: The

Story of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (New York: Garland,1976), 7; and Barry D. Watts , The Foundations of U.S. Air Doctrine: The

Pro ble m of Fr icti on in Wa r (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1984),1718 .

42. Clausewitz , 164.43 . Douhet , 62 .44. MacIsaac, 635.45 . Sher ry, 176 .46. Schaffer, xii .

47 . Ib id . , 710; and MacIsaac , 626 .48 . Wat t s , 25 .


21


34/236

Chapter 2

The Early Years:Education and ACTS

Haywood Sheperd Hansel l J r. was born the son of a Uni tedSta tes Army surgeon on 28 September 1903 , For t Monroe ,Virginia . By the t ime he was a teenager he had acquired then ickname Possum, which was la te r shor tened s imply toPos. In an effort to explain his nickname, Hansell inventedthe s tory that he selected the name himself because i t i s Lat in

for can do . Other accounts s ta te tha t he acqui red the name because he hunted the marsupia l in h i s na t ive Georg ia or tha t he napped dur ing h is morning c lasses a t Georg ia Ins t i -tute of Technology. The simple truth is that his thin, inquisi-t ive nose and mouth and smal l b r igh t eyes won h im the n ick-name Possum. In short , he looked l ike a possum. Trivialthough i t may be, the nickname offers ins ight into the qual i -t i es o f the man. 1

Hanse l l was an engineer by t ra in ing and possessed the

stereotypical a t t r ibutes of his profess ion. He tackled problemswith a can-do at t i tude, working with an intensi ty that wasoften reflected in his small bright eyes, and he usually ac-complished what he set out to do. Once he directed his ful la t tent ion to a project , he would use every means a t his dis -

posal to complete i t , whether i t was a formula for laying pipesor the plan for the s t ra tegic bombing of Germany. After he hadgathered al l the data possible and reached a decis ion based onhis own analysis , he was determined to make his plan work

s imply because he bel ieved in his own abi l i t ies .Unl ike the s tereotypical engineer, however, Hansel l pos -sessed a sense of romant ic i sm tha t d i rec ted h im to pa ths tha twere not f requented by most technicians . He loved Gilber t andSul l ivan operet tas , quoted Shakespeare , wrote his own poetryand lyrics to songs, and was obsessed by Miguel de Cervantes s

Don Quixote . Jus t as Don Quixote jous ted wi th windmi l l s ,Hansel l saw himself as the champion of los t causes . Eventhough he would la te r a r r ive a t h i s s t ra teg ic a i r war doc t r ine

through an engineer s unemotional logic , he would defend that

23


35/236

doctrine with the zeal of onecommitted to a romantic quest .From his days as a f ledgl ing

lieutena nt to t he peak of his ca -reer as commander of the XXIBomber Command, he foughtf o r h i s c o n c e p t o f a i r p o w e r against opponents who were far more dangerous to his career than mere windmills .

Hansell displayed in his per -sonal life and in his career anab i l i t y t o de t e rmine wha t hewanted to accomplish and thew i l l t o a c c o m p l i s h i t , e v e nagainst great odds. In his mili-tary career he would achieve aw e l l - e a r n e d r e p u t a t i o n a s a

technological expert who was respected by his fellow officers.On the o ther hand , h i s more l i t e ra ry s ide was misunders tood

by his compatriots . He was considered nervous and highstrung by Gen Ira C. Eaker and was la ter descr ibed by GenBarney M. Giles as a kind of brilliant-type fellow given tosent imental i ty. In short , he was fundamental ly different f romthe other young general officers in the Army Air Forces dur in gWorld War II . As one historian observed, he was set apart fromthe o thers by h is sou thern b i r th and Army upbr ing ing , ye t , inaddi t ion to these obvious differences , i t was his temperamentmore than any o the r f ac to r t ha t made h im un ique . 2

Hansel l s mil i tary her i tage began with John Hansel l , whoserved in the American Revolution. William Andrew Hansellhad been a major in the War of 1812. Andrew Jackson Hansellserved in the Confederate Army in the adjutant generals officeand was briefly in charge of Atlantas defenses. As southerngent lemen and mi l i t a ry off icers , they se t the s tandards tha tguided the Hansel ls in their devot io n to duty and country, andin their quest for family honor. 3

Haywood Sheperd Hansel l Sr. was a physician in the UnitedSta tes Army and was a Georg ian who was devout ly southern .

At the Hansel l household, the evening meal was an occasion

Maj Gen Haywood S. Hansell Jr.

THE QUEST

24


36/236

that saw Colonel Hansell arrive at the head of the table in awhite linen suit and Panama hat. He believed in firm disciplineand demanded nothing less than strict obedience. In later years

as corps surgeon, he had prestige usually afforded a major gen -eral and received tremendous respect in accordance to his posi-t ion and rank. The sense of southern aristocracy and of belong-ing to the officer class had a great influence on the relationship

between father and son. Young Haywood was under great pres -sure to live up to his father s high expectations. 4

Young Haywoods mother was a lso a member of the south-ern a r i s tocracy. Susan Wat t s , l ike her husband , was devout lysouthern , bu t the s imi la r i t i es ended there . She was a wi t ty,

inte l l igent woman who had a wonderful sense of humor. Sheloved to play practical jokes and was a talented storytelle r whoenthral led her chi ldren with her yarns . Young Haywood, or Hay as she cal led him, was therefore inf luenced s t rongly bytwo very different personali t ies, and as an adult he exhibitedthe character is t ics of both parents a lmost equal ly. The self -confident, disciplined engineer was the product of his father sinf luence while the l i terate , romant ic s torytel ler was the prod-uct of his mother s inf luence. Through both he received his

sense of being a member of the genteel southern ar is tocracy.5

At the tu rn of the cen tury, Amer ica had jus t acqui red her empire , and the Hansel l family shared in the imperia l exper i -ence. Soon after young Haywoods birth in 1903, the Hansellfamily was stationed in Pekin g, China, where Lieutenant Han sellserved in his capacity as an Army doctor. Mrs. Hansell kept adiary of their Chinese experiences and recorded a very memo-rable visi t with the Dowager Empress Tzu-hsi . ApparentlyLieutenant Hansel l had ingrat ia ted himself to the imperia l

household by t reat ing a royal family member who had becomeill . As a reward for this act of kindness (and as an indicationtha t the empress wanted to main ta in good re la t ions wi th theWesterners after the disastrous Boxer Rebell ion), Mrs. Hansellwas allowed to present young Haywood to the empress. Theimperial court made a great deal of fuss over the child, with theempress declar ing that the chi ld was the most beaut i ful babyshe had ever seen. Even though young Haywood would notremember the experience, l iving in China was an important

part of his childhood. His first words were Chinese , learned from

THE EARLY YEARS

25


37/236

the house servants, and when the Hansells left Peking theempress gave them a chest from her palace as a gift . 6

The familys next duty s ta t ion was in the Phi l ippines where

young Haywood quickly forgot his Chinese but soon picked upSpanish f rom the Fi l ipino house servants . Toward the end of the i r tour in the i s lands , young Haywood had an impor tan texperience, which he later recalled: In 1912 I got my firstgl impse of an a i rplane. I was s tanding on the fa i rgrounds of the annual carnival in Mani la , Phi l ippine Is lands, when a bi-

plane beat i ts s low pace across the sky. An aged Fi l ipinostanding nearby said , in as tonishment , Muy gran pollo ! or Very large chicken! As a boy of nine I was in full agreement. 7

Upon the i r re turn to the Uni ted S ta tes , the Hanse l l s werefortunate to serve at Army posts in their native Georgia. Firsta t Fort McPherson and la ter a t Fort Benning, young Haywoodgot a thorough introduction to routine Army life with i ts mo-notony and red tape . Even though h is fa ther had the h ighes texpectat ions for him, his school work did not measure up.Once h is fa ther was tu tor ing h im a t the d in ing room tab le andyoung Haywoods a t tent ion was diver ted by an ant , promptinghis fa ther to s t r ike h im on the back of the head so hard tha t

the impact on the table cut his chin. In obvious disappoint-ment with his sons lack of discipline, Captain Hansell decidedto send him away to the familys ranch along the Gila River in

New Mexico to grow up as a proper Hansel l should. 8

Southwest New Mexico at the turn of the century still offeredthe flavor of the old West. The Hansell ranch was nothingfancyjust a couple of cowhands and a dozen horses located inscrub and desert country. Captain Hansell provided a tutor for the youngster, hoping to improve his academic performance.

Young Haywood took an immediate l iking to his tutor, a manliving in New Mexico because he suffered from tuberculosis,and their relationship grew into a l ifet ime admiration. Yet helearned more than mathemat ics and the c lass i cs on the ranch .His lessons included roping and rounding up catt le, l iving in a

bunkhouse, and shoot ing. Even though he acc identa l ly shothimself in the foot with the pistol he wore on his hip, youngHaywood thr ived in th i s new adventurous se t t ing , and hedrifted even further away from his schoolwork. Perhaps the

m o s t i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n h e l e a r n e d w a s h o r s e m a n s h i p . H e

THE QUEST

26


38/236

served as a wrangler on a surveying expedition. This experi-ence, plus his love for horses , served him wel l in la ter Armylife. The time spent in New Mexico did give the young teenager

a taste of the active, adventurous l ife, but his father s objec-t ives were not achieved. 9

Young Haywood arrived at Sewanee Mili tary Academy near Chat tanooga , Tennessee , as a f reshman in 1916 . This pr iva temil i tary high school was his fa ther s answer to his poor aca -demic standing. By 1918, however, now Colonel Hansell was inFrance with the American Expedi tionary Force. The geograp hi-ca l separa t ion of fa ther and son d id no t b reak the s t rongemotional bond between the two. In a le t ter dated 29 May

1918, Colonel Hansel l revealed that his sons progress wasvery much on his mind when he wrote, Well , when Mother sle t ter about your school reports reached me, I decided to wai tfor the next report , hoping i t would show improvementandthank goodness and you , I was no t d i sappoin ted . Here thefather acknowledged his sons s low cl imb to success but wenton to add, If you do your best , remember Dad is alwayswilling to forget the shortcomings. Young Haywood was ex-

pected to succeed and was a l so expec ted to take on the addi-t iona l burdens brought on by the war : France and the end of the war a re bo th so fa r away, tha t you wi l l have to assumeresponsibi l i t ies ear l ier than you would otherwise . This is hardon you, but I dont see how it could be avoided. He offeredanother gl immer of pr ide in his son by s ta t ing that i f he werekil led he had a fine boy to carry on the work. He concluded

by reminding his son, Dont let Mother worry about you. Youknow how wrapped up she is in you and your career. 1 0

Sewanee Mili tary Academy did indeed bring out the best inyoung Haywood. Whether he improved because of his father sadmonishments , h i s own matur i ty, o r a combina t ion of thetwo is di ff icul t to say, but his academic t roubles were behindhim. Sewanee gave young Haywood a sense of identity that washis own. He was st i l l high-spiri ted and once earned a st int atwalking the triangle in the snow for some infraction of ther u les . The punishment a lmost turned into t ragedy when Possu mdeveloped pneumonia. He was confined to his room for two

weeks with only his textbooks for company. The fortnight of

THE EARLY YEARS

27


39/236

i solat ion not only improved his heal th , but the self -discipl ineimposed by the i l lness improved his grades . 1 1

Possum found a n ew ho me a t S ewanee . His favor ite t eacher

was his Engl ish inst ructor, Stuar t McLean. Mr. McLean made,as Hansel l la ter put i t , devoted Browning scholars out of us .He also encouraged the boys to read popular magazines withe n t h u s i a s m .

The cade t honor sys tem a t Sewanee was based on the as -sumption that a cadets word is as good as his bond, whichmeant that a cadets word was never quest ioned. I f any cadetwere found not to have told the t ruth , he would have beendismissed by the cade ts themselves . 1 2

By h is sen ior year in 1920 , Possum had been e leva ted tocaptain of cadets . There had been a f i re a t Sewanee, so whilethe rebui lding was in progress , the cadet corps was moved toa location near Jacksonville, Florida. Hansell later recalled, Iwas just a country boy and the br ight l ights were too much for me. I suddenly acquired an awful lot of demerits . 1 3 Ironically,as cade t cap ta in he had become qui te a mar t ine t wi th h i scade ts . The combina t ion of demer i t s and h is harshness wi ththe cade t co rps was more than the s choo l admin i s t r a t i on

could s tand. Unfortunately, Hansel l s downfal l came at lunch-t ime when a b i scu i t was th rown in the mess ha l l . Possumcal led the cade ts to a t ten t ion and ordered tha t no more b i s -cu i t s be th rown. At tha t po in t another b i scu i t sa i led th roughthe a i r. He immedia te ly marched the en t i re corps ou t wi thoutlunch . Then , qu i te by co inc idence , he was handed a no teinforming h im tha t he had been demoted f rom cade t cap ta into buck pr ivate . The t iming of events was more than he could

bear . Upon graduat ion a short t ime la ter , he was offered an

a p p o i n t m e n t t o We s t P o i n t , b u t t h e h u m i l i a t i o n a n d h i swounded pr ide caused h im to tu rn i t down. 1 4

There is no record of Colonel Hansells response to his sonsdec is ion not to a t tend West Poin t , bu t i t mus t have been asource of d i sappoin tment . Ins tead of a mi l i t a ry educa t ion ,Possum became an engineer ing s tudent a t the Georg ia Ins t i -tute of Technology in Atlanta. Upon arrival at Georgia Tech,Possum took on the role of the naive f reshman and lost a l l h isexpense money in a gambling spree. Gambling was one mis -

takegoing to his fa ther about i t would have been another.

THE QUEST

28


40/236


41/236

Even though the twent ies have been remembered as a t imeof economic expansion, Haywood Hansell found i t impossibleto secure a posi t ion as an engineer. He had dreams of bui lding

br idges and dams in South Amer ica bu t was soon forced tocompromise. Colonel Hansell was stationed at the Presidio inSan Franc isco , and h is son soon jo ined h im and Mrs . Hanse l lto look for employment there. The only work Possum couldf ind was with the Steel Tank and Pipe Company of Berkeley,as a bo i le rmaker s ass i s tan t . He worked 10 hours a day a t awage of 26 cen ts an hour, and he had to purchase h i s owntools . He used h is t ime to s tudy to become a journeyman

boi lermaker and worked par t - t ime as a spar r ing par tner for

professional boxers. After a year of study, he was finally quali -f ied to become a journeyman and was honored by an invi ta -t ion to the boi lermakers bal l . His only problem was that hedid not know what to wear, so he decided i t was bet ter to beoverdressed and rented a tuxedo for the occasion. Upon arrivalhe was shocked to see everyone else in ta i ls ; he was under -dressed after al l . This story became one of his favorites in later years , but despi te his pr ide in being accepted by the boi ler -makers , he knew h is t a len ts were be ing was ted . 1 8

Aviation promised America a bright future in 1928. Charles A.Lindbergh had crossed the Atlant ic the year before , and avia -t ion technology was growing at a t remendous ra te . Hansel ldecided that his future lay in aeronaut ical engineer ing, but i twas a difficult field to break into without flying experience,and the best source of such experience was the Army. TheArmy Air Corps was underbudgeted and f lew an inventory of obsolete or obsolescent aircraft. The shortage of aviation offi -ce r s was so acu te t ha t t hey cou ld no t r ep l ace those lo s t

through attr i t ion caused by accidents. I t was difficult to f i l l theslots for commissioned pilots from West Point or even from th eother branches of the Army, so each year hundreds of po ten -t ia l aviators enrol led as f lying cadets , the successful candi-dates receiving reserve commissions. Hansell decided to be-come a flying cadet, serve in the Army for one term, and then

begin his c ivi l ian career as an aeronaut ical engineer . 1 9

Hansell began his Air Corps primary fl ight training at MarchField, Cal i fornia , in March 1928. From the minute he got in

the a i rp lane h i s whole l i fe tu rned a round; he had found the

THE QUEST

30


42/236

direct ion his l i fe had needed. By November 1928 he had com - pleted the Primary Flying School and the Basic Flying Schoolat March Field . In March 1929 he graduated from the Air

Corps Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field near San Antonio,Texas , and was commiss ioned as a reserve second l ieu tenant .This marked a major turning point in Hansel l s l i fe . Firs t , hehad pleased his parents , h is fa ther especial ly, who concededtha t a t l as t young Possum was go ing to tu rn ou t a l l r igh t . Butmore important ly, Hansel l had f inal ly determined his owncourse and had se t ou t on the ques t o f h i s choos ing . 2 0

Hansells first duty assignment was with the 2d Bombard-ment Group at Langley Field, Virginia. Even though he was

assigned to a bombardment group, he had piloted at least 12different types of aircraft. His main interest at Langley was intesting the capabilities of various airplanes, and in so doing hewas involved in three accidents. Two accidents occurred in1930. The first was a failed takeoff in a C-1C in six inches of snow at Uniontown, Pennsylvania. Weather conditions were

blamed for the first accident, but pilot error was blamed for thesecond accident at Fredericksburg, Virginia, in which he suf-fered a ground loop upon landing a P-1F. Both accidents were

considered to be minor and there were no serious injuries.2 1

In 1931 Hansel l suffered a more ser ious accident whi le con -duct ing tes ts that would al low a P-12 to carry a radio. He wasins t ruc ted to take the P-12 on a prac t ice run wi th 70 poundsof sand in the baggage compartment to check the a i rcraf t s

performance with the extra weight. While over Black River near Hampton, Virginia , the a i rplane went into a violent ma-neuver and fe l l in to a ta i lspin. When he real ized that he couldnot recover f rom the spin, he bai led out and parachuted into

the icy river; with great difficulty he released himself andswam to a nearby duck bl ind. Maj George Kenney, who hap- pened to be f lying close by, saw the accident and directed therescue boa t to Hanse l l . Af te r about 20 minutes the rescue

boa t a r r ived but go t s tuck in the mud. An oys te r f i shermanfinally rescued him, and he was taken to Fort Monroe, Vir -ginia , where he was t reated for shock and exposure . 2 2

A local newspaper quoted Hansells fellow officers as statingthat Lieut . Hansel l d isplayed unusual presence of mind in

the difficult posit ion in which he found himself when the ship

THE EARLY YEARS

31


43/236

failed to straighten out of the spin. 2 3 While in the hospi ta l a tFort Monroe, Hansell received a telegram from General Eaker welcoming him to the Caterpi l lar Club s ince he had r idden asi lk parachute to safety. I f h is peers were impressed with hisflying abil i t ies, his superiors were not. With t ight budgetsevery a i rp lane counted , so the Army charged Hanse l l the$10,000 or so for the lost P-12. Natural ly, Hansel l could nota fford to pay such a sum, so a f te r the Army had made i t s

point the i ssue was quiet ly dropped.2 4

Hansel l received his regular commission as a second l ieu-t enan t i n t he Army on 12 June 1929 , t hus ensur ing h i s fu -ture . Tha t fu ture was fur ther b r igh tened in 1930 when he metMiss Dorothy Dotta Rogers of Waco, Texas. She had recentlygraduated from Baylor University and was visi t ing a cousinwho lived near Langley Field. On her first evening in Virginia,she passed Lieutenant Hansel l , qui te by accident , in the lobbyof a hotel . He quickly took home the young lady he was escort -

ing and returned to the hotel dining room where he invi ted

Boeing P-12

THE QUEST

32


44/236


45/236

for the sake of his career. Like their Bri t ish counterpar ts ,American Army officers felt it was their social prerogative to

prac t i ce the eques t r ian ar t s in t he i r o f f -du ty hours . Even

though the Hanse l l s were ab le to sc rape enough toge ther tolive the life of the officer class, they were often short of cash.One weekend when the cook was off , the Hansel ls had com -

pany and dec ided to go out for hamburgers , bu t in an agewhen a hamburger cost only f ive cents there were not threenickels to be found in the Hansel l household. 2 8

In Mrs. Hansells eyes her husbands priori t ies were clear:the Air Corps came f i rs t , polo came second, and she ran adistant third. Soon after the birth of their f irst child, Hansell

re turned home af ter s ix weeks of temporary duty away fromMaxwell Field. He brought two young l ieutenants home for d inne r, and Mrs . Hanse l l had p repa red a sumptuous mea l .Jus t a s d inne r began , t he baby began to c ry ups t a i r s p rompt -ing Hansel l to exclaim, What in heavens name is that?Tha t , Mrs . Hanse l l r e sponded , i s your son ! , and shestormed away in anger. She was a lso expected to par t ic ipatein ac t iv i t i e s she de t e s t ed , such a s a f t e rnoon t ea s , b r idgegames, and, worst of a l l , r id ing lessons. One af ternoon she

decided not to go to her r iding lesson, but her husband be-c a m e s o a n g r y t h a t h e p u n c h e d a h o l e i n t h e s c r e e n d o o r with his f is t . She went to the lesson because, l ike his fa ther,Hansel l demanded that every member of the family l ive up toh is expec ta t ions . 2 9

Hansell served as assistant operations officer at MaxwellField, his f irst real posit ion in the Air Corps. In addit ion toflying, he was involved in day-to-day base operations. He st i l lhad enough t ime to cont inue his t radi t ion of wri t ing di t t ies

tha t tu rned in to Ai r Corps songs . Dur ing th i s per iod he wrotesuch enduring favori tes as Eight Bucks a Day, The Forma-tion, The Old Bombardment Group, and Old 97. He alsoassis ted Capt Harold L. George in a number of projects, in -cluding a s tudy of the ant ia i rcraf t defenses of the PanamaCanal. The working relationship and friendship between Hanselland George las ted a l i fe t ime and was an important boost toHanse l l s ca ree r l a t e r on . Up to t h i s po in t Hanse l l had con -sidered himself a pursui t

Documents

Haywood Hansell