Gems_and_Gemology_Summer_2014.pdf

The Future of Botswanas Diamond Industry

Determining Emerald Origin from Multi-phase Inclusions

Cause of Color in Rare Blue Amber

VOLUME L

SUMMER 2014

THEQUARTERLY JOURNAL OF THEGEMOLOGICAL INSTITUTE OF AMERICA

EDITORIAL95 Challenges and Opportunities

Duncan Pay

FEATURE ARTICLES96 Botswanas Scintillating Moment

Robert Weldon and Russell Shor Examines the history of diamond production in Botswana and the long-term outlook forbeneficiation through value-added industries.

114 Three-Phase Inclusions in Emerald and Their Impact on Origin DeterminationSudarat Saeseaw, Vincent Pardieu, and Supharart SangsawongDiscusses the role of three-phase inclusions in emerald, in combination withspectroscopy and trace-element analysis, in determining geographic origin.

NOTES AND NEW TECHNIQUES134 Color Phenomena of Blue Amber

Yan Liu, Guanghai Shi, and Shen WangInvestigates the presence of fluorescence, rather than iridescence, as the cause of color inblue amber from the Dominican Republic and Indonesia.

142 Experimental Studies on the Heat Treatment of Baltic AmberYamei Wang, Mingxing Yang, and Yiping YangDemonstrates the procedures for heating amber to achieve golden, red, sun spark, andbeeswax effects, and provides identification criteria for these products.

80TH ANNIVERSARY SPECIAL170 Celebrating G&Gs 80th Year and the Artistry of Harold and Erica Van Pelt

REGULAR FEATURES141 Thank You, Donors

151 Lab NotesChameleon diamond with nickel absorption band Long-term durability of CVDsynthetic film on natural diamond Star opal Shell pearl as pearl imitation YellowCVD synthetic diamond Flux-grown synthetic ruby with hydrothermal synthetic seedcrystal Rare faceted wurtzite Tenebrescent zircon

158 Gem News InternationalJadeite bangle with the appearance of polymer treatment Prasiolite with inclusioninfluenced by Brazil-law twinning Record-size natural moissanite crystals discoveredin Israel Unusual optical effect in blue sapphire Assemblage of synthetic ruby incalcite matrix Composite coral veneer glued to artificial matrix Dyed bone as a redcoral imitation Bumble Bee jasper from Indonesia Pyrex bracelets Shattuckitefrom the DRC Shanghai jewelry show Museum exhibits at GIA New York

Summer 2014VOLUME 50, No. 2

pg. 115

pg. 109

pg. 167

pg. 135

SubscriptionsCopies of the current issue may be purchased for$29.95 plus shipping. Subscriptions are $79.99 forone year (4 issues) in the U.S. and $99.99 else-where. Canadian subscribers should add GST.Discounts are available for group subscriptions,GIA alumni, and current GIA students. For insti-tutional rates, contact Customer Service.

To purchase print subscriptions, visit store.gia.eduor contact Customer Service.

Database CoverageGems & Gemology is abstracted in ThomsonReuters products (Current Contents: Physical,Chemical & Earth Sciences and Science CitationIndexExpanded, including the Web of Knowl-edge) and other databases. For a complete list ofsources abstracting G&G, go to gia.edu/gems-gemology.

Manuscript SubmissionsGems & Gemologywelcomes the submission ofarticles on all aspects of the field. Please see theGuidelines for Authors at gia.edu/gandg or con-tact the Managing Editor. Letters on articles pub-lished in Gems & Gemology are also welcome.

Copyright and Reprint PermissionAbstracting is permitted with credit to the source.Libraries are permitted to photocopy beyond thelimits of U.S. copyright law for private use of pa-trons. Instructors are permitted to photocopy iso-lated articles for noncommercial classroom usewithout fee. Copying of the photographs by anymeans other than traditional photocopying tech-niques (Xerox, etc.) is prohibited without the ex-press permission of the photographer (wherelisted) or author of the article in which the photoappears (where no photographer is listed). Forother copying, reprint, or republication permis-sion, please contact the Managing Editor.

Gems & Gemology is published quarterly by theGemological Institute of America, a nonprofit ed-ucational organization for the gem and jewelryindustry.

Postmaster: Return undeliverable copies of Gems& Gemology to GIA, The Robert MouawadCampus, 5345 Armada Drive, Carlsbad, CA92008.

Our Canadian goods and service registration num-ber is 126142892RT.

Any opinions expressed in signed articles are un-derstood to be opinions of the authors and not ofthe publisher.

Editorial Staff

Production Staff

Editorial Review Board

About the Cover

Botswanas diamond-based economy could continue to thrive even after the last rough has been extracted, thanksto the governments commitment to developing value-added industries such as polishing and jewelry manufactur-ing. The cover photo shows diamond cutter Mabedi Motlhasedi examining her work at Laurelton Diamonds, amanufacturing and retail subsidiary of Tiffany & Co. that opened a plant in Gaborone in 2011. Photo by RobertWeldon/GIA, courtesy of Tiffany & Co. and Laurelton Diamonds.Printing is by L+L Printers, Carlsbad, CA.GIA World Headquarters The Robert Mouawad Campus 5345 Armada Drive Carlsbad, CA 92008 USA 2014 Gemological Institute of America All rights reserved. ISSN 0016-626X

Creative DirectorFaizah Bhatti

Image SpecialistMatt Hatch

IllustratorsChristopher CruzLarry Lavitt

PhotographerRobert Weldon

Production SupervisorRichard Canedo

Video ProductionPedro PaduaNancy Powers

Editor-in-ChiefDuncan [email protected]

Managing EditorJustin [email protected]

EditorStuart D. [email protected]

Technical EditorsTao Z. [email protected]

Jennifer Stone-Sundberg

Associate EditorsJennifer-Lynn [email protected]

Paula [email protected]

Editorial AssistantsBrooke GoedertNathan Renfro

Editors, Lab NotesThomas M. MosesShane F. McClure

Contributing EditorsJames E. ShigleyAndy LucasDonna Beaton

Editor-in-Chief EmeritusAlice S. Keller

Customer ServiceMartha Erickson(760) [email protected]

Ahmadjan AbduriyimTokyo, Japan

Shigeru AkamatsuTokyo, Japan

Edward W. BoehmChattanooga, Tennessee

James E. ButlerWashington, DC

Alan T. CollinsLondon, UK

John L. EmmettBrush Prairie, Washington

Emmanuel Fritsch Nantes, France

Elose GaillouLos Angeles, California

Jaroslav HyrlPrague, Czech Republic

A.J.A. (Bram) JansePerth, Australia

E. Alan JobbinsCaterham, UK

Mary L. JohnsonSan Diego, California

Anthony R. KampfLos Angeles, California

Robert E. KaneHelena, Montana

Stefanos KarampelasLucerne, Switzerland

Lore KiefertLucerne, Switzerland

Ren LuWuhan, China

Thomas M. MosesNew York, New York

Mark NewtonCoventry, UK

Nathan RenfroCarlsbad, California

Benjamin RondeauNantes, France

George R. RossmanPasadena, California

Kenneth ScarrattBangkok, Thailand

Andy ShenWuhan, China

Guanghai ShiBeijing, China

James E. ShigleyCarlsbad, California

Elisabeth StrackHamburg, Germany

Christopher P. SmithNew York, New York

Wuyi WangNew York, New York

Christopher M. WelbournReading, UK

gia.edu/gems-gemology

EDITORIAL GEMS & GEMOLOGY SUMMER 2014 95

Duncan Pay | Editor-in-Chief | [email protected]

Welcome to the second issue of our 80th year! In June, GIA held a reception at our Carlsbadheadquarters to celebrate this anniversary and to honor the artistry of Harold and Erica Van Pelt.The reception marked the opening of a museum exhibit of their G&G cover shots, displayedalongside many of the fabulous pieces they photographed. The Van Pelts beautiful imagesgraced the covers of our journal for nearly 30 years and really symbolized the stature and qualityof G&G.

Along with GIA president Susan Jacques, editor-in-chief emeritus Alice Keller, and frequentcontributor John King, I was privileged to offer a few words to our guests. While the others spoketo G&Gs context, its place at theheart of GIAs mission, and thecontributions that enriched the

journal over the years, my topic was the future.Although there are undoubtedly challenges in living upto G&Gs 80-year legacy, there are correspondingopportunities to take our journal to a much wider audience. While technology and social media provide much of thisnew potential, its also abundantly clear how well people respond to the print journal, and the importance of face-to-facecontact in transforming ideas into reality. In the future, our strategy must incorporate both elements.

Our lead article, by GIAs Robert Weldon and Russell Shor, examines Botswanas efforts to become a major diamondprocessing and jewelry manufacturing center, for the benefit of its people. The article draws from Weldons 2013 visitto Botswana with GIA videographer Kevin Schumacher, whose extensive videos illuminate many of the locations andpeople described in the paper. We invite you to view them from your smartphone or tablet by using the quick reference(QR) code at the end of the article, or from your computer by visiting www.gia.edu/gems-gemology.

In the minds of many practicing gemologists, three-phase inclusions in emerald are inextricably linked to Colombianorigin. Yet emeralds from Afghanistan, China, and Zambia can display strikingly similar inclusions. Sudarat Saeseaw,Supharart Sangsawong, and Vincent Pardieu, all from GIAs Bangkok lab, present detailed photomicrographs ofsamples from these localities combined with spectroscopy and trace-element analysis. The authors demonstrate that acombination of these techniques has significant potential for determining the geographic origin of emerald.

We also offer a fascinating paper examining the blue color phenomena seen in some Dominican and Indonesianamber. Yan Liu of Liu Research Laboratories and coauthors Guanghai Shi and Shen Wang provide the gemologicalbasis for the surface-related blue fluorescence seen in such amber.

Our final feature articlealso on ambercomes from Yamei Wang and Mingxing Yang, both of the ChinaUniversity of Geosciences in Wuhan, and Yiping Yang, a former postgraduate from the same institution. This paperdocuments their heat treatment experiments on a range of amber samples, which successfully reproduced some ofthe products found in todays jewelry marketplace. Along with the methods and results of their experiments, theauthors present criteria for identifying heated amber.

One of our continuing priorities is to develop synergy with the GIA website. In this issue, we entreat you to visitincase you missed themour recent article posts and related videos. Youll hear the voices of researchers, miners, andgem professionals, and see inside research institutions, mines, museums, and the diverse locations where gems arebought and sold. Please visit page 172 for QR codes and links to this enhanced content.

We hope you enjoy the summer 2014 edition!

Challenges and Opportunities

Although there are undoubtedly challenges inliving up to G&Gs 80-year legacy, there arecorresponding opportunities to take our journalto a much wider audience.

96 BOTSWANAS DIAMOND INDUSTRY GEMS & GEMOLOGY SUMMER 2014

Just off Airport Road in Gaborone, Botswana,where the capital citys scrubby outskirts begin, anew complex erected in the open expanse mightwell be mistaken for the airport itself. The mainbuilding, a hulking structure surrounded by highfences and security cameras, is considerably largerthan Sir Seretse Khama Internationals concourse.And for good reason: The Debswana complex, repre-senting a fifty-fifty joint venture between De Beersand Botswana, includes a $35 million state-of-the-artdiamond sorting, valuing, and selling center, calledDTC Botswana, the worlds largest facility of its kind(Even-Zohar, 2002; De Beers, 2008). It has the capac-ity to make ready for market almost 45 million caratsof rough per year, or about 40% of the worlds totalannual diamond supply. In value terms, it accountsfor about $6 billion worth of diamond rough annually(Spektorov et al., 2013; figures 1 and 2).

Behind this momentous change is the worldslargest diamond producer, De Beers. As of November2013, all of De Beerss mine productionfrom SouthAfrica, Namibia, and Botswana, as well as Canadais consolidated at DTC Botswana, in a pre-selling sort-ing and valuation process known as aggregation.While De Beers has fifty-fifty joint partnerships with

governments in other African countries such asNamibia and South Africa, Bot swana is by far itslargest and richest source of diamonds today. Throughagreements with Botswana, the vast majority of thediamonds are purchased by De Beers for sale to thecompanys sightholders. Although De Beers was tra-ditionally Debswanas only client, the renewal in 2006of the 25-year mining lease for Jwaneng stipulated thatas of 2013, 1015% of production must be sold to thegovernment-owned Okavango Diamond Company(ODC). This arrangement gives the government itsown direct sales channel of rough diamond to clientsaround the world, bypassing the De Beers channel.

BOTSWANAS SCINTILLATING MOMENTRobert Weldon and Russell Shor

FEATURE ARTICLES

While South Africas Nelson Mandela inspired the world with his vision of forgiveness and racial har-mony, leaders in neighboring Botswana long ago sowed the seeds of cooperation and economic devel-opment. They also demonstrated a clear understanding of how to harness the countrys naturalresourcesdiamonds, primarilyfor the good of its people. Botswana has now taken a bold step for-ward with a long-term plan for value-added industries that will keep the country vibrant long after itsdiamond reserves are spent. While Botswanas aspirations of becoming a major diamond center aregreat, so too are the challenges that lie ahead.

See end of article for About the Authors and Acknowledgments.GEMS & GEMOLOGY, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 96113,http://dx.doi.org/10.5741/GEMS.50.2.96. 2014 Gemological Institute of America

Figure 1. The Debswana complex in Gaborone in-cludes DTC Botswana. Photo courtesy of DTCBotswana.

Perhaps even more importantly, a new 10-year salescontract, signed in 2011, included provisions for relo-cating the DTCthe De Beers sales armfrom Lon-don to Gaborone. This agreement essentially locks inthe companys commitment to beneficiation (Dia-monds sparkle, 2011).

Aggregation of the diamonds at DTC Botswanaprecedes each of the so-called sights, where selectedbuyers from around the world convene to purchaserough allotments. The sights, held in London forclose to a century, moved to Gaborone following re-portedly intense mining lease renegotiations withBotswanas government that took place in 20042005(Mokone et al., 2013). The move signals a historicchange and a significant upheaval of De Beerss tra-ditional business model, shedding a remnant of thecontrol over diamond sales exerted by the company

since the colonial days of South Africa. As a result,more than 60% of its London-based staff relocated toBotswana in 2013. At a cost of over $120 million, notto mention the loss of long-established power, it wassurely not an easy decision (Ferreira-Marques, 2013).

But the die has been cast, and both De Beers andits parent company, Anglo American, have high-lighted the positive aspects of the move. De BeersGroup CEO Philippe Mellier (figure 3) says the effortsunderscore the companys commitment to benefici-ation. As we make this move, Africa is once againat the forefront as De Beers and its partners lead thediamond industry into a sparkling new chapter in itsillustrious history, Mellier noted (De Beers, 2013a).He added, Africa was home to the diamond industrywhen it began in the late 19th century, and De Beersand its partners were central to that growth.

BOTSWANAS DIAMOND INDUSTRY GEMS & GEMOLOGY SUMMER 2014 97

Figure 2. These diamondoctahedra rough in the 3ct range are from Jwa-neng in southernBotswana, the worldsrichest diamond mineby value. Photo byRobert Weldon/GIA,courtesy of DTCBotswana.

For the people of Botswanathe Batswanathestakes are high: creating added value above and be-yond the mining of resources. They expect thechanges will stimulate the growth of diamond tradingand rough diamond manufacturing, jewelry manufac-ture, related businesses, and other sectors of theireconomy. If the plan succeeds, this evolution willcarry Botswana far beyond 2030, when the countrysdiamond reserves are expected to run out.

CHANGES DOWNSTREAMThe changes have required De Beerss 82 sightholdersand their associates to alter their habits and travelschedules. Sightholders have begun to make the 10treks a year to Gaborone instead of London (figure 4).Reports from the first DTC Botswana sight in No-vember 2013 were largely positive, despite initialgrumbling and some logistical challenges (Bates,2013). For example, there are currently no directflights to Gaborone from the United States, Asia, orEurope. The dearth of banking infrastructure, Inter-net service, hotels, restaurants that will accommo-date special dietary considerations, taxis, theaters,and other amenities that sightholders were accus-tomed to in London is not making the transitioneasy. These challenges will have to be worked outover time.

In a sense, this is exactly what its all about, ex-plains Kago Mmopi, communications and corporateaffairs manager at DTC Botswana (figure 5).Botswana is a developing country, and infrastruc-ture is also developing, and needs to develop further.The move is inspiring the Batswana to do that. Wehave been speaking to local businessmen and alertingthem of many opportunities that lie ahead. We alsoknow that we need to fast-track this area.

The government is also pushing hard to createstate-of-the-art infrastructure to facilitate diamondtrading in Botswana. Jacob Thamage (figure 6) is thecoordinator of the Diamond Innovation Hub, an or-ganization set up in part by the government to coor-dinate banking, security, and transportation for the


Figure 3. Philippe Mellier, CEO of De Beers Group.Courtesy of De Beers.

Figure 4. Left: Keneilwe Dihutso, a diamond grader at DTC Botswana, displays a 54.29 ct rough octahedron fromJwaneng prior to a visit by De Beers sightholders. Right: The 54.29 ct crystal is shown next to a 3.00 ct octahedronfrom the same mine. Photo by Robert Weldon/GIA.

diamond business, as well as to address the concernsof De Beers sightholders. But it also hopes to seizethe opportunities that will arise for new diamondmanufacturers in Botswana and the attendant busi-nesses that will begin to grow as the diamond sectorexpands.

Our job at the Diamond Innovation Hub is to at-tract the kind of companies that will bring innova-tion to Botswana. The idea is to also be able to go into

partnerships with many of those companies, Tham-age explains. Weve always had aspirations and de-sires to beneficiate our people and add value to thecountry, for the various reasons that brings: skillsbuilding, employment, and the creation of ancillaryservices. In 1981, we had only one diamond-manu-facturing factory. By 1992, we had two, and four in1994. Between 2004 and 2006, we licensed 12 morefactories to build.

As of early 2014, 21 factories are licensed to facetdiamonds in Botswana. One of them, the Indian-basedShrenuj Company, is manufacturing jewelry there aswell (figure 7).

While the aspirations for Botswana and its peopleare great, the difficulties are equally so. Logisticalchallengessimply the time and distance it takesbuyers to get thereas well as the infrastructureneeded to efficiently run the diamond industry afterthe end of mining, are the obvious barriers. More ho-tels and restaurants accommodating dietary needs ofthe diverse global business community will need tobe built. International banking facilities and directairline links to Gaborone need to be established,while unnecessary duplication of bureaucracy in theimport and export sector must be eliminated.


Figure 5. Kago Mmopi, DTC Botswanas communica-tions and corporate affairs manager, says the new fa-cility can process 45 million carats of diamond peryear, about twice the capacity of Orapa House, thesorting facility used by De Beers until recent years.Photo by Robert Weldon/GIA.

Figure 6. Jacob Thamage, coordinator of the Dia-mond Innovation Hub, is responsible for attractingforeign investment in Botswana and helping provideimpetus to beneficiation projects. Photo by RobertWeldon/GIA.

In Brief Botswana has emerged as a significant player in thediamond industry, with Gaborone becoming an in-creasingly important destination for sightholders andbusiness interests.

The government of Botswana, historically mindful ofthe countrys importance to the world diamond market,has taken steps to partner with operations of differentsizes to meet both industry demands and the needs ofthe Batswana.

Future endeavors include moving beyond productionand into value-added industries such as cutting andjewelry manufacturing, allowing for long-term eco-nomic growth.

Perhaps the biggest challenge for Botswana lies inthe competitive strength of diamond centers aroundthe world, which have been cutting diamonds fordecades, if not centuries. Diamonds flow naturallytoward Antwerp, Tel Aviv, Mumbai, and New York.Even though none of these manufacturing centershave their own diamond mines (as Botswana does)they have the necessary infrastructure and skillsbase, and they are generally located closer to end con-sumers. This is not yet the case for Botswana. Today,almost a million people are employed in the Indiandiamond industry, which commands almost 60% ofthe polished market (Mbayi, 2011), compared to the3,200 cutters in Botswana. Yet the Batswana are con-fident that this number will grow, as competenciesare developed downstream.

A lot of our youth have come into the diamondbusiness and excelled, and that has been a pleasantsurprise, explains Thamage. But as we all know, itis an expensive industry that requires a lot of cash.The schemes we have in terms of funding our youthare not enough now for them to be able to buy dia-monds for themselves. What we hope to see, as a be-ginning, is that a lot of those workers will somedayopen an office, just like this one, become diaman-taires, and start contract polishing.

Growth in African manufacturing, howeversmall, is not going unnoticed in other cutting cen-ters. The Hindu Business Line cited beneficiationprograms in Africa as one of the reasons why the In-dian market is losing its sparkle (Ashok, 2013).

Those concerns are premature, given Botswanasminor role in manufacturing. What the countryneeds is a critical mass of talent, manufacturing effi-ciencies, and an infrastructure that supports a cuttingindustry. For consumers of such goods, inevitablequestions arise: Are the diamonds well cut? Is therean understanding of proper yield? Can African laborcosts compete with those of India? Can the world dobusiness in Africa? Will consumers around theworld, heeding a call to contribute to beneficiationin Africa, demand diamonds that are both mined andcut there? To illuminate these questions requires abasic understanding of the country, its people, and itsdiamond richness (figure 8).

BOTSWANAS DIAMOND BUSINESSBotswana remains a landlocked, sparsely populatedterritory comprising some 600,000 square kilometers,composed chiefly of arid savannah (figure 9). WhatBotswana lacks in agricultural capacity it makes upfor with the worlds richest diamond reserves and pro-ductionfour major mines and other deposits identi-fied through explorationas well as a relatively stabledemocratic government, and a hardworking, well-ed-


Figure 7. Shrenuj, a diamond and jewelry manufac-turing firm based in India, became the first companyto add value in Botswana beyond diamond manufac-turing. This star motif in white and pink gold con-tains diamonds mined and manufactured inBotswana. Photo courtesy of Shrenuj.

Figure 8. At Laurelton Diamonds Botswana, a cuttingsubsidiary of Tiffany & Co., skills transfer bringsmuch-needed jobs to the local Batswana. Photo byRobert Weldon/GIA.

ucated population. Its 2013 GDP per capita of approx-imately $16,400 is among the highest on the conti-nent and closing in on neighboring South Africas,which is declining (CIA World Factbook, 2013).

At the time of its independence in 1966,Botswana was one of Africas poorest countries, withonly a few miles of paved road and a largely agrarianand illiterate population. The average GDP per capitawas $80. A Harvard study written in 2005 noted thatthe countrys future in the early 1960s was ines-timably bleak. Even Seretse Khama, Botswanasfirst president (19661980), conceded that his coun-try was beyond doubt one of the poorest nations inAfrica (Alfaro et al., 2005). Relations between GreatBritain and Botswana remained cordial through thetransition, in part because Botswana offered so littlestrategic importance. In 1966, Queen Elizabeth IIknighted Khama, who had studied at Oxford andmarried an Englishwoman, Ruth Williams (figure10).

Just one year later, Botswanas fortunes radicallyimproved. The countrys diamond reserves, un-known at the time of independence, became evidentwhen the first diamond-rich kimberlite pipe was dis-covered by De Beers prospectors at Orapa in 1967 (DeBeers, 2014). Diamond production began in 1970(Janse, 2007). The sudden windfall could have takenthe poverty-stricken new country in any number ofdirections, but a dedication to democracy and ethicalgovernance prevailed. So did the understanding thatthe diamond riches could not be achieved without

technical assistance. In a 1978 speech, Khama de-clared, We will have to learn how to share aspira-tions and hopes as one people, united by a commonbelief in the unity of the human race. Here rests ourpast, our present, and, most importantly of all, ourfuture.

Khamas foresight appears particularly prescienttoday. Following his inauguration, he proposed thecontroversial 1967 Mineral Rights Act, aimed atvesting all mineral resources in the central govern-ment rather than in the hands of tribal leaders.Khamas delicate negotiations, and his appeal fortribal elders to consider the good of the nation ratherthan the good of the tribe, ultimately led to passageof the act. His skills as a negotiator and leader werenow cemented (Alfaro et al., 2005). This agreement,as well as a progressive and open attitude toward for-eign investment, would lay the foundation forBotswanas extraordinary growth, and ultimately forfuture negotiations with De Beers.

No other mining groups existed in Botswana. In1968, a jointly owned company called Debswana (85%owned by De Beers and 15% by the government) wasformed. For Khama and the democratic rulers whosucceeded him, Debswana became the model forBotswanas negotiations with other diamond andmetal mining companies. By 1975, the discovery ofadditional diamond-rich pipessuch as the spectacu-


Figure 10. In 1948, Seretse Khama caused a considerablestir, both in England and in Botswana, when he marriedan Englishwoman, Ruth Williams. Their son Ian Khama,far left, has been Botswanas president since 2008. Photoby Brian Seed, Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images.

Figure 9. Map of Botswanas diamond mines.

BOTSWANA

A F R I C A

N

Bulawayo

NORTH-WEST

GHANZI

CENTRAL

KWENENG

Jwaneng mine

Letlhakane mine

Tswapong mine

Damtshaa mine

KGALAGADI

SOUTHERN SOUTH-EAST

KGATLENG

Pretoria

Gaborone

Johannesburg

Z I M B A B W E

B O T S W A N A

S O U T H A F R I C A300 km0

Orapa mine

lar Jwaneng deposittruly changed the equation. Twodecades later, Botswana had become the most impor-tant diamond producer, supplying one quarter of theworlds diamonds by value (Janse, 1996). Although thegovernment could have chosen to nationalize themines, as neighboring countries were doing (Alfaro etal., 2005), Botswanas leadership chose to negotiateterms that were extremely favorable to the countrywhile acknowledging that it lacked the capacity tobuild the mining operations. Renegotiation with DeBeers in 1969 led to a new agreement, essentially re-sulting in fifty-fifty joint ownership (Hazelton, 2002).That, combined with revenues from taxation of its re-sources, has given Botswana the lions share of theprofits from diamond mining. Conversely, for DeBeers, Botswana became a sort of insurance policyagainst growing competitors, particularly in Russiaand Australia (Shor, 1990).

As much as the partnership between governmentand private enterprise has been lauded, it has alsofaced opposition. Critics contend that the partner-ship is too lopsided to be efficient and suggest that inrecent economic downturns, as in the mining con-traction of 2009 and 2010, many Batswana have beenleft without a safety net. Diversification of the econ-omy and less reliance on a single cash crop wouldserve as a hedge against downturns, it is believed,particularly as diamond mining reaches an end inBotswana. Some suggest that the partnership is infact counterproductive, for that very reason. Therelationship serves as a disincentive to economic di-versification and political accountability, wroteKenneth Good, an Australian professor in globalstudies at the University of Botswana who was ex-pelled from the country in 2005 for writing a bookcritical of its politics (van Wyk, 2009).

The relationship has not always been smooth, andsome historians note that Botswana has struggled, attimes contentiously, to diversify its economy and tomake De Beers its partner in the manufacturing as-pect of the diamond business as well. According toindustry journalist Chaim Even-Zohar (2007), DeBeers was initially against bringing facilities toBotswana. Even-Zohar notes that the company dideverything in its power to prevent the establishmentof more than two or three token manufacturingunits.

Shortly before the Jwaneng contract renewal,President Festus Mogae (19982008) expressed hiscountrys objective: We are looking for some im-provement in the sharing of benefit. The resource isours, which is very important, but the investor is also

entitled to a fair return (Idex, 2004). Clearly muchhas changed since 2006, when the new agreementscame into play. Today, beneficiation is a word thatostensibly holds equal weight with De Beers andBotswana. Mellier often singles out Botswana inspeeches dealing with the companys portfolio, not-ing the countrys role as a manufacturer and its risingprofile as a rough diamond trading destination (Mel-lier, 2014).

Seretse Khama and subsequent presidents have allplayed significant roles in harnessing the countrysnatural wealth and building institutions of good gov-ernance, education (the current literacy rate is almost85%), and anticorruption. As in several precedingyears, Botswana was rated the least corrupt Africancountry in 2013 by Transparency International. Butit was not only the rich diamond reserves that af-fected Botswanas destiny; more recently, copper,gold, nickel, uranium, and other resources have beendiscovered. A focus on bolstering secondary andhigher education, and a commitment to steering theeconomy away from total dependence on diamondrevenue, began in earnest in 2008, when Ian Khamawas voted into office. The fruits of an educated pop-ulace, good governance, and skillful negotiation forthe extraction of its wealthy natural resourcespar-ticularly diamondshave kept Botswana on track asone of the worlds fastest-growing countries, averag-ing 10% annual growth for almost three decades(Sanchez, 2006; Farah, 2013; figure 11).

While building the framework for its people, thegovernment is equally committed to responding tobusiness needs. Ive had the chance to observewhats happening in mining in plenty of other coun-tries, says Jim Gowans, outgoing managing directorfor Debswana. Government officials in Botswanamay not get enough credit for having done a good job.They have an idea about what they need to do, andtheyre pretty quick to do it. Another big benefit forBotswana is to have a democratic system and onlyfour presidents in their history. Certainly these fac-tors have led to stability.

From the late 1970s into the early 21st century,well over half of the countrys GDP was from dia-monds, but a consistent policy to make the countryless dependent on mining has emerged. In 2013, thediamond business alonenot counting copper,nickel and gold, or other industriescontributed toover a third of the countrys revenues. Over the years,Botswana has been lucrative for De Beers as well. In2000 alone, over 80% of the companys revenuecame from its Botswana portfolio53% of that from


the Jwaneng mine alone (Even-Zohar, 2002). For DeBeers, reliance on Botswanas richesand somemight argue overrelianceis also evident.

Of course, there are still enormous challengesBotswana must contend with. In the 1990s, thescourge of HIV/AIDS virus hit hard in the sub-Saharancountry (Weldon, 2001). Today, approximately 24% ofthe population is infected with the virus, according tothe World Health Organization. Botswanas relativelytiny population and workforce can ill afford such a dev-astating blow. Nevertheless, Botswanas leaders havemet the challenge with education programs on HIVprevention, partnerships and grants with pharmaceu-tical companies such as Bristol-Myers Squibb, and theconstruction of hospitals and treatment centers.Grants from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation areaimed at managing the symptoms of the disease or pre-venting its progression. Over 80% of Batswana infectedwith HIV/AIDS are covered by free antiretroviral med-ication, and 100% have access to it. President QuettMasire (19801998) was the first Batswana leader toface the problem at the turn of the century, and in 2009he declared it a national imperative to wipe out the dis-ease. He established 2016 as the target year when nonew infections would occur. In 2011 alone, theBotswana government spent some $385.5 million onAIDS prevention, care, and treatment, with a specialfocus on children stricken with AIDS or orphaned bythe disease. The results have been dramatic in termsof life expectancy through earlier detection and treat-ment, and reductions of HIV transmission frommother to child (figure 12). In 2012, President Khama

noted in a state of the nation address that the countrywas on track to achieve a less than 1% transmissionfrom mother to child by 2015. Botswanas example hasbeen lauded throughout Africa and the rest of theworld. The expenditures come at a considerablecost, according to Khama, though they are universallyconsidered utterly necessary for Botswana to move for-ward economically and socially.

Another challenge was the attempted relocation ofindigenous peoples in the Kalahari Desert to makeroom for a potential new mine at Gope. Survival In-ternational, a UK-based non-governmental organiza-tion, campaigned for several years against developingthe mine and, in late 2010, attempted to block its li-censing. According to reports, a lawsuit ended the cri-sis by allowing the Kalahari Bushmen to return totheir land (Botswana outraged, 2011).

In 2012, De Beers produced less than 30 millioncarats worldwideanother year of retrenchment froma high of 34 million carats in 2006due mainly to flag-ging global diamond demand, a lingering after-effect ofthe 2008 global recession. The following year sawmajor changes at the sources, such as the sale of theFinsch mine and a slope failure at Jwaneng (Greve,2013). Liquidity problems for many Indian manufac-turers, which still cut most of Botswanas diamonds,also slowed the momentum. For Debswana, a com-pany dedicated to addressing safety concerns, it wasalso a difficult year. The slope failure at Jwaneng inJune 2012 killed an employee, and investigations intoits cause shuttered the mine for several months. Deb-swana has since taken an even more aggressive stance


Figure 11. The Three Dikgosi, a frequently visitedmonument in Gaborone, depicts the tribal elders whotraveled to Great Britain in 1885 to request the cre-ation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the precursorto the modern state of Botswana. Photo by RobertWeldon/GIA.

Figure 12. The government of Botswana ensures thatits citizens are eligible for free antiretroviral medica-tions to treat HIV infection. Additionally, a series ofprograms aimed at reducing transmission of HIVfrom mother to child have been instituted. Photo byLucian Coman, Shutterstock.

on safety, promulgating a zero harm culture whileimproving its production figures (J. Gowans, pers.comm., 2013).

In tandem with declining production, 2012 salestotaled $5.5 billion, a billion less than 2011 (De Beers,2013b). Nevertheless, the goal of transferring DeBeerss sales arm to Botswana was accomplished in2013. The business lull may have been advantageousby allowing a more gradual buildup of Gaborone as adiamond sorting, valuing, and selling center. Deb-swana is poised for growth, particularly as new dia-

mond customers emerge in India, China, and other de-veloping markets. De Beers estimates 5% growth inChina, Hong Kong, and India by 2017, while the U.S.marketwhich now represents over a third of globaldiamond saleswill slip by about a third of its presentportion.

Beyond mining, the creation of long-term, value-added products, training, and employment forBotswana is beginning to take effect, though there isstill a ways to go, says Pauline Paledi, the executivedirector of the Botswana Diamond Manufacturers As-sociation (figure 13). The organization, established in2007, consists of some 17 full members who actuallymanufacture diamonds in the country today, plus re-cent applications for an additional four members atthe time of this writing. The association lobbies theBotswana government as a single voice, explainsPaledi, and works out compliance matters regardinglabor laws and visa and residency issues for foreignmanufacturing companies. The goal is to attract moreforeign investment, and eventually homegrown dia-mond manufacturing as well. We see growth ahead,says Paledi. The market is getting stronger for man-ufacturing, and it is diversified, as we can all see.

The notion that diamonds mined on African soilcould also be manufactured and sold there, bringinglong-term sustainability to Africans, has largelyeluded the continent since South African diamondswere discovered in 1867. For the Batswana, suchdreams now appear enticingly possible.

DIAMOND MINES OF BOTSWANAFrom Gaborone, a car can reach the front gate of Jwa-neng, the worlds richest diamond mine, in about


Figure 13. Pauline Paledi, executive director of theBotswana Diamond Manufacturers Association.Photo by Robert Weldon/GIA.

two and a half hours, a ride straight through a deso-late, hilly region of savannah and occasional cattleranches. For those lucky enough to receive an invi-tation to visit the mine and proceed through securitychecks and briefings, the overwhelming desire is topeer over the edge into this open pit, a gigantic man-made hole visible from outer space (figure 14).

Jwanengwhose name means place of smallstones in Setswanawas discovered in 1973. Thepit currently descends nearly 400 meters into threeseparate kimberlite pipes. It is expected to reach al-most 700 meters in depth by 2017, as new cuts diginto the kimberlitic ore in the search for diamonds.The latest is Cut 8, which extends laterally into thekimberlite pipes at Jwaneng and is expected to pro-duce over 100 million carats and extend the life ofthe mine until 2028. A birds-eye view of this mas-sive removal of earth reveals the rugged face ofBotswanas principal mine by value, which has thecapacity to produce some 2.5 million carats of dia-mond on a monthly basis. During the recession, andbecause of the 2012 slope failure, production droppedto about half of that (Mmopi, pers. comm., 2013).Once fully operational, Cut 8 will transform Jwanenginto one of the worlds super-pit mines.

Jwaneng employs over 2,500 people, though theyare rarely visible, partly due to the pits immense sizeand partly for security and safety reasons. Cut 8 isexpected to expand the workforce by at least 50%.At the bottom of the pit, kimberlitic ore is broken upthrough dynamite blasting on a regular basis. Minersare also busy maneuvering the massive Komatsu 930trucks, each the size of a house and designed to cartout 250 tons of kimberlitic ore per haul (figure 15). A

staggering 60 million tons of earth are thus removedin a high production year; on any given workday, traf-fic from the trucks forms a constant stream into andout of the mine. Where the earth goes after process-ing is another logistical and engineering feat.

First, the ore is crushed into much smaller parti-cles at a plant on the surface. The clay and mud areremoved, and the diamonds are separated from theore by X-ray at a completely automated recoveryplant (CARP) where, as a theft countermeasure, nohuman hands touch the ore. After that, the diamonds


Figure 14. Thispanoramic view of theJwaneng mine, Deb-swanas largest andmost lucrative, shows amanmade pitvisiblefrom outer spacethatcovers approximately520,000 square metersat the surface and ismore than 400 metersdeep. Photo by RobertWeldon/GIA.

Figure 15. A Komatsu 930 truck can remove up to 250tons of diamond-bearing rock and earth in a singlehaul. Photo by Robert Weldon/GIA.

are presorted, cleaned, and packaged using laser tech-nology (again with no hands touching the rough).The diamonds are then ready for transport toGaborone for sorting and valuing, and ultimately forsale. The rough is classified by weight, shape, clarity,and color, regardless of source. According to KagoMmopi, Debswanas mines alone supply between200,000 and 500,000 carats to DTC Botswana on aweekly basis (figure 16).

A similar procedure takes place at Debswanasother mines, all of which are open pit. The Orapamine is Botswanas oldest, established in 1971, a fewyears after diamonds were first discovered in a drynortheastern part of the country. As with all De Beersprojects, the mine is owned fifty-fifty with the govern-ment. Orapa has the capacity to produce almost 20million carats a year; in 2012, however, productionslowed to 11 million carats due to global economicconditions. Letlhakane and Damtshaa are both muchsmaller-capacity mines, producing less than a millioncarats annually. Combined, Debswanas four mines

produced 20.22 million carats in 2012 and treated21.87 million tons of earthjust over a carat per ton(De Beers, 2013b). In 2013, Debswana produced over22 million carats; these numbers are expected to in-crease as global economic recovery takes hold.

Botswanas other diamond mines are independ-ently owned rather than joint ventures between DeBeers and the government. One of these is the Leralamine, owned by DiamonEx, which has been stalleddue to restructuring and is expected to reopen in 2014.Others such as the Karowe mine, operated by LucaraDiamond Corporation, are selling diamonds throughauctions. Karowe made news by yielding 26,196 caratsfor auction (Lucara completes first sale of Botswanadiamonds, 2012) and announcing the find of a 4.77 ctblue diamond as well as several large diamonds(Golan, 2013). Auctions are also the governments pre-ferred method of selling diamonds, at least for now.

THE OKAVANGO DIAMOND COMPANY: THE MARKET EXPERIMENTDe Beers was traditionally the sole purchaser of dia-monds mined in Botswana. A renegotiation in Sep-tember 2011 changed that, with the governmentobtaining the right to purchase a progressive 1015%allotment of the rough to sell through its own chan-nels over the next few years. To that end, the govern-ment established the ODC (figure 17) in 2012 and


Figure 16. Mixed rough from Debswanas mines mustbe collected and sorted into categories by size, color,and clarity. Photo by Robert Weldon/GIA.

Figure 17. The Okavango Diamond Company, awholly owned government company that derives itsname from Botswanas rich Okavango Delta, pur-chases over 10% of the rough diamonds produced byDebswana for sale to clients around the world. Thismargin will increase gradually to 15%. Photo byRobert Weldon/GIA.

appointed Toby Frears as its managing director thatsame year.

As diamonds arrive weekly at Debswana, DeBeers and government negotiators settle on a valuefor the goods. After the purchases are made, De Beersaggregates Botswanas goods with its allotments fromNamibia, South Africa, and Canada.

The 10%-plus that the ODC buys on a weeklybasis is gathered and sold to clients around the worldvia auction. Sales occur about 10 times a year and in-clude parcels and single stones 10 ct or larger. It is thusa different system from the fixed allocation contractsimplemented by De Beers and its sightholders. Aswould be expected, ODC clients must be properly vet-ted and comply with strict guidelines to register andqualify as buyers. Details about each companys rolein the diamond value chain, top personnel, and com-pliance with all diamond sector regulations are re-quired by ODC.

For all its advantages, the auction system tends tobe risky: volatile during good economic times, andslow to nonproductive during bearish economies.Under such conditions, fixed contracts make it easierto fine-tune and control the market. Marcus Terhaar(figure 18), ODCs deputy managing director, ex-plains that the auctions help the government derivecurrent market value for the products.

Auctions are going to be far more volatile thanother selling mechanisms. But thats not necessarilya bad thing, because over a consolidated period oftime, you will find that they do very well despite theboom-and-bust cycle.

Jacob Thamage, who also serves on the board ofthe ODC, agrees, alluding to current economic cli-

mate. For ODC to launch under these conditions isactually very good, because, like they say, Roughseas make the best sailors. It is conditions such asthese that will really teach us what the market is,and what it could be.

ODC officials seem open to the idea of a dual sell-ing system that incorporates both ideologies. A lotof companies use dual systemsmeaning that theyhave options and contracts. That tends to mitigatethe risk, Thamage explains. By the middle of 2014,we will have completed a full cycle of selling and un-derstood the possibilities of auctions and contracts.

Terhaar highlights the beneficiation aspects thatare already taking place through the ODC: What wehave in Botswana, insofar as the diamond sector isconcerned, is a very strong diamond mining industry.We have a very well-established sorting and valuingoperation in Debswana, and we have a good five toseven years into diamond manufacturing. Roughtrading is clearly the missing link for Botswana, andthat is the primary focus of the ODC. It will bringjobs. This means that 150 people are coming to ourpremises every five weeks or so. That means 150more hotel accommodations, 150 more seats on localairlines, and 150 more customers looking for taxis,making dinner reservations at restaurants. It will fos-ter the growth of ancillary services: diamond reports,banking, rough valuing, and marketing services, andso many other types of related services.

For now, ODC is busy establishing its operation,conducting sales, and promoting itself as a viable sep-arate channel for rough diamond buying. This is a bigfeather in Botswanas cap, says Terhaar. Ten yearsago this was all bush country. Botswana has proventhat it can be done. And while there is a lot of learningto capture, there is certainly the motivation, and thewill, for Botswana to perform as a benchmark dia-mond centeras efficiently as Antwerp, Israel, or anyother diamond center in the world.

CAN A CUTTING INDUSTRY BE SUSTAINED INBOTSWANA?While Botswana prospered by carefully redirecting itsdiamond wealth into nation-building, establishing adomestic diamond manufacturing industry remainedan elusive goal until recently. Neighboring SouthAfrica benefited from a well-established diamondcutting industry that employed several thousandworkers. Even so, much of this industry survived be-cause De Beers subsidized local cutting operations byproviding rough at a 10% discount (actually sparing


Figure 18. Marcus Terhaar, deputy managing directorof the Okavango Diamond Company. Photo byRobert Weldon/GIA.

buyers export taxes on rough). Some of these opera-tions existed mainly as a means for their owners toobtain rough allocations from De Beers. They per-formed minimal work on stones in the local plantsbefore exporting them to Israel, Antwerp, or India foractual manufacturing (Shor, 1990; figure 19).

In the past, De Beers actively discouraged dia-mond manufacturing in Botswana, claiming thecosts of doing business there were not low enough tocompete with India and China. In addition, De Beersnoted, the country was too far removed from majorconsumer markets (Grynberg, 2013).

De Beerss opposition began to crumble in 1990when the company entered negotiations to renew itsfive-year contract with the government to sell roughmined by Debswana. With De Beers owning 50% ofDebswana, such contracts would seem to be a routinematter, but in 1989 the government had raised theissue of starting a domestic manufacturing operation.At the same time, a number of major rough diamonddealers were lobbying Botswanas parliament to sell20% of the companys production outside De Beerssnetwork, claiming they would be willing to pay 57%higher prices than De Beers. One of those dealers,Maurice Tempelsman of Lazare Kaplan International(LKI), offered to build a polishing factory if the govern-ment was willing to supply diamonds to the operation(Shor, 1990). The government made no such promise,but LKI built the factory anyway.

De Beers, which already employed 5,000 workersat its three mines in Botswana, eventually agreed todevelop a cutting factory, mainly to forestall the par-liament from considering this 20% market win-dow (Shor, 1990). The operation, named Teemane,opened in 1993, but a decade later only three othershad been built, the largest being the Lazare KaplanInternational operation (J. Thamage, pers. comm.,2013).

Botswana assumed a much greater role in DeBeerss operations after 2001 when, as part of thecompanys reorganization, it assumed a 15% stake inthe firms ownership. Botswana also captured a muchgreater strategic role after De Beers began phasing outits agreement with Alrosa, the Russian diamondmining company, to market its productionac-counting for about 25% of De Beerss rough salesand sold off its aging South African mines and its $5billion diamond stockpile (Even-Zohar, 2007). By2005, Botswana was by far the largest and most prof-itable part of De Beerss operations, accounting for70% of its earnings (Grynberg, 2013). This fact wasnot lost on the countrys leadership, which leveraged

an aggressive series of beneficiation measures in itsnegotiations for both the sales contract with Deb-swana and the renewal of the 25-year lease at Jwa-neng (Even-Zohar, 2007).

The agreements, reached in 2006, covered a thou-sand pages but contained three main requirementsthat would transform operations for both sides:

De Beers would directly supply local firms thatqualified for a diamond manufacturing license.

De Beers would relocate all of its sorting andrough sales operations from London toGaborone by 2009.

A certain percentage of De Beers sight goodswould be reserved for local polishing operations.

In short, the government of Botswana, which hadowned a 15% stake in De Beers since 2000, now hadsufficient clout to force the company to supply localpolishing operations, and to require large diamondmanufacturers to develop factories on its soil if theywanted to obtain supplies of rough diamonds (Gryn-berg, 2013).

While the 2006 agreement provided for suppliesto 10 factories, as selected by De Beers, Botswana


Figure 19. Laurelton, a joint venture manufacturingbranch of Tiffany & Co., has set up shop close to theDTC Botswana complex and the Diamond Technol-ogy Park. Today, it works with Indian cutting expertsto bring about a transfer of skills to the Batswana.The manufacturing plant has ample room for growth,which it clearly expects. Photo by RobertWeldon/GIA.

moved aggressively beyond De Beerss plans and is-sued licenses to 16 companies, which began takingrough supplies through separate sights domesticallyin January 2007. By fall of that year, six had gone intoproduction (Golan, 2007). On the second point, the20082009 world financial crisis hit De Beers hard,requiring the company to borrow $500 million fromshareholders (including $200 million from the Op-penheimer Trust, which owned 40% of the com-pany). The crisis also forced De Beers to postpone itsrelocation plans until 2013 (Krawitz, 2008; AngloAmerican, 2009).

In 2008, in preparation for De Beerss arrival andthe growth of a domestic cutting industry, the dia-mond industry, led by South African manufacturerSafdico with the Botswanan governments coopera-tion, commissioned the Diamond Technology Park.The secure 35,000-square-meter facility was locatednext to the new De Beers building and just four kilo-meters from Sir Seretse Khama International Airport.It was designed to house about 15 medium-size man-ufacturing operations in two buildings, plus industryservices such as banking, manufacturing equipment,and diamond gradingGIAs Gaborone laboratorywas one of the first tenantsin a third building. TheDiamond Technology Park website notes that by2012, these operations had outgrown the complex,causing a number of manufacturers to locate in theindustrial parks nearby.

Statistics for 2013 indicate that Botswanas driveto create a local diamond manufacturing industry hasbeen a success. More than 3,000 workers are em-ployed in polishing operations (compared to fewerthan 500 in 2006) and several thousand more throughancillary businesses serving the diamond sector. Pol-ished diamond exports neared $800 million and wereforecast to top $1 billion by 2015, compared to $100million in 2008. The Diamond Technology Park wasfully rented, and the government commissionedplans for a fourth building of 4,000 square meters tobe completed by the end of 2014 (Grynberg, 2013;Shor, 2013). By the end of 2013, 24 manufacturerswere operating in Botswana, 21 of them receivingrough from Debswana through local sights (figure20).

One reason for this success is that even before DeBeers transferred all of its sorting and sales operationsto Gaborone, the Botswana sights consisted primarilyof higher-value rough that could be profitably pol-ished (Grynberg, 2013). But the rush to open diamondmanufacturing operations in Botswana rekindled thedebate over whether diamond manufacturing there

was economically sustainable, particularly in light ofCanadas unsuccessful attempts to develop large-scalecutting operations (Yellowknife diamond-cuttingplants future in limbo, 2009; Danylchuk, 2013).

MANUFACTURING COSTSDiamond manufacturing costs in Botswana rangefrom just under $40 to $60 per carat, depending onthe efficiency and technological capabilities of agiven operation. These costs include labor, utilities,maintenance and technology support, and trans-portation. This cost range is much lower thanCanadas ($80 per carat) but still more than doublethat of China ($17 per carat) and four to six times thatof India ($10 per carat), which polishes 92% of worldproduction by volume (Gregorian, 2013; figure 21).

Visits to nearly all of Botswanas large manufactur-ing facilities found them fully committed to develop-ing sustainably profitable operations. These operationsbegan between 2006 and 2010, using expatriates fromIndia, China, South Africa, and Israel to train local pol-ishers. Each operation had to be started from scratchbecause no skilled workers, equipment, or financingwere available locally (R. Moses, pers. comm., 2013).Over the next four to five years, however, local pol-ishers largely replaced foreign workers at the wheels,and now comprise 8090% of the workforce (figure22). For many local Batswana, the employment oppor-tunities have helped them extricate themselves frompoverty. In some cases, the salaries have helped feedentire families.

The countrys largest diamond factory is run byEurostar, an Antwerp firm that has its roots in India.The company now employs 520 workers; 485 ofthese are locals who received a minimum of six


Figure 20. A cutter at Diacore Botswana examines theinitial facets made on a fancy yellow diamond. Photoby Robert Weldon/GIA.

months of training and are polishing precision-cutround and princess diamonds 0.25 ct and up. Thecompany recently spent $7.5 million to upgrade itshigh-tech processing equipment.

Expatriates still dominate the highly technical as-pects of the cutting process: rough planning, brutingand laser sawing, and shaping. Here, too, Batswanatrainees work beside the technicians, learning howto use advanced equipment (figure 23).

Another large operation, employing 300 workers,is Shrenuj, which produces half-carat and largerrounds and has also begun a jewelry manufacturing

operation. The company has a program to hire hear-ing-impaired workers, who now comprise one-quar-ter of its labor forcebut is still working to matchthe productivity of its Indian operations (K. Lanny,pers. comm., 2013). Nevertheless, the operation hasbecome profitable as performance improves.

Labor costs are less of an issue with Safdico andDiacore Botswana (formerly Steinmetz), which spe-cialize in large, high-quality diamonds. Both compa-nies have developed rigorous training programsbecause each diamond must meet very high, exactingstandards. Safdico and Diacore both added that theyare in Botswana for the long term (K. Teichman andR. Moses, pers. comms., 2013).

The government has been diligently auditingcompanies to ensure that diamond factories providefull training and employ Batswana to perform all ofthe work necessary to produce finished stones (R.Moses, pers. comm., 2013). Diamond executives givethe government high marks for introducing regula-tions and policies that support equipment imports,funds transfer, building licenses, and transparency.

Several diamond firms have taken their benefici-ation role beyond offering training and employmentto local workers. Safdico supports programs that traincomputer technicians, schoolteachers, and othercommunity-building professionals in villages outsidethe capital. Diacore Botswana provides microloansto employees for school fees and conducts events forcommunity improvement projects. They have alsosupported sporting events and employ prominentlocal athletes (figure 24).


DIAMOND MANUFACTURING COSTS, BY COUNTRY

New York Canada Belgium Israel SouthAfrica

Russia andCIS

Armenia Thailand China India

100100

80

60

40

20

0

80

70

40 40

3025

20 1710

600 n/a 1,100 2,000 3,000 10,000 3,500 10,000 110,000 1 million

Estimated employment

US$ per polished carat

Botswanaprocessing cost

Figure 21. This chart,prepared for the WorldBank, analyzes the per-carat costs of diamondmanufacturing (includ-ing labor and operatingcharges) in diamondcenters worldwideagainst Botswanas costs(Grigorian, 2012).

Figure 22. Diacore Botswana offers diamond manu-facturing jobs to hundreds of Batswana. Photo byRobert Weldon/GIA.

Beyond the high cost of labor, significant chal-lenges to sustaining a diamond processing industryremain. Infrastructure is still lacking. Power outagesare common, Internet service remains sluggish, andimporting or repairing equipment is still very costlyand inefficient.

Executives of manufacturing facilities in Botswana,while acknowledging the economics and challenges,are divided over whether the countrys diamond indus-try can become fully self-sufficient. But even the mostskeptical see significant potential for improvingBotswanas competitive position so that it may be-come a successful niche producer, like New York orAntwerp. It is still early days, initial stages, said Erik

van Pul, manager of Eurostar in Botswana. We are see-ing improvements all the time as workers gain moreexpertise and government services and infrastructureimproves.

In 2010, for example, most Botswana diamond op-erations could not profitably produce polished dia-monds below one carat because training and high-techprocessing equipment were not fully in place. By 2012,the more advanced operations were producing 0.40 ctstonesat a profit, according to van Pul. At least 10factories were producing precision triple-excellentcuts comparable to any diamond polishing operationin the world. While that represents true progress, oneanalyst believes that the ability to polish melee (0.100.20 ct) profitably is necessary to create a manufactur-ing industry that sustains large-scale employment (M.van den Brande, pers. comm., 2013).

THE FUTUREThe year 2027 is the governments benchmark for de-veloping a diamond-polishing industry that does notdepend on domestic rough (figure 25). Jwaneng isscheduled to be redeveloped into an undergroundmine that same year, which will sharply reduce pro-duction. By comparison, Australias Argyle mine fellfrom a peak annual output of 42 million carats as anopen pit to 20 million carats as an underground mine(Argyle Diamond Mine, 2013). Production will likelycontinue 30 to 40 years beyond this date, but withmuch smaller volume and higher cost.

Both the Botswana government and the diamondcommunity anticipate that rough auctions by Oka-vango Diamond Company will stimulate manufactur-ing and help build the countrys trading base.Okavango is a government-affiliated company thathas begun selling between 12% and 15% of the coun-trys diamond production through monthly tendersales. Existing diamond manufacturers say the tenderswill cut costs and provide greater access to supplies(R. Moses, pers. comm., 2013). Another goal, accord-ing to Terhaar, is attracting smaller diamond compa-nies and rough traders to set up business in thecountry. Okavango sales have much lower purchaserequirements than De Beers sights, plus a fairly simpleapplication process that will enable such firms to par-ticipate. Building this trading environment will becritical, and the government understands that it needsto work with the diamond industry to lower infra-structure costs and improve services for the countrysdiamond polishing industry to survive beyond sup-plies from its mines (Grynberg, 2013).


Figure 24. Diacore Botswana manager Kefir Teichman(right) poses with gemologist Monica Alfred, a five-year veteran of the company and a member ofBotswanas national volleyball team. Photo by RobertWeldon/GIA.

Figure 23. The use of highly sophisticated planning,sawing, and polishing technology is prevalent at thenew manufacturing plants in Gaborone. Photo byRobert Weldon/GIA.

Indeed, one World Bank study (Grigorian, 2013)noted that [diamond] producing countries hoping toestablish a viable cutting industry are squeezed bycompetition from two directions: one from low-costeconomies such as India and China, another fromhigh-skills economies such as the United States, Bel-gium, Israel, and Canada. For any latecomer, thechallenge is plain: Either be cheaper (and workharder) than the former, or be more knowledgeableand skills-intensive than the latter. The waythrough this competition, the study concluded, wasfor these countries to achieve a manufacturing nicheby branding to provide added value to their products.

It remains to be seen whether Botswana-brandedcut diamonds will captivate consumer attentionglobally. Buyers are increasingly conscious of theproducts they purchase and the supply chain in-volved. The storyline for a Botswana brand is un-doubtedly strong. Consumers, drawn to Africandiamonds for well over a century, could find assur-ance in knowing that the diamonds they purchase

today have contributed to skills transfer in Africa,poverty alleviation, and the dignity of employmentfor Botswanas people.


ABOUT THE AUTHORSMr. Weldon is manager of photography and visual communica-tions, and Mr. Shor is senior industry analyst, at GIA in Carlsbad,California.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe authors wish to thank DTC Botswana for kindly allowing GIAto interview staff and take photos on the diamond floor. Warmthanks to Alan Bronstein for his encouragement, insights, and in-troductions. Thanks also to Marc van den Brande for his invalu-able assistance, Drs. Roman Grynberg and Bram Janse for theirinsights, and the executives of Botswanas diamond-manufactur-ing facilities who opened the doors to their operations to the au-thors. Claudia DAndrea, director of GIAs Bangkok campus, andAnthony Licht of GIAs Johannesburg lab provided firsthand

knowledge of the Botswana diamond industry. Many thanks toKevin Schumacher, GIAs digital resources specialist, who pro-vided video expertise during the interviews in Botswana.

We dedicate this article to our colleague and friend, Tawfic Farah,GIAs vice president of international operations until his untimelydeath in 2013. Tawfic had a passion for Botswana, and he nur-tured a strong desire to help the people of Africa by providing edu-cational opportunities. We need to find a way to be on the rightside of history, he would often advise us. Tawfic wrote a scholarlypaper on Botswana that was not published but served as theseed for this story.

Figure 25. Botswana is capitalizing on its diamond re-source riches by adding value through diamond man-ufacturing. Though not yet large by global standards,the cutting industry in this sub-Saharan countryshows considerable promise. De Beers now holds itsrough diamond sales in Gaborone and has encour-aged large diamantaires to set up manufacturingplants there. Photo by Robert Weldon/GIA.

Visit www.gia.edu/gems-gemology, or scan the QR code on the right.

Discover more about Botswanas strategies and challenges as itdevelops a thriving diamond industry. G&Gs exclusive online contentprovides access to video interviews and additional resources toenhance your knowledge of this countrys importance to the diamondand jewelry markets.

For More on Botswanas Diamond Industry


Alfaro L., Spar D., Allibhoy F. (2005) Botswana: A diamond in therough. HBS case no. 9-703-027. Harvard Business School Publish-ing, Boston, http://altongp.com/currentprojects/Zimbabwe%20Diamond/Botswana%20Diamonds.pdf.

Anglo American (2009) Annual report 2009. http://ar09.an-gloamerican.solutions.investis.com/financial_statements/notes/note38.html.

Argyle Diamond Mine (2013) The future: Argyle as an under-ground operation. http://www.argylediamonds.com.au/index_operations.html.

Ashok T. (2013) Indian diamond industry losing sparkle. TheHindu Business Line, Jan. 29, http://www.thehindubusi-nessline.com/opinion/indian-diamond-industry-losing-sparkle/article4357705.ece.

Bates R. (2013) What sightholders really think about De Beers moveto Botswana. JCK, Oct. 15, http://www.jckonline.com/blogs/cutting-remarks/2013/10/15/what-sightholders-really-think-about-de-beers-move-to-botswana.

Botswana looking to raise rent on Jwaneng mining lease. (2004) Idex,No. 174, pp. 7576, http://www.idexonline.com/portal_Full-MazalUbracha.asp?id=23157.

Botswana outraged over boycott of diamonds, tourism (2011)Bangkok Gems & Jewellery, Vol. 24, No. 6, p. 47.

Danylchuk J. (2013) Yellowknife diamond row factory deal stillnot iced. Northern Journal, Feb. 26, http://norj.ca/2013/02/yel-lowknife-diamond-row-factory-deal-still-not-iced.

De Beers (2008) Largest, most sophisticated sorting facility in theworld begins operations in Botswana. March 18, http://www.de-beersgroup.com/ImageVaultFiles/id_686/cf_5/8-03.PDF.

(2013a) De Beers holds inaugural international sight inBotswana. Nov. 11, http://www.debeersgroup.com/ImageVault-Files/id_2126/cf_5/De_Beers_holds_inaugural_sight_in_Gaborone.PDF.

(2013b) Operating and financial review 2012. http://www.debeersgroup.com/ImageVaultFiles/id_2064/cf_5/2012_OFR.PDF.

(2014) Debswana. http://www.debeersgroup.com/operations/mining/mining-operations/debswana.

Diamonds sparkle (2011) African Mining, Vol. 16, No. 6, Novem-ber-December, p. 66.

Even-Zohar C. (2007) From Mine to Mistress: Corporate Strategiesand Government Policies in the International Diamond Industry.Mining Communications Ltd., London.

Farah T. (2013) The politics of development in Africa: Botswana asa case study. Working paper, GIA Library, Carlsbad, California.

Ferreira-Marques C. (2013) Goodbye London, hello Gaborone: DeBeers sales head to Africa. Reuters, Oct. 3, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/03/us-debeers-idUSBRE99204C20131003.

Golan E. (2007) DTC sightholders list: Whos on and what now?Idex Online, Dec. 20, http://www.idexonline.com/portal_Full-News.asp?TextSearch=&KeyMatch=0&id=29129.

(2013) Lucara recovers 4.77 ct blue diamond. Idex, Vol. 28,No. 274, p. 125, http://www.idexonline.com/portal_Full-News.asp?id=37641.

Greve N. (2013) De Beers 2012 gem production dips to 27.9m, salesdown 16%. Mining Weekly, Feb. 15, http://www.mining-weekly.com/article/de-beers-2012-gem-production-dips-to-

279m-2013-02-15. Grigorian K. (2012) Diamond production and processing: What

Armenia can learn from an intra-regional exchange on the diamond trade. World Bank, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECALEA/Resources/1040211-1251905880790/KB47_ArmeniaDiamond.pdf.

Grynberg R. (2013) Some like them rough. Botswana Institute forDevelopment Policy. Discussion Paper 142.

Hazelton R. (2002) Diamonds: Forever or for good? The Diamondsand Human Security Project, Partnership Africa Canada, Oc-casional Paper #3, March, http://pacweb.org/Documents/diamonds_KP/3_diamonds_Forever_Eng_March2002.pdf.

Janse A.J.A. (1996) History of diamond sources in Africa, Part II.G&G, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 230, http://www.gia.edu/gems-gemol-ogy/spring-1996-diamond-history-africa-janse.

(2007) Global rough diamond production since 1870. G&G,Vol. 43, No. 2, p. 98119, http://www.gia.edu/gems-gemology/summer-2007-global-rough-diamond-production-janse.

Krawitz A. (2008) De Beers postpones setting up aggregation inBotswana. Diamonds.net, Dec. 9, http://www.diamonds.net/news/NewsItem.aspx?ArticleID=24441.

Lucara completes first sale of Botswana diamonds (2012) Solitaire,No. 61, September, p. 28.

Mbayi L. (2011) Linkages in Botswanas diamond cutting and polish-ing industry. MMCP Discussion Paper No. 6, http://www.prism.uct.ac.za/Papers/MMCP%20Paper%206_0.pdf.

Mellier P. (2014) We cannot lose consumer trust in diamonds. Pro-fessional Jeweller, Jan. 28, http://www.professionaljeweller.com/article-14143-we-cannot-lose-consumer-trust-in-diamonds/.

Mokone O., Mogapi S. (2013) The treacherous home coming journeyof Botswana diamonds. Sunday Standard Online, Nov. 25,http://www.sundaystandard.info/article.php?NewsID=18502&GroupID=4.

Sanchez L. (2006) Botswana: A rags to riches story. Jewellery NewsAsia, No. 256, January, pp 141152.

Shor R. (1990) Prosperity & politics. JCK, Vol. 161, No. 6, June, pp.5672.

(2013a) Botswana: Making beneficiation work. GIA Re-search & News, June 24, http://www.gia.edu/research-news-botswana-making-beneficiation-work.

(2013b) Industry Analysis: Demand improves after slow au-tumn, but challenges remain. GIA Insider, http://www.gia.edu/gia-news-research-march-2013-demand-improves-slow-autumn.

Spektorov Y., Linde O., Cornelissen B., Khomenko R. (2013) Theglobal diamond report 2013: Journey through the value chain.Bain & Company Insights, Aug. 27, http://www.bain.com/pub-lications/articles/global-diamond-report-2013.aspx.

Transparency International (2013) Botswana. http://www.trans-parency.org/country/#BWA

Weldon R. (2001) Diamonds for good. Professional Jeweler, January,http://www.professionaljeweler.com/archives/articles/2001/jan01/0101dn1.html.

Yellowknife diamond-cutting plants future in limbo (2009) CBC News,June 11, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/yellowknife-diamond-cutting-plant-s-future-in-limbo-1.800202.

REFERENCES

114 EMERALD ORIGIN DETERMINATION GEMS & GEMOLOGY SUMMER 2014

The traditional practice of assigning Colombianorigin to emeralds exhibiting three-phase inclu-sions (Giuliani et al., 1993) is in need of updat-ing, as we now know that such inclusions are oftenseen in emeralds from other locations, includingChina, Zambia (Schwarz and Pardieu, 2009), andAfghanistan (Hammarstrom, 1989; Bowersox et al.,1991). The characterization of these inclusions usingspectroscopy and chemical composition has not beendocumented until now.

A new Zambian deposit at Musakashi was firstreported in 2005 (Zwaan et al., 2005), and field tripreports were subsequently published (Klemm, 2009and 2010). These articles presented historical and ge-ological information about the mine (see box A), ex-amined the gemological properties of these newemeralds, and presented chemical analysis usingelectron microprobe (Zwaan et al., 2005).

The present study characterizes emeralds con-taining multiphase inclusions from all of the locali-ties above by using microscopy, spectroscopy, andtrace-element analysis to create a framework for ge-ographic origin determination.

MATERIALS AND METHODS A total of 84 emeralds were studied, gathered fromthe GIA Field Gemology Collection and from gemmerchants of Zambian and Colombian emeralds.Color ranged from light to deep green. The sampleswere studied in three forms: 55 were rough sampleswith one or two polished surface windows, 28 werefabricated as optical wafers oriented either perpendi-cular or parallel to the crystals c-axis, and one wasfaceted. After fabrication, the samples ranged from0.18 to 4.85 ct. The group consisted of:

Eleven samples reportedly from Musakashi (fig-ure 1), acquired from gem dealer Guy Clutter-buck, who visited the mines several times.Weight range: 0.574.85 ct.

Ten samples collected from the Kagem mine inthe Kafubu area of Zambia by author VP in thesummer of 2013. Weight range: 0.292.22 ct.

Fifteen samples collected from AfghanistansPanjshir Valley by author VP in 2011. Weightrange: 0.181.80 ct.

Thirteen samples collected from Davdar,China, by author VP in 2005 and 2009. Weightrange: 0.161.77 ct.

Thirty-five Colombian samples from Muzo(12), Coscuez (12), La Pita (3), Peas Blancas (2),and Chivor (6), acquired from Flavie Isatelle, a

THREE-PHASE INCLUSIONS IN EMERALD ANDTHEIR IMPACT ON ORIGIN DETERMINATIONSudarat Saeseaw, Vincent Pardieu, and Supharart Sangsawong

FEATURE ARTICLES

Until now, the observation of three-phase inclusions in emeralds has been considered a potential indi-cator of Colombian origin. Nevertheless, emeralds from Afghanistan (Panjshir Valley), China (Davdar),and Zambia (Kafubu and a new deposit at Musakashi) may contain three-phase inclusions resemblingthose often found in specimens from Colombian deposits (Muzo, Chivor, La Pita, Coscuez, and PeasBlancas). This article presents detailed photomicrographs of samples from these localities, with a focuson their multiphase inclusions. Also investigated are spectroscopic features and trace-element data. Forthe gemologist studying the origin of emeralds hosting three-phase inclusions, a powerful set of tools toaid in this determination comes from the combination of detailed microscopic examination, UV-Vis-NIR and FTIR spectroscopy, and LA-ICP-MS trace-element analysis.

See end of article for About the Authors and Acknowledgments.GEMS & GEMOLOGY, Vol. 50, No. 2, pp. 114132,http://dx.doi.org/10.5741/GEMS.50.2.114. 2014 Gemological Institute of America

field gemologist/geologist who visited in May2010, and gem merchant Ron Ringsrud. Weightrange: 0.124.14 ct.

Standard gemological properties were measuredwith a Rayner refractometer (yttrium-aluminum-gar-net prism) equipped with a near sodiumequivalentlight source to measure refractive index and birefrin-gence, a Chelsea filter, and four-watt long-wave (365nm) and short-wave (254 nm) UV lamps to observefluorescence. Due to fracturing in the samples, cou-pled with their relatively small sizes, no useful specificgravity measurement was acquired. The wafers opti-cal path lengths were measured using a Mitutoyo Se-ries 395 spherical micrometer with an accuracy of 2microns. Microscopic examination was performedwith GIA binocular microscopes at 1070 magnifi-cation, using both darkfield and brightfield illumina-tion. Other lighting techniques, including fiber-opticillumination, were employed to investigate internalcharacteristics. Photomicrographs were captured at upto 180 magnification with a Nikon SMZ 1500 sys-

tem using darkfield, brightfield, and oblique illumina-tion with a fiber-optic light.

Ultraviolet through visible and near-infrared (UV-Vis-NIR) spectra were collected with a Hitachi U-2900 spectrophotometer (for polarized ordinary rayspectra) at 1 nm resolution and a PerkinElmerLambda 950 spectrophotometer at 0.3 nm resolution,operating with a 60 mm integrating sphere accessoryand a Lambda polarizer accessory. Fourier-transforminfrared (FTIR) spectroscopy was performed using aThermo Nicolet 6700 FTIR spectrometer operatingwith a 4 beam condenser accessory at 4 cm1 resolu-tion. A Renishaw inVia Raman microscope fittedwith a 514 nm argon ion laser was used for identifyinginclusions.

For laser ablationinductively coupled plasmamass spectrometry (LA-ICP-MS) chemical analysis,we used a Thermo Scientific X Series II ICP-MS com-bined with a Nd:YAG-based laser ablation device op-erating at a wavelength of 213 nm. For the ICP-MSoperations, the forward power was set at 1300 W andthe typical nebulizer gas flow was approximately

EMERALD ORIGIN DETERMINATION GEMS & GEMOLOGY SUMMER 2014 115

Figure 1. These emeralds from Musakashi, Zambia, range from 0.57 to 4.85 ct. The rough samples were polished with one window on each. The faceted sample measures 6.29 5.35 3.53 mm and weighs 0.97 ct.Photo by N. Kitdee.

0.90 L/min. The carrier gas used in the laser ablationunit was He, set at approximately 0.78 L/min. Thealignment and tuning sequences were set to maxi-mize Be counts and keep the ThO/Th ratio below2%. Laser ablation conditions consisted of a 40 mdiameter laser spot size, a fluence of 10 1 J/cm2, anda 7 Hz repetition rate. For quantitative analysis, sam-ples must be calibrated against an external standardof known composition, which meant measuring thesignals for the elements of interest in the sample andcomparing them to the signals for a standard withknown concentrations of those elements. Generally,NIST 610 and 612 glasses were used for calibrationstandards. All elemental concentrations were calcu-lated by applying 29Si as an internal standard, with Siconcentration calculated from the theoretical valueof beryl (31.35 wt.%). Laser spots were applied in thesame area where UV-Vis spectra were collected,which was usually clean and had an even color dis-

tribution, though color-zoned areas were also sam-pled (figure 2).

RESULTSGemological Properties. The samples gemologicalproperties are summarized in table 1. The refractiveindices varied from 1.570 to 1.588 for n and 1.576 to1.593 for n, with birefringence between 0.006 and0.010. Emeralds from Musakashi, Davdar, and all theColombian deposits had lower RI than the samplesfrom Kafubu and Panjshir. The Musakashi emeraldsdisplayed a particularly strong pink reaction in theChelsea color filter, while a pink to strong pink dis-play was typical in samples from all other localitiesexcept for Kafubu, in which there was no reaction.

Microscopic Characteristics.Musakashi, Zambia. Inthe 11 samples reportedly from Musakashi, the mostcommon inclusions were three-phase, usually con-

116 EMERALD ORIGIN DETERMINATION GEMS & GEMOLOGY SUMMER 2014

Little information is available about the Musakashi de-posit (figure A-1) reportedly discovered in 2002, and muchof it is conflicting. It appears to have originally beenworked by local miners from 2002 to 2004. Emeraldsfrom Musakashi were first reported in 2005 by AntoninSeifert, Stanislav Vrna, Bjrn Anckar, and Jaroslav Hyrl(Zwaan et al., 2005). Seifert and his colleagues reportedthat these emeralds had a significantly different colorfrom those found in the Kafubu area. The Musakashistones were said to show an intense bluish green remi-niscent of emeralds from Muzo, Colombia. The similar-ity did not end there:

The most interesting characteristic was the presence inall the stones of three-phase inclusions, consisting of abubble and a cube-shaped crystal in a liquid, almost iden-tical to those commonly seen in Colombian emeralds.

Zwaan et al. also identified sphene, iron oxides, feldspar,and quartz as mineral inclusions.

Production reportedly resumed in 2006, starting withhand tools and progressing to the use of an excavator fora few months in 2009 (Klemm, 2009 and 2010). Thesereports, published after visits to Musakashi in July 2009and August 2010, provide details adding to the historyof emerald mining there.

Location and AccessDuring the dry season, the Musakashi area is accessibleby a five-hour, 165 km (102 mile) drive from Ndola,mainly on the poorly maintained Kasempa road (Klemm,2009 and 2010).

Production and DistributionAccording to the mine director, the area produced about1520 kg of emeralds from its discovery through late2010 (Klemm, 2010). Gem merchant Guy Clutterbuck,who supplied some of the samples for this study, re-ported to one of the authors in 2013 and 2014 that lim-ited emerald mining was still taking place nearMusakashi.

BOX A: EMERALDS FROM MUSAKASHI, ZAMBIA

Figure A-1. This map shows the location of the Ka-fubu and the Musakashi emerald deposits.

N

WESTERN

SOUTHERN

NORTH WESTERN

LUAPULA

NORTHERN

LUSAKA

EASTERN

CENTRAL

COPPERBELT

Kafubu Area

Musakashi Area

Z A M B I A

Z I M B A B W E

M O Z A M B I Q U E

D E M. R E P. O F T H E C O N G O

150 km0

Lusaka

ZAMBIA

A F R I C A

taining at least two colorless transparent crystals anda rather small gas bubble suspended in a fluid (figures3 and 4). Such inclusions were found in every samplewe studied. The gas bubble always measured withinthe size range of the two crystals in the multiphaseinclusion. In those inclusions containing two crys-tals, both crystals appeared to be singly refractiveunder cross-polarized illumination. The larger crystalwas essentially cubic and bright, while the smallerone was rounded and faint (figure 3, A and B). In manysamples, the multiphase inclusions also hosted oneor more small dark to black crystals, and occasionallytiny colorless or whitish crystals (figures 3 and 4).Some of these inclusions were identified by Ramanspectroscopy (figure 4); the gas phase was identifiedas CO2 (peaks at 1284 and 1387 cm

1). The singly re-fractive cubic crystals displayed only the emeraldspectrum and no Raman lines, suggesting they couldbe halides (Venkateswaran, 1935). Daughter crystals

were identified as calcite (peaks at 283, 713, and 1085cm1). An additional peak at 2328 cm1 was assignedto N2. These results match those for fluid inclusionsfound in Colombian emeralds (Giuliani et al., 1994),but SEM is needed to identify the different complexmixed salts and daughter minerals. The shape of theinclusions was usually irregular, with numerousbranches. In rare cases they appeared needle-like (fig-ure 3C) or jagged (figure 3D).

Under darkfield illumination, tube-like growthfeatures (figure 5) were found in 10 of the 11Musakashi samples. The tubes were oriented parallelto the prism faces of the crystal, a common featurein emeralds. Each sample had an evenly distributedgreen color except for one that displayed color band-ing ranging from strong green to colorless perpendi-cular to the c-axis and the growth tubes.

Solid inclusions were quite rare. Of the 11 emer-alds, only four hosted mineral inclusions that were notpart of multiphase inclusions. The most common

crystal inclusions identified using Raman spec-troscopy were colorless and transparent euhedral cal-cite crystals (figure 6, left). Also found were severalopaque and metallic euhedral inclusions resembling

EMERALD ORIGIN DETERMINATION GEMS & GEMOLOGY SUMMER 2014 117

In Brief Three-phase inclusions in emerald, once considered areliable indicator of Colombian origin, have also beenobserved in specimens from Zambia, Afghanistan, andChina.

Microscopy, spectroscopy, and trace-elemental analysiswere used to characterize 84 emeralds with multiphaseinclusions.

A promising basis for determining the geographic ori-gin of emeralds comes from