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DHS Energy Security InitiativesDHS Energy Security Initiatives
11 MAR 200911 MAR 2009
Scott PughScience and Technology DirectorateInteragency Programs OfficeU.S. Department of Homeland Security
DHS Science & Technology DHS Science & Technology
CONSEQUENCE OF OCCURRENCE
LIK
ELIH
OO
D O
F O
CC
UR
REN
CE
HIGHER
HIGHER
BOMBS, BORDERS, BUGS, BUSINESS, BODIES & BUILDINGS
TERRORIST ROADMAP
LOWER
LOWER
Cyber
Gov’t, economy, societal instability
IEDs
Nuclear
Biological
Radiological
ChemicalPhysical Critical Infrastructure Attack
Trans Nat’l Migration?
?
?
?
S&T NPPD
NCSC
I&A
FEMATSA CBP CIS ICE USSS USCG
U.S. Electric GenerationU.S. Electric Generation
50%50%20%20%
20%20%
10%10%
Gas
Nuclear
Renewables
Coal
Projected US Electric DemandProjected US Electric Demand
US EIA AEO 2009
50% growth by 2030
50% Electricity Demand Growth By 203050% Electricity Demand Growth By 2030
To maintain current electric fuel supply mix would mean building in next 21 years:
Nuclear reactors (1,000 MW)
Renewables (100 MW)
Natural gas plants (400 MW)
Coal-fired plants (600 MW)
50
93
279
261
Source: 2006 Annual Energy Outlook, Energy Information Administration
> 2 / year (104)
(~ 600)
North American Transmission GridNorth American Transmission Grid
HVDCHVDC
HVDCHVDC
HVDC
HVDC
Mexico
Canada
Transmission owned by over 500 independent companies.Generation supplied by over 3000 utilities.
A DOD, DOE, DHS Joint ConcernA DOD, DOE, DHS Joint Concern“Critical national security and
Homeland defense missions are at an unacceptably high risk of extended outage from failure of the grid.”
“Backup power is often based on diesel generator sets with limited on-site fuel storage, undersized for new Homeland defense missions, not prioritized to critical loads, and inadequate in duration and reliability.”
““DOD Facility IslandingDOD Facility Islanding””
Grid VulnerabilitiesGrid Vulnerabilities
Circuit BreakersHigh Voltage TransformersHigh Voltage Transformers
Generators
EHV Circuit BreakersEHV Circuit Breakers
Extremely High Voltage SF6 Circuit Breakers
3 Phase Circuit Breaker Operation3 Phase Circuit Breaker Operation
LOAD SIDE(Grid)
In Phase Out of Phase
GENERATOR SIDE(Power Plant)
+5000v
-5000v
+5000v
-5000v
v1 = +5000 vac
v1 = +5000 vac
v1 = -5000 vac
2007 Grid Cyber Test at INL2007 Grid Cyber Test at INL
““AuroraAurora””
Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) -23 Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
JAN 08 (Top Secret)
Transformer RisksTransformer Risks• Extreme High Voltage (EHV) Transformers are critical grid components • Vulnerable to natural disasters and deliberate attacks
– No transformers above 345kV are manufactured in the US– US has largest 345+KV grid– 100+ tons, difficult to transport– Months to years of pipeline delays– Manufactured overseas with backlog through 2010– Cost tens of millions of dollars– Many reaching end of design lives
765kV500kV345kV
ECAR Region - Age of EHV Transformers - Total MVA
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
1953
1955
1958
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
Transformer Manufacture Date
MVA
Cap
acity
Salem Nuclear Plant GSU Transformer Failure, March 1989
EHV TransformersEHV Transformers
Super High Voltage Transformers - 765 KV, 500 KVNo existing US manufacturing capability.
Virtually no domestic spares.
Emergency TransformersEmergency Transformers
230 KV Mobile Transformer (Made in US)765 KV, 500 KV, 345 KV are too large & heavy for mobile versions.
DHS Recovery TransformerDHS Recovery TransformerProduct Description• Recovery transformers designed for
transportability, ease of installation and low maintenance as temporary solutions during emergencies and grid blackouts
• Phase 1: Develop/demonstrate state of the art technologies in form, fit function prototype suitable for 60% of US transformers
• Phase 2: Develop/demonstrate increased transportability (form/fit and reduce weight) while maintaining or increasing efficiency and increasing suitability to 80% of US transformers
TRL at Start: 3/2 TRL at Transition: 7/6 (phase1/phase2)
Planned Demos & Deliverables/Transitions • Demo 1 - Phase 1a: Design and demonstrate a Recovery
Transformer in a lab environment – FY09• Demo 2 - Phase 1b: Demonstrate a Recovery
Transformer on the grid - FY10• Demo 3 - Phase 2: Design and demonstrate a smaller,
lighter, more transportable and more efficient Recover Transformer - FY12
Payoff• Eliminate up to 2 year lag in transformer
replacement • Decreasing power-on recovery times from
months to days.• More resilient transformer as part of power gridIntended Customer for Transition• Energy Sector, DHS OIP
Resilient Electric Grid (REG)Resilient Electric Grid (REG)
May 2007
Blackout Timeline:Nov 65 - Northeastern U.S.Jul 77 - New York CityAug 03 - Northeastern U.S.Jul 06 - New York City (Queens)Jun 07- New York CityFeb 08 - Florida
17 sector- specific plans for protecting critical infrastructure have been developed
A failure of imagination…
ConEdConEd’’s Revolution in Power Deliverys Revolution in Power Delivery1G 1G –– System of the PastSystem of the Past 2G 2G –– System of TodaySystem of Today 3G 3G –– System of the FutureSystem of the Future
ConEd Concept (2015)
High temperature superconducting cable with inherent fast acting
fault current limiting characteristics.
Allows “meshed” distribution system withmultiple redundant current paths.
Reduces impact of single substation loss.
Liquid N2
3 electrical phases
Liquid N2
Cable developed byCable developed byAmerican Superconductor.American Superconductor.
HTS FCL cable under test at ORNL in 2008. HTS FCL cable under test at ORNL in 2008.
Upgrading ORNL facility for Jan-Apr 09 tests:• 25m cable, 3 phase, in cryostat• Normal operating current (up to 4000 amps) and voltage (15,000 volts).• Fault currents up to 40,000 amps for 100s of milliseconds
Outdoor cable test facility for exposure to weather.Outdoor cable test facility for exposure to weather.
Long Island Power Authority Holbrook SubstationLong Island Power Authority Holbrook Substation
• DOE Sponsored• 1st generation high
temperature superconducting cable
• Operating since April 2008• Lacks inherent fault current
limiting characteristic being tested now at ORNL
24
BACKUPsBACKUPs
White House
OSTP
NSTC
CoScience CoTech CHNS CENR
GVTF
Grid VulnerabilitiesGrid Vulnerabilities
Step Down Transformer Substation
Transmission
Distribution
Power
Comprehensive National Cyber Security InitiativeComprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative HSPDHSPD--23 23
OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORYU. S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Why Federal R&D Investment?ONLY the Federal Government can take “game-changing” risks that benefit society, create leading-edge AMERICAN technology, AMERICAN JOBS and assure AMERICAN security!
Navy Nuclear Submarine
Curtis LeMay
ARPANET World Wide Web
Boeing 707
Civilian Nuclear PowerHyman G. Rickover
KC-135
NautilusSSN 571~ 1954
~ 1955
1960’s
DDG 1000 “Electric Navy”
AMSC - 50,000 SHP (36.5MW)HTS AC Synchronous Motor
> 2000
Electric Grid Security• Vulnerabilities
– Cyber attack– Physical attack– Natural disasters– Infrastructure failure
• Consequences– Minor to devastating– Civilian and military– Economic and practical
• Policy– HSPD 7 - Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
Protection (DEC 03)– HSPD 23 - Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative (JAN
08)– White House OSTP National Science & Technology Council
• Committee on Homeland & National Security• Grid Reliability Task Force (SEP 08)
• Major Stakeholders– DHS– DOE– DOD– DOC – EPA
• S&T Concepts/Engagement – Project Hydra– Recovery Transformer– Distributed Power for Resilience and Recovery– Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for Power (TCIP)
U.S. Electricity MixU.S. Electricity Mix
50%50%20%20%
20%20%
10%10%
Gas
Nuclear
Renewables
Coal