British Intellegence & the Turkish National 1919

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British Intelligence and the Turkish National Movement, 1919-22Author(s): A. L. MacFie

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British

Intelligence

and the

Turkish

National

Movement,

1919-22

A.L.

MACFIE

Readers

of Keith

Jeffery

and Alan

Sharp's

article

'Lord Curzon and Secret

Intelligence', in ChristopherAndrewandJeremyNoakes (eds.) Intelligence

and International

Relations

(University

of

Exeter,

1987),

and Robin

Denniston's Churchill's

Secret War

(Sutton

Publishing, Stroud, 1997),

might

be

excused

for

concluding

that British

intelligence regarding

the

Turkishnational movement

in

Anatolia in the

period

of

national struggle,

1919-22, was obtained almost

entirely

from

intercepts

of

Turkish, Greek,

French,

Italian

and

other

telegraphic

and

radio

communications,

decoded

where

necessary

either

by

British

MilitaryIntelligence, Constantinople,

or

by the British Code and Cypher School (BCCS), set up in 1919, or its

predecessors, Room 40, Old

Building, Admiralty, and

MI

lb,

War Office.

Such was not the case.

Throughout the period

of

national

struggle

MI

lc,

later known

as

the

Secret

Intelligence

Service

(SIS),

and the

other,

associated British

intelligence

services,

in

particular

Naval

Intelligence, provided

a

great

deal

of

information about events

in

Anatolia,

most of which was

obtained,

not

from

intercepts, but

from

the more traditional sources of

information

available at the time. These included Turkish, Greek, Armenian and Arab

agents,

locally

recruited

by

MI

Ic, Constantinople, and the various British

intelligence

services, operating in

Syria

and

Mesopotamia; members of the

Ottoman

government,

the

Turkish national

movement and the Greek

Orthodox

Church, friendly

to

Britain; employees of

the

Levant Consular

Service;

reports published

in

the

local

and

foreign press (Journal d'Orient,

Yeni

Gun, Ileri,

Hakimiet-i-Millie, Ankara Press Agency, Chicago Tribune

and

many others);

contacts

in

the

French, Italian and Greek

intelligence

services; and British controlofficers andotherpersonnel posted at strategic

points

in

Anatolia,

until

the

spring

of

1920, when

following the Allied

(British, French

and Italian) occupation of

Constantinople (the previous

occupation had

been unofficial), British personnel

were either arrested or

expelled

from

the

area.

Until the spring of 1920,

therefore, information

regarding

events in

Anatolia was more than plentiful.

Only following the

Middle Eastern

Studies, Vol.37, No.1,

January

2001,

pp.1-16

PUBLISHED BY

FRANK

CASS,

LONDON







2

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES

Allied occupation of the Ottoman capital,

and the outbreak of civil

war in

Anatolia, when direct access

to the interior was cut

off,

did the

supply

of

information become somewhat restricted,

and even then

it

remained

plentiful, except with regard to the eastern provinces,

a remote

area,

about

which little was known.'

That is not to suggest that

British

intercepts

of

Ottoman,

Turkish

nationalist, Greek and other telegraphic and wireless communication,

made

possible by the co-operation

of Cable and

Wireless, Constantinople,

and

by

the installation

of a series

of

listening

stations

in

Mesopotamia,

did not

make a significant contribution

to the work of the

intelligence

services. On

the contrary,as the records show, MI Ic (later SIS) was throughoutable to

intercept

not

only

a substantial

part

of the

telegraphic

communication

of

the

Ottoman

ministries in

Constantinople, including

the Grand

Vizierate,

the

War Office

and the

Ministry

of the

Interior,

but also that of

the

Turkish

nationalist administration

in

Ankara,

and the

principal

nationalist

army

corps

in

the interior.

In

November 1919,

for

instance,

MI

Ic

intercepted (or

otherwise

obtained

-

the source

of

the informationcollected

is

not

always

made

clear)

telegrams despatched by Kiazim Karabekir, ommander of the XVth Army

Corps, based

in

Erzerum, regarding

the

organization

of a

pan-Islamic

conference, shortly

to be convened

in

Erzerumor Sivas.2

In

December

they

intercepted a telegram, again

from Kiazim

Karabekir, informing

the

Ministry

of War in

Constantinople

that a council of sheikhs

had assembled

at

Kharput

o consider what action

they might

take

in

the event of a French

occupation

of Diarbekir.3

n

February

1920

they interceptedtelegrams

from

the

Representative

Committee

in

Ankara to the various

army corps,

stationedin Anatolia, informingthemwhat attitudethey should adoptin the

event

of an Allied

attempt

to

extend

their

occupation

of Anatolia.4

In

April

they intercepted

a

telegram

from Mustafa Kemal to

Salih Pasha, the Grand

Vizier, despatched following

the Allied

occupation

of

Constantinople,

opposing

the

possible appointment

of

Damad Ferid

Pasha,

an

enemy

of

the

nationalists,

as Grand Vizier.5

In

May they intercepted a telegram from

Fevzi

Pasha, informing

the Sultan

of

the

opening

of the Grand National

Assembly

in

Ankara,

and of the

decisions

unanimously adopted

there.6In

February 1921 they intercepted a telegram from Mustafa Kemal to the

Grand

Vizier, calling

on the Sultan to

acknowledge

the

sovereignty

of

the

Grand National

Assembly,

as established

in

the Law of

Fundamental

Organization

of 20

January192

1.

Finally, as Keith Jeffery and Alan Sharp

have

shown,

in

November 1921 they intercepted telegrams despatched by

the Ankara and

Constantinople governments,

both to each other and to

the

various

European capitals, regarding possible Allied mediation

in

the war

then

taking place

between

the

Greeks

and the Turkish

nationalists

in









4


TalaatPasha,

until

recently

Grand

Vizier,

was said to remain

in

effective

control of the

Committee,through

secret channels. His whereaboutswere

not

known, but it was believed that he remained either

in

or near the Ottoman

capital

(in

fact he had

fled,

first to the Crimea and then

to

Berlin).

Enver

Pasha,

until recently Minister of

War,

and

Djemal

Pasha,

Minister of

Marine

and rulerof

Syria,

were also said to remain n

touch with the Ottoman

capital

(both

had

in

fact

fled, ending

up

like

Talaat

n

Berlin);

but both were

regarded

as

completely

discredited and

unlikely

to

play

any

further

part

in

Turkish

politics.

Ismail

Djanbulat,

a CUP

chief of the secret

police,

was believed to

remain

effective,

acting

as a link

between the

organization

and the 'forces of

terror'.BehaBey, a lawyer,andleadingmemberof theorganization,was said

to

carry

considerable

weight

in

the masonic

movement,

frequently

associated

by

British

intelligence

with the

CUP,

in

particular

he Grand

Orient

Lodge.

Dr Nazim, also a

leading

member,

was

unlikely,

it was

said,

to

return o the

Ottoman

capital.

Rezmi

Bey,

a

donme

and

recent

president

of the Permanent

Court

Martial,

and

Arab Kiamil

Pasha,

an Under

Secretary

of

State for

War,

were said to be the most

prominent

army

members of the

CUP.

Surprisingly,

in

the

report,

no mention is made

of Mustafa Kemal

Pasha,

the later leader of

the Turkishnationalmovement, thoughsome mention is made of Fethi Bey,

a close friend

and

political

collaboratorof

Mustafa

Kemal's,

once

president

of the CUP central

committee. Mention is also

made of Raouf

Bey,

also a

later

leader of the Turkish national

movement,

described in

the

report

as a

'hot

head', ready for

anything.

According

to the General

Staff,

Intelligence, report,

following the

appointment

of Izzet

Pasha as Grand

Vizier,

in

October

1918,

members of

the

CUP, officially

dissolved

in

November,

formed a new

party,

the

Tejeddud(Renovation) Party,described as being merely 'a cloak for the

CUP',

in

order that

they might

carry

on

the

strugglefollowing the

defeat of

the Ottoman

Empire

in

the war.

Other

parties

and

groups identified by

the

General Staff

report

include

Hurriyet

Perveran Ammi

(Liberal Popular

Party) set

up by

Fethi

Bey,

Muhafiz-i-Millie

(National Defence),

Wilson

Principleri

Osmanli

Firkasi (Society of

Turks

professing the principles

of

President

Wilson), and Turk

Ojaghy (The Turkish

Hearth).The

exact

nature

of the funds

available to

the CUP and

its

supporters,

n

the

post-warperiod,

was not known, but it was believed that they were substantial,possibly

totalling

as

much as

?30-40

million, much of it

invested

abroad.2

It

should

not be

assumed, the General

Staff

Intelligence report

concluded,

that

the CUP was

now an

ineffective

organization.

On

the

contrary,

it

remained

active,

enjoying

the

support not only of

many

members of

the

police,

the

army

and

the Ottoman

administration,but also

of a

loyal corps

of

fedais (men prepared o sell

themselves

'body and soul'

to the

committee,

'assassins',

and

guardiansof

secret stores

of arms).'3







BRITAIN

AND THE TURKISH

NATIONAL

MOVEMENT,

1919-22 5

The fact that

Mustafa Kemal

Pasha received

no mention in the

British

Staff, Intelligence, report

of March 1919

does not mean that he

entirely

escaped

the attention

of

the

intelligence

services in the

period immediately

following

the end

of the First

World War.

In

February

1919

his name was

included, along

with

those of Kiazim

Karabekir,

at that time GOC

Gallipoli

Army Corps,

Ismet

Bey,

Under

Secretary

of

State,

and some 40

or so

others

in a list of

persons

connected

in

one

way

or another with

the

CUP,

whose

discharge

from the

army

or removal from office was

requested.4

Most of the information

collected

by

the

British on the rise

of the

national movement,

in its first

phase,

was

collected,

it would

seem,

not

by

the British intelligence services, butby the various British controlofficers,

relief officers

and other officials

stationed

in,

or

passing through,

Anatolia; though

it is not

always possible

to make

a clear distinction

between

intelligence

and

non-intelligence

sources. Thus

in

July

1919

Commander

Heathcote-Smith, RNVR,

wrote

a

'History

of the

Movement', based on information

collected

during

a

journey

from

Constantinople

to Trebizond

and back.

5

In

the same month

Captain

Perring,

a relief officer stationed

in

Samsun,

wrote a

report describing

the

recent activities of Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Raouf Bey in his area.'6In

October the control officer

in

Samsun, probably Captain Hurst,

wrote a

Report on the Political Situation

in

the Samsun Area; and

in

November

Captain Hadkinson,

a relief

officer,

wrote a

Report

on the Conditions

in

the

Vilayet

of

Bursa, after a two-month stay

in

the area.'7It was no doubt

on the basis of these and

other,

similar

reports that,

in

the autumn of 1919

the

War Office felt able to

put together

a

'History

of

the National

Movement', probably the most accurate of the short accounts of the

national movement produced at the time.'8

Much of the information

collected by the British control and relief

officers

and

others,

in

the course of their

duties, was remarkablydetailed,

though

not

always entirely

accurate. In

a 'General Report on the Irregular

Turkish

Army', operating

in

the neighbourhoodof the territoryoccupied by

the

Greeks

in

western

Anatolia, and on the feelings of the Turks in the

interior,

which had

given rise to the 'Irregular Movement', the Control

Officer, Akhissar, following

a

personal visit to the area carried out in July

1919, was able to provide detailed information regarding the organization,

numbers, eadership and morale of the armedbands operating n the 'Aivali,

Pergama, Soma, Akhissar, Salihli, Odemish, Aidin and Chinar' areas.'9

Information

provided

in

this report was later used by General Milne,

Commander of

the

Army

of

the Black Sea, in a 'Report on the Strength of

the

Ottoman

Army

in

Anatolia', drawn up in October

1919.2?

According to

a note

attached to the

report,

the

figure given for the armed bands operating

in

the

Smyrna

area

-

a

total of approximately 20,000

-

was probably







6 MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

overestimated,

as their information had in most cases been obtained

from

the leaders of

the bands,

who

were inclined

to

exaggerate.

Estimates

given

by the Greek headquarterswere also considered to be exaggerated.

A

later

report,

composed in October 1919, suggested that, in the Aidin

district,

there were

more than 20,000

irregulars

under

arms;

on the

Smyma (Izmir)

front, up

to 25,000; and

in

the Balyk-Hissar district,about

10,000.21

Most

of

the information collected by

British

intelligence regarding

the

foundation of the Turkishnational movement

in

Anatolia was obtained then

from non-intelligence sources

(though

as we have seen

the

distinction

was

never clear

cut).

But

that

does not

mean that the

intelligence

services

were

not busy, in that period, recruiting agents and collecting information. In

December 1919 Major Hay,

Constantinople, reported

to the Director of

Military

Intelligence, London,

that General

Staff, Intelligence,

Constantinople,

had

recently

succeeded

in

planting

an

agent

in a 'small

group of persons' in the Ottoman

capital,

who were

apparentlyseeking,

on

behalf

of

the Soviet

Government,

to establish contact with Mustafa Kemal

and the

other nationalist leaders.

Volunteering

to

go

to the

interior,

as an

emissary

of

the group, accompanied

by

another

volunteer,

the

agent

was

reported to have succeeded in travelling as far as Balyk-Hissar, where he

met Kiazim

Pasha, Commander

of

the 61st Division. At

the meeting Kiazim

Pasha declared

that

he

was, himself, sympatheticto the Bolshevik

cause,

and wished

to

work with

the

Communists,

but

he

did not believe the Turkish

people

would

respond positively

to Bolshevik

propaganda,

which

might

prove

counterproductive.Successful propaganda n

Turkey could only be

carried out

on

national and

religious grounds.

According

to

the agent's

report,

Kiazim

Pasha's staff were not at that time in

touch with any of the

separatist'republics' of Russia - neither with Azerbaijannor with Georgia.

But Mustafa

Kemal was said to have made

contact

with both.22

Not that Bolshevik

propaganda

in

Anatolia

in

that

period was

non-

existent.

In

the

Weekly

Summary

of

Intelligence Reports for the week

ending

14

January 1920,

MI Ic

reported

that

Bolshevik propaganda,

propagated

by

Bolshevik

agents,

was

rife in

the Bandirma

area.23 olshevik

agents

in

Turkey,

it

was

reported, had been instructed to work solely on

nationalist

and

pan-Islamic

lines.

The Weekly Summaryof Intelligence Reports for the week ending 14

January

also

stated that secret

information,recently

obtained, suggested that

the Ottoman

Ministry

of

War

was

engaged

in

the

direction of nationalist and

pan-Islamic intrigue

in

the former

Ottoman

Arab provinces, India,

Afghanistan and Azerbaijan.

A

mission, headed by

one Jabbara,had been

instructed

by the Ministry of

War to remain in contactwith the 'Sheikhs', a

group

which was

presumed

to include Ibn

Saud,

the ruler of

Nejd, and

Ibn

Rashid,

the

ruler of

Ha'il.

Kiazim

Karabekir,Commander

of

the XVth







BRITAIN AND

THE

TURKISH

NATIONAL

MOVEMENT,

1919-22

7

Army Corps, stationed

in

Erzerum,

was

believed to

be

acting

as

intermediarybetween the

Ministry

of

War

and the

mission.24

Throughoutthe

period

of

Turkishnational

struggle

the British

remained

well

informed

about the

thinking

of

the

Sultan and

his

government

in

Constantinople.

Allied

High

Commissioners

enjoyed

direct access

to

the

Sultan and his

ministers,

and where

necessary

additional

information

was

provided

by a

host of

agents and

informers, employed

in the Palace and

the

Porte.

Thus,

in the

Weekly

Summary

of

Intelligence Reports

for

the

week

ending

19

December

1919,

it was

reported

that the Ottoman

government

had decided to send

a

mission, accompanied

by

Refik

Bey,

Keeper

of the

Privy Purse, to meet Ahmed Anzavour,a leading anti-nationalist,operating

in north

western Anatolia; and

in a similar

summary,

drawn

up

about

the

same

time,

that

the

Sultan

had

recently

consulted

Tewfik Pasha about

the

possibility

of

reappointing

Damad Ferid

Pasha as Grand

Vizier.25

In the Weekly

Summary

of

Intelligence

Reports

for

the

week

ending

25

March 1920,

it

was

reported

that,

according

to a source within

the

Palace,

the Sultan was much

relieved at

the

recent arrest

of

nationalist leaders in

Constantinople (20

or so nationalist

deputies

had

been

arrested,

following

the Allied occupation of the Ottomancapital, and 150 or so intellectuals,

sympatheticto the

nationalist

cause).26Had

the Allies

not taken

action,

he,

the

Sultan,

would have been

obliged

to

do

so

himself. Fears of a

coup

d'etat,

it

was

reported,about the same

time, had

led

to a

strengtheningof the Palace

guard.

In

the event

of

an

Allied decision to

expel the Turks

from

their

capital,

it had been

suggested

that the

Imperial

Family leave

immediately

for

Anatolia.

Konya might

provide

a

suitable place of

residence.27

n

the

Weekly Summary of

Intelligence Reports for the week

ending 22

April, it

was reportedthat Princess Ulvieh had recently visited the Sultan and told

him

that the

nationalists were

planning to crush

Anzavour; and

that in view

of

the

numbers and

resources of the

nationalists,resistance to

them

would

only

lead to the

useless

shedding

of

Muslim

blood.

Anzavour's

movement,

which was

merely aiding

the British, was most

unpopular in

the Muslim

world. All

the

princes

of

the Imperial

House

agreed.

Nationalist success

might lead to the

dethronementof the

Sultan.28

The

Allied occupation of

Constantinople,carriedout on 16

March

1920,

proved a turningpoint in the history of the nationalstruggle, leading to the

closure of

the

Ottoman

Chamber of

Deputies in

Constantinople; he

setting

up

of

a

Grand

National

Assembly

in

Ankara; the despatch,

by the

Sultan

and his

government

in

Constantinople,

of an 'Army of the

Caliphate'

to

Anatolia,

to

suppress

the nationalists; a

prolonged

period of civil war

and

an

eventual

nationalist

victory

-

a victory which,

short of a

total Greek

defeat of

the

national forces

in

Anatolia, made the imposition

of the

harsh

peace

treaty

envisaged by

the Allies

(a

peace treaty

was

actually signed by







8 MIDDLEEASTERN

STUDIES

the Ottoman government at Sevres on 10 August 1920)

unlikely, if not

impossible.29About these and other relatedevents, British intelligence was

as usual well informed.In the Weekly Summaryof Intelligence Reportsfor

the week ending 22 January 1920, it was reported that

in

view

of the

possible loss of Constantinople to Turkey (the Allies, having

in

January

decided to allow the Sultan

and his

government

to remain in

Constantinople, yet

intended to use the threat of

expulsion

to

compel

Turkish acceptance

of

the proposed peace treaty),

the nationalists were

planning to

form

armed

bands of

fedayis who,

under the

direction of the

National Defence Organization, would organize sabotage,

strikes and

general disturbances n the Ottomancapital.Funds for the operation would

be

provided by

Unionist societies located

in the

area.30

In the Weekly Summaryof Intelligence Reportsfor the week ending 8

April

it was

reported

that General Staff

Intelligence,

Constantinople,

had

recently received a copy

of a

letter, purported

o be from Mustafa

Kemal to

Raouf Bey, regarding

the

possible

loss

of Turkish

control

of

the Straits;and

in the

summary

of the

following

week

that Halide

Edib

Hanim,

the

famous

authoress,

Dr

Adnan

Bey,

her

husband,

Ferid

Bey,

a former Minister

of

Works,and JelalledinArif, President of the Ottoman Chamberof Deputies,

had arrived

n

Ankara.3'

n

the Weekly Summary

of

Intelligence

Reports

for

the week

ending

22

April,

it

was

reported

that the nationalists intended to

form a constituent

assembly

in Ankara.32

And

in

the

Weekly Summary

of

Intelligence

of

Reports

for the week

ending

8

July,

it was

reported that the

operations

authorized

by

the Paris Peace Conference

-

in

June the Allies

had authorized

a

Greek advance

in

the area of the

Straits,

threatened by

advancing

nationalist

forces

-

had

brought

about an

atmosphere

of

hopelessness and tension in nationalist circles, though a French business

man, recently returned

from

Ankara, reported that order and

security had

been

maintained.33 rains crowded with troops, well armed and

disciplined,

were

moving westward.

As

far

as one

could judge, there were

no Germans

in

Ankara,

but at

Eskishehir there were civilians of doubtful

nationality.

According

to

the French businessman, a decided split

had occurred

within the nationalistparty.

A

more moderate group of prominentmilitary

officers,

led

by

Ali

Fuad

Pasha, Colonel

Ismet

Bey and Nurreddin

Pasha,

had joined togetherto terminatethe dictatorshipof Mustafa Kemal. Their

programme

included such

objects

as a

separation

of the executive and the

legislative authority,

a reconciliation

with

the central

government,

the

strengthening

of the

prestige

of the Khalifate and

Sultanate,

and

direct

negotiations

with

the Entente

powers.

If

based

on

fact,

this report would, it

was

remarked,

be 'of

great interest'.34

Throughout

his

period a close watch was kept on the couriers

employed

by

the Ankara

regime

to

communicate

with their

supporters

in







BRITAIN

AND THE

TURKISH

NATIONAL

MOVEMENT,

1919-22

9

Constantinople.

Many

of these

couriers,

it was

believed,

were

Turkish

women,

belonging

to the

Islamic Women's Work Association set

up by

Enver

Pasha's wife,

Najie

Sultane. The route followed was believed to

be

Kartal-Samandra-Shile-Dudurlu-Guive-Ada

azar.

Railway

and

landing

stage

officials were

employed

to

pass

on

information;

but it was

accepted

that

many couriers

escaped

detection.35

British perceptions

regarding

the

nature and

identity

of the national

movement

in

Anatolia remained confused

throughout

he

period

of

Turkish

national

struggle;

but

in

August

1920

SIS,

Constantinople,

received

a

report

from

a 'well educated and

intelligent'

Turkish

gentleman,recently

returned

from Anatolia, which helped them resolve many of theirdifficulties. In the

report,

the 'well

educated and

intelligent' Turkish

gentleman

explained

that

the national

movement

in

Anatolia was

divided into two main factions: a

Unionist

faction,

led

by Eyub

Sabri,

who

believed that in order

to obtain

effective

Bolshevik assistance it was

necessary

to

adopt

Bolshevism,

with

all its

consequences; and

a

'genuine'

nationalist

faction,

led

by

Mustafa

Kemal,

who

wished to make use of

Bolshevik assistance

for their own

purposes but did not wish to

adopt

the

Bolshevik

social

system.

About

100

deputies in the Grand National Assembly had been won over to the

Bolshevik

cause,

and their

numbers were

growing.

They

were

in

constant

communication

with Talaat

Pasha, the

'principal

protagonist

of

Islamic

Bolshevism in

Europe', who with

the assistance of

the

Russians

and

Germans was

making every

effort to

obtain

control of the

national

movement;

and

they had

organized

a

'Green

Army',

or

People's Party,

to

rouse the Islamic

world

against Europe.

Mustafa Kemal's

position in

Anatolia

was,

therefore, by

no

means

secure. The

Bolsheviks,

in

Moscow,

with whom he hadrecentlyestablishedrelations, hadno intention of pulling

his

chestnuts out of

the fire. If

they

ever did offer

armed

assistance it would

almost

certainly

take

the same form

as

that

given

to the

ephemeral

'Republic' of

Azerbaijan.36

The report from

the 'well

educated and

intelligent' Turkish

gentleman

made

an

immense

impression on

the

officials at the

British

foreign office.

As

D.G.

Osborne minuted

on 23

September

1920, this

report

showed that

there were two

parties in

Anatolia and not

only one.

The

weaker was that of

Mustafa Kemal, who, induced by patriotic and religious motives, was

endeavouring

to resist the

peace

terms and the

resultant

dismembermentof

Turkey.The

stronger,

gaining ground every

day,

was thatof the

Unionists,

that of

Enver,

Talaat

and the CUP

-

Jew-German-Bolshevik

-

a

far more

dangerous

party, who

were

not

concerned with the

defence

of Turkey, but

with the

organization of

a

pan-Islamic

Bolshevik

offensive

throughoutthe

east,

primarily

directed

against the British.

Enver

and his

associates had

sacrificed

Turkey to

the Bolshevik

conception of

pan-Islam and

accepted







10

MIDDLE EASTERN

STUDIES

the principles

of Lenin.

They

were

disseminating

those

principles by

means

of the Green

propagandistArmy.37

In

September 1920 SIS,

Constantinople, composed

a

report

on

Turco-

Bolshevik co-operation,

based on information

supplied by

a

Turkish

agent,

recently

returned rom Baku, acquainted

with the

principal

Unionist

leaders.

This report,

as the authorof an introduction

written

by

a British

intelligence

officer

remarked,

confirmed

the

impression recently given

by

the

'intelligent

and well-educated' Turkish

gentleman;

but to some extent

it

also

modified thatimpression. Whilst

it was true that Unionists

in

Europe,

led

by

Talaat, were

promoting

a

pan-Islamic-Bolshevik

alliance,

aimed at the

destruction of the BritishEmpirein Asia, Unionists who had witnessed the

depredations

of the Bolsheviks

in

Transcaucasiaand Central

Asia,

shocked

by

what

they

had

seen,

were

becoming

increasingly sceptical.

Nevertheless

the Unionists would

probably

be

prepared

o

go

furtherdown the Red road

than

Mustafa Kemal and his

followers,

whose

aspirations

regarding

a

possible

union with other Muslim countries were motivated

purely by

Turkish nterests. Mustafa Kemal's

policy

could not be

dignified by

the term

pan-Islamist,

except

in

a

degraded

sense of the

expression.

As for the

activities of Talaat and the other Unionist leaders, resident in Europe, the

'hidden hand'

shaping

their

complicated

schemes could not as

yet be

identified; but

in

TranscaucasiaHalil

Pasha,

Enver's

uncle,

was

clearly a

guiding spirit.38

The extent

to which British officials depended on information

provided

by

SIS and the other

intelligence services,

particularly

with

regard

to events

in

Transcaucasia,

s

made clear

in

a memorandumentitled

'Note

Presented

to Lord Curzon

on Relations Between

Bolsheviks and Turkish

Nationalists',

presentedin November 1920.39 n this the anonymous authorremarked hat

the

Foreign

Office had

practically

no

original reportson the subject.

They

were almost

entirely dependent

on

information supplied by SIS. Two very

full

and

detailed

reports, recently

drawn

up by

the War

Office and the India

Office

-

the first

entitled 'Examination of

the Cause of the Outbreak in

Mesopotamia' and the

second 'Mesopotamia: Causes of Unrest' (a

report

drawn

up

in

two

parts by Major N.N.E.

Bray, a special intelligence

officer

attachedto the

Political

Department,

India

Office)

-

had attempted o

make

sense of the information available. Bray, in his report, had attempted to

relate the events taking place in

Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia

to the

conclusion

of a

Bolshevik-Turkish

alliance, supposedly concluded byEnver

Pasha

and Lenin

in

Moscow, and to a

series of anti-imperialist

organization

set

up by

Talaat

Pasha and

other CUP leaders, resident in

Europe. But

definite

evidence of

Russian

assistance to the Turkishnationalists

remained

scanty, owing

to the

fact that the

majority

of the reports received had

been

written

by

anonymous agents, whose

accuracy could not be

vouchsafed. So







BRITAIN

AND THE

TURKISH

NATIONAL

MOVEMENT,

1919-22

11

far, it seemed the Bolsheviks

had

provided

the nationalists

with

little

effective aid:

merely

a 'small

sum of

money'

and an 'unknown

quantity

of

military supplies.40

Later

reports, issued by SIS,

Constantinople,

confirmed

the

Foreign

Office

in

its belief that a substantial divide

existed

between

the

Unionists,

led by Talaatand

Enver,

in

exile,

and the nationalists led

by

Mustafa

Kemal.

In a

report drawn up

in

May

1921,

following

the

failure of a

peace

conference

convened in London in

March,

SIS,

Constantinople reported

that the extremists

(the

Unionists)

had

gained ground.

On Mustafa

Kemal's

advice,

the Grand

National

Assembly

had voted

against

ratification

of

the

agreementsconcluded by Bekir Sami Bey, the nationalistForeign Minister,

at

the London

conference,

as ratification

of the

agreements

might

lead to

a

cessation of

supplies

from

Russia.4'

t

was

to be

expected,

therefore,

thatthe

Ankaragovernmentwould

pursue

a

strong, pro-Bolshevik

policy.

Not

that

Mustafa Kemal was,

himself,

necessarily fully committed

to that

approach:

As

regards

Mustafa Kemal's

attitude,

here

is no

doubt

that,

on

the one

hand, he is

strongly

opposed to Bolshevik

doctrines, but that on the

otherhand, one of

the

fundamentalprinciples

of his

foreign

policy is

close co-operation with the Soviet Government.He is also opposed to

Enver

Pasha on personal

grounds,

but it does not

appear

that this

hostility

is

extended to Unionist

doctrines.

It

is

difficult,

in

fact,

to

distinguish

between the

pan-Turanianism f the Committee of Union

and Progress

and the

pan-Islamism

of

Mustafa

Kemal and his

supporters.The

keynote,

however, to Mustafa

Kemal's attitude is his

all-dominating

ambition, through the influence of which his

policy

is

based

upon

two main

principles: one

involving

the

adoption

of

an

extreme

Nationalist

policy, completely in

harmony with

that

of

the

majority

of

the

members

of

the

Great National

Assembly, and

the

other

involving consistent

opposition to

Communist

doctrines, to

which also

the

great

mass

of the Nation

is equally

hostile. By

this

espousal of extreme

Nationalism, Mustafa

Kemal Pasha secures

the

support of the

extremists,

including

probably a considerable

number

of the

Unionists,

while by his opposition

to

Bolshevism he acquires

the

confidence of

the moderate party

also. In this

manner he has

succeeded

in

maintaining himself in

that position of

domination

which alone

can

satisfy his

nature, and which

renders unlikely

any

settlement

either with the

Central

Government or with the

Allies

which

would

involve

his

relegation to a

less prominentposition.42

In

the

same report it

was

noted that information

received

from a

'prominent member of

the

Nationalist organization in

Constantinople', an

'original' member

of the

CUP, suggested that

leading

members of the

CUP,







12

MIDDLE

EASTERN STUDIES

recently released from Malta

where

they

had been interned,

in

particular

Djavid Bey, were endeavouring

to recover control

of

the national

movement

in Anatolia, which they claimed to have set up. Mustafa

Kemal was

expected to bury the

hatchet with Enver

Pasha,

who was more

popular

than

Mustafa Kemal

in

Germany,

Russia

and certain Muslim countries.

On the eve of

the

Battle

of

Sakarya, August 1921,

British

intelligence,

as was to be expected,

had excellent information

on the size and

composition

of

the

Greek

expeditionary

force

in

Anatolia;

but

they were,

according

to a

report

of 6

July 1921,

unable to secure accurate information

with regard

to the size

and

composition

of the

nationalist

forces. Evidence

obtained about recent operations, supplementedby reports obtained from

French, Italian and

Greek sources, suggested

that the nationalistarmy

had

been greatly expanded

in

recent

months,

and

that

its

training

had been

methodical

and efficient.

In all

probability,

therefore,

the Greek

force,

though superior

to the nationalist by

a factor

of

three

to two

in

infantry,

would not succeed

in

defeating

the Turks.

No

possibility

of a

'decisive

victory' existed.43

Following

the

defeat

of the Greek

expeditionary

force

at

Sakarya,

the

War Office, in a reportof 1 October 1921, explained the defeat in terms of

the

'over-wheening'

self-confidence

of

the Greek

High Command,

the

indifferent

quality

of the Greek intelligence service,

and the

inadequate

planning of operations.

As a result of the Turkish nationalist victory,

the

prestige of Mustafa Kemal had been greatly

enhanced. The British

government might,

therefore, reasonably

assume

that henceforth the

moderate party

in

Ankara would exercise

power.

There was

now

no chance

of a

return of

Enver

Pasha,

or of a

military

alliance

being

formed between

the nationalists and the Bolsheviks.44

British

intelligence

in

this period appears

to have

been remarkablywell

informed about the structureand organizationof the intelligence service set

up by

the Ankara

regime

in

the summer of 1921.

In

a reportof 5 October

1921, passed

on

by

the

Director

of

Military

Intelligence to the Foreign

Office, GHQ,

Allied Forces of

Occupation,

supplied

detailed information

about

the

structureof the

new

Directorate,

he identityof its directorsandits

principal functions. Branches were reported to

have been established in

Rome, Zurich, Berlin, Paris and Moscow, with Rome acting as a centre of

communication. Communications

with Anatolia were

maintained

by way

of

Rhodes and

Antalya;

and a courier

system

had been set up between Moscow,

Berlin

and Rome.

The

Rome organization

was also believed to have

established communication with the Muslim committees in Tripoli and the

Indian

Khalifat Delegation.

The

Constantinoplebranch

of the service, which

operated

'under

the

cloak' of the Ottoman War Office, kept

in

close touch

with the

Deuxieme

Bureau of the French

armyGHQ, Constantinople.45







BRITAIN AND THE

TURKISH NATIONAL

MOVEMENT,

1919-22

13

Throughout the

remaining

months

of the

Turkish

nationalist

struggle

SIS,

Constantinople,

remained

remarkably

well informed

about events

in

Anatolia.

In

January

1922,

they

were able to

pass

on to the

Foreign

Office

information,

obtained from a

'trustworthy'

source,

about the

events

leading

to the

resignation

of Raouf

Bey

as National Commissioner of

Public

Works,

together

with

a

copy

of

Raouf

Bey's

letter of

resignation,

supplied

by

an

'independent'

nationalist

source.46

n March

they

were able

to

pass

on a

summary

of

information, supplied

by

'various'

nationalist

sources,

regarding

the

status and

characterof the

various

political

parties

operating

in

the Grand

National

Assembly. These

included the Defence of

Rights

Party,the majorityparty,the ClericalParty,the EasternProvinces Party,the

'so-called'

Communist

Party,

the Unionist

Group,

the Kume

Party

and

the

Tevhid Club

Group.

The

Tevhid

Club

Group, the

report

noted, was

composed

mainly

of

supporters

of Raouf

Bey

and Fethi

Bey. Although for

many reasons

opposed

to

Mustafa

Kemal,

Raouf

and Fethi

were

trying

to

reconcile the

'various

conflicting currents of

public

opinion'

in

Turkey.

Most of the

deputies

in

the

assembly were

army

officers

and former

members of

the CUP.47

Finally,

in

June

1922, CIS,

Constantinople,

presented a remarkably detailed report, provided by an 'informant', on

relations

between Enver

Pasha and

Mustafa Kemal.

According to this

report

Mustafa

Kemal,

when

threatened

by

the

possible returnof Enver

Pasha,

had

taken

fright

and thrown

himself

'on his

knees' before

the

Russians,

promising to

serve them

more loyally if

they

supported him.

This

undertaking, the

report

declared, Mustafa

Kemal had

given in

writing,

keeping

it

secreteven

from

his closest

advisers. It is not

clear if

SIS believed

this

report,but as the

anonymous

author

remarked,

t cast

a new light

on the

circumstancesleading to Enver Pasha'sdeparture or Turkestan.48

It is

evident that

the British

intelligence

services were

for

the most part

well

informed

about events in

Anatolia

in

the

period of

Turkish

national

struggle.

In

particular,

hey were aware of

the

part

played in the

foundation

of

the

national

movement

by the

CUP,

supposedly

dissolved in

November

1918;

the

nature

of

Mustafa

Kemal's

relations

with the

Ottoman

government

in

Constantinople;

the

strength of

the

Turkish

nationalist

irregular

forces facing

the

Greeks in

western

Anatolia; the

extent of

Bolshevik and pan-Islamicpropaganda n the interior;the divisions in the

Grand

National

Assembly and

the

national

movement,

created by

the

different

policies,

pursued by

Mustafa Kemal

and his

opponents;

the

complex

natureof

Mustafa

Kemal's

relationshipwith the

Soviets; the likely

outcome of

the battle of

Sakarya;and

the methods

used

by the

nationalists

to

establish

relations with

Constantinopleand

Europe.

Subjectsabout

which

they

appeared

less

well

informed

include

the Amasya

Declaration of 22

June

1919,

seen

by

some

as

the

founding

document

of the

national







14


movement;

he two

greatcongresses,organized

by

the Defence of

Rights

Associations,

n

Erzerum

n

July

and

Sivas

in

September;

he

probable

consequences

of the

Allied occupation

of

Constantinople,arried

out

in

March

1920;

the

precise

strength

f the Turkishnationalist

egular

orces

operating

n

Anatolia,particularly

n the

early

period;

nd he

precise

nature

of MustafaKemal's

elationship

with the Arabsheikhs.

That the

information

ollected

by

the

British

intelligence

services

regarding

he Turkishnationalmovement

adically

affected

British

policy

may

be doubted.

British

policy

with

regard

o the Ottoman

Empire,

n

particularAnatolia,

was

initially

based on

the

principle

of

partition,

aid

downin the secret treatiesconcludedby the EntentePowers n the First

WorldWar.The retreat rom

his

policy

that occurred

n

the

period

of

Turkish

ational

truggle

was for the most

part

dictated

y

a

series

of events

and

developments,

he

implications

of

which could

be

easily

identified

without he assistanceof

information

upplied

by

the

intelligence

ervices.

These events anddevelopmentsncluded he rise of the Turkishnational

movement;

he

rapid

demobilization

f

the Allied forces

assembled

n

Europe

and

the Middle East

in

the

First World

War;

he refusal of

the

Americans o accepta mandate orthe Armenian rovinces; hereturn f

KingConstantine,

n

enemyof the

Entente

Powers,

o

the

Greek

hrone;

he

failureof the

Allies to

pursue

a united

policy;

and the defeatof the Greek

expeditionary

orce at

Sakarya

n

August-September 921

and its

later

expulsion

rom

Anatolia.

In one

area,however, t

may

be

assumed hat

he informationollected

by

British

ntelligence

made

a

significant

ifference. nformation

egarding

the

nature

of the

struggle

akingplace

in

Anatoliabetween he 'moderate'

party,edby MustafaKemal,and he 'extremist' arty, ed by Enver,Talaat,

and the other

CUP leaders

abroad, xponentsof

a

pan-Islamic-Bolshevik

alliance

aimedat the

destruction f

the BritishEmpire n Asia,

encouraged

the

British,

n

particularhe War

Office

and

theAdmiralty well

awareof

the

advantageso be gained

from the creation

of an independent

urkish

state

in

Anatolia

capable

of

acting

as a bulwark

againstthe

advanceof

Russia

n

the

area

-

eventually o pursuea

policy of compromise,

which

mightotherwisehave

provedunacceptable.

ccuratenformationegarding

eventsin Anatoliaprovedvital, therefore,n opening heroad,firstto the

LondonConference

nd then

to Lausanne.Not

that he Britishwerequick

to

adapt heir

policy

to

the

realitiesof the newsituation.Radical

hange n

British

policy (a recognition f Turkish

overeigntyhroughouthe

wholeof

Anatoliaand

eastern

Thrace)had to awaitthe

defeatand expulsion

of the

Greek

expeditionaryorce n

westernAnatolia,

accomplishedn September

1922.







BRITAIN AND

THE

TURKISH NATIONAL

MOVEMENT,

1919-22

15

NOTES

1.

For

further

nformationon British

intelligence

in

the

period

of the

First

World War and its

aftermath, see C. Andrew and J. Noakes, Intelligence and International Relations,

1900-1945

(Exeter

University

Press, 1987).

Much of

the

information

regarding

British

intelligence and

the

Turkish national movement has

been made available

in

B.N.

im ir,

British

Documents

on Ataturk

BDA),

4

vols.,

1973-74

(Ankara:

Turk

Tarih

Kurumu).

2.

BDA,

Vol.

1,

No.96, enclosure.

3.

Ibid.,No.106,

enclosure.

4. Ibid.,

Vol.2,

No.41, enclosure.

5.

Ibid., No.6.

6.

Ibid.,

No.33, enclosure.

7.

Ibid.,Vol.3,

No.46,

enclosure.

8.

K.

Jeffery

and

A.

Sharp,

Lord

Curzonand Secret

Intelligence',

in C. Andrew

and

J.

Noakes,

Intelligenceand InternationalRelations,pp.108-21.

9.

BDA, Vol.2,

No.42,

enclosures

1-3.

10.

Ibid.,No.23.

11.

Public Records

Office,

London,

FO

371/4141/49194,

General

Staff,

Intelligence,

Constantinople,

The Committee of

Union and

Progress.

For an account of

the

political

parties set

up

by the CUP in the

period

immediately

ollowing the end of the

FirstWorldWar

see E.J.

Zurcher,The Unionist

Factor

(Leiden:

E.J.

Brill,

1984),

Ch.3.

12.

FO

371/4141/49194,

General Staff

Intelligence,

Constantinople,

The

Committee of

Union

and

Progress.

13. Ibid.

14.

BDA,

Vol.1,

No.1,

enclosure.

15. Ibid.,

No.22, enclosure.

16.

Ibid.,

No.66, enclosure.

17.

K. Bourne

and D. Cameron

Watt,

British

Documents

on

Foreign

Affairs (BDFA)

Part

II,

Series

B,

Vol.

1,

Docs. 77 and 94.

18. W.O.32/5733

History

of the

'National Movement' in

Turkey.

19.

E.L. Woodward and R.

Butler, Documents

on British

Foreign

Policy,

1919-1939, First

series, Vol.4,

No.509.

20.

BDFA,

Part

II, Series

B, Vol.1,

Doc. 76.

21.

BDA,

Vol.

1,

No.

101, enclosures.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., No. 112.

24. Ibid.

25.

Ibid., Nos. 102

and 106.

26.

Ibid.,Vol.2,

No. 1,

enclosure.

27.

Ibid.,

No.10, enclosure.

28.

Ibid.,

No.24, enclosure.

29.

For

an

account of the

Allied

occupation

of

Constantinopleof

15

March 1920and

the

events

which

followed see

A.L.

Macfie,

Ataturk

Harlow:

Longman,

1994),

pp.93-4.

30.

BDA,

Vol.1,

No.119,

enclosure.

31.

Ibid.,

Vol.2,

Nos.

I

I

and

22,

enclosure.

32.

Ibid.,No.24,

enclosure.

33. Ibid.,No.73, enclosure.

34. Ibid.

35.

Ibid.,

Nos.1O

and

96,

enclosures.

36.

Ibid.,

No.92.

37.

Ibid.,

note.

38.

Ibid.,

No. 12

1.

39.

Ibid., No.175.

For an

account of

the

two reports

referred

to, see A.L.

Macfie,

'British

Intelligenceand the

Causes of

Unrest in

Mesopotamia,

1919-21',

MiddleEastern

Studies,

Vol.35,

No.

1,

1999.

40. Ibid.







16

MIDDLE

EASTERN

STUDIES

41. Ibid.,

Vol.3, No.126.

42.

Ibid.

43. Ibid.,

No.200.

44. Ibid.,

Vol.4, No.9.

45.

Ibid.,

No.

12,

enclosure.

46.

Ibid.,

No.72.

47.

Ibid.,

No.92.

48.

Ibid., No.115.