9 Metaforas y Literatura

7/29/2019 9 Metaforas y Literatura

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DE GRUYTER MOUTONDOI 10.1515/sem -2012-0074 Semitica 2012 ; 192: 53 5- 55 6

Claas LattmannIcons of novel thought: A new perspectiveon Peirce's defntion of metaphor(CP 2.27 7)*Abstract: This paper tries to elucidate Peirce's notoriously obscure definition ofmetaphor (CP 2.277) in the contex t of his gene ral the ory of signs. It is argu ed thatPeirce defined metaphor not as a proposition, but as a genuinely original iconic(meta-)sign that represents a novel sign relation and, hence, novel thought. Theadequ acy of this appro ach is discussed against the back ground of rival theoriesof metaphor. This shows, inter alia, 1) that metaphors can and must be inter-preted like ordinary signs (which in particular allows for paraphrases); 2) howthey get conventional and how they can be revived; and 3) that they are intrinsi-cally independent of linguistic levels (e.g., words) and media (e.g., natural lan-guage). Peirce's theory thus turns out to be a reasonab le ex planation of a centralsemiotic phenomenon and, hence, promises to serve as a powerful tool for mod-ern literary an d cu ltural studies.Keywords: m etap hor; C. S. Peirce; icon; image; literary theory; sem antics

Claas Lattmann: Kiel University. E-mail: clattmann@ email.uni-kiel.de

1 IntroductionNo doubt, metaphor is an indispensable and ubiquitous tool of speech andthought (cf., e.g., Blumenberg 1999; Lakoff and Johnson 1980) - but, nonetheless,it surely is elusive. Thus it is no surprise that there have been many attempts to

* I wou ld like to thank Lutz Kppel (Kiel) cordially for his helpful advice and support inpreparing this paper. I also feel o bliged to Thorsten Burkard (Kiel), Wolfgang Deppert (Kiel), RalfKonersmann (Kiel), Bjrn Kralemann (K iel), Jan Radicke (K iel), Bardo Gauly (Eichsttt) and Glenn


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define it, at least since Aristotle.' Charles S. Peirce, founder of modern semiotics,also proposed a definition {CP 2.277) - which, however, is not easy to grasp.Rather, it is renowned for its cryptic obscurity, despite many attempts at elucida-tion. So, it has had no impact on philosophy and literary studies - but perhapsundeservedly: it would not be so far off if Peirce, distinguished theorist of signs hewas, could indeed have recognized what metaphor really is.

Therefore, this paper will try to take a fresh look at Peirce's definition of met-aphor. It will take the following steps: After clarifying the state of the problem insection 2 and contextualizing the definition in the framework of Peirce's generaltheory of signs in section 3, the definition will be explicated in section 4 and, fi-nally, its adequacy will be critically reviewed in section 5.

2 Peirce's definition of metaphorPeirce doesn't speak about metaphor anywhere at length, but in CP2.277 (=EP2.274) he defines it briefly thus:

Hypoicons may roughly [he] divided according to the mode of Firstness which they partake.Those which partake the simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which rep-resent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts ofone thing by analogousrelations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent therepresentative char-acter of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors.(CP 2.277)2

1 On Aris totle's theory see Poetics 1457 b 6-3 3, Rhetoric 1A06 b20-25; cf.Lau's (2 006 :117-270) ana lysis. For a systematic overview on influ en tial theories ofmetaphor see Rolf(2005), also Weinrich (1980), Eggs (2001), Taverniers (2002 ). For single papers, see Sacks(1979), Haverkamp (1996), Ortony (1993). For further references, see Lau (2006:14).2 Quoted according to fP 2.274 (the italicized angular brackets indicate a supplement bythe editors; see http://www .iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/ep2app/ep2 app20.htm [accessed08 May 2012]). This definition ispart of a section titled "Sundry Logical Conceptions" of thesupplement to the Lowell Lectures (1903) titled "A Syllabus ofCertain Topics of Logic" (MS 478;see EP 2.258; 267). There Is, however, a second variant in the manuscript: "Ico ns may bedist ingu ishe d, though only roughly, into those which [represent] are icons in respect to thequalities of sense, being/moges, and those which are icons in respect to the dyadic relationsof their parts to one another being diagrams or dyadic analogues, and those which are iconsin respect to their intellectual characters, being examples" (quoted according to Strub 1994:


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DE GRUYTER MOUTON icons of novel thought 537

Although it is clear that Peirce evidently und ers tan ds m etaphor as a special kindof the so-called hypoicon - the othe rs being image and d iagram - his wh ole defi-nition and its implications are pretty obscure for themselves.

Thus, other theories of metaphor have been draw n on for elucidation, am ongthem Aristotle's (cf. Gumpel 1984: 82-83; Jappy 1996,1999, 2002; Joh anse n 1996,20 00), Rich ards' and Black's interaction view of m etap hor (Anderson 1984; Haley1988; Hausm an 1987,1989,1994,1996 ; cf. N th 20 00: 346-347; for this theory, seeRichards 1936; Black 1954,1993) and Lakoff's theory of conceptual metaphor (cf.Danaher 1998; Haley 1999; Hiraga 2005; for this theory, see Lakoff and Johnson1980; Lakoff 1993). Methodologically, however, this is gravely problematic, asconcepts of m etap hor alien to Peirce are projected onto his definition resulting ina lack of integra tion into his gen eral theory of signs, its primary context (for thistheory in general, see, e.g., the introductory sections to Peirce 2000: vols. 1-3;Nth 200 0: 59-70; Short 2007; cf. K appner 200 4:105-2 31).

On the other ha nd , Peirce-imm anent ap proach es have also been p ut forward(cf. Farias and Queiroz 2006, Fenk 1997; Pharies 1985; Strub 1991,1994 an d its ap-plication by Brning and Lohmann 1999), but, although they in principle ac-knowledge that Peirce's definition stands in the context of his general theory ofsigns, they no nethe less display severe theoretical shortcom ings.

That being said, Peirce's definition shall now be explicated anew against thebackground of its imm ediate primary theoretical context.

3 icons, indices, and symbolsSigns (or representamens, as Peirce often calls them) are classifiable by differentcriteria, one of the most important being "according as the relation of the sign toits object consists in the sign's having som e cha racter in itself, or in some existen-tial relation to tha t object, or in its relation to an inte rpr tant" [CP 2.243; for othe rdivisions cf. CP 2.243-2.253). This yields three distinct classes of signs, namely,icons, indices, and symbols, respectively:

There are three kinds of signs which are all indispensable in all reasoning; the first is thediagrammatic sign or icon, which exhibits a similarity or analogy to the subject of discourse;the second is the index, which like a pronoun demonstrative or relative, forces the attentionto the particular object intended without describing it; the third [or symbol] is the general


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name or description which signifies its object by means of an association of ideas or habit-ual connection between the name and the character signified. {CP 1.369; cf. CP 2.247-249; C4.447-448)

Accordingly, metaphor (being qua hypoicon nothing but an icon: see CP 2.276)^"exhibits a similarity or analogy to the subject of disco urse ." This prope rty is dueto the nature of the Peircean categories, as they form the conceptual basis of thisclassification (and of Peirce's whole theory of signs): in princ iple, there a re threefundamental categories, named firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which arethe "most universal categories of elements of all experience, natural or poetical"[CP 1.417; see CP 1.300-353; CP 1.417-520; CP 1.545-567; CP 7.327-332; for a comprhensive acco unt, see O ehler 1993: 41-60, and Peirce 2000 : Introduction to vol. 2).As such , they are mo st abstract and capab le of being applied in many an d va riousways (cf. CP 1.418-420). But, basically, firstness is the catego ry of quality, second-nes s the category of actuality and facticity, and thirdn ess th e category of thou ghtor (regarding its m ann er of operation) med iation and represe ntation.

This is due to their resting upon the notion of relation (as show their verynames): a phenomenon of firstness consists only of itself, yielding a monadicrelation, a ph eno m eno n of secondne ss con sists of two things, yielding a dyadicrelation, and , finally, a phen om eno n of thirdness consists of three things, yield-ing a triadic relation, com prising two things betw een w hich a third me diates (cf.,e.g., CP 1.356; CP 1.430; CP 8.328). Accordingly, the general triadic sign relationtoo, is a phenomenon of thirdness, its relata being the representamen itself (afirst), its object (a secon d) an d its interpr tant (a third), which together originatean d provide for the sign's capacity to represen t (see CP 1.480; cf. CP 1.337).

It is these th ree categories tha t are es sential for dividing signs into icons, in-dices, and symbols, the respective relation between representamen and objectbeing categorically different: the sym bol as a sign havin g a conventiona l connec -tion to its object (e.g., ordin ary words) is a sign of thirdn ess (see CP 2.249, also CP2.292; CP 2.298; CP 1.369; CP 7.544); the index as a sign hav ing a factual connec-tion to its object (e.g., the weathercock, insofar as it indicates the direction ofth ewind at a given moment in time) is a sign of secondness (see CP 2.305; CP 2.248;CP 2.286); an d, finally, the icon is a sign of firstness: "An Icon is a Rep resentamenwh ose Represen tative Quality is a Firstness of it as a First. That is, a quality th atit has qua thing rend ers it fit to be a rep resenta m en. Thus, an ything is fit to be aSubstitute for any thing tha t it is like" (CP 2.276).


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DE GRUYTER MOUTON Icons of novel thought 539

An icon, thu s, represents its object via its specific quality, but only insofar asthis quality is like som e specific quality of its object (so tha t the icon itself and itsobject are like each other in this very respect): a photograph, e.g., represents itsobject by possessing certain colors and shapes that correspond {qua icon) to cer-tain colors and shapes of (the phenomenal impression of) the thing represented(i.e., its object).

4 A fresh look at Peirce's definition of metaphorBy definition, the division of hypoicons into images, diagrams, and metaphorsrests on distinguishing them by their "m ode of Firstness, " i.e., by the m ode of th atby which they rep resent their objects qua being icons. Since the mode of firstnessis distinguished in respect to the categorical quality ofthe icon's firstness (i.e., theicon's quality itself), this yields a classification by the quality of quality.

So, as images are "First Firstnesses," diagrams obviously must be "SecondFirstnesses," and m etapho rs "Third Firstnesse s":'' images , first, are (as icons) liketheir objects in respect to some quality (i.e., their firstness), which itself is simpleand monadic (i.e., is a phenomenon of firstness; cf. "simple qualities" in Peirce'sdefinition); they resemble their objects in a direct way (without, however, beingidentical). Diagrams, second, similarly represent their objects (as icons) by theirown quality (i.e., their firstness), which itself consists primarily of dyadic rela-tions (i.e., is a phenomenon of secondness):

Many diagrams resemble their objects not at all in looks; it is only in respect to the relationsof their parts that their likeness consists. Thus, we may show the relation between the dif-ferent kinds of signs by a brace, thus:

[Icons,Signs: I Indices,I Symbols.This is an icon. But theonly respect in which it resembles its object is that the brace shows

the classes of icons, indices, and symbols to be related to one another and to the generalclass of signs, as they really are, in a general way. {CP 2.282)Diagrams as "second firstnesses" are like their objects in respect to a (dyadically)relational quality, irrespective of a (secondary, accidental) similarity in respect


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to any other quality. So, mathematical equations, too, are to be interpreted asdiagrams: '

When, in algebra, we write equations one another in a regular array, especially w hen we pu tresembling letters for corresponding coefficients, the anay is an icon. Here is an example:

This is an icon, in that it makes quan tities look alike which are in analogous relations to theproblem. In fact, every algebraical equation is an icon, in so far as it exhibits, by means ofthe algebraical signs (which are not themselves icons), the relations of the qu antities con-cerned. (CP 2.282)

Therefore, unde rstan ding diagram s as m onadic un ities (i.e., icons) alone allowsfor discerning the relation al quality of their objects that the iconic rep rese ntam enrepre sen ts by its very own q uality an d th at, hence, lies at the core of its represen -tative quality:

It may seem atfirstglance that it is an arbitrary classification to call an algebraic expressionan icon; tha t it might as well, or better, be regarded as a compound conventional sign. Butit is not so. For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the d irect observation ofit other truths concerning its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determineits construction . . . Given a conventional or other general sign of an object, to deduce anyother tru th than that which it explicitly signifies, it is necessary, in all cases, to replace thatsign by an icon. This capacity of revealing unexpected truth is precisely that wherein theutility of algebraical formulae consists, so that the iconic character is the prevailing one. (CP2.279; cf. CP 4.530)

Metaphor, finally, is a "third firstness": being an icon, it represents its object (likeboth other forms of hypoicons) by its own quality (i.e., its firstness), the objectbeing accordingly necessarily a firstness, too, and, second, the respective qualityof the rep resentam en and the object share a triadic, i.e., representative characterimplying a sign relation (cf. CP 1.339; CP 1.480).

Two out of the three elem ents con stituting the m etaphoric sign relation cannow be specified: first, the metaphoric representamen is an iconic sign with a(subordinate) triadic quality and, second, its object is a triadic representativerelation, conceived of as mo nad ic qu ality (necessarily, it sho uld b e said, of a rep-resen tam en). This representative relation ha s, in addition, the specific property


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DE GR UY TER M OU TO N Icons of novel thought 5 4 1

phor, thus, is by definition an (iconic) meta-sign, its essential character consist-ing of making (iconically) a statemen t abou t anothe r sign: metaph ors "representthe representative character of a representamen" (cf. EP 2.163).

It has thus become evident what dividing hypoicons by their "mode of First-ness which they partake" implies: the image as first firstness has a monadic(qualitative) quality as its object and represents it by its own monadic (qualita-tive) quality; the diagram as second firstness has a dyadic (directly relational)quality as its object and represents it by its own dyadic (relational) quality; and,finally, the m etaph or as third firstness h as a triadic (representative) quality as itsobject and represents it by its own triadic (representative) quality (cf. the manu-script variant quoted in note 2, which confirms this interim result, especially inrespect to th e thir d case of the division).'

This being clear, the way metap hor achieves this, however, clearly is not -and, as well, what the interprtant of the general metaphoric sign relation is.

Nonetheless, this issue can be clarified by formahzing the approach: let them etap horic s ign relation M be the triadic re lation (R^,, 0^ , I J wh ere R , is theme taphoric repr esen tam en, 0 its object, a nd I its interp rtan t. Let 0^, be (aspermissible simplification: see note 6) the representative quality of the repre-sentamen Rg, consisting (as every representative quality) in the triadic relationRelo = (RQ. OQ, IQ ) where Rg is the rep resentam en, OQ the object, and Ig the inter-prtant (the index "0" indicates a belonging to the object 0 of M [i.e., O J) . Sincethe metaphoric representamen R , necessarily has to share with its object 0 theproperty of having a triadic quality itself, let the corresponding relation Rel^ be(F, S, T) wh ere F is a first, S a seco nd, and T a third. In M, R , and 0^, can then be

an "analogy" {CP 7.591). It is therefore not right tha t by distinguish ing hypoicons Peirce wantedto assign the analogy to diagrams alone (e.g., Anderson 1984: 453, Hausman 1987: 40 1-40 2,Hausman 1 994 :198 , Strub 1994: 210). Hence, one should not assign comparison - beingunderstood as analogy - to diagram and distingu ish it thus from metaphor (e.g., Strub 1994:211-215), this being also clearly out of the question as diagrams exh ibit the relations iconically,whereas comparisons could clearly not be iconic in that respect.6 More correctly, it is not the quality itse lf that is the icon's object, but some other thin ghaving this very quality, be it m onadic (image), dyadic (or so regarded : diagram) or triadic(metaphor); the quality is rather the so-called "ground of the representamen," i.e., "a sortof idea " in reference to which the representamen stands for its object {CP 2.228). Thissim plification, however, is no doubt perm issible, since "the Form of the Icon . . . is also itsob jec t"; e.g ., a diagram is an "Icon of the forms of relations in the cons titution of its O bject"


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M:RM :

O u :lu :Rek:F:S:T:Relo:Ro:

Oo :lo :

MetaphorMetaphoric represen-tamenObject o f RMInterprtant of RMThe triadic relation beinthe qual i ty of RMA first in ReiA second in ReinAth i rd inRe lThe triadic relation beingthe qual i ty of 0Representamen in Relo(metaphorized represen-tamen: vide infra}Object in ReioInterprtant in Relo

Fig. 1 : A formalization of Peirce's definition of metaphor

replaced by Rel^ and Rel^, respectively, so that M finally is ((F, S, T), (Rg, OQ, I J ,I^,). Formally, all elements of the metaphoric sign relation have thereby beenspecified; th e result is show n in Figure 1.

Although formally complete, this specification has not yielded specific con-tents for all of its elem ents y et. What they a re, however, gets clear by con sideringthe m uch-d iscussed , bu t perha ps just therefore con venient example "Achilleus isa lion." Here, it is evident that not the single word "lion" could be the metaphor(which it surely must from a rhetorical point of view), since it is principally notcapab le of representing the required parallelism by itself, this being a necessarilydyadic relation (cf. Hausman 1994: 205-206). However, as a parallelism gener-ally consists of two relata and as there is only one other item in this statement,namely, "Achilleus," it gets clear that it is rather this word together with "lion"that must be the two searched for elements of the parallelism - evidently in per-fect accordan ce w ith the obvious m eaning of this m etaphor.

At first sight, thou gh, it could be surprisin g th at the re show s up a dyad ic rela-tion, the definition of metaphor demanding a triadic relation. But this is not aproblem at all: every triadic relation comprises or even originates a dyadic rela-


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DE GR UY TER M O UT O N Icons of novel thought 5 43

ing but the entire metaphoric representamen R itself, being the peculiar signmediating between the dyadically linked elements ofthe parallelism, i.e., "Achil-leus" and "lion": in general, every representation necessarily "involves a sign,or representamen ... mediating between an object and an interpreting thought"(CP 1.480).

Metaphor, then, shows a parallelism that is - insofar as it truly is a meta-phoric parallelism - being originated (primarily) first and solely by the meta-phoric representamen itself (wherefore the parallelism has to be understood assome kind of analogy; for a differing view see H ausm an 1987: 401 -405 ,199 4: esp .205 -206 ). Thu s, the wh ole sen tence "Achilleus is a lion" rep resen ts its object quabeing a mediating third (T = R J "by representing a parallelism in som ethingelse," implying that "Achilleus" (S) may be named "Hon" (F) - nota bene in themode of possibility, in correspondence with its character as iconic firstness.

F ("hon"), therefore, can be named "metaphorized sign," as the metaphoricrepr esentam en R , ("Achilleus is a lion") evidently a sser ts tha t this sign can beused (in a non-ordinary way) for S ("Achilleus"). Accordingly, the relation Relo(stand ing for the metaph oric object 0 J is the novel rep rese ntatio nal re lation con-sisting ofthe representamen "hon" (RJ, the object (ofthe sign) "Achilleus" (OQ)and an interprtant (I^), which, in turn, may be the recognition of the involvedparallelism or of the represented representational quality itself (cf. EP 2.277). Forthis reason, the object proper of a m etapho r clearly is not the im phed parallelism(so, e.g., Jappy 1996, 2002), this being a dyadic relation.

Just as it is the case with diagrams and images, it is strictly mandatory tounderstand metaphoric representamens as monadic wholes and not as "com-poun d conventional signs" [CP 2.279), i.e., as (so-called) dicisigns - which wouldbe necessary for understanding Peirce's definition of metaphor in the frameworkof (inter alia) the rhetoric theory, the interaction view of metapho r a nd the theoryof conceptual metaphor (cf., e.g., Haley 1988: esp . 14-17; Ha usm an 1994:199-201 ;Strub 1994: esp . 211-215. 218-222; Hausman 1996:197 -200). But metap hor princi-pally cannot be a proposition - unless it is assumed that Peirce's definition isincomplete (which, for the time being, clearly is not a warranted assumption):being signs of secondn ess, propo sitions are truth-apt and consist of an index andan icon that act as subject and pred icate, respectively [CP 2.310-314; cf. CP 2.309-388). A m etaph or, how ever, is by definition an icon (i.e., a sign of firstness) which,in general, "our definition fo rb id s. .. to be a Dicisign" [EP 2.277; cf. EP 2.292)' andwh ich, in particular, cann ot be the mere metaphorized sign.


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This is corroborated by the semantics of the example metaphor: interpreting"Achilleus is a lion" as a proposition (with "Achilleus" as the indexical subjectand "lion" as the iconic predicate) would only yield the insight that this state-ment is a false statem ent - but the metaphor "Achilleus is a lion" evidently sta tessomething principally difl'erent: it may, for example, provide for recognizingAchilleus as brave. So, "Achilleus is a lion" has to be understood in its entirety asa (so-called) rhem e and, thus, an icon.

However, if - as is principally possible - the sentence is uttered without ad-equa te knowledge a bout Achilleus (evidenced, e.g., by the fact that the text doesnot deal with the Greek hero Achilleus), this sentence would be nothing but aprop osition, albeit simply a false one . Analogously, the neg ation "Achilleus is nota lion" could, dependent on the context, be interpreted as a proposition (e.g.,answering the mal-informed proposition "Achilleus is a lion") or as a metaphoricicon (e.g., negating the positive metaphoric statement, aiming at denying Achil-leus any bravery).

Sentences, it follows, never are metaphors or propositions in and for them-selves, but they always and necessarily have to be interpreted as such. Peirce'stheory, thus, avoids implying that metaphors assert that something is and isnot something else simultaneously (cf. Ricur 1975: 310-321, also Rolf 2005:195-204) - and this by simply transcending the problem, which necessarily re-sults from seeing metaphor as a proposition. For the same reason, absurdity orself-contradiction - which can, besides, always be done away with by negation- is not a necessary criterion for some sign's being a metaphor (cf. Black 1993:34-35; on such theories, see Rolf 20 05 :49-52 , concerning CP2.277, see S trub 1994223-226).

As iconic signs metaphors represent a representative quality, implying arepresentative relation, and thus they "reveal" (like diagrams) "unexpectedtruths" by (necessarily merely: see, e.g., CP 8.338; cf. CP 2.230) exhibiting aspecific triadic relation (cf. CP 2.279; CP 2.282). This "truth" is associated withthe interprtant of the whole metaphoric sign relation (I) and it is created bya series of abductive, deductive, and inductive reasonings, i.e., starting with ahypothesis, whose results are then predicted and finally tested by experi-ment , i.e., by examining the text, part of which the metaphor is (on abduc-tion, deduction, and induction see CP 7.183-255; CP 2.619-772; concerning the


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imp ortan ce of abd uction in decoding m etap hors cf. Dan aher 1998: 193 -200).

The process of understanding a particular metaphor can then be envisagedas follows: confronted with a statement looking like a metaphor (i.e., roughly,giving iconically the impression of making a statement about another sign thanitself in re spect to its very being a sign), its oddity (w hich in the case of "Achilleusis a hon " results merely from b eing false wh en un ders tood as a propo sition) lea dsto forming an ex planative hy pothe sis (e.g., " 'lion' has a rep resentative qu ality inrespect to Achilleus by some parallelism") the (abstract) consequences of whichare predicted by deduction (e.g., "Achilleus and hons are brave") and finallytested by induction (e.g., by inspecting the context of the sentence, accountingfor on e's ow n know ledge ab out Achilleus and lions), so tha t a verification or fal-sification of the h yp oth esis is ach ieved (cf., e.g., CP 8.178; see also CP 8.314). Ifnecessary, this abductive-deductive-inductive process (which, by the way, is alsothe general process of acquiring any knowledge) can be continued, e.g., ongrounds of the context's demanding some adjustment to the deductive conclu-sions. In the case of "Achilleus is a ho n," e.g., the text cou ld deal not with bravery,but with ferocity or bestiality - or, in a parody, with the color of hair or with thelength of toenails.But wh atever it is tha t is determina ble as the "ten or" of the m etapho r, it sure-ly dep end s solely on the interpreter, since [qua icon and, thus, by definition) them etap ho r itself can no t provide for this (cf., e.g., CP 1.538;CP 2.777). Param eters ofjudgement are inter alia the wording and the context (in the widest possiblesense) of the uttera nce as well as the general know ledge of the interpreter (cf. EP2.404-2.409 and in general Coseriu 2007:124-137,143-146). Metaphor c an th us beregarded text-linguistically as textual function like irony, commands, questions,etc. (cf. Coseriu 2007: 60-63) .Part of the knowledge of the interpreter is, of course, the knowledge aboutliterary traditio n a nd gen re: so, it sha ll (and will) make a (likely great) differencewhether the (potential) metaphor occurs, e.g., in a scientific or in a poetic text,the process of making a hypothesis for understanding this peculiar sign being(likely, of course) differently determined - not only in respect to the mere act ofrecognizing the sign as a metaphor, but also in respect to the specific meaningone assigns to it. Thus, it surely is quite right (frankly, as it generally is for allsigns) that the recipient of a metaphor is an individual faced by a single usage,bu t this chan ges no thin g in respect to the recip ient's being (in a more or less rigid


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m eaning ofth e m etapho r (the utterer could, e.g., mistakenly think tha t Achilleuswas some feeble little dwarf).

All in all, the elements of the metaphoric sign relation are as follows (cf.Figure 1):1. The me taphoric sign relation M is the iconic sign relation involving th e

rep resenta m en R, the object 0^,, an d th e interp rtant I ,.2. The metaphoric representamen R^,, being a mediating third (T = R J ,

rep rese nts a para llelism b etween a first (F) and a second (S), resulting in thetriadic relation Rel^ involving these thre e e lem en ts.

3 . The object 0^, is the novel repre sentative qua lity of the rep rese ntam en Rg forthe object OQ determ ining th e interp rtan t I , as repre sented by R. Rg, OQ,and IQ form the c orresp ond ing triadic relation Rei.

4. Rel, an d Relg are like each o ther an d the sa me hold s for their elem ents OQand the object of S; furthermore, IQ may be understood as analogue to T, andthere is also an equivalence between F and RQ, established by their identicalobjects (the signs them selves ne ed n ot necessa rily be strictly identica l intheir character as signs: it is , e.g., pos sible th at F only circumsc ribes Rg orthat M is a metaphor in absentia, as the rhe torical tradition calls it).

5. Ij, is primarily a hyp othesis for explaining M (or, primarily, R ); in a w idersens e, it is the insight that potentially is achievable through the me taphoricreprese ntam en (i.e., concretely the insight concerning the represen tedparallelism and its implications).

The iconicity of metaphor, then, is obviously not due to the iconicity of the rep-resentamen RQ for its object OQ (cf. Peirce's remarks on diagrams quoted above)and it is also not due to an iconic relation involving the objects proper (i.e., pre-metaphoric) of RQ ( F) an d S, since it is not the object of RQ that acts as a meta-phorized sign for the object of S (which must be the case if the metaphor bean icon), but, on the contrary, Rg (= F) itself. Secondarily, nonetheless, the objectof RQ naturally (and necessarily) is in some respect like the object of S due tothe metaphoric parallelism and so, due to the iconic character of metaphor, the

8 The one or the other is the ordinary understanding of Peirce's defin ition of metaphor: see,e.g., Pharies (1985: 36), Haley (1988: esp. 16-17. 3 6-39 ), Danaher (1998), Hiraga (2005: esp.29 -3 4) ; Fenk (1997: 229-230) raises objections against this and Factor (1996: 231) tries to


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parallelism repre sen ted by R , can (a nd m ust) be found in 0 ^ (in some form oranother).

Rather, the iconicity of metap hor consists essentially (and primarily only) inthe iconicity of the triadic sign relation manifest in the metaphoric representa-men (RJ and its object (OJ. This representative relation likely is (in a Peirceansense) of symbolic natu re, RQ an d 0^ not being like iconically nor being connect-ed indexically. Therefore, this relation could not exist without the metaphor, sothat it is (primarily) the metaphor that originates it. Metaphors are, thus, essen-tially creative - at least as long as the represented representational relation hasnot yet become strictly conven tional (i.e., as long as it ha s not c onstituted a newsymbolic sign relation independent of the originating metaphor). Regarding thelexicon, metaphors always generate new meaning - after all, they represent "aparallelism in something else."

By now, however, it should have become clear why the hitherto proposedexplanations of Peirce's theory of metaphor cannot be adequate: first, they sug-gest an iconic representative relation involving Rg and its new object and, secon d,they unders tand metaph or as proposition instead of as icon. Rather, the essentialproperty of metaphor is being a meta-sign and as such being the icon of a novel,not yet habitualized sign relation - and, therefore, of genuinely novel thought,this being no thing b ut a semiotic proce ss. However, this icon of novel though t -which is nota bene the proper and only sign for this special object - does not as-sert its truene ss explicitly, bu t leaves this to its beho lder w ho h as to figure out byherself the condensed thought represented by the metaphor by thinking it ac-tively anew.

How she achieves this is left to her alone, but, ideally, she sufficiently fac-tors in {inter alia) the context (including literary tradition and genre) and thespecial character and usage of the metaphor: she is, in principle, even free tosearch for a tertium comparationis (as according to the rhetorical theory ofmetaphor: see, e.g., Mller-Richter 2001: esp . 403) or to project som e associatedimplications of a primary subject (i.e., the metaphorized representamen) upona secondary subject so that both subjects interact with each other (as accordingto the interaction view of metaphor: see Black 1993: 27-28) or to project twoconceptual domains (or images) upon each other (as according to the theoryof conceptual metaphor: see Lakoff 1993: esp. 206-207. 229) - or to exhaust asmuch as is possible the whole (potential) meaning of the metaphor, explicatingthe represented parallelism abductively-deductively-inductively in extensive


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5 The adequacy of Peirce's theory of metaphorHaving explicated Peirce's theory of m etaphor, its factual adeq uacy s hall now be(necessarily superficially) tested by exam ining som e exam ple m etapho rs (for fur-ther theoretical and practical comments, cf. Lattmann 2010: esp. ch. 2.4). Let'sbegin with "The sun laug hs": this sentence, being (in most cases) mea ningless asa prop osition, can be unde rstood as metaphoric icon (R) representing the repre-sen tation al q uality (which, primarily, exists only in the realm ofth is m etaphor) ofthe representamen "laughs" (F = Rg) for the issue represented implicitly, i.e.,(e.g.) the an alogue to hum an laughing (Og [implicit] S) in the dom ain o fthe su n.The metaphoric representamen (R^,), thus, assigns a representational quality(Relg) to the representamen "laughs" (F = Rg) in respect to a property ofthe sunby representing (exhibiting) a parallelism between sun and human, so that, ineffect, the sign for this human behavior gets also a sign for some behavior of thesun not yet represen ted by words at all. This can, d epe ndin g on th e context (in itswide st se nse), lead to (in this case unlikely im portan t) insights (I), e.g., that thesun is (as is a laughing human) friendly or glad (or behaves analogously, as thatwo uld be a metap hor, too), bu t it could equ ally well aim at show ing the su n ridi-culing somebody.Signs like "leg of a chair," too, were in origin metaphors (T = RJ and theyused to represent iconically the representative quality (Relg) of the repre-sentamen "leg" (F ~ Rg) for some part of a chair (Og = [implicit] S) that itselfhad not yet received a representamen of its own. The representative quality of"leg," then, was represented by the meta-sign "leg of a chair" (T = R^,) repre-senting in itself (and thereby postulating) some (abstract) parallelism be-tween "leg" - as it is commonly understood (i.e., as symbol) - and that part ofa chair that itself is like a leg proper. Although, potentially, there still could besome insights resulting from decoding this as a metaphor (I^,), the repre-sentamen "leg of a chair" will normally not be interpreted as such any more,but rather as conventional sign, i.e., symbol, "a Sign ... which is constituted asign merely or mainly by the fact that it is used and unde rstood as such, w hetherthe habit is natural or conventional, and without regard to the motives whichoriginally governed its selection" {CP 2.307; cf. CP 2.292, also CP 2.222 with CP2.278).

The interprtant of "leg of a chair" would now rather habitually be, e.g., an


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dead m etaphor. Or should we say: unde ad , since it can be revived in an d by somespecial context.

This process of metaphors becoming conventional symbols also explainstheir general importance for any natural langua ge: through getting conven tionaland being lexicalized, metaphors are one of the few true origins of ordinarywords, i.e., symbols {CP 2.222, where, besides, the Peircean categories appearin logical order, so that here, too, metaphor gets assigned to thirdness; cf.CP 2.302). Clearly, this occurs w hen the originally metapho ric sign is not un der-stood as metaphoric icon any more, but receives (like "leg of a chair") a habitualinterprtant and becom es a sym bol, a process that is more likely to occur wh enthere is a gap in the semantic system, i.e., when there would be no representa-men for some special thing without the respective metaphor (so that therewould be, rhetorically spoken, a catachresis: see in general Neumann 1998; cf.Lausberg 1998: 562). In order to avoid a category m istake, o ne s hou ld thereforein general not speak of "dead m etap hors ," but rather of symbols with m etaphoricorigin.

Surely, there will be a continuum of gradations of liveliness, its extremesbeing the absolutely novel (bold) metaphor (as, e.g., also Chomsky's well-known"colorless green ideas sleep furiously" could have been understood) and thequasi-dead metaphor that virtually acts as an ordinary symbol, although itsmetaphoricity can still barely be felt (e.g., the dead metaphor "dead metaphor"itself). One also has to assu m e differences in respect to situation an d genre (etc.),contextual circumstances normally playing a great role in recognizing and under-standing concrete metaphors: a sign that acts as metaphor in a scientific textneed not qua this also act as metap hor in a poetic text (and vice versa ). The stateof being a metaphor proper or a "dead metaphor" is thus a function of manyparam eters that always have to be accounted for for an ad equ ate und ersta ndin g.Accordingly, Peirce's theory also yields an ex plana tion of why an d ho w originallymetaphoric symbols (= "dead metaphors") can be revived as metaphors proper,this depending on a re-interpretation (if possible) of some symbol as metaphoricicon (e.g., "leg of a chair" ).

Lastly, let us take a look at an example metaphor given by Peircehimself:

Consciousness is rather like a bottomless lake in which ideas are suspended, at differentdep ths. Percepts alone are uncovered by the m edium. The meaning of this metaphor is that


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must continue for some time before the latter is brought to a level of easy discernment.Meantime the former is sinking to dimmer consciousness . . . The aptness of this metaphoris very great. (CP 7.554)

Here, the icon "Consciousness is rather hk e a bottomless lake " acts as me taphor-ic representamen proper (T = R ,) and rep resents a parallelism betw een "bottom-less lake " (F = RQ) and "consciousness" (S = OQ) and , thereby, a non -conventionalrep resen tative qua lity (Relg) of "bottomless lak e" (F R ) for (the object of thesign) "consciou sness" (O (j='S). Peirce then show s one way (among p otentiallymany) of interpreting this metaphoric representamen (mainly by chiefly explicat-ing the deductive reaso nings wh ich are left to implicit inductive verification), sug-gesting tha t such an interpre tation can potentially be inex hau stible (cf. the exten-sive explication of the me taphor that " m an" was a "sym bol": CP 7.583-7.596).

But two further interesting po ints show u p: first, that a p arap hras e can prin-cipally explicate the meaning of a metaphor, this having often been called intoquestion (cf., e.g.. Black 1954: 292-294). No doubt, a paraphrase differs from am etap ho r categorically and could never exp licate it completely, but this is princi-pally true for every sign witho ut excep tion - even for ordinary wo rds like "h ou se ,"which necessarily need an interprtant, which, in turn, principally differs fromthe sign itself. Moreover, some sort of para ph ras e is even esse ntially nec essa ry forunderstanding a metaphor, since every metaphor is qua icon principally in needof some ex plication for its being un ders tood (and ac ting as a sign at all): a meta-pho r by itself asse rts nothin g, for, otherw ise, it wo uld be a propo sition. No nethe-less, it is equally evident that the explication of a metaphor by way of a para-phrase can be replaced by some other kind of sign, e.g., an image - which, inturn , is also in need of an interp rtant, b eing an icon. (Thus, theories th at definem eta ph or as som e sort of imag e fall short of their ex plan ative goa l: cf., e.g., Lakoff1993:229 on poetic m etapho r.)

Second, Peirce obviously does not distinguish between metaphor and com-parison: although an affinity between both has been postulated often (especiallyin the rhetorical tradition, following Aristotle: cf. Rhetoric 1406 b2O -25, an d, e.g.,also Q uintilian, Institutio oratoria 8, 6, 8-9), an essential difference betweenthem ha s be en seen as crucial (for an overview, see , e.g., Rolf 2005:21-34). But, asPeirce's theory show s, metaphor and com parison are principally alike, since bothrepresent a parallelism (the com parison, albeit, surely less em phatically). None-


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DE GRUYTER MOUTON Icons of novel though t 551

This leads to recognizing another shortcoming of the rhetorical theory thatdefines metaphor on the level of words only: operations semiotically equivalentto (the rhetorically understood) m etaphor like the comparison, but also the alle-gory, the exemplum, the ainigma, the hyperbole, and even the metaphoric periph-rasis necessarily are systematically classified differently.' But, surely, this is notadequate and impedes a deeper understanding of the nature of the linguisticmechanism actually at work in metaphoric processes - an understanding that,generally, should be the scientific goal of every theory of me taphor. Peirce's theo-ry, howev er, can furnish this insight and explain all these phenomena (insofar asthey are metaphoric at all) semiotically w ithout se parating the same arbitrarily,thereby showing that linguistic level and medium are principally irrelevant forbeing capable of acting as metaphor.

What is more, Peirce's theory warrants a sufficient differentiation betweenmetaphor and linguistic phe nom ena with (also in the tradition of rhetoric) differ-ent natures, such as metonymy and synecdoche - although this partial conver-gence should not be understood by itself as a sufficient criterion for determiningthe adequacy of Peirce's theory (on metonymy and synecdoche, see Lausberg1998: 565-571 and 572-578, respectively): m etonymy, e.g., insofar differs frommetaphor, as it does not represent "a parallelism in something else," but is char-acterized just by the lack of it. In "I read T homas Mann," e.g., surely no parallel-ism between "Thomas Mann" and "a book by Thomas Mann" is represented, butboth representamens are connected by an indexical relation, being (unlike theiconical relation) characterized by secondness (seeCP 2.222).

This, by the way, show s, too, tha t the representational relation postulated bythe metaphor (Relj,) does not have an indexical or iconical, but rather a symboliccharacter, as the metaphorized representamen (F RJ and its new object (OQ),assigned to it by the m etaph or, ne ither are like each other (i.e., sha re an essentialquality) nor are connected in an antece dent dyadic relation. O f this new symbol,however, a {nota bene: primarily postulated) iconic relation serves as factualfoundation, the object of RQ and OQ being in some (metaphorically implied) wayparallel. So, this parallelism is not the antecedent factual foundation, but thesubsequent product of the metaphor.

Lastly, it should be admitted that at first sight there seems to be a cer-tain shortcoming of Peirce's theory, insofar as it surely cannot provide for


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distinguishing between better and worse metaph ors, its scope being the explana-tion of the metaphoric mechanism per se. But, on a closer look, this definitely isno severe shortcom ing at all, beca use Peirce's definition of metapho r is - by de-termining metaphor sufficiently - capable of laying the solid foundation for fur-ther theories on metaphor that explore, inter alia, the specific and, particularly,aesth etic qu ality of concrete m etap ho rs. But these theo ries belong to the realm ofliterary studies, their goal being an adequate understanding of specific texts andtheir meanings on the basis of accounting for (inter alia) literary tradition andgenre.

Peirce's theory of theoretical metaphor, thus, surely needs to be supple-men ted by some theory of applied m etaphor that, inter alia, also ha s to determinewheth er there are distingu ished (classes of) signs - be it on the level of lang uag e,genre, speaker etc. - which get used as metaph orized signs more often tha n o thersigns and what reasons may contribute to this (cf. the emp irical research programarising from Lakoff's theory of conceptual metaphor). But this surely is beyondthe scope of this p aper.

6 ResultsThis paper endeavored to elucidate Peirce's notoriously obscure theory of meta-phor [CP 2.277). It could be shown th at, in the framework of his general theo ry ofsigns, he defined metaphor as a sort of sign that represents the representativecharacter of another sign for something else (than its own object proper) iconi-cally by its own triadic quality on the ba sis of some (primarily pos tulated ) p aral-lelism (which, thereby, gets represented, too). Metaphor, thus, necessarily is ame ta-sign tha t always deals abou t other signs. It is a "third Firstne ss" and as suchthe icon of novel thoug ht th at itself h as no t yet been represented , at least neces-sarily not habitually. Accordingly, metaphors are no decorative ornament ofspeech (as the rhetorical tradition has it), but rather vital and genuine tools ofthought (cf. CP 2.222, CP 2.278, CP 2.290 no te 1; see also Anderson 1984: 460 -46and cf. S0 rensen 2 008 ; S0rensen et al. 2007).

Signs, however, which principally meet the defining conditions for being ametaphor are not yet qua this actual metaphors, but they have, beyond that, al-ways to be recognized as such in an intentional interpretative act (barring, interalia, an u nde rstand ing as proposition). This is accomplished, analogously to all


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DE GRUYTER MOUTON Icons of novel though t 553

ordinary signs with habitual interprtants (i.e., as symbols). Non etheless, theirmetaphoric iconicity can be revived on the condition that the symbolic repre-sentamen be re-interpreted as metaphoric icon.

All in all, Peirce's theory of metaphor turns out to be able to semiotically ex-plain the workings of metaphor ad equately and comprehensively by firstly defin-ing metaphor as a (principally ordinary, albeit necessarily meta-)sign (whichproves theorists of m etaphor w rong who deny categorically that m etaphor couldbe defined non-metaphorically: cf. Ricur 1975: 24-25, Rolf 2005: 68), by sec-ondly proving the possibility and revealing the manner of interpreting it, bythirdly disclosing the process of its getting conventional and, in turn, being re-vived, by fourthly laying open its necessarily semantically creative character,and by fifthly show ing its fundamental independence of medium or linguisticlevel: in this framework, metaphors can be expressed and understood on thelevel of, among others, words, morphemes, syntagmata, sentences, and textsand, as well, in media differing from natural language, especially in images, ges-tures, arch itecture, dan ce, film, music etc., and nota bene also in combinationsthereof (on such m etaph ors, cf., e.g., vol. 25 of the Zeitschriftr Semiotik [2005]).

If no thin g else, this last feat alone ren der s Peirce's theory of m etap hor a pow-erful tool for mo dern literary and cultural studies.

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Lausberg, Heinrich. 1998. Handbookof literary rhetoric: A foundation for literary study. Leiden:Brill.Mller-Richter, Klaus. 2001. Metapher/Metapherntheorie. In Hubert Cancik & HelmuthSchneider (eds.), Derneue Pauly. Enzyklopdie der Antike, vol. 15/1, 40 2-4 0 8. Stuttgart &Weimar: Metzler.Neumann, Uwe. 1998. Katachrese. In Gert Ueding (ed.), Historisches Wrterbuch der Rhetorik,vol. 4, 911-915. Tbingen: Niemeyer.Nth, Winfried. 20 00 . Handbuch derSemiotik, 2nd edn. Stuttgart: M etzler.Oehler, Klaus. 1993. Charles Sanders Peirce. Mun ich: Beck.Ortony, Andrew (ed.). 1993. Metaphor and thought, 2nd edn . Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1931-1966. The collected papers of Charles S. Peirce, 8 vols., C.Hartshorne, P. Weiss & A. W. Burks (eds .). Cambridge: Harvard unive rsity Press. [Referenceto Peirce's papers will be designated CP followed by volume and paragraph number.]Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1998. Essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings, vol. 2(1893-1913). Peirce Edition Project (eds.). Bloomington : Indiana U niversity Press.[Reference to vol. 2 of Essential Peirce will be designated EP 2.]Peirce, Charles Sanders. 2 0 0 0 . Charles S. Peirce: Semiotische Schriften, Christian J. W. Kloesel& Helmut Pape (eds.), 3 vols. Frankfurt am Ma in: Suhrkamp.Pharies, David A. 1985 . Charles S. Peirce and the linguistic sign. Amsterdam & Philadelphia:Benjamins.Richards, Ivor Arm strong. 1936. The philosophy of rhetoric. New York: Oxford University Press.

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and linguistic conceptions of metaphor from Aristotle to the 1990s. Gent: Academia Press.Weinrich, Harald. 1980. M etapher. In Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Grnder & Gottfried G abriel(eds.). Historisches Wrterbuch de r Philosophie, vol. 5,1179 -1186. Basel: Schwabe.


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literature (especially lyric and p hilosop hy), literary theory, history of science, a ndmodel theory. His publications include Selbstorganisierte Systemzeiten. Ein inter-disziplinrer Diskurs zur Modellierung lebender Systeme auf der Grundlage in-terner Rhythmen (co-editor, 2002); "Die Dichtungsklassifikation des Aristoteles.Eine neue Interpretation von Aristot. Poet. 1448al9-24" (2005); Das Gleiche imVerschiedenen. Metapher des Sports und Lob des Siegers in Pindars Epinikien(2010); "The se ma ntics of mod els: A semiotic p hilosophy of science app roach "(with B. Kralemann, forthcoming).


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