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The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in BangladeshAuthor(s): Patrick Develtere and An HuybrechtsSource: Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Apr.-June 2005), pp. 165-189Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40645154 .

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Alternatives 30 (2005), 165-189

The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh

Patrick Develtere and An Huybrechts*

This article presents a comparative overview of the most relevant findings from studies of the impact of microcredit institutions like the Grameen Bank and BRAC in Bangladesh. It first evalu- ates the evidence on economic impacts, which suggests that the vulnerability of bank members has been reduced even if there is no consensus about whether the two institutions also reduce poverty. It then considers the social impact, especially in relation to the situation of poor women and to various spill-over effects in different spheres of social and economic life. Keywords: microcredit, development, Bangladesh, Grameen Bank, BRAC.

Since the 1990s, alleviating poverty has been the top priority in international development. Within this framework, various initiatives have already been taken. One particular strategy in tackling poverty that has caught the attention of many aid donors and non- government organizations (NGOs) is the provision of small loans through microcredit programs. Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, is the cradle of this "microcredit movement." Grameen Bank in Bangladesh enjoys international fame, and its model has been replicated in countries all over the world. Likewise, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) is showing success as one of the largest NGOs in the world. Both have generated an international wave of interest and have been the main source of inspiration for the Microcredit Movement, which was launched in 1997 as a "global movement to reach 100 million of the world's poorest families, especially the women of those families, with credit for self-employment and other financial and busi- ness services, by the year 2005. 'n

Grameen Bank and BRAC have received a lot of attention not only from development agents but also from academics. They have been criticized for their neoliberal developmentalism,2 their social

*Higher Institute for Labour Studies, Katholieke Universiteit, Leuven, Belgium.

165



166 The Impact of Microcredit in Bangladesh

control and disciplinary imperatives,3 and the subsidized system of lending that they apply.4 Others look at them from the perspectives of a growing space for civil society,5 or the emergence of a social economy, or a third sector.6 The question of whether these two organizations truly improve the situation of their members in a sustainable way has also been discussed intensively.

This article gives an overview of the research findings on this issue. More specifically, it deals with the impact of Grameen Bank and BRAC on the economic and social situation of the poor. These two topics have been discussed in many studies. Most studies focus on the results and impact of microcredit institutions at the level of the individuals concerned (the members, clients, or customers), their immediate environment (the household or the village), or their region or district. Very few studies compare their findings with those gathered by others. This article gives a comparative overview of the most relevant findings. The wider impact of these microcredit institutions on society at large has been subject to some debate, but so far no comprehensive research has been done on this matter. We nevertheless present some of the existing findings that give us an idea of what might be the effect of microcredit institutions on society.

Before examining the main findings of impact analyses, we briefly outline the organizational structure of both Grameen Bank and BRAC.

Genesis, Organization, and Practice: An Overview

The roots of Grameen Bank and BRAC go back to the early 1970s, when, after the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan, a huge influx of refugees caused a severe famine. It is in this context that Grameen Bank and BRAC started their programs.

Table 1 sets out briefly the main similarities and differences between the two institutions and their programs. BRAC started as a relief organization, but gradually extended its services to include education, skills training, and, eventually, microcredit. Today, BRAC is still refining this holistic "credit plus" approach.

Grameen Bank, on the other hand, started from a rather "min- imalist" philosophy in which microcredit is considered to be the main tool for combating poverty. Through the years, Grameen Bank has added training and education to its program, but its approach is still not as comprehensive as that of BRAC.

Typical of both institutions is the provision of small loans to poor people who are deprived of access to credit offered by regu-



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lar private banks. The cause of this problem, lack of material col- lateral, has been dealt with through the introduction of "social col- lateral." Grameen and BRAC give individual loans to villagers in groups of five and holds the group jointly liable for repayment. If any group member defaults, the entire group is punished (denied future loans). This group mechanism creates peer pressure and solidarity, which seems to work well in a society where social networks are often of vital importance. The repayment success rate has never dropped below 90 percent.

The group mechanism is often presented as the key factor of Grameen Bank's success, but not everybody shares this view. Jain sees strong decentralization, combined with an extensive information and communication system, as the source of success for both Grameen Bank and BRAC.7 The specific organizational structure makes good management and transparency possible. Rai et al. emphasize the combination of joint liability with cross reports as vital to high repayment rates.8

In recent years, impact assessment of programs has gained momentum. Aid donors in particular want to make sure that their money is well spent. Nevertheless, measuring impact remains a controversial issue. It is difficult, as well as costly, and the results are susceptible to various interpretations, depending on how con- cepts are defined. This may result in contradictions and discrepan- cies among findings on microcredit programs.

The contradictory results in microcredit literature are discussed below. Research results of optimists are confronted with those of more cautious writers who are skeptical of such optimism. We also try to clarify another controversy: whether or not microcredit programs manage to reach the "bottom poor."

Economic Assessment

A Positive Evaluation of the Impact on Poverty

Impact on Income and Consumption. There are different ways to measure the impact of microcredit on income and consumption. First there is the borrowers' recall of the "before-after" situation. Using this method in the early 1980s, Hossain concluded that both per capita income and household income were positively associated with the amount of credit obtained from Grameen Bank.9

The impact can also be gauged through member perception. On the basis of a survey of 1986 measuring borrower perception, Hossain found that 91 percent of Grameen Bank members improved their economic conditions after joining Grameen Bank.10



Develtere and Huybrechts 169

More recent research uses income and consumption as depen- dent variables for the measurement of microcredit programs' impact. Using this technique, most authors conclude that microcredit institutions can have a positive impact on combating poverty. Khandker takes the lead in this positive evaluation. Together with Chowdbury, he examines the impact of Grameen Bank and BRAC. They find for both institutions that a greater number of loans means a lower incidence of poverty for all program participants. In the Grameen Bank villages, for instance, 76 percent of participants who have taken no loans or only one loan are below the poverty line, compared with only 57 percent of those who have taken five or more loans.11

Based on his 1998 research, Khandker comes to the same conclusions.12 He estimates that for every 100 taka lent to a female member of BRAC, household consumption increases by 18 taka. For men, this figure is 11 taka. These results indicate that poverty decreases as the borrowed amount (possibly in different instal- ments) increases. The study further shows that the poverty rate of BRAC members falls by around 15 percent for the moderate poor and by 25 percent for the ultrapoor when borrowers have a loan for up to three years.

Khandker points out, however, that this rate of poverty reduction appears to decline with duration of membership. For instance, for households that have been members for more than five years, moderate poverty fell by 9 percent and ultrapoverty by 18 percent. These figures are considerably lower than for households that had been members for three years or fewer. Moreover, since the "less than three years" category has a lower average cumulative loan size (3,348 taka) compared with the "five years plus" category (6,567 taka), these results suggest that the poverty reduction impact of credit declines with cumulative loan size for BRAC. Khandker and Chowdbury observe the same outcome for Grameen Bank.13 Thus, the reduction of the level of poverty is variable and declines with the passage of time.

Khandker goes further in this comparative analysis.14 His 1998 study reveals that for both Grameen Bank and BRAC, the per capita spending and net worth (assets plus savings/loans outstand- ing) of the members has increased. Women, however, seem to score better than their male counterparts when it comes to per capita spending,15 while men generally have a higher net worth. Female members of Grameen Bank show better results on this criterion than those of BRAC.

It should be noted that many households working in the agri- cultural sector have to deal with seasonality in consumption. At




Table 2a Economic Impact of Microcredits

Percentage change for a 10% increase in loan size

Grameen Bank BRAC

Men Women Men Women

Household indicator loan 0.18% 0.43% 0.19% 0.39% Expenditure per capita net wealth 0.15% 0.14% 0.20% 0.09%

Source: S. R. Khandker, "Microcredit to Advance Women," Grameen Dialogue 37, no. 1 (1999): 3.

harvest time, their income reaches a peak. In other periods they have almost nothing. The programs of Grameen Bank and BRAC help to smooth their consumption pattern.

Finally, for a program to be successful, it is not only important to alleviate the poverty of its clients but also to achieve a long-term sustainability of the benefits. Khandker and Chowdbury point out that it takes approximately five years for a poor member to work up to above the poverty line,16 and it generally takes eight years before the member is able to function independently from the microcredit institution. Consequently, Khandker is convinced that providing microcredit is an effective instrument to reduce poverty and even to overcome it.

Impact on Employment and Productivity. Besides income and consumption, the employment generated by microcredit programs can indicate a reduction of the poverty rate. Rahman and Khandker show that Grameen Bank and BRAC have been successful in expanding the opportunities of self-employment for their members.17 Self- employment generates a higher return than wages.18 Still, the average returns are higher in nonagriculture activities compared with those in livestock and agriculture. This finding is strongly correlated with "the fallacy of composition" in the sense that the more people who specialize in the same activities, the lower the return will be.

Further, Rahman and Khandker's paper shows that labor-force participation rates among women have increased compared with those of nonmembers living in control villages. The latter often do not have the necessary credits and other inputs to start up their own enterprises. Finally, Hossain states that the members' careful choice of projects, cooperation with the staff, and peer pressure also contribute to the two microcredit institutions' successful fight against poverty.19




Controversy on Assessing the Impact on Poverty

Not everyone shares the optimism described above. The research of Hulme and Mosley shows that the impact of credit on BRAC members' monthly incomes has been limited.20 Particularly when inflation is taken into account, income increases of members are negligible. Hulme and Mosley, however, nuance their statement by acknowledging some success among the wealthier poor.

Zaman recognizes that microcredits can contribute to poverty reduction, but only if the poor have achieved a certain economic level.21 Morduch is even more radical in his conclusions.22 He explicitly attacks Khandker's impact study (1998). He demonstrates that positive results are to a large extent attributable to Khandker's measuring of the income of members who do not belong to the specific target group of Grameen Bank and BRAC. According to Morduch, 30 percent of them would be too rich to be part of the target group. Consequently, with the same data, but after adjust- ments, he cannot find any proof of an increase in income. The economic-impact assessment seems to remain a controversial issue on which no consensus has yet been reached.

Reducing Vulnerability

Opinions are not entirely divided on all issues, however. Although researchers cannot take a unanimous stand on whether or not microcredits increase incomes and therefore contribute to the fight against poverty, authors do agree that microcredit institutions are helping to reduce the vulnerability of their clients. In other words, microcredit programs do assure that the situation of their poor members does not deteriorate any further.

Morduch points out that consumption variability from season to season indicates a reduction of 47 percent for eligible Grameen Bank households and of 54 percent for eligible BRAC households, compared with a control group.23 Like Khandker, Morduch concludes that the pattern of consumption is smoothed over the year. There also seems to be a greater stability of labor supply in the program villages compared with the control groups, and nonagricul- tural activities practiced by Grameen Bank and BRAC members reduce families' vulnerability. Furthermore, during crisis, microcredit institutions play an important role in reducing members' vulnerability. Zaman examined this matter for the floods in 1998 and came to the conclusion that Grameen Bank and BRAC build- ings had successfully been converted into relief and rehabilitation centers, which their members highly appreciated.24




A third way to reduce vulnerability is to increase members' net worth. For instance, assets can be sold in case of dire need. They can also increase the creditworthiness of clients. Khandker and Chowdbury find that despite high indebtedness among program participants, their net worth is still greater than among nonpartic- ipants in all program areas.25 Zaman also sees the importance of net worth.26 He concludes that the "oldest" members of BRAC have, on average, the highest value of nonland assets. The latter demonstrates that BRAC members invest particularly in productive capital (e.g., rickshaws, poultry, grocery shops) and in nonagricul- tural activities. Hulme and Mosley's study confirms these findings.27 Hulme, however, also warns of the dangers this may involve when investments are unprofitable.28 He agrees with Zaman29 that savings can be very important to hedge against such failures. In recent years, BRAC and Grameen Bank have come to realize that savings are necessary in reducing vulnerability and have made their saving institutions much more accessible to their members.

Problems in Reaching the Poorest: Valid Criticism?

Do Grameen Bank and BRAC Reach the Hardcore Poor?

Although not all researchers agree that microcredit helps in combating poverty, most are convinced that it reduces the vulnerability of the poor. These results, however, need to be considered with some caution. People talk too easily about the poor as one homo- geneous group, when in fact there are gradations of poverty. And an oft-heard criticism against microcredit institutions is that they do not reach the bottom poor.

In their targeted approach, both BRAC and Grameen Bank have defined their target group as being comprised of those who have less than half an acre of land. Nevertheless, the research of Mustafa et al. (1996), Montgomery et al. (1996), and Khandker (1998)30 has indi- cated that this official criterion is often neglected; 15 to 30 percent of BRAC members do not belong to the target group. For Grameen Bank, similar figures were found.31 Also Amin, Rai, and Topa find that while microcredit is successful at reaching the poor, it is less successful at reaching the vulnerable poor.32

Khandker (1998) and Husain (1998), however, do point out that a large part of BRAC and Grameen Bank members consists of bottom poor.33

In Khandker's research, 65 percent of BRAC members and 55 percent of Grameen Bank members did not have any land at all at their disposal.34 Evans, Adams, Mohammed, and Norris came to the




same conclusion.35 In their study, they classify 24,234 families com- ing from thirty-two areas where BRAC's Rural Development Pro- gramme (RDP) was executed in three wealth groups according to their income. Only groups two and three met the eligibility criteria for participation in BRAC's program. Table 2b gives the percentage of each of the groups in the sample's total population. Of the total population, 24 percent are not eligible for participation. Table 2c shows how BRAC's members are spread over the three groups.

Table 2b Percentage of Groups in Total Population of Sample

1 2 3 Wealth Group (Richest) (Poorest) Total

Number of households 5,917 6,512 11,805 24,234 Total percentage 24% 27% 49% 100%

Source (tables 2b, 2c, 2d, and 2e): T. G. Evans, A. M. Adams, R. Mohammed, and A. H. Norris, "Demystifying Nonparticipation in Microcredit: A Population- Based Analysis," World Development 27, no. 2 (1999): 420 and 423.

Table 2c BRAC RDP Members per Wealth Group (n=5,535)

1 2 3 Wealth Group (Richest) (Poorest)

BRAC members 11% 28% 61%

Table 2c indicates that only 1 1 percent of all BRAC members do not belong to BRAC's target group. From the 89 percent who do meet the eligibility criteria for participation in BRAC's program, no fewer than 61 percent are part of wealth group 3. These results confirm that, contrary to what some may believe, BRAC does succeed in reaching the poorest. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement. As we see in Table 2d, a large group of the bottom poor has not yet been reached: 60 percent of the poorest people of the sample's population still do not participate in BRACs program.

Table 2d BRAC RDP Members per Wealth Group

1 2 3 Wealth Group (Richest) (Poorest)

Members 10% 24% 29% Nonmembers 82% 65% 60% Former members 8% 11% 11%




Table 2e Possible Barriers to Participation in Microcredit Programs

Program-related Barriers Client-related Barriers

- Insufficient supply of microcredit - Insufficient means programs - Bad health or vulnerable to crises

- Membership requirements - Female head of household - Expectations of the peer group - Lack of education - Institutional incentives - Individual and household preferences

Barriers to Reaching the Poorest: Possible Solutions

Table 2e gives an overview of the program-related and client- related barriers to participation in microcredit programs. Con- cerning the program-related difficulties, the exponential growth of Grameen Bank and BRAC indicates that they have been doing their utmost to reach as many clients as possible. Only time will tell, however, whether this exponential expansion does not also lead to a loss in efficiency. Furthermore, Evans et al. see the membership requirements as major obstacles for the very poor. Time- consuming activities such as paying registration fees, saving, attending group meetings, and participating in training sessions are often impossible for poor members. They need to spend all of their time and assets in surviving the day.

Another factor is that the group mechanism does not make things easier for the poor. Evans et al., Hashemi,36 and Hulme and Mosley37 say that would-be members of Grameen Bank and BRAC often do not want to take the bottom poor into their group. They regard them as too risky. Microcredit institutions themselves often prefer the richer poor as clients since they are more likely to assure the sustainability of the organizations.

When we focus on the client-related barriers, self-selection or self-exclusion is regarded as one of the major obstacles. Hashemi,38 Morduch,39 Evans et al.,40 and Hulme and Mosley41 agree that the bottom poor often consider a loan to be too risky. Having few assets and fearing an even greater burden of debt, they do not want to take part in a microcredit scheme. Even when they take a loan, they can get into trouble if the returns from investment fall short of the cost of borrowing. This gap is then filled by one (or more) of five options, depending on the preloan endowment of the borrower:42 borrowing from moneylenders, using savings or selling assets, reducing existing consumption levels, negotiating to reshed- ule the loans, or simply defaulting. As Banerjee says, some defaults, in turn, energize a demonstration spiral, and many households practice self-exclusion.43 The net result is that the poorest fall through the net. This may also be the reason for high numbers of




dropouts from microcredit programs stimated at 15 percent per year for Grameen Bank and 10 to 15 percent per year for BRAC.

The research of Evans et al. sees lack of education as an important obstacle in reaching the bottom poor.44 "Ill health or vulnerability to a crisis" and "female head of household" are not significant factors in the research, yet they contribute to the poverty rate of these people and often reinforce one another.

The foregoing findings show that, although a significant number of very poor is reached, Grameen and BRAC do not succeed in covering the majority. Still, Hashemi sees this not so much as a fail- ure but as an indicator that microcredit is not necessarily the way out for all the poor.45 Poor people who do not have the needed assets, social relations, or self-confidence have to be reached in different ways.

Grameen Bank is trying to meet the specific needs of the hardcore poor by investing in local economic activities. Grameen's initiatives in textiles (the setting up of a textile factory), in agriculture and fisheries (the Krishi and Motso Foundations), in solar and wind energy (Grameen Shakti), and in telecommunications indicate that Grameen Bank wants to make special efforts to improve the situation of the bottom poor. BRAC has also understood this need and, with its Income Generation for Vulnerable Group Devel- opment program,46 it has concerned itself with the destiny of the poorest women in Bangladesh.

The Social Impact of Grameen Bank and BRAC

Impact assessment is all too frequently discussed in a purely economic sense. In recent years, more researchers are concentrating on the social impact of microcredit institutions. Since Grameen Bank and BRAC prefer female members to male members, we first assess the social impact on the lives of women. Later, the broader impact of these institutions on the society will be examined.

With patriarchal norms being strictly observed in Bangladesh, it is not easy for a microcredit institution to reach women. Pur- dah - female seclusion - confines women to the homestead and makes contact with men outside the family unacceptable.47 Educa- tion for girls is considered unnecessary.48 Dowries are paid, and women have to make sure that their husbands do not leave them.49 Women are not supposed to have any income independent of their husbands. It is obvious that under these conditions, females attending meetings with male leaders and being in control of finances are aspects of microcredit programs that violate patriarchal values.




Although female members are difficult to reach, it is important to involve them in development projects. Because a woman has to stay at home, she is confronted with poverty more than a man. She has to feed the children, and if there is a lack of food, she eats less.50 Further, Sen, using the term women's agency, indicates that women cannot merely be passive recipients of aid: They have to be actively involved in improving their lives.51

Sen is convinced that women can take part in household decision making and improve their status considerably if they contribute to family income. It is in this field that the microcredit program of Grameen Bank and BRAC can contribute to women's emancipation. Combined with a social program of skills training, education, and social awareness, microcredit not only improves the situation of women but may also positively affect the entire family.

Thus, in order to measure the impact of microcredit provision on the situation of poor women, we now concentrate on the contribution to family support as the intermediate variable between credit and empowerment. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley indicate that these contributions to family income are often rather small.52 While 72 percent of the Grameen Bank members and 40 percent of the BRAC members were classified as "contributing to family support," only 26 percent of the former and 12 percent of the latter declared to be responsible for more than half of the family bud- get. These low figures are due to the fact that Grameen Bank members often invest in traditional activities like stock breeding. These can be practiced at home, but do not bring in a lot of money. Further, the loans are not merely used for the women's own activities. They also have to cover the husband's undertakings. This problem of control of resources is discussed below.

When we compare Grameen Bank and BRAC, Grameen Bank members on average seem to add more to the household's income than their BRAC counterparts. A faster, more frequent loan provision, and greater discipline among Grameen members, may explain the different outcome. The available evidence supports the hypothesis that, through the provision of credit, both microcredit organizations enable their members to contribute to family support. Whether this will lead to emancipation of women is discussed later, when positive and negative opinions are considered.

The Impact of Credit on Emancipation of Women: A Positive Evaluation

Involvement in Family Decisions. A first indicator of women's empowerment is a larger involvement of women in important family deci-




sions. The research of Amin and Pebley shows that female BRAC members have a larger role in decision making within the household than control group members.53 Khandker and Pitt54 as well as Rahman (1986)55 confirm this finding for both Grameen Bank and BRAC. As the wife is now seen as a source of income rather than as a burden, her status will rise, and with it also her decision-making power. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley agree, but they nuance their findings by stating that for more important decisions, such as those related to finances, only Grameen Bank members have significantly better scores compared with the control group.56 The larger contribution of Grameen Bank members to family support can be an explanation, although a selection bias may also be involved.

Women's Exposure to Violence. Domestic violence against women is a serious problem in Bangladesh. In the patriarchal Bengali society, this violence is not strongly condemned. Women put up with it because they lack alternatives. In their study, Schuler et al. explore the possible role of Grameen Bank and BRAC in reducing women's vulnerability to male violence.57 A regression analysis indeed shows that Grameen and BRAC members are better treated by their husbands.

Although we would assume that this positive result can be attributed to the strengthening of the women's economic role within the household, the researchers come up with a more significant factor: "the entrance of women in public life when joining a microcredit institution." This generates new social-control mecha- nisms that make husbands more prudent since they fear disap- proval of their acts by village people. Thus, although indirectly, credit plays a role in improving the situation of women. However, if we really want to stop the violence against women, more specific measures will be needed.

Greater Awareness of an Expanding World. The observance of purdah highly restricts the mobility of Bengali women. We may wonder whether microcredit programs are able to improve this mobility. According to Amin and Pebley, female members of BRAC set out for the village center more often after joining BRAC.58 Several obliga- tions, like repaying loans and going to meetings, take them to the village center. Still, only very few members travel outside the village. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley contest this last finding and state that Grameen Bank and BRAC members do go outside the village to participate in various training programs.59 The results, however, are not significant for Grameen Bank.

Although opinions vary, we cannot deny that the world of




Grameen Bank and BRAC members is expanding. Weekly meetings at the center and daily contact with the five members of their group get them out of their isolated family lives. In this way, members are exposed to different ideas and information.60 The question of how much women are influenced by this matter is still to be researched.

Various studies indicate that contact of the members with other people within the microcredit organization has a serious impact on the knowledge and awareness of those members. Based on their ethnographic research, Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley state that the weekly meetings give the members a chance to build up their own identity outside the family.61 Further, interaction with other men and authorized people gives the women more confidence and helps them to learn to talk in public. They even get the chance to take up leadership in their group or the center where meetings take place. Amin and Pebley add that members are not afraid anymore that their husbands will leave them.62 Microcredits give these women the chance to stand firm.

Moreover, the positive effects not only affect the female members of Grameen Bank and BRAC. The research of Khandker shows that microcredit also has a positive influence on the members' children and that this effect is larger than when the same loan is given to men.63 Children's welfare increases as does their food consumption. The school enrolment of both girls and boys is positively influenced for Grameen Bank. For the school enrolment of BRAC's boys, this result is not significant. Amin and Pebley go even further and see no significant result for either girls or boys.64 Nevertheless, the difference with the control group increases for BRAC villages with more than five years' involvement in the program. Apart from this indirect effect on school enrolment, Grameen takes direct measures, such as scholarships, and the "five star" grading system, recently introduced.65 Concerning the marital aspira- tions of their young daughters, BRAC members' traditional view has not altered.

Emancipation and Fertility. Hossain and Kabir indicate that members of microcredit institutions in general are more inclined to use contraceptives.66 About 65 percent of Grameen Bank members and about 70 percent of BRAC members were contraceptive users at the time of the survey. This figure was 15 percent lower (65% against 50%) for nonmembers of the control group. Factors such as a better knowledge about and access to contraceptives as well as discussions and mutual support may explain the increased contraceptive use among microcredit members.




Khandker and Latif put the fertility concept in a broader perspective, stating that the demographic landscape is not only influenced by fertility but also by infant mortality.67 As children are a sort of social security for their parents, contraceptive use will be effective only if people do not have to worry anymore that the children they already have might die. In the short term, microcredits may increase contraceptive use and decrease infant mortality. In the long run, awareness raising and education are more efficient methods of dealing with the situation.

Impact of Credit on Emancipation of Women: A Negative Evaluation

Above we have put forward a lot of positive effects of microcredit programs on the situation of women; however, opinions are more diverse when it comes to women's control over loan use and domestic violence. Goetz and Sen Gupta have investigated whether female members of Grameen Bank, BRAC, TMSS, and RD-12 actually control their credit.

As Table 3 shows, about 63 percent of the women involved in these programs have only "partial," "very limited," or "no control." Goetz and Sen Gupta further indicate that the results are con- firmed by the research of Rahman, White, and Ackerly.68 Also Hulme and Mosley agree on women's minor control over loan use, even stating that credit does not encourage emancipation at all.69 Female members' better status can be observed only when it is compared with other women's status, not when it is compared with that of men.

Further, Goetz and Sen Gupta show that single women have more control over their credit. This finding also counts for women who invest in traditional activities. These traditional activities, such as livestock and agriculture, are often considered as female activities and do not generate much extra income. The higher the amount of money that can be made, the faster men take over control. This finding can also explain the diminishing level of female control over credit when membership extends over time.

Table 3 Women's Extent of Control over Loan Use (n = 253)

Extent of control Full Significant Partial Very Limited No Control

Women (%) 17.8% 19.4% 24.1% 17% 21.7%

Source: A. M. Goetz and R. Sen Gupta, "Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programme in Bangladesh," World Devel- opment^ no. 1 (1996): 49.




When we evaluate the findings of Goetz and Sen Gupta for Grameen Bank and BRAC specifically, the Grameen Bank's results are much better than BRAC's. Of BRAC's members in the sample, 45 percent are part of the groups with "very limited" or "no control." This is the case for only 10 percent of Grameen Bank's members. We cannot, however, conclude that BRAC's strategy is less effective. Possibly the difference is due to Grameen Bank's giving smaller loans to its members and its encouraging them to invest in traditional activities.

Loan repayment remains the major difficulty when it comes to women's control over loan use. When a man makes sure that his wife can pay back her loan, there is not much of a problem; however, since the wife remains responsible for the repayment to the center, things become more serious when a husband refuses to pay back money he has used. Moreover, the tensions that this situation brings may escalate into domestic violence. Rahman supports this statement,70 writing that out of 120 Grameen Bank members he interviewed, only 18 percent said that domestic violence had decreased, while 70 percent claimed an increase of violence and aggressive behavior in the household. These findings indicate the need for reassessment of the results discussed earlier.

Positive or Negative Impact of Credit on Emancipation of Women: A Critical Comparison It is difficult to draw unequivocal conclusions out of these contradictory findings. A few researchers, however, have dared to try. Kabeer71 and Zaman72 came to the conclusion that the diversified opinions are due to a difference in methodology. Also, Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley give some interesting remarks.73

Kabeer indicates that while some studies rely largely on statis- tical data and significance tests for their findings, others are based on more qualitative, sometimes anecdotal, evidence; consequently, some figures refer to "average" and others to "nonaverage" out- comes. In this way, the general finding of Hashemi et al., that violence against women decreases when they join a microcredit institution, can be consistent with Rahman's statement that the violence in some households increases. Further, Kabeer contends that an accurate definition of the terminology used in the research is indispensable. Goetz and Sen Gupta, for instance, conflate "control" and "management" of a loan, whereas making decisions about loan use and decisions about implementation are two different things; consequently, they do not indicate the extent to which the wife was involved in the decision-making process of allocating the




loan. It is even possible, although unlikely, that 78 percent of the women out of their sample (22 percent of them did not have a clue as to what happened with their loan) actually did participate in the decision-making process.

We should not draw conclusions too quickly. Hashemi et al. notice that a loss of control over loan use does not necessarily exclude emancipation of women. Even if a wife entirely lacks control, the membership of the microcredit institution can offer her a lot by bringing her in contact with other people and ideas. Without the prospect of getting access to credit, most women probably would not be permitted to join the programs and get the educa- tional and social benefits. In this way, participation actually stimu- lates women's emancipation. Mahmud holds a similar opinion,74 finding that, while microcredit program participation has only a limited direct effect in increasing women's access to choice- enhancing resources, it nevertheless has a much stronger effect in increasing women's ability to exercise agency in intrahousehold processes. The expansion of women's access to household resources, even when these are used by men in family-based enterprises, is therefore to be encouraged.

Finally, according to Zaman and Kabeer, researchers often interpret the same results in a different way. Zaman uses the study of Goetz and Sen Gupta to enforce his argument. The study indicates that 63 percent of the women have "partial control," "very limited control," or "no control" over the credits. It is, however, possible to add up the figures in a different way and thereby conclude that 61.3 percent of the women have "full control," "significant control," or "partial control" over their loans and, therefore, a fair degree of control over their credit.

Kabeer concludes that these contrasting opinions are due to differences in the notions that researchers have in use of the word control. By and large, the negative evaluations consider only the wife's individual control over loan use as emancipating; the more positive studies value it as highly progressive for a patriarchal society if a wife and husband decide together. Zaman concludes that the positive approach is the most realistic one.

Rahman concludes that despite the mixed results within and across studies, authors do agree that microcredit has some positive impact on women's lives.75 The main benefits women derive from participating in microcredit programs are:

• Greater involvement in income-earning activities • Increase in awareness about social, economic, and health related issues




• Increase in the adoption of family-planning methods • Increase in girls' education and school-enrollment rates

The Influence of Microcredits on Society We have seen how thoroughly Grameen Bank and BRAC intervene in the lives of their female members. The latter, however, are not the only people to be affected by the two microcredit institutions. In one way or another, nonmember groups in the villages can be touched by the microcredit institutions. Further, state and elite networks are confronted with these constantly expanding organizations. Although there is not much research on the topic, it is interesting to discuss the impact of Grameen Bank and BRAC on the society as a whole, even though the following has to be rather hypothetical in character.

Effects on Nonmember Villagers. The effect of microcredit programs on nonmembers has received little attention by researchers. Studying this effect is complicated by the fact that microcredit has become a standard ingredient in the vast majority of development projects ini- tiated by nongovernmental agencies: it is estimated that around 78 percent of the nearly sixty thousand villages in the country are "cov- ered" by the NGO community. The probability that more than one microcredit program is operating in a village therefore is extremely high. It is still worth looking at what we know about the indirect effects and impacts of the microcredit programs of Grameen Bank and BRAC. Rahman points out that the impact of microfinance institutions on the nonprogram households may be routed through various channels.76 He believes that the social inputs in the form of knowledge, awareness, and better practices of health, sanitation, and family planning are spread to nonmembers. Such a spillover effect is expected to be positive.

A more direct effect of microcredit will be felt in the credit market since the supply of total credit available will increase, lead- ing to a decline in the interest rate. A similar effect can potentially be observed when it comes to rural wages. Khandker, Khalily, and Khan,77 for example, suggest that the Grameen Bank has a significant positive effect on the wages of men and children in the program villages. The average man's wage in Grameen Bank villages (Tk 29.8 per day) was higher than in the villages without a Grameen Bank program (Tk 24.2), implying that the Grameen Bank's services increased the wage rate by about 4 percent. This increase would be due to the Grameen Bank's enabling of self- employment, which reduces labor supply and consequently raises the wage rate. Wages remain at this higher level if the program




increases members' income and induces a larger demand for food and other local products. However, the same survey did not find similar wage impacts in villages with BRAC program placements.78

Khandker, Khalily, and Khan's study of Grameen Bank projects shows that the nonparticipant target group members in program villages are employed for a larger number of days when compared with target groups in control villages. The study's authors suggest that this finding is likely to be associated with the spillover effect of the microcredit program.

Rahman says that the land-tenure market is also contaminated by the microcredit programs.79 Since the program participants have access to cash and are thus in a better position to make investment on land, they may be preferred as sharecroppers. Thus, the microcredit recipients may displace the other poor households from the land-tenure market. This hypothesis remains to be tested.

Confrontation with Existing Systems. The rural society of Bangladesh is built on local networks in which family and elite take a prominent place. For many of these traditional systems, like the often-exploitative patron/client relationship, BRAC and Grameen Bank offer an alter- native by providing microcredits and education to poor women.80 Especially in the beginning, their activities were seen as undermining the traditional social and religious values of the country. Women vio- lating purdah by joining a microcredit program have, for instance, been strongly condemned by religious leaders and middlemen. Hash- emi and Schüler81 and the Economist82 report on attacks on microcredit institutions by mullahs defending patriarchal values.

Although religious opposition is the most severe, criticism is also heard from the political and economic forum. Wahid and Hsu, for instance, found that leaders of the Union Parishad and the rural elite blamed Grameen Bank for increasing rural wages.83 They will, however, not undertake any action as long as Grameen Bank members stick to small-scale, nonsubstantial activities.

Cooperation and Coexistence. In spite of a few quarrels, politicians seem to approve of the activities of Grameen Bank and BRAC. The political class pays lip service to the objective of combating poverty. In some instances, there are cooperation arrangements between governmental institutions and the microcredit institutions (e.g., government-BRAC's IGVGD). The government has used Grameen Bank and BRAC as models for various projects.84

Grameen Bank and BRAC take advantage of cooperating with the government and the elite. Dr. Yunus's being part of Chittagong University and his family's having connections with a bank helped him in starting up the Grameen Bank. With the government as one




of the shareholders, the Grameen Bank has been able to grow into the institution it is today.85 Local leaders have often been played off against each other or have helped in solving conflicts between members.86

Since politicians and microcredit institutions need each other, it is important that good relations be maintained. Grameen Bank and BRAC, therefore, prefer a neutral position in politics (the elections of 1991, for instance, showed the dangers of being hijacked by one party).87 Nevertheless, by encouraging their members to vote, Grameen Bank and BRAC play an important political role. In local-government elections, more and more Grameen and BRAC members stand for election as independent candidates, and get elected.88 The future will tell if this encouragement will strengthen the poor as a vocal political grouping.

In the meantime, Grameen Bank and BRAC continue their social mobilization and advocacy. At the local level, the ceremonial and ritual references during group meetings to BRAC's Seventeen Promises and to Grameen Bank's Sixteen Decisions may create a new way of thinking that radically opposes the conservative society. To what extent the members and customers believe in these nor- mative rules and put them into practice has not, to our knowledge, been studied.

The same is true for the advocacy work done at macrolevel. BRAC created an advocacy unit, and both organizations do present their opinions on national and international development issues on a regular basis, (e.g., there was the international seminar "Attacking Poverty with Microcredit," PKSF, 2003). So far, no research has been done on the impact of this kind of advocacy work on decision making at the national level. This broader and more comprehensive perspective adopted in measuring the impact of social organizations at all levels (from impact at household level to impact on national decision making) is worthy of note for scholars and practioners interested in processes of social change. More- over, it is a condition sine qua non for assessing whether or not the institutional setting, which is creating and maintaining poverty and social exclusion, has changed.

* * *

Our overview of various studies has made it possible to get a more accurate view on microcredit systems in general and Grameen Bank and BRAC in particular. As both institutions are highly praised for their positive contributions in combating poverty, we




have tried to verify this success through an investigation of their economic and social impact on their members and on society.

The assessment of economic impact revealed that Grameen Bank and BRAC definitely succeed in reducing their members' vulnerability and, by consequence, succeed at preventing them from falling even further into poverty. There was, however, no consensus on whether the two institutions also reduce poverty per se. The criticism that Grameen Bank and BRAC would not reach the bottom poor was refuted, and it is clear that the poorest make up the largest group among their members. Nonetheless, we cannot deny that, as yet, most of the poorest people in Bangladesh have not been able to take part in a microcredit program.

Assessment of the social impact led us to examine studies on the situation of poor women in the patriarchal society of Bangladesh. Several authors shared the opinion that Grameen Bank and BRAC have a positive influence on their female members. Especially in regard to women's status, their increased involvement in family decisions, expanding knowledge, awareness, and an improved situation for children were the most important realizations. Critics who claimed that females' lack of control over loan use was negative were contradicted by other studies. The latter maintained that female members of Grameen Bank and BRAC actually had (some) control over their loans.

Although the wider effect of microcredit programs on nonmembers in the villages and on the surrounding villages has not received much attention by researchers, some research suggests a positive spillover in different spheres of social and economic life. The social inputs of the programs in terms of individual empowerment and capabilities (knowledge, awareness, health, etc.) also affects nonmembers in the community. Also, an increase in the supply of credit leads to a decline in interest rates. Rural wages may also be positively affected by microcredit programs. The hypothesis that the land-tenure market may be contaminated by the microcredit programs remains to be tested.

It is not clear what impact Grameen Bank and BRAC - as well as other microcredit programs - have on the wider social, economic, and political environment. While religious leaders see Grameen Bank and BRAC as endangering traditional values, local and national leaders have tried to work with them. Grameen Bank and BRAC have continued to mobilize their members around very sensitive issues. But no research has been done on the impact of this sensitization and mobilization on the ideas and practices of members nor on the way family members and other villagers react




to them. There is a similar lack of research on the advocacy work done by both institutions. While, increasingly, Grameen Bank and BRAC voice their opinions on national and international development issues, the effect of their advocacy strategies is not known.

Notes

1 . MicroCredit Secretariat, "The Microcredit Summit: Declaration and Plan of Action, 1997": microcreditsummit.org.

2. M. Brigg, "Empowering NGOs: The Microcredit Movement Through Foucault's Notion of Dispositif," Alternatives: Global, Local, Politi- cal 26, no. 3 (2001): 233-258.

3. D. Bornstein, The Price of a Dream: The Story of the Grameen Bank and the Idea That Is Helping the Poor to Change Their Lives (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997). See also A. Rahman, "Micro-credit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development: Who Pays?" World Developmental ', no. 1 (1999): 67-82.

4. M. S. Robinson, The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor (Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Open Society Institute, 2001).

5. D. Hulme and M. Edwards, NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort? (London: MacMillan, 1997).

6. J. Defourny, P. Develtere, and B. Fonteneau, The Social Economy North and South (Liège/Leuven: Centre d'Economie Sociale and HIVA, 2000).

7. P. S. Jain, "Managing Credit for the Rural Poor: Lessons from the Grameen Bank," World Development 24, no. 1 (1996): 79-89.

8. A. S. Rai and T. Sjostrom, "Is Grameen Lending Efficient?" CID Working Paper 40 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 2000), p. 41.

9. M. Hossain, Credit for the Rural Poor: The Experience of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Research Monograph 4 (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Institute of Development Studies, 1984).

10. M. Hossain, Credit for Alleviation of Rural Poverty: The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, Research Report 65 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1998).

11. S. R. Khandker and Ο. Η. Chowdbury, "Targeted Credit Pro- gramme and Rural Poverty in Bangladesh," World Bank Discussion Papers 336 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), p. 15.

12. Khandker, in H. Zaman, "Assessing the Impact of Micro-credit on Poverty and Vulnerability in Bangladesh," Policy Research Working Paper 2145 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999), p. 3.

13. Khandker and Chowdbury, note 11, p. 15. 14. S. R. Khandker, "Microcredit to Advance Women," Grameen Dia-

logue 51, no 1 (1999): 3. 15. See also Hossain, in A. N. M. Wahid and M. K. Hsu, "The Grameen

Bank of Bangladesh: History, Procedures, Effects, and Challenges," Asian Affairs 31, no. 2 (2000): 165.

16. Khandker and Chowdbury, note 11, p. 23. 17. A. Rahman and S. R. Khandker, "Role of Targeted Credit Pro-

grammes in Promoting Employment and Productivity of the Poor in Bangladesh," Bangladesh Development Studies 22, nos. 2-3 (1994): 49-92.

18. See also Alam, in Wahid and Hsu, note 15, p. 165.




19. Hossain, in Wahid and Hsu, note 15, p. 165. 20. D. Hulme and P. Mosley, Finance Against Poverty, vol. 2 (London:

Routledge, 1996), pp. 134-135. 21. Zaman, note 12, p. 4. 22. Ibid., p. 3. 23. J. Morduch, "Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evi-

dence from Flagship Programme in Bangladesh" (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1998), pp. 19-20.

24. Zaman, note 12, pp. 15-18. 25. Khandker and Chowdbury, note 11, p. 14. 26. Zaman, note 12, pp. 18-19. 27. Hulme and Mosley, note 20, pp. 135-136. 28. D. Hulme, "Is Microdebt Good for Poor People? A Note on the

Dark Side of Microfinance," Small Enterpnse Development 11, no. 1 (2000): 26-28.

29. Zaman, note 12, p. 24. 30. All in Zaman, note 12, p. 2. 31. Morduch, note 23, p. 4. 32. S. Amin, A. S. Rai, and G. Topa, "Does Microcredit Reach the Poor

and Vulnerable? Evidence from Northern Bangladesh," Journal of Develop- ment Economics 70 (2003): 59-82.

33. Both in Zaman, note 12, p. 2. 34. Yunus cites a World Bank study by Shahid Khondkar showing that

microcredit programs operating in Bangladesh over a long period have produced a greater impact on extreme poverty than on moderate poverty: Khondkar, "Expanding Microcredit Outreach to Reach the Millennium Development Goal - Some Issues for Attention," from the PKSF Inter- national Seminar, Dhaka, 2003.

35. T. G. Evans, A. M. Adams, R. Mohammed, and A. H. Norris, "Demystifying Nonparticipation in Microcredit: A Population-Based Analy- sis," World Developmental no. 2 (1999): 421-424.

36. In G. D. Wood and I. A. Sharif, Who Needs Credit? Poverty and Finance in Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press, 1997), p. 253.

37. D. Hulme and P. Mosley, Finance Against Poverty, vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 130.

38. In Wood and Sharif, note 36, p. 253. 39. Morduch, note 23, pp. 6-7. 40. Evans et al., note 35, p. 420. 41. Hulme and Mosley, note 37, p. 130. 42. Shariff, in N. Banerjee, Role of Microcredit in Capacity Development for

Poverty Alleviation: Case Study from the Non-Government Sector of Bangladesh, Report for Canadian Partnership Branch, Canadian International Devel- opment Agency (Ottawa, 1999).

43. Banerjee, note 42. 44. Evans et al., note 35, pp. 426-427. 45. In Wood and Sharif, note 38, pp. 253-257. 46. I. Matin and D. Hulme, "Programs for the Poorest: Learning from

IGVGD Program in Bangladesh," World Development 31, no. 3 (2003): 647-665.

47. S. Amin and A. P. Pebley, "Gender Inequality Within Households: The Impact of a Women's Development Program in Thirty-six Bangladeshi Villages," Bangladesh Development Studies 22, nos. 2-3 (1994): 123.




48. S. M. Hashemi, S. R. Schüler, and A. P. Riley, "Rural Credit Pro- gramme and Women's Empowerment in Bangladesh," World Development 24, no. 4 (1996) 636.

49. Hulme and Mosley, note 20, p. 166. 50. D. S. Gibbons, The Grameen Reader (Dhaka: Grameen Bank, 1995),

pp. 47-48. 51. A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1999), pp. 189-203. 52. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley, note 48, pp. 643-646, 649. 53. Amin and Pebley, note 47, pp. 142-145. 54. S. R. Khandker and M. M. Pitt, "Household and Intrahousehold

Impact of the Grameen Bank and Similar Targeted Credit Programmes in Bangladesh," World Bank Discussion Papers 320 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), pp. 41-43.

55. In N. Kabeer, "Conflicts over Credit: Re-Evaluating the Empower- ment Potential of Loans to Women in Rural Bangladesh," World Develop- ment 29, no. 1 (2001): 65.

56. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley, note 48, p. 641. 57. S. R. Schüler, S. M. Hashemi, A. P. Riley, and S. Akhter, "Credit

Programme, Patriarchy, and Men's Violence Against Women in Rural Bangladesh," Social Science and Medicine 43, no. 12 (1996): 1729-1742.

58. Amin and Pebley, note 47, pp. 133, 142-146. 59. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley, note 48, pp. 638, 641, 649. 60. Hulme and Mosley, note 37, p. 125. 61. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley, note 48, pp. 648-649. 62. Amin and Pebley, note 47, pp. 144-146. 63. Khandker, note 14, p. 3. 64. Amin and Pebley, note 47, pp. 121-146. 65. Yunus, note 34. In the "five star" grading system, a branch can win

a star for a particular accomplishment, such as when the children of all borrowers are in school or have completed at least primary school.

66. M. D. Hossain and M.. Kabir, "Does Micro Credit Programme in Rural Bangladesh Have Any Impact on Reproductive Behaviour of Poor Rural Women?" Genus 55, nos. 3-4 (1999): 120-126.

67. S. R. Khandker and M. A. Latif, "The Role of Family Planning and Targeted Credit Programmes in Demographic Change in Bangladesh," World Bank Discussion Papers 337, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1996, pp. 6-16.

68. A. M. Goetz and R. Sen Gupta, "Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programme in Bangla- desh," World Development 24, no. 1 (1996): 48-56, 60-62; R. I. Rahman, Impact of the Grameen Bank on the Situation of Poor Rural Women (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 1986); S. White, Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation: Bangladesh Country Study (London: ODI, 1991); B. Ackerly, "Testing Tools of Development: Credit Programmes, Loan Involvement, and Women's Empowerment," IDS Bul- letin: Getting Institutions Right for Women in Development 26, no. 3 (1995): 56-68. TMSS is an NGO for women in Bangladesh. RD-12 stands for the government's Rural Credit Programme.

69. Hulme and Mosley, note 20, pp. 166-173. 70. Rahman, note 3. 71. Kabeer, note 55, pp. 65-68. 72. Zaman, note 12, pp. 7-8.




73. Hashemi, Schüler, and Riley, note 48, p. 648. 74. S. Mahmud, "Actually How Empowering Is Microcredit?" Develop-

ment and Change 34, no. 4 (2003): 577-605. 75. R. I. Rahman, Poverty Alleviation and Empowerment Through Microfi-

nance: Two Decades of Experience in Bangladesh (Dhaka: Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies, 2000).

76. Ibid. 77. S. R. Khandker, B. Khalily, and Z. Khan, "Sustainability of a Gov-

ernment Targeted Credit Programme: Evidence from Bangladesh," World Bank Discussion Papers 316, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1995, pp. 77-79.

78. S. R. Khandker and B. Khalily, "The Bangladesh Rural Advance- ment Committee's Credit Programme: Performance and Sustainability," World Bank Discussion Papers 324, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1996, pp. 84-85.

79. Rahman, note 75. 80. S. M. Hashimi and S. R. Schüler, State and NGO Support Networks in

Rural Bangladesh: Conflicts and Coalitions for Control (Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, 1992), pp. 2-4.

81. Ibid., p. 9. 82. "The Other Government in Bangladesh, Opinion," Economist 30,

no. 12 (2000), on-line: www.economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_ID= 169223.

83. Wahid and Hsu, note 15, pp. 166-167. 84. Khandker and Khalily, note 78, p. 93. 85. M. Berger, "Giving Women Credit: The Strengths and Limitations

of Credit as a Tool for Alleviating Poverty," World Development 17, no. 7 (1989): 1028-1029.

86. Hashimi and Schüler, note 80, pp. 9-11. 87. In this election, some politicians promised to let off the repay-

ment of BRAC loans in exchange for votes. It took a while to convince the members that BRAC had nothing to do with those politicians and that everybody had to continue repaying their loans. See D. Hulme and P. Mosley, note 20, p. 164.

88. M. Yunus, "Best Practices. Empowering Women, Microcredit Sum- mit +5" (November 2003), on-line: www.microcreditsummit.org/newsletter/ best5.



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