SECURITY K ANSWERS –INDEXSecurity K Answers –Index..............................................................................................................1Realism Inevitable...........................................................................................................................2Realism Inevitable...........................................................................................................................3Realism Inevitable- Elites................................................................................................................4Realism Good................................................................................................................................... 5Realism Good- War..........................................................................................................................6Perm................................................................................................................................................ 7State good........................................................................................................................................ 8Securitization good..........................................................................................................................9Securitization Good.......................................................................................................................10Securitization Good.......................................................................................................................11Securitization Good.......................................................................................................................12Reps Bad........................................................................................................................................13Reps Bad........................................................................................................................................14Alt Fails.........................................................................................................................................16Alt Fails.........................................................................................................................................17Securitization fails.........................................................................................................................18

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REALISM INEVITABLERealism is inevitable.John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Pages 1-3

Alas, the claim that security competition and war between the great powers have been purged from the international system is wrong. Indeed, there is much evidence that the promise of everlasting peace among the great powers was stillborn. Consider, for example, that even though the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States still maintains about one hundred thousand troops in Europe and roughly the same number in Northeast Asia. It does so because it recognizes that dangerous rivalries would probably emerge among the major powers in these regions if U.S. troops were withdrawn. Moreover, almost every European state, including the United Kingdom and France, still harbors deep-seated, albeit muted, fears that a Germany unchecked by American power might behave aggressively; fear of Japan in Northeast Asia is probably even more profound, and it is certainly more frequently expressed. Finally, the possibility of a clash between China and the United States over Taiwan is hardly remote. This is not to say that such a war is likely, but the possibility reminds us that the threat of great-power war has not disappeared. The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous business, and it is likely to remain that way. Although the intensity of their competition waxes and wanes, great powers fear each other and always compete with each other for power. The overriding goal of each state is to maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other states. But great powers do not merely strive to be the strongest of all the great powers, although that is a welcome outcome. Their ultimate aim is to be the hegemon—that is, the only great power in the system. There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power; on the contrary, they face a constant incentive to change it in their favor. They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at a reasonable price.3 At times, the costs and risks of trying to shift the balance of power are too great, forcing great powers to wait for more favorable circumstances. But the desire for more power does not go away, unless a state achieves the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since no state is likely to achieve global hegemonyh, however, the world is condemned to perpetual great-power competition. This unrelenting pursuit of power means that great powers are inclined to look for opportunities to alter the distribution of world power in their favor. They will seize these opportunities if they have the necessary capability. Simply pill, great powers are primed for offense. But not only does 1 1.reai power seek to gain power at the expense of other states, it also rlcs 10 thwart rivals bent on gaining power at its expense. Thus, a great power will defend the balance of power when looming change favors another state, and it will try to undermine the balance when the direction of change is in its own favor. Why do great powers behave this way? My answer is that the structure of the international system forces states which seek only to he secure nonetheless to act aggressively toward each other, Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other slates’ intentions. Given this fear—which can never be wholly eliminated—states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival. Indeed, the best guarantee of survival is to be a hegemon, because no other state can seriously threaten such a mighty power.

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REALISM INEVITABLEAttempts to create peace outside of the realist system are misguided – states will always act in their best interest.John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Page 17-18

In contrast to liberals, realists are pessimists when it comes to international politics. Realists agree that creating a peaceful world would be desirable, but they see no easy way to escape the harsh world of security competition and war. Creating a peaceful world is surely an attractive idea, but it isn’t a practical one. “Realism,” as Carr notes, “tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in accepting, and adapting oneself to these forces and these tendencies.”26 This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause hue deadliest wars. Second, realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all slates must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend mint to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government.27 It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size.28 Third, realists hold that calculations about power dominate states’ thinking, and that states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war, which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist, war is a continuation of politics by other means.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.

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REALISM INEVITABLE- ELITESThe critique can’t solve – elites will always make calculations based on powerJohn Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Page 25

Because Americans dislike realpolitik, public discourse about foreign policy in the United States is usually couched in the language of liberalism. Hence the pronouncements of the policy elites are heavily flavored with optimism and moralism. American academics are especially good at promoting liberal thinking in the marketplace of ideas. Behind closed doors, however, the elites who make national security policy speak the language of power, not that of principle, and the United States acts in the international system according to the dictates of realist logic. In essence, a discernable gap separates public rhetoric from the actual conduct of American foreign policy.

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REALISM GOODRealism is capable of making accurate predictions.John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Pages 7-8

Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit, I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

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REALISM GOOD- WARA departure from realism leads to great power war.John Mearsheimer, Professor at University of Chicago, 2001The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Page 32

The possible consequences of falling victim to aggression further amplify the importance of fear as a motivating force in world politics. Great powers do not compete with each other as if international politics were merely an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more dangerous business than mere economic intercourse; the former can read to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield as well a5 mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the destruction of states. The horrible consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies. Political antagonism, in short, tends to be intense, because the stakes are great. States in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival. Because other states are potential threats, and because there is no higher authority to come to their rescue when they dial 911, states can’ t just depend on others for their own security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances.” But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience: today’s alliance partner might be tomorrow’s enemy, and today’s enemy might be tomorrow’s alliance partner. For example, the United States fought with China and the Soviet Union against Germany and Japan in World War II, but soon thereafter flip-flopped enemies and partners and allied with West Germany and Japan against China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

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PERMPerm – do both. We can still do the plan and maintain a critical eye, allowing us to rethink securitization.Murray-Professor of Politics at the University of Wales-1997 (Alastair J.H., “Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics”, p. 193-196)

For realism, man remains, in the final analysis, limited by himself. As such, it emphasizes caution, and focuses not merely upon the achievement of long-term objectives, but also upon the resolution of more immediate difficulties. Given that, in the absence of a resolution of such difficulties, longer-term objectives are liable to be unachievable, realism would seem to offer a more effective strategy of transition than reflectivism itself. Whereas, in constructivism, such strategies are divorced from the current realities of international politics altogether, realism’s emphasis on first addressing the immediate obstacles to development ensures that it at least generates strategies which offer us a tangible path to follow. If these strategies perhaps lack the visionary appeal of reflectivist proposals, emphasizing simply the necessity of a restrained, moderate diplomacy in order to ameliorate conflicts between states, to foster a degree of mutual understanding in international relations, and, ultimately, to develop a sense of community which might underlie a more comprehensive international society, they at least seek to take advantage of the possibilities of reform in the current international system without jeopardizing the possibilities of order. Realism’s gradualist reformism, the careful tending of what it regards as an essentially organic process, ultimately suggests the basis for a more sustainable strategy for reform than reflectivist perspectives, however dramatic, can offer. For the realist, then, if rationalist theories prove so conservative as to make their adoption problematic, critical theories prove so progressive as to make their adoption unattractive. If the former can justifiably be criticized for seeking to make a far from ideal order work more efficiently, thus perpetuating its existence and legitimating its errors, reflectivist theory can equally be criticized for searching for a tomorrow which may never exist, thereby endangering the possibility of establishing any form of stable order in the here and now. Realism’s distinctive contribution thus lies in its attempt to drive a path between the two, a path which, in the process, suggests the basis on which some form of synthesis between rationalism and reflectivism might be achieved. Oriented in its genesis towards addressing the shortcomings in an idealist transformatory project, it is centrally motivated by concern to reconcile vision with practicality, to relate utopia and reality. Unifying technical and a practical stance, it combines aspects of the positivist methodology employed by problem-solving theory with the interpretative stance adopted by critical theory, avoiding the monism of perspective which leads to the self-destructive conflict between the two. Ultimately, it can simultaneously acknowledge the possibility of change in the structure of the international system and the need to probe the limits of the possible, and yet also question the proximity of any international transformation, emphasize the persistence of problems after such a transformation, and serve as a reminder of the need to grasp whatever semblance of order can be obtained in the mean time. Indeed, it is possible to say that realism is uniquely suited to serve as such an orientation. Simultaneously to critique contemporary resolutions of the problem of political authority as unsatisfactory and yet to support them as an attainable measure of order in an unstable world involves one in a contradiction which is difficult to accept. Yet, because it grasps the essential ambiguity of the political, and adopts imperfectionism as its dominant motif, realism can relate these two tasks in a way which allows neither to predominate, achieving, if not a reconciliation, that at least a viable synthesis. Perhaps the most famous realist refrain is that all politics are power politics. It is the all that is important here. Realism lays claim to a relevance across systems, and because it relies on a conception of human nature, rather than a historically specific structure of world politics, it can make good on this claim. If its observations about human nature are even remotely accurate, the problems that it addresses will transcend contingent formulations of the problem of political order. Even in a genuine cosmopolis, conflict might become technical, but it would not be eliminated altogether.67 The primary manifestations of power might become more economic or institutional rather than (para) military but, where disagreements occur and power exists, the employment of the one to ensure the satisfactory

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resolution of the other is inevitable short of a wholesale transformation of human behaviour. Power is ultimately of the essence of politics; it is not something which can be banished, only tamed and restrained. As a result, realism achieves a universal relevance to the problem of political action which allows it to relate the reformist zeal of critical theory, without which advance would be impossible, with the problem-solver’s sensible caution that, before reform is attempted, whatever measure of security is possible under contemporary conditions must first be ensured.

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STATE GOODSecurity is inevitable, relying on the state is key to stopping multiple scenarios of violenceCilliers – South African Political Scientist – 2004 (Jakkie, “Human Security in Africa – A conceptual framework for review” African Human Security Initiative < http://www.africanreview.org/docs/humsecjun04.pdf>)

If human development is freedom from want (a process widening the range of people’s choices), human security can be understood as the ability to pursue those choices in a safe environment and on an equal basis with others. Seen the other way around, human development contributes to human security by tackling the long-term structural causes of conflict and by strengthening the capability of societies to deal with conflict in a peaceful manner.20 For the purposes of this project, the concept of human security therefore includes an obligation on the state to provide a facilitating environment for equality and individual participation through democracy, adherence to human rights and the participation of civil society. The state can only do so if it is responsive to its citizenry and is efficient – implying that it is not structurally or intrinsically corrupt. An approach predicated upon the provision of a secure environment also implies a commitment to conflict resolution and peacekeeping, control of the means of violence (small arms), controlling organised crime and, in the post-9/11 context, combating terrorism.

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SECURITIZATION GOODEmpirically, securitization politicizes issues – this is essential to solve problems. Ivarsson- Head of Department of Political Science: Peace and Conflict Studies at Lund Univerity- 2006 (Niclas, Health and Security: HIV/AIDS in Post-Apartheid South Africa, p.9-10, http://theses.lub.lu.se/archive/2007/05/30/1180512652-29760-128/Uppsatsen.PDF)

Budgets are always limited and the competition for funds is tough between different sectors. Issues that are securitized are obviously in a better position to receive adequate funding than nonsecuritized issues. An example is South Africa that in 2001 spent $4 billion on rearmament at a time when there is no present military threat to South Africa and at the same time saying that it lacks resources to expand its HIV/AIDS programmes (Heywood 2004 p 30). In the same spirit Prins emphasizes that securitizing an issue is the same as playing the trump card of priority but also that over the last two decades an “uneasy relationship between the claim that an issue is important and the claim that it is a ‘security issue’” has emerged (Prins 2004 p 939f). In many African states the ministries of health are usually the most under funded ministries with very little political clout. Securitizing lifts issues like HIV/AIDS from these ministries to higher levels in the government with substantially more clout. Pharmaceutical patents are also possible to override if the patents are seen as threats to national security. The World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) that bars countries from producing or importing cheaper made medicine has an article that allows for breaking the agreement if it is for protecting essential security interests. No dispute has yet occurred under this article 73 but voices are raised within the WTO and the UN to change that. India has lobbied in the Security Council for having AIDS declared as a threat to international peace and security, which is something that will be necessary for invoking article 73 (Elbe 2006 p 131ff). Securitization also has the benefit of giving attention to an issue. This can lead to increased international aid and most importantly alerting governments in concerned countries. Elbe quotes de Waal about African governments: “that [they] act when they perceive real threats to their power.” (Elbe 2006 p 134). Securitization can in other words provoke governments to respond. Highlighting the implications of HIV in the armed forces has proved to be a trigger for placing HIV/AIDS on the political agenda. When that is done it is much harder for politicians to deny the implications of HIV/AIDS on the rest of the society (Elbe 2006 p 135).

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SECURITIZATION GOODSecuritization is key to hege.

Kelstrup—Writer and editor for Sage Publications—2004(Morten, “Globalisation and Societal Insecurity”,Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, pg.115)

This strategy is, it seems, challenged by a new, power-based strategy of dominance based on a global securitisation. Of course, a strategy of power and power projection is not entirely new, but it – and in particular its legitimation – is being reinforced through the securitisation of the globalisation of the threat from terrorism. The new strategy might be viewed as the action which a superpower might undertake relatively unrestricted by existing international law, but – because, through securitisation, it involves legitimation – it is also a project for the reformulation of legitimising norms and rules in the global system. It is clear that the USA, as the only superpower, has the possibility of disregarding the rather weak elements of existing international law and acting unilaterally. Much in the USA's attitude towards the UN system indicates that the USA does not support the traditional strategy for global governance, but aims at establishing an alternative. The USA's attitude towards international agreements and its withdrawal of its signature on the agreement on the UN Tribunal on Crime in The Hague is a rather clear manifestation of this. The problem for such a new power-based strategy, which at least partly rests on USA unilateralism, is not only whether the USA has the capacity to act, but also how it might be possible for the USA to get its policy accepted from others, i.e. to give it legitimation. In this, securitisation plays an important role. Securitisation might change a basically unilateral strate into a much broader and more legitimate power project. Through securitisation it might be possible to generate support for a strategy for global governance led by the only superpower in defence of 'humanity' or 'civilisation'. The interpretation suggested here is that securitisation and the 'waron terror' is part of such a strategy.

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SECURITIZATION GOODThe need for security is an endless pursuit, either we must master it or it will master usMichael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at the University of Lancaster, 1996 ["Security, philosophy and politics", Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought, Routledge] p. 19-20

Hence, just as political thought has its inception in metaphysics, so metaphysics has its inception in the polls. Each - metaphysics and traditional political thought - is an enterprise concerned with securing foundations because each has its inception in a question - whose Leibnizian formulation is: 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' - which imbues it with an endless security imperative. To pose our puzzlement about existence, and our desire for the truth of it, this way requires that it be shown how something is wrested from nothing and is prevented somehow against falling back into nothingness. In other words. it requires us to discover how secure (certain) things are - what secures them and how they can be secured - so that we can confidently take them to be the very things that we take them to be; or resolve disputes between us in respect of what they really are. A ground is sought that will explain the emergence of some-thing, allow us to judge exactly what it is, and measure the inevitable variation in its appearance against how that ground tells us it 'really' is. And, of course, if this is done, if we can securely determine how something is something rather than nothing, then we have mastered it. Naturally, the reverse also applies. We are driven to mastery of the world because of the way that we have expressed puzzlement about it, and comported ourselves towards it in search of a certain kind of truth about it, and each other within it. This is what directs us to make the world secure. If this is our question - the question in fact that makes us the 'we' of the 'West' - then we must secure security.

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SECURITIZATION GOODThe need for security is an endless pursuit, either we must master it or it will master usMichael Dillon, Professor of International Relations at the University of Lancaster, 1996 ["Security, philosophy and politics", Politics of Security: Towards a political philosophy of continental thought, Routledge] p. 19-20

Hence, just as political thought has its inception in metaphysics, so metaphysics has its inception in the polls. Each - metaphysics and traditional political thought - is an enterprise concerned with securing foundations because each has its inception in a question - whose Leibnizian formulation is: 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' - which imbues it with an endless security imperative. To pose our puzzlement about existence, and our desire for the truth of it, this way requires that it be shown how something is wrested from nothing and is prevented somehow against falling back into nothingness. In other words. it requires us to discover how secure (certain) things are - what secures them and how they can be secured - so that we can confidently take them to be the very things that we take them to be; or resolve disputes between us in respect of what they really are. A ground is sought that will explain the emergence of some-thing, allow us to judge exactly what it is, and measure the inevitable variation in its appearance against how that ground tells us it 'really' is. And, of course, if this is done, if we can securely determine how something is something rather than nothing, then we have mastered it. Naturally, the reverse also applies. We are driven to mastery of the world because of the way that we have expressed puzzlement about it, and comported ourselves towards it in search of a certain kind of truth about it, and each other within it. This is what directs us to make the world secure. If this is our question - the question in fact that makes us the 'we' of the 'West' - then we must secure security.

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REPS BADRepresentations arguments destroy effective political action – only by embracing modernist truth claims can we avoid relativism and establish a coherent understanding of the world.Jarvis, 2000 [DSL, lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations, Faculty of Economics, Politics and Business at the University of Sydney, Australia, ‘International Relations and the Challenge of Post Modernism, University of South Carolina Press, pg 189-190]

First, the project of subversive-deconstructive postmodernism can be seen as contrary to the discipline of International Relations as a social science, designed not so much to generate knowledge as to disparage knowledge spawned through Enlightenment thinking and the precepts of rationality and science. At its most elemental, it is a project of disruption and an attack upon the "complacency" of knowledge generated in modernist quarters. Not that this is all bad. There is much good to come from a shakeup of the academy, from a reexamination of our ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations and from the types of practices that ensue from certain modes of conceptualization and analysis. Pointing out silences and omissions from the dominant discourse is always fruitful and necessary, but, arguably, also accomplished under theories and paradigms and from critical quarters that are not necessarily postmodern and which do not seek to "undo all knowledge simply on the basis of imperfection. Modernist discourse is not unreflective, can make autonomous corrections, engage in revisionist history, identify injustices, crimes of exclusion, and extend representation to groups that were otherwise not previously represented (think of liberalism or socialism for example!). This, after all, is why we understand modernity to be progressive and history a forward-moving narrative that is self-effusive. More importantly, given the self-defeating contradictions endemic to subversive-deconstructive postmodernism, especially its specious relativism, it requires no great mind to postulate that the use of modernist/rationalist/Enlightenment discourse will better make the case for a progressive politics of ever greater inclusion, representation, and justice for all than will sloganistic calls for us to "think otherwise." The simple and myopic assumption that social change can be engineered through linguistic policing of politically incorrect words, concepts and opinions, is surely one of the more politically lame (idealist) suggestions to come from armchair theorists in the last fifty years. By the same token, the suggestion that we engage in revisionism of the sort that would "undo" modernist knowledge so that we might start again free of silences, oppressions, and inequalities also smacks of an intelligentsia so idealist as to be unconnected to the world in which they live. The critical skills of subversive postmodernists, constrained perhaps by the success of the West, of Western capitalism, if not liberal democracy, as the legitimate form of representation, and having tried unsuccessfully through revolution and political uprising to dethrone it previously, have turned to the citadel of our communal identities and attacked not parliaments, nor forms of social-political-economic organization, but language, communication, and the basis of Enlightenment knowledge that otherwise enables us to live, work, and communicate as social beings. Clever though this is, it is not in the end compatible with the project of theory knowledge and takes us further away from an understanding of our world. Its greatest contribution is to celebrate the loss of certainty, where, argues John O'Neill, "men (sic) are no longer sure of their ruling knowledge and are unable to mobilize sufficient legitimation for the master-narratives of truth and justice." To suppose, however, that we should rejoice collectively at the prospects of a specious relativism and a multifarious perspectivism, and that absent any further constructive endeavor, the great questions and problems of our time will be answered or solved by this speaks of an intellectual poverty now famed perversely as the search for "thinking space."

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REPS BADRecognizing international relations is socially constructed is useless—changing representational practices doesn’t alter the material reality of state practices or help create better policy for the oppressed

Jarvis 00 [DSL, lecturer in the Department of Government and International Relations, Faculty of Economics, Politics and Business at the University of Sydney, Australia, ‘International Relations and the Challenge of Post Modernism, University of South Carolina Press, pg 128-30]

Perhaps more alarming though is the outright violence Ashley recom-mends in response to what at best seem trite, if not imagined, injustices. Inculpating modernity, positivism, technical rationality, or realism with violence, racism, war, and countless other crimes not only smacks of anthropomorphism but, as demonstrated by Ashley's torturous prose and reasoning, requires a dubious logic to malce such connections in the first place. Are we really to believe that ethereal entities like positivism, mod-ernism, or realism emanate a "violence" that marginalizes dissidents? Indeed, where is this violence, repression, and marginalization? As self- professed dissidents supposedly exiled from the discipline, Ashley and Walker appear remarkably well integrated into the academy-vocal, pub-lished, and at the center of the Third Debate and the forefront of theo-retical research. Likewise, is Ashley seriously suggesting that, on the basis of this largely imagined violence, global transformation (perhaps even rev-olutionary violence) is a necessary, let alone desirable, response? Has the rationale for emancipation or the fight for justice been reduced to such vacuous revolutionary slogans as "Down with positivism and rationality"? The point is surely trite. Apart from members of the academy, who has heard of positivism and who for a moment imagines that they need to be emancipated from it, or from modernity, rationality, or realism for that matter? In an era of unprecedented change and turmoil, of new political and military configurations, of war in the Balkans and ethnic cleansing, is Ashley really suggesting that some of the greatest threats facing humankind or some of the great moments of history rest on such innocu-ous and largely unknown nonrealities like positivism and realism? These are imagined and fictitious enemies, theoretical fabrications that represent arcane, self-serving debates superfluous to the lives of most people and, arguably, to most issues of importance in international relations. More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflects our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating the-ory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our lmowledge.37 But to suppose that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggles as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and des-titute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the emigres of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to suppose that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary-or is in some way bad-is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, "So what?" To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judged pertinent, relevant, help-ful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholasti-cally excited by abstract and recondite debate.38 Contrary to Ashley's assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than ana-lyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render an intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight

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of those who struggle at marginal places. If the relevance of Ashley's project is questionable, so too is its logic and cogency. First, we might ask to what extent the postmodern "empha-sis on the textual, constructed nature of the world" represents "an unwar-ranted extension of approaches appropriate for literature to other areas of human practice that are more constrained by an objective reality. "39 All theory is socially constructed and realities like the nation-state, domestic and international politics, regimes, or transnational agencies are obviously social fabrications. But to what extent is this observation of any real use?Just because we acknowledge that the state is a socially fabricated entity, or that the division between domestic and international society is arbitrar-ily inscribed does not make the reality of the state disappear or render invisible international politics. Whether socially constructed or objectively given, the argument over the ontological status of the state is of no particular moment. Does this change our experience of the state or somehow diminish the political-economic-juridical-military functions of the state? To recognize that states are not naturally inscribed but dynamic entities continually in the process of being made and reimposed and are therefore culturally dissimilar, economically different, and politically atypical, while perspicacious to our historical and theoretical understanding of the state, in no way detracts from its reality, practices, and consequences. Similarly, few would object to Ashley's hermeneutic interpretivist understanding of the international sphere as an artificially inscribed demarcation. But, to paraphrase Holsti again, so what? This does not malce its effects any less real, diminish its importance in our lives, or excuse us from paying serious attention to it. That international politics and states would not exist with-out subjectivities is a banal tautology. The point, surely, is to move beyond this and study these processes. Thus, while intellectually interesting, con-structivist theory is not an end point as Ashley seems to think, where we all throw up our hands and announce there are no foundations and all real-ity is an arbitrary social construction. Rather, it should be a means of rec-ognizing the structurated nature of our being and the reciprocity between subjects and structures through history. Ashley, however, seems not to want to do this, but only to deconstruct the state, international politics, and international theory on the basis that none of these is objectively given but fictitious entities that arise out of modernist practices of representa-tion. While an interesting theoretical enterprise, it is of no great conse- quence to the study of international politics. Indeed, structuration theory has long talcen care of these ontological dilemmas that otherwise seem to preoccupy Ashley.40

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ALT FAILSThe alt fails – it relies on Western security discourse.Mercer et al – Lecturer in Geography at the University of Leicester – 2003 (Claire, Giles Mohan - Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at The Open University, Marcus Power - Lecturer in the Department of Geography at the University of Durham, “Towards a critical political geography of African development” Geoffrum. Volume 34, Issue 4. Pg. 422. Accessed Online at Science Direct)

Thus in one sense the post-colonial refers partly to a generation of intellectuals and to the coherence of an epoch rather than a particular ‘theory’ ([Pieterse, 2001]). This is nonetheless a particularly important generation of scholars whose work does have a direct relevance to the theory and practice of development today. The question is, how do we combine the important cultural focus of post-colonial studies with the economic focus of the study of development ( [Schech and Haggis, 2000])? This is not an easy task since post-colonial studies are premised on a critique of western and Eurocentric models such as those generated in the name of ‘development’. Additionally, it is worth remembering that even progressive agendas focused on ‘decolonising’ development draw upon ‘western’ discourses in order to articulate a vision of alternatives. This complexity is further compounded by the fact that post-colonial studies and development studies are rarely seen as interconnected fields: Two giant islands of analysis and enterprise stake out a large part of the world and operate within it––or with respect to it––as if the other had a bad smell. ([Sylvester, 1999])

The critic itself securitizesJef Huysmans, Lecturer in Politics, Department of Government, Open University, January 2002. ALTERNATIVES, p. np.

Social-constructivist authors face a normative dilemma that is central to their research project. They are sensitive to how security "talk" about migration can contribute to its securitization (7)--that is, it can render migration problematic from a security perspective. They may point out how criminological research establishes a relationship between crime and immigration; for example, by looking for a correlation between Turkish immigrants and trade in heroin, they establish a discursive link, irrespective of whether the correlation is confirmed or not. The discursive link is thus embedded in the very setup of the research; in other words, from the very beginning the research embodies an assumption, often already politicized, that a particular group of aliens may have a special relationship to crime. (8) This observation is of course not a dilemma as such: it becomes a dilemma for social-constructivist authors only when they realize that this interpretation feeds back into their own research. They also pro duce security knowledge that therefore could as such be securitizing. If an author values a securitization of migration negatively, she faces the question of how to talk or write about the securitization of migration without contributing to a further securitization by the very production of this knowledge. The normative dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs, and so forth. (9)

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ALT FAILSThe critic alternative reproduces the worst dangers of securitization.Jef Huysmans, Lecturer in Politics, Department of Government, Open University, January 2002. ALTERNATIVES, p. np.To summarize, the normative dilemma of social constructivism rests on the understanding that the effect of the communication depends on a socially constructed formation of rules, which constrains the author in what can be said and how it will be received while the author depends on security language ruled by the formation if he or she wants to transform a securitization of a particular area from within security studies. In other words, the desire to transform always risks further securitizing an area because the security formation simultaneously constrains and empowers the authors to make serious security statements. Social-constructivist authors who are critical of a particular securitization such as migration are thus caught by the question: "How can I interpret security problems in the societal area in such a fashion that I reduce the risk of repeating the very securitization of the area?"

The Alternative fails and ultimately keeps security intactPhillip Darby, Professor of Political Science at the University of Melbourne and Director of the Institute on Postcolonial Studies, October, 2006Alternatives, Volume 31, Issue 4: Security, Spatiality, and Social Suffering, GaleGroup

Our starting point must be that security and insecurity are inextricably linked: The two are mutually constituted. As Michael Dillon puts it, “we have to think security and insecurity together.”25 The tradition of thought, however, is otherwise. In the practice of states and in the evolution of strategic doctrine, security takes on a life of its own. In the disciplinary domains of IR and security studies, the situation has not been much better. Particular constituencies, it is true, have broached issues relating to insecurity— conflict resolution theorists, feminists, critical-security studies advocates, and those at the margins influenced by anthropology and social theory. Their influence on mainstream discourses, however, has been very limited. Late in the Cold War, when public disquiet in Europe over nuclear weaponry threatened the strategic game-plan, the distinguished military historian, Michael Howard, ventured the proposition that deterrence must be accompanied by reassurance.26At the time this was seen as something of a breakthrough, but it cannot be said to have left a lasting imprint on security discourse, much less to have spawned broader rethinking. For one thing, the concern with ordinary people cut across the grain. For another, insecurity tended to be subsumed under instability, enabling established security imperatives to remain intact. The commitment to securing international order from the “top down” and primarily by increasing military capabilities was too entrenched for alternative ideas to make much headway.

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SECURITIZATION FAILSSECURITIZATION DOES NOT LEAD TO VIOLENCE—THE KRITIK OVERSIMPLIFIESRichard Jones, Director of Institute of Welsh Politics at the University of Wales, 1999. SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND CRITICAL THEORY, p. 110.

But the notion that the implications of securitization–the meaning of security–are fixed can be challenged at both the empirical level and at the level of the theory of language. Empirically, there can be no doubt that the theory and practice of traditional security have come under unprecedented scrutiny over the past twenty or so years. In particular, notions of “common security” have been advanced based on the argument that there can be no long-term resolution of threats through unilateral, militarized, zero-sum action. Rather, it is only a holistic and empathetic approach to security that can hope to ameliorate threats (the emergence of such an approach can be traced through the following independent, international commissions: the Commission on International Development Issues [1980]; the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues [1982]; the Commission on Global Governance [1995]). Moreover, the experience of the end of the Cold War demonstrates that such a conception of security can become influential (a point returned to and developed further in Chapter 6). This suggests that contrary to the opinions of Wæver or indeed Deudney, the meaning of security is not necessarily fixed but is open to argumentation and dispute.

SECURITIZATION DOES NOT ALWAYS VALIDATE MILITARISTIC RESPONSERichard Jones, Director of Institute of Welsh Politics at the University of Wales, 1999. SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND CRITICAL THEORY, p. 111.

Understood in Habermasian terms, the speech act of security cannot simply be narrowed by prior definition to exclude all threats other than those that are military in nature–rather, the breadth of the concept is subject to debate. Similarly, the meaning–the implications–of securitizing a particular issue cannot be regarded as fixed. However, I am not arguing that it is easy to challenge the traditions that are attached to a particular concept. Simply to talk about something differently does not necessarily lead to different forms of behavior: Practice cannot simply be reduced to theory. But argumentation and disputation can have– and have had–profound effects even on the practice of security (a theme pursued in Chapter 6). When anchored in Habermasian pragmatics, the speech act approach to security supports arguments for broadening the understanding of the concept and certainly undermines attempts at closure as a result of prior definition rather than argumentation and discussion. More generally, the focus on how arguments concerning truth, rightness, and sincerity are brought into play by security discourse provides powerful theoretical support for the project of critical security studies.

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