20005914.pdf

7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

1/12

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Religious Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

God and the TaoAuthor(s): George D. Chryssides

Source: Religious Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Mar. 1983), pp. 1-11Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20005914Accessed: 15-01-2016 08:43 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Fri, 15 Jan 2016 08:43:24 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/publisher/cuphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20005914http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/20005914http://www.jstor.org/publisher/cuphttp://www.jstor.org/

7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

2/12

Rel. Stud.

I9,

pp.

i-I

I

GEORGE

D.

CHRYSSIDES

SeniorLecturer nPhilosophy, lymouth olytechnic

GOD AND THE

TAO

In

his

highly important

work

I and

Thou

Martin Buber

speaks

of God

as

the

'Eternal Thou',

'who

can only

be

addressed,

not asserted'.'

Buber

might

therefore aptly

be

described

as an

'anti-theologian':

one

may legitimately

enter into a relationship with God, which is the appropriate response, but

any attempt to

theorize

about

God is not

simply

irreverent

or

excessively

academic,

but

a

genuine impossibility.

At

best,

statements about

God

can

only be understood 'allegorically'.2

The position

that the

Eternal

is

inexpressible

is

by

no means confined

to

theJudaeo-Christian

tradition,

whose support

has been

less than unanimous.

More notably,

the notion

forms

the basis of the

religious

tradition

known

as

Taoism.

In Lao

Tzu's

classic

text,

the Tao Te

Ching,

the

opening

words

read:

The way that can be spoken of

Is

not the

constant

way;

The name that

can

be

named

Is not the constant name.3

In

so far

as

anything

can

be said

about

the Tao

at

all,

the Tao is regarded

as

the

source of the universe

and

the natural order

which flows through it.

One's

spiritual goal

is

seen

as atunement

to

the

natural

harmony

of nature,

a return to the

Tao

by

the

recognition

that one's consciousness

is the Tao,

that one cannot avoid flowing along with it, and cannot deviate from it.

It

is possible

that the Tao is simply

an alternative

name for God? Buber

is

certainly

amenable

to the suggestion

that it isnot

necessary to use theword

'

God'

(or

its

conventionally agreed synonyms)

in

order to

address the

Eternal Thou:

'Men

have addressed

their

eternal You

by many names',

we

are

told.4

The fact

that,

in

the

Judaeo-Christian

tradition, God has been

widely

regarded

as a

person,

whereas the Tao is

generally impersonal,

need

not

in

itself

be an

insuperable

barrier,

for-

if

Buber is right

-

descriptions like

'

person'

and

'impersonal'

can

only

at best function as

analogies,

and neither

term can express any literal truth about the Eternal. Not only is this so, but

Buber's

I-Thou relation is not necessarily

a relation

between oneself and

1

Martin

Buber,

I

and

Thou,

transl.

W. Kaufmann

(Edinburgh:

T. & T.

Clark, I970),

p.

I29.

2

Ibid.,

p.

147

3

Lao

Tzu,

Tao Te

Ching,

transl.

D. C. Lau

(Harmondsworth: Penguin, I963),

v.

I.

4

Buber, op. cit., p. I23.

I

RES 19

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

3/12

2

GEORGE

.

CHRYSSIDES

another person:

it

is the quality

of

the relation

which is decisive,

not

the

nature of the

Thou.

Buber's

examples

of I-Thou

relations

include

not only

animals, but human artefacts such as pieces ofmachinery

and objects in

the

natural world

such

as trees

and twigs.

Indeed,

it is possible

on Buber's

account to

deny explicitly

the existence

of God

but

yet

to

experience

the

Eternal Thou:

But whoever

abhors

the name

and fancies

that

he is godless

-

when

he addresses

with

his whole devoted

being

the You

of his life

that cannot

be restricted

by any other,

he addresses God.1

Thus

it follows

that the

self-styled

atheist

may have

the

experience

to

which

Buber is pointing,

and equally,

mutatis

mutandis,

the affirmed

believer

may

not

be

acquainted

with the Eternal Thou.

On

what

grounds

might

it

be argued

that God

and

the Tao are

to

be

identified?

One

fairly

compelling

reason

is that,

if

it is true that

there is

a

Supreme

Principle

which

controls

the

universe,

it seems

implausible

to

suggest

that one religious

tradition,

whether

it be Taoism

or Christianity,

has

sole

access

to

it.

Furthermore,

and

perhaps

this

ismore

philosophically

compelling,

there

is

at

least

a

prima facie

ground

for

claiming

an

identity of

two concepts

when

they

admit

of common

predication,

and this, I believe,

is

the

case

when

we examine

the

concepts

of God

and the Tao as they

feature

in

their respective

religious

traditions.

This

point

can

perhaps

be made

clearer

by

means of

an

analogy.

Suppose

we

are

wondering

whether

Sri

Lanka

and

Ceylon

are

one

and

the

same

place.

How

does

one

decide?

One

obvious

way

of

dealing

with the

matter is

to assess how

many

pieces

of

common

predication

can be made

both of 'Sri Lanka'

and

'Ceylon'.

We

might

therefore

note:

Ceylon

is

an island.

Sri

Lanka

is

an island.

Ceylon

is off

the south-east

coast

of

India.

Sri

Lanka is

off the

south-east

coast

of

India.

Ceylon

is

a

Buddhist

country.

Sri

Lanka

is

a Buddhist

country.

Ceylon

exports

tea.

Sri

Lanka

exports

tea.

Once

sufficient

common

predication

is

established,

it is then reasonable

to

conclude that the terms 'Ceylon' and 'Sri Lanka' do not pick out two

different referents,

but

one.

Can

the

same

kind

of

operation

be

carried

out with

respect

to

God

and

the Tao,

to

ascertain

whether

there

is sufficient

common

predication?

At

the

outset

there

is

an

obvious

problem.

No

common

predication

is

possible

if

no

1

Ibid., p.

124


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

4/12

GOD

ND

HE

AO

3

predication

at all is possible,

and, according

to both

Buber and

Lao

Tzu,

nothing at all

can be predicated

of

either

God

or the Tao

respectively,

since

in both cases we are dealing with the inexpressible. Nevertheless, in both

religious

traditions,

although

it

is, strictly,

true that one

cannot express

the

Eternal

Thou or

the

Tao,

one

can state certain

things

analogously

of each,

and

it is clear

from both traditions

that there is

a range of

expressions

which

is

appropriate

and

a

range

which

is

inappropriate.

Thus,

one

can

say

of

both

God

and the

Tao

that

they

are 'eternal', but

it would

be nonsense

to say

of either

that

they

were,

for

instance, 'hexagonal'

Just

as Buber allows

that

remarks

about

God may

be made

'allegorically',

similarly

one

finds that, in connection

with the Tao,

there

is some

lifting

of

the ban on silence: ifwords cannot express the ultimate source of all things,

neither

can

silence. As Chuang

Tzu

states,

'Neither

speech

nor silence

is

sufficient

to convey

the

notion

of it.Neither

by

speech

nor

by

silence

can

our

thoughts

about

it have

their

highest

expression'.1

Just

as words in

the

religious

traditions

ofJudaism

and

Christianity

are

allegorical,

so, Chuang

Tzu

tells us,

theword

'Tao'

is

itself

a

metaphor.2

When Lao Tzu

writes,

'The

Tao which

can be said

is not the

eternal Tao'

he is implying

that

there

are,

if

one may

put

it so, two Taos

and

not one

-

there

is

one

which

can be

expressed

and

one

which

cannot. The

former gives

us a clue to

the

latter,

the

former

being, as onewriter has put it, 'obscuremore profound than obscurity itself'.3

But

the

unknowable

has

nevertheless

a

mystical

entrance, and language

can

assist by expressing

relative

truth.

Insofar

as the

Tao

can be

expressed

in

words, the descriptions

of the 'Tao

which

can

be said'

are in

many

cases remarkably

close to those

which

are

predicated

of theJudaeo-Christian

God. Above

all else,

the Tao

is described

as

'great'.

As

Lao Tzu writes:

I know

not its

name

So

I

style

it 'the way'.

I

give it the

makeshift

name of

'the

great'.4

Its three

great

names are 'complete',

'all-embracing',

and 'whole'.5

All

things

depend

on the Tao,6

it is unchangeable

and cannot

be stopped.7

This

is not all dissimilar

to

the description

of

God which

is

given,

for example,

in

the

Thirty-Nine

Articles:

There

is

but

one

living

and true God,

everlasting,

without

body, parts,

or passions:

of infinite

power,

wisdom, and goodness;

the

Maker, and

Preserver of

all things

both

visible and invisible.8

I The Writings of Chuang Tzu, Book xxv, Part iII, Sect. iII, para. II; in The Texts of Taoism, Vols. I&

ii, transl. James Legge (New

York:

Dover, I962).

2 Loc. cit.

3 Max Kaltenmark, Lao Tzu and

Taoism

(Stanford University Press, I965),

p.

35.

4

Lao Tzu, op. cit., ch. xxv, v. 56.

5 The Writings of Chuang Tzu, Book xxii, Part ii, Sect. xv, para. 6.

6

Op. cit.,

Book

xxii,

Part

ii, Sect. xv, para. 5.

'

Chuang Tzu, op. cit., Book xxii, Part iI, Sect. xv, para. io; Book xiv, Part ii, Sect. vii, para. 8.

8 Articles of

Religion:

Article

I;

in

The Book

of

Common

Prayer

(London:

Collins,

I968), p.

388.

1-2


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

5/12

4

GEORGE D.

CHRYSSIDES

What

is also

common

to both

religious

traditions, of

course, is that

they

refer to a

Supreme

Principle which

is incapable

of being

named, and

what

is even more striking, the reasons given for the inappropriateness of naming

either

God or the Tao

are

surprisingly

similar. Naming

the

Supreme

Principle would be to

suggest that

one had

control over it,

when in fact

the

Tao controls us,

together

with

the

rest

of

the

universe.

Thus

Kaltenmark

writes:

Neither

tao

nor any other

word in

a

human

language can serve as

a name

(ming)

for the

Supreme

Principle. For

ming is the

personal, intimate

name of the

individual,

the

use of which

was

forbidden to

inferiors, and which

was therefore

taboo,

because

to

know

it and

(especially)

to

pronounce

it was to gain

a hold on the

person

named.

The true name of the Tao must therefore remain unknown - Tao isonly a style (tzu),

a

non-taboo

given name for

public

use.1

This idea is

virtually

identical to

the

prohibition

which

still

exists today

withinJudaism

on the

pronunciation of

the

divine name

'Yahweh',

and there

are

stories

written

in

the

Old

Testament

which

underline the idea

that God

has a

name which

his servants must

not use.

For

example,

in

his

encounter

with

Moses at

the

burning bush,

the

divine

answer to

the

question,

'What

is your name?'

appears

to be

a

deliberately

evasive one: 'I

am

who

I

am

... I

AM

has

sent

me to

you.

'2

At

the ford of the

Jabbok, when God

wrestles with

the patriarch Jacob, Jacob, who reveals his name, is physically

injured,

whereas

God, who refuses

to

do

so, maintains

the

upper hand and is

unable

to

be

controlled.3

The

taking

hold of the

divine

name is

thus

to

be

construed

as an

attempt

to control

God,

when

in

fact

God

firmly

and

surely

controls

man.

Thus

far I

have

argued

the

case that

a

substantial

amount of

common

predication

provides

a case

for

establishing identity.

But at

this

point

an

objection

may

be raised. Common

predication

is

a

necessary

condition

for

ascribing

identity,

but is it a

sufficient

condition?

My

hat

may

be

exactly

like

your

hat

in

all

respects,

but it

does

not

follow from this that we

share

one

and

only

one hat between

us:

our

hats

possess

qualitative

identity,

but

not

numerical

identity.

Likewise,

in

the

case

of

Ceylon

and Sri

Lanka,

it

is

conceivable,

although

unlikely, that

Ceylon and Sri

Lanka,

while

bearing

identical

descriptions,

are two

different

places

which

happen

to

look

exactty

alike,

but

are not one

and the

same

island.

In

order

to

be

numerically

identical,

A

and

B must

be

correctly

stated

to

occupy

the

same

spatial

co-ordinates

simultaneously:

this criterion

-

identity

of

spatio-temporal

occupation

-

will

serve as

a

means to

enable

us to

distinguish

Sri Lanka

from

some other island

which

happened

to look

remarkably

similar. It is

worth

pointing

out

at

this

point

that this criterion would also

enable the

philosopher

I

Kaltenmark,

Op. Cit.,

pp.

28-29.

2

Exodus

3.

I

3

f New International

Version

(London: Hodder &

Stoughton, I979), p. 69.

3

Genesis

32.

22-3

I.


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

6/12

GOD

AND

THE TAO

5

of

religion

to

equate Jehovah

and

Allah,

for the Islamic tradition

would

acknowledge

that

Allah sent Moses to deliver his people

from Egypt.

Thus,

Jehovah and Allah, by virtue of the fact that they act in the same

spatio-temporal

co-ordinates,

cannot

be two separate gods,

but

must

be

regarded

as

numerically identical.

It

may be

pointed

out,

however, that,

unlike

the situation

with

respect

to

Islam

and

Christianity,

the Taoist

and

the

Christian traditions

have

no

common

ancestry

and

hence

the terms 'God' and 'Tao'

do not

overlap,

but

name

two separate,

discrete principles,

not one.

However,

there are

two

very

compelling

reasons

for

rejecting

this

suggestion.

Unlike

the situation

of

Ceylon

and

Sri

Lanka,

where it is

possible

that someone might make

the

mistake of supposing that these were two separate places, no one - at least

to

my

knowledge-

has entertained

the

hypothesis

that there

might

exist

two

sources of being,

God

and the

Tao,

and

not

one Indeed

it is difficult to

see

what sense

such

a contention

would

make.

Second, by

invoking

the

criterion

of identity

of

spatio-temporal

occupation,

it

seems

clear

that,

insofar as

it

can

be

stated

that

God

or the Tao

occupy

space

and

time

at

all, they

are

indeed

spatio-temporally

identical

in

their extent,

since both are

said to

occupy

all

of space

and

all

of

time. This would

seen

a

plausible

reason for

regarding

God

and the

Tao

as one and

the same.

I have stated that common predication is a necessary condition for

numerical

identity (identity

of reference),

but

by

means

of

this

criterion

my

argument may

also be

challenged.

In the

example

of

Sri Lanka

and

Ceylon,

we are

justified

in

identifying

the two

islands

as

long

as common

predication

continues

consistently.

But it

only

takes

one instance

of divergent

predication

to

indicate fairly

conclusively

that

we

are

dealing

with two

referents

and

not

one.

Suppose

it

were

to

be shown

that:

Ceylon

contains many elephants.

Sri Lanka contains no elephants.

No matter

what

degree

of common

predication

could

thereafter

be

found,

this

pair

of facts

would

in

themselves

provide

conclusive proof

that Ceylon

could not conceivably

be the same

island as Sri Lanka.

There are corresponding

problems

here regarding

the possible

identification

of

God and

the

Tao,

for

it

might

be

objected

that

there

are

certain

things

which

can

be said

of the

Tao which

cannot be said

of God, and

vice versa.

Thus,

Alan Watts

writes:

... itmust be clear from the start that Tao cannot be understood as 'God' in the sense

of the

ruler, monarch,

commander,

architect,

and maker of the

universe. The

image

of

the

military

and

political

overlord,

or

of

a creator

external to

nature, has no

place

in the idea of

Tao.1

I

Alan Watts, Tao:

The Watercourse

Way (Harmondsworth:

Penguin,

I979),

p. 40.


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

7/12

6

GEORGE.CHRYSSIDES

Again, the Tao is not worshipped. As Chuang Tzu puts it, 'The Great

Tao does not admit of being praised '.IAnd, as John Blofeld more forcibly

expresses thematter:

For creatures to sing the praises of such a Mother in the form of hymns or psalms

is simply to make a noise. The Tao is never obtrusive, demanding or flamboyant.

To sing of its glories would be a waste of breath; what needs to be done is to observe

the manner of itsworking and take that for a model. To live by the Tao is to function

like the Tao, to conform with that marvellously effortless way of getting all things

done, and to produce what

is of

use to others as the Tao produces beneficial rains

and dews with never

a

thought of praise or thanks, still less reward.2

The situation might be summarized as follows:

God is a person.

The Tao is

impersonal.

God is

worshipped.

The

Tao is

not

worshipped.

Since these are instances

of

divergent predication,

it

may

be contended these

two

concepts

ought

to be

dissociated,

not

identified.

In

reply

to this

objection

a

number of comments are

necessary. First,

it

is possible

for a

description

of a

Supreme Being

or

Principle

to

be

mistaken.

For example, although Jehovah and Allah are, as I have argued, one and

the same

God,

this does

not

entail

that what is

predicated

of

God

in

each

religious

tradition

is

always

the

same.

If

thiswere the

case,

Christianity

and

Islamwould

not

be

two separate

religions

but one.

Consequently, Christianity

may

affirm that God has

a

son,

whereas the

Islamic

tradition

emphatically

rejects this assertion.3

In

view of the fact that different religions ascribe

different

predications

to

the

Supreme Being

or

Principle,

a

slight

modification

is

required

to the criterion

which

I

offered earlier for

determining identity.

It

is

a

necessary

condition

of

A's

identity

with

B,

not that

A

and

B

simply

admit of common predication, but rather that A and B admit of common

true

predication.

Thus the evidence

that

Ceylon

contains

many

elephants.

Sri

Lanka contains

no

elephants.

should only

cause

us

to

regard

Ceylon

and

Sri Lanka

as

two

separate

places

if

both

claims

are true.

(On

the other

hand,

if we

regard

the

pair

of assertions

as

mutually

incompatible,

we

presuppose

that

they

have

the same

referent.

Indeed

it is

precisely

this

point

which should

cause us to

identify

Allah with

Jehovah- the Muslim would be unable to contradict the Christian on

theological

matters

(such

as

whether God has

a

son)

if

each

religion

named

a

different

being by

'Allah' and 'God'

respectively.) Consequently,

God and

1

Chuang

Tzu, op.

cit.,

Book ii,

Part

I,

Sect. II, para.

7.

2

John

Blofeld, Taoism:

The

Questfor Immortality

(London:

Unwin, I979),

p.

44.

3

The Koran,

suras

2:

I

I6 &

I

7:

III .


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

8/12

GOD

ND

HE

AO

7

the Tao

may

be

identical,

but the

fact of the

matter

may

well

be

that the

respective religions disagree about the reasonableness of

worshipping a

Supreme Principle. Perhaps the Jew and the Christian arewasting their

breath

in

singing

hymns

and

saying

prayers.

Perhaps

on

the other

hand

Taoists such

as

Lao

Tzu and

Chuang

Tzu

were

wrongly

critical of

the

religious rituals

which were

characteristic of their

Confucian rivals.

Second, it

is to

be remembered

that

the

predicates

which are

used of the

Supreme Principle

are not to be taken

literally,

but

analogously,

and

thus

it follows that

divergent predication by

different

religious

traditions

may

not

involve such

a

sharp

clash as at

first

sight appears.

To

talk

of

the

deity

as

a

political

ruler

is

merely

to

give

some

kind of indication of the

degree

of

importance ascribed to God, and no doubt such a concept of God is a

reflection of the

kind

of

political society

in

which such

an

analogy

originated.

One

runs

the

analogy

to

death

if one

takes it

literally,

as one

would

be

doing,

for

example,

if one

asked what colour God's

crown

was,

or

how much it

weighed

Since

predication

is

analogous,

it is

not

surprising

that

we can come

across

other

pieces

of

predication

within

one

religious

tradition which

seem to

approach

the

apparently divergent predicates

which

are

found

within

the

other.

For

example,

although

the Tao is

generally regarded

as

impersonal,

there are places where one finds personalistic characterizations of it, when,

for

instance,

the

Tao

is referred

to as

'the

Mother'.1 The

fact that

the

God

of

the

Judaeo-Christian tradition

is

more

typically

referred

to as

'father'

rather than 'mother' need

not

present

us with

too

much

cause

for

concern.

The

Christian

may

use the

pronoun

'he'

but

yet

he is

not

conceiving

of

God

completely

anthropomorphically:

no

Christian

would draw the

conclusion

that,

since

he

spoke

of God

in

the masculine

gender,

God

must

therefore have

male

reproductive organs

Because it

is

recognized

that

apparent

attributions

of

gender

to the

Supreme

Principle

are

metaphorical, there

is

nothing

surprising in the fact that a Taoist text can occasionally switch from feminine

characterizations of the Tao tomasculine

ones, for example,

when

Chuang

Tzu

describes the

Tao

as

'theGreat and Most

Honoured Master'.2 Perhaps

it is

surprising

that

theJudaeo-Christian

tradition has

eschewed all feminine

characterizations of God.

However, whether the vocabulary used is imper

sonal

or

personal,

masculine or feminine, both traditions are plainly aware

that since

neither God

nor

the Tao

can,

strictly, be

expressed,

neither set

of

vocabulary

can

do justice

to

the unsayable. As John Hick reminds us,

God

is

beyond

the concepts

of both 'he' and

'it'.3

I have so far argued that God and the Tao can be identified if they both

admit

of

common

true

predication, and

that divergent

predication may

1

Lao Tzu,

op.

cit.,

vv. 56

&

I

17.

2

Chuang Tzu, op. cit., Book

vi,

Part

i,

Sect.

vi.

3

John Hick, Death and Eternal Life (London: Fount,

1979), p.

453.


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

9/12

8 GEORGE D. CHRYSSIDES

simply indicate

the

existence

of error on the part of one or both sets of

religious practitioners. However, the situation is somewhat more complex

than this. The contention that Allah has a son is one which is blatantly false

for the Muslim, but

a

statement such as 'The Tao has a son' is a statement

which is not evenfalse for the Taoist, for the issue of whether or not the Tao

has a son is a question which cannot even arise

within the religious discourse

of Taoism: 'The

Tao has a son' is an

expression

which finds no use within

the Taoist's

religious

discourse or the form

of

life associated with it.

Does this show that

theTao cannot have the same referent as 'God

'?

Must

it be the case that for

A

to be identical with

B, everything which can be

meaningfully predicated

of A can

also be meaningfully predicated of B? This

is certainly a difficulty for the thesiswhich I am putting forward, but I do

not believe

it is an

insuperable

one. Both

the Christian

and the Taoist alike

have

affirmed that, whatever language

is used to

describe

the

ultimate

principle underlying

the universe, that

language

will

always

be inadequate,

and

therefore

at

best

analogous.

When one uses

language

in

an

analogous

sense,

one

has

always

to be

wary

of the

exact

conclusions

which

one draws

from the analogy. From

talk about the

eye

of

God,

one is not to

infer

that

God has

eyebrows.

On the other

hand,

one can

draw

inferences from

the

phrase

'the

eye

of God'

about what God can

'see',

and whether or not it

is possible to hide anything from God. The extent to which one can press

an

analogy is

always

a

difficult question,

and one which is

likely

to

generate

disagreement. Thus,

while God

is

described

in

the

Christian tradition

as

'Father',

this has

permitted

inferences about

God having

a

son but

disallowed

certain

other

inferences,

such

as

Arius'

statement

that there

must

have been

a

time when

the Son of God did not

exist

(since

sons

typically

come

into existence

at

a

point

in

time).

When

an

analogy

is

employed

there

is

therefore

a

limit

to

the

number of

apparently

logical

conclusions

which

may

be

drawn from

it,

and which conclusions

are

legitimate

and which

are not

can only be decided by looking at what the proponents of the faith in question

are

willing

to

accept.

In

the

case

of the

Tao,

the

description

'mother'

is

legitimate, but, having recognized

that this

can

only

be

a

very

inadequate

analogy,

no further inferences

are

permitted

from

this,

such

as

a

universal

mother begetting

children.

The

difference

between

the Christian

and the

Taoist is

therefore

their

disagreement

as

to

how

far certain

religious analogies

may be

legitimately

extended.

To

pursue

this

point

would

require

considerable

discussion

about

the role of

analogy

and

its

implications

for

theology.

However, although

this issue

would

no

doubt

benefit

from fuller

discussion,

I think I have said enough to indicate that while the words 'God' and 'Tao'

can

pick

out

the

same

referent,

there

can

nevertheless

be

disagreement

between

the

two

religious

traditions about the

meaningfulness

of certain

predications,

about

which

analogies

are

most

appropriate,

and how

far an

analogy

should

be

pressed.

The

fact

that

some

Christians

have

pressed


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

10/12

GOD

AND THE

TAO

9

analogies further than

others

(such

as

Arius

and Athanasius

on

the

notion

of

sonship) does not entail

that

they

believe

in

discrete and

separate

gods.

Another problem which may be posed concerning my thesis is this.Plainly

it can be a

serious issue as to whether

A

and

B are

identical when A

and

B

both

exist. But

can

one

state that

A

and

B are

identical

when the

existence

of

one

or

both

is an

open

question?

If

the

prime

criterion for

determining

identity of reference is

the

occupation

of the

same

spatio-temporal

co

ordinates,

then

plainly

non-existent

entities

cannot

begin

to

satisfy

this

cri

terion since

they do

not

occupy any space

or

time at

all.

It

might

be

thought

that

the

obvious

way

of

dealing

with this

problem

is

simply to state

that my thesis is

dependent

on

the

existence

of God and

the Tao. But this will not do. For one thing, it is not at all clear than an

expression like 'The

Tao

exists'

is one

which

would

have

a

legitimate

place

in

the

context

of Taoism.

As

Chuang

Tzu

writes,

'The

Tao cannot

have

a

(real)

existence-if it

has,

it

cannot

be made

to

appear

as if

it

had

not'.'

What I

take to be

implied

in

Chuang

Tzu's

somewhat

cryptic

remark

is that the

Tao

is

not

an

additional

entity

over

and

above the

totality

of

entities within

the

physical

world. The

Tao,

rather,

is

their

organization,

the means

by

which

things flow

in

the

universe.

Equally,

on

the

Christian

side,

it has

been

questioned

by

theologians

such

as

Paul

Tillich

whether

God

is

an

entity

over

and above the totality of entities comprising the universe, and Tillich insists

that

'God

does

not exist.

He

is

being-itself beyond

essence

and

existence'.2

Whatever

ontological

status

is

given

either to

God

or

to

the

Tao,

it

is not

necessary

to

assert

any

form of

reality to

pairs

of

concepts in

order to

claim

their

identity:

if

one is

unable

to

do

so,

this

only

makes

identification more

difficult.

This can

be

illustrated

by

the

example

of

the

fictitious

characters,

DrJekyll

and Mr

Hyde. These

two

persons

can

be said

to

be identical

even

though neither

of

them

actually

exist.

Although

neither Dr

Jekyll

nor Mr

Hyde

actually

inhabit space

and time,

the author of

the novel

has placed

them in identical hypothetical paces and times. Similarly one might contend

that, just

as it

may

be

false that

the

universe

is

governed by an

all-pervasive

God

or

controlled

by

a

natural

flow of

things which is

provisionally called

the

Tao,

the

claims

which are

made by

the

respective religions

at least

hypothetically lace

God and the

Tao in

identical spaces

and times

-

in

this case,

occupying

all

space and all time.

One further

problem

demands

a

response. It may

be objected

that my

equation

of

God and

the Tao

fails

to

reflect the

way in which

religious

believers use

language.

It

may

be argued that

when

religious believers

use

a word like 'God' they are precisely not intending to refer to a principle of

order

which

is

found

within

the

universe, and

which is

co-existent with

it,

but to a

transcendent being who

stands outside

the

universe and exists

as

1

Chuang

Tzu,

op. cit.,

Book

xxv,

Part

iii,

Sect.

iii,

para.

i

i.

2

Paul Tillich,

Systematic

Theology,

Vol.

I

(Welwyn:

Nisbet,

I953),

p.

227.


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

11/12

10

GEORGE D. CHRYSSIDES

a

separate entity over and above the totality of terrestrial beings. Is the

contention

that

'God' and 'the Tao' have identical references a description

of

how religious language is used, or is it a prescriptionabout how it ought to

be

used?

A

number of

comments are in

order

here. First, it

should be noted that

my

thesis is

not primarily about the meaning of the

concept of God, but about

its reference.1 Thus, it is quite possible for religious

believers to talk about

God

as

if

he were a

supernatural being who existed

as

an additional entity

over

and above all other terrestrial

entities,

and,

by

so

talking tomisdescribe

the Supreme Being

or

Principle

to which their

language really refers. As

Stevenson's novel clearly shows, it

would be

perfectly possible for someone

to talk about Dr Jekyll and describe him accordingly, but simultaneously,

and indeed inadvertently,

to

refer

to

Mr

Hyde.

Second,

it is

by

no means

obvious

that when

Christians describe God as

'a

person' (or perhaps

as

'three persons') they

mean

themselves

to

be taken

as

literally

as

their

language might

seem to

suggest.

As

I

have already

attempted

to

show,

the Christian is

typically

unwilling

to draw the sorts

of

conclusion

which

one

would

normally

draw when

describing

a human

being

as

'a

person'.

Thirdly,

if

my

thesis carries

with it a

degree of

prescriptivity,

there

is

nothing necessarily wrong in that. Prescriptivity is not only legitimate, but

necessary

if

religious concepts

are to

develop.

If

it is

asked

why

it is

necessary

to

regard religious

concepts

as

dynamic

and

changing

rather than

static,

possessing

fixed

meaning,

one answer

is

that,

if

this had

not

occurred

in

the

past,

Christians

would still be

worshipping

a

God who had

a

physical

body,

subject

to the

limitations which made Adam

and Eve think

they

could hide

from him amongst

the

trees

in

the Garden of Eden.

They would still be

worshipping

a

god

who

could

literally

be

seen,

but whose

face

one was

ill-advised to

behold,

lest one

should be struck down

instantly.

One would

still be worshipping a 'portable' deity who could be physically conveyed in

an

Ark,

and

whose

presence

was

deemed

to

confer

victory

to

his devotees

and destruction

to

his enemies.

One

would,

like the

psalmist,

be forced

to

bewail

the

fact that

one

could

not

sing

the Lord's

song

in

a

foreign

country,

and one

would

presumably,

like

Ezekiel,

have

found

it

surprising

that

Yahweh

should

appear

outside

his

own

home

territory.

These

beliefs

were,

of

course,

crude

forms of

primitive Yahwism,

and

even

within the Old

Testament

itself

one

finds

refinements and

developments

taking place.

There

is no obvious

reason

why

the

Christian

needs

to

latch

on to

one

particular

point in the history of Christian doctrine, such as the formation of the New

I

In this discussion

I have made

the unargued assumption

that proper

names

have a meaning as

well

as

a reference.

I am aware

that

this is controversial.

The

thrust of

my argument, however,

has focused

on

the

issue

of identity

of reference,

and barely touched

the

question

of

meaning. Thus,

even

if

it

were

convincingly

demonstrated

that

proper

names have strictly

no

meaning whatsoever,

I believe

I have

provided

a sufficiently plausible

set of arguments

to demonstrate

identity

of reference between

'God'

and

'the

Tao'.


7/25/2019 20005914.pdf

12/12

GOD

AND THE TAO

II

Testament, or theApostles'

or Nicene

Creeds,

and

regard

them

as

the

points

at which

religious concepts

and doctrines

are to

be frozen for

all

time. One

of the reasons in the past for developing religious concepts was the Judaeo

Christian

interaction with

alien intellectual and

religious environments: the

identification of Jesus Christ with the logos by St John is only one fairly

obvious example

of certain

Christians'

readiness to contend that the Greek

philosophers and themselves

shared certain

basic concepts in common. Now

that the sacred writings of the

east are

becoming better

known amongst

western

scholars,

it

is

surely

to

be

expected

that

common

elements

will

be

noted which

may

influence

the

future

shape of

Christian

philosophical

thought.

Documents

20005914.pdf