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Demography and Conflicts in the context of Israel/Palestine. Forecasts for the future

Conference on “Between Dependence and Independence : What Future for Palestine?”

IALIIS, Bir Zeit, 9 march 2013

Youssef Courbage, INED, Paris

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Introduction• 2 manners to analyze demography in Israel/Palestine:

• -As « normal » countries: size, growth, structure, projections, impact on education, on employment…

• -As imbricated countries, history, geography, politics. Israeli/ Palestinian demographics deeply embedded.

• • In this area « historical » Palestine population issues to

consider Israeli project and Palestinian response.

• Increase of Jewish population and reduction of Palestinian one strategic objective, before and after 1948.

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Populationnism and pro-natalism• Project been and still populationist and pro-natalistic .

• Based firstly on immigration.

• But even more effective: role of fertility.

• successes : Fertility high (by Western standards) not only for the ultra-orthodox and religious (a quarter of the population) , but in all segments of the society.

• By mirror-effect, Palestinians engaged in “battle of numbers”, or “war of cradles”, benefiting from sole asset of fertility (no possible immigration).

One or two states, depending on demography?

• One of major issues:• One single State in Israel/Palestine, or two

States (shape of the future Palestinian State?)

• Depends heavily on population dynamics of the 2 populations.

• For long while (1922-2000) Palestinian fertility an anomaly in paradigm of fertility transition.

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An atypical Jewish fertility…• But Jewish fertility (in Israel) also an anomaly. • Very high GNP per capita (around 40 000

USD), no illiteracy, high intake in secondary and university education, high urbanization.

• Yet, in spite of “inhibiting” factors, Jewish fertility high and ever-increasing

• from a TFR=2.6 in 1990 (twice rate of Europe) to 3.0 in 2010 (50% more than France). (diaspora Jews TFR=1.5)

• Likely to surpass Palestinian TFR, (Arabs now at 3.3, West Bank at 3.8, rapidly falling).

…confronted to the Palestinian fertility decline

• Palestinian fertility following opposite trend,

• after a rise during the first intifada,• Then, considered as efficient mean to

counteract occupation and colonization,

• has fallen with the second intifada.6

• Figures differs slightly, MOH estimates (births registration) and PCBS : censuses and surveys.

• PCBS survey (2010) :TFR= 3.8 in West Bank,• (including annexed East Jerusalem) and 4.9 in Gaza

strip. In both settings, fertility decline is remarkable, from over 8, 20 years ago (1987-1993).

• Competition between Jewish and Palestinian dynamics acute in conflict zones: West Bank, East-Jerusalem.

• In Gaza, there are no more Jewish settlers since 2005.

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The growth of settlers population: low mortality…

• Chart 1 shows the rise of settlers population from 41000 in 1977 to 560 000 in 2011, multiplication by 14.

• In the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the rate of growth of the Jewish settlers is 4% per annum, for the Palestinians: 2.6%.

• • 4 factors explain this increase:

• Their lower mortality rate, high life-expectancy and less aged persons.

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Immigration• Immigration: • Each year some 5 000 newcomers due to immigration,

either from other side of the Green Line or from abroad.

• Contrariwise, Palestinians have been emigrating (as shown by the MEDHIMS Survey 2010 by PCBS).

• But immigration does not tell the whole story. • Very high fertility rate of settlers, by its own and

compared to Palestinians.

• Last Israel Central Bureau of Statistics yearbook of 2012 enables such comparisons of fertility between Jewish settlers and Palestinian “natives” in the West Bank.

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A “sub Saharan” fertility• Settler’s fertility rising all over 4 decades

following the 1967 occupation. In 2010, it had reached (without Jerusalem), 5.18 children,

• • increasing from 5.06, in 2009.• • In 2011, it was 5.07. (sub Saharan Africa :

4.80).

• Palestinians in WB : 3.80, more than 1.3 child per woman (+ 33%).

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Proximate determinants

• Age at first marriage, both females and males particularly low among settlers.

• Low contraceptive rate especially among religious Jews.

• Low abortion rate, almost nil among religious.

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Chart 1: Jewish settlers in the West Bank (including East-Jerusalem), 1977-2011

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Chart 2 : Age-sex structure of the Jewish population in the West Bank, 2010

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Jerusalem’s fertility disparities• Jerusalem’s, “war of cradles” even more intense than in

other parts of the WB.• East-Jerusalem Palestinians kept for long high fertility,

sort of insurance against political risks.• Situation did’nt last. Jerusalemite Palestinians had

3.84 children in 2010, decreasing from previous year• Lower by 11%, than Jews of the city: 4.26• Jewish fertility in Jerusalem increasing: 4.16 in 2009. • In 2011, Jewish fertility remained the same : 4.24,

Palestinian’s decreased sharply: 3.63 (-5.2%). • Fertility disparities more pronounced, in East-Jerusalem

alone, fertility of the ¼ million settlers, 5.40 exceeded Palestinian by 40%.

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Palestinians in Israel• In the sixties, with 9 children per woman (world record

level), the 1948 Palestinians (17% of the population of Israel, 4 June 1967 borders) had 3 times more children than Jews: 3.4.

• Scene completely reshuffled. Jewish fertility increasing.• • At its lowest it was 2.6, it is now in the vicinities of 3• (2.98 for Jews by religion, 2.90 for the so-called group

“Jews and others” (i.e non Arab Christians, no religion.

• Contrariwise, Israeli Palestinians TFR was divided by 3 reaching 3.3 now, few decimal point above Jews.

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Chart 3 : Jewish and Israeli’s Palestinians fertility (1960-2011)

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A reversal in fertility situation• Also that in Israel, convergence of Jewish and

Israeli Palestinians fertility is a matter of years not decades.

• Remnants of high fertility only in Gaza : TFR 4.9

• Almost half what it used to be during first intifada 1987-1993.

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Chart 4: Recent fertility differences among Palestinians and Jews, 2010

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East- Jerusalem Israel

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Population perspectives and Statehood

• I will present sets of population projections until 2048. Showing issues in terms of statehood, potential conflicts (Table 1).

• Evolution of the Palestinian population (West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza, Palestinians of 1948) compared to the Jewish population in historical Palestine.

• • In 2020, number of Palestinians will be equal

to the number of Jews : 6.9 millions. (But some claim that it already happened in 2012).

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Table 1: Population perspectives in historical Palestine, 2011-2048

Jews Palestinians West Bank Jerusalem Gaza Palestinians of 1948

2011 6155 5503 2285 284 1658 1276

2015 6475 6067 2477 308 1882 1400

2020 6872 6772 2720 338 2186 1528

2025 7268 7514 2960 368 2510 1676

2030 7666 8273 3192 396 2849 1836

2035 8071 9015 3404 423 3193 1995

2040 8497 9717 3594 447 3531 2145

2045 8939 10364 3758 467 3849 2290

2048 9212 10724 3843 477 4025 2379

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• Chart 5 shows that one-state on the whole of historical Palestine inconceivable,

• for Palestinians, naturally• also for Israelis, occupation creating

inextricable issue: 9.2 million Jews (46%) dominating a majority of 11.8 millions Palestinians.

• Well-known fact for both Palestinian and Israelis (only a minority claims the contrary in the far right).

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Chart 5 : The perspectives of the Palestinian and Jewish populations in historical Palestine

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P alestinians

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Without Gaza?• Since 2005, Gaza detached from area of direct

occupation. Mainly, for demographic reasons: 8 000 thousands settlers could not face 1.5 million Palestinians, for the then prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

• What would be the demographic perspectives of historical Palestine without Gaza (Chart 6).

• While retaining almost the entire territory (minus 360 Km2), Israel will keep comfortable Jewish majority in 2048: 9.2 millions Jews more than 6.7 millions Palestinians in West bank, East-Jerusalem and Israel.

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• A one state, under a demographic Jewish majority becomes conceivable.

• Besides, the trend of the curves shows that after 2048, the numerical advantage will remain for the Jews.

• Naturally the status of the Palestinian minority is open to many questions which are beyond the scope of this study (homelands/ Bantustan????).

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Chart 6 : Same perspectives, without Gaza

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Most serious issue: settlers in West Bank

• Chart 7 presents 3 variants of population growth of settlers from 2011 until 2048, based on varying assumptions of fertility and immigration (and one life-expectancy scenario).

• Chart 8 gives the percentage of settlers in the total population of the West Bank.

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Chart 7 : The explosion of settlers numbers in the West Bank

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Chart 8: Percentage of Jewish settlers in the West Bank (including East-Jerusalem)

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Jerusalem• East Jerusalem settlers account for slightly

less than half total number of settlers:260 000 from 560 000 in 2011.

• Jewish Immigration has to play a role but higher fertility indispensable to keep Palestinians in Jerusalem below an “acceptable” threshold: 30%.

• In the whole “reunified” city the proportion of Palestinians is now higher: 37,6% of the total of 788 000 inh.).

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To keep Palestinians below 30%

• In 2001, the Israeli demographer Sergio Della Pergola forecasted increasing Palestinian percentages, to such an extent that:

• “A possible shift of the majority of Jerusalem’s population from the Jewish parts to the Arab (and other) parts”, could occur.

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• Indeed, since 1972, Jewish population increased less: multiplied by 2.1, Palestinian by 3.5.

• This highly differentiated growth could have undermined the israelization of the Holy City.

• But recently two factors have changed the deal:

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• Huge increase in building of neighborhoods,

attracted great number of immigrant settlers, from Israel proper and directly from abroad

• the unexpected reversal of fertility trends.

• Thus enlarging the gap with the Palestinian’s one,

• Hence the objective of 30% could be reached soon.

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Demographic shifts, political shifts• Indeed, politics, socio-economic and political

developments impact on population dynamics.• • Yet, demographic factors on their own might have

an impact on politics.

• For the Palestinians, differentials fertility trends between West Bank and Gaza might enlarge the divide which began with the de facto secession of Gaza in 2006.

• From 2011 until 2048, population growth will be lower in WB (and EJ) than in Gaza. (Chart 10)

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Chart 10: Palestinian population in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza, 2011-2048

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Higher growth in Gaza• In West Bank, fertility is lower and emigration

significant.• Same, in East-Jerusalem, where the Israeli authorities

pressures the population to push them to emigrate. • Emigration very low from the Gaza strip,• population increase will be extremely high:• even if fertility fells to replacement level (2.1) in 2048, the

population of Gaza, 1.7 million now, • will exceed 4 millions in 2048• 3.8 millions if fertility fells to the present Lebanese or

European level.• 5 millions in the most extreme case scenario (constant

fertility).

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Differential voting patterns in Gaza

• The last Palestinian elections, in 2006 revealed a gap between the West Bank and the Gaza strip (Chart 11).

• Hamas was close to the absolute majority in Gaza : 48.3%

• whereas in the West Bank, it was 39.5% far from the majority.

• Naturally, political attitudes, voting patterns are transient phenomena.

• We cannot assume that these patterns of voting would last for ever.

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• However, demographic shifts of the population and of the electoral body from the West Bank to Gaza,

• whose share of 39% now will approach the absolute majority : 48% in 2048, (Chart 12)

• may have an impact on future elections results.

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Chart 11: Voting patterns at the Palestinian elections in 2006

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Chart 12: The proportion of the Palestinian population living in Gaza, 2011-2048

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Weight of the settlers within Israel• During the last elections at the Knesset in January 2013,

the extreme right party Ha Bayit Ha Yehudi “the Jewish home” party of Naftali Benett won 12 seats and large number of votes, it came as the first party in the settlements (detailed results not yet available).

• During the preceding Knesset in 2009, Israeli settlers voted overwhelmingly for far right, right and religious parties,

• higher proportion than Israelis living beyond the Green Line.

• Likud : 28%• Kadima 9%• Ysrael Beitenu 8%• Shas 11%• United Torah 14%• Ichid Leumi 20%• Labor 2%, Meretz, 0.5% Hadash and Balad : 0%.

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• Hence, shift in population from « Green Line » to settlements, might translate mechanically into increase of voters for right wing, nationalists and religious parties.

• Settlers likely to grow from 0.6 million now to 1.7 million, 18% of Jewish population in 2048, according to the “medium variant”.

• The impact of this shift on future elections results is crystal clear.

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Chart 13: The population growth beyond the Green Line and in the settlements

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Chart 14 : The proportion of the settlers population among the Jewish population

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Conclusion

• In 2012, recent demographic history is one of inversion of demographic trends.

• For Palestinians, demographic transition and fertility decrease has speeded. Against all odds.

• For Israeli Jews, on the contrary, fertility is increasing, for the general population and in the areas of frictions : The West Bank and Jerusalem.

• This is a unique model in the world, which reconciles most aspects of modernity: standard of living, education, urbanization… with tradition.

• Israeli fertility beyond the Green Line and in the settlements has been boosted by the policy of the State to increase Jewish fertility by direct and indirect measures. Billion of dollars have been spent for this purpose.

• It has met a high demand for children by the Jewish population

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• Contrariwise, Palestinian fertility is rapidly declining in the West Bank in Jerusalem in Gaza and in Israel, as a combination of modernization and individuation transition

• and a poverty-led transition particularly severe since the 2nd Intifada of 2000.

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