The South Carolina Confederate Flag: The Politics of Race and Citizenship

Laura R WoIiver Angela D. Ledford

Chris J. Dolan University of South Carolina

The interest group and social movement mobilizations to remove the Confederate Jag, which had been /lying since 1962,from atop the South Carolina State Capitol dome provides an instance where large, issue-specific coalitions successfully expanded the scope of a conflict andframed an issue in a universalistic discourse of inclusive citiienship. The groups and movements seeking to keep the /lag on the dome of the capitol experienced cascading defections in part based on a narrow vision of histoty the political context, and goals for the future. Based on seventeen in-depth interviews with interest group activists; key members of the South Carolina legislature; and educational. religious, and business leaders active in the issue along with observations at five pro and anti-/lag demonstrations and rallies, this study seeks to explain how the effort to remove the Confederate j lag was partially successful. The analysis includes media attention from 1962 to 2000 in South Carolina regarding the Confiderate flag and public opinion on the flag over time. Prior interest group work helpedprepare the terrain for the mobilizing effects of several galvanizing events-the NAACP tourism boycott and national media attention during the highly contested 2000 Republican primary in the state, which in turn pressured institutions-parties, the legislature, and the governor-to respond. The struggle was an instance of applied philosophy.

Symbols and Citizenship in the "New South"

symbols pack a lot of political power and can become tropes for larger meanings (Edelman 1964, I97 I , and 1988). A flag is for many people a condensation symbol meaning much more than the cloth, threads, and dyes that construct it. Even when a physical symbol remains unchanged, how it is viewed and understood can change dramatically. In 1962 the South Carolina Legislature placed a Confederate flag on top of the State Capitol. Even &om the beginning, the flag was controversial. It took thirty-eight years, however, to move it. Many factors converged to make this happen.

This study is based on, first, seventeen interviews with interest group leaders, key members of the South Carolina legislature, and educational, religious, and business leaders active in the 1999 Confederate flag issue in South Carolina. Second, we analyze media attention from 1962 to Moo in South Carolina regarding the Confederate flag. Third, we examine public opinion on the flag issue over time. Fourth. we include our personal observations at five pro and anti-flag demonstrations and rallies.

Transforming the issue from one ofanticonfederacy and anti-racism to a frame of inclusive citizenship widened acceptance for the anti-flag movement by linking

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the flag to issues of simple decent human treatment (see also Moore 1978). Indeed, at its most fundamental level, full and active citizenship is about real inclusion with regard to the issues that affect citizens’ lives, particularly those issues with broad public consequences (Spitz 1984; Phillips 1993; Smith 1997). Meaningful inclusion must entail not only a voice in matters designated or regarded as legitimate issues, but also some control over what will be deemed a legitimate issue, i.e. agenda control (Bachrach and Baratz 1962 and 1970; Parenti 1970). In addition to these nobler causes and philosophies was “‘The color green. The only color that really matters in America”’ (Cobb-Hunter Interview 2000). A tourism boycott by the NAACP strengthened the resolve of flag opponents and displayed to flag supporters or the uncommitted the price South Carolina would pay for its flag display. It is clear From our analysis that the anti-flag forces in South Carolina encountered significant opposition. The power of the status quo, combined with citizen inertia, quiescence, and resignation to keep the flag issue off the political agenda for decades. As we will show, the increased political power of African American citizens in South Carolina state government, a shift in the scope of the conflict from provincial concern to a national political audience, pressure from business interests, and the articulation of a universalistic frame of citizenship and sovereignty mobilized power to move the flag.

The Maze of Interests in State Politics Interest groups concerned with flying the Confederate flag were found in varying

forms in South Carolina. The relevant groups ranged from the Chamber of Commerce to the NAACP, the Baptist Convention, and the Progressive Network. These influential groups sought to build up their memberships, lobby the statehouse in Columbia, educate and organize voters, support their friends in public ofice and oppose their political enemies. These groups also faced internal problems, such as maintaining cohesion, dealing with factions that break off From the group in response to special needs, and balancing democracy with discipline.

On the whole, group influence in South Carolina is dominant in terms of economic diversity and policy impact relative to political parties and state government institutions (Thomas and Hrebenar 1996). With respect to economic diversity, wealthy urban industrial states tend to have weaker group influence because of the range and complexity of their economies. While no single interest dominates political life, multiple competing groups, to a great extent, balance each other. In contrast, in rural states with less economic diversity, such as South Carolina, a few dominant groups appear to wield more influence.

Another important factor is group influence within the framework of party competition. According to Morehouse, “where parties are strong, pressure groups are weak or moderate; where parties are weak, pressure groups are strong enough to dominate the policy-making process” (Morehouse 198 1, I 1 8). Morehouse argues that where competitive parties are strong-where the parties actively recruit candidates, provide campaign support, and hold their members accountable after

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elections-groups tend to be less influential in state politics. Where parties are weak- less able to recruit candidates, unable to supply campaign support, unable to hold their members accountable after elections-groups tend to be more influential. Put simply, weak party states have strong interest group systems and vice-versa. South Carolina has a weak par-$ system, due in large part to the infiltration of conservative social and religious groups within the parties.

Quiescence with Disgruntlement South Carolina’s political and social culture mitigates against the mobilization

of citizen conflict. The state has a highly traditionalistic political culture, with low citizen participation in politics and institutions that blunt citizens’ voices. The traditionalistic culture “emphasizes social hierarchy with an economic, social, and political elite at the top to which ordinary citizens routinely defer” (Graham and Moore 1994,3-4; see also Botsch 1992; Woliver 1999). Central to the South Carolina political culture are two ideas about activism: “First, internal division was unnatural and dangerous, and second, political opposition was external and undesirable” (Graham and Moore 1994,46). The nonns of conflict avoidance help mute activism in South Carolina which is helped along because pro-business attitudes reinforce an emphasis on “civilities” (Chafe 1980): not tolerating overt dissent and above all maintaining the status quo (Graham and Moore 1994, 100). Recent South Carolina politics displays a strong pro-business emphasis and an almost invisible union presence (Botsch 1992). Quietly pretending that everyone agrees on issues and their “place” in the social hierarchy helped sustain the Confederate flag over the State House for a long time.

Public opinion polls over time displayed massive cultural shifting over the issue. In 1987, 75 percent of polled South Carolinians wanted the flag to remain atop the dome (“SC Backs . . .” 1987) yet by February 26,2000, that number had dropped to approximately 13 percent (Pratt 2000). Of that 75 percent who wanted the flag to stay put in 1987,68 percent were White and 32 percent were African American. In 1999,47 percent of Whites wanted the flag to remain (37 percent to be moved to the State House grounds, 42 percent to take it down altogether, and 16 percent did not know or refused to answer), while only five percent of African Americans agreed (26 percent to be moved to the State House grounds, 1 1 percent to take it down altogether, and 16 percent did not know or refused to answer) (Stroud 1999). By January 13, 2000, 59 percent of those polled wanted the flag removed from the dome, and 67 percent were in favor of relocating it to the Wade Hampton Confederate Memorial on the State House grounds (Editorial, May 7,2000).

Embedded in Southern culture is a revulsion for direct confrontation, unpleasanmess, and incivility. The emphasis on civility, however, has a conservative political effect since people asking for social change are often confronted by those with power as being impolite, confrontational, strident, and insensitive to “how things are done around here” (Chafe 1980). Even when aggrieved groups have waited decades for the “powers that be” to rectify injustices in the normal course of things, and

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when, finally having enough, they take to the streets, lunch counters, and jails, they are castigated as being impatient and radical. This was clearly evoked in interviews with state government officials. David Wilkins, Republican Speaker of the South Carolina House, interpreted the continued opposition by groups such as the SC NAACP and the SC Legislative Black Caucus to several proposed compromises as intransigence. “Basically the compromise was reached despite the NAACP, not because of the NAACP,” Wilkins stated, “After a while, if you’re not going to agree with anything, you’re kind of less effective. When you’re trying to find compromise, middle ground, they weren’t going to agree to anything.” Representative Joe Neal lamented this kind of characterization of the NAACP as radical and the acceptance and quiescence of the public which they worked hard to transform (Neal Interview).

Shaping the context for the flag debates were several moral shocks which highlighted the persistence of violent racism in South Carolina, visually linked it to the Confederate flag, and revealed public revulsion for the perpetrators. From 1990 to 1996 at least 72 African American churches around the country were burned. South Carolina had more church burnings than any other state, with 26, which was more than a third of the national total. The response to the church bumings was ecumenical support to condemn the actions and rebuild the churches. President Clinton even attended the re-opening of one burned and rebuilt church in the “Upstate,” the northern part of South Carolina.

Derived from the church bumings, a second event underscored the vicious nature of state racists. Moms Dees of the Southern Poverty Law Center won a major victory against the South Carolina KKK and its leaders who were implicated in inspiring some of the church bumings. Both events, the church burnings and then the exposure of the local KKK. its adherents, and their involvement in some of the church burning-made manifest that the “new” South still had remnants of the old and often used Confederate flags and emblems in their identities. “The most effective moral shocks are those embodied in, translatable into, and summed up by powefil condensing symbols” (Jasper 1997, 161). The Confederate flag became such a condensing symbol.

These, plus previous brave yet futile attempts to bring the flag down, left “residues of reform” (Tarrow 1998) which later would provide foundational work for a more sustained effort to bring the flag down. Coalitions of South Carolina churches and civic leaders, in addition, had recently mobilized in opposition to video poker gambling in South Carolina. Those networks and affiliations were still fresh and in place when the Confederate flag’s removal moved up on the public agenda.

Protest movements help us reform. shift, and redefine ourselves, our morals. and our obligations to each other: “Protest movements work at the edge of a society’s understanding of itself and its sunoundings. Like artists, they take inchoate intuitions and put flesh on them, formulating and elaborating them so that they can be debated“ (Jasper 1997. 375). From the opposing side of a movement. as it becomes more acceptable to join the counter-movement, what happens is the phenomena known as “cascading defections” (Chong 199 I , 17; Woliver 1996) spinning down into group

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demobilization. The pro-flag adherents experienced such cascading defections as more mainstream flag supporters exited From participation while extreme and controversial adherents remained active. In addition, protests tap into a deep moral significance buried in self-identity (Jasper 1997,56).

Central to African American politics is the social morality inspired by religion (Billingsley 2000; Billingsley 1999; Darby2000; Harris 1994; Moms 1984; McAdam 1982; Woliver 1993). As one informant, an African American minister, put it, “In the African American community, the church is the center of everything we do. We galvanized [the Coalition] where we gather and we gather in the church” (Holness interview). Highly visible involvement of religious leaders and entire denominations made it more difficult for people to take a “Free ride” (Olson 1965). as one’s reputation within the community and church gets tied to activism on the flag as a civil rights issue (Woliver 1996; see also Chong 199 I ; Moms 1984). As one of the leaders in the anti-flag coalition explained, “There is almost never a good time, you have to make it a good time” to mobilize for social change (Ards interview).

Party Politics Significant political changes have occurred in the wake of the evolution of

Southern culture and party politics. While the old Southern politics was driven by a race-based social and political order, a new Southern politics has emerged that is slightly more democratic (Key 1949; Black and Black 1992). The traditional system of Democratic Party dominance has given way to a two-party politics in which the partisan racial landscape has become more dynamic. Earl Black contends that the South’s delegation to the U. S. House reveals significant political competition among White citizens for White Republicans, Blackcitizens for Black Democrats, and Black and White coalitions for White Democrats (Black 1998). However, Southern politics has been structured by the emergence and dominance of a White Republican majority, which c h e s t h e torch ofSouthern political and social conservatism and has sectional considerations that pervade all areas of American politics.

In 1988 South Carolinian Lee Atwater, as chair of George Bush’s presidential campaign, helped orchestrate an early Republican primary date in South Carolina, one where South Carolina voted before the rest of the South on what was then called “Super Tuesday.” This helped secure the presidential nomination for George H. W. Bush. Years later, however, it also helped shine the national spotlight on South Carolina’s race relations as symbolized by the Confederate flag on the State House dome.

Ambitions of South Carolina Republicans to play prominent roles in national Republican politics also inadvertently raised the issue of the Confederate flag. Republican party support was nowhere stronger than in South Carolina (Black and Black 1987; 1992; Barone and Ujifusa 1997. 1266-90). South Carolina Governor ( 1986- 1994) Carroll Campbell, for example, a very popular two-term governor. was mentioned as a possible Vice Presidential candidate for Senator Robert Dole in the 1996 election. Among other issues, the matter of his inactivity for eight years as

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governor with regard to the Confederate flag on the State House dome was discussed as detrimental to including him on the national ticket. What is important here is the perception of the Confederate flag dragging down Republican rising stars and movers and shakers if ever their audience went beyond the boundaries of the state.

Others have weighed in on the linkage between national media coverage of the South Carolina Republican presidential primary and the Confederate flag debate. The SC Chamber of Commerce believed the timing of the primary was crucial to bringing outside pressure to bear on legislators to seek a compromise measure (Wooley interview). Mayor Coble of Columbia even hinted that the Republican Party’s efforts to make South Carolina an early presidential primary brought enough national media attention to the state that it intensified the debate (Coble interview). Speaker of the SC House, David Wilkins, commented, “I think the Presidential primary shined a light on this issue that never had been shined before-and never otherwise would be. But Republican Presidential politics and the candidates being here put so much emphasis on this issue and made it a national issue that never has been made of it. I think the presidential primary, the national media here, and the candidates-in a critical state-brought a lot of attention to our state. And this issue became an issue that was even asked of Governor Bush at the presidential debates on the first week of January [2000], nationally televised over, I think, CNN about his view on the Confederate flag. I mean it just brought some attention to that issue that had never been brought before” (Wilkins interview).

Ironically, in 2000 some members of the Republican party in South Carolina were hung on their own petards by the national media attention they wanted regarding their Republican primary. The hundreds ofjournalists from all over the world, camped in South Carolina after the New Hampshire primary, naturally took many pictures of the unique configuration of flags flying over the state capitol. What might have appeared to some in South Carolina to be a hopeless issue, or axiomatic, raised many questions for the national and international media covering the primary. Indeed, all the Republican presidential candidates were questioned about the Confederate flag. Most of them said it was a state and local issue.

The media attention from the February 2000 South Carolina Republican primary overtlowed into additional and important national media attention for the NAACP tourism boycott. Since a national consumer boycott is a silent, individualist action by compassionate anonymous outsiders, national media attention is essential for success (Jasper 1997. 25 1-66). Sometimes the mere announcement of a boycott has more effect than the boycott itself. Moral protest by boycotts such as that over the Confederate flag makes groups choose whether to support the boycott or not, and:

“Most effective is a series of press conferences by disparate groups, each in turn announcing its support for the boycott. When they succeed, national boycotts usually work through political voice, not consumer exit. In today’s world, the news media are a vital conduit for political messages” (Jasper 1997,265).

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South Carolina Republican officials argued that the attention the flag was getting was being used cynically for partisan reasons. Democrats fired back by reminding the public that it was the Republican Party of South Carolina which put a Confederate flag referendum on the Republican primary ballot in 1994.

Political parties are, of course, in the business of winning elections. The defeat of incumbent Republican Governor David Beasley in 1998. in part because of his inept entanglements with the flag, gave party elites pause for concern. Over time party elites discern the need to evolve on an issue or keep losing elections. American political parties are complex coalitions of interests and, given the movement within groups of the coalitions, the meaning of an issue can change over time. From what was issue equilibrium can come disruption and redefinition ofwhat an issue or symbol means, forcing party elites to reexamine the issue (Carmines and Stimson 1990; Lohmann 1993; Wolbrecht 2000). As these cognitive frames shift, the positions of groups within the coalition shift and the parties have to respond or go the “way of the Whigs” (Sundquist 1983).

The Coalition to Keep It Flying Three major organizations fought to keep the Confederate flag flying atop the

South Carolina State House and were present at the pro-Confederate flag rally on the grounds on January 8, 2000. One of the most ardent supporters of keeping the Confederate flag flying was the South Carolina chapter of the Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC), which saw itself as a defender of Southern heritage and culture. The CCC sought to undermine the efforts of anti-flag legislators, the Legislative Black Caucus, Mayors Bob Coble of Columbia and Joe Riley of Charleston, and organized groups, especially the NAACP and the South Carolina chapter of the Chamber of Commerce.’ According to South Carolina CCC President Frances Bell, anti-flag forces were proponents of unfair liberal attacks on Southern symbols. On May 22, Bell released an “Open Letter to Governor Hodges” that accused the governor of cooperating with anti-Southern, pro-Yankee liberals. She also projected her personal anger at “Black legislators” and “young Blacks” who conspired with communists and the NAACP to destroy Southern culture (see website: www.sccofcc.org). After the flag was removed, the South Carolina CCC devoted much of its time to defeating state legislators who voted for the compromise.

Another active proponent of the Confederate flag was the League of the South. an organization designed to promote Southern cultural and political independence from the United States and the creation of a sovereign Southern nation.? From time to time, the League issues what are called “heritage violations,” which are “attacks on the cultural identity of the Southern people-especially our Confederate heritage” and instances 0f“cultural genocide against the people ofthe South.” On January 19. 2000, President ofthe League ofthe South Dr. Michael Hill accused President Clinton, the South Carolina NAACP, and Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow/PUSH Coalition of committing a ”heritage violation” against citizens of the South. He labeled these three groups/individuals “anti-Southem cultural bigots“ and called on people

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throughout the South to demand secession from the United States. The Ku Klux Klan was relatively active in support of the Confederate flag. The

KKK promoted a nationalist argument that perceived the flag as a symbol of white Christian principles that liberals sought to destroy. At the January 8, 2000, pro-flag rally at the South Carolina State House, former KKK "grand-wizard" David Duke spoke in support of the flag as a White Christian symbol of"what is good in all of us" (personal observation). Joining the KKK were skinheads and other sundry racist individuals who perceived the flag in terms of European cultural purity. Although the KKK and individual racists were active in the pro-flag camp, the CCC and the League did not publicly welcome their presence and saw their efforts as counterproductive because they focused on race and downplayed Southern heritage and culture.

On April 6,2000, a rally for the Confederate flag was held on the grounds of the South Carolina State House. Three major forces comprised the pro-flag camp as witnessed at this demonstration. The first group was comprised of openly racist individuals who looked upon the Confederate flag as a symbol of White power and supremacy. The second group saw the flag as the embodiment of Southern culture and denied the presence of racism in Southern society as symbolized by the Confederate flag. For this second group, sectional cultures are the natural starting point driving individual perceptions of the flag. The third group perceived themselves as purely states' rights advocates who downplayed Southern heritage and racism. Key to their position was protecting the 10* Amendment and opposing national supremacy in the federalist governmental framework.

The third group is a complex and dynamic contingent. They couched their rhetoric in terms of governmental power and constitutional authority indicative of the Civil War generation of White Southerners. Another important facet was their sweeping defense of Southern secession from the Union and the creation of a separate and independent Southern nation. Furthermore, they perceived any outside mass media or group influence as a Yankee conspiracy that sought to undermine the sovereign power of the state government of South Carolina. Therefore, taking the flag down meant giving in to outside influence and the national government.

"Heritage, Not Hate" Many pro-flag forces tried to deflect racial issues from the flag by emphasizing

that it was a symbol of their history and heritage, not hate. This was a hard sell. First, the flag was placed on the State House dome during the height of the Civil Rights Movement ( 1 962) and during a time of massive resistance to integration, voting rights, and other reforms linked to race throughout the South and acutely in South Carolina (Burton et a1.1994). South Carolina Whites were so successful in their disenfranchisement of African American citizens that the last disputes concerning at-large versus district elections for county council and city elections were settled in South Carolina only in the mid to late 1980s. The NAACP in South Carolina spent a lot oftime and energy re-enfranchising African American voters and fighting attempts to dilute their votes. These efforts were important in the 1990s. then, when people

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started discussing the chances of moving the Confederate flag. The re-enfranchisement of African Americans in South Carolina and their political potential might have played a role in the mobilization and compromise to bring the flag down (see also Hill 2000).

Second, a blow to the heritage frame was the growing realization that the flag flying over the State House was the wrong one. It was as if the 1962 legislators couldn’t even get the right flag up there, no matter what their motivations to begin flying it were. Evoking old language of the Civil War, pro-flag forces called dissenters “carpetbaggers” and “scalawags,” among other epithets.

The Coalition to Remove Eventually a broad and powerful coalition pressured the legislature to remove

the flag. The NAACP’s boycott set the stage and forcefully put the issue on the political agenda. A diverse confederation of business, civic, education, government, and religious interests were unified in their message to remove the flag from the dome of the capitol for the sake of the state and its citizenry. These included at least 25 business groups, seven civic groups, 17 educational institutions, 17 governmental bodies, 26 prominent governmental officials, and 18 religious organizations (“A Diverse Group . . .” 2000). Virtually every institution of higher learning in the state supported removal of the flag, even Bob Jones University. The South Carolina Chamber of Commerce had a long-standing policy supporting removal of the flag, and local, city, and county chambers joined in with resolutions for removal. The religious support was truly ecumenical ranging from the mighty Southern Baptist Convention to the Baha’i Communities of Greater Columbia and Charleston. One measure of the strength and breadth of this coalition was the fact that the King Day at the Dome anti-flag rally, January 17, 2000, was “the largest social protest in the history of South Carolina; and on that date it was the number one news story around the world” (McLawhorn interview).

Just Business, Nothing Personal The economic development context shaped the ultimate fate of the Confederate

flag in South Carolina. Many Southern cities strongly believe in the importance of projecting a modem, pro-business “New South” image (Pagan0 and Bowman 1997, 44). The Executive Director of the Columbia Urban League observed that the flag issue and the NAACP’s boycott “was having an adverse impact on tourism, on investments in South Carolina. . . Many businesses were just watching and waiting to see what would happen” regarding the flag controversy (McLawhorn interview; corroborated by Morrison interview).

The organization most active in molding this context was the South Carolina Chamber of Commerce, which led a business coalition called “Courage to Compromise” and the Palmetto Small Business Forum. The official position of the SC Chamber called for the removal of the Confederate flag from the State House dome and for relocating it “to an appropriate place of honor” (Wooley interview). Fully within the economic development context, the SC Chamber believed “the flag

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created negative perceptions about the state-business and non-business.” According to public relations representative Deb Wooley, the SC Chamber first assumed this position in 1996 “following a request from [former] Governor Beasley” (Wooley interview).

Throughout the flag debate, the SC Chamber worked with Republicans and Democrats in both houses, the governor’s office, and Columbia Mayor Bob Coble. To keep the public pressure on elected officials, the SC Chamber designed a three- fold process which included creating “a public climate in which legislators can vote for a solution, identify and activate grass-roots support to contact legislators, and provide direct lobbying support during the legislative process” (Wooley interview). In the end, Wooley believed that the SC Chamber’s public efforts ‘’made the final resolution of the issue possible” (Wooley interview).

Two of the most ardent opponents of the SC Chamber were the South Carolina Chapter of the NAACP, which “wouldn’t accept a compromise solution” and the Sons of the Confederacy, which “wanted no solution.” These two groups sought to undermine the SC Chamber by applying political pressure via television ads, appealing to the grass-roots, and issuing retaliatory threats during the Republican presidential primary. Although the SC Chamber believed local journalistic coverage of the flag debate was “crusading,” the national mass media simplified the issue. For Wooley, national media outlets “reduced the issue to racism and negative perceptions instead of looking at the complexity of the issue.” However, the timing of the GOP presidential primary brought the necessary national attention to the issue that eventually benefited the SC Chamber and contributed to the legislative compromise, which it saw as “good for the state-therefore, good for business” (Wooley interview).

The combined force of this coalition, the visible anti-flag protests, the dynamics of party politics, and the effective framing by the movement to move the flag were instrumental in getting it off the dome of the State House. Others have noted the strengths and weaknesses of protest actions (Browning, Marshall and Taub 1984; Piven and Cloward 1977; Woliver 1993).

The broadened national coalition served notice to party leaders in South Carolina that the anti-flag effort in 1998-2000 was not sporadic, fleeting, and easily brushed OK Instead, the anti-flag movement now had what Charles Tilly (1 998) calls “WUNC,” it is: Worthy, Unified, Numerous and Committed (21 1). The consistent, uncompromising position ofthe NAACP established a framework from which other groups could work. The NAACP’s boycott was only for tourism, but they intimated that if no progress was made it would be expanded to sports, the film industry, and business in general. The NAACP’s staunchness enabled others to appear more “reasonable” while also working for the controversial goal of moving the Confederate flag from atop the State House. This “radical flank effect” helped make the issue of moving the flag, once so controversial that it was not even on the agenda, now a matter of how to compromise to get it down. The South Carolina Baptist Convention in an official resolution regarding the flag resolved, one, that the flag be relocated and two, that the economic sanctions be withdrawn (South Carolina Baptist

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Convention, November 9, 1999). Linking the two is evidence of the radical flank effect.

“Your Heritage is My Slavery”

Redefining the meaning of the flag in South Carolina was done in terns of citizenship, manners, racial insensitivity, and a more complete rendering of history. A universalistic rhetoric opposes any use of the thing no matter where it is was evoked by some in the anti-flag movement. More effective for bringing the flag down off the Capitol dome, however, was the semi-universalistic rhetoric which pinpointed the issue as one of having the Confederate flag atop the people’s sovereign house of government. Semi-universalistic rhetoric, Jasper ( 1 997) explains, opposes displaying something in certain kinds of places, including the one currently used or proposed but not outlawing the thing altogether (276). “Bring the flag down” slogans captured this point. Flag opponents often stipulated that people were Free to commemorate their heritage in the privacy of their homes but not on the dome of a capitol which embodies all the citizens of the state.

One image was that the flag was linked to slavery, racism, prejudice, and bigotry. Outside of South Carolina this meaning for the Confederate flag was well established. For instance, a Kansas school policy asserts that displays of the Confederate flag violate the racial harassment and intimidation policies of the school (“Court Rejects Appeal . . .” 2000, A3). In South Carolina a vociferously vocal minority of Whites defended the meaning of the Confederate flag as one of respect for history. The anti- flag response, articulated strongly in the two years before the flag came down from the dome, was “your heritage is my slavery.” That this message worked is partly based on the decades long efforts of educators, historians, and cultural critics to include the lives of slaves in discussions of South Carolina’s past. Critical communities influence cultural shifts on issues such as race relations. While critical communities acting in partnership with movements do not guarantee success for their cause, they “do guarantee that there will be controversy about an issue that is likely to have previously been seen as unproblematic” (Rochon 1998,53). This very same inclusive history, however, offended pro-flag adherents who often castigated the more realistic historical education as “political correctness.” The fact that what the Confederate flag meant and symbolized outside of South Carolina, racial harassment in the Kansas schools, for instance, highlights the danger for pro-flag forces if and when the heretofore parochial discussion within South Carolina about the merits of flying the Confederate flag over the State House ever entered a broader audience.

The Confederate flag evoked, then, an injustice frame of racial discrimination and a heritage of slavery and subjugation. Incorporation of culture and biography into analysis of protest movements helps us see, “People can be reasonable-applying their cultural repertory of morals, meanings, and skills in purposive and creative ways-short of calculating self-interest” (Jasper 1997, 98). The cultural move concerning the meaning of the flag, and the potential to remove it, stimulated

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mobilization, citizen compassion, changes in public opinion, and the shape and growth of the social movement to bring it down.

National Attention: Expanding the Scope of the Conflict

Initial stories about the Confederate flag atop the State House led to follow up stories creating an echo of more stories in different media outlets. The “information cascade” changed the dynamics of the debate, making it more national and strengthening the hand of the NAACP as it sought support for the boycott. What occuhed was an expansion of the scope of the conflict (Schattschneider 1960) from one of local concern to a national race relations issue which was going to harm South Carolina businesses. National media covering the South Carolina Republican primary combined with the dueling protests of citizens for and against the flag activated what Lipsky (1 968) calls “the attentive public” to the controversy, a latent and potentially sympathetic public otherwise not paying attention to the issue or mobilized. Add to these the existing organizational structures provided by churches, an active and focused SC NAACP (Gallman interview, October I I , 2000), a concerned Chamber of Commerce, and a committed SC Progressive Network and the opportunity structure was set for the flag issue to blaze onto the scene (Tarrow 1998; Costain 1992; and McAdam 1982).

A chain of influence is often evident running from a critical community, to the mass media, and then to social behaviors (Rochon 1998, 77). Following an examination of news articles on the Confederate flag in The State newspaper of Columbia, we can draw two observations as to the local media coverage of the issue from February 1962 to July 2000. First, the Confederate flag was a well covered and documented political issue in February 1962, the month the General Assembly first flew the flag, and in July 2000, the month the flag was removed from the State House dome and a smaller, more historically accurate flag placed on the grounds in front of the capitol. However, in the 38-year period between these events, the issue of the Confederate flag fluctuated. According to our results, TheStare published an average of 56 news articles on the Confederate flag per month from February to December 1962. Although coverage slightly dropped throughout 1963, it quickly declined thereafter. Throughout the rest of the 1960s, coverage of the issue in The Stare averaged 18 articles per month; in the 1970s, coverage fell to five articles per month; and in the 1980s. it slipped to a low of three articles per month. Coverage of the issue picked up again in the 1990s. averaging 25 articles per month for the decade.

Second, coverage of the Confederate flag increased in almost every year there was a gubernatorial or legislative election. In every state-level election year from 1962 to 2000, coverage of the issue increased in October and November in comparison to previous months. The largest increases in coverage came in the 1994 and 1998 gubernatorial elections. In the 1994 election between Beasley and Democrat Nick Theodore, although average monthly coverage from January to September was 22 articles, in October and November the number of articles averaged 67 articles. In the

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1998 election between the incumbent perceived anti-flag, Republican David Beasley and Democratic challenger Jim Hodges who had yet to commit himself to a position on the Confederate flag, coverage of the issue averaged 19 articles per month between January and September. However, coverage jumped to an average of 43 articles in October and November. For an illustration of the yearly coverage by The State newspaper of the Confederate flag, see the graph below.

Figun 1. Number of Newspaper Articles on the Confederate flag by Year of Publication

I960 1970 1980 1590 2000

Year

Sources: Articles published in 7%e Store newspaper, Columbiq South Carolina, from 1962 to July 2000.

These observations led us to make two general conclusions concerning local media coverage of the issue of the Confederate flag by The State newspaper. First and foremost, this evidence runs contrary to those who argue that the issue of the Confederate flag was not controversial enough to be newsworthy until 1999 and 2000. In 1962, the year the flag was raised over the State House, news coverage of the issue was the second highest over the 38-year period. According to Senate President h o Tempore Drummond, however, the Confederate flag was never really a big political issue. He identified Senator Kay Patterson’s “opposition to the flag on the dome and in the Chambers going back to the 1970s” as the only sign of public activity on the issue (Drummond interview). The evidence From the newspaper articles challenges such assertions.

Second, increases in news coverage in every state-level election year, especially in 1994 and 1998, indicate that journalists andlor candidates for elected ofice raised the issue in campaigns. This indicates that social movements and groups on all sides of the issue were active when it came time for citizens to vote.

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Conclusion

Although the Confederate flag issue slowly faded from the headlines after the compromise was signed on July I , 2000, the debate still remains a big political issue in South Carolina for some voters and groups. According to Senate President Pro Tempore Drummond, “There is still a constituency that puts the flag before education, health care, elder care, etc.” Some would even “vote for a pro-flag candidate over anyone”( Drummond interview). “Even though the flag remains,” Representative Neal pointed out, “this debate spawned a renewed commitment among [Bllacks and progressives to grass roots organizing and activity” (Neal interview).

With the Confederate flag now relocated to the Confederate Memorial in front ofthe State House, some members ofthe pro-flag contingent have organized a coalition called “No Votes for Turncoats” in an effort to dislodge legislators from ofice who once supported keeping the flag on the dome but later voted for the compromise that moved it. More than 100 flag supporters from points around the state attended a rally in an effort to oust these “Benedict Amolds” (Bauerlein 2000).

At the ceremony moving the flag off the dome and to the new location on the capitol grounds, pro-flag activists chanted, “Off the dome, and in your face.” Anti- flag protesters, unsatisfied with the compromise, countered, “Shame” (Personal observati ons).

The controversy over the Confederate flag atop the South Carolina State House highlights the importance of timing, framing, coalitions, and moral voice in reform efforts. Displayed is the fluid nature of social movements with national and local social movement organizations working symbiotically and in separate niches to press for change. The context in South Carolina underlines the importance of layers of previous residues of reform and movement which shape and reconstitute the odds of hture reform efforts’ successes or failures. Social movement results have to be assessed carefully, for simple success and failure is not the point. There can be “measures ofjustice” (Woliver 1993) which add up cumulatively to heartfelt progress and hope. It is central to understand that

“Seeing social movements as a source of vision and voice, rather than the vanguard of a new world, I am not bothered by the fact that they accomplish so few oftheir stated goals. These goals are often overdrawn; the importance of protesters, I think, lies more in their moral visions than their practical accomplishments. They are more like poets than engineers” (Jasper 1997,379).

Bringing the Confederate flag down off the State House dome was a monumental accomplishment of visionary people. The compromise which placed a different, smaller, more historically accurate flag behind the Confederate Monument on the State House grounds is defined by different people. The facts do not speak for themselves but are interpreted socially by different people (Rochon 1998, 90). We

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must remember that “what was won must be judged by what was possible” (Piven and Cloward 1977, xiii). The framing work done by the anti-flag movement emphasized citizenship, inclusion, the symbol ofthe State House, and the building of a value connection between anti-flag forces and the larger public. The struggle was one of applied philosophy (Rochon 1998,56). Extensive preliminary work prepared the terrain for the mobilizing effects of several galvanizing events, both the NAACP boycott and the national media attention, which pressured institutions-parties, the legislature, the governor-to respond.

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Appendix A: Chronology of Events

February, 1962: South Carolina Legislature resolves by concurrent resolution to fly the Confederate flag over the State House dome in recognition of the Civil War centennial.

1978-1983: Proposals to take down the flag are killed in the Legislature. Democratic Senator Kay Patterson (Richland County) sponsors one resolution in 1983; defeated 52-44 in Assembly (House) with 28 representatives not voting.

1993: Issue raised by State Attorney General Travis Medlock on legality of the flag flying by Concurrent Resolution. Medlock states Budget and Control Board could order it down. Chair of Budget and Control Board dismisses that idea.

March 1994: Then Governor Carroll Campbell says the Stars and Bars. one of the Confederate national flags, should replace the naval battle flag on the dome.

April 1994: A group of AFrican American ministers reports it is considering an economic boycott to force the flag down.

May 20, 1994: NAACP Chairman William Gibson says his group will organize national economic sanctions against South Carolina.

May 27 - June 2,1994: Some Legislators crat? a compromise to lower the flag and place two other Confderate flags h i d e monuments on the State House grounds. Senate approves. House twice refuses to consider the compromise. Legislature adjourns without action.

June 1994: Columbia Mayor Bob Coble and 23 business and community leaders file suit seeking a court order to bring the flag down.

July 1994: Flag opponents march in Myrtle Beach. State they will call for economic sanctions if the flag flies past Labor Day.

August 5. 1994: A statewide poll shows 52 percent of South Carolinians oppose removing the flag.

August 9, 1994: In the Republican state primary, 76 percent of voters oppose removing the flag. Ballot contained a referendudstraw poll on the Confederate flag.

September 1994: Flag opponents march in Hilton Head Island and state they will wait for the South Carolina Supreme Court to act on the lawsuit before calling for a boycott. Flag adherents march the next day.

November IS. 1994: State Supreme Court agrees to hear the case.

May 1995: The General Assembly passes a law protecting the flag during upcoming State House renovations.

~~ ~

724 Politics & Policy VoL 29 No.4

July 1995: Mayor Coble asks that his lawsuit be dismissed since Legislature's May law makes it moot.

August 1996: A poll shows only 40 percent of South Carolinians support keeping flag up on State House dome.

November 27. 1996: Republican Governor David Beasley proposes in televised speech to move Confederate flag to a monument on State House grounds. Idea endorsed by former governors, including Republican Carroll Campbell.

December 1996: Statewide poll shows 48 percent of South Carolinians favor lowering the flag.

January 21, 1997: [Martin Luther King. Jr.. day, an optional holiday for state employees at the time]; 500 religious leaders march in Columbia to remove the flag, encircle the Legislature (meeting in USC Visitors Center building while State House being renovated) hold hands. and silently pray to bring the flag down.

January 23. 1997: South Carolina House rejects Beasley plan; votes to hold a special referendum to let voters decide. The Senate lets the bill die in cornminee.

March 8. 1997: Governor Beasley acknowledges failure of the flag compromise.

May 5,1998: South Carolina Senate votes to put a nonbinding flag referendum on the November general election ballot.

May 7, 1998: Senate Republicans force the referendum proposal out of the state budget.

September 1998: In South Carolina governors race, incumbent David Beasley repeats his pledge to never again try to remove the llag from the dome. Democratic candidate Jim Hodges denies that he tells people privately that he would work to bring the flag down. 'It's not going to happen," Hodges says. Hodges. however, does support moving the flag but will not initiate any effort to remove it.

October 10, 1998: Led by SC NAACP President James Gallman. I00 people demonstrate on State House steps against the flag.

November 2. 1998: Hodges defeats incumbent Beasley for governor. A "Dump Beasley" movement by flag supporters probably helped Hodges.

December 9, 1998: 200 African American church leaders %om the Congress of National Black Churches march down Columbia's Main Street to demand removal of the Confederate flag.

June 1999: African American legislators request that the cover of the new legislative manual be reprinted to remove images of the Confederate flag.

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July 15, 1999: The NAACP at its national convention passes a resolution calling for tourists to boycott South Carolina until the flag is removed.

July 20, 1999: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference moves its 2000 annual convention from Charleston, SC to Charlotte, NC.

July 26. 1999: Governor Hodges meets with NAACP. Governor's staffbegin polling legislators to see if they would support a compromise to move the flag from the dome of the State House.

November 9. 1999: In its first statement against the Confederate flag, representatives of the SC Baptist Convention (the state's largest religious denomination), urge the General Assembly to remove the flag from atop the State House.

December 7, 1999: Former Governors John West and Robert McNair join 5 1 legislators who voted to raise the flag in 1962 in calling for it now to be removed.

January 7.2000: Republican primary debate, West Columbi& SC. covered by national media When MSNBC's Brian Williams presses Texas Governor George W. Bush to take a position on the Confederate flag, the audience boos loudly.

January 8,2000: More than 6.000 people march up Main Street to state capitol steps in support of the Confederate flag. When addressing this pro-flag rally, State Senator Arthur Ravenel. R-Charleston. triggers additional controversy when he calls the NAACP "the National Association of Retarded People."

January 17. 2000: [Mattin Luther King, Jr., holiday]. More than 46,000 people march in downtown Columbia to the steps of the State House to "Take the Flag Down.' Speakers included the President of the national NAACP. Kweisi Mfume.

January 18, 2000: President Clinton states that the Confederate flag should not fly over the SC State House.

January I9.2000: During Governor Hodges' "State of the State" address he asserts the flag should be moved. "sanctions or no sanctions."

February I . 2000: Representatives of the $7 billion-a-year SC travel industry anend the Governor's Convention on Tourism and Travel, urging lawmakers to remove the flag.

February 14,2000: Joined by legislators, community leaders, USC football coach Lou Holti and U.S. Congressperson Jim Clyburn, Governor Hodges explains proposal to move the flag next to the statue of Civil War General Wade Hampton on the State House grounds instead of on the dome of the capitol.

February 19,2000: South Carolina Republican Primary.

March I6.2000: Announcement of survey results from the Columbia Metropolitan Convention and Visitors Bureau that the NAACP boycott cost the Midlands [Columbia area] $3.9 million. 20 percent of its major convention business since July.

726 Politics & Policy Vol.29 No.4

April 7. 2000: Charleston Mayor Joe Riley concludes a 120-mile. five-day walk from the coast to the capitol called "Get In Step With South Carolina" to remove the flag from the dome. He criticizes lawmakers for not removing the flag. Meanwhile, on other side of the State House. 300 flag supporters sing "Dixie" and criticize those who want to remove the flag.

April 13. 2000: On the 139' anniversary of the tiring on Ft. Sumter, the South Carolina Senate votes 36-7 to remove the Confederate flag from the dome o f the State House and place a square version on a pole behind the Confederate Soldier Monument at Main and Gervais Streets.

May 10.2000: On South Carolina's first official Confederate Memorial Day, House votes 63- 56 to remove Confederate flag from the dome and place a square version of the banner behind the Confederate soldier's monument on the grounds of the state capitol. at the intersections of Main and Gervais Streets.

May 23,2000: In a live statewide broadcast Governor Hodges signs legislation removing the flag from the dome.

July 1,2000: While crowd of more than 3.000 watch, flag removed from the dome by Citadel cadets; Confederate flags also removed from the House and Senate chambers; Confederate re- enactors run up square version of the Confederate battle flag at new 30 foot flagpole behind the Confederate Soldier's Monument. NAACP will continue boycott until flag off the State House grounds altogether.

Sources: "Divided We Stand." 1999. The Stare. August I , ID. 5D; Stroud Joseph S. 2000. How It Happened: Timing Was Key on Flag." The Slate, June 25. Al , A 10- 1 1.

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Appendix B: Interviews Conducted

Ards, Sheila Benedict College, February 7,2001.

Bonanno, Phyllis 0. Former President of Columbia College, March 9, 2001. Washington, D.C.

Bursey: Progressive Network leader Bret Bursey, August 24,2000.

Cobb-Hunter, Gilda SC Representative and Minority Leader, October 10,2000.

Coble: Mayor Bob Coble, City of Columbia, August 22, 2000.

Drurnrnond: South Carolina State Senator John Drummond, August 4.2000.

Gallman: South Carolina NAACP President James Gallman, October 1 I . 2000.

Holness, Gail. Benedict College, Columbia, SC, February 20,2001.

McLawhorn, J.T. Columbia Urban League. Columbia, SC, February 20.2001.

Morrison: MYND Corporation Legal Councel, Steve Morrison, November 20,2000.

Neal, Joseph. SC State Representative, February 7,2001.

Riley: Mayor Joseph Riley, Jr., City of Charleston, written responses to survey questions, February 27.2000.

Sheheen, Fred R. USC Institute of Public Main, and Coordinating Committee member for United 2000, Columbia, SC Telephone interview, April 2,2001.

Sibley, Julia Director, Ministry ofJustice and Reconciliation, South Carolina Christian Action Council, October IS, 2000.

Suber, Glenda Honors Program and Political Science Department, Benedict College, Columbia, SC. March 13,2001.

Wilkins: South Carolina Speaker of the House, David Wilkins, July 28.2000.

Woolley: Public Relations Liaison, South Carolina Chamber of Commerce, Deb Woolley. October 5.2000.

728 Politics & Policy Vol.29 No.4

Notes

Angela D. Ledford and Chris J. Dolan would like to thank the Institute for Southern Studies at the University of South Carolina-Columbia for a Graduate Research Grant which enabled them to conduct research for this project. All three authors thank the interviewees who worked us into their busy schedules to help us better understand the groups and movements involved in the Confederate flag issue. An earlier version of this article was delivered at the 2000 Southern Political Science Convention in Atlanta, Georgia. We thank the discussants on that panel for their helphl comments on the paper.

I The Council of Conservative Citizens is a national organization that seeks to preserve White European culture and immigration policies and considers itself the 'me voice ofthe American right."

According to its website. "the League of the South, is committed to repelling the relentless and mean-spirited campaign of ''cultural cleansing" being waged by the "politically correct" elements of American society."

South Carolina 729

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