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Non-NewtonianLegislativeViscosity
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Non-Newtonian Legislative Viscosity
Paper presented to 2016 Political Studies Association Annual Conference
Steven MacGregor University of Stirling
Work in progress – not to be quoted without the author’s permission
Introduction Legislative typologies provide a useful mechanism by which to identify different “types” of parliament and the impact they are likely to have during the legislative process. Using Blondel’s (1990) theory of legislative viscosity, and the Scottish Parliament as a case-study, this paper will argue that we need to pay more attention within the legislative studies discipline to the nature of parliamentary scrutiny of individual Bills to better understand and describe the variation there is in that impact and to avoid reinforcing stereotypical generalisations about the nature of executive-legislature relations. We can use this finer-grained detail to improve the predictive power of legislative studies typologies. This in turn can help to explain why minority governments are able to secure the parliamentary passage of their legislative programmes in contradiction to what theory would suggest. The paper begins with an analysis of the assumptions which lie behind characterisations of “weak” and “strong” parliaments, focusing on what Blondel’s theory of legislative viscosity would predict about the nature of a minority government’s legislative programme. It will then consider the fate of four prospective pieces of government legislation from the SNP minority administration’s legislative programme in the Scottish Parliamentary session 2007-2011. This will show that the predictive element of Blondel’s theory breaks down at the level of individual Bills and overestimates the level of impact which parliaments are likely to have. This is because of the need to take into account the differential context surrounding each Bill and the implications that has for the manner in which the parliament will conduct its scrutiny. The paper concludes by identifying the key variables which should feed in to a refinement to Blondel’s theory to enable that differential context to be taken into account in minority government settings - leading to the concept of “non-newtonian legislative viscosity”. Typologies of legislature impact, variables influencing parliamentary “strength” and Blondel’s theory of legislative viscosity A common issue within the legislative studies literature is how parliaments compare to each other. Is the impact of a parliament on legislation of a type? If it is, what is that type and what does that tell us about the parliament? Between them, Blondel (1990), Mezey (1990), Norton (1990) and Polsby (1975) have developed a range of concepts and frameworks to describe and categorise the variation which exists in parliamentary impact in the legislative process. These different legislative typologies can be brought together to create a single unified spectrum of parliamentary impact in the legislative process as set out in figure 1. The left-hand side of the spectrum is where we would place parliaments which have a significant impact on the legislative process. In Polsby’s language these would be the transformative parliaments, in Mezey’s they are active and strong policy-making, in Norton’s they are policy-making legislatures and in Blondel’s they are highly viscous. Here is where we would place parliaments which routinely create and pass their own legislation, which routinely block government legislation, or which routinely make significant changes to government legislation. The right-hand side is where we would place parliaments which have little impact in the legislative process. In Polsby’s language these would be the arena parliaments, in Mezey’s they are minimal with little or no policy-making capacity, in Norton’s they have little or no policy effect, and in Blondel’s they are low viscous. Here is where we would place parliaments which routinely rubber-stamp legislation put before them, perhaps discussing and considering that legislation but making no discernible changes to it.
FIGURE 1 - UNIFIED SPECTRUM OF PARLIAMENTARY IMPACT IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Significant parliamentary influence Minimal parliamentary influence
Transformative (Polsby) Arena (Polsby)
Policy-making (Norton) Policy-influencing (Norton) Little or no policy effect (Norton)
Active (Mezey) Vulnerable (Mezey) Reactive (Mezey) Marginal (Mezey) Minimal (Mezey)
Strong policy-making (Mezey) Moderate policy-making (Mezey) Little or no policy-making (Mezey)
High viscosity (Blondel) Low viscosity (Blondel)
Discussion of where to place individual legislatures on this spectrum often takes place at a theoretical level, based on assumptions about the impact which constitutional, institutional and political variables will have on a legislature’s ability to create their own legislation or to block or amend the government’s. Literature from Norton (1994) and Mezey (1991) are particularly influential in this debate. For example, more or less potential legislature power will be assumed depending on whether the political system is parliamentary or presidential or a hybrid of the two - with the assumption being that legislatures in parliamentary systems will be weaker, because they will usually require the confidence of the legislature on a vote by vote basis to survive. Party systems are considered to be important, with two-party systems with cohesive parties and a dominant main party expected to result in low parliamentary influence compared with a multitude of small parties where none dominate. Party structure is also thought to have an impact, with those that are more centralised expected to lead to weaker parliaments because of the reliance of MPs on party affiliation to get elected and then to stay elected and the conditioning effect that has on their behaviour. Internal procedures are also expected to have an influence on parliamentary behaviour. “Strong” committee systems (small, informed, with the ability to take evidence and which get involved early in the legislative process) are thought to be better able to hold governments to account and to challenge the policy presented to them. The resources which a parliament has at its disposal may also have an influence on a legislature’s ability to process, understand and challenge potentially complex legislation produced by the government. Finally, and of most relevance to this paper, is party control within the legislature. Logically, where the governing party controls a majority of votes it ought to find it easier to “control” the parliament than if it had a minority of votes. Blondel’s theory of legislative viscosity is particularly relevant when seeking to understand what should happen in a minority government situation. Blondel’s focus was on a legislature’s power of reaction when faced with government legislation. Where a legislature is very compliant (i.e. dominated by a majority government), Blondel suggests that government Bills do not merely pass, they pass very easily and the time spent in debate is limited. As legislatures become freer (i.e. where the government party cannot dominate them), Blondel suggests that the time spent in debate increases and amendments are debated and passed. In Blondel’s terms, a compliant legislature will result in low viscosity and a relatively quick and easy passage for government Bills, and a free legislature will result in high viscosity and a slower and more difficult legislative passage. Blondel’s concept of legislative viscosity is attractive for its logic and its simplicity and because it provides a theoretical foundation and justification for the stereotypical assumptions which are typically made about the nature of executive and parliamentary relationships. It seems intuitively obvious that the less control which a government exerts over a legislature, the more that legislature will act independently and seek to assert itself on government Bills. And vice-versa, the more that a government has control over a legislature, the less independent and less able that legislature to resist the government legislation put before it. Fundamentally, Blondel’s concept assumes that where legislatures have “power” over governments they will always seek to exercise that power. Blondel’s conception of the relationship between parliamentary freedom and viscosity can be represented thus.
Minority government case-study – the Scottish Parliament There haven’t been many opportunities to test assumptions about legislature influence on a minority government’s legislative programme in the UK setting, principally because single-party majority government or coalition governments which command a majority of votes within the chamber have been the norm. Since the Scottish Parliament was established in 1999 Scotland has seen both of these formations but also an SNP minority government of 2007-2011. This provides an opportunity to investigate what actually happens when a parliament has the opportunity to substantially block or amend a minority government’s legislative programme. Established in 1999, the Scottish Parliament attracted an initial flurry of academic interest, particularly as it was supposed to herald a “new politics” in Scotland built on consensus and power-sharing. Since it has become apparent that many features of “old politics” have prevailed, academic interest has waned. In particular, relatively little empirically-based study of the Scottish Parliament’s legislative process has been carried out. That which is available (for example, Shephard and Cairney (2005) and Cairney (2006)) is now outdated, and does not cover the minority government period. General commentary on that period has focused on the relative lack (at least at the time the analysis was conducted) of legislation which was brought forward by the government. (Keating and Cairney, 2009) This paper will therefore add to the limited existing literature on the Scottish Parliament’s legislative process. It will also add to the relatively limited body of legislative studies that examine in detail the actual policy impact which the parliament has had on individual Bills. Case-study Bills – 3rd session of the Scottish Parliament This paper draws from four case-study Bills from the SNP Government’s legislative programme from 2007-2011. These Bills were deliberately chosen to provide a spectrum of policy contentiousness, based on the author’s knowledge of the nature of each Bill. A summary of the very different policy objectives of each Bill as originally conceived by the government is set out below:
Scottish Local Government (Elections) – To decouple the Scottish Parliament election from Scottish local government elections i.e. to ensure that they took place on different days in the future.
Public Records – To improve the management of records across the Scottish public sector by placing an obligation on them to produce and implement a Records Management Plan.
Alcohol – To reduce alcohol consumption in Scotland through provisions such as: a minimum unit price on alcohol; an age-verification policy; a social responsibility levy; and giving local flexibility to make decisions on the sale of alcohol to under-21s.
Referendum – To hold a public referendum on whether the Scottish Government should negotiate with the UK Government for Scottish independence from the UK.
Blondel’s theory would predict that the legislative viscosity which each Bill should encounter should effectively be a constant and, in the minority government context, that it should be high. That is, we should anticipate that the parliamentary passage of each of the Bills would have been equally slow, that a significant number of non-government amendments should have been lodged for each and that a substantial portion of those non-government amendments should have been passed against the will of the government and that as a consequence we should be able to identify a material change in the policy content of each Bill.
To test this, comparable data on key viscosity indicators for each Bill was extracted from the Scottish Parliament’s Official Report of Bill proceedings and is summarised in the table below (with further detail provided in Annex A). Table 1 – case-study viscosity indicators
Scottish Local
Government (Elections)
Public Records Alcohol Referendum
Time taken to pass Bill 134 days 160 days 350 days n/a
Number of stage 1 evidence sessions 2 3 8 n/a
Number of stage 2 evidence/amendment
sessions 1 1 5 n/a
Total time taken (hours) 4:53 7:08 36:57 n/a
Number of non-government amendments
lodged
0 41 62 n/a
Number of non-gov amends (including
inspired gov amends) passed 0 56 36 n/a
Number of government defeats on
amendments (gov and non-gov) 0 0 9 n/a
Significance of non-gov amendment
impact None Procedural/cosmetic Significant policy change n/a
Scottish Local Government (Elections) Bill – It seems clear that this Bill’s passage was
characterised by a very low level of legislative viscosity. Its parliamentary passage was the quickest of the Bills, it had the fewest stage 1 sessions, it had no amendments lodged or passed in relation to it, and the legislature had no policy impact whatsoever on the Bill.
Public Records Bill – This Bill’s parliamentary passage was still characterised by a relatively low level of legislative viscosity but its parliamentary passage was qualitatively different than that of the previous Bill. A little more time was spent debating the Bill but this time a large number of non-government amendments were lodged and a relatively large number were passed both by the legislature and by the government on behalf of the legislature. None of the non-government amendments passed by the legislature were opposed by the government and no government amendments were defeated. The effect of the non-government amendments which were passed could best be described as procedural/cosmetic. Some amendments changed words without changing the legal effect of the Bill (e.g. the word ‘approval’ was changed to ‘agreement’ in a number of places) and others introduced procedural requirements (such as introducing a requirement to consult publicly in the preparation of guidance to be produced under the Bill). None of the changes made or inspired by the legislature could be said to have fundamentally changed the policy impact of the Bill (either through the removal of provisions or by the addition of provisions).
Alcohol Bill – This Bill was again characterised by a different type of legislative viscosity than seen for the first two Bills. Significantly longer was spent processing this Bill, both in terms of the amount of evidence which was taken and in the time spent processing amendments. A larger number of non-government amendments were lodged than in relation to the Public Records Bill and, although in strict numerical terms, less amendments (lodged by the legislature or inspired by the legislature) were passed their impact was vastly different. In relation to this Bill, the government was defeated on 9 amendments (a combination of government amendments not being passed and non-government amendments being passed against the government’s wish). The policy impact of those amendments was much more significant than for the Public Records Bill with, amongst other things, a non-government
amendment removing the key provision of the Bill (the minimum unit price per unit of alcohol provision).
Referendum Bill – This Bill saw a fundamentally different level of viscosity in that, although it was a key component of the legislative programme of the government, it was not introduced to the Parliament because all of the main opposition parties had made clear their intent to defeat it.
Non-newtonian legislative viscosity Rather than “disprove” Blondel’s theory and leave it at that. we should consider why it breaks down at the level of individual Bills and whether it can be revised to better predict what will happen in a minority government setting. The starting point is the fact that Bills are not identical and we need to ensure that our theories of legislature impact are capable of taking that into account. This is a fact that, whilst self-evident, seems to often be lost in parliamentary impact analysis - analysis tends to be aggregated up into generalisations about the parliamentary passage of Bills. Bills vary in size, in scope, in subject matter, in how controversial they are, in their press profile and in their public profile. The Ministers in charge of Government Bills have varying personalities, as do the committees which process them. Stakeholder views of Bills vary dramatically depending on how closely or otherwise the policy intentions of a Bill match their preferences. In many respects each Bill is unique, and so is its parliamentary passage, even if the process which they must go through to become law is virtually identical. It is that variation in type which has consequences for how a parliament will process a piece of legislation. To address this variation in Bills in the context of Blondel’s conception of legislative viscosity, we can draw from concepts in a different scientific discipline. In the study of the viscosity of liquids it is common to differentiate between two types: newtonian liquids (such as water, where its viscosity is a constant in its liquid state) and non-newtonian liquids (where viscosity varies according to the stress which is applied to the liquid). In some non-newtonian liquids a thickening (an increase in viscosity) occurs when greater stress is applied. That concept of variable viscosity in non-newtonian liquids can also be applied to the passage of legislation in a minority government setting. In conducting “legislative rheology” we should take ‘stress’ into account to provide the nuance we need to explain the reality of government-legislature relations. The new starting assumption this introduces is that parliament will not always exercise its “power” in a minority government setting but that whether it does so will be decided by a number of stress variables. If a Bill is uncontroversial and does not trigger legislature opposition we could expect it to pass quickly and easily despite the fact that the legislature could, if it wanted to, block or amend it. But if a Bill is highly controversial and does trigger legislature opposition, the viscosity of the legislature will be activated and the Bill should experience a more troublesome parliamentary passage. There are arguably three contextual variables which are crucial for understanding to what extent a legislature’s potential legislative viscosity will be activated in a minority government setting (a fourth, relevant to majority government settings, is internal party cohesion). These are:
Policy divergence – It is reasonable to hypothesise that the more divergent the views between the government and opposition parties within the legislature on the policy topic(s) addressed in a Bill, the more likely that opposition parties will seek to block or amend it. And vice-versa, the more that the policy views of the government and opposition parties converge, the more amenable they should be to the passage of a Bill.
Stakeholder views – It is also reasonable to hypothesise that, the more external criticism that is voiced about a Bill by key stakeholders, and the more changes to the Bill which stakeholders lobby for, the easier it will be for the legislature to challenge the government position and to formulate potential amendments. And vice-versa, the more that stakeholders express support for the principles of a government Bill the harder it will become for opposition parties to rationalise and justify their opposition to a Bill and to generate detailed amendments to it.
Perceived political gain – We should assume that some element of rational choice decision-making will inform the legislature’s position in relation to a government Bill. For example, where a Bill is technical, uncontroversial and is supported by stakeholders the legislature potentially stands to lose more than it gains in stakeholder support and public perception by blocking it. By contrast, the legislature may see advantage in seeking to block a Bill which is unpopular or is opposed by key elements of stakeholder opinion.
Returning to the four case-study Bills, what can we say about the stress levels for each? Table 2 below sets out, for each of the three key variables, what description best characterises the stress/context surrounding each Bill. Table 2 – case-study stress indicators
Stress indicator Scottish Local
Government (Elections)
Bill
Public Records Bill Alcohol Bill Referendum Bill
Policy divergence Nil Nil Major Polar opposites
Stakeholder views Supportive Mixed Mixed Mixed
Political environment Neutral Neutral Antagonistic Highly antagonistic
Overall level of
‘stress’
Very low Low High Very High
Scottish Local Government (Elections) Bill – All main parties expressed their support for the Bill at the Stage 1 debate1 with Jim Tolson of the Liberal Democrats noting that ‘this is a difficult debate, not because there will be much argument but rather because there is so much consensus’. The lead committee’s stage 1 report2 noted the broad agreement amongst stakeholders for the principles of the Bill and, although some concerns were raised about electoral turnout and funding of elections, the environment surrounding the passage of the Bill was essentially supportive. With the recommendation stemming from an independent report3, there was limited scope for political conflict to arise. There were no votes taken in relation to this Bill. On that basis, the overall level of ‘stress’ for this Bill could be argued to be very low.
Public Records Bill – All of the main parties in the legislature expressed their support for the principles of the Public Records Bill during the Stage 1 debate4 so the policy divergence between the government and the legislature was nil. There was a clear split in stakeholder opinion on the public records Bill – archivist organisations and bodies representing survivors
1 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/lgc/reports-09/lgr09-08.htm 2 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/s3/committees/lgc/reports-09/lgr09-08.htm 3 Following problems with significant numbers of ballot papers being spoiled at the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary
elections, which took place alongside local authority elections, the Gould Report recommended the decoupling of
the elections. 4 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/apps2/business/orsearch/ReportView.aspx?r=6102&mode=html#iob_54774
of abuse were very supportive of the Bill while some public bodies and third sector bodies5 while supportive of the principles of the Bill opposed the statutory nature of the regime. The political environment for the Bill could best be described as neutral. It was a relatively technical Bill and with it origins stemming from the Historic Abuse Systemic Review: Residential Schools and Children’s Homes in Scotland 1950-95 (initiated by the previous Labour/Liberal Democrat coalition government) there was no obvious scope for criticising the government for bringing it forward. There were no votes taken on the Bill. On the basis of stakeholder dissent only (and principally because during the passage of the Bill some stakeholders asked for the Bill to be withdrawn, and inspired the non-government amendments which were lodged) the overall ‘stress’ level of the Bill could be described as low rather than very low.
Alcohol Bill – There was major policy divergence between the government and all of the main oppositions on one key element of the Bill – the proposal for an alcohol minimum unit pricing provision6 – although most of the other provisions of the Bill were supported in principle. Stakeholder views were polarised, with the health professions very supportive of the minimum unit pricing provisions and key elements of the licensed trade opposed7. The political environment was highly antagonistic – the minimum unit pricing provision was a key element of the government’s policy programme and the opposition parties were opposed to it, making for considerable friction during debates. Votes were taken on the Bill. Taken together, the level of ‘stress’ associated with this Bill could be described as high.
Referendum Bill – The nature of the policy for this prospective Bill meant that the government and opposition parties took polar views – all of the opposition parties expressed their opposition to a referendum Bill. On this topic, a better barometer than stakeholder opinion is public opinion, and this showed that there were mixed views amongst people in Scotland on whether a referendum should be held and whether they supported independence.8 The political environment on this topic was extremely antagonistic, creating regular arguments between the government and opposition parties.9 The Bill was not introduced to the parliament so there is no parliamentary passage in that sense. The level of ‘stress’ associated with this Bill could easily be described as very high.
Case-studies – relationship between stress and viscosity Taking these stress and viscosity variables together we should get a relationship as represented in the graph below.
5 http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/apps2/business/orsearch/ReportView.aspx?r=6102&mode=html#iob_54774 66 The committee’s stage 1 report records that there was a division of opinion amongst the committee on the
minimum unit pricing provision, and this was the main issue discussed during the stage 1 debate when the
opposition parties made clear that they were opposed to the provision. 7 Compare, for example, the evidence submitted to the Parliament by the British Medical Association and the
Scotch Whisky Association. 8http://blogs.ft.com/westminster/2011/05/poll-finds-substantial-support-for-scottish-
independence/#axzz1TtWvTq2d 9 http://news.stv.tv/election-2011/244993-labour-leader-attacks-independence-referendum-risk/
The relationship between the two sets of variables is never likely to be as precise as suggested by the graph but the basic point which is illustrated is that there can be significantly varying levels of legislative viscosity within a minority government setting depending on the context of the Bill. All four Bills are arguably good examples of the point. There was virtually no stress associated with the Scottish Local Government (Elections) Bill and accordingly it had a relatively quick and easy passage through the legislature. On the Public Records Bill, divergent stakeholder opinion generated a higher level of stress (although still relatively low given the broad political support for the purpose of the Bill) and this resulted in more debate, and the lodging and passing of non-government amendments (although they had very limited policy effect). The level of stress in relation to the Alcohol Bill was of a different order of magnitude, with different sets of stakeholders holding conflicting and entrenched positions and with the government and opposition parties fundamentally split on the minimum unit price of alcohol provision. The end product was the removal of the minimum unit pricing provision, representing a fundamental change in the policy impact of the Bill. Finally, conflict between the government and opposition parties on whether a referendum Bill should be introduced to the parliament and passed was a regular source of friction in the 3rd session of the Scottish Parliament. The level of political opposition was so great that the government decided against introducing the Bill, representing its anticipated reaction of the level of legislative viscosity which the Bill would encounter. Conclusion There is an understandable temptation to reach for generic labels to describe parliaments based on perceptions about government/legislature relationships, or based on aggregated data about the fate of Bills and amendments. This approach does have value in that it can help differentiate different types of parliament and the relative significance of their involvement and impact in the legislative process. But they can also serve to reinforce lazy stereoypes and can mask the often considerable variation in how the same parliament treats individual Bills. That differentiation is both interesting and important. It demonstrates that parliaments will often not exercise the “power” they have to influence legislation. This paper has shown some examples of how the legislative programme of the minority SNP government of 2007-2011 was treated by the Scottish Parliament. It shows that individual Bills experienced considerably different treatment, determined by how controversial each Bill was. It helps demonstrate why a minority government may succeed in passing a substantial legislative programme – individual Bills may of themselves not trigger significant political opposition and there may be little potential political benefit (and potential significant disbenefit) of opposition parties opposing these Bills. Where controversy does arrive, we can see in the cases of alcohol
minimum unit pricing and the potential referendum Bill the ability of Parliament to flex its muscles against a minority government. To reflect this reality better in theory we might therefore want to consider the fate of minority government legislative programmes through the lens of non-newtonion legislative viscosity, which allows for this differential context to be taken into account.
ANNEX A CASE-STUDY VISCOSITY INDICATORS
Scottish Local
Government
(Elections) Bill
Public Records
Bill
Alcohol Bill Referendum
Bill
Time taken to pass Bill 134 days 160 days 350 days n/a
Number of stage 1
evidence sessions 2 3 8 n/a
Time taken on stage 1
evidence sessions 2:04 3:57 21:43 n/a
Session1 1:39 (25/3/09) 0:36 (8/12/10) 2:44 (10/2/10) n/a Session 2 0:55 (1/4/09) 1:32 (12/1/11) 3:04 (24/2/10) n/a Session 3 n/a 1:49 (19/1/11) 3:25 (3/3/10) n/a Session 4 n/a n/a 4:15 (10/3/10) n/a Session 5 n/a n/a 2:39 (17/3/10) n/a Session 6 n/a n/a 2:05 (23/3/10) n/a Session 7 n/a n/a 1:56 (24/3/10) n/a Session 8 n/a n/a 1:35 (5/5/10) n/a Time taken on stage 1
debate 1:42 (14/5/09) 1:14 (10/2/11) 2:25 n/a
Total stage 1 time 3:46 5:11 24:08 n/a Number of stage 2
sessions 1 2 5 n/a
Time taken on stage 2
sessions 0:01 1:14 8:44 n/a
Session 1 0:01 (3/6/09) 1:14 (2/3/11)
0:52 (4/9/10)
(e) n/a
Session 2 n/a
n/a 1:52 (15/9/10)
(e) n/a
Session 3 n/a n/a 3:44 (22/9/10) n/a Session 4 n/a n/a 1:26 (29/9/10) n/a Session 5 n/a n/a 0:50 (5/10/10) n/a Time taken on stage 3
amendments 0:00 0:02 (est) 3:03 n/a
Time taken on stage 3
debate 1:06 0:43 1:02 n/a
Total time taken at stage 3 1:06 0:45 (est) 4:05 n/a Total time taken an stage
1, stage 2 and stage 3 4:53 7:08 36:59 n/a
Total non-gov
amendments lodged 0 41 62 n/a
Total non-government
amendments passed 0 25 12 n/a
Total government
amendments inspired by
legislature
0 31 24 n/a
Total government defeats
on amendments 0 0 9 n/a
BIBLIOGRPAHY
Blondel, J., Legislative Behaviour: some steps towards a cross national measurement, in Legislatures, Norton, P., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp.186-207. Mezey, M. Classifying legislatures, in Legislatures, Norton, P., Oxford University Press, 1990, pp.149-176. Olson, David M. & Mezey, Michael L. (Eds.), Legislatures in the Policy Process: the dilemmas of economic policy, Oxford: Owbow Books, 1991, pp.201-214. Mitchell, J., New Parliament, New Politics in Scotland, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 53, 2000, p.605-621. Norton, P., The legislative powers of parliament, in Flinterman, A., Heringa, A.W. and Waddington, L., The evolving role of parliaments in Europe, Maklu, 1994, pp. 15-32. Norton, P., Legislatures in perspective, in Norton, P. (ed.), Parliaments in Western Europe, London: Frank Cass, 1990, pp. 143-152.
Polsby, N. W., “Legislatures”, in Handbook of Political Science, F.I. Greenstein and Nelson Polsby (eds.), Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Press, pp.257-319 P. Cairney, ‘The analysis of Scottish Parliament committee influence’, European Journal of Political Research, pp.181-208, 2006 M. Shephard and P. Cairney, ‘The impact of the Scottish Parliament in amending Executive legislation’, Political Studies, pp.303-319, 2005 M. Keating and P. Cairney, “The New Scottish Statute Book: The Scottish Parliament’s Legislative Record since 1999”, in The Scottish Parliament 1999-2009: The First Decade, edited by C. Jeffrey and J. Mitchell, Hansard Society, 2009.
