Dealing with the dilemmas posed by power asymmetry in intergroup conflict

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Perception of Power, Threat, and Conflict Intensity in Asymmetric Intergroup Conflict:Arab and Jewish Citizens of IsraelAuthor(s): Nadim N. Rouhana and Susan T. FiskeSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, No. 1, (Mar., 1995), pp. 49-81Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174322Accessed: 02/05/2008 16:40

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Perception of Power, Threat, and Conflict Intensity in Asymmetric Intergroup Conflict

ARAB AND JEWISH CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

NADIM N. ROUHANA Boston College

SUSAN T. FISKE University of Massachusetts at Amherst

This article examines the perception of power, threat, and conflict intensity in an asymmetric intergroup conflict. About 900 Arab and 900 Jewish high school and university students in Israel were surveyed on their sense of threat and security, the intensity of the conflict between their communities, and power relations between Arabs and Jews who both are citizens of Israel. Scales were developed to measure all three concepts in that setting. Factor analysis of the power scale shows that the two groups distinguish between two dimensions of power. Both sides agree that the Jewish population asymmetrically controls more institutional power and to a lesser extent social-integrational power. The two groups distinguish between two dimensions of threat, but what threatens one group evokes either security or no threat in the other. Perceived power, threat, and intensity of conflict are best predicted by political affiliation, although other social and political predictors were also found. A profile of the right wing in the Israeli sample emerged, which resembled, but did not mirror, the profile of the left wing in the Arab sample.

Research on mutual perceptions and other psychological processes in interethnic and international conflict has generally focused on parties who enjoy equal or close to equal power relations. Studies in this area have covered a broad range of issues, such as biases in images of the enemy (Bronfenbrenner 1961; Silverstein and Flamenbaum 1989; White 1965), mutual threat (Jervis 1985; Lebow and Stein 1987; Stein 1988), and mutual perceptions, psychological dynamics, cognitive distortions, and common misperceptions (Burn and Oskamp 1989; Jervis 1976; Sande et al. 1989). An underlying assumption of many studies is that whatever social psychological

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 39 No. 1, March 1995 49-81 ? 1995 Sage Publications, Inc.

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50 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

dynamics apply to one party apply to the other as well. For example, it is assumed that the enemy perceptions held by one party and the psychological processes that support them are the mirror image of the other side. The examination of the psychological processes in parties with structural asymmetric power has not received as much attention in the literature on interethnic conflict or in laboratory studies involving intergroup relations.

But parties to conflict, whether interpersonal, professional, or racial, are more often than not unequal in their power. In particular, in interethnic conflicts, especially those in multiethnic states (Horowitz 1985) or even in advanced industrial democracies (Messina and Fraga 1992; Rhodebeck 1992), parties do not enjoy the same power nor do they show the same sense of threat or security. Examination of power-asymmetric situations should become central to understanding the dynamics of interethnic conflict as each party might bring to the conflict different motivations, concerns, perceptions, and analyses. For example, to what extent do groups in asymmetric relations agree as to the distribution of power between the two groups, and what are their goals in this regard? Do they cognitively construe power the same way? Is their power status related to their sense of security or threat? What threatens them most? Do they attribute the same intensity to the conflict between them? The differential power status might affect perceptions of power, threat, and

intensity of conflict, thus affecting the strategic conflict behavior of each

party. In this article, the conflict between Jewish and Arab citizens in Israel is chosen further to define and examine some of these questions.

But if we want to examine ethnic conflict with asymmetric power between

parties, we immediately have to answer two questions embedded in the term itself. First, when talking about high power and low power, whose definition are we using? That of the groups themselves, of observers, of the researchers? Or are we applying some criteria according to which power is measured? For

example, in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, each party views itself as low

power depending on the relational context. Israel considers itself weak vis-a-vis the Arab world, but the Palestinians see themselves as less powerful vis-a-vis Israel. In our case study, we hypothesized that one party-the Jewish majority-controls more power than the Arab minority, but we asked each of the parties to evaluate its own power in the relationship. This means that the relative power of each side was posed as an empirical question to be answered by the parties, with possible disagreement.

Second, what definition of power are we using and how is the relative

power of each party to be measured? Is it tangible power or also intangible power? Power over the other party or power to achieve goals? These questions bring us to the essence of the power concept and require us to adopt a

working definition.

Rouhana, Fiske /ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 51

POWER, THREAT, AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

Whereas threat and intensity of conflict are relatively simple concepts that psychology and political science have dealt with extensively, power remains one of the most complex and most elusive concepts in the social sciences.

DEFINING AND MEASURING POWER IN AN INTERGROUP CONFLICT

Social scientists and philosophers have always had a hard time defining power. Testimony to this difficulty is the broad and diverse range of definitions advanced by political theorists, philosophers, economists (for example, Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Boulding 1989; Dahl 1957, 1963; Lukes 1974; Rorty 1992; Sharp 1980), sociologists (for example, Blalock 1989; Laue and Cormick 1978), and social psychologists (for example, Depret and Fiske 1993; French and Raven 1959; Kelman and Hamilton 1989; Ng 1980; Rubin and Brown 1975; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). This article, which takes a social psychological perspective on power and examines it in a field study of a real conflict, anchors the social psychological perspective in a broader political theoretical view of power.

Research in the social psychological tradition has relied heavily on experimental manipulations to examine the effects of power on dynamics of conflict, negotiation, and reconciliation. It has sought operational definitions in the context of controlled experimental research. But concepts such as

power, threat, and intensity of conflict have profoundly different meanings in conflicts that involve groups' collective well-being, identity, and often collective existence than they do in the laboratory. This makes it difficult to define these variables in a way that refers to collective identity, competing political ideologies, and systemic structures that are usually involved in interethnic conflicts. Despite its limitations, the experimental method has

provided different definitions and procedures, some of which can be ade-

quately applied to field research in interethnic conflict, particularly if inte-

grated with the approaches and definitions advanced by political theories. Social psychological research has offered a number of approaches to the

study of social power, three of which are frequently applied. In the first

approach, intangible resources were simulated in the laboratory, usually by varying the status of disputants or their access to information and powerful others. Operational definitions of power were conveniently based on this

conception (see Rubin and Brown 1975 for a review). The second approach is based on the power typology proposed by French

and Raven (1959) and further developed by Raven (1992). Rooted in the social influence tradition, the model, called "a power/interaction model of


interpersonal influence," defines power as the potential for social influence. It proposes six bases for power, conceived of as resources that the influencing agent can use to change the behavior, beliefs, or attitudes of the target. The six bases of power, or resources, are coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, expert power, referent power, and informational power (Raven 1965, 1992; Raven and Rubin 1983). The intangible resources used in the first approach as the bases for power can be subsumed within this typology as legitimate, referent, or informational power, depending on the structural relationship between the agent and target. In response to conceptual and methodological criticism, Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989) introduced consis- tency to the conceptual bases of power by defining all of them in terms of the ability of one person (the agent) to administer tangible or intangible outcomes for another (the target). The model is most frequently used in the organiza- tional setting but is cumbersome for interethnic and international conflict as it is extremely hard to differentiate empirically the conceptually separate bases of power in the intertwined conflict setting, although the model has been used to analyze international conflicts (see, e.g., Hare and Naveh 1986; Raven 1990). Moreover, threat and power are also confounded in this model, as coercive power is defined as the use of punishment or the threat of punishment by the agent or mediated by the agent.

The third approach is the power dependence theory (Blau 1964; Emerson 1972; Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Molm 1989; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). In its most general terms, the theory states that the mutual dependence charac- terizing social exchange provides the structural basis of power. In an interaction between two people, one person's dependence is considered the source of the other's power. Kelley and Thibaut, using social psychological terms, developed a formal framework of interpersonal relations that relied on this mutual dependence: an interdependence matrix that describes how two

people control each other's outcomes in the course of the interaction (Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). But in this model, it is the characteristics of the interdependence, as described below, that define each side's power. This model is extended here by the application of asymmetric interdependence to conflict relationships. The operational definition of power derives directly from the definition adopted above: the perceived control over allocation of resources or outcomes for the other party. Conceptually, this model can subsume the French and Raven (1959) typology, as a party's source of asymmetric dependence in an interdependent relationship can stem from any of the power sources defined by the typology. But what defines

power for one party is not the resources (in any of the six bases in the typology above) but the perceived control over the outcome for the other side.

Kelley and a group of his colleagues (1983) identify some fundamental features of interdependence in close relationships, which are also useful for


analyzing interdependence in conflict relationships. The three main features of that model are symmetry, facilitation or interference, and strength. These features are comparable to our three main structural variables in this study: perceived power, threat, and intensity of conflict.

Most important is symmetry, that is, whether the perceiver and target have mutual or one-sided power or control over each other's outcomes. The symmetry or asymmetry of interdependence essentially predicts who pays attention to and thinks about whom and how much the party does so (Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Riley and Fiske 1991). (In our work this is equivalent to the power concept.)

Another important dimension is facilitation or interference, that is, whether the perceiver's and target's respective goals are mutually helpful or hindering. Facilitation of the other person's goals leads to positive emotions, whereas interference leads to negative emotions (Fiske and Ruscher 1993). This suggests that the quality of attention may be influenced by the degree of perceived facilitation or interference. In our work, interference is partly comparable to threat, bringing about negative attention.

A final dimension is the strength of interdependence. In effect, it is the proportion of one person's outcomes that depends upon the other. Strength is here predicted to intensify or polarize responses. This is comparable to intensity of conflict in the present study.

In sum, our working definition of power is the perceived control over allocation of resources and over the outcome for the other party. This definition captures two essential components common to many of the other definitions, components that can be applied to field (and experimental) studies. Questions that we designed to measure the perception of power have been based on this definition.1

1. This view of power coincides with some of the recent thinking and rethinking of the concept of power, which goes beyond the debate on the "three faces of power" by political theorists (see Bachrach and Baratz 1970; Ball 1988; Isaac 1992; Lukes 1974; Wartenberg 1992). For example, Isaac (1992) stresses the structural aspect of power relations rather than the behavioral dimension. He defines social power as "the capacities to act possessed by social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate" (p. 47). This is similar to Giddens's (1979, 93) definition of power as the capability to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes depends on the agency of others. Both definitions emphasize the relations of interdependence, which makes the distinction between "power over" and "power to." Similarly, Rorty (1992) argues that power is both relational and marginal in the sense that whatever group is empowered

always and only has power relative to someone else's lack of power and to someone else's complicit cooperation. The attribution of power is typically the attribution of marginal power, "more power than Y, or even power over Y, to bring it about that he does something." But even that is not enough, because unless we specify what kind of action is in question-to bring about what-the attribution of power is empty. (p. 6)

54 JOURNAL OF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

The questions we used to measure power (see Table 1) reflect the margin- ality, interdependence, and specificity of outcomes as emphasized above. We asked subjects to assess which of the two groups (Arabs or Jews in the country) has more power (or less power) to achieve a list of 14 tangible and intangible objectives.

SENSE OF THREAT

Although power has been assigned a major role in the examination of dynamics of interethnic and intergroup conflict, the feeling of being threatened has not. But if one considers security as one of the basic needs that identity groups in conflict have to satisfy (Azar 1990; Burton 1987), then it becomes obvious that examining the sense of threat and security is of major concern. In this study, it is the sense of threat that parties experience, not threats that parties make or use, which is at the center of our concern. Threat in the latter sense, using threats by parties, has been examined in experimental settings (Deutsch 1973) and in international conflict (Lebow, Jervis, and Stein 1984). But the examination of the sense of threat and security is less a focus of concern in the literature. Sense of threat or security is defined as the extent to which the party feels danger to (or security in) its physical existence, social and economic well-being, or its identity and values. It is measured by asking people to what extent various actions invoke in them a sense of threat or a sense of security (see the Method and Findings sections). This concep- tualization of threat and security is consistent with the interference or facilitation dimension of the power dependence theory discussed above. The

perception of one party as either hindering or facilitating the achievement of one's goals affects the sense of threat or security the party feels vis-a-vis the other.

As a first step, we wanted to find out whether groups in conflict with high and low power perceive and understand threat differently-both the nature of threat and extent of threat each party feels. For example, the high-power group might be threatened by losing some of its grasp over power-a change in the status quo-whereas the low-power group might be threatened by the

open-ended perpetuation of the status quo.

INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

The strength of interdependence in the power dependence theory is

perceived as the proportion of one party's outcomes that depends upon the other. Strength of interdependence is here predicted to contribute to the


TABLE 1

Factor Analysis of Perceived Relative Power of Arabs and Jews in Israel to Achieve Various Goals

Factor Loading Mean

Jewish Arab Jewish Arab Sample Sample Sample Sample t

Factor 1 1. Determine national character of state .70 .70 1.69 1.51 4.88* 2. Determine social and cultural character .61 .73 1.64 1.61 0.47 3. Distribution of political representation .61 .73 1.64 1.61 0.47 4. Ownership of land .58 .64 1.78 1.60 4.52* 5. Actualize rights to the country .54 .48 1.82 2.26 9.37* 6. Control centers of power .53 .66 1.20 1.28 2.69* 7. Economic power .44 .59 1.69 1.69 0.98

Factor 2 8. Determine collective identity of Arabs .70 .58 3.16 2.80 6.31* 9. Use of collective protest methods by Arabs .65 .60 3.17 3.12 0.33

10. Extent of social integration of Arabs .62 .57 2.38 2.62 6.42* 11. Determine demographic balance .59 .44 3.05 2.75 5.51* 12. Determine extent of equality .43 .40 1.94 2.12 4.45* 13. Ability of endurance .42 .57 3.14 3.60 7.60* 14. Optimal solution for Palestinian problem .37 .48 2.41 2.98 10.32*

NOTE: Calculations of means were based on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means Jews have much more power and 5 means that Arabs have much more power; 3 is the equal power midpoint. Two power factors for each sample explain 35% and 38.3% of the variance in the correlation matrix of the Jewish sample and Arab sample, respectively. Also means of the Arab and Jewish samples on the power scale items and t test for the mean differences are provided. *p < .05.

feeling of intensity of the conflict. In power-asymmetric conflict, the proportion of the outcomes that depends on the other party is larger for the less powerful party. Therefore, it is predicted that intensity of conflict is perceived differently by parties to the same conflict, with the low-power party attributing more intensity to the conflict than the high-power party.

THE CASE STUDY: CONFLICT BETWEEN ARAB AND JEWISH CITIZENS OF ISRAEL

Within Israel of the pre-June 1967 borders (that is, exclusive of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem), Arabs and Jews are all citizens who enjoy


formal civic equality before the law but not full equality when all the laws of the country are reviewed (Kretzmer 1990). The Arabs, who were granted citizenship when Israel was established in 1948, today make up about 16% of its citizens. For the most part, Arabs and Jews live in separate towns, but six cities have mixed Arab-Jewish communities. This study did not concern the Palestinian or Jewish communities in the West Bank and Gaza, where an

uprising was taking place at the time of the research. Inside Israel proper, the relationship between Jewish and Arab citizens is

multifaceted, characterized by cooperation in many areas and conflict in

many others. The relationship between Israel and its Arab citizens evolved in the context of three main ideological pillars that are held by Israel and

supported by consensus of its Jewish population: Israel as a state of the Jewish

people; Israel as a democratic state; and Israel as a state with profound security concerns (Rouhana 1989). Many of Israel's policies toward its Arab citizens are guided by these principles. But researchers often disagree as to what principle guided which policies. For example, although researchers

generally agree that Israel employed a systematic system of control over its Arab citizens (Lustick 1980; Smooha 1980, 1984; Tessler 1980), some attribute this system of control to Israel's ideological considerations (Jiryis 1976; Zureik 1979) and others to its security needs (Israeli 1991). Recent works examine the inherent tensions among the three pillars of Israel's policy guidelines, particularly the contradiction between Israel as a Jewish state and as a democracy (Peled 1992; Rouhana 1993; Smooha 1992). Because Israel's

policies are motivated by arguably contradictory guidelines, the relationship between Israel and its Arab citizens itself is often permeated with ostensibly contradicting manifestations, such as conflict and cooperation. Thus conflict between Israel and its Arab citizens is frequent over land ownership, distribution of resources, share in the power base, role in Israeli society, and the

identity of the Arab minority and of the state itself. These issues are also

complicated by the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Arab citizens identify closely with their Palestinian counter-

parts in the territories, although they have not shown readiness to join in their

uprisings (due to the different bases of each Palestinian group's dispute with Israel; Rouhana 1991) or to move to a Palestinian state if one is established in the territories as a result of the Israel-PLO agreement on interim self-

government arrangements. Many of the issues of conflict between the state and its Arab citizens were translated into items used in the questionnaires on

power and intensity of conflict. Although the conflict between the two groups is almost completely devoid of physical violence, it is often strained (Smooha 1992). We used the areas of contention, as well as open-ended interviews, to define areas of threat that each group expresses.

Rouhana, Fiske IASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 57

Conflict is by no means the only component of the multidimensional relations between the two groups, who are citizens within the same state. Arabs participate in the local and national elections and send representatives to the Knesset. They are members of the Histadrut, Israel's Workers Union, and in the most recent Histadrut elections, held in 1994, about 84% of their votes were cast for Jewish-dominated parties. They are integrated to a large extent in the Israeli economy, and they receive state social services, although to a lesser extent than the Jewish public (Kretzmer 1990). So far Arab citizens have not raised questions about the legitimacy of Israel's sovereignty or their civic status within Israel.

The Arab community has undergone a process of intense politicization (Smooha 1984, 1992) and developed a national consensus that crystallizes around three main points: support for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza; a call for full equality within Israel; and adherence to protest within the Israeli law (Rouhana 1989). Yet the political spectrum includes those who work within Zionist parties (about 52% of the Arab voters voted for Zionist parties in the 1992 elections), an exclusively Arab party (about 15% of the vote), and Arab-dominated parties (the Israeli Communist Party and the Progressive List for Peace, which together received about 33% of the votes). Other Arab groups boycott elections on an ideological basis, but their power base remains local rather than national. Recently, religious groups guided by the Islamic movement have been gaining support on both the local and national levels (Mayer 1988), although leaders of the Islamic movement have thus far not run in the national elections. The leaders of the Islamic movement are divided over whether their followers should boycott the elections or cast their votes for other parties. As a consequence of all these factors, in our study, political affiliation and religious values were used as predictors of each group's perceptions of power, threat, and intensity of conflict.

In conclusion, we wanted to examine the following questions:

1. Do the two groups agree on who controls power, and what evokes threat? 2. How are power and threat cognitively structured by the two groups? 3. What are the social and political predictors of the attribution of power, threat,

and intensity of conflict? 4. Is the conflict perceived as more intense by the low-power group?

Answering theoretical questions in a field study poses some difficulty because, given the complexity of a real-life intergroup conflict, we cannot control the variables that we can control in experimental settings. Neverthe- less, this field study also has an intrinsic value regardless of its theoretical


interest, because it provides a set of analyses on the differing views of Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel regarding their perceptions of power, threat, and intensity of conflict, and the social and political predictors of their perceptions.

METHOD

A questionnaire designed to examine perceptions of power, threat, and intensity of conflict was administered in the spring of 1989 to a sample of Arab and Jewish high school and university students in Israel.

QUESTIONNAIRE

A preliminary open interview was held with a group of academics, journalists, and high school and university students from both communities to explore the prevailing views on the meaning of power, threat, and the evaluation of the power status of the communities and to survey issues that are loaded with high intensity. There was a consensus among the Jewish interviewees that the issue of threat should be thoroughly examined, because the distribution of power by itself does not explain whatever tension there is in the relationship. The Arab interviewees emphasized more the issues related to power distribution and allocation of resources. Both views are incorpo- rated in the survey.

Based on these interviews, questions were formulated and included in three separate questionnaires on the perception of power, threat, and intensity of conflict. The formulation of the questions reflected the theoretical framework of the study.

Thus, in the power questionnaire, interviewees were asked to indicate to what extent the Jewish or Arab population had more power in determining the outcome on 14 issues. People's attributions about the intensity of the conflict on most of these items were examined in the intensity questionnaire. The threat and security questionnaire inquired about the extent to which each of 22 issues evoked threat or security in the interviewee.

The face validity of the questionnaires was examined with a group of social psychologists working in the area of conflict resolution between the two communities. The questionnaires were then pretested with a sample of

high school and university students to examine comprehension, time of administration, and perceived objectivity. After modifications, the power questionnaire consisted of 14 items, the intensity questionnaire of 11 items,


and the threat and security questionnaire of 22 items. Questions about background variables were also included.

SAMPLE

Our sample for the study consisted of 894 Jewish and 946 Arab high school and university studeits. Slightly more than one-third of the sample in each group was university students, and 44% and 52% of the Arab and Jewish

samples, respectively, were females. In Israel, Arab and Jewish high school students go to separate Arabic-

speaking or Hebrew-speaking schools-an arrangement accepted by both groups-but attend the same Hebrew-speaking universities. Thus high school students were surveyed in their classes in 11 Arab high schools and 11 Jewish high schools. University students were interviewed from five universities in Israel. Our goal was not to select a random sample, but towns and schools were selected to represent a broad range of geographic areas, ethnic and religious composition, and socioeconomic status. Therefore, in the Jewish sector, schools from large cities and development towns were included, as well as religious and kibbutz-run schools. And in the Arab sector, Arab schools in small towns, large towns, and in big cities were included, reflecting the religious composition, geographical concentration, and urban- rural distribution in the Arab community.

Trained Arabic- and Hebrew-speaking interviewers, with written permission from the department of education, arranged with principals and teachers to visit the schools and administer the questionnaires to 11th graders who had been chosen for the sample.

Questionnaires were administered in the mother tongue of the interviewees, Arabic or Hebrew. Because of the small percentage of Arab students in Israeli universities, some university students filled out the questionnaires in their classes, and others were approached outside classes by assistants to fill out the questionnaire.

The data for this study were collected in 1989, about two years after the

beginning of the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza (in December of 1987), and before the PLO-Israel agreement was reached (in September 1993). But the essence of the issues of conflict between Arabs and Jews in Israel has not been altered by either the uprising or the agreement, although the relationship between the two groups became somewhat strained during the uprising, affecting their intergroup attitudes and adding new dimensions to the perceived threat and power of each group.


FINDINGS

The first two questions of this article are (1) What meanings does each group assign to power and threat? and (2) Do the two groups agree on who controls power and what evokes threat? The findings on these two questions are presented below, according to the three separate variables: power, threat, and intensity of conflict.

POWER PERCEPTION

The power questionnaire included 14 items. Respondents were asked to assess "the relative power that Arabs and Jews have to fulfill their goals" on each of the 14 issues that emerged in the open-ended interviews. Respondents gave their answers on a scale from 1 (Jews have much more power) to 5 (Arabs have much more power) with 3 indicating equal power. The Cron- bach's alpha reliability for the scale was .72 for the Arab sample and .75 for the Jewish sample. The items of the scale are described in Table 1.

Factor analyses, forcing two, three, four, and five factors for each group, were produced to find out if any solutions are identical (or very similar) for both groups, which means that the same items load similarly on the same factors for each group separately. This procedure was used to construct the same power measures for both groups so they could be used in further analysis. The two-factor solution produced the exact same factors for both groups, as reported in Table 1. The averages of the scores on each scale were used as two measures of power for each individual in subsequent analysis.2

The first of the two common factors included seven items that refer to control of economy, power, representation, land, character of the state, and so on. This factor, therefore, is interpreted as the institutional-representational power that represents the majority power factor. On all items in this factor, both the Arab and Jewish samples attribute more power to the Jewish majority in the country. Averages of all items, except for one, are below the 2 point on the scale. The significant differences between the Arab and Jewish samples on four out of seven items in the scale are not on who has more power but on how much more power the Jewish majority has. The differences between the samples, on those four items, although significant, range from .08 (on item

2. Without forcing any solutions, factor analysis revealed four factors with an eigenvalue larger than one for each group. The composition of the factors for each group was different. Thus these factors can be used to elaborate on and refine the meaning of power for each group, a task beyond the scope of this article. A separate article that examines the meaning of power based on the results of unforced factor analysis is in preparation.


6) to .44 (on item 5) thus all falling below half a point on the 5-point scale. Given the sizes of the samples, the similarity, not the difference, between the means is the striking characteristic. Table 2 shows that the difference between the two samples on the average of all items of the factor is .09, with both groups attributing much more power to the Jewish population.

The second factor includes seven items, such as ability of endurance, protest, demography, integration, and equality. The difference in power between the two groups on this factor is less apparent and, unlike the first factor, the power of the Jewish majority is equivocal. Most item averages are between the points 2 and 3 on the scale. Both groups attribute to the Arabs slightly more power to fulfill their goals on two items: ability of endurance and use of collective protest methods (averages are above the 3 point). The Jewish sample also attributes slightly more power to the Arabs than they attribute to themselves in determining the collective identity of the Arabs and the demographic balance in the country. But as with the first factor, none of the differences between the two samples on any item reached half a point (see Table 1). Thus, given the sizes of the samples, it is again the similarity between the means that is the striking characteristic. This factor is interpreted as the social and political integration factor, and unlike the first factor, it is not a majority factor. It is seen as the factor of more or less balanced power.

It is worth noticing that the factors have the same order for both groups: the first factor is the power and control of the majority as reflected in the institutional power factor. This is also the factor on which both groups agree that the majority commands much more power than the minority. But the second factor shows that both groups realize that there are other unresolved issues on which the power of the majority is not as clear and in some components of which the minority might even have a slight edge. As Table 2 shows, the average of all items on this factor for the Arab sample is 2.86 and for the Jewish sample 2.70. Thus, although both samples attribute slightly more power on this factor to the Jewish population, the Arab sample is closer to the midpoint than the Jewish sample.

PERCEPTION OF THREAT

Interviewees were asked to what extent each of 22 items evoked a sense of threat or a sense of security on a scale from 1 (evokes a sense of threat) to 5 (evokes a sense of security), with a neutral midpoint of 3 (doesn't affect). Both factor analysis and the item means showed that three items were

problematic for both samples, and thus these items were removed, as ex-

plained below.


TABLE 2

Means of the Power Factors, Threat Factors, and Intensity Scale for Each Sample

Means of Factor Items

Jewish Sample Arab Sample t p

Power, factor 1 1.61 1.70 3.77 .001 Power, factor 2 2.70 2.86 3.17 .002 Threat, factor 1 1.78 3.66 60.4 .000 Threat, factor 2 2.77 1.82 32.5 .000 Intensity scale 3.58 3.78 6.97 .000

The Cronbach's alpha of the whole questionnaire for the Arab sample was .73 and for the Jewish sample it was .65. After discarding the three items (see Table 3), Cronbach's alpha for the questionnaire remained about the same, .75 in the Arab sample and .64 in the Jewish sample.

Factor solutions forcing two, three, four, and five factors for each group were produced to see if any solutions were identical (or very similar) for both groups. As with the power factors, the goal was to construct measures of threat that are the same for both samples. The two-factor solution produced very similar factors, based on which two threat scales (see Table 3) were formed.3 These scales will be used for subsequent analysis of threat.4 The Cronbach's alpha reliability measures for the first and second factors were .80 and .79, respectively, for the Jewish sample, and .84 and .59, respectively, for the Arab sample.

3. Three items in the questionnaire were problematic and therefore discarded. Item 14, existence of an Arab minority in Israel, produced very low loads on factor 1 and 2 for both samples (.18 on factor 1 for the Jewish sample and .13 on factor 2 for the Arab sample). Also, the mean for the Arab sample (2.45) shows that it is likely that this item was understood in two ways: that there are Arabs in Israel (security evoking) and that they are a minority (threat provoking). Similarly, item 8 (public discussions about cutting off Galilee) was misunderstood by the Arab sample as either cutting it off and closing it or cutting it off and joining a possible Palestinian state. It double loaded for the Arab sample on the two factors with low loads (.25 and .33). Item 12, referring to Jewish emigration from Israel, produced low loadings on both factors for both samples (.37 for the Jewish sample on factor 1, and .25 for the Arab sample on factor 1). By removing these three items, the two factors became almost identical for both groups, with one reconcilable difference. Item 15, which asks about "public discussion about establishing a Palestinian state in the territories," loaded highly on factor 1 for the Arab sample (.63) and highly but negatively on factor 2 for the Jewish sample (-.67). For scaling purposes it was kept on factor 1 (with positive sign assigned to it when averaging items, for both samples).

4. Unforced factor analysis of the threat questionnaire produced five separate factors for each sample.


TABLE 3

Factor Analysis of Perceived Threat and Security of Arab and Jewish Youth in Israel

Factor Loading Mean

Jewish Arab Jewish Arab Sample Sample Sample Sample ta

Factor 1 1. The uprising in the territories 2. Attacks and sabotage acts 3. Arabs in Israel join the uprising 4. Rise in Arabs' national consciousness 5. Arab majority in the Mideast 6. Change in U.S. policy toward Israel 7. Arabs birthrate 8. Cutting off Galileeb 9. Rise in Islamic movement in Israel

10. Arabs feeling they live here forever 11. Erosion of Israel's international image 12. Jewish emigrationb 13. Change in Israel's Jewish character 14. Existence of Arab minorityb 15. Discussions about Palestinian state Factor 2 16. Discussions about expulsion of Arabs 17. Rise in strength of the right wing 18. Expropriation of Arab land 19. Rise of Jewish religious movement 20. Erosion of democratic values 21. Discussions of PLO recognizing Israel 22. Arab emigration from Israel Other items 15. Discussions about Palestinian state 8. Cutting off Galileeb

14. Existence of Arab minority

.67 .64 1.52 3.72 39.60

.66 .56 1.43 3.11 31.55

.65 .58 1.48 3.31 33.25

.62 .65 1.99 4.40 53.93

.62 .67 1.65 3.79 45.54

.59 .59 1.58 3.74 42.99

.58 .66 1.65 3.76 45.83

.25 1.57 2.43 15.92

.53 .40 1.64 3.06 26.22

.51 .62 1.99 4.40 53.93

.47 .63 1.85 3.62 34.26

.37 .25 1.71 3.00 23.93

.37 .51 2.01 3.51 27.23

.18 2.70 2.45 4.22 .63 2.13 4.20 36.90

.82 .68 2.84 1.50 23.47

.81 .60 2.88 1.70 19.23

.61 .59 2.85 1.45 29.83

.61 .51 2.11 1.65 9.81

.60 .63 1.70 1.77 1.57 -.52 -.26 3.04 3.14 1.60

.49 .40 3.96 1.65 51.39

-.67c .33 .13

NOTE: Calculations of means were based on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates that the item evokes much threat and 5 indicates that the item evokes much security. Two threat factors for each sample explain 37.5% and 32.9% of the variation in the correlation matrix of the Jewish and Arab samples, respectively. In addition, means of the Arab and Jewish samples on the threat-security scale items and t test for the mean differences are provided. a. The t values show that the differences between the means of the two groups on all 19 items that remained on the scale, except for item 20, were significant at p < .05. b. Item was discarded. c. This item loaded negatively on factor 2 for the Jewish sample and positively on factor 1 for the Arab sample. For scaling purposes it was kept on factor 1 (with positive sign assigned to it when averaging items for both samples).


A t test for differences between the samples on the means of the 19 remaining items of the scale shows that for all items, except for one, the extent of the sense of threat or security evoked is significantly different. Only on one issue, erosion of democratic values in the country (item 20), was there no significant difference between the means of the two groups. This seems to be a common concern of both groups, as they were equally threatened by it. Both groups exceeded the midpoint of 3 on only one item, the public discussion about the PLO recognizing Israel (item 21), indicating that this act will evoke security not threat for both groups (perceptions borne out by subsequent events). On all other items, there seem to be substantial differences between the two samples. Notice that the difference in the values of the scale is not only in the extent of threat or security, but in whether the item evokes a sense of threat or a sense of security. Thus values of 1 and 2 represent two degrees of threat and values of 4 and 5 represent two degrees of security. So the difference in the degrees on this scale between the two samples represents also two contradictory feelings if the values are below and above the midpoint of 3.

The first factor seems to represent threat for the Jewish group. On all items the scores of the Jewish sample fall between 1 and 2. It includes items that evoke a sense of threat in the Jewish population: the uprising in the occupied territories, attacks and sabotage acts, a shift in U.S. policy on the Middle East, establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories, change in Israel's Jewish character, and so on. But for the Arab sample, in sharp contrast, all but one item on this factor fall above the midpoint of 3, thus evoking security rather than threat. Only one item falls on the midpoint (Jewish emigration). Thus, for the Arab sample, this is a security-evoking factor, although not a strong one: only two items exceeded the 4-point on the scale. So it seems that items that evoke threat in the Jewish sample tend to evoke neutrality or security in the other. Table 2 reflects this finding very well. The average of the means of all items on factor 1 for the Jewish sample is 1.78, but for the Arab sample this average is 3.66 (t = 60.4; p < .0000).

For the majority group, or the high-power group as revealed above, the first factor is the threat factor; for the minority, or the low-power group, it is the security factor. It will be of theoretical importance to find out whether this finding is rooted in relations between asymmetric power groups or the particularities of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The mirror image revealed in factor 1 is not replicated in factor 2. For the Arabs, factor 2 includes threat-evoking items such as public discussion about expulsions of Arabs, rise in the strength of the Jewish right wing, expropriation of Arab land, and so on. Most of the items are reactions to developments in Israeli society. But on average, for the Jewish sample these and other items


on this factor do not seem to evoke reassurance or threat except for one: Arab emigration from Israel, with an average of 3.96. The Jewish sample seems to be close to the midpoint of 3 on many of the items that threaten Arabs. As Table 2 shows, the average of the means of all items on factor 2 for the Jewish sample is 2.77, but for the Arab sample this average is 1.82 (t = 32.5; p < .0000), well into the sense of threat zone. The second factor-reactions within Israeli society-can therefore be interpreted as a threat factor for the Arabs. For the Jewish sample, the average of items is close to the neutral point of 3. Notice that the item "PLO recognizing Israel" is negatively loaded for both samples on factor 2, which means that those who tend to be most threatened (or reassured) by the other items in the factor tend to be least threatened (or reassured) by this item.

In sum, for the Jewish sample, the threat-security scale revealed two factors: a threat factor as the first factor, and a neutral factor as the second factor. There is no security-evoking factor. For the Arab sample, the minority and less powerful in the state, the first factor is a security-evoking factor and the second is a threat-evoking factor.

CONFLICT INTENSITY

The intensity of conflict over the first 11 items used in the power scale was used to examine the attributed intensity of conflict on each one of the items. Interviewees were asked to indicate the intensity of conflict over these issues on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating no conflict at all and 5 indicating very intense conflict. Cronbach's alpha reliability of the scale was .76 for the Jewish sample and .72 for the Arab sample. To test the hypothesis that the conflict is perceived as more intense by the low-power group, a t test showed that the Arab interviewees attribute more intensity than the Jewish interviewees (p < .0001; see Table 2).5

SOCIAL PREDICTORS OF POWER, THREAT, AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

To examine whether the attributions of power, threat, and intensity of conflict are correlated with social variables, multiple regression was under- taken with the following predictors: interviewee age, religious values, politi-

5. Factor analysis of the intensity scale revealed four identical factors for each sample. The rank order of the first three factors (in terms of eigenvalue) was reversed. A t test of differences on the means of scores of four factors showed that on three factors, Arab interviewees attributed more intensity, and on one there was no significant difference. The means of Jewish and Arab samples on the factors were 3.94, 4.16; 3.96, 4.20; 3.32, 3.35; and 2.84, 3.24, respectively.


cal affiliation,6 readiness to have a friend from the other national group,7 years of father's education, and years of mother's education. The findings of the regression analysis for the two power factors, two threat factors, and the intensity scale for both samples are presented below.

Predictors of perceived relative power. Table 4 shows that for the Jewish sample, the two predictors with a significant beta for perceived institutional/ representational power are gender and readiness to have an Arab friend. Jewish males, compared to females, attribute more power to the Jewish population. Also, the less ready a Jewish person is to have an Arab friend, the more power that person attributes to the Jewish population. For the Arab sample, only religious values were a significant predictor of this power factor: the more religious a person is, the less power that he or she attributes to the Jewish population.

On the second power factor, which represents social and political integration, two variables in the Jewish sample contributed significantly to the regression formula-readiness to have an Arab friend and political affiliation. The less ready that a Jewish person is to have an Arab friend, and the more associated with right-wing parties, the more power that person attributes to the Jewish population. As for the Arab sample, political affiliation was the

single significant variable. Unlike the Jewish sample, those Arabs who tend to the left of the political spectrum attribute less power to the Jewish majority (thus more power to their own group) on this factor. But notice that the size of the effect is less than the others.

Predictors of threat. For the Jewish sample, the threat factor 1 (which represents sources of threat to the Jewish sample) is significantly predicted

6. Three political categories were created for each sample based on party preference. For each sample, three blocs were created: right, center, and left. Sample members who fell outside these categories were excluded for the purposes of this analysis. Notice the different meaning of left and right in each sample, as the political spectrum is usually determined more by attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict than socioeconomic issues. In the Jewish sample, right was defined as respondents who favor parties from Likud to the right on the political spectrum, center as respondents who favor labor, and left as respondents who favor one of the three small left-wing parties. In the Arab sample, the right was defined as respondents who voted for Zionist parties and the left as those who do not vote at all; the center was defined as those who favor Arab or Arab-dominated parties (see Table 4 for details).

Coding all nonvoters in the Arab sample as left wing assumes that the vast majority of them do not vote on principle. Although this assumption may not hold for the general public, it is more likely to hold true for a student population that is politically dynamic and lively. But because we had no means to test this assumption, we redid the analysis using a different three-category scale based only on the existing parties. Results of the new analysis gave the same patters as reported in this article.

7. This variable was used as predictor because it is the only indicator we have of social interaction with members of the other national group. As such it is used as a measure of social proximity. Obviously, this variable could in itself be a dependent variable in a different analysis.

TABLE 4

Multiple Regression Analysis: Some Social Characteristics as Predictors of the Power Factors

Step Predictor Beta t p R F p

Dependent Variable = Power Factor 1 Jewish sample

1 Gender 0.15 3.68 .0003 .17 17.01 .000 2 Readiness for friend -.10 -2.26 .0243 .20 11.12 .000

Arab sample 1 Religious values -.16 -4.043 .0001 .16 16.35 .0001

Dependent Variable = Power Factor 2 Jewish sample

1 Readiness for friend -.21 -4.402 .0000 .26 36.13 .0000 2 Political affiliation .10 1.995 .0466 .27 20.16 .0000

Arab sample 1 Political affiliation 0.10 2.34 .0193 .10 5.502 .0193

NOTE: Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female. Political affiliation (for the Jewish sample, right wing included Likud, Tehiya, Tsomet, and Moledet parties; center included labor; and left wing included Mapam, Ratz, and Shinui. For the Arab sample, right wing included voting for Zionist parties; center included Arab and Arab-dominated parties; and left wing those who would not vote): 1 = right wing, 2 = center, 3 = left wing. Religious values: 1 = very religious, 2 = religious, 3 = keeps religious traditions, 4 = secular. Readiness to have a friend from the other national group: 1 = certainly, 2 = ready, 3 = ready, but prefer not, 4 = ready only to have Arab/Jewish friend.


by two variables: political affiliation and age. Sense of threat increases as political affiliation moves to the right (see also Table 7 for separate analysis of political affiliation), but decreases with age (but notice that the score on threat factor 1 is close to one for the whole sample). As to threat factor 2, the more neutral factor on average for the Jewish sample, Table 5 shows five

significant predictors: the more threatening these items are, the more likely the person is to be older, left wing, and ready to have an Arab friend; the less

likely the respondent is religious; and the higher the respondent's mother's education. The five significant predictors give an R = .81. Notice that political affiliations are reversely correlated with each one of the two factors: the right wing tends to be threatened by the first factor and the left wing by the second; the younger are more threatened by the first factor, the older by the second.

For the Arab sample, a different picture emerges. The first factor, which

represents sources of security to the Arab sample, is associated with left wing affiliation and lack of readiness to have a Jewish friend. The second factor, threat emanating from reactions in Israeli society, is also associated with

political affiliation: the more threatened the person is, the more right-wing that person's political views are. This is the same picture that emerged for the Jewish sample on the first factor.

Predictors of intensity of conflict. For the Jewish sample, intensity of conflict is predicted by a single variable: political affiliation (see Table 6). The more the person is inclined to the right wing, the more likely he or she is to attribute more intensity to the conflict. As Table 6 shows, in the Arab

sample, religious values and mother's education are the significant predictors. Attribution of higher intensity is associated with less religiosity and less mother's education. But notice that the value of R for both the Jewish and Arab samples is relatively small.

DIFFERENCES ASSOCIATED WITH POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND AGE

Because political affiliation and age appeared as significant predictors in

many factors of threat and power, a separate analysis for each variable is

presented below.

Political affiliation. Three political groups-right, left, and center-were constructed for each sample based on their party preferences. (See Table 4 for parties included in each category.) One-way analysis of variance tested whether the three political categories differed on the two power factors, the two threat factors, and the intensity scale. Orthogonal post hoc tests compared

TABLE 5

Multiple Regression Analysis: Some Social Characteristics as Predictors of the Threat Factors


Dependent Variable = Threat Factor 1 Jewish sample

1 Political affiliation .34 8.45 .000 .35 74.95 .0000 2 Age .09 2.3 .02 .36 40.24 .0000

Arab sample 1 Political affiliation 0.21 4.63 .0000 .25 35.68 .0000 2 Readiness for friend 0.16 4.28 .0000 .29 25.06 .0000

Dependent Variable = Threat Factor 2 Jewish sample

1 Political affiliation -.46 14.12 .000 .73 606.30 .0000 2 Readiness for friend 0.30 10.02 .000 .78 417.71 .0000 3 Religious values -.20 6.93 .000 .80 319.94 .0000 4 Age -.11 3.84 .0001 .80 248.59 .0000 5 Mother's education -.05 1.98 .0454 .81 200.74 .0000

Arab sample 1 Political affiliation 0.15 3.63 .0003 .15 13.20 .0003

NOTE: Political affiliation (for the Jewish sample, right wing included Likud, Tehiya, Tsomet, and Moledet parties; center included Labor; and left wing included

Mapam, Ratz, and Shinui. For the Arab sample, right wing included voting for Zionist parties; center included Arab and Arab-dominated parties; and left wing those who would not vote): 1 = right wing, 2 = center, 3 = left wing. Religious values: 1 = very religious, 2 = religious, 3 = keeps religious traditions, 4 = secular. Readiness to have a friend from the other national group: 1 = certainly, 2 = ready, 3 = ready, but prefer not, 4 = ready only to have Arab/Jewish friend.


TABLE 6

Multiple Regression Analysis: Some Social Characteristics as Predictors of the Intensity Score


Dependent Variable =

Intensity of conflict Jewish sample

1 Political affiliation -.18 4.33 .000 .18 18.71 .0000

Arab sample 1 Religious

values .10 2.61 .009 .10 5.94 .015 2 Mother's

education -.10 2.46 .014 .14 6.01 .0026

NOTE: Political affiliation: 1 = right wing, 2 = center, 3 = left wing. Religious values: 1 = very religious, 2 = religious, 3 = keeps religious traditions, 4 = secular.

the means of center and left, as well as right and the average of the other two

categories. Table 7 shows that for the Jewish sample, the three political groups do not

differ on the attribution of institutional/representational power to the Jewish

population. With striking similarity, they all agree that the Jewish population controls more power than the Arab population. But there are interesting differences on the second power factor, the two threat factors, and the

intensity scale. In all of those, the right wing differs from the average of the left wing and the center: the right wing thinks Jews have more power on the second power factor (the social and political integration factor), feels more threatened by external factors, feels less threatened by internal factors, and attributes more intensity to the conflict.

In the Arab sample, analysis of variance carried out on the three political categories shows that the three political groups differ significantly on the two

power factors, the two threat factors, and the intensity scale. Orthogonal post hoc comparisons between the means of three political categories show that as the political scale moves from the left wing to the right wing, there is a decreased sense of security (invoked by the same acts that threaten Israeli

society), an increased sense of threat emanating from changes in Israeli

society, and a decreased sense of intensity, creating a mirror image of the trends in the Jewish sample on those scales. As to the power factor, post hoc

analyses of differences between the means show that among the three groups, the left wing attributes to Arabs the least power on the institutional factor and

TABLE 7

Analysis of Variance of Power, Threat, and Intensity of Conflict Measures by Political Party Affiliation

Means

N Right (1) Center (2) Left (3) F p 2 vs. 3 1 vs. 2, 3

Jewish sample Power 1 672 1.58 1.62 1.61 0.64 .53 .66 0.29 Power 2 605 2.63 2.82 2.92 16.43 .0000 .05 0.000 Threat 1 651 1.63 1.80 2.00 46.39 .0000 .000 0.000 Threat 2 639 2.91 2.14 1.74 384.5 .0000 .000 0.000

Intensity scale 639 3.70 3.46 3.46 13.98 .0000 0.97 0.000 Arab sample

Power 1 699 1.61 1.75 1.55 7.88 .004 0.000 0.52 Power 2 651 2.61 2.96 2.79 13.46 .0000 0.009 0.000 Threat 1 643 3.34 3.79 3.96 24.65 .0000 0.02 0.000 Threat 2 703 1.49 1.47 1.69 13.75 .0000 0.000 0.06

Intensity scale 671 3.55 3.85 3.86 14.08 .0000 .79 .000

NOTE: Political affiliation: 1 = right wing, 2 = center, 3 = left wing.


the right wing attributes to Arabs the least power on the second factor-the social and political integration factor.

Age groups. Differences between high school and university students on the power factors, threat factors, and intensity scale were examined.

Table 8 shows that for the Jewish sample, there are no differences on the first power factor, but university students attribute less power to the Jewish population on the second power factor, feel less of a sense of threat emanating from outside the Jewish community, and more of a sense of threat emanating from changes within the Jewish community. The two groups do not differ significantly on attribution of intensity to the conflict.

In the Arab sample, the two age groups do not differ on attribution of power on the second power factor or on intensity of conflict. However, compared to high school students, university students attribute more power to the Jewish population on the first power factor (p < .0001), show more security on the first threat/security factor, and feel more threatened by changes within Israeli society.

DISCUSSION

POWER, THREAT, AND INTENSITY OF CONFLICT

Considering asymmetry, the first dimension of interdependence in our case study, it is clear from the findings that the power relations between the Jewish and Arab communities in Israel are asymmetric by consensus, as both samples attribute more power to the Jewish community. Factor analysis revealed that the two samples make the same distinction between at least two types of power. The first is institutional power, which includes tangible elements such as ownership of land, economic power, and intangible elements such as the determination of the national character of the state. The second factor is a latent power to determine the political and social integration of the minority; it includes mostly, but not exclusively, intangible elements such as extent of integration of the minority, its identity, and its ability to endure. Thus factor analysis confirms that the interviewees themselves distinguish between different types of power that one group has over the outcomes or objectives for each group.

As Table 2 shows, the extent of asymmetry is different on each factor. Both the Arab and Jewish samples attribute much more power to the Jewish community on the institutional power factor. This finding is not surprising given the political structure of Israel, which was established expressly as the


state of the Jewish people. Thus the state's institutions and power centers- such as the government, ruling parties, court system, state-controlled media, army, economic centers-are all either exclusively Jewish or Jewish dominated. The center of decision making for distribution of state resources such as land and budgets is under complete Jewish control. In our sample, the Jewish group attributes slightly more power to the Jewish community than does the Arab sample. The asymmetry of power on this dimension is drastically in favor of the Jewish population.

The asymmetry of power on the second factor is less drastic. Both groups agree that the Jewish population has more power but not to the same degree as on the first factor, making it a more balanced situation. The one-sided dependency of the Arabs on the Jewish majority on these issues is less obvious. Indeed, on some items on the second factor, both Arabs and Jews attributed more power to the Arab sample: ability to endure, to determine the demographic balance, and to determine their own identity, all of which are not as dependent on the Jewish majority as are other items.

Thus, even in drastically asymmetric institutional power relations between groups in conflict, not all types of power are asymmetric. Power asymmetry is better measured by referring to types of power rather than just one type of power. In general, the diagnostic and prognostic value of the perceived power distribution among ethnic groups in multiethnic states is of great importance if one assumes that conflict resolution requires addressing the needs of parties for power sharing, equality, and identity. It is possible, for example, that the combination of more or less balanced power on the integrational power factor and the gross asymmetry on the institutional power factor will mobilize the minority to seek more institutional power, maybe through integration. How- ever, from the majority's point of view, its control over institutional power is inextricably linked with the identity of the state as a Jewish state.

Our data show that the asymmetry of power between the Arab and Jewish communities discussed above is not accompanied, for the more powerful party, with a sense of security. Factor analysis of the threat/security scale shows that, for the Jewish community, the first factor is a threat factor rather than a security factor. The perceived power of the majority is not translated into a sense of security. The threat emanates from external factors, such as the Arab world, the Palestinian uprising, shift in U.S. policy, and so on, or directly from the Arab population in Israel, such as from Arab birthrate, Arab

feelings that they live here forever, rise in Arabs' national consciousness, and fear of Arabs in Israel joining the uprising. But this same factor that threatens the Jewish population reassures the Arab community. Thus for the high- power group, the most salient factor is one of threat, not one of security, but for the low-power group, the most salient factor is a security one.


This same factor, which represented threat for the Jewish sample and security for the Arab sample, showed very low correlation with either power factor for either group. Thus the sense of threat and sense of power are two constructs that under some conditions, as in this case, can be unrelated. If the examination of conflict dynamics is limited to power dynamics, one might miss an essential ingredient in the dynamics of conflict.

It is not clear whether the combination of high power and high threat characterizes high-power groups in ethnic conflict, or perhaps characterizes ethnic conflicts between immigrant ruling populations and indigenous populations (such as Protestants and Catholics in Ulster or Blacks and Whites in South Africa), or just reflects the double minority status inherent in this case: the Arabs are a minority in Israel, but the Jewish population is a minority in the Arab Middle East. It might also be related to the unique case of the Jewish community; threat might be rooted in its prolonged history of persecution. Comparative studies are needed to answer this question.

It is also possible that the Jewish population's control over centers of

power is either motivated or justified by the salient sense of threat emanating from the Arab world and, as such, associated with the Arab population. If this is so, the resolution of the larger conflict with the Palestinians in particular and the Arab world in general, which most probably will reduce the sense of threat, might open possibilities for more inclusion of Arabs in power-sharing capacities. Yet the resolution of the broader conflict with the Palestinians and other Arabs does not necessarily address the tension between an infrastruc- ture of a binational state and a superstructure of a Jewish state; arguably this tension might even increase as the external threat to the state is relaxed (Rouhana 1993).

For the Arab sample, the second factor on the threat/security scale represented threat. Most items on the factor describe developments in the Jewish sector in Israel, such as discussions about expulsions of Arabs, expropriation of Arab lands, erosion of democratic values in Israel, and Arab emigration from Israel. By contrast, the score of the Jewish population on this factor is close to the midpoint. Actually on all items that refer directly to Arabs (items 16, 18, and 22), the means of the Jewish sample are at the midpoint or higher.

Thus an incomplete mirror image emerges: the Jewish population is threatened by the items on the first factor, which reassure the Arab population; the Arab population is threatened by the items on the second factor, which

hardly matter to the Jewish population. There are very few items in the whole scale that either equally reassure or threaten both groups. This finding is of extreme importance to the present and future state of relations between the Arab and Jewish citizens in Israel, and perhaps to high- and low-power


groups more generally. Not only do the two groups seem to share very few sources of threat and security, but many eventualities that threaten the Jewish population reassure the Arab population, whereas many sources of threat for the Arab population do not threaten the Jewish population. Although both groups share Israeli citizenship, it seems that real common identity and a sense of common fate have yet to be established (Rouhana 1993).

The two groups further differed in their attribution of intensity to the conflict between their two communities over specific issues. As predicted, the low-power group attributed more intensity to the conflict than the high-power group. It is possible that when conflicting parties of unequal power enter into a conflict that challenges the status quo of their relationship, they bring different motivational bases to the conflict. The party with more

power is intrinsically interested in preserving the status quo that perpetuates the power balance; the party with less power is inherently motivated to disrupt the status quo and change the power relations toward parity. Thus the activities that challenge the status quo are initiated by the low-power party. The proportion of outcomes that depend on the other group is higher for the

low-power group than for the high-power group, thus making the conflict more intense at first. But although the difference in intensity is significant, it is small, a fifth of a scale point. Both groups, it should be remembered, agree that their conflict is intense.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PREDICTORS OF POWER, THREAT, AND INTENSITY

The most frequent predictors of the power factors, the threat factors, and the intensity of conflict in the Jewish sample were political affiliation, which

appeared on four of the five multiple regressions, readiness to have an Arab friend, and religious values. Gender, age, and mother's education appeared less frequently.

It seems that the right wing in the Jewish sample is likely to attribute more power to the Jewish population on the integrational power factor, to be more threatened by external factors, to be less threatened by internal developments in Israeli society, and to attribute more intensity to the conflict with the Arab community. This political profile is interesting. This group combines even more attribution of self-power and sense of threat than the average Jewish

society in Israel, but it also attributes more intensity to the conflict than the other political groups; it is less concerned than the other groups about

developments in Israeli society (such as democratic erosion). The combination of these factors makes the difference between left and right in Israeli Jewish society much more meaningful than just a position on an ideological


continuum. It is possible that the psychological underpinnings of the ideological groups are as qualitatively different as their political views.

Similar differences are found between high school and university students. The high school students' profile resembles the right-wing profile. University students perceive the conflict as being of slightly greater intensity than do high school students, perhaps because they go to college, where they meet Arab students for the first time in the same educational institution after their army service. Arab students in Israeli universities outspokenly support the Arab community in Israel and the Palestinians in the occupied territories, thus exposing the Jewish students to some examples of conflict between the two communities.

It is not clear why increased attribution of power to the Jewish community (on both power factors) is correlated in the Jewish sample with less readiness to have Arab friends. On the social and political integration factor, readiness to have an Arab friend is the best single predictor of the extent of power attributed to the Jewish population. The multiple regression analysis can neither point to possible mediating variables nor explain the direction of this relationship. Further analysis is needed to answer this question.

In the Arab sample, political affiliation is also the most frequent predictor in the five multiple regression formulae. But it should be remembered that the meaning of the political continuum is completely different in the Arab community. The right wing was defined as those who vote for or favor Zionist

parties (usually Labor and left-wing Zionist parties); the left wing as those who do not vote on principle, as a protest measure. The profile of the left

wing on power, threat, and intensity of conflict is as follows: They attribute more power to the Arab community on the second power factor than the right wing; they are more reassured on the first threat/security factor (by the same items that threaten the Jewish community); and they are less threatened by developments within Israeli society than the Arab right wing. Thus they mirror more the Jewish right than the Jewish left. The Arab left attributes more integrational power to the Arab community (than the Arab right); the Jewish right attributes more integrational power to the Jewish community (than the Jewish left). The Arab left is more assured by the first threat/security factor; the Jewish right is more threatened. The Arab left is less threatened

by developments in Israeli society; so is the Jewish right. An interesting predictor of power and threat in the Arab sample is religious

values. It is the single predictor of the institutional power factor and the first

predictor of intensity of conflict. Those who are more religious tend to attribute to the Arab population more power on the institutional power scale and less intensity of conflict. This finding contradicts the general perception that the more religious groups hold views that the conflict is more intense.


Readiness to have a Jewish friend appears as a predictor on the first threat/security factor. Those who feel more secure are less ready to have a Jewish friend. Notice that in the Jewish sample, readiness to have an Arab friend was associated with the two power factors and the second threat factor. Further analysis is needed to examine the meaning of these findings.

The two age groups show some differences that could be related to their experience with Jewish society and Israeli institutions. The university students assign more power to the Jewish population on the institutional power factor, are slightly more reassured by the same factor that threatens the Jewish sample, and are more threatened by developments within Israeli society. The broad exposure to Jewish society and institutions that Arab students gain for the first time when they go to college might teach them more about Israeli

political thinking and developments within the Jewish community. Whereas Arab university students attribute more institutional power to Jews than Arab

high school students do, Jewish university students attribute more integrational power to Arabs than Jewish high school students do. The university experience shows Arabs the institutional power of the Jewish population and Jewish students the latent integrational power of the Arab population.

In sum, it seems that the two communities differentiate between two dimensions of power in their relationship: one representing institutional-representational power, and the other representing social and political integration power. The two sides seem to give similar meaning to power and agree on who holds the power in Israeli society. Both agree that the Jewish population asymmetrically controls institutional power, but the power asymmetry is not as wide on the second factor. Perhaps minorities in interethnic conflict derive their power from their control of the extent of social and political integration they want to achieve. It seems that the dominant group's sense of power is not accompanied by a sense of security. Actually the Jewish sample showed a profound sense of threat, the source of which is the other group and other outside factors. But the factors that evoke threat in one community evoke either no threat or even a sense of security in the other community.

The findings of our study have far-reaching implications for the future of the relationship between Israel and its Arab citizens, particularly after the recent agreements between Israel and the Palestinians. The fact that Israel is a state with two groups of citizens, both of them aware that only one group, the Jewish majority, asymmetrically controls institutional power, is likely to be challenged by the minority. The stronger this minority grows- demographically, economically, politically, and educationally-the more

likely it will be to challenge the asymmetric power distribution. If a

dynamic Palestinian polity in the West Bank and Gaza emerges, this


TABLE 8

Differences between High School and University Students in the Jewish and Arab Samples

High School University df Students Students t p

Jewish sample Power 1 838 1.60 1.63 1.15 .25 Power 2 756 2.71 2.85 3.22 .001 Threat 1 814 1.73 1.87 4.07 .000 Threat 2 794 2.55 2.17 7.54 .000 Intensity scale 791 3.61 3.75 .68 .50

Arab sample Power 1 808 1.81 1.55 6.06 .000 Power 2 740 2.83 2.91 1.52 .130 Threat 1 722 3.66 3.79 2.26 .024 Threat 2 812 1.61 1.48 3.72 .000 Intensity scale 770 3.76 3.81 1.16 .25

demand might actually be strengthened by a heightened sense of intensity of conflict over power, as our data show, and facilitated by a heightened sense of community.

Our findings also point out that the Jewish majority shows a profound sense of threat, some of which originates in the existence of the Arab minority itself. Except for common concern over Israeli democracy, the two groups do not seem to share any sources of reassurance or threat. This brings to the fore the question of shared identity between the two groups who are citizens of the same state. Some scholars (e.g., Smooha 1984, 1992) argue that the Arabs in Israel have developed a strong component of Israeli identity, actually one that is as strong or even stronger than their Palestinian identity; others (e.g., Rouhana 1993) postulate that the Israeli component of the Arabs' collective identity does not include a sense of belonging to the state, identi- fying with it, and developing a sense of attachment because the uninational superstructure excludes their identity. If one considers a shared sense of threat and security essential to collective identity, our findings raise questions about whether the two groups share any meaningful common identity. It seems that the two communities have yet to develop common goals and elements of identity. It might be the case that the absence of a meaningful common identity is related to our earlier finding about the perception of gross asymmetry in the distribution of institutional power. If only one group-the majority-is perceived to control institutional power, and the minority is


perceived to be excluded from the power centers, including determining the character of the state, distribution of political representation, and economic power, then it is possible that genuine power sharing is a prerequisite for the development of meaningful shared collective identity. In the aftermath of the agreement with Palestinians on self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza, this can become the next major issue in Arab-Jewish relations in Israel.

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Dealing with the dilemmas posed by power asymmetry in intergroup conflict