Planning for people and parks: Design dilemmas

World Developmenr, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 557-570, 1992. 0305-750X/92 $5.00 + 0.00 Printed in Great Britain. @ 1992 Pergamon Press Ltd

Planning for People and Parks: Design Dilemmas

KATRINA EADIE BRANDON World Wildlife Fund and The World Bank, Washington, DC

and

MICHAEL WELLS* The World Bank, Washington, DC

Summary. - Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs) attempt to link biodiversity conservation in protected areas with social and economic development in surrounding communities. The performance of ICDPs thus far has been hampered by numerous difficulties, many of which are strikingly similar to those encountered in rural development efforts. While many of these difficulties can be traced to specific design or implementation flaws, more fundamental conceptual issues pose a challenge for the approach. This paper highlights the evolution and performance of these projects thus far, and the conceptual tradeoffs inherent in linking conservation and development

1. INTRODUCTION

National parks and reserves represent the single most important method of conserving biological diversity worldwide. These protected areas conserve many of the world’s habitats and species. Yet human encroachment, especially in the tropics, is severely degrading and destroying many of these areas. Fences and fines have been the traditional way of minimizing human impacts and discouraging encroachment and illegal activities. The value of traditional enforcement activities, however, is increasingly being questioned as a long-term solution to the protection of many critical ecosystems.

An emerging view among conservationists is that the successful management of protected areas (PAS) must include the cooperation and support of local people. Excluding people who live adjacent to PAS from use of these resources, without providing them with alternatives, is increasingly viewed as politically infeasible and ethically unjustifiable. In response, projects which link the conservation of biological diversity in PAS with local social and economic development have been implemented. Although these projects represent a broad range of initiatives, they can all be grouped under the heading of Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs). While the core objective of these projects is protected area conservation, the

projects aim to achieve this by promoting socioeconomic development and providing local people with alternative income sources which do not threaten to deplete the plants and animals within the PA.

These projects represent the vanguard of what will undoubtedly be a broad array of initiatives attempting to link conservation and development. A recent analysis of ICDPs found that these projects were experiencing many difficulties in meeting either their conservation or development objectives (Wells and Brandon, 1992). The mixed results already emerging from the first generation of ICDPs suggest that any effort to present this approach as a panacea for conservation should be strongly resisted.

Many of the experiences and difficulties faced by ICDPs are comparable to those of integrated rural development projects. Yet ICDP design and implementation is usually more complex than most rural development projects. This paper summarizes recent findings on ICDPs and describes some of the tradeoffs which seem to be inherent in the ICDP approach.

‘The authors would like to thank Carter Brandon, Mac Chapin, R. Michael Wright as well as anonymous reviewers for comments. The authors arc solely responsible for the contents of the paper. however, which should not bc interpreted to reflect the views of the World Wildlife Fund-US or the World Bank.

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558 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

2. EVOLVING CONSERVATION APPROACHES

Park planning concepts introduced in the United States in the 19th century have served as models for the development of protected area networks worldwide (Machlis and Tichnell, 1985). These models propose drawing boundaries around special areas to protect them from direct use so they will be available for public enjoyment (Hales, 1989). There has been a growing appreciation of the much broader contri- bution that parks and reserves make to society.’

The global network of protected areas has expanded dramatically during recent decades, with more parks and reserves having been established since 1970 than in all previous periods. By 1989, about 4,500 sites covering 4.8 milion km2 (3.2% of the Earth’s land surface) had been designated as protected. Of these, 2,253 sites covering 2.4 million km’ are located in the tropics; national parks comprised 792 of these sites and occupied I.3 million km2 (Reid and Miller, 1989).

Many of these protected areas, particularly those in the tropics, are experiencing serious and increasing degradation as a result of large-scale development projects, expanding agricultural frontiers, illegal hunting and logging, fuelwood collection and uncontrolled burning. In most situations, park managers have inadequate resources to do anything to counter these forces. Agencies charged with management responsibili- ties lack the inclination or capability to identify or address people-park conflicts (Hough, 1988).

The lands adjacent to parks are often remote and marginal, which has contributed to their protection. Yet increased pressure from human encroachment is now a problem in many of these areas as a result of increased population growth in traditional communities and/or migration and settlement. The people in these areas are often extremely poor, with limited access to government services and no political power.

The creation of parks and the consequent loss of access to resources often means that these same communities bear substantial costs2 while receiving few benefits in return. Not surprisingly, local people often view parks and reserves as restricting their income and access to needed resources. The contrast between limited resources outside the park and abundant resources inside the park becomes marked as the pressure on the resource base intensifies. Not surprisingly, local people are willing to risk fines or imprison- ment if they are caught breaking the park regulations in order to satisfy a variety of needs.” Yet both at the level of individual parks and

worldwide, encroachment into and destruction of park resources are so high that they pose serious consequences for biodiversity preservation.

3. ICDP APPROACHES

Among conservationists, there has been increasing awareness of the needs of impoverished local people who live adjacent to PAS and depend on these resources for their livelihoods. Much of this awareness is reflected in discussions on how to operationalize “sustainable development” and to make conservation “people- oriented” (see, for example, WCED, 1987; McNeely, 1988). Numerous articles and books appeared in the late 1980s which portrayed the ease and success of implementing sustainable development projects.J The point of these reports was to demonstrate that projects already existed which were successfully linking conservation and development objectives and that the international donor community should fund these and similar projects.

Many of the initiatives grouped under the ICDP heading have received substantial attention from both conservation and development organizations. ICDPs encompass a wide variety of project initiatives, including activities on the boundaries of national parks, or within biosphere reserves and multiple-use areas, as well as regional land-use plans with protected area components or large-scale development projects with links to nearby protected areas.

An analysis of ICDPs was recently completed to identify what strategies these projects have pursued and the extent to which investments in ICDPs represent cost-effective, sustainable or replicable approaches to the management of protected areas and certain categories of forested lands (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Twenty-three projects at 19 sites in 14 countries were visited.’ Each of the projects had social or economic development components linked to protected areas which had been operational for at least three years. The areas selected included sites where development activities were outside of traditional models of protected areas, i.e.. national parks and reserves which totally excluded local people from consideration when they were originally established, and protected areas which were established either after or at about the same time as the ICDP.

(a) Examples of ICDPs

There is no representative or “model” ICDP.

PEOPLE AND PARKS 559

Each of the projects attempted to address the most serious conservation and development issues at the particular site (See appendix). Descriptions of two ICDPs, the Annapurna Conservation Area in Nepal and the Monarch Butterfly Overwintering Reserves in Mexico provide some idea of the context and scope of these initiatives. The Annapurna case reflects one of the most promising ICDPs, while the Monarch case demonstrates the complexity and challenges encountered at many sites.

(i) Annupurna Conservafion Area

The 2,600 km2 Annapurna Conservation Area is one of the most geographically and culturally diverse conservation areas in the world. About 40,000 people, mostly poor rural farmers, live in the region. Over 30,000 foreign trekkers visit each year, which has led to the development of hundreds of lodges and tea shops along the trails. While tourism has become important to the local economy, it has also led to serious environmental problems. Forests have been cleared to provide fuel for cooking and heat for visitors. Expanding agriculture, water pollution, poor sanitation and litter on trekking routes have all accelerated, compounded by a rapid growth in the resident population.

Improving tourist development while safeguarding the environment was the focus of a royal directive in 1985. Following a royal directive, the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Con- servation (KMTNC), a Nepali non governmental organization (NGO), was assigned the task of improving the Annapurna region. New legisla- tion established the Annapurna Conservation Area in 1986, a multiple-use area allowing hunting, collection of forest products, use of visitor fees for local development and the delega- tion of management authority to the village level. KMNTC initiated the Annapurna Conservation Area Project (ACAP) to help the inhabitants, especially the poor farmers, maintain control over their environment.

KMNTC developed a zoning system that specified permissible land uses and the degree of protection in the region. They established a headquarters in the intensive-use zone primarily staffed by local Nepalis and started community development, forest management, conservation education, and research and training activities. High priority was given to reducing the environmental impact of visiting trekkers and increasing the local economic benefits from tourism. A 200 NR($8) visitor entry fee generates four million NR (US$160,000) annually for the project.

Training courses for lodge owners upgraded the quality of service, standardized menus and prices and improved standards of sanitation and waste disposal. Lodges and expeditions were required to use kerosene and fuelwood collection was limited to subsistence use. Local participation included a lodge management committee and reviving a traditional forest management committee which was responsible for enforcing regulations, fining poachers and controlling timber cutting.

The project has made significant progress in motivating a skeptical local population to partici- pate in natural resource management decision making, although local institutions are not expected to assume major responsibility for several years. The kerosene regulation has substantially reduced deforestation rates and training programs have reduced the adverse impacts of tourism and improved the livelihoods of lodge owners, although the significant economic benefits from tourism have not been distributed widely. The costs of this project have been less than $500,000 for the first four years. The total project revenue from all sources has been about $200,000 per year since 1989.

(ii) Monarch Butterfly Overwintering Reserves

Over 100 million butterflies migrate from throughout Canada and the United States to a small area in Mexico each year, where they spend the winter resting in oyamel trees, a fir species. The overwintering site is located in a volcanic range in Central Mexico that also forms part of the watershed for Mexico City. Monarca, A.C. is a small, elite Mexican NGO, based in Mexico City which formed in 1980 with the objective of protecting monarch butterflies. Intensive lob- bying by Monarca, A.C. led to the creation of five overwintering reserves, each surrounded by a buffer zone. While two of the reserves are open to tourism, the others are essentially strict protection areas. The reserves span two Mexican states and are surrounded by 31 communal landholding areas (ejidos). Population growth is high, and few economic opportunities, declining agricultural productivity, increasing landlessness and worsening poverty are leading to logging, cattle grazing, and agricultural expansion into the core park areas and buffer zones.

Since the reserves were created, Monarca, A.C. has actively lobbied the government for their management; they have facilitated research on the butterflies, paid for park guards, developed educational materials and programs about the butterflies, and tried to improve the trails.


They also worked with the Mexican government to develop an integrated development plan for the region, yet the government never adopted the plan. They have worked with local communities on reforestation, have developed plans for increasing agricultural production and fish farming, and, most important, have tried to help the local communities capture some of the benefits from nature tourism through revenue sharing of gate fees, organizing food stalls, and starting a community store selling souvenirs.

Monarca, A.C. has been extremely successful at attracting attention to the butterflies and in getting the reserve established. But they have been unable to get the Mexican government to commit the necessary resources for protection and management. The reforestation effort has been seriously hampered by technical problems, and the benefits generated from tourism have been poorly captured and distributed to the local community. Community participation in design and implementation of the project has been minimal and there has been no slowdown in the deforestation which threatens the butterflies and their habitat. The complexity of working with 31 local, two state, and several federal agencies is overwhelming. Resources for the project have been small ($254,000 during 1985-W) and the NGO is highly dependent on one donor.

(b) ICDP strategies

The major objective of ICDPs is to reduce the pressure on a protected area. Projects seek to accomplish this goal through activities which generate benefits to local communities. There are three major strategies which projects have attempted, often in combination: strengthening park management and/or creating buffer zones around protected areas; providing compensation or substitution to local people for lost access to resources; or encouraging local social and economic development.

(i) Purk management and buffer zones

Improved park management was included as a component of many ICDPs. Boundary marking. the development of park management plans, research, trail maintenance, and improved enforcement activities were among the actions under- taken by ICDPs. For example, many of these steps were carried out in varying degrees in both the Monarch and Annapurna projects.

Buffer zones are most often conceptualized as a protective band of land which encircles the

protected area. Because ICDPs often take place near or adjacent to PAS, the projects are often called buffer-zone projects, whether or not de facto buffer zones exist. Buffer zones can be located within the boundaries of certain types of protected areas, such as biosphere reserves, or they may be bands which encircle what is considered a “core” protected area, where only a few uses (e.g., research and tourism) are allowed. At least conceptually, low-level exploitation of forest resources is allowed in these areas. Limited resource exploitation (e.g., hunting, gathering, and firewood collection) by local people is often permitted in buffer zones. The principal objective of buffer zones is to protect the park; providing economic benefits to local people is a secondary objective. At the Monarch Butterfly Overwintering Reserves, for example, buffer zones were legally established surrounding each of the reserves. On paper, exploitation of forest resources in these buffer zones is limited to very low-impact uses to protect the core reserves. In practice, however, the regulations are not enforced and the ejidos surrounding the reserves are unaware that the buffer zones exist.

(ii) Compensation and substitution

The immediate objective of the compensation/ substitution approach is to reduce the economic burden on those people who would otherwise have few alternative means of livelihood beyond continued exploitation of the park’s flora and fauna. The compensation/substitution approach attempts to do at least one of the following: first, compensate local people for the economic losses which they have suffered as a result of the establishment of a park or reserve; second, provide substitutes for specific resources to which access has been denied; third, provide alternative sources of income to replace those which are no longer available due to the existence of the park. These project components are therefore likely to be oriented toward people living in the immediate vicinity of a park or reserve. Benefits are directed toward actual or potential agents of park degradation, and not intermediaries or the ultimate sources of demand for park-derived products.

The idea of compensation is relatively simple, at least in theory, and can take the form of cash payments, goods or services. These are provided in exchange for agreements by local people to relinquish their former rights of access and to respect the conservation goals of the protected area. For example, Masai pastoralists traditional- ly grazed and watered livestock in the area


proposed as Amboseh National Park. Compen- sation in the form of concession rights and water points for livestock were promised in exchange for their agreement to stop using the area.

Substitutes can be targeted on specific resource uses, for example, if a park area was formerly used as a source of fuelwood, woodlots outside the boundaries might provide an adequate substitute. The requirement that kerosene be brought into the Annapurna Conservation Area to avoid further depletion of the local wood supply is an example of the substitution strategy. Direct substitutes may not always be available outside the protected area, or may not be consistent with the objectives of the protected area. For example, if a park represents the only local source of construction materials, medicinal plants, certain fruits, or rare animal species, substitutes probably cannot be provided for individuals formerly dependent on these sources.

In cases where substitutes are not possible, ICDPs can provide alternatives which attempt to either increase incomes, reduce costs or provide access to new ways of earning a living. These alternatives might include direct employment, low-interest loans, fertilizer subsidies, improved access to markets, promotion of nonrural enter- prises, new skills training, etc.

(iii) Local social and economic development

Among the 23 sites visited, the most common ICDP strategy was promoting social and economic development among communities adjacent to protected area boundaries. The primary emphasis of this strategy was poverty mitigation and community development activities. The lack of options forces rural people to exploit resources in ways which are unsustainable. Population growth, migration, and declining soil fertility lead to an expansion of the agricultural frontier into wildlands. The explanation for this strategy is that government policies often exacerbate these trends. The only hope for breaking the destructive patterns of resource use is to reduce rural poverty, and improve income levels, nutri- tion, health care and education.

Most of the projects included one or more activities designed to provide social and economic benefits to local communities. Projects generally tried to implement activities which would meet the most evident local needs. The most common way to provide benefits was through project components designed to improve natural resource management outside of protected areas. i.e., agroforestry and forestry, wildlife utilization, irrigation and water manage-

ment, soil enhancement and erosion control, and generally improving agricultural yields. Both Annapurna and Monarca had components designed to address at least one of these areas. Several projects also attempted to improve pro- duct market activities through, for example, as road construction or cooperative marketing strategies. Generating employment and increasing local incomes was prevalent in two of the African projects on a large scale. In Zambia, the ADMA- DE program has resulted in the hiring of 400 local-level village wildlife scouts. Most projects generated some employment, although it was generally on a small scale. Improving the local ability to capture the benefits of nature tourism was an important component in a number of projects worldwide. Both Annapurna and the Monarch reserve devoted substantial emphasis to these components, although it is important to note that less than half of all projects attracted tourists on any significant scale. Finally, many of the projects provided community services, such as health clinics, schools, and sanitation works to local communities.

(c) Assessment of ICDPprogress to date

Most ICDPs are still at an early stage of implementation. Many operate on a small scale in relation to the size of the protected area. Governments, multilateral development organizations, and NGOs were all found as either implementing or funding agencies. While many projects received a great deal of attention from international donors and conservation organizations eager to claim “success,” few projects could in fact match the claims put forward about them or had met their stated goals of linking development to protected area management.

Despite the tremendous diversity among project strategies and the site specific conditions, similarities emerged in the overall findings on the factors that affected project performance. Many of these findings are similar to evaluations of rural development projects (World Bank, 1988). Critical factors to successful ICDP performance are: (i) base-line data collection and a good understanding of the ecosystems, threats, and socioeconomic context; (ii) involvement of local people in all phases of project design and implementation in an active capacity; (iii) collaboration among governments, donors and executing agencies and a willingness to undertake “innovative” management structures; (iv) an ability to balance the enforcement and regulatory components of the project with development objectives and incentives; (v) an ability to influ-


ence the broader policy environment which affects projects; (vi) long-term commitment of financial and technical support; and (vii) enforcement activities.

4. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN ICDP PROJECT DESIGN AND

IMPLEMENTATION

ICDPs represent one of the most promising methods of conserving biodiversity in PAS worldwide. Certainly, the number of ICDPs is likely to increase as the pressure to protect biologically sensitive areas increases. One of the difficulties with the approach is that there has been no systematic analysis of the critical elements in ICDP design. Many of the projects started as small-scale conservation initiatives with only minimal rural development expertise and with uncertain funding sources. ICDPs could benefit significantly by incorporating the lessons of rural development projects. Yet the major objective of ICDPs is to reduce the pressures on a protected area. While their ultimate objective is not rural development, many of the techniques and processes they use make them “development projects.” Thus while the overall projects could be substantially improved, the approach is nonetheless riddled with a number of conceptual dilemmas and design tradeoffs that can fundamentally affect project performance, and ultimately, the preservation of parks and protected areas. Accordingly, broader debate and discussion about these problems is essential to improve their performance.

(a) Project cycle und need for urgent action

Simply stated, the first dilemma facing most projects involves the timing of project activities. A good understanding of the social, economic, ecological and institutional characteristics of the area, and how they are interrelated, is necessary prior to project design. The projects which undertook systematic analysis of the project context were among the most successful projects, at least in part because project design matched local conditions and needs.” In an ideal setting, projects would involve significant local participation in all phases of data collection and project design. Yet undertaking such a comprehensive analysis, although essential, takes months if not years. Although techniques such as rapid rural appraisal have been designed to generate large amounts of data in a short amount of time, they fail to capture many of the seasonal variations in

the ecology and socioeconomy of areas and the interactions between the two.

From a conservation perspective. however, there is often an urgent need to halt encroachment and degradation. If projects do not begin to limit degradation, biodiversity may be so com- promised and destructive practices so entrenched that it is not cost effective or technically possible to reverse them. This is most often the case when migration and colonization of wildlands are just beginning. In the ICDP case studies, projects took immediate action under the following cir- cumstances: (i) a precipitous decline in the population of a particular species; (ii) habitat destruction to the point where recovery would be difficult; (iii) a potential development project (a dam, road, or other large scale; (iv) a large-scale planned invasion of land. If projects immediately focus on enforcement in order to limit environmental degradation, however, it is much more difficult to elicit local support and encourage local participation.

Yet circumventing good base-line data collection can lead to a misdiagnosis of the threats to wildlands and the local needs, and consequently to flawed project designs. The underlying reasons for obvious threats can often be extremely complicated, involving many actors. Multiple sources of threats to protected areas resulting from multiple actors and underlying causes were common in many of the projects. For example, at one project site (Khao Yai), a quick assessment might lead to the conclusion that encroachment into the park and consequent deforestation was for villagers to gain access to more farmland. But a survey revealed that brokers (loan sharks) controlled village economies, providing credit to farmers at an exorbitant 5% per month and frequently taking over the lands of those unable to make repayments. The debt situation resulted in illegal hunting, logging and land clearing (to compensate for lands taken by brokers) in the park. This process was reinforced by a high urban demand for both fuelwood and construction materials and a steady supply of brokers traveling to villages to purchase both logs and scraps from villagers. Even with a good understanding of the context, it is difficult to identify the appropriate incentives to induce people to stop logging. But a misdiagnosis of the problem, which in this case might lead to the conclusion to intensify agricultural production, would have little impact. Seve- ral projects had “misdiagnosed” the fundamental problems and were effectively doing little to meet either conservation or development objectives as a result.

Clearly. it is essential to balance the urgent need to “save things” with the need to conduct a


thorough, site-specific assessment of local social, economic, and environmental conditions. Poten- tial arguments for a middle ground may include the belief that if things are likely to be destroyed that fast, then an ICDP is the wrong approach and that perhaps there should be an exclusive emphasis on enforcement. Yet the cases suggest that people are willing to take on significant risks to fulfill immediate needs. For example, in Chitwan Park in Nepal, the presence of the Nepalese army, tigers and rhinoceroses is insufficient to deter people from entering the park to collect firewood or graze animals. What is the appropriate tradeoff between information gathering and urgency? How can these be ba- lanced? What does this tradeoff mean for select- ing sites? Should areas where the problem is urgent be excluded from the ICDP approach?

(b) Defining appropriate incentives and linkages

The three strategies which ICDP projects have pursued are all based on the premise that some appropriate set of incentives exists to induce people to change their practices. McNeely (1988) addresses the types of incentives and disincen- tives that have been used to conserve biological diversity, including direct cash incentives, fees, rewards, compensation, grants, subsidies, credit. and employment. As described above, it may be impossible to design appropriate incentives without a clear understanding of the threats to the PA and the local needs. While this is a necessary condition, it is nonetheless insufficient. Yet several issues make the design of such incentives more complex than previously envisioned.

Theoretical descriptions of buffer zones and how they might be implemented abound (e.g., Oldfield. 1988) but most definitions in current use contain logical inconsistencies and overlook practical problems. For example, many potential buffer zones are already being exploited, so there is little point in conceding use rights to local people as compensation for lost access to a park. Another common problem is that few protected area management agencies have jurisdiction which extends outside park and reserve boundaries. Therefore, these agencies have no authority to establish or regulate buffer zones in the absence of legislative changes. Such legislative changes were made in several of the projects, including the Annapurna Conservation Area. Finally, there is the more technical problem of defining what uses are allowable in the buffer zone, at what level of use or exploitation, and by whom. Should enforcement also extend to these areas?

There are also obvious shortcomings with a strategy based on either compensation/ substitution or widespread poverty mitigation. In many projects, and in the literature, there is a general perception that most poor households would prefer to switch from illegal, unsustainable, and difficult activities such as poaching to legal activities which generate greater revenue (MacKinnon, et al., 1986). This proposition implicitly assumes that poor households have a fixed income need and if that need can be met then the poor will stop their environmentally destructive practices.

In fact, there is little basis for this conclusion. Most poor households are not satisfied with their existing income levels. If there is a labor surplus in the household, or there are seasonal variations in labor patterns, it is rational for households to continue illegal activities in the absence of strong deterrence or a risk which they define as too great. Many projects seemed unaware that rural households will often try to maximize total household income.’ Unless legal activities generate more income, require less labor, and fit into an overall household strategy to maximize income, it is unlikely that people will switch to them. Moreover, few projects are able to provide an array of income-generating, labor-absorbing activities which will satisfy the needs of those engaging in destructive practices which are essential to their very survival in many cases.

For example, half of the projects had components to improve agricultural production; but the rural poor often engaged in poaching or logging during slack labor periods. At one project site, logging was taking a serious toll on hillsides. A large agricultural project, successful by development standards, was introduced. But logging continued, in part because there was no explicit link in the minds of local people between growing more and better rice and making more money by logging.

Participation in the context of ICDP design will be discussed below. But there are some difficult issues in designing project strategies based on the compensation approach. There were a number of cases where what the community wanted did not make sense within the project context; the linkage between the conservation objective and the incentive was very weak. But the project provided or facilitated the receipt of these goods or services in order to keep the goodwill of the people. For example, suppose the point of the project is to minimize encroachment into a protected area. Does it make sense for a project to provide a community with a school or health clinic as compensation for loss of access? Will such indirect incentives have an impact and


reduce encroachment? One project provided a health clinic as compensation for lost access. Illegal activities to the protected area decreased for a few years, then they soared. When the project met with villagers to find out why, they smiled and said, “Now we want a school.” While this was in fact an apocryphal story, it serves to highlight the difficulty when linkages are not direct.

Should there be a direct link between the protected area and the proposed activities? How can agreements for such relationships be enforced? For example, suppose a community will lose access to wildlands once a park is established, and as compensation, they decide they want a school. What if encroachment continues? Can/should the government or project take the school away? Can a school “compensate” for lost forest land? For how long?

(C) Incorporating local participation into projects

One common perspective is that governments lack the capacity to insure the long-term viability of the natural resource base; in order for resources to be managed adequately, local people must ultimately become the managers of the resource base (Poole, 1989; WCED, 1987). From the perspective of project performance, there is ample evidence that community participation in the design of development projects increases both the quality of designs and project effective- ness (Paul, 1987). These arguments make it clear that strong, local participation is fundamental in all phases of ICDP design and implementation.

Yet there are some design dilemmas when it comes to incorporating local participation into ICDPs. First, should project designers “hide” their true conservation agenda from communities? Some case study project planners felt that they needed to find out what the community felt was important, and that they should not influence the process by commenting on what they perceived as important. A secondary and related issue is that what the project defines as a problem (which may be the entire reason for the project’s existence), e.g., decline in a species, may not be a concern of local communities, which are more likely to be concerned with day-to-day survival issues. Third, community participation may lead the community to define a set of needs which are not linked to the conservation objectives, as described in (b) above. This issue has caused some projects to avoid including participation in the preliminary design phases, so they can identify direct linkages. Finally, when resources had not yet been threatened, but were likely to

be, projects felt that the appropriate response was education prior to participation, rather than as an adjunct to it.

The perspective of some project planners on how to balance local participation and interest in conservation, taking immediate action, and a need to demonstrate results is evident in the following quote:

The intention is to involve local people in the design of projects however, while local communities may identify the problems which concern them (and which may or may not match the objectives of various projects or donors), true participation is often only developed after a project has already been accepted and is under implementation. The urgency of the region’s conservation prohlems dictates against the lengthy process of developing local support and participatory capacity, however important this may be for long-term success. The project’s philosophy is that popular support and, eventually, voluntary and internally motivated participation, can only be achieved through a helief in what one is doing. Therefore, the approach which the project is taking is to produce tangible evidence of the beneficial results of its various activities (Newhy. 1990, p. 57).

Another theme echoed by project staff was that while they agreed that the ultimate goal of participation was empowerment, they were not sure that local communities would make deci-

sions that would reflect conservation objectives. How would the project know if the community was empowered, or if decision making had been captured by local elites? What intervention could a project make? Or more dramatically, what would happen if local people decided, through participatory mechanisms. that they wanted to use the resources in an unsustainable way? What if their priorities reflect the present, rather than the future?”

The potential conflict between projects and communities stressing participation has been cited in other development spheres, such as health care. A project may prefer to stress preventive health care, but the community may prefer curative care.’ Yet this analogy does not address the fact that the mismanagement of resources may be irreversible, affecting not only the immediate resource being exploited (e.g.. trees for fuelwood). but may have a host of other consequences (e.g., loss of animal habitats, soil erosion, flooding, etc.). The ideal of either an ICDP or health care project might be to empha- size prevention in order to stop a situation from becoming acute and requiring dramatic action. Yet in the case of many ICDPs, the situation is already acute, and preventive measures are not readily apparent. I”

In ICDPs where threats result from multiple


causes, it is often difficult to ensure the participation of all of the important actors. In other cases, what benefits one group and meets the conservation objective may harm another group. These divisions may be based on class, ethnicity, gen- der, etc. For example, in one successful African project, local communities, through their village chiefs received a share of hunting revenues as an incentive to control local poaching. Employment opportunities for men as guides and game scouts have become an important source of local income. Yet women are now afraid to go into the bush since wildlife populations have increased as local poaching declined. The project is attempting to identify ways that they can “compensate” women; yet it is difficult to “compensate” a family for the loss of a child, or to restore the feelings of safety they had when wildlife populations were lower.

Clearly, participation is fundamental to ICDPs. But the rural development experience with local participation is not entirely analogous to ICDPs. In ICDP case studies analyzed, however, projects had in fact done little to involve local people in project design, implementation, and evaluation or to create strong local organizations. If anything, the caution displayed appears to result more from a reluctance and lack of knowledge among organizations implementing ICDPs on how, and to what extent, to involve local people, rather than as part of a conscious strategy.

(d) Indigenous management systems

In many traditional societies, local people have rules regulating natural resource use (see Feeny et al., 1990; West and Brechin, 1990). The regulatory systems, technologies used, and the management systems in many indigenous societies have become the focus of significant attention, since many think that they might provide substantial insights in how to sustainably exploit biologically sensitive areas. Within both the conservation and development communities, there has been a tendency to “glamorize” these indigenous resource management practices. Many of these systems have worked because they are based on low population densities, either intensively extracting from a small area, and allowing that area to regenerate, or extensive use of resources collected over a wide area.

These systems are appropriate within their own cultural and ecological context, which are almost exclusively subsistence based rather than market oriented. But to assume that many can be adapted wholesale to groups of migrants is likely to prove unrealistic.

These systems within indigenous cultures are prone to breakdown, thereby failing to maintain the resource base, under the following conditions, if: (i) there is a substantial increase in the local population; (ii) the area available for exploitation is substantially reduced; (iii) a few commodities increase in value and become more heavily exploited. Population growth as a result of natural increases or migration can cause previously extensive or shifting patterns of resource exploitation to become intensive. This is a common problem at many ICDP sites. A corol- lary situation is when resource scarcity results from natural forces. Either population growth or resource scarcity can lead to changes in community structure, which can undermine local management practices. Reductions in the area available are extremely common near ICDPs resulting either from colonization or more directly, from establishment of the protected area itself.

One dilemma for ICDPs is that while indigenous management systems may exist, they will not necessarily be adequate to maintain or protect the resource base under rapidly changing conditions. Moreover, communities may wish to protect resources other than those the project wishes to protect. In some ICDP project sites, it is possible to “piggyback” conservation strategies. For example, in Rwanda, local farmers had little interest in protecting the mountain gorillas. They did, however, understand that the same mountains that protected the gorillas also protected the watershed, which was critical for farming. In other areas, however, there will be little overlap, at least initially, between community and project interests. In either case, it is important to develop mechanisms to encourage the greatest number of people to abide by the ‘new rules.”

In any case, it is important for project designers to be aware that local management systems may not always be “better” than externally imposed systems. Externally imposed systems, through government or district councils, for example, may lead to more equitable imposition of regulations. Is it better for projects to adapt existng management systems or to create new ones? Is it better to build up the authority of traditional decision-making mechanisms, which may be highly exclusionary, or to institute broad- based participatory mechanisms? The answers to these questions will in part depend on the sociocultural context and the relationship of local people to the resource base.

(e) Conservation project or development project?

One of the most difficult aspects of ICDPs is


defining the appropriate incentive structure and properly targeting the benefits. This process becomes more difficult in areas where threats are caused by multiple factors. Another problem facing projects is benefit distribution. Should distribution of benefits be equitable? Should they only be focused on those people who are degrading or threatening the resource base? These questions apply not only within villages, but they apply when projects target multiple villages.

In both the compensation and substitution approaches, serious practical issues arise in determining what compensation or substitution should take place, who should benefit and what the total value of the substitutes should be. Should those who currently degrade the resources be “rewarded” by receiving project benefits (narrow benefit distribution)? Should benefits be distributed more broadly, so that everyone has a stake in reducing threats, regard- less of whether they represent a threat? This latter strategy costs a great deal more. What if many of the threats to the resource base are caused by those individuals who are better off, which is often the case?

In Annapurna Conservation Area in Nepal, for example, deforestation resulted from the surge in tea shops and lodges competing to provide food. warmth, and hot showers for foreign trekkers. Special courses were provided to owners of these establishments to help them improve service quality, sanitation, and revenues. As mentioned, kerosene regulations were introduced. The community at large was bearing the costs associated with deforestation, while local elites were able to capture the financial rewards from tourism. Tourism to some villages has led to increasing income inequality among villages in the area. The project is one of the most successful ICDPs in that it is beginning to meet its conservation objectives. What about the intra- and intervillage income inequality that may result? Should the project be concerned with this issue? Should benefits be more widely distributed? Is it realistic for ICDPs to focus on all phases of conservation and development?

(f) Scope and scale

The relationship between four interrelated design components and the geographic area of a park are necessary to assess the scope and scale of a project. These components are: (i) the project’s geographic reach, which may be the same as or differ from the PA boundaries; (ii) project diversity, or the range of different activi-

ties the project is trying to introduce; (iii) intensity, the level of effort involved in implementing these activities; and (iv) elapsed time since the inception of the project (Wells and Brandon, 1992).

Projects must carefully define the tradeoffs which exist among these design elements. For example, a project that has many activities (high diversity) in many villages (high reach), but has few staff (low intensity) is likely to fail. One of the difficult challenges facing projects is getting the balance right.

Projects must reduce the level of threats to the protected area in order to meet their conservation objectives. If they are only active in a few villages, they may reduce threats in that particular area, but will do little to reduce overall encroachment on the PA. In essence, projects should be active in all areas that threaten a PA in order to attain conservation goals. This task is further complicated by the problem of balancing the project cycle versus the need to take urgent action.

Khao Yai National Park in Thailand is surrounded by over 100 villages. Total project activities have reached no more than 11 villages. The impact of these activities has varied substantially within each village depending on a variety of factors. Yet the project cannot claim to be reducing the overall threat to the national park by more than a very small amount. To actually reduce park-wide threats would mean initiating ICDPs in over 100 villages. The scope and scale, not to mention costs and management challenges of such an undertaking would be immense.

Many of the most successful examples of rural development and conservation education are based on small-scale approaches. often promoted by NGOs (Annis, 1987; Cernea. 1988). These approaches tend to be flexible, staff intensive, participatory, and targeted, and they operate without a fixed project cycle. This “model” is sometimes proposed as the one that ICDPs should follow. Yet such models will only be possible in areas where there are a limited number of villages encroaching on protected areas. In areas of denser population or where the scale of the area is great, it seems clear that if ICDPs are implemented, they will have to be at a scale never before attempted.

(g) Growth poles or buffer zones?

Conceptually at least, the desire to offset the costs borne by local people by providing them with some benefits makes sense. But there is an


inherent risk in providing benefits, or even promoting “development” in fragile areas. In- frastructure and services in many of these areas are poor, and until recently, most of these areas have been among the most isolated regions.

When functioning well. ICDPs generate employment, provide infrastructure and services, and contribute to a “growth” process in these areas. What if the ICDP attracts new people to the area? Experience has shown that infrastructure provided by development projects can often be a magnet. Many would agree that the justifica- tion exists for providing people who have tradi- tionally resided in an area with benefits to “offset” their losses. Should these benefits be provided to recent migrants? Clearly, if the objective were simply development, the answer would be an unequivocal yes. The ICDP objective, however, is biodiversity conservation, and funding for such projects will be limited.

One could argue that growth poles should be developed in areas near enough to PAS to draw people away, but far enough to reduce the exploitation of the resources inside the protected area. While none of the projects we reviewed were functioning as growth poles, most were relatively small scale. Should projects be under- taken on the periphery of parks and protected areas? Is it possible for them to be big enough to provide clear incentives to halt encroachment without attracting people?

5. CONCLUSIONS

These questions indicate that we are still a long way from knowing how to design and implement an ideal ICDP project. Much of the difficulty is derived from the overall project strategy: using development as a means to achieve conservation objectives. The end is not development. Linking conservation and development objectives is in fact extremely difficult, even at a conceptual level.

Many would agree that the conservation of biodiversity should be a worldwide priority given the unprecedented rates of extinction and habitat loss underway globally. We can also agree that poverty amelioration should be a goal worldwide. Can the two, however, be successfully linked at local and regional levels? There is some

evidence that such linkages are possible. But conflicts between development and conservation objectives will arise. Project planners must have a very clear idea what they are trying to achieve and a clear definition of their priorities.

Some factors will be essential to the success of ICDPs. Many of these factors are similar to the lessons evident from rural development projects. At a minimum, it is essential that the development components of ICDPs have a good chance of success. In most cases enforcement will be needed to complement the development components. Some of the most critical factors which affect ICDP projects are: (a) a good understanding of the local context and the interactions between local populations and the environment;” (b) emphasis on local participation in the design and implementation of the projects; (c) support or collaboration among governments, donors and executing agencies; (d) knowledge of and an ability to influence the broader policy environment which affects projects; and (e) long-term commitment of financial and technical support.

Finally, projects must be able to balance the development/positive incentive components and the enforcement/regulatory components in projects. This means developing incentives focused on those degrading the resource base. Inducing people to change their behavior in these circums- tances will be most successful when: (a) there is a clear and direct link between the conservation objective and the project component; (b) the threats to the resource base are direct and clear, not when they are caused by many actors for many reasons; and (c) when there is a high dependence on the resource and adequate alternatives, technologies, or management approaches can be identified. Education will also play an important role in this process.

It can be expected that there will be a huge learning curve in developing and implementing ICDPs. It is not unwise to question whether they should even be attempted. Enforcement will remain an important component of park management and biodiversity protection. Enforcement alone, however, is insufficient to deter people from doing what they must in order to survive. Until poverty is eradicated near biologically sensitive areas, conflicts are likely to remain between conservation and development needs.

NOTES

1. Protected area functions have recently been described as including the following: the maintenance

diversity and the genetic variation within species; the

of ecological processes; the preservation of species maintenance of the productive capacities of ecosystems and the safeguarding of species’ habitats; and to


provide opportunities for scientific research, education. desire? Few households want to remain at current training, recreation and tourism (McNeely er al., 1990). income levels and most have high aspirations.

2. Both opportunity costs (for example, increased 8. We need only note the current US budget deficit, time resulting from loss of access to resources, such as the inaction on acid rain and the dilution of the Clean fuelwood, and the need to collect it elsewhere) and Air Act to demonstrate that this is the prevalrnr form of negative externalities (more traffic, tourists, cultural decision making. Why should we expect poor people to conflicts, etc.) associated with parks. make “better” choices than we do?

3. People worldwide are willing to break the law to meet an income need, whether it is drug dealing in US inner cities or peasants growing coca and poppies.

4. See Gradwohl and Greenberg (198X) and Reid, Barnes, and Blackwelder (1988). These reports contain many factual errors and glib statements, in what Chapin (19X9) describes as “desperation to show success.”

5. Additional ICDP case studies may be found in the work of West and Brechin (lY90), who also consider protected areas in industrialized countries.

6. The Aga Khan Rural Support Program in Pakis- tan is generally considered to be successful. They believe that a 1@15 year design timeframe is necessary and that the first five years are “start-up” time.

7. It may be possible to satisfy need. but what about

9. We are indebted to Norman Uphoff for providing this example.

10. In many cases. projects sought to provide alternatives to existing resource-use patterns. Yet the adoption of these new technologies only occasionally com- pensated for the change in resources (see Chapin, 19XY and Wells and Brandon. 1992).

11. See Dove (1986) for an account of the relationship between weeds and their control by different groups in Indonesia, and the governments perceptions. For example, some villagers burned weeds to cncouragc growth of cattlc fodder; government officials began arresting villagers for starting fires. villagers stopped the “controlled burn” approach they had followed, and fires spread to adjacent forests. Protecting the forest would necessitate an understanding of livestock-fodder patterns.

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Twenty-two years later.” Humun Eco(o,qy. Vol. 18, No. I (1990). pp. 1-19.

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Hough. J.. “Obstacles to effective management of contlicts between national parka and surrounding communities in developing countries,” Environmen- tal Conservation. Vol. 15, No. 2 (lYXX), pp.129-136.

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McNccly. J. A.. K. R. Miller, W. V. Reid. R. A. Mittermeicr, and 7‘. B. Werner. Corrwrviq drc World’s Hrologictrl Dj~~errirv (Washington, DC: IUCN, World rcsour& Ins,titutc. International./(World Wildlife ‘Fund World Bank. 1990).


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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OFTHE CASE STUDY PROTECTED AREAS SITES AND PROJECTS (adapted from Wells and Brandon, 1992)

Asia

Annapurna Conservation Area, Nepal: A 2,600 km’ multiple-use area established in 1986 under the jurisdiction of Nepal’s leading NGO to mitigate the impact of tourism on the environment and to promote local development. The 1986-89 cost was $450,000. Dumoga-Bone National Park, Indonesia: The 3,000 km’ park was established in 1982 to protect the rivers supplying two irrigation projects used by 8,000 farmers to grow paddy rice. Funding was provided by a $60 million World Bank loan about $1 million of which was used for park creation. Gunung Lesser National Park, Indonesia: The 9,000 km’ park is acutely threatened by agricultural encroachment and logging, both facilitated by road construction. Buffer zones have been delineated but not implemented. Khao Yai National Park, Thailand: The 2,200 km’ park, an important tourist attraction, is seriously threatened by logging and hunting. Two Thai NGOs began a project in one of 150 villages on the park border in 1985 to promote conservation through development, later expanding into several other communities. The 1985-89 cost was $500,000. Royal Chitwan National Park, Nepal: The 900 km’ park, created in 1973, is a premier tourist attraction surrounded by a rapidly growing population. Park officials permit villagers access to collect grasses once a year for house construction and thatching.

Africa

Beza Mahafaly and Andohahela Reserves, Madagascar: One Malagasy and two American universities helped local people establish the six km’ Beza reserve in 1985. The project has implemented local development and conservation programs and recently expanded to include the 760 km’ Andohahela. Funding for 1977-89

AirlTenere National Nature Reserve, Niger: This 77,000 _ was $45U,UU(J

km’ game reserve was established in 1988. A 1982-86 World Wildlife Fund/International Union for the Con- servation of Nature (WWF/IUCN) and government of Niger conservation project was the forerunner to a three-year $2.5 million dollar project emphasizing conservation, protection, and rural development in and adjacent to the reserve. Amboseli National Park, Kenya: A 1977 World Bank loan supported tourism development, water point development, and community services to compensate local people for loss of access to the 488 km2 park. The separate community-based Wildlife Extension Project, aims to improve local participation and use of wildlife, with an annual budget of $50,000. Burundi: The Bururi Project promotes conservation and forestry activities around a 20 km’ forest reserve, with US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding of $1.2 million during 1983-87. Replication is underway at three other reserves, totalling 58 km’, with funding of $500,000 for 1986-91. East Usambara Mountains, Tanzania: A patchwork of 18 forest reserves covering 16 km’ has been threatened by logging and shifting cuttivation. A Tanzanian government project with IUCN technical assistance has worked in 15 villages to promote conservation and development since 1987.


Nuzinga Game Ranch, Burkina Faso: A 940 km’ ranch was established to protect dwindling wildlife populations and provide local communities with benefits from employment, safari hunting, tourism and meat production. Government and Canadian International De- velopment Agency (CIDA) funding of $3.1 million during 197949. South Luungwa National Park, Zambia: A 9,050 km’ park surrounded by game management areas. The Lupande project, replicated as the national ADMADE program, promotes return of safari hunting revenues to local communities, job creation, and anti-poaching in a game management area. Annual funds are $50,000 for the pilot project and $3 million over four years for the ADMADE project. The Luangwa Integrated Rural Development Project. initiated in 1988, is a large, regional project with funding of $25 million for five years. Both projects are implemented by the government of Zambia. Volcunoes National Park, Rwanda: The 150 km’ park is surrounded by intensive agriculture. Since 1979, an African Wildlife Foundation project has attempted to protect the Park’s gorillas and promote tourism. Fund- ing exceeds $250,000 annually.

Latin Americu

Cenrral Selva, Peru: Site of the 1,220 km’ Yanachanga- Chemillen National Park and forest and indigenous reserves. A $22 million USAID-funded project (1982- 87) was initiated in an attempt to maximize sustained

productivity of the watershed and increase local income so as to reduce inappropriate development. Since 1988, the World Wildlife Fund-U.S. has provided $100,000 to the Yanesha Forestry Cooperative. Monarch Overwintering Reserves, Mexico: A cluster of five mountain-top reserves, totalling 5 km’, to protect butterflies. A Mexican NC0 is working to promote tourism development and education in local communities and reduce the high level of illegal logging which threatens the tiny reserves. World Wildlife Fund-US (WWF-US) contributed over $250,000 during 1985-90. Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica: The 1,750 km’ peninsula includes several protected areas, all threatened by logging. The Boscosa project initiated in 19X7 by WWF-US supports income generation through forest management, agriculture, and other components. Funding from 198S-91 has been approximately $850,000. Sian Ku’an Biosphere Reserve, Mexico: This 5.2011 km’ multiple-use area includes terrestrial and marine habitats. Amigos de Sian Ka’an, a local NGO supports the reserve and its residents through small-scale development activities and publicity with less than $100,000 annually. The nearby Pilot Forestry Plan, works with local communities on their collective landholdings to improve forestry practices. Talumancu Region, Costa Rica: The region includes a variety of protected areas. ANAI, a Costa Rican NGO, has promoted small-scale activities emphasizing sustainable development practices in the region since the early 1980s. Funding was $1.2 million during 198488.

Documents

Planning for people and parks: Design dilemmas