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COST OF CONFLICT IN Planning & Development Department, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar – Pakistan Planning & Development Department, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar – Pakistan

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COST OF CONFLICT IN

Planning & Development Department,FATA Secretariat, Peshawar – Pakistan

Planning & Development Department,FATA Secretariat, Peshawar – Pakistan

Cost of Conflict in

FATA

Planning & Development Department,FATA Secretariat, Peshawar – Pakistan

April, 2009www.fata.gov.pk

Cost of Conflict in

FATA

Planning & Development Department,FATA Secretariat, Peshawar – Pakistan

April, 2009www.fata.gov.pk

Contents

Foreword………….……………………………....…….....................……..….. 1

Summary of Cost of Conflict in FATA at a Glance..………......................….. 3

Damage to Infrastructure and Human Losses…….……..…......................... 4

Economic Damages ……..….……………………………..…......................... 9

Social Costs ………………………………….……………………………....….. 12

Environmental Costs .....................……..………………………………….….. 14

Security and IDPs Costs …....…………………………………....................... 15

Way Forward …………………..……………………………..…...................... 20

CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 6

Contents

Foreword………….……………………………....…….....................……..….. 1

Summary of Cost of Conflict in FATA at a Glance..………......................….. 3

Damage to Infrastructure and Human Losses…….……..…......................... 4

Economic Damages ……..….……………………………..…......................... 9

Social Costs ………………………………….……………………………....….. 12

Environmental Costs .....................……..………………………………….….. 14

Security and IDPs Costs …....…………………………………....................... 15

Way Forward …………………..……………………………..…...................... 20

CHAPTER 1

CHAPTER 2

CHAPTER 3

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5

CHAPTER 6

The territories that form FATA consist of seven 'political agencies'-Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, North Waziristan, Orakzai and South Waziristan-and six smaller zones, called 'frontier regions' (FRs) in the districts of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan,

Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Peshawar and Tank. To the north and east, the tribal areas are bounded by the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), while on the south lies the province of Balochistan. In the south-east, FATA joins the Punjab province. The Durand Line, which separates Pakistan from Afghanistan, forms the western border of FATA.

In the 19th century, the area held great strategic importance, serving as a buffer between the British colonial government of India and Tsarist Russia. More than a hundred years later, the region has been thrust onto the world political stage once again for reasons of global security. However, the fact that FATA is amongst the most poorly developed parts of Pakistan has not been properly addressed in the domestic and international policy frameworks.

Starting with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the last three decades have seen turmoil and instability across the border spill over into FATA. During the same period, FATA has remained one of the most insular and isolated corners of the country, cut off from the mainstream of Pakistani society. Its people have seen few of the benefits of development activities launched in their own area and have failed to share in the progress achieved elsewhere in the country. Increasingly impoverished and marginalised, they have also become vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of criminal and extremist elements.

To fathom the gravity of the present situation in FATA, it would be important to distinguish between law & order, insurgency and conflict. Law and order is mainly related to actions taken against anti-social elements to create enabling environment for political, economic and social development in a specific area. The intent of the anti-social elements is not to create alternate governing authority or control of certain territory rather to express themselves for resolutions of their specific problems. Conversely, insurgency – being a protracted political-military activity- is a contest by an organized group with the government for support of people and control over resources and territory. Given the regional and international dimensions of the ongoing insurgency in FATA, it has now assumed the status of a conflict.

The socioeconomic indicators of FATA suggest that it is one of the poorest areas of the country. The key reasons of the historical development lag are attributed to resource and capacity constraints, scarce economic activities and socio-cultural barriers and prevailing law & order situation. A number of projects were started under FATA Annual Development Programmes (ADPs) over the years. However, meager financial allocations coupled with increased development cost has resulted in huge throw forward liabilities. FATA ADP has throwforward liabilities of more than Rs. 40 billion. With current level of funding by the Federal Government it would take atleast four years to complete the ongoing projects of the

1

Cost of Conflict in FATA

FOREWORD

The territories that form FATA consist of seven 'political agencies'-Bajaur, Khyber, Kurram, Mohmand, North Waziristan, Orakzai and South Waziristan-and six smaller zones, called 'frontier regions' (FRs) in the districts of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan,

Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Peshawar and Tank. To the north and east, the tribal areas are bounded by the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), while on the south lies the province of Balochistan. In the south-east, FATA joins the Punjab province. The Durand Line, which separates Pakistan from Afghanistan, forms the western border of FATA.

In the 19th century, the area held great strategic importance, serving as a buffer between the British colonial government of India and Tsarist Russia. More than a hundred years later, the region has been thrust onto the world political stage once again for reasons of global security. However, the fact that FATA is amongst the most poorly developed parts of Pakistan has not been properly addressed in the domestic and international policy frameworks.

Starting with the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the last three decades have seen turmoil and instability across the border spill over into FATA. During the same period, FATA has remained one of the most insular and isolated corners of the country, cut off from the mainstream of Pakistani society. Its people have seen few of the benefits of development activities launched in their own area and have failed to share in the progress achieved elsewhere in the country. Increasingly impoverished and marginalised, they have also become vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of criminal and extremist elements.

To fathom the gravity of the present situation in FATA, it would be important to distinguish between law & order, insurgency and conflict. Law and order is mainly related to actions taken against anti-social elements to create enabling environment for political, economic and social development in a specific area. The intent of the anti-social elements is not to create alternate governing authority or control of certain territory rather to express themselves for resolutions of their specific problems. Conversely, insurgency – being a protracted political-military activity- is a contest by an organized group with the government for support of people and control over resources and territory. Given the regional and international dimensions of the ongoing insurgency in FATA, it has now assumed the status of a conflict.

The socioeconomic indicators of FATA suggest that it is one of the poorest areas of the country. The key reasons of the historical development lag are attributed to resource and capacity constraints, scarce economic activities and socio-cultural barriers and prevailing law & order situation. A number of projects were started under FATA Annual Development Programmes (ADPs) over the years. However, meager financial allocations coupled with increased development cost has resulted in huge throw forward liabilities. FATA ADP has throwforward liabilities of more than Rs. 40 billion. With current level of funding by the Federal Government it would take atleast four years to complete the ongoing projects of the

1

Cost of Conflict in FATA

FOREWORD

3

Cost of Conflict in FATA

Tentative Cost

(In million) Sector

Pak Rs. US$

-

Infrastructure losses

- Human Losses

- Economic costs

- Social costs

- Environmental costs

-

Security and IDPs costs

8270

4405

9505

88725

15000

45766

103

55

119

1109

188

572

Grand Total:

171671

2146

Note: Currency conversion rate US$ 1 = Pak Rs.80

-

Cost of Conflict in FATA

2

FATA ADP. Thus it leads to poor visibility and impact of the development interventions. Even with increased allocation since year 2002, the per capita government funded development investment in FATA (Rs. 905/- or US$ 11.30) stands very low against the national per capita government funded development investment (Rs. 2044/- or US$ 25.55). This issue is more compounded due to the fact that there is also no private investment being made in FATA as well.

The cost of development and construction is also high mainly due to lack of availability of local material, human resources and machinery. Similarly, availably of limited resources coupled with increased rates has adversely impacted the development and cost of construction in FATA. Moreover, the ongoing insurgency in FATA has severely impacted the already limited economic activity as there has been significant increase in the flight of capital and human resource from the war ridden area of FATA.

Another phenomenon is that the ongoing insurgency has limited the access of tribesmen to market places in settled districts of NWFP and vice versa. Resultantly, the cost of living has increased manifold. Moreover, there have been frequent incidents of blasting of public infrastructure including electricity pylons, schools, health facilities etc. resulting in poor service delivery. The cost of protection of these facilities and public life has also increased manifold due to the on going conflict in the area.

This report attempts to highlight and quantify scope and scale of damage that has occurred due to the ongoing insurgency across FATA. It is essential to highlight that the cost estimates incorporated in the report are preliminary assessments based on the initial estimates of the political administrations. Due to the complex nature and impact of the conflict, the costs increase on a daily basis.

It also appears that there is no quick fix of the crises. Undoing this damage will require a long term commitment, both political as well as financial, that would address not only the brick and mortar reconstruction but also try to heal the psychological scars which have marked the population.T

ORD SUMMARY OF COST OF INSURGENCY IN FATA AT A GLANCE

3

Cost of Conflict in FATA

Tentative Cost

(In million) Sector

Pak Rs. US$

-

Infrastructure losses

- Human Losses

- Economic costs

- Social costs

- Environmental costs

-

Security and IDPs costs

8270

4405

9505

88725

15000

45766

103

55

119

1109

188

572

Grand Total:

171671

2146

Note: Currency conversion rate US$ 1 = Pak Rs.80

-

Cost of Conflict in FATA

2

FATA ADP. Thus it leads to poor visibility and impact of the development interventions. Even with increased allocation since year 2002, the per capita government funded development investment in FATA (Rs. 905/- or US$ 11.30) stands very low against the national per capita government funded development investment (Rs. 2044/- or US$ 25.55). This issue is more compounded due to the fact that there is also no private investment being made in FATA as well.

The cost of development and construction is also high mainly due to lack of availability of local material, human resources and machinery. Similarly, availably of limited resources coupled with increased rates has adversely impacted the development and cost of construction in FATA. Moreover, the ongoing insurgency in FATA has severely impacted the already limited economic activity as there has been significant increase in the flight of capital and human resource from the war ridden area of FATA.

Another phenomenon is that the ongoing insurgency has limited the access of tribesmen to market places in settled districts of NWFP and vice versa. Resultantly, the cost of living has increased manifold. Moreover, there have been frequent incidents of blasting of public infrastructure including electricity pylons, schools, health facilities etc. resulting in poor service delivery. The cost of protection of these facilities and public life has also increased manifold due to the on going conflict in the area.

This report attempts to highlight and quantify scope and scale of damage that has occurred due to the ongoing insurgency across FATA. It is essential to highlight that the cost estimates incorporated in the report are preliminary assessments based on the initial estimates of the political administrations. Due to the complex nature and impact of the conflict, the costs increase on a daily basis.

It also appears that there is no quick fix of the crises. Undoing this damage will require a long term commitment, both political as well as financial, that would address not only the brick and mortar reconstruction but also try to heal the psychological scars which have marked the population.The project will provide solar electricity to 450 villages of FATA besides provision of solar pumping of drinking water supplies to 250 such villages. This project will have visible positive effect on the social status of deprived people of these remote areas.

FOREWORD SUMMARY OF COST OF INSURGENCY IN FATA AT A GLANCE

Damage to Infrastructure and human losses

Chapter 1

Damage to Infrastructure and human losses

Chapter 1

Pakistan is suffering a series of overlapping crises due to the conflict in its FATA region which has led to significant deaths, damages and internal displacement that has left thousands, in need of immediate humanitarian assistance.

The Government of Pakistan has utilized a variety of means to deal with the problems of insurgency and militancy in FATA. Underpinning all these efforts was the government's commitment to follow a policy of quelling conflict through negotiations. Government of Pakistan's commitment to settle the conflict through negotiations and peaceful means is evidenced by the Government, time and again, entering into peace agreements with insurgents and militants. Unfortunately, foreign and local militants operating in the tribal areas and causing unrest and destruction have not been too interested in dialogue.

As a last resort, the government has no option but to use force to control the insurgency and establish the writ of the government across the affected areas.

The damage to infrastructure and human losses can be divided in the following three categories:

?Damage to the people. This includes lives lost and injuries sustained. Also included here are the Internally Displaced Persons that were forced to migrate to escape violence.

?Damage to Public Assets. This refers to destruction and damage of public buildings and infrastructure (e.g., hospitals, schools, roads, power grids, water supply, etc.)

?Damage to Private Assets. This includes destruction and damage to privately owned property (e.g., homes, shops, factories, farms, etc.).

The figure regarding payment of compensation to tribesmen affected by violence/terrorist acts in FATA including pending claims have been worked out as Rs.4405 million.

Damages caused due to violence/terrorist acts to the public/private assets worked out as Rs.8270 million.

It may be pointed out that these are highly conservative estimates and therefore, can be termed as tip of the iceberg.

4

-

DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMAN LOSSES

Cost of Conflict in FATA

Pakistan is suffering a series of overlapping crises due to the conflict in its FATA region which has led to significant deaths, damages and internal displacement that has left thousands, in need of immediate humanitarian assistance.

The Government of Pakistan has utilized a variety of means to deal with the problems of insurgency and militancy in FATA. Underpinning all these efforts was the government's commitment to follow a policy of quelling conflict through negotiations. Government of Pakistan's commitment to settle the conflict through negotiations and peaceful means is evidenced by the Government, time and again, entering into peace agreements with insurgents and militants. Unfortunately, foreign and local militants operating in the tribal areas and causing unrest and destruction have not been too interested in dialogue.

As a last resort, the government has no option but to use force to control the insurgency and establish the writ of the government across the affected areas.

The damage to infrastructure and human losses can be divided in the following three categories:

?Damage to the people. This includes lives lost and injuries sustained. Also included here are the Internally Displaced Persons that were forced to migrate to escape violence.

?Damage to Public Assets. This refers to destruction and damage of public buildings and infrastructure (e.g., hospitals, schools, roads, power grids, water supply, etc.)

?Damage to Private Assets. This includes destruction and damage to privately owned property (e.g., homes, shops, factories, farms, etc.).

The figure regarding payment of compensation to tribesmen affected by violence/terrorist acts in FATA including pending claims have been worked out as Rs.4405 million.

Damages caused due to violence/terrorist acts to the public/private assets worked out as Rs.8270 million.

It may be pointed out that these are highly conservative estimates and therefore, can be termed as tip of the iceberg.

4

-

DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMAN LOSSES

Cost of Conflict in FATA

Methodology of Data Collection and Basis of assigning Costs:

a) Damage to the people has been divided into the following categories, which are as under:-

?Dead: Rs 500,000 per person

?Injured:

§Serious: Rs 200,000 per person

§Minors: Rs 100,000 per person

?Disabled after recovery: Rs 250,000 per person

Working:

?Dead: Rs 500,000 x 3205 = 1603 million

?Injured:

§Serous Rs 200,000 x 2160 = 432 million

§Minors i Rs 100,000 x 1520 = 152 million

?Disabled after recovery Rs 250,000 x 205 = 52 million

Total = 2239 million

Agency

Dead

Serious Injured

Minor Injured

Disabled

Bajaur Agency 600 600 50 25

Mohmand Agency 400 300 100 20

Khyber Agency 50 5 45

FR Peshawar 10 0 0

Kurram Agency 500 400 250 50

Orakzai Agency 150 30 45

FR Kohat 450 25 30 5

North Waziristan Agency 500 400 350 60

FR, Bannu 20 0 0

FR, Lakki 5 0 0

South Waziristan Agency 500 400 650 45

FR, Tank 20 0 0

FR, D. I. K 0 0 0

Total 3205 2160 1520 205

Agency-wise breakup of human losses

Source of above data is Agency locals, Administration and other Government offices etc

As per the working of finance department FATA compensation worked out and sent to finance division Islamabad for the government employees . As a whole the amount is Rs 2165.408 million.

So the total cost for human losses is Rs 2239+Rs 2165.408= Rs.4404.41 million say Rs.4405 million.

b) Damage to Public Assets have been worked out from the estimate of damaged infrastructure by the line directorate tabulated as under:-

Agencies Education Health Roads Irrigation Agriculture Livestock Sericulture Forest Fisheries Total

Bajaur Agency 186.35 72.428347.723 8.09 503.52 396.96 0.36 170.455 1685.886

Mohmand Agency 75 10357

55

9.13

1.6

181.772

5.3 694.802

Khyber Agency

15

15

123.6

30

1.5

2

37.5

4.7 229.3FR Peshawar

15.5

3.5

7

7

33

Kurram Agency

10

5

10

35

37.527

4.763

37.527

9.4 149.217

Orakzai Agency

3

10.5

1.9

40

66.5

10.515

4.1 136.515

FR Kohat

90.268

3.5

7

43

1.668

145.436

North Waziristan

Agency

76

50

325

4.285

10

20.3

8

5.7 499.285

FR, Bannu

5

7

9

5

0

0.328

4.3 30.628

FR, Lakki

5

5

0

10

South Waziristan

Agency

75

118

380

25

17.256

2.552

617.808

FR, Tank

5

1

5

5

16

FR, D. I. K

1

10.3

11.3

Total

553.118

294.43

1567.8

14.28

727.52

602.473

8.723

457.32

33.5 4259.177

Public Assets Costs = Rs 4270 million

Private Assets Costs (Assumed) = Rs 4000 million

Total: = Rs 8270 million

65

DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMAN LOSSES DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMAN LOSSES

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

Methodology of Data Collection and Basis of assigning Costs:

a) Damage to the people has been divided into the following categories, which are as under:-

?Dead: Rs 500,000 per person

?Injured:

§Serious: Rs 200,000 per person

§Minors: Rs 100,000 per person

?Disabled after recovery: Rs 250,000 per person

Working:

?Dead: Rs 500,000 x 3205 = 1603 million

?Injured:

§Serous Rs 200,000 x 2160 = 432 million

§Minors i Rs 100,000 x 1520 = 152 million

?Disabled after recovery Rs 250,000 x 205 = 52 million

Total = 2239 million

Agency

Dead

Serious Injured

Minor Injured

Disabled

Bajaur Agency 600 600 50 25

Mohmand Agency 400 300 100 20

Khyber Agency 50 5 45

FR Peshawar 10 0 0

Kurram Agency 500 400 250 50

Orakzai Agency 150 30 45

FR Kohat 450 25 30 5

North Waziristan Agency 500 400 350 60

FR, Bannu 20 0 0

FR, Lakki 5 0 0

South Waziristan Agency 500 400 650 45

FR, Tank 20 0 0

FR, D. I. K 0 0 0

Total 3205 2160 1520 205

Agency-wise breakup of human losses

Source of above data is Agency locals, Administration and other Government offices etc

As per the working of finance department FATA compensation worked out and sent to finance division Islamabad for the government employees . As a whole the amount is Rs 2165.408 million.

So the total cost for human losses is Rs 2239+Rs 2165.408= Rs.4404.41 million say Rs.4405 million.

b) Damage to Public Assets have been worked out from the estimate of damaged infrastructure by the line directorate tabulated as under:-

Agencies Education Health Roads Irrigation Agriculture Livestock Sericulture Forest Fisheries Total

Bajaur Agency 186.35 72.428347.723 8.09 503.52 396.96 0.36 170.455 1685.886

Mohmand Agency 75 10357

55

9.13

1.6

181.772

5.3 694.802

Khyber Agency

15

15

123.6

30

1.5

2

37.5

4.7 229.3FR Peshawar

15.5

3.5

7

7

33

Kurram Agency

10

5

10

35

37.527

4.763

37.527

9.4 149.217

Orakzai Agency

3

10.5

1.9

40

66.5

10.515

4.1 136.515

FR Kohat

90.268

3.5

7

43

1.668

145.436

North Waziristan

Agency

76

50

325

4.285

10

20.3

8

5.7 499.285

FR, Bannu

5

7

9

5

0

0.328

4.3 30.628

FR, Lakki

5

5

0

10

South Waziristan

Agency

75

118

380

25

17.256

2.552

617.808

FR, Tank

5

1

5

5

16

FR, D. I. K

1

10.3

11.3

Total

553.118

294.43

1567.8

14.28

727.52

602.473

8.723

457.32

33.5 4259.177

Public Assets Costs = Rs 4270 million

Private Assets Costs (Assumed) = Rs 4000 million

Total: = Rs 8270 million

65

DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMAN LOSSES DAMAGE TO INFRASTRUCTURE AND HUMAN LOSSES

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

Damage to the private store Damage to the office of News Channel

Damage to the local assets Damage to local assets

Damage to the public Eye Hospital Damage to the Mosque

CONFLICT IN PICTURES CONFLICT IN PICTURES

Damage to the school buildings

87

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

Damage to the private store Damage to the office of News Channel

Damage to the local assets Damage to local assets

Damage to the public Eye Hospital Damage to the Mosque

CONFLICT IN PICTURES CONFLICT IN PICTURES

Damage to the school buildings

87

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

Economic Damages

Chapter 2

Economic Damages

Chapter 2

9

-

There are few livelihood opportunities for the people. The rural economy is chiefly pastoral, with agriculture practiced in a few fertile valleys. Most households are engaged in primary-level subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing. Some are

involved in business and trading, or find employment in the small-scale commercial and industrial sectors. Those unable to earn a living at home migrate to other parts of the country or travel abroad in search of work. Women take active part in agricultural activities, collect fuel wood and fetch water, in addition to attending to household work and family duties.

Commerce and trade form a major source of livelihood in the tribal areas, second only to agriculture. The majority of this activity is in the form of wholesale and retail trade in consumer goods and consumer durables, clearance and transportation services, warehousing, hotels and restaurants, used vehicle spare parts, vehicles, and small-scale commercial establishments providing auxiliary services. Historically, and particularly during the 1980s, the region was a major centre for opium production and trafficking. Today, the transit trade with Afghanistan provides employment for the local population. The idea of long-term investment with slow but steady returns is not part of the business culture. It is partly for this reason that industrial development has failed to take off.

Industrial activity is restricted primarily to small, owner-financed units, operating without government oversight. These include stone processing, textile weaving, furniture manufacture and light engineering units producing firearms. It is estimated that some 10,000 workers are currently employed in the industrial sector. With the exception of those engaged in weapons and furniture manufacture, most local workers are unskilled. Some mineral extraction is taking place in various agencies, using outdated technology and antiquated methods. Significant reserves of minerals and commercially valuable stone remain unexplored.

The local economy operates on an informal basis and is undocumented, since few laws providing for the regulation of economic activity have been extended to FATA.

The damage to the already poor economy of FATA can be monetized in terms of the impact through closure of markets/businesses, increase in transportation cost (travel/freight cost), increase in prices due to inflation, decrease in employment, decrease in agriculture, industrial production, marketing and transit trade with Afghanistan.

Taking Bajaur and Kurram Agencies as examples, a major portion of the local economy is agrarian supported by non-farm economic activities. The business centre of Khar, Loesum, Anayat Kalley (Bajaur), Parachinar, Sadda, Alizai (Kurram) have remained closed for more than a year. Approximate number of businesses in these markets is 3500. Due to the closure there has been increased shortage of daily use commodities. Even if available, the average price increase is more than 1000%. For example, the prices of a 20 kg bag of flour in Kurram is more than Rs.6000 whereas it is available at Rs.600 in the adjacent district of

ECONOMIC DAMAGES

Cost of Conflict in FATA

9

-

There are few livelihood opportunities for the people. The rural economy is chiefly pastoral, with agriculture practiced in a few fertile valleys. Most households are engaged in primary-level subsistence agriculture and livestock rearing. Some are

involved in business and trading, or find employment in the small-scale commercial and industrial sectors. Those unable to earn a living at home migrate to other parts of the country or travel abroad in search of work. Women take active part in agricultural activities, collect fuel wood and fetch water, in addition to attending to household work and family duties.

Commerce and trade form a major source of livelihood in the tribal areas, second only to agriculture. The majority of this activity is in the form of wholesale and retail trade in consumer goods and consumer durables, clearance and transportation services, warehousing, hotels and restaurants, used vehicle spare parts, vehicles, and small-scale commercial establishments providing auxiliary services. Historically, and particularly during the 1980s, the region was a major centre for opium production and trafficking. Today, the transit trade with Afghanistan provides employment for the local population. The idea of long-term investment with slow but steady returns is not part of the business culture. It is partly for this reason that industrial development has failed to take off.

Industrial activity is restricted primarily to small, owner-financed units, operating without government oversight. These include stone processing, textile weaving, furniture manufacture and light engineering units producing firearms. It is estimated that some 10,000 workers are currently employed in the industrial sector. With the exception of those engaged in weapons and furniture manufacture, most local workers are unskilled. Some mineral extraction is taking place in various agencies, using outdated technology and antiquated methods. Significant reserves of minerals and commercially valuable stone remain unexplored.

The local economy operates on an informal basis and is undocumented, since few laws providing for the regulation of economic activity have been extended to FATA.

The damage to the already poor economy of FATA can be monetized in terms of the impact through closure of markets/businesses, increase in transportation cost (travel/freight cost), increase in prices due to inflation, decrease in employment, decrease in agriculture, industrial production, marketing and transit trade with Afghanistan.

Taking Bajaur and Kurram Agencies as examples, a major portion of the local economy is agrarian supported by non-farm economic activities. The business centre of Khar, Loesum, Anayat Kalley (Bajaur), Parachinar, Sadda, Alizai (Kurram) have remained closed for more than a year. Approximate number of businesses in these markets is 3500. Due to the closure there has been increased shortage of daily use commodities. Even if available, the average price increase is more than 1000%. For example, the prices of a 20 kg bag of flour in Kurram is more than Rs.6000 whereas it is available at Rs.600 in the adjacent district of

ECONOMIC DAMAGES

Cost of Conflict in FATA

10

Hangu (NWFP).

The number of local transport vehicles, which were plying on the roads and catering for the transportation needs of the locals have reduced to a very large extent which has resulted in a sharp increase in transportation costs. According to one estimate, transportation cost has increased by more than 500%. A small example of this can be seen from the fact that prior to operations, a person was charged Rs.1 from Khar Bazar to the gate of Civil Colony Khar but during the operations it has increased to Rs.5. Furthermore, hiring a motor car from Khar to Munda would cost Rs.300 whereas during the turbulent days the asking rate for the same is Rs.5000 and even more at times. A large number of instances have been recorded where people did not have enough money for paying transportation costs of their families and they had to dispose off their cattle at throw away prices, much lower than their actual market prices. Similarly, in Kurram the travel cost between Peshawar and Parachinar has increased from Rs.200 per person to more than Rs.5000 per person as the tribesmen have to travel via Afghanistan as the road between Peshawar and Parachinar has been closed for more than one and a half years. This increase in travel cost has in-turn adversely affected businesses in the settled districts as well.

In agriculture, FATA being mainly involved in subsistence farming cannot produce sufficient food items to meet its demands. It has to heavily rely on the inflow of these items from the settled districts of NWFP. However, FATA also exports off-season vegetables and fruits which are a substantial source of income for the locals. The loss to farmers is reported to be more than Rs.9505 million per annum.

Another indicator of economic activity in the Agencies can be gauged through the collection of cess on various commodities by the political administrations. If Bajaur is taken as an example, the cess collection before the beginning of war on terror in 2002 was Rs.35.61 million per annum which has been reduced to Rs.10.553 million for 2007.

In FATA, the domestic consumers of electricity do not pay their monthly bills. A via media was devised by the Government through which they were charged a monthly flat rate. A systematic effort for collection was showing good progress and it was hoped that with the passage of time, a new culture of payment for the utility would develop in the tribesmen. However, after the start of insurgency the paying capacity of the people has fallen and now the collection figures for the last five years stand below 1% of the outstanding arrears. As an example, the total TESCO domestic bills for 2006-2007 were Rs.10004 million out of which only Rs.98 million were collected giving recovery figures of 0.98%.

ECONOMIC DAMAGES

11

Methodology of Data Collection and Basis of assigning Costs:

The economic cost is directly based on the losses incurred to the business activities, private/public infrastructure damage cost and public/Commercial transportation activity costs.

Keeping in view the above indicators following working procedures (supposition) are adopted:-

a) Business activity Cost=15% of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses.

b) Private / Public Infrastructure economic Cost=50% of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses.

c) Private/Commercial transportation economic activity Cost= 10% of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses.

Agencies

Infrastructure losses Cost

Public + Private

human losses Cost

Public + Private

Infra +Human

Losses Cost

Economic Cost @ 75%

of Infra +Human

Losses Cost

Bajaur Agency

1999.58

597.82

2597.40

1948.05

Mohmand Agency

1007.49

441.57

1449.06

1086.80

Khyber Agency

536.99

197.07

734.06

550.55

FR Peshawar

340.69

171.57

512.26

384.20

Kurram Agency

456.91

534.07

990.98

743.23

Orakzai Agency

444.21

252.07

696.28

522.21

FR Kohat

453.13

400.82

853.95

640.46

North Waziristan Agency

806.98

546.57

1353.55

1015.16

FR, Bannu

338.32

176.57

514.89

386.17

FR, Lakki

317.69

169.07

486.76

365.07

South Waziristan Agency

925.50

572.82

1498.32

1123.74

FR, Tank

323.69

176.57

500.26

375.20

FR, D. I. K

318.99

166.57

485.56

364.17

Total :

8270

4405

12675

9505

Total Economic Cost = 75 % of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses

ECONOMIC DAMAGES

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

10

Hangu (NWFP).

The number of local transport vehicles, which were plying on the roads and catering for the transportation needs of the locals have reduced to a very large extent which has resulted in a sharp increase in transportation costs. According to one estimate, transportation cost has increased by more than 500%. A small example of this can be seen from the fact that prior to operations, a person was charged Rs.1 from Khar Bazar to the gate of Civil Colony Khar but during the operations it has increased to Rs.5. Furthermore, hiring a motor car from Khar to Munda would cost Rs.300 whereas during the turbulent days the asking rate for the same is Rs.5000 and even more at times. A large number of instances have been recorded where people did not have enough money for paying transportation costs of their families and they had to dispose off their cattle at throw away prices, much lower than their actual market prices. Similarly, in Kurram the travel cost between Peshawar and Parachinar has increased from Rs.200 per person to more than Rs.5000 per person as the tribesmen have to travel via Afghanistan as the road between Peshawar and Parachinar has been closed for more than one and a half years. This increase in travel cost has in-turn adversely affected businesses in the settled districts as well.

In agriculture, FATA being mainly involved in subsistence farming cannot produce sufficient food items to meet its demands. It has to heavily rely on the inflow of these items from the settled districts of NWFP. However, FATA also exports off-season vegetables and fruits which are a substantial source of income for the locals. The loss to farmers is reported to be more than Rs.9505 million per annum.

Another indicator of economic activity in the Agencies can be gauged through the collection of cess on various commodities by the political administrations. If Bajaur is taken as an example, the cess collection before the beginning of war on terror in 2002 was Rs.35.61 million per annum which has been reduced to Rs.10.553 million for 2007.

In FATA, the domestic consumers of electricity do not pay their monthly bills. A via media was devised by the Government through which they were charged a monthly flat rate. A systematic effort for collection was showing good progress and it was hoped that with the passage of time, a new culture of payment for the utility would develop in the tribesmen. However, after the start of insurgency the paying capacity of the people has fallen and now the collection figures for the last five years stand below 1% of the outstanding arrears. As an example, the total TESCO domestic bills for 2006-2007 were Rs.10004 million out of which only Rs.98 million were collected giving recovery figures of 0.98%.

ECONOMIC DAMAGES

11

Methodology of Data Collection and Basis of assigning Costs:

The economic cost is directly based on the losses incurred to the business activities, private/public infrastructure damage cost and public/Commercial transportation activity costs.

Keeping in view the above indicators following working procedures (supposition) are adopted:-

a) Business activity Cost=15% of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses.

b) Private / Public Infrastructure economic Cost=50% of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses.

c) Private/Commercial transportation economic activity Cost= 10% of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses.

Agencies

Infrastructure losses Cost

Public + Private

human losses Cost

Public + Private

Infra +Human

Losses Cost

Economic Cost @ 75%

of Infra +Human

Losses Cost

Bajaur Agency

1999.58

597.82

2597.40

1948.05

Mohmand Agency

1007.49

441.57

1449.06

1086.80

Khyber Agency

536.99

197.07

734.06

550.55

FR Peshawar

340.69

171.57

512.26

384.20

Kurram Agency

456.91

534.07

990.98

743.23

Orakzai Agency

444.21

252.07

696.28

522.21

FR Kohat

453.13

400.82

853.95

640.46

North Waziristan Agency

806.98

546.57

1353.55

1015.16

FR, Bannu

338.32

176.57

514.89

386.17

FR, Lakki

317.69

169.07

486.76

365.07

South Waziristan Agency

925.50

572.82

1498.32

1123.74

FR, Tank

323.69

176.57

500.26

375.20

FR, D. I. K

318.99

166.57

485.56

364.17

Total :

8270

4405

12675

9505

Total Economic Cost = 75 % of total cost of Infrastructure plus human losses

ECONOMIC DAMAGES

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

Chapter 3Social Costs

Chapter 3Social Costs

12

In terms of human development and quality of life indicators, FATA lags far behind both the NWFP and the country as a whole. Overall literacy in FATA is as low as 17.42 per cent, compared to 35.41 per cent in the NWFP and 43.92 per cent at the national level

(1998 figures). Just 3 per cent of females aged 10 years and above are literate in FATA, compared to 18.82 percent in the NWFP and 32.02 per cent across the country. While 29.51 per cent of males over the age of 10 are literate in FATA, this figure trails the NWFP (51.39 per cent) and the national average (54.81 per cent) by a wide margin. Health care indicators are equally disappointing, with one doctor for every 7,670 persons in FATA, compared to 4,916 persons per doctor in the NWFP and 1,226 persons for every doctor in Pakistan.

Delivery of social services has been adversely affected due to the closure of educational and health institutions and non-attendance by teachers and students. More than 500 social sector institutions have been partially or completely damaged. Moreover, there is a general fear in the people due to which the school/college attendance especially of girls has decreased to 0% in a significant number of cases.

In the health sector the service delivery has also been reduced by more than 50% due to non-availability of medicines and doctors. For example till June 2008 the average OPD in Agency Headquarter Hospital, Bajaur was 25792 which has been reduced to 8826. The situation in the far flung areas is worse.

During 2005, the average coverage of EPI was 70% which dropped down to 41% during the year 2008. During 2004, there were only two confirmed cases of Poliomyelitis in FATA which have increased to 08 cases during the year 2008, mainly owing to refusals and stigma of NGOs attached to the polio campaign.

Medicines/food supplement were sent to various health facilities to be distributed amongst the pregnant women and their children in order to reduce the maternal mortality rate (MMR) and infant mortality rate (IMR). But these items were snatched and set ablaze in AHQ hospital Wana, Parachinar and other parts of FATA. Resultantly, the MDGs No.04 & 05 “to reduced by three quarter between 1990 and 2015, the MMR and IMR ratio” have been badly affected.

Due to heavy damages to drinking water supply schemes, the incidence of diseases like gastroenteritis and other diseases have increased mortality, especially in infants and children.

Although it is difficult to quantify social costs. However, if the increase in household expenditure on health and loss of school days is taken as a proxy then the estimated loss in the social sector would run over millions. This does not include the impact of psychological trauma on the population.

SOCIAL COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

12

In terms of human development and quality of life indicators, FATA lags far behind both the NWFP and the country as a whole. Overall literacy in FATA is as low as 17.42 per cent, compared to 35.41 per cent in the NWFP and 43.92 per cent at the national level

(1998 figures). Just 3 per cent of females aged 10 years and above are literate in FATA, compared to 18.82 percent in the NWFP and 32.02 per cent across the country. While 29.51 per cent of males over the age of 10 are literate in FATA, this figure trails the NWFP (51.39 per cent) and the national average (54.81 per cent) by a wide margin. Health care indicators are equally disappointing, with one doctor for every 7,670 persons in FATA, compared to 4,916 persons per doctor in the NWFP and 1,226 persons for every doctor in Pakistan.

Delivery of social services has been adversely affected due to the closure of educational and health institutions and non-attendance by teachers and students. More than 500 social sector institutions have been partially or completely damaged. Moreover, there is a general fear in the people due to which the school/college attendance especially of girls has decreased to 0% in a significant number of cases.

In the health sector the service delivery has also been reduced by more than 50% due to non-availability of medicines and doctors. For example till June 2008 the average OPD in Agency Headquarter Hospital, Bajaur was 25792 which has been reduced to 8826. The situation in the far flung areas is worse.

During 2005, the average coverage of EPI was 70% which dropped down to 41% during the year 2008. During 2004, there were only two confirmed cases of Poliomyelitis in FATA which have increased to 08 cases during the year 2008, mainly owing to refusals and stigma of NGOs attached to the polio campaign.

Medicines/food supplement were sent to various health facilities to be distributed amongst the pregnant women and their children in order to reduce the maternal mortality rate (MMR) and infant mortality rate (IMR). But these items were snatched and set ablaze in AHQ hospital Wana, Parachinar and other parts of FATA. Resultantly, the MDGs No.04 & 05 “to reduced by three quarter between 1990 and 2015, the MMR and IMR ratio” have been badly affected.

Due to heavy damages to drinking water supply schemes, the incidence of diseases like gastroenteritis and other diseases have increased mortality, especially in infants and children.

Although it is difficult to quantify social costs. However, if the increase in household expenditure on health and loss of school days is taken as a proxy then the estimated loss in the social sector would run over millions. This does not include the impact of psychological trauma on the population.

SOCIAL COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

13

Methodology of Data Collection and basis of assigning costs:

The social cost is directly based on the following:-

?Closure of Education / health facilities

?Non attendance by teachers / students

?Non attendance by patients / doctors

?Poor social service delivery

?Maternal and infant mortality ratio

?House hold expenditure on health

?Loss of School days

?Deforestation

?Environment

?Wild life hebetate loss

? Agro-climatic and soil degradation

?Road service delivery and communication

All the above indicators provide a vision of impact assessment of infrastructure and human loss damages. After detailed review of the agencies and through some monitoring visits and through assumptions it was concluded that social cost can be equated as 700% of the total infrastructure and human loss. i.e. Rs 88725 million

Chapter 4Environmental Costs

SOCIAL COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

13

Methodology of Data Collection and basis of assigning costs:

The social cost is directly based on the following:-

?Closure of Education / health facilities

?Non attendance by teachers / students

?Non attendance by patients / doctors

?Poor social service delivery

?Maternal and infant mortality ratio

?House hold expenditure on health

?Loss of School days

?Deforestation

?Environment

?Wild life hebetate loss

? Agro-climatic and soil degradation

?Road service delivery and communication

All the above indicators provide a vision of impact assessment of infrastructure and human loss damages. After detailed review of the agencies and through some monitoring visits and through assumptions it was concluded that social cost can be equated as 700% of the total infrastructure and human loss. i.e. Rs 88725 million

Chapter 4Environmental Costs

SOCIAL COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

14

Figures for forest cover in FATA ranges from 1 per cent to 8 per cent of the total reported area from Agency to Agency. What is clear, however, is that forest cover is declining rapidly as a result of timber extraction (for local use and sale and export to

areas outside FATA), prolonged periods of drought, uncontrolled grazing, and pressure from fuel wood and fodder collection.

Following the war on terror, the rate of deforestation has further increased because plantation and post management activities funded through the development programme has come to a virtual halt. In addition, the security forces to eliminate terrorists hideouts have also cleared large tracts of forest for tactical purposes especially in North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Bajaur Agencies. Resultantly, the gap between production and use is widening, and current levels of extraction are unsustainable. Over-exploitation has also affected the natural regenerative capacity of forests.

With forest resources rapidly disappearing, the environmental services provided by natural ecosystems have also diminished. The water retention capacity of the soil has fallen, the area suffers from flash floods, and the quality and quantity of fodder has been affected.

Rangeland and pasture areas are in a depleted state, partly from overgrazing but also because of extended periods of drought. In the past, ruminants belonging to Afghan refugees are thought to have added to the problem. Although use by refugees is reported to have decreased in recent years, range resources will require considerable time to recover.

Land erosion is a serious concern as well, with denuded hills unable to retain soil or water. Erosion increases the incidence of flash floods which wipe away crops, farmland and valuable infrastructure, while low water retention has led to a drawing down of the water table, creating scarcity where none existed a few generations ago.

An overall deterioration in the health of freshwater ecosystems has also been witnessed, caused in large part by insufficient conservation measures. Fisheries resources have been affected, with natural populations of fish declining in rivers and streams.

Prior to the beginning of insurgency in FATA, Liquid Petroleum Gas was the main source of energy in the towns. TESCO coverage of electricity was also more than 60%. However, due to the restricted supply of LPG and frequent blowing up of power infrastructure, de-forestation for use as energy or as a supplement income has increased by 70%. This has augmented the incidence of flash floods and washing away of rich top soil already impacting agriculture yields and causing severe damages to village abadies. The cost to the environment would roughly run over Rs.15000 million.

ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

14

Figures for forest cover in FATA ranges from 1 per cent to 8 per cent of the total reported area from Agency to Agency. What is clear, however, is that forest cover is declining rapidly as a result of timber extraction (for local use and sale and export to

areas outside FATA), prolonged periods of drought, uncontrolled grazing, and pressure from fuel wood and fodder collection.

Following the war on terror, the rate of deforestation has further increased because plantation and post management activities funded through the development programme has come to a virtual halt. In addition, the security forces to eliminate terrorists hideouts have also cleared large tracts of forest for tactical purposes especially in North Waziristan, South Waziristan and Bajaur Agencies. Resultantly, the gap between production and use is widening, and current levels of extraction are unsustainable. Over-exploitation has also affected the natural regenerative capacity of forests.

With forest resources rapidly disappearing, the environmental services provided by natural ecosystems have also diminished. The water retention capacity of the soil has fallen, the area suffers from flash floods, and the quality and quantity of fodder has been affected.

Rangeland and pasture areas are in a depleted state, partly from overgrazing but also because of extended periods of drought. In the past, ruminants belonging to Afghan refugees are thought to have added to the problem. Although use by refugees is reported to have decreased in recent years, range resources will require considerable time to recover.

Land erosion is a serious concern as well, with denuded hills unable to retain soil or water. Erosion increases the incidence of flash floods which wipe away crops, farmland and valuable infrastructure, while low water retention has led to a drawing down of the water table, creating scarcity where none existed a few generations ago.

An overall deterioration in the health of freshwater ecosystems has also been witnessed, caused in large part by insufficient conservation measures. Fisheries resources have been affected, with natural populations of fish declining in rivers and streams.

Prior to the beginning of insurgency in FATA, Liquid Petroleum Gas was the main source of energy in the towns. TESCO coverage of electricity was also more than 60%. However, due to the restricted supply of LPG and frequent blowing up of power infrastructure, de-forestation for use as energy or as a supplement income has increased by 70%. This has augmented the incidence of flash floods and washing away of rich top soil already impacting agriculture yields and causing severe damages to village abadies. The cost to the environment would roughly run over Rs.15000 million.

ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

Chapter 5Security and IDPs Costs

Chapter 5Security and IDPs Costs

15

The overall security cost can be classified into following two categories:

?Military (Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps)

?Levies and Khasadars (Community Forces)

The cost of military operation is beyond the scope of this report and would be worked out separately by the concerned agencies.

Focusing on the civil law enforcement agencies, before the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, FATA was one of the most peaceful regions of Pakistan. Crime rate of the area was negligible as compared to the settled districts. This was because of the system of administration based on the principle of collective responsibility of a tribe executed through a body of Elders / Mashars called Maliks. Law enforcement is done through Khassadars / Levies which are drawn from amongst the tribes and are supported by the Frontier Corps. Khassadar Force is a part of the territorial responsibility concept. This force besides discharging protective territorial responsibility on behalf of the tribe also carries out police duties in maintaining law and order.

Breakdown of the authority of Maliks started in 1980 when they were marginalized and instead religious clerics were used to unite the tribes against Russians. The situation was further deteriorated after 9/11 when Pakistan joined the international community in the war against terror. Law and order situation in FATA can be gauged from the fact that 600 influential maliks/elders have been killed, 11 incidents of suicide attacks, 153 IEDs explosion and 146 cases of kidnapping of Government functionaries / pro-government Maliks took place from March to October 2008. The war against terror has shattered the social fabric of the society. People have become homeless, health and education facilities are no more there, economic activities are at a stand still. A majority of the population of the war torn areas have migrated to other places for safety and earning their livelihood.

Levies and Khassadars

The militants are not ordinary criminals. They are trained fighters whereas the levies/ khassadars are not trained to handle insurgency like situation.

Khasadars use their own weapons and ammunition whereas Levies have been provided small arms with very little ammunition. They are not properly equipped with modern weapons, communication equipments, transport, accommodation etc to effectively face the heavily armed, well funded and well equipped miscreants.

The LEAs are paid a meager monthly salary of Rs. 3500/- which is less than the minimum wage announced by the Government whereas the miscreants per source reports are paid a handsome monthly amount ranging from Rs.10000/- to Rs.15000/- with unlimited supply

SECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

15

The overall security cost can be classified into following two categories:

?Military (Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps)

?Levies and Khasadars (Community Forces)

The cost of military operation is beyond the scope of this report and would be worked out separately by the concerned agencies.

Focusing on the civil law enforcement agencies, before the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, FATA was one of the most peaceful regions of Pakistan. Crime rate of the area was negligible as compared to the settled districts. This was because of the system of administration based on the principle of collective responsibility of a tribe executed through a body of Elders / Mashars called Maliks. Law enforcement is done through Khassadars / Levies which are drawn from amongst the tribes and are supported by the Frontier Corps. Khassadar Force is a part of the territorial responsibility concept. This force besides discharging protective territorial responsibility on behalf of the tribe also carries out police duties in maintaining law and order.

Breakdown of the authority of Maliks started in 1980 when they were marginalized and instead religious clerics were used to unite the tribes against Russians. The situation was further deteriorated after 9/11 when Pakistan joined the international community in the war against terror. Law and order situation in FATA can be gauged from the fact that 600 influential maliks/elders have been killed, 11 incidents of suicide attacks, 153 IEDs explosion and 146 cases of kidnapping of Government functionaries / pro-government Maliks took place from March to October 2008. The war against terror has shattered the social fabric of the society. People have become homeless, health and education facilities are no more there, economic activities are at a stand still. A majority of the population of the war torn areas have migrated to other places for safety and earning their livelihood.

Levies and Khassadars

The militants are not ordinary criminals. They are trained fighters whereas the levies/ khassadars are not trained to handle insurgency like situation.

Khasadars use their own weapons and ammunition whereas Levies have been provided small arms with very little ammunition. They are not properly equipped with modern weapons, communication equipments, transport, accommodation etc to effectively face the heavily armed, well funded and well equipped miscreants.

The LEAs are paid a meager monthly salary of Rs. 3500/- which is less than the minimum wage announced by the Government whereas the miscreants per source reports are paid a handsome monthly amount ranging from Rs.10000/- to Rs.15000/- with unlimited supply

SECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATA

16

of petrol/diesel. In case of death / injury, the miscreants receive 300% more than LEAs get in compensation from the Government.

The LEAs receive threats from the miscreants to desert their posts. Their financial conditions make them vulnerable physically and monetarily.

Due to the above reasons the LEAs are ineffective in maintaining law and order and in many cases have left their picquets to the miscreants without firing a single bullet. The picquets can not sustain fire from rocket launcher/ mortar. As a result Government infrastructure having cost of Rs. 1127.007 (M) has been damaged. Moreover, to arm and equip the levies and khassadars enabling them to offer resistance to militants, arms / communication equipments / vehicles/ training etc, an amount of Rs. 2656.318 (M) is required.

Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs)

To counter insurgency, several military operations against miscreants have been initiated by the Government which resulted in large number of internally displaced persons. For example, in South Waziristan about 200000 persons came to DIKhan, Peshawar and other districts of NWFP. A large number even migrated to other parts of the country including Islamabad and Karachi. Operation in Bajaur was started in August 2008. As a result of this operation a number of people were displaced and about 2,74,000 migrated to the neighboring districts and were accommodated in 45 camps including one established at Islamabad. At present 32392 persons are residing in 09 camps whereas 67766 persons are residing with relatives/friends. In FR Kohat about 9000 people migrated to Kohat and Peshawar due to operation against miscreants. Similarly about 30000 people migrated from Kurram Agency.

The rehabilitation costs of the IDPs is not only limited to give them shelter, food and other assistance in the camps but its stretches to the period when these people return to their homes. This cost is estimated to exceed Rs.15000 million till these people can restart their normal livelihood activities.

Most vulnerable among all the IDPs are children. More children die from disease and malnutrition due to armed conflicts than die as a direct result of fighting. Displaced children lack proper health and education services. Once displaced, children may have difficulty in establishing their identity and also suffer psychological traumas.

SECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

17

Methodology of Data Collection and Basis of assigning Costs:

The expenditure incurred on the IDPs is worked out as under:

a) Travelling Expenditure Rs 1000 per head

b) Shelter Rs 5000 per head

c) Food (at arrival at camp) Rs 1000

d) Medical Rs 2500

e) Compensation for Business: Rs 10000

Total: Rs 19500 per head fixed

f) Daily food Consumption Rs 1200

g) Drinking Water Rs 50

h) Electricity Rs 50

i) Medical Rs 300

Total: Rs 1600/head/month Recurring

So Rs 19200 per year or Rs 35000 per the whole period since displacement.

IDPs Fixed cost at arrival

Agencies

Reported IDPs

Non-Reported expected

Assumption IDPs

Total IDPs

Cost Per head

Total Costs

(in Millions)

Bajaur Agency

274,000

75,000

349,000

19,500

6,806

Mohmand Agency

-

50,000

50,000

19,500

975

Khyber Agency

-

-

-

19,500

-

FR Peshawar

-

-

-

19,500

-

Kurram Agency

30,000

50,000

80,000

19,500

1,560

Orakzai Agency

-

-

-

19,500

-

FR Kohat

9,000

3,000

12,000

19,500

234

North Waziristan Agency

- 50,000 50,000 19,500 975

FR, Bannu - - - 19,500 -

FR, Lakki - - - 19,500 -

South Waziristan Agency 200,000 50,000 250,000 19,500 4,875

FR, Tank - - - 19,500 -

FR, D. I. Khan - - - 19,500 -

Total: 513,000 278,000 791,000 15,425

SECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

16

of petrol/diesel. In case of death / injury, the miscreants receive 300% more than LEAs get in compensation from the Government.

The LEAs receive threats from the miscreants to desert their posts. Their financial conditions make them vulnerable physically and monetarily.

Due to the above reasons the LEAs are ineffective in maintaining law and order and in many cases have left their picquets to the miscreants without firing a single bullet. The picquets can not sustain fire from rocket launcher/ mortar. As a result Government infrastructure having cost of Rs. 1127.007 (M) has been damaged. Moreover, to arm and equip the levies and khassadars enabling them to offer resistance to militants, arms / communication equipments / vehicles/ training etc, an amount of Rs. 2656.318 (M) is required.

Internally Displaced Persons' (IDPs)

To counter insurgency, several military operations against miscreants have been initiated by the Government which resulted in large number of internally displaced persons. For example, in South Waziristan about 200000 persons came to DIKhan, Peshawar and other districts of NWFP. A large number even migrated to other parts of the country including Islamabad and Karachi. Operation in Bajaur was started in August 2008. As a result of this operation a number of people were displaced and about 2,74,000 migrated to the neighboring districts and were accommodated in 45 camps including one established at Islamabad. At present 32392 persons are residing in 09 camps whereas 67766 persons are residing with relatives/friends. In FR Kohat about 9000 people migrated to Kohat and Peshawar due to operation against miscreants. Similarly about 30000 people migrated from Kurram Agency.

The rehabilitation costs of the IDPs is not only limited to give them shelter, food and other assistance in the camps but its stretches to the period when these people return to their homes. This cost is estimated to exceed Rs.15000 million till these people can restart their normal livelihood activities.

Most vulnerable among all the IDPs are children. More children die from disease and malnutrition due to armed conflicts than die as a direct result of fighting. Displaced children lack proper health and education services. Once displaced, children may have difficulty in establishing their identity and also suffer psychological traumas.

SECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

17

Methodology of Data Collection and Basis of assigning Costs:

The expenditure incurred on the IDPs is worked out as under:

a) Travelling Expenditure Rs 1000 per head

b) Shelter Rs 5000 per head

c) Food (at arrival at camp) Rs 1000

d) Medical Rs 2500

e) Compensation for Business: Rs 10000

Total: Rs 19500 per head fixed

f) Daily food Consumption Rs 1200

g) Drinking Water Rs 50

h) Electricity Rs 50

i) Medical Rs 300

Total: Rs 1600/head/month Recurring

So Rs 19200 per year or Rs 35000 per the whole period since displacement.

IDPs Fixed cost at arrival

Agencies

Reported IDPs

Non-Reported expected

Assumption IDPs

Total IDPs

Cost Per head

Total Costs

(in Millions)

Bajaur Agency

274,000

75,000

349,000

19,500

6,806

Mohmand Agency

-

50,000

50,000

19,500

975

Khyber Agency

-

-

-

19,500

-

FR Peshawar

-

-

-

19,500

-

Kurram Agency

30,000

50,000

80,000

19,500

1,560

Orakzai Agency

-

-

-

19,500

-

FR Kohat

9,000

3,000

12,000

19,500

234

North Waziristan Agency

- 50,000 50,000 19,500 975

FR, Bannu - - - 19,500 -

FR, Lakki - - - 19,500 -

South Waziristan Agency 200,000 50,000 250,000 19,500 4,875

FR, Tank - - - 19,500 -

FR, D. I. Khan - - - 19,500 -

Total: 513,000 278,000 791,000 15,425

SECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

IDPs Recurring Cost

18

AgenciesReported

IDPs

NonReported expected

Assumption IDPs

Total IDPsCost Per

head / total period

Total Costs(in

Millions)

Bajaur Agency

274,000

75,000

349,000

35,000

12,215

Mohmand Agency

-

50,000

50,000

35,000

1,750

Khyber Agency

-

-

-

35,000

-

FR Peshawar

-

-

-

35,000

-

Kurram Agency

30,000

50,000

80,000

35,000

2,800

Orakzai Agency

-

-

-

35,000

-

FR Kohat

9,000 3,000 12,000 35,000 420

North Waziristan Agency

- 50,000 50,000 35,000 1,750

FR, Bannu

- - - 35,000 -

FR, Lakki

- - - 35,000 -

South Waziristan Agency

200,000 50,000 250,000 35,000 8,750

FR, Tank

- - - 35,000 -

FR, D. I. K

- - - 35,000 -

Total:

513,000

278,000

791,000

27,685

Total Cost of Security & IDPs = Security Cost + Fixed Cost + Recurring Cost.

Total Cost = 2656.318 + 15425 + 27685

Cost of Security & IDPs = Rs 45,766 million

-

19

CONFLICT AREAS AND IDPs CAMP LOCATIONSSECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

IDPs Recurring Cost

18

AgenciesReported

IDPs

NonReported expected

Assumption IDPs

Total IDPsCost Per

head / total period

Total Costs(in

Millions)

Bajaur Agency

274,000

75,000

349,000

35,000

12,215

Mohmand Agency

-

50,000

50,000

35,000

1,750

Khyber Agency

-

-

-

35,000

-

FR Peshawar

-

-

-

35,000

-

Kurram Agency

30,000

50,000

80,000

35,000

2,800

Orakzai Agency

-

-

-

35,000

-

FR Kohat

9,000 3,000 12,000 35,000 420

North Waziristan Agency

- 50,000 50,000 35,000 1,750

FR, Bannu

- - - 35,000 -

FR, Lakki

- - - 35,000 -

South Waziristan Agency

200,000 50,000 250,000 35,000 8,750

FR, Tank

- - - 35,000 -

FR, D. I. K

- - - 35,000 -

Total:

513,000

278,000

791,000

27,685

Total Cost of Security & IDPs = Security Cost + Fixed Cost + Recurring Cost.

Total Cost = 2656.318 + 15425 + 27685

Cost of Security & IDPs = Rs 45,766 million

-

19

CONFLICT AREAS AND IDPs CAMP LOCATIONSSECURITY AND IDPS COSTS

Cost of Conflict in FATACost of Conflict in FATA

Chapter 6Way Forward

Chapter 6Way Forward

20

The Government of Pakistan has devised a comprehensive strategy to fight insurgency and counter terrorism in FATA. This policy is based on three Ds – Dialogue, Development and Deterrence. Focusing on the development aspects, the following

strategy is proposed:-

?Recovery and Rehabilitation

In the immediate to short term, the losses of the assessed damages should be provided for immediate relief, recovery and rehabilitation. This would improve the credibility and have an immediate impact on the lives of the people.

?Sustainable Development of FATA

The FATA Secretariat has prepared the FATA “Sustainable Development Plan (SDP 2006-2015)”. This document provides a coherent and practical framework for addressing the basic needs of the people. Its approach is human-centric and focuses on the provision of infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods, building local capacity and generating economic activities. The estimated financial requirements of the Plan stand at Rs.160 billion (US$ 2 billion) over 9 years. The Government of Pakistan and the donors should allocate sufficient funds for effective implementation of the Plan.

The FATA Development Plan was prepared when the level of insurgency in the area was of low intensity. In the present circumstances, the development efforts have received a severe set back due to the huge damages. Extra funds would be required in the first instance to rehabilitate both human and infrastructure losses and then embark upon a programme for future development.

It is also crucial to highlight that the suggestions proposed here require to be implemented earnestly and expeditiously. It also requires to be ensured that the full benefits reach the people. If adequate funds are not provided, no tangible difference in the lives of the people of FATA would be made giving way to more disappointment and frustration.

WAY FORWARD

Cost of Conflict in FATA

20

The Government of Pakistan has devised a comprehensive strategy to fight insurgency and counter terrorism in FATA. This policy is based on three Ds – Dialogue, Development and Deterrence. Focusing on the development aspects, the following

strategy is proposed:-

?Recovery and Rehabilitation

In the immediate to short term, the losses of the assessed damages should be provided for immediate relief, recovery and rehabilitation. This would improve the credibility and have an immediate impact on the lives of the people.

?Sustainable Development of FATA

The FATA Secretariat has prepared the FATA “Sustainable Development Plan (SDP 2006-2015)”. This document provides a coherent and practical framework for addressing the basic needs of the people. Its approach is human-centric and focuses on the provision of infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods, building local capacity and generating economic activities. The estimated financial requirements of the Plan stand at Rs.160 billion (US$ 2 billion) over 9 years. The Government of Pakistan and the donors should allocate sufficient funds for effective implementation of the Plan.

The FATA Development Plan was prepared when the level of insurgency in the area was of low intensity. In the present circumstances, the development efforts have received a severe set back due to the huge damages. Extra funds would be required in the first instance to rehabilitate both human and infrastructure losses and then embark upon a programme for future development.

It is also crucial to highlight that the suggestions proposed here require to be implemented earnestly and expeditiously. It also requires to be ensured that the full benefits reach the people. If adequate funds are not provided, no tangible difference in the lives of the people of FATA would be made giving way to more disappointment and frustration.

WAY FORWARD

Cost of Conflict in FATA

Name Designation Phone No Email Address

Mr. Habibullah Khan Additional Chief Secretary, +92-91-FATA Secretariat, Peshawar.

Major Attaullah Chief Executive,FATA Development Authority +92-91-9218517 [email protected]

Mr. Zafar Hasan Secretary, Planning & +92-91-9212130 [email protected] Department,FATA Secretariat, Peshawar.

Mr. Fakhar e Alam Director General Projects +92-91-9213015 [email protected]

FATA Secretariat, Peshawar.

Syed Mazhar Ali Shah Deputy Secretary Planning +92-91-9210420 [email protected]

& Development Department, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar.

9212148 [email protected]

Cost of Conflict in FATA

21

Following FATA related documents can be downloaded from the website: www.fata.gov.pk

FATA Sustainable Development Plan (2006-2015)

Digest of Mega Projects

FATA Annual Development Programmes

CONTACT LIST