A Rose by Any Name? The Values Construct

Meg J. RohanSchool of Psychology

University of New South Wales

Definitional inconsistency has been epidemic in values theory and research. An ab-breviated review of values-related theory and research is provided, and 5 aspects ofthe values construct that may have contributed to this inconsistency and the resultinglack of synthesis are discussed. A proposal for the process by which value priorities in-fluence attitudinal and behavioral decisions also is outlined. Attitudinal and behav-ioral decisions are shown to be traceable to personal value priorities, although thelink is indirect. The importance of 4 constructs in this process is highlighted. In thepast, personal value systems, social value systems, worldviews, and ideologies eachmay have been given the generic label values.

“WhenI use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather ascornful tone, “it means just what I choose it tomean—neither more nor less.”

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether youcanmake words mean different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which isto be master—that’s all.” (Carroll, 1865/1966, p. 185)

Important theorists in a variety of fields have em-phasized the importance of people’s value priorities inunderstanding and predicting attitudinal and behav-ioral decisions. For example, Gordon Allport (1961)suggested that value priorities were the “dominatingforce in life” (p. 543) because they directed all of a per-son’s activity toward their realization. Elsewhere,Allport (1955) berated psychologists for failing to con-sider that people’s value priorities influence their per-ception of reality (p. 89). Allport’s reprimand remainsrelevant even now because value theory and researchare at the fringe of the field. For example, no discus-sion of value theory appears in a sample of introduc-tory social psychology and personality textbookspublished in this decade (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert,1997; Baron & Byrne, 1997; Burger, 1997; Carducci,1998; Cloninger, 1996; Hewstone, Stroebe, &Stephenson, 1996; Liebert & Liebert, 1998; Myers,1996; Pervin, 1996; E. R. Smith & Mackie, 1995). Al-though Allport’s enthusiasm for the construct lost itsinfluence with the rise of behaviorism (behavioristswould have looked with disfavor at this unobservable

construct), it does not explain why enthusiastic atten-tion to the values construct has not been revived nowthat there is a willingness to discuss and investigateother latent constructs such as schemas (e.g., Reich &Weary, 1998) and working models (e.g., Mikulincer,1998). Or, does the values construct exist in contempo-rary research under other names?

The status of values theory and research suffers be-cause the wordvaluesis open to abuse and overuse bynonpsychologists and psychologists alike. For exam-ple, consider politicians’ (and others’) moaning abouttheerosionof familyvalues.Whatdo theymeanby fam-ily values? People—including psychologists, anthro-pologists, political scientists, and sociologists—seemtousethewordvaluesinHumptyDumpty fashion:Theymake it mean just what they choose it to mean.

However, the problem is not new. Adler (1956), forexample, suggested that as a result of definitional con-fusion, the “emphasis on values has slowed down theadvancement of the social sciences rather than fur-thered it” (p. 279). One popular strategy for settlingconfusion is to invent new names for the construct.Clyde Kluckhohn (1951), whom Levitin (1968) de-scribed as having offered one of the most comprehen-sive analyses of the values construct, described theresult of this strategy:

Reading the voluminous, and often vague and diffuse,literature on the subject in the various fields of learn-ing, one finds values considered as attitudes, motiva-tions, objects, measurable quantities, substantive areasof behavior, affect-laden customs or traditions, and re-lationships such as those between individuals, groups,objects, events. (C. K. M. Kluckhohn, 1951, p. 390)

M. B. Smith (1969) also bemoaned the “proliferation ofconcepts akin to values” that were labeled, for example,

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Personality and Social Psychology Review Copyright © 2000 by2000, Vol. 4, No. 3, 255–277 Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Preparation of this article was supported in part by an AustralianResearch Council Small Grant to Meg Rohan. Thanks to MarkZanna, David A. Kenny, Felicia Pratto, and Shalom Schwartz fortheir insightful comments and suggestions.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Meg J. Rohan, School ofPsychology, The University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052,Australia. E-mail: m.rohan@unsw.edu.au.

as core attitudes or sentiments, preferences, cathexes,and valences (p. 98). D. T. Campbell (1963) provided alist of 76 concepts that included value, attitude, and mo-tive to illustrate that “superficially quite dissimilar ter-minologies may be describing essentially the samefacts and processes” (pp. 100–101). D. T. Campbell(1963) suggested that the common characteristic ofthese concepts was that each could be viewed as coordi-nators of behavior. However, conceptualizing the ab-stract, trans-situational, implicit nature of these funda-mental coordinators of behavior is difficult.

The purpose of this article is to review briefly workin the area of values, to propose a definition of the val-ues construct that distinguishes it from other relatedconstructs, and to propose a process by which valuepriorities coordinate people’s attitudinal and behav-ioral decisions. In tracing the link between value prior-ities and decisions, I highlight the importance of twoconstructs—worldviews and ideologies—that are of-ten labeled asvalues.Before presenting this proposal, Idiscuss aspects of the values construct that are at theheart of definitional diversity and confusion.

At the Heart of the Confusion? FiveAspects of the Values Construct

Aspect 1: Nouns and Verbs

Use of the wordvalueas a noun is recorded in theCompact Oxford English Dictionary(1991) as early as1303, to refer to the fairness and equivalence of theamount of a commodity in an exchange, and in 1398 tomean a standard of estimation. Use ofvalueas a verb isregistered at a similar time, to describe the act of ap-praising the worth—in terms of its appropriateness forexchange—of a commodity. However, its meaningwas later expanded to incorporate more abstract ex-changes and standards. Thomas and Znanieki(1918/1958) focused on this latter meaning in their fa-mousThe Polish Peasantwork.

Valueas a verb. The use ofvalueas a verb im-plies that some higher level evaluation has taken place.When people say that they value (verb) a thing, person,action,oractivity, theyareexpressingadeepermeaningassociated with that entity. So, they do not simply liketheentity; theyfeel that it isgood(themeaningofgoodisdiscussed later) and relates to or somehow expressestheir underlying values (noun). The link between peo-ple’s liking for an entity and their value priorities hasbeen demonstrated empirically (see Feather, 1995; seealso Feather, 1982s).

Little specific attention has been paid to the valuingprocess,but ithasbeensuggested, forexample, thatpeo-ple chronically and effortlessly engage in ascertaining

the goodness or badness of the stimuli in their environ-ments (a “drive to evaluate,” Festinger, 1954; see alsoPratto,1994).NormanFeather’s (1996)commentshedslightonwhatmaybe takingplace in thevaluingprocess:“We relate possible actions and outcomes within partic-ularsituations toourvaluesystems, testing themagainstour general conceptions about what we believe is desir-able or undesirable in terms of our own value priorities”(p. 224). Perhaps as a result of the lack of theoretical(and empirical) attention to the valuing process itself,programs designed to change people’s value priorities(e.g., the value self-confrontation method; Rokeach,1973) have met with limited success, and long-termchanges are disappointingly rare (e.g., see Kristiansen& Hotte, 1996). Investigation of the valuing processmay benefit from work such as Tetlock’s (1986) exami-nations of ideological reasoning and work on the pro-cessing of information (e.g., the heuristic–systematicmodel and the elaboration likelihood model; see Eagly& Chaiken, 1993).

Valueas a noun. A dilemma that early valuestheorists and researchers faced was whether values(noun) should be investigated from the perspective ofthe entity being evaluated (e.g., “How much value doesthe entity have?”) or from the perspective of the persondoing the valuing (e.g., “What does this person value?”;see Feather, 1975, p. 3, for a discussion of this point).However, this issue essentially has been settled: Con-temporary values theorists investigate the values con-struct from the perspective of the person who evaluatesthe entities in his or her environment, and they seek tomeasure people’s priorities on various values in an ef-fort to understand the underlying motivations of peo-ple’s responses to their environments (see Rohan &Zanna, in press).

An aid to people’s constant evaluation of the stimuliin theirenvironments (valueasaverb)wouldbeacogni-tive structure in which information about past evalua-tionscouldbecollected(seeBargh,Chaiken,Govender,& Pratto, 1992). This information, if organized, thencould serve as a kind of analogical principle to use inevaluating and imbuing meaning to newly encounteredobjects and events. Humans’ ability to use analogy toimbue meaning and coherence to their experiences ishighly developed. Indeed, some cognitive scientists(e.g.,Holyoak&Thagard,1995,1997;Thagard&Shel-ley, inpress)haveconsidered it somuchapart ofhumanexperience that they have used computer simulations todemonstrate theeasewithwhichanalogiesareused.Be-cause these analogical principles are relevant across sit-uations and time, they may be what are generallyreferred to asvalues(noun). The values construct de-scribed this way, then, seems not unlikeschematathatwere defined by Bartlett (1932) as being “active organi-zations of past experience” (p. 201).

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Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) found that fivefeatures of the values construct are recurrently men-tioned in the values literature: that the values con-struct concerns (a) beliefs, (b) desirable end states orbehaviors, (c) trans-situational guides, (d) selectionand evaluation of behavior and events, and (e) therelative ordering of beliefs, desirable end states or be-havior, or guides. These features are all consistentwith the suggestion that the value system is a stablemeaning-producing superordinate cognitive structure.Considering its analogical nature, the value systemmay provide the basic architecture of what has beenreferred to as the “narrative mode” of human under-standing that deals in “human or human-like intentionand action and the vicissitudes and consequences thatmark their course” (Bruner, 1986, p. 13; see alsoMcAdams, 1999). The value system also may pro-vide organization for what Hazel Markus (1977) andher colleagues (e.g., Fong &Markus, 1982) have in-vestigated asself-schemata.

It is a well-supported suggestion that value systemsare cognitive structures, and often it is implied in valuedefinitions (see Table 1 for a selection of definitions)and in explanations about the function of value sys-tems. For example, this suggestion is implied inAllport’s (1961) contention that value systems were“schemata of comprehensibility” (p. 544) and in C. K.M. Kluckhohn’s (1951) answer to the question “Whyare there values?”: Because without value systems “in-dividuals could not get what they want and need fromother individuals in personal and emotional terms, norcould they feel within themselves the requisite mea-sure of order and unified purpose” (p. 400). Othershave stated it more clearly. For example, Rokeach

(1968) suggested that value priorities occupy centralpositions in cognitive networks of attitudes and beliefs.

Feather (1971,1980,1999)alsoclearlydescribedthecognitive structure status of value systems and de-scribed them as abstract structures or associative net-works. However, he highlighted an importantfeature—that the networks are linked to the affectivesystem. As a result, these abstract structures—“orga-nized summaries of experience”—provide “continuityand meaning under changing environmental circum-stances” (Feather, 1980, p. 249). Silvan Tomkins’s(e.g., 1979) script theory seems relevant. Tomkins sug-gested that from the earliest weeks of life, humans store“scenes” containing at least one affect and one object ofthat affect (see Carlson, 1981). These scenes are col-lected into “scripts” so that sense can be made of the re-lations among various scenes.

An assumption implicit in discussions of affectivelinks to value systems is that people will be motivated toengage in situations that are similar to other situationsthat resulted inpositiveaffect (oranabsenceofnegativeaffect), to be with people who enable positive affect (orminimize negative affect), and to behave in ways thatwill produce positive affect (or reduce negative affect).These motivations may then produce what Schwartzand Bilsky (1987, 1990) described as themotivationalgoalsthat underlie value priorities—people may havepreferences for particular types of emotion (and there issome indirectevidence for this; seeworkonself-regula-tory focusbyHiggins,e.g., 1997).Forexample,accord-ing toSchwartzandBilsky (e.g.,1987) thedefininggoalof self-direction values is independent thought and ac-tion; thinking and behaving in independent ways mayprovide feelings that can be described as positively

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Table 1. A Selection of Values Definitions

Theorist Definition

Lewin (1952, p. 41) Values influence behavior but have not the character of a goal (i.e., of a force field). Forexample, the individual does not try to “reach” the value of fairness, but fairness is “guiding ”his behavior. It is probably correct to say that values determine which types of activity have apositive and which have a negative valence for an individual in a given situation. In otherwords, values are not force fields but they “induce ” force fields. That means values areconstructs that have the same psychological dimension aspower fields.

C. K. M. Kluckhohn (1951, p. 395) A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of agroup, of the desirable that influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends ofactions.

Heider (1958, p. 223) We shall use the term value as meaning the property of an entity (x has values) or as meaning aclass of entities (x is a value) with the connotation of being objectively positive in some way.

Rokeach (1973, p. 5) Avalueis an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence ispersonally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state ofexistence.

Feather (1996, p. 222) I regard values as beliefs about desirable or undesirable ways of behaving or about thedesirability or otherwise of general goals.

Schwartz (1994, p. 21) I definevaluesas desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guidingprinciples in the life of a person or other social entity.

Schwartz (1999, p. 24) I define values as conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g., organizationalleaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, andexplain their actions and evaluations.

valenced, high arousal (e.g., excited, elated). The defin-ing goal of security values is stated as safety, harmony,and stability of society, of relationships, and of self; be-having inwaysthatenablesuchsafety,harmony,andse-curity may provide a feeling that can be described aspositively valenced, low arousal (e.g., calm, relaxed;seeFeldmanBarrett&Russell, 1998, foranaffectstruc-ture model in which the distinction between high andlow arousal is described).

Feather’s (e.g., 1999) suggestion that some valuetypes may be relatively undifferentiated with a limitednetwork of associations, whereas others have a high de-gree of differentiation with a complex network of asso-ciations, may provide direction for further research intothe development of values and value change. The im-portance of particular value types may be driven by re-peated confirmation of particular entity–outcomesequences. Repeated disconfirmation of such se-quences may stimulate modification, and the provisionof experiences (either direct or vicarious) may build upthe entity–outcome sequences in less elaborated valuetypes.

Values versus attitudes. When the values con-struct isviewed in termsofanabstractmeaning-produc-ing cognitive structure, the divide between value priori-ties and evaluations of specific entities seems wideindeed. However, people not only use the words “Ivalue” in talking about their evaluations of specific ortangible entities, they also use them in describing theirevaluations of abstract trans-situational guides. For ex-ample, people not only may say “I value that ring” butalso may say “I value security.” The problem is that se-curity can be labeled as avalue,but it seems inappropri-ate to labelaperson’sattachment toaringasavalue.Thetermattitudemay provide a temporary solution to theproblem of the abstractness or specificity of people’sjudgments. Allport (e.g., 1935), as well as others (e.g.,see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), used the wordattitudetodescribe specific judgments as well as abstract judg-ments that could be labeled as values. However, atti-tudes that have some kind of value-related implicationare often discussed in terms of having an “ego defen-sive” function (e.g.,Katz,1960;Ostrom&Brock,1968,1969; Sherif & Cantril, 1947; M.B. Smith, Bruner, &White,1956; seealsoJohnson&Eagly, 1990).WorkbyDavid Sears and his colleagues onsymbolic racism(e.g., Sears & Kinder, 1985) and work by Mark Zannaand his colleagues (e.g., Esses, Haddock, & Zanna,1993;Zanna,Haddock,&Esses,1990; seealsoBiernat,Vescio,Theno,&Crandall,1996) inwhich theviolationof symbolic beliefs was found to be an important factorin prejudiced attitudes can be viewed as another per-spective on the value-related implications of attitudes.

Although the termattitude has remained popular(e.g., see the much-quoted passage in Allport, 1935, p.

798), empirical focus on the values construct hasbecome somewhat obscured. To allow the values con-struct a chance to come back into the limelight, I pro-pose that the termattitudeis used only for evaluationsof specific entities. The termvaluesthen can be re-served for discussions of abstract trans-situationalguides. Already, this seems to be the convention in dis-cussions of what are labeledvalue-expressive attitudes(e.g., see Maio & Olson, 2000a, 2000b).

Summary. Used as a verb,valuerefers to the pro-cess of ascertaining the merit of an entity with referenceto an abstract value system structure. Used as a noun,valuerefers to the result of this process. These valuejudgments may be formed or amended when people en-counter new entities or existing judgments are chal-lenged.Rather thanuseattitudeto refer toevaluationsofeither specific or more abstract entities, I propose thatattitude is reserved for describing evaluations of spe-cific entities. In view of the conceptualization of thevalue system as an affectively charged cognitive struc-ture, more attention to affect value system links seemswarranted.

Aspect 2: Values, Value Types, ValuePriorities, and Value Systems

Not only is the wordvaluesused in reference topeople’s value priorities and the organization of thosevalue priorities, their value systems, it is also used todescribe judgments and categories of judgments. Forexample, broad-mindedness is a judgment that con-cerns acceptance of diversity, and self-direction refersto a category of judgments that concern independenceand free thinking.

The ensuing confusion not only leads to misunder-standings and misinterpretations but also obscures animportant assumption that has been characteristic of allvalue theories and for which there is now empirical sup-port: Although people differ in terms of their value pri-orities, the structure of the human value system isuniversal (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 1996). That is,people differ only in terms of the relative importancetheyplaceonasetofuniversally importantvaluetypes.

The assumption that value system structure is uni-versal may be lost in phrases such as “people attachgreat importance to their values” (Maio & Olson,1998, p. 294) that are meant to describe people’s ten-dency to defend their value priorities. It also may belost in discussions of how children acquire values (i.e.,how children’s value priorities undergo change; seeGrusec & Kuczynski, 1997).

A review of value theories is presented next to pro-vide an overview of past and contemporary focus onthe value system, value types, and value priorities.

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Early value theories. In general, early theoristsfocused on individual differences in the organization ofsome universally relevant set of human features. Forexample, Alexander Shand (1896, 1914) proposed atheory of character in which different configurations inthe organization of sentiments (a concept somewhatconsistent with the values construct) resulted in differ-ences in people’s attitudinal and behavioral responsesto the world. Eduard Spranger (1928), a philosopherwho also focused on organization, suggested that six at-titudes (i.e., value types) were present in everyone indifferent proportions with one dominating. So, for ex-ample, Spranger suggested that for the self-affirmingrhetorician, political value priorities dominated,whereas economic value priorities dominated the prac-tical type.

Spranger’s (1928) work inspired the first (1931)version of the Study of Values instrument (Allport,Vernon, & Lindzey, 1960). This instrument providedan indication of the relative priorities people placed onthe six value types by measuring the effect of people’svalue priorities on their answers to questions. TheStudy of Values instrument was one of the most popu-lar measures of human value priorities for many years.

Also guided by the assumption that a value systemcontains a finite number of universally relevant valuetypes on which people place relative importance, Mor-ris (1956) presented people with 13 ways to live andasked them to rate each of the descriptive paragraphs toshow how much they liked or disliked each of them(see Dempsey & Dukes, 1966, for a shortened, revisedversion). Morris (1956) found that five general valuetypes were contained in the “ways to live” descriptions(see pp. 32–34): social restraint and self-control, en-joyment and progress in action, withdrawal andself-sufficiency, receptivity and sympathetic concern,and self-indulgence (or sensuous enjoyment). Eachway seems to describe the implications of a high prior-ity on one value for priorities on other values. For ex-ample, the following way can be viewed as adescription of the effects that a high priority on hedo-nistic values has for other value priorities:

Life is something to be enjoyed—sensuously enjoyed,enjoyed with relish and abandonment. The aim in lifeshould not be to control the course of the world or soci-ety or the lives of others, but to be open and receptive tothingsandpersonas,and todelight in them.Life ismorea festival than a workshop or a school for moral disci-pline. To let oneself go, to let things and persons affectoneself, is more important than to do—or to do good.Such enjoyment, however, requires that one beself-centeredenough tobekeenlyawareofwhat ishap-pening and free for new happenings. So one shouldavoid entanglements, should not be too dependent onparticular people or things, should not be self-sacrific-ing;oneshouldbealonealot,shouldhavetimeformed-

itation and awareness of oneself. Solitude and socialitytogether are both necessary in the good life. (Morris,1956, p. 16)

In measurement terms, Morris can be viewed as beingahead of his time—his approach has been labeled theprototype approachand it has been used, for example,in assessing attachment style (e.g., see Griffin &Bartholomew, 1994), parenting style (Rohan & Zanna,1996), and self-esteem (Rohan, 2000). The logic of thisapproach is that people in general (both novices and ex-perts) primarily understand the world by assessing di-verse configurations of characteristics and comparingthis assessment with a prototype (see Broughton,Boyes, & Mitchell, 1993; Cantor, Smith, French, &Mezzich, 1980; Mayer & Bower, 1986; Setterlund &Niedenthal, 1993).

Rokeach’s (1973) value theory.Milton Rokeach(1973)—who has been accorded the major credit forproviding an impetus for values research after behav-iorism’s heyday (see Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, & Loges,1994)—used a somewhat different approach to mea-surement. He named values, briefly explained theirmeaning, and asked people to arrange the value words“in order of importance to YOU, as guiding principlesin YOUR life” (e.g., Rokeach, 1973, p. 27). There weretwo types of value words in the list: goals (terminal val-ues) and modes of conduct (instrumental values). Thelist of goals included such things as a “comfortable life(a prosperous life)” and “self-respect (self-esteem),”and the mode of conduct list included such things as“broad-minded (open-minded),” “forgiving (willing topardon others),” and “helpful (working for the welfareof others)” (see Rokeach, 1973, pp. 359–361). Respon-dents then arranged the list of value words in terms ofthe relative importance they placed on them. The set ofvalues named was created on the basis of intuition (seeRokeach, 1973, p. 30) and was meant to be a reasonablycomprehensive sample of possible human values.However, Braithwaite and Law (1985) identified fouromissions in this list: values relating to “physical devel-opment and well-being (e.g., physical fitness, goodhealth),” “individual rights (e.g., privacy, dignity),”“thriftiness (e.g., care with money, taking advantage ofopportunities),” and “carefreeness (acting on impulse,spontaneity).” Nevertheless, Rokeach’s (1973) list ofvalue words was produced with the assumption that “allmen everywhere possess the same values to differentdegrees” (p. 3). Incidentally, Schwartz (e.g., 1992) wasunable to find support for the usefulness of the termi-nal–instrumental distinction.

Since its development, the Rokeach Value Survey(Rokeach, 1973) has been perhaps the most popularmethod of measuring value priorities. Unfortunately,

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no theory about the underlying value system structurewas proposed, and therefore the Rokeach Value Sur-vey is essentially a list of unconnected value words.Without a theory about underlying value system struc-ture, it is impossible to understand the consequences ofhigh priorities on one value type for priorities on othervalue types (see Schwartz, 1996, for further discussionof the problems that result when an integrated systemof value priorities is not considered). Attention to theconsequences of one value priority for other value pri-orities surely is critical to understanding patterns of re-sponses that seem, at first glance, to be unrelated. Suchattention may be important for understanding consis-tency in response patterns. Response consistency al-ready has received a huge amount of theoretical andempirical attention (e.g., see Aronson, 1969, 1992;Festinger, 1957).

Schwartz’s (e.g., 1992) value theory. Schwartzand Bilsky (e.g., 1987, 1990) developed a theory aboutvalue system structure by focusing on the motivationalconcern embodied in each value. They revived the as-sumption that people differ only in the relative impor-tance they place on a universally important set of valuetypes, and because they focused on the motivationalgoal each value type embodies, the implications of pri-orities on one value type for priorities on others withinan integrated system could be proposed.

In a revision of the original theory, Schwartz (1992)suggested that two motivational dimensions structurethe value system. These are cast in terms of conflicts,and the two dimensions can be understood in terms oftwo fundamental human problems that need to besolved (Rohan, 1998; see also F. R. Kluckhohn &Strodtbeck, 1961, who suggested there were five fun-damental human problems). One dimension, labeledopenness to change–conservation,relates to the con-flict between being motivated “to follow their own in-tellectual and emotional interests in unpredictable anduncertain directions” or “to preserve the status quo andthe certainty it provides in relationships with close oth-ers, institutions, and traditions” (Schwartz, 1992, p.43). The second dimension, labeledself-enhance-ment–self-transcendence,relates to the conflict be-tween concern for the consequences of own andothers’ actions for the self and concern for the conse-quences of own and others’ actions in the social con-text. Ten value types are arranged along these twodimensions (see Table 2 for definitions and representa-tive values for each type): power, achievement,hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism,benevolence, conformity, tradition, and security.

In Figure 1, the location of these value types alongthe two dimensions is shown. New labels for these twodimensions are provided. Use of these labels not onlymay avoid evaluative misinterpretation (e.g., it may

seem that openness to change is somehow better thanconservation) but also may direct attention to the myr-iad of ways in which these motivations can be ex-pressed. For example, the funky-looking new wavearomatherapist who adheres religiously to his or her re-gime of essential oil applications may well be moti-vated by a focus on organization rather than onopportunity (the conservation end of the openness tochange–conservation dimension); the osteopath whorelishes in his or her status as a miracle worker may bestrongly motivated by his or her focus on individualoutcomes rather than on social context outcomes (theself-enhancement end of the self-enhancement–self-transcendence dimension).

The focus on theindividual–social context outcomesdimension (i.e., the self-enhancement–self-transcen-dencedimension)mayreflectpeople’sbeliefsabouthu-man nature (see Wrightsman, 1991): People who have agreater focus on social context outcomes than on indi-vidual outcomes may believe that humans are essen-tially good, whereas people who have a greater focus onindividual outcomes than on social context outcomesmay be less positive about others’ essential goodness(Schwartz has made similar suggestions, e.g., personalcommunication,April 3, 1999). Indirect support for thissuggestion was provided by de St. Aubin (1996), whofound that people who were highly humanistic weremore likely to report high priorities on values thatSchwartz (e.g., 1992) classified as relevant to the socialcontext outcomes end of the individual–social contextoutcomes dimension (e.g., broad-mindedness, world ofbeauty; see Table 2).

The focus on theopportunity–organizationdimen-sion (i.e., the openness to change–conservation dimen-sion) seems conceptually similar (or even identical) tothe Big Five personality factor Openness to Experi-ence as described and discussed by McCrae (1996).According to McCrae, this factor is best understood“as a fundamental way of approaching the world thataffects not only internal experience but also interper-sonal interactions and social behavior” (p. 323). Thefocus on the opportunity–organization dimension alsomay relate to temperament (Rohan, 1998; see alsoKochanska & Thompson, 1997, who discuss its role inchildren’s internalization of parental values). For ex-ample, on the basis of their response to novelty, Kaganand his colleagues (e.g, Kagan, Reznick, & Gibbons,1989) identified what seems to be a stable tempera-ment style; it may be expected that those who focus onopportunity will be less anxious in response to noveltythan will those who focus on organization. Links be-tween the focus on the opportunity–organization di-mension and what Carol Dweck and her colleagues(e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988) described in terms ofincrementalself-theories (personal attributes are rela-tively malleable) andentityself-theories (personal at-

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tributes are relatively fixed) also could be explored.Further, the promotion versus prevention self-regula-tory focus proposed by Tory Higgins (1997) alsoseems somewhat consistent with the focus on the op-portunity–organization dimension (see Rohan &Zanna, 1998, for a discussion of the links betweenvalue priorities and self-regulatory focus).

Identification of the underlying value system struc-ture allowed Schwartz (1992) to specify the relationsamong the value types in the value system: People’s pri-orities on adjacent value types will be similar, whereasmaximum differences in priorities will occur whenvalue types are opposite each other. For example, be-cause human rights activists are likely to have high pri-

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Table 2. Value Types, Definitions, and Representative Values (See, e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1996)

Value Types and Definitions Representative Values

Power: Social Status and Prestige, Control or DominanceOver People and Resources.

Social power: Control over others, dominance.Authority: The right to lead or command.Wealth: Material possessions, money.

Achievement: Personal Success Through DemonstratingCompetence According to Social Standards.

Success: Achieving goals.Capability: Competence, effectiveness, efficiency.Ambition: Hard work, aspirations.Influence: Have an impact on people and events.

Hedonism: Pleasure and Sensuous Gratification for Oneself. Pleasure: Gratification of desires.Enjoyment in life: Enjoyment of food, sex, leisure, and so on.

Stimulation: Excitement, Novelty, and Challenge in Life. Daringness: Adventure-seeking, risktaking.A varied life: Filled with challenge, novelty, change.An exciting life: Stimulating experiences.

Self-Direction: Independent Thought and Action-Choosing,Creating, Exploring.

Creativity: Uniqueness, imagination.Freedom: Freedom of action and thought.Independence: Self-reliance, self-sufficiency.Curiosity: Interest in everything, exploration.Choose own goals: Select own purposes.

Universalism: Understanding, Appreciation, Tolerance, andProtection for the Welfare of all People and for Nature.

Broadminded: Tolerant of different ideas and beliefs.Wisdom: A mature understanding of life.Social justice: Correcting injustice, care for the weak.Equality: Equal opportunity for all.A world at peace: Free of war and conflict.A world of beauty: Beauty of nature and the arts.Unity with nature: Fitting into nature.Protecting the environment: Preserving nature.

Benevolence: Preservation and Enhancement of the Welfareof People With Whom One is in Frequent Personal Contact.

Helpful: Working for the welfare of others.Honesty: Genuineness, sincerity.Forgivingness: Willingness to pardon others.Loyalty: Faithful to my friends, group.Responsibility: Dependable, reliable.

Tradition: Respect, Commitment, and Acceptance of theCustoms and Ideas That Traditional Culture or ReligionProvide the Self.

Humility: Modesty, self-effacement.Acceptance of my portion in life: Submission to life’s circumstances.Devotion: Hold to religious faith and belief.Respect for tradition: Preservation of time-honored customs.Moderate: Avoiding extremes of feeling or action.

Conformity: Restraint of Actions, Inclinations, and ImpulsesLikely to Upset or Harm Others and Violate SocialExpectations or Norms.

Politeness: Courtesy, good manners.Obedience: Dutiful, meet obligations.Self-discipline: Self-restraint, resistance to temptation.Honor parents and elders: Showing respect.

Security: Safety, Harmony, and Stability of Society, ofRelationships, and of Self.

Family security: Safety for loved ones.National security: Protection of my nation from enemies.Social order: Stability of society.Cleanliness: Neatness, tidiness.Reciprocation of favors: Avoidance of indebtedness.

orities on equality values—these are representative ofthe universalism value type—they are likely also tohavehighprioritiesonself-directionbecauseuniversal-ism and self-direction are adjacent in the system. Fur-ther,becausethepowervalue type is indirectoppositionto universalism, activists’ lowest value priorities arelikely to be on power. Thus, activists’ very negative re-action to a show of police strength and power at a streetrally could be predicted.

According to Schwartz (1996), value priorities areresponses to “three universal requirements of humanexistence: biological needs, requisites for coordinatedsocial interaction, and demands of group survival andfunctioning” (p. 2). As mentioned earlier, this com-ment highlights the assumption that has been charac-teristic of value theories: All of the value types in thehuman value system are important in some way to hu-man functioning—otherwise, why would they be partof the universally shared value system structure? Therelative importance people place on each value type re-flects their choices about what they are prepared to losea little of to gain a little more of something else. For ex-ample, although all people are likely to see the positiveaspects of adhering to traditional standards, the struc-ture of the value system (see Figure 1) is such that tohave higher priorities on a tradition value type meanslower priorities on stimulation and hedonism valuetypes: less excitement in exchange for predictability.

Measurement of value priorities is in the style of theRokeach Value Survey (Rokeach, 1973). In theSchwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz, 1996), respon-dents are asked to rate the importance (after choosing

the two most important and two least important valuewords to provide an anchor for ratings) of 44 valuewords(seeTable2) that relate to the10value types in thevalue system.

Summary. To avoid confusion, use of the termsvalue priority, value type, andvalue systemis encour-aged to clarify the assumption (which has theoreticalsupport) that all humans have a value system that con-tains a finite number of universally important valuetypes, but differ in terms of the relative importance theyplace on each of these value types—people’s value pri-orities—can be kept clearly in mind.

TheSchwartzvalue theory(1992) isacontribution tounderstanding not only the components of the humanvalue system but also how people differ in terms of thedynamic organization of value priorities on the 10 valuetypes contained in the value system. Value-neutral la-bels for the two motivational dimensions described inthe Schwartz theory as structuring the value sys-tem—focus on individual outcomes–focus on socialcontext outcomes, and focus on opportunity–focus onorganization—were proposed, and links between thesedimensions and other constructs were highlighted.

Aspect 3: Value Priorities Are a Function ofWhat Type of Judgments?

Braithwaite and Scott (1991) cast this problem interms of the controversy about whether value prioritiesare conceptions of the desirable (what people ought todo) and the desired (what people want to do). They

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Figure 1. Location of 10 value types in a two-dimensional space.

suggested that this question had been settled, and therewas some consensus that value priorities concerned thedesired rather than the desirable. However, Schwartzand Bilsky’s (1987) value definition can be viewed interms of both the desired and the desirable: They de-scribed the values construct in terms of the “cognitiverepresentations of three types of universal human re-quirements: biologically based needs of the organism,social interactional demands for interpersonal coordi-nation, and social institutional demands for group wel-fare and survival” (p. 551). Thus, people’s valuepriorities can be viewed in terms of people doing whatthey ought because they want to survive in their socialenvironments. But, do people want to do more thansimply survive? The question of what value prioritiesare judgments of seems to require further attention.

Values as guides for survival. If people’s valuepriorities are viewed in terms of survival in the socialenvironment (i.e., in terms of satisfying requirementsof existence), it is difficult to explain why people willignore their personal safety to behave in ways they feelare consistent with their value priorities. For example,consider the person with high priorities on benevolenceor universalism (see Table 2) who, as discussed earlier,can be understood in terms of a greater focus on socialcontext outcomes than on individual outcomes. She orhe may do as the unidentified passenger did in 1982when he altruistically passed the helicopter winch toothers so that they could escape the freezing Washing-ton River after their plane crashed (Kelly, 1982): pro-vide others with a means of survival to his or her owndetriment. Or, consider people who embrace a religionand likely have high priorities on tradition (seeSchwartz, 1992), who would rather die than give uptheir religion. Patrick Henry’s proclamation, “Give meliberty or give me death,” provides another example.When people give up their lives to uphold their valuepriorities, they make exceptionally strong statementsthat without this entity, life is not worth living. Valuepriorities surely are more than survival guides.

Values as guides for goodness.Returning to thenotion that value priorities concern the “ought” ratherthan “want,” value priorities may provide guides forgoodness. The ability to live by such guides rather thansimple drives has been discussed at length as the featurethat separates animals from humans (e.g., see Tomkins,1962), and some believe that humans essentially striveto be moral or ethical (e.g., Aronson, 1992; Kagan,1999). Therefore, value priorities provide the princi-ples for moral and ethical living (e.g., Hart, 1962).

However, judgments of goodness are idiosyncratic(e.g., see Ichheiser, 1949; Kendler, 1993). In 1644,Spinoza (1644/1985) explained the idiosyncratic na-ture of the judgment of goodness: “From all this, then,

it is clear that we neither strive for, nor will, neitherwant, nor desire anything because we judge it to begood; on the contrary, we judge something to be goodbecause we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it”(Postulate IX, p. 160).

Spinoza’s wisdom leads to a suggestion for the inte-gration of the ought and want aspects of value priori-ties in a way that reference to disputable notions ofgood can be avoided. Often in early research, what wasgood and moral was assumed to be consensual (e.g.,see Peck & Havinghurst, 1960, who focused on char-acter development). Roger Brown (1965) provided anexample in which people generally might not agreeabout the goodness and badness of particular types ofpeople: He reported that in 1938, a psychologist (E. R.Jaensch), who was also a Nazi supporter, discoveredan ideal type (the J-Type) who would make a goodNazi party member because he (and presumably she)would “recognize that human behavior is fixed byblood, soil and national tradition” (Brown, 1965, p.478) and an “anti-type” who would be an irritant to theNazi cause as a result of liberal views that the environ-ment and education were the determinants of behavior.

Value priorities as guides to “best possibleliving.” Theoughtandwantaspectscanbe integratedif value priorities are viewed as evidencing the dynamicorganization of judgments about the capacity of entities(i.e., things, people, actions, activities) to enable bestpossible living. This means (consistent with argumentsmade by many theorists and researchers) that people arenot simply driven to satisfy their basic survival needs(e.g., see Lee, 1948) or to avoid pain (e.g., see Higgins,1997, 1998) but are driven to live as pleasantly and pro-ductively as possible. This proposal is grounded in theAristotelian (Aristotle, circa 350 BCE/1980) wisdomthateudaimoniais the ultimate human goal. The Greekword eudaimoniahas been misleadingly translated as“happiness.”However, byeudaimonia,Aristotlemeanthuman flourishing (i.e., actualizing potential) ratherthan mere positive affect. This point was taken up byWaterman (1993), who translatedeudaimoniaas “per-sonal expressiveness,” linked it to optimal psychologi-cal functioning,andsuccessfullydistinguishedbetweentwo conceptions of happiness: Aristotle’seudaimoniaand hedonic enjoyment. According to Aristotle, flour-ishing is the ultimate goal towards which all human ac-tion is directed (seeNicomachean Ethics,Book 1, Sec-tion VII, Aristotle, circa 350 BCE/1980). Valueprioritiescanprovideguides for living thebestwaypos-sible. The value system, therefore, can be understood asconcerning the aspects of the environment to which hu-mans must pay attention. This is consistent with theidea,discussedearlier, that the twomotivationaldimen-sions structuring the value system concern the two fun-damental human problems humans must solve.

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People’s failure to distinguish between wants andsurvival needs may reflect their value priorities. So, bysaying “I need” rather than “I want,” a person may beexpressing that an object is somehow related to his orher high priorities on a particular value type. Consider,for example, “I need a new car.” People with high pri-orities on the power value type (defined in terms of amotivation toward social status and prestige; see Table2) may see a new car as absolutely necessary to main-tain their social superiority. To these people, losingtheir social superiority would mean feeling unable tolive the best way possible.

Although people may be motivated to live the bestway possible, a multitude of personal and environmen-tal constraints mean that people do not always behavein ways consistent with their value priorities. Further-more, because people generally use what has been de-scribed as the “fast and frugal” satisficing strategy—labeled the “take the best strategy” (Gigerenzer &Goldstein, 1996)—they may not always make deci-sions that lead to best possible living. People’s evalua-tions of their progress in negotiating their socialenvironment in a way that enables them to adhere totheir value priorities, that is, their progress in living thebest way possible, can be understood as the evaluationthat underlies self-esteem (see Rohan, 2000, in whichself-esteem is described as resulting from an estimateof personal progress in living the best way possible).

Ordering the importance of requirements anddesires. From this perspective, the value system canbe viewed as providing a way to order which require-ments or desires are more or less important to best pos-sible living. So, for example, people who have high pri-orities on tradition and conformity value types can beviewed as having judged that best possible livingmeans that personal desires are less important than therequirements of being a cooperative group member. Incontrast, people who have high priorities on the hedo-nism value type can be viewed as having judged thatbest possible living means that personal desires aremore important than are the requirements of groupmembership.

Psychologists have described humans’ psychologi-cal requirements at length. For example, Aronson(1992) suggested that people strive to view themselvesin three ways: as competent, predictable and consis-tent, and moral. Other basic human needs have beendiscussed. For example, the need for relatedness al-ways has been a popular topic (e.g., Baumeister &Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969). What these things meanto people, and the primacy of each, are likely to be dic-tated by people’s value priorities. For example, moral-ity to a person who has high priorities on tradition maymean following traditional practice, whereas it maymean being true to oneself to someone who has high

priorities on self-direction. Though this may be a uni-versal human requirement, people’s value prioritiesmay dictate the primacy of relatedness over other hu-man requirements. So, for example, the need for relat-edness may be primary for those who have highpriorities on value types motivated by a focus on socialcontext outcomes but less important for those whohave high priorities on value types motivated by a fo-cus on individual outcomes. For the latter people, theneed for power may be primary (see Baumeister, 1998,who discussed the needs for “belongingness” andpower as fundamental interpersonal motives).

If value priorities are understood as guides to bestpossible living that provide a way to order require-ments and desires, it is easy to explain why people inthe same environment differ in terms of their valuepriorities if value systems concern “universal humanrequirements” (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) or if valuesystems concern conceptions of what is desirable thathave been learned in the social environment. Thoughthey share an environment, particular configurationsof experiences and personal attributes will result invariations in people’s views of what best possible liv-ing means to them; this will be reflected in theirvalue priorities that evidence the dynamic organiza-tion of people’s judgments about the capacity of enti-ties to enable best possible living. Furthermore, valuepriorities are likely to change as people’s judgmentsare amended in response to changes in circumstancesand personal attributes (e.g., skill level). For exam-ple, consider the finding that people tend to becomemore conservative when they become parents (e.g.,see Altemeyer, 1988). For a parent, best possible liv-ing now may include having a happy and successfulchild, and planning for this happiness and successmay mean that the importance of value types moti-vated by a focus on organization (tradition, confor-mity, security) will be increased.

Summary. In response to the confusion aboutthe nature of the judgments that give rise to value pri-orities, it was proposed that judgments concern thecapacity of entities to enable best possible living.Best possible living is viewed in Aristotelian termsand was explained to mean flourishing or personalexpressiveness—not just surviving (Aristotle, circa350 BCE/1980). This view builds on the suggestionthat people’s value priorities will change in responseto changes in their environments: As people’s cir-cumstances change, so too will their judgments aboutwhat best possible living means to them. This view isconsistent with the consensus described byBraithwaite and Scott (1991) that personal value pri-orities have to do with the desired, or what peoplewant, rather than with the desirable, or what peopleought to do.

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Aspect 4: Personal, Social, orCultural Value Systems?

People have not only their own value system but per-ceptions of others’ value systems, and groups (e.g.,clubs, religious congregations, corporations, societies,cultures)canbedescribed in termsof thevalues theyen-dorse or promote. Whereas people’s own value systemand their perceptions of others’ value systems areintrapsychic cognitive structures, descriptions ofgroups’ value systems are not. Although a distinction isoften made between personal value systems and de-scriptions of groups’ value systems (cultural value sys-tems), there has been little or no attention to thedistinction between two intrapsychic value systems,whatwill be referred tohereaspersonalandsocial valuesystems. Descriptions of the values that groups endorsecan be understood as being ideological value systems.The difficulty in conceptualizing these value systems isbeyond the scope of this article, but suffice it to say thatthere is no consensus about whether to understand thesein terms of the average of the group members’ personalvalue priorities or, for example, group leaders’ or othersignificant members’ beliefs about what the groups’value priorities should be (see Rokeach, 1979, for a dis-cussion). In focushereare intrapsychicvaluesystems.

Makingadistinctionbetweentwo intrapsychicvaluesystems, the personal and the social, introduces newcomplications. Attention to at least four of these is re-quired. First, a layer of complication is added to theproblem of definition. Whereas personal value systemscanbedefinedas judgmentsof thecapacityofentities toenable best possible living, what are social value sys-tems? It is proposed that social value systems containpeople’s perceptions of others’ judgments about bestpossible livingor functioning, that is,others’ (e.g.,otherpeople, groups, institutions, cultures) value priorities.Social value systems, therefore, organize people’s per-ceptions of others. Second is the issue of whether per-sonal and social value systems are similarly ordifferently structured. Rules of parsimony—and re-search (e.g., Schwartz, 1999; Schwartz & Sagiv,1995)—support the proposal that personal and socialvaluesystemswillbestructuredsimilarly.Furthermore,if personal value system structure is universal (althoughvalue priorities differ, the underlying structure is thesameforallpeople;seeearlier), thenothers’valueprior-ities surely also would be organized according to thisuniversal structure. Third, what does the personal ver-sus social value system distinction mean for the numberof intrapsychic value systems? It seems reasonable topropose that people have only one personal value sys-tem. Logically, it would be impossible for people tohave more than one personal value system if they are tofeel that their thoughts “do not fly about loose, but seemeach to belong to some one thinker and not to another”

(James, 1890/1950, p. 330). However, people may havemore than one social value system—they may have per-ceptions of the value systems of all people and groupswith whom they interact. However, in view of people’sability to categorize (e.g., Cantor & Mischel, 1979), it islikely that people will have a limited number ofprototypicalsocial valuesystemsthatwill allowcatego-rization of their perceptions of others’ value priorities.Fourth, if both personal and social value systems exist,then attitudinal and behavioral decisions may be tracedto either system. This is discussed further later.

Some of the confusion about the difference betweenpeople’s personal value systems and their perceptionsof others’ value priorities—people’s social value sys-tems—stems from the tendency to discuss people’sstable tendencies to deal with others in their social en-vironments in particular ways as social values (e.g.,Beggan & Allison, 1994; Liebrand & Dehue, 1996;McClintock, 1978; Rokeach, 1973; Van Lange, Otten,De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997). Schwartz (1992) pro-vided evidence that such tendencies can be understoodin terms of what has been labeled thefocus on individ-ual–social context outcomesdimension of the personalvalue system.

The strength and replicability of the finding thatpersonal value priorities influence perceptions and be-havior (see Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 1948, foran early study) has been discussed at length (e.g.,Allport, 1955). Distinguishing between personal andsocial value priorities is grounded in the assumptionthat not only will personal value priorities influenceperceptions and behavior, but so too will social valuepriorities influence perceptions and behavior. Indirectevidence for this assumption comes from studies thatshow people who identify with groups often behavesimilarly in response to a stimulus. For example, per-haps the Dartmouth and Princeton football fans’ foot-ball club social value priorities were highly salient andtherefore influenced their perceptions of the footballgame made famous by Hastorf and Cantril (1954). Per-haps salient ethnic group social value priorities alsoproduced the finding (Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985)that pro-Arab and pro-Israeli television viewers sawdifferent things in the same programs.

People’s social value systems may have idiosyn-cratic aspects when they do not involve actual individ-uals. For example, the way people perform role-relatedbehavior may relate to idiosyncratic aspects of their so-cial value systems. For example, one person’s percep-tions of a prison guard’s value priorities may differfrom another’s, and these differences are likely to bereflected in different role-playing behavior. Not all theguards in Zimbardo’s prison study (Zimbardo, Haney,Banks, & Jaffe, 1982) behaved similarly. Work in thearea of intercultural stereotyping also is relevant to theidiosyncratic nature of social value systems. For exam-

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ple, Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1996) showed thatthere were identifiable individual differences in peo-ple’s beliefs about Black people; social value prioritiesare likely to have inspired these beliefs.

When social value systems involve actual individu-als, accuracy and clarity become an issue. Relevant tothis issue is Grusec and Goodnow’s (1994) work inwhich children’s accurate or inaccurate perceptions ofparental value priorities and other messages influencedsubsequent behavior (see also Grusec, 1997). Inaccu-racyorconfusionaboutsocial valuesystemsmaybe im-portant to understanding social anxiety (e.g., see Leary& Kowalski, 1995, who suggest that lack of knowledgeabout social rules will lead to social anxiety). Social in-telligence (e.g.,Cantor&Kihlstrom,1987)alsomay re-late to social value system accuracy and clarity.

If personal and social value systems exist, then peo-ple must decide whether to behave in line with others’expectations—consistent with social value priori-ties—or in line with their own value priorities. There isno shortage of research showing that people use infor-mation about others’ needs, desires, and expectations inregulating their behavior (e.g., Moretti & Higgins,1999),and thenotion thatpeopleneed to reconcilesatis-faction of their own value priorities with conformity toothers’ value priorities is not a new issue. For example,Allport (1955) acknowledged the problem. He dis-cussed the difference between the “tribal” and the “per-sonal” and suggested that although “opportunisticmodes of adjusting” (p. 39) are dictated by the social(tribal) environment, individuals develop other stan-dards of conduct for themselves. Allport (1955) sug-gested that attempting to reconcile these two modes ofbecoming, the tribal and the personal, was a lifelongprocess. Permanent reconciliation between the tribaland the personal may take the form of what has been de-scribed as internalization—people then have similarvalue priorities to those of an important social group,such as the family or a religious organization (e.g., seeDeci & Ryan, 1995; Emler, Ohana, & Dickinson, 1990;Goodnow,1990;Rohan,1998;Rohan&Zanna,1998).

Theoryand research inwhich it is suggested thatper-sonal autonomy is important for psychological health(e.g.,Deci&Ryan,1995) impliesanoptimal reconcilia-tion for daily conflicts between personal and socialvaluepriorities:Behaveaccording topersonalvaluepri-orities. However, for some (e.g., those with high priori-tiesontheconformityvalue type),behaving inwaysthatare in line with others’ value prioritiesis in line withtheir own value priorities. Highest priorities on a partic-ular value type may be associated with a particular opti-mal reconciliation. For example, for the person withhighest priorities on hedonism, optimal reconciliationmay be something like “whatever gives me the mostpleasure” (or, perhaps, the least pain). However, forpeople who have highest priorities on power, optimal

reconciliation may be total adherence to personal valuepriority standards.Diarystudymethods (seeWheeler&Reis,1991)maybemostuseful forexamining thisprob-lem, as suggested by a pilot study (Rohan & Harris,1999) using this methodology. It was found, for exam-ple, that people’s personal value priorities were relatedto the relative number of occasions in which their own,others’, or both own and others’ value priorities wereviewed as being an issue: Although all participants re-ported more instances in which both own and others’value priorities were involved, participants motivatedboth by a focus on organization and social context out-comes (high priorities on benevolence, tradition, andconformity) reported the greatest number.

Research in the area of self-presentation may beuseful to investigations of the daily reconciliation be-tween personal and social value priorities. Two mainkinds of motivations for seeking to present particularinformation or images about self to others have beenproposed (see Baumeister, 1982): as a means to gainpractical and material rewards or to claim an identity.Whereas the first can be understood as a delayed-grati-fication reconciliation solution (behaving according tosocial value priorities for later personal value prioritysatisfaction), the second (often observed in studies onreactance) can be understood in terms of a personalvalue priority reconciliation solution.

Past research into “value fit” has acknowledged thebenefits associated with compatibility between per-sonal and social value priorities (e.g., see Bills, 1952;Feather, 1975; Furnham & Bochner, 1986; Triandis,1990). The difficulty of conceptualizing and measuringwhatwere labeledearlierasideological valuesystemsisan important factor in interpreting such research. In re-cent research (Rohan & Maiden, 2000), a modifiedSchwartz Value Inventory was used to measure teach-ers’ perceptions of their school’s ideological value sys-tem (i.e., their school-related social value priorities),and it was shown that the fit between teachers’ personalvalue priorities and their social value priorities (usingwithin-subject correlations) strongly predicted, for ex-ample, reported stress, job commitment, and satisfac-tion. Neither an index of fit constructed on the basis ofpersonal value priorities and the school’s value priori-ties according to the school principal nor an index con-structed on the basis of fit between personal valuepriorities and the average of all teachers’ social valuepriorities could match this prediction.

There is an unmistakable similarity between the no-tion that people need to reconcile personal and socialvalue priorities and the concept of agendas (individual,interpersonal, relationship, group) discussed by Snyderand Cantor (1998) in their proposal that a functionaliststrategy could be used productively to understand per-sonality and social behavior. Use of a values approachwill provide a way to understand the structure of the

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agendas and will provide a way to understand howwell-being is influenced by the satisfaction of each typeof agenda or only one type of agenda to the detriment ofothers. In short, the values approach may serve as a uni-fying foundation for carrying out Snyder and Cantor’ssuggestions for investigation.

Summary. To settle the confusion generated bythe existence of different types of value systems, in dis-cussions of people’s own value priorities it should bespecified thatpersonalvalue priorities are at issue; indiscussions of people’s perceptions of others’ (e.g.,other individuals, groups, institutions, societies) valuepriorities, it should be specified thatsocialvalue priori-ties are at issue; and when descriptions of the value pri-orities endorsed or promoted by groups are discussed,they should be identified asideologicalvalue systems.Personal and social value systems are located withinthe person (i.e., are both intrapsychic value systems).Although people will have only one personal value sys-tem, they are likely to have more than one social valuesystem. Social value systems will have the same struc-ture as the personal value system.

A major issue that the personal–social distinctionhighlights is how people reconcile what they want withwhat others want, and whether optimal reconciliationis related to people’s personal value priorities requiresconsideration. Investigations of this issue could use di-ary study methods and strategies suggested by psy-chologists who promote a functionalist approach tounderstanding personality and social behavior.

Aspect 5: Value Systems, Worldviews,and Ideologies

Not only is the wordvaluesoften used to refer tocognitive structures that now have been labeled asvalue systems,but it also has been applied to people’sconscious beliefs about the way the world is or shouldbe, as well as to the value-laden constructions peopleuse when deliberating about, justifying, or promotingtheir attitudinal or behavioral decisions. To settle theresulting confusion, I propose the following guidelinesso that the values construct can be distinguished fromtwo other related constructs: identify focus on the cog-nitive structure in terms of value systems (or valuetypes, or value priorities), use the termworldviewstodescribe people’s conscious beliefs about the worldthat are a function of their value priorities, and use theterm ideologiesto describe value-laden constructionspeople use in or after their decision making.

A separate issue: Use of value language.A sep-arate issuefromnamingandseparately investigating thethree very different constructs is the ease with whichpeopleuse the languageofvalues.People’s facilitywith

value language reflects human capacity formetacognition (e.g., see Mischel, 1998). This meta-cognitionnotonlymeans thatpeoplearecapableof talk-ing about their value priorities but also means that peo-ple are able to use value language to argue for oneattitudinal or behavioral decision over another. Indeed,Perelman (1982) suggested, based on Aristotle’s wis-dom, thatconvincingarguments require reference to thevaluesystem.Asdiscussed later,arguments thatcontainvaluepriorityassociationsarereferredtoas ideologies.

Humans’ capacity for metacognition concerningtheir value priorities is critical for measuring value pri-orities. Because the way people cognitively representtheir value priorities is shared (although value prioritiesdiffer, the structure of the value system is universal), itseems unsurprising that the language of values is shared(see Schwartz, 1996, p. 2). However, individual differ-ences are likely to exist in the ease with which peoplecan (or want to) think and talk about their personal andsocial value priorities; that is, their metacognition con-cerning their value priorities may differ. People whosuffer from a lack of what has been calledself-conceptclarity (J. D. Campbell, 1990) andself-certainty(Baumgardner, 1990) may suffer from difficulty inthinking and talking about their personal value priori-ties. (See also Fazio & Powell, 1997, who showed that“attitude accessibility” was related to students’ adjust-ment to college—attitude accessibility is likely to belinked to the ease with which people can think and talkabout value priorities.) Rokeach (1973) alerted re-searchers to this problem when he suggested that com-pletion of his value survey was “highly projective innature, somewhat like the Rorschach or the ThematicApperception Test” (p. 27). Whether difficulty in re-porting their personal value priorities is related to a ha-bitual tendency to settle daily personal–social valuesystem conflicts (discussed earlier) in favor of socialvalue priorities should be considered.

Perhaps the developers of the early value prioritymeasureswereveryaware thatnotall peoplewould findit easy to think or talk about their value priorities. In theearlymeasures,personalvalueprioritieswere indirectlymeasuredbyaskingpeopleabout theirattitudesorprob-able behavior (e.g., the study of values; Allport et al.,1960) or by asking them about their preferred ways ofliving (e.g., Morris, 1956). Because direct questions areasked about value priorities, Rokeach’s (1973) andSchwartz’s (1992) value inventories, as well as a newmeasurement tool designed to measure priorities ac-cording to the Schwartz (1992) value theory (Oishi,Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998), seem to take less ac-count of this problem.

Schwartz and his colleagues have almost completedtesting a new questionnaire for measuring personalvalue priorities that requires less abstract thought (Sha-lom Schwartz, personal communication, March 24,

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2000). Respondents are asked to compare themselveswith individuals who are described in terms of what isimportant to them. The descriptions are theoreticallylinked to values that differ in terms of the two value sys-tem dimensions. For example, to measure priorities re-lated to the conformity value type, male respondents areasked to rate theirsimilarity toapersonwho isdescribedin the following way: “It is important to him to be politeto other people all the time. He believes he should al-ways show respect to his parents and to older people.”To reduce demands even further, another strategy maybe toask respondentsquestions that relatedirectly to theunderlying motivational dimensions. For example, tofind out whether people are more focused on individualor social context outcomes, they could be asked,“Which do you think is better: to be respected or appre-ciated? Which do you think is worse: to be a selfish per-son or a dependent person?” To find out whether peopleare more focused on opportunity or organization, theycould be asked, “Which would be better in the long run:to be consistent or be open to new experiences? Whichwould be worse: to have limited options or have noplans?” This would enable identification of people interms of the quadrant location of their highest value pri-orities with minimum decision making.

Wolfgang Bilsky (1998a, 1998b), with whomSchwartz (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) developedthe original version of his value theory, also has dis-cussedpeople’sabilities to thinkabout their valueprior-ities. Bilsky (1998a, 1998b) suggested that themotivational concerns that underlie value priorities canbe characterized according to an implicit–explicit con-tinuum. So, for example, to the extent that value priori-ties are easily accessible to consciousness, they areexplicitmotives.Healsosuggested that the implicit–ex-plicitdistinctionmayallow integrationof thevaluesandmotivation literatures.

Value systems and ideologies. Demonstrationsthatpeople’svaluepriorities influence theirperceptions(e.g., Postman et al., 1948) support the widely held as-sumption that theoperationofpeople’svaluesystems inguiding theirbehavioroftenoccurseffortlessly,withoutconscious awareness. However, more consciousthought is likely when making a decision that involvesan entity that is not easily categorized in a way that en-ables swift analogical reasoning from value priorities,when a choice is between whether to behave in accordwith one’s own value priorities or another’s value prior-ities, or when the reconciliation process involves one’sown and more than one other’s dissimilar value priori-ties (see Wegner & Bargh, 1998, for a review of auto-matic and controlled behavior theory and research). Insuch situations, people are likely to argue for one courseof action over another. Because, as mentioned earlier,goodargumentsneedreference tovaluepriorities,argu-

mentswill containeither implicitorexplicit reference tovalue priorities. Thus, value priorities still guide attitu-dinal and behavioral decisions because they enable thedecision to be framed in a particular way (see Pratto, inpress; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; see also Conover &Feldman’s 1984 discussion of the use of schemas inthinking through political issues).

However, people use value priority-based argu-ments not only in deliberating about their decisions butalso for self-justification purposes (see Aronson et al.,1997, who linked self-justification with the mainte-nance of self-esteem; recall that earlier, self-esteemwas described as resulting from an estimate of progressin living the best way possible, i.e., according to per-sonal value priorities). Both pre- and postdecisionalvalue priority-relevant arguments can be labeled asideologies (see Pratto, in press). The labelideologyseems appropriate for these constructions that arelearned—and maintained—in the social environmenteven though, as a terminology, it has about as muchdefinitional diversity as the termvalues (e.g., seeMcLellan, 1986, p. 1: “Ideology is the most elusiveconcept in the whole of social science”).

Rokeach (1973) described people’s postdecisionuse of ideologies (though not using that term) and sug-gested that this enabled a person to “end up smellinghimself, and being smelled by others, like a rose” (p.20). Rokeach (1973) expanded:

The language of values is an ingenious language admi-rably suited to the enlightenment of all kinds of self-in-terest, whether enlightened or unenlightened, selfishor altruistic. It permits rational justification of self-in-terest, and, insofar as it is necessary, the language ofvalues can also be employed as an Aesopian languageto permit rationalized justification of self-interest. (p.168)

Because ideologies contain value priority associations,people will be able to feel they are making the best deci-sion and will be able to convince themselves and othersthat they are good, moral, or ethical, that is, behavingaccording to a set of principles. (Morality from thispoint of view has been referred to asenlightenedself-interest,see Ramm, 1998; see Kristiansen & Hotte,1996 for a discussion of the value language use inself-evaluations of morality; see Kristiansen & Zanna,1988, 1994, for discussion of value language use in jus-tifying social and intergroup attitudes; and see Pratto,in press, for a discussion of “legitimizing ideologies.”)Whether the same ideology will be used in deliberatingabout and in explaining, justifying, or promoting thedecision may depend on whether the context of deci-sion making changes. The appropriate ideology in onecontext may not be appropriate in another.

Because the rhetoric in ideologies can be manipu-lated to connect almost any thing, person, action, or ac-

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tivity to value priorities (i.e., to what constitutes bestpossible living), an ideology can be made relevant to awide variety of situations by virtue of the value priorityassociations contained within it, and the attitudinal andbehavioral decisions that result will depend on featuresof the situation in which it is applied (e.g., see Pratto,Tatar, & Conway-Lanz, 1999, who suggested that ide-ologies may have different implications for differentsocial groups). However, the manipulation of the rhet-oric in ideologies means that values are often viewedas “remarkably slippery social constructions that takeon different meanings over time and across politicalcultures” (Tetlock, Peterson, & Lerner, 1996, p. 34).But, it is ideologies, not value priorities, that are re-markably slippery.

Ideologies may contain a large number of value as-sociations or a few. For example, a noblesse oblige ide-ology—those with more should help those withless—contains implications for universalism value pri-orities but no obvious implication for stimulation valuepriorities (see Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz,1999, who examined use of this ideology in legitimiz-ing “guns” rather than “butter” social policies). In con-trast, political ideologies may contain a greater numberof links (e.g., see Braithwaite, 1994, 1997; Rokeach,1973). Whether the structure of ideologies can bemapped onto the value system will depend on the num-ber of value system associations: Whereas broader ide-ologies may map onto value system structure,narrower ideologies will not.

Tetlock (1986; see also Billig, 1991; Billig et al.,1988) focused on ideologies people use in decisionmaking. His value pluralism model of ideological rea-soning (as well as the revised model; Tetlock, Peterson,& Lerner, 1996) can be used in systematic investiga-tions of the value priority-related reasoning connectedto attitudinal and behavioral decisions. Tetlock et al.(1994) used the model to demonstrate, for example, thatpolitical ideologiesdiffer in thedegree towhich theyac-knowledge conflicts among important value priorities,and thus theextent towhich ideologiescontaincomplextrade-off reasoning. Whether this model is relevant tounderstandinghowpeoplereconcilepersonalandsocialvalue priorities can be considered.

In other research, Tetlock and his colleagues are in-vestigating “taboo trade-offs” (e.g., Fiske & Tetlock,1997;Tetlock,Kristel,Elson,Green,&Lerner,2000)—trade-offs that people do not like to think about or dis-cuss openly (e.g., trade-offs between friends and itsmonetary cost). In addition, these researchers are inves-tigating the success of ideologies that do or do not ac-knowledge conflicts between value priorities. Forexample,Tetlock(inpress) foundthat to theextent thatapolitician acknowledges value conflict (i.e., has en-gaged inmorecomplex trade-off reasoning), sheorhe istrusted and respected less (the “traitor effect”).

Value systems and worldviews. Solomon Asch(1952) discussed the importance of knowing about the“conscious mode” in which things appeared to people(pp. 64–65). Feather (1971) recognized that this con-sciousmodewasdistinct fromvaluesystems,andhede-scribed itasaperceivedstructure that representedthe in-formation immediately present in the environment. Thetermworldviewcan be used to distinguish between thisconscious mode and the cognitive structure that hasbeen described as the value system. Although the termworldviewalso is not without definitional diversity (seeMannheim, 1936/1972), it seems the most appropriatebecause it is defined as “contemplation of the world,view of life” (Compact Oxford English Dictionary,1991, p. 2340).

How do value systems relate to people’s world-views? Parsons (1951) suggested an inescapable linkbetween people’s personal value priorities and the waythey viewed the world. Early research in which peo-ple’s (personal) value priorities influenced their per-ceptions (e.g., Postman et al., 1948) supported thesuggestion that people’s worldviews directly evidencetheir personal value systems. Because of this stronglink, the value system structure could be used to guideinvestigations of people’s worldviews. Beliefs relatingto each value type should be found.

There has been some research into the relation be-tween personal value priorities and worldviews. For ex-ample, Altemeyer (1998) examined the relationbetween people’s worldviews and their personal valuesystems. He found, consistent with expectations andearlier research (e.g., Rohan & Zanna, 1996), that thestrongest relationsbetween the right-wingauthoritarianworldview and the personal value system concernedpriorities on tradition and conformity value types. Healso found that the strongest relation between the socialdominance orientation (SDO) worldview (see Pratto, inpress; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) andthe personal value system concerned priorities on thepower value type. Altemeyer (1998) observed that

Right-wing authoritarians fear that authority and con-ventions are crumbling so quickly that civilization willcollapse and they will be eaten in the resulting jungle.In contrast, high SDOsalready see life as “dog eatdog” and—compared with most people—are deter-mined to do the eating. (p. 75)

How very different, then, is the conscious mode inwhich things appear to right-wing authoritarians and topeople who have a strong SDO as a result of their per-sonal value priorities. For each, it is clear that best pos-sible living has a very different meaning (i.e., they havevery different value priorities), and this controls theway each views the world.

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I mentioned earlier that if personal value prioritiesevidence judgments about the capacity of entities toenable best possible living, then personal value priori-ties will change when circumstances (or personal at-tributes) change. Changes in circumstances could beunderstood not only in terms of physical circumstancesbut also in terms of the people contained in one’s socialenvironments. Constant interaction with people whohave different personal value priorities may changepeople’s beliefs about the world; changes in people’sbeliefs about the world will be reflected in changes totheir personal value priorities.

Summary. I propose the following guidelines sothat the values construct can be distinguished from twoother related constructs: Use the termvalue systemifthe cognitive structures are in focus, use the termworldviewsif investigating people’s beliefs about theway the world is or should be that are a function of theirvalue priorities, and use the termideologiesto describevalue-laden linguistic constructions that are used in orafter decision making.

In investigations of worldviews, beliefs that evi-dence each value type should be found because theway people view their worlds is a function of their per-sonal value priorities. In contrast, ideologies will differin terms of the number of value associations that can beidentified. An ideology only will have links to valuepriorities—either personal or social—by virtue of thereferences (implicit or explicit) to values contained inthat ideology.

What Does It All Mean for theValues–Attitudinal and Behavioral

Decision Link?

To bring together the points made regarding the po-tentially confusing aspects of the values construct thatrelate to understanding how value priorities cause atti-tudinal and behavioral decisions, I now describe a pro-posal for this process. First, definitions for constructsrelevant to the process are given.

A value is an implicit analogical principle con-structed from judgments about the capacity of things,people, actions, and activities to enable best possibleliving. Value priorities evidence the dynamic organi-zation of these principles. Valuesystemsare integratedstructures within which there are stable and predictablerelations among priorities on each value type.

Personal value systemsconcern people’s own judg-ments about the capacity of entities to enable best pos-sible living for themselves.Social value systemsconcern people’s perceptions about others’ judgmentsconcerning the capacity of entities to enable best possi-ble living, that is, others’ value priorities. Aworldviewis a collection of conscious beliefs about how things

are or should be. Thus, people’s worldviews constitutetheir version of actual or potential realities. Anideol-ogyis a rhetorical association or set of associations be-tween things, people, actions, or activities and bestpossible living. Because value systems structure judg-ments about the capacity of entities to enable best pos-sible living, ideologies will contain either implicit orexplicit reference to value priorities.

The Process

If personal value priorities are “intimately bound upwith a person’s sense of self” (Feather, 1992, p. 112)and are “a type of personality disposition” (Bilsky &Schwartz, 1994, p. 178), then it seems logical to sug-gest that all attitudinal and behavioral decisions ulti-mately should be traceable to personal value priorities(see Figure 2). That is, personal value priorities causedecisions. People intuitively may operate under the as-sumption that personal values cause decisions, and thisassumption may explain the (possibly) universal pro-hibition against hypocrisy (see Aronson, Fried, &Stone, 1991, who use this prohibition to change behav-ior). Thus, in Figure 2, the personal value systemstands as the superordinate structure.

People’s personal value systems cause people toview the world in a particular way. However, as men-tioned, constant interaction with people who have dif-ferent personal value priorities may change people’sbeliefs about the world; changes in people’s beliefsabout the world will be reflected in changes to valuepriorities. In Figure 2, there are double arrows betweenpersonal value systems, worldviews, and social valuesystems to reflect this potential. This arrangementtakes account of Rokeach’s (1973) comments that “amajor advantage gained in thinking about a person as asystem of values rather than a cluster of traits is that itbecomes possible to conceive of his undergoingchange as a result of changes in social conditions” (p.21; see also Tomkins, 1966; Young, 1946).

The most direct path from personal value priorities(through worldviews) to attitudinal and behavioral de-cisions(seeFigure2) reflects thewidelyheldandempir-ically supported assumption that people’s personalvalue priorities often guide their behavior effortlessly,with little or no conscious awareness. Relevant to this isthehypothesisput forwardbySchwartz (1996):Associ-ations with “any outside variables” will “decreasemonotonically as one moves around the circular struc-tureofvalue types inbothdirections fromthemostposi-tively associated value type to the least positivelyassociated value type” (p. 6). Sagiv and Schwartz(1995) found, for example, that interpersonal coopera-tion is related in the predicted way: Benevolence priori-ties were most strongly associated with interpersonalcooperation,andpowerprioritieswere leaststronglyas-

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sociated. Interpersonal cooperation behavior was cho-senforstudybecausethegamesthatcouldbeusedto testhypotheses “are constructed to tap behaviors that ex-press relatively pure motivations straightforwardly”(Schwartz, 1996, p. 6). Research in which these types ofrelativelypuremotivations (i.e., those thatare relativelyunaffectedbysituational influencesandthereforesocialvalue priorities) are investigated may be most relevantto themostdirectpath frompersonalvaluesystemstoat-titudinal or behavioral decisions.

If people are thoroughly immersed in their interac-tions with others, they may behave according to theirsocial value priorities effortlessly. The path from so-cial value systems to attitudinal decisions reflects thispossibility. Perhaps relevant to this path is research(Ybarra & Trafimow, 1998) in which priming of whatwas described as thecollective self(perhaps, socialvalue priorities) produced different behavior than didpriming of what was described as theprivate self(per-haps, personal value priorities). That such priming pro-duced different behavior may be important to considerin discussions and investigation of “interattitudinal

consistency” (e.g., Lavine, Thomsen, & Gonzales,1997)—attitudes may be consistent with either per-sonal or social value systems.

When people use ideologies to help them make morecomplex decisions—those that require consciousthought—the ideologies may be in line with either per-sonal or social value priorities. A path from the personalvalue system (through worldview) to a personal valuesystem linked ideology element, as well as a path from asocial value system to a social value system linked ide-ology element, therefore, is included. Billig’s (1991)discussion of discourse analysts who demonstrate peo-ple’sability to takeondifferent “patternsof talk” is rele-vant to the idea that people may use different ideologiesin theirdecisionmakingdependingonwhetherpersonalor social value systems are salient. Somewhat similar isLuker’s (1984) proposal that people differ in terms ofthe beliefs on which they base their attitudes. For exam-ple, Luker found that prolife activists based their abor-tion attitudes on statements such as the purpose of sex isprocreation, whereas prochoice activists based theirabortion attitudes on statements such as the purpose of

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Figure 2. Proposed relations among personal and social value priorties, worldviews, ideologies, andattitudinal and behavioral decisions.

sex is to foster intimacy and experience pleasure. Al-thoughSeligmanandKatz (1996)suggested thatpeoplemay “construct value systems in the context of specificissues” (p. 55), they made a point related to Luker’s,namely that people associate particular value prioritieswithparticular issues(seealsoTourangeau,Rasinski,&D’Andrade, 1991, who found that students who had dif-ferent opinions also framed the relevant issue in differ-ent ways by linking the issue to different value prioritiesand premises). It is likely that when personal value pri-orities are salient, the ideology that “feels right” will beone that contains links to important personal value pri-orities;whensocialvalueprioritiesaresalient, the ideol-ogy that feels right will be one that contains links toimportant social value priorities.

Peoplemaychange theirbeliefsabout theworld (i.e.,their worldview) if they behave in particular ways oftenenough. This may be why “stateways can change folk-ways” (see Aronson, 1995). Consider as a simple exam-ple the change in attitudes and behavior regarding thewearing of seat belts (for a weightier example, seeDeutsch&Collins,1951).There isnowgeneral consen-sus that it is good to wear seat belts, although the ideolo-giespeoplemayuseto justify theirpositiveattitudesandseat belt wearing behavior may differ depending onvaluepriorities (e.g., highprioritiesonconformity: “be-cause it’s the law”; high priorities on security: “becauseit keeps me safe”). The arrow from attitudinal or behav-ioral decisions back to the worldview element was in-cluded to reflect this type of worldview changepossibility (Figure2).Thearrowfromdecisionexplana-tion, justification,promotionback to theworldviewele-ment was included for the same reason.

Whether or not they made a decision with fullawareness, people are likely to use ideologies in ex-plaining to themselves or others why they made aparticular decision, in justifying their decision, or inpromoting their decision. As mentioned, whether theideology used in deliberating about decisions is thesame one used in decision explanation, justification,or promotion may depend on whether the deci-sion-relevant context (in terms of both physical cir-cumstances and people involved) remains constant.Therefore, in Figure 2 there is an element from attitu-dinal and behavioral decision labeled “situationallyappropriate ideology.” The only time decision mak-ing should not require use of an ideology is whenpeople deny they had any choice: Involuntarily ex-pressed attitudes or behaviors need not be explainedor justified (this has been demonstrated extensively indissonance research; e.g., Zanna & Cooper, 1974).

If people use a different ideology in the course ofexplanation, justification, or promotion, they maychange the decision (the arrow from situationally ap-propriate ideology back to attitudinal or behavioral de-cision). The potential for explanation, justification, or

promotion to alter decisions may underlie Maio andOlson ’s (1998) findings: They found change in attitu-dinal decisions (in this case, reports of value priorities)when people provided reasons for their previously re-ported attitudinal decisions.

The major implication of the proposed process bywhich value priorities—both personal and social—cause attitudinal and behavioral decisions is that theoften-recorded failure to find strong value–attitude–behavior relations (e.g., LaPiere, 1934; Wicker, 1969)can be explained. In Figure 2, four possible paths frompersonal value systems to decisions are proposed. Eachof these paths may be associated with a different deci-sion, even though the underlying value systems are sta-ble. Specification of which path is being investigatedmay enhance understanding and prediction of thevalue–attitude–behavior relation.

General Summary

In discussing five confusion-producing aspects ofthe values construct, I presented a selection of theoryandresearch inwhichthetermvalueswasnotusedbut inwhich the construct under investigation seemed consis-tent with it. I also described work of earlier values theo-rists, and a contemporary value theory, the Schwartz(1992) value theory. Because it explains how people’ssolutions to two of the most basic human problems in-fluence their motivational focus, the Schwartz (1992)theory can provide the structure for investigating thefundamental coordinators of behavior.

Confusion can be reduced greatly if social theoristsand social scientists specify when they are talking aboutpeople’s value priorities and value systems rather thanthe category of judgment or set of judgments that can bedescribed as values or value types. The termattitude,which sometimes has been used to describe a value pri-ority, shouldbe reserved fordescribingaspecificevalu-ation of an entity. To distinguish it from the valuesconstruct, a worldview was described in terms of a per-son’s conscious beliefs—which are a function of thatperson’s value priorities—about the way the world is orshouldbe.Valuepriority-basedargumentspeopleusetohelp them make decisions as well as explain, justify, orpromote their decisions were labeled as ideologies, andan ideology was described as a rhetoric association orset of associations between entities and living the bestway possible. Because judgments about how to live thebest way possible are assumed to be what value systemsorganize so analogical reasoning can be used to providemeaning to experience and guide action, ideologies willcontain either implicit or explicit reference to valuepriorities.

I proposed a distinction between personal and socialvalue systems. Both are intrapsychic structures, andsocial value systems contain organizations of people’s

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perceptions of others’ value priorities. Both can influ-ence people’s attitudinal and behavioral decisions, andas Gordon Allport (1955) suggested, reconciliation be-tween action to satisfy personal value priorities or con-formity to social value priorities is likely to be alifelong process.

Personal and social value systems, worldviews, andideology constructs were included in a proposal for theprocess by which personal value priorities cause attitu-dinal and behavioral decisions. I offer the framework asastartingpoint for researcherswho, likeAllport,believethatvaluesystemsare the fundamentally importantcon-struct for understanding and predicting people’s atti-tudes and behavior, but who have found that theconfusion associated with the values area reduces thepotential for focused, systematic investigations.

For centuries, psychologists and others have soughtto understand the fundamental coordinators of humanbehavior. The message embedded in this article is thatby conceptualizing these fundamental coordinators asvalue systems, we may be able to synthesize and buildon the knowledge produced by generations of theoristsand researchers who have focused on this importantconstruct, whether or not they have used the problem-atic termvalues.

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