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The Argument of Aristotle's "Politics" 1

Author(s): Marguerite DeslauriersSource: Phoenix , Vol. 60, No. 1/2 (Spring - Summer, 2006), pp. 48-69Published by: Classical Association of CanadaStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20304580Accessed: 13-04-2016 12:14 UTC

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2/23

THE ARGUMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

Marguerite Deslauriers

i introduction

?ince the nineteenth century, many commentators have understood

Book 1 of Aristode's Politics as an argument to the conclusion that the polis is

natural.1 Aristode does make claims about the naturalness of certain relations

between people, and the naturalness of political community as such. But I take

Aristode's primary concern in Book 1 to be to establish that there are different

kinds of rule because there are different kinds of people.2 That political comm unity

I am grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for a grant which helped to

support this work.

1 See Newman 1887, commenting that the subject of Book 1 is olicovouia and ?eanotE?a (citing

3.6 1278bl7). But he seems to believe that the point of the discussion of the household and slavery

is to establish that the household (and hence the polis) is natural: "A modern work would not first

prove that the household exists- by nature, and then inquire whether it ought to exist. Yet this is

what Aristode does in the First and Second Books of the Politics" (xxix). For more recent works,

see Mulgan 1977 and Miller 1995 (esp. chapters 1-2). Miller writes MOf paramount importance for

Aristode's political theory are the doctrines defended in Politics 1.2, that human beings are by nature

political animals and that the polis exists by nature" (15). This suggests that the primary point of

chapters 1-2 of the Politics, at least, is a point about nature. Miller refines the point later, claiming

that the apparent tension between Books 1 and 3 (because the polis is a natural growth in Book 1, and

yet the criterion of identity for 2. polis in Book 3 is identity in constitution) dissolves if we understand

the polis in Book 1 in the sense of a society (i.e., the total community) and the polis in Book 3 more

narrowly as the state. So what is natural, on his view, is the polis as a community rather than as a state.

Mulgan sees (as most commentators do) two parts to Book 1: chapters 1-2 and chapters 3-13. He

seems to believe that the point of the first part is to prove that the polis is natural (18): "After a brief

introduction, Aristode sets out to prove that the polis is natural or exists by nature." But he mentions

that Aristode also formulates the doctrine that the polis is a compounded whole (28). And he claims

that "The nature of these qualitative differences [between the different types of rule] is one of the

subsidiary themes of Book One and serves to connect the lengthy examination of the household with

the general theory of the polis" (36). I take it that Mulgan means to say that the primary theme of

Book One is that the polis is natural, and that the discussion of differences in types of rule is subsidiary

to that theme.

2 In making this argument I am following Malcolm Schofield (1990: 16-17), who writes, "it is

tempting to suppose that Aristode's main object in Book A is to establish that the polis is a natural

community, ... and that the need to show that the household is a natural community is what leads

him to present at some length a vigorous case for the naturalness of one of its two fundamental

component relationships?slavery_But although Aristode does not always make the strategy and

organization of the argument of Book A as explicit as he might have done, it seems probable that his

main preoccupation is not the naturalness of the polis and its constitutent associations?which is a

topic barely mentioned in subsequent parts of the treatise. The issue which appears to dominate his

mind right through the book is the question: how many forms of rule (?pxt|) are there? And the urge

to reply 'not just one but several' is the mainspring of the argument." In a note Schofield adds that

his argument has "much in common" with Natali 1979-80; he also refers us to Kelsen 1977:172-175.

48

PHOENIX, VOL. 60 (2006) 1-2.



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50

PHOENIX

political society is composed of households (as Aristotle says at 1253b2-3); and

an account of household governance requires accounts of the household relations.

The view is correct but unsatisfying insofar as the explanation is incomplete:

why is an account of the elements of a composite necessary to an account of the

composite? The answer lies in Aristotle's understanding of the relation of the parts

of the polis (households) to the polis: because households are for the sake of the

polis, the polis determines what the household is like, just as, say, the essence of an

animal determines what the parts of the animal will be like, because those parts are

for the sake of the animal as a whole.6 The parts therefore reveal to us something

of the whole, precisely because they are determined by the nature of the whole.

And the relation between household and polis is unlike the relation between

animal and animal part, insofar as Aristotle seems to believe that households

are more readily knowable than the polis in its best form, and so households

can inform us about the essence of the wel l-form ed pol i s .7 In other w ords, we

inquire into the elements of a political community not just to confirm that the

polis is indeed constituted out of households and that households are constituted

by certain relations of rule, but because this investigation will tell us something

about the polis. What it tells us, I argue, is that there is a variety of kinds of

person, and also a variety of forms of rule, that can be manifested (although not

all should be manifested) at the level of political society. Aristotle says as much at

1.11252al6-22, introducing the analysis of the polis into (ultimately) households:

xauxa ?b?K eaxiv a^nOi]. ?tiXov 8' ?axai to Xeyouevov 67uaK07roGai Kax? xrjv o^ny

T|uivr|v uiGo?ov. cocraep y?p ?v xo?? aAAo?? x? a?vGexov uixpi xcov ?auvO?xc?v ?vayicri

?taipe?v (xauxa y?p ?Xctxvcrxa fi?pia xou Ttavxo?), ouxco ko? ttoXiv ?? &v a?yiceiTca

cFK07touvx8? ?\|/oue6a icat Ttep? xo?xcov uaMov, xi xe ?ia^?pouaiv ?XXr\X


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ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 1

51

But these claims are not true. What I am saying will be clear, if we examine the matter

according to the method of investigation that has guided us elsewhere. For as in other

cases, a composite has to be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite, since

these are the smallest parts of the whole, so if we also examine the parts that make up a

city-state, we shall see better both how these differ from each other, and whether or not it

is possible to gain some expertise in connection with each of the things we have mentioned

(tr. Reeve 1998).8

The point of the discussion of 1-2 is often misconstrued as a point about

nature, and as a result the relation of the discussion of 1-2 to that of 3-13 is

misunderstood. The point of 1-2 is that it is a mistake to think that ruling is

simply a question of science and that it is a related mistake to think that there

is only one k ind of rule .9 The eviden ce for this is the developm ent of chapters

3-13, and the way in which Aristode introduces and summarizes the discussion

of slavery and other household relations. I shall first summarize the structure of

the discussion in chapters 3-13, and then turn to a more detailed examination of

the working out of the two controversies introduced in 1.3 below in section iv.

In 1.3 Aristode distinguishes the three household relations and allows that some

people believe that there is a fourth part of the household (wealth acquisition). He

discusses the relation of slavery first, and introduces that discussion by connecting

the question of the justice of slavery with the question whether mastership is the

same as other kinds of rule (the question of 1.1). In 1.4-7 he discusses slave/master

relations and concludes that discussion in 1.7 with the claim that different forms

of rule are indeed different relations, and hence that mastery is a question of being

a certain kind of person and not a question of science (in response to the question

of 1.1). Chapters 8-11 then take up the issue whether wealth acquisition is indeed

a part of, or the whole of, household management?the question raised in 1.3.10

8 When quoting Aristode, I have noted the translations in parentheses after passages quoted,

except where the translations are my own.

Paul Moraux (1957: 6) argues that the claim that there are multiple forms of rule, and that there

are parallel structures in political rule and household rule (and within the individual) are themes that

stem from an early dialogue by Aristode, the rcepi ?ikcuocjuvti?. Moraux focuses on the discussion

of the kinds of rule distinguished according to their aims in Pol. 3.6 1278b30-1279a21, but that

discussion refers back to Book 1. The three kinds of rule are Seanoxeia, ?pxri nk oIk?cl?, apx*l

no\\x\Kx\. Moraux (1957: 25) thinks that the important point in this passage is that political rule

can take either the form of despotism or the form of household rule. This is not to say that political

rule is formed on the model of household rule, but it does suggest that we can more easily observe

the relations of rule in a household (if they are more intelligible "to us," if not more intelligible "in

themselves"), and learn something from them about political rule. Parallel passages in the Nicomachean

Ethics and the Eudemian Ethics suggest the same (see Eth. End. 1241b27-40, 1242a31-bl; Eth. Nie.

1160b22-1161a9; as well as Pol. 1.12). I return to this point below in section v.

10 Some think that the space devoted to this question in Politics 1 is sufficient to show that Aristode

does not have a single or even a primary aim in Politics 1. This is not, I think, obvious. These

chapters are clearly intended to dispose of a current notion which Aristode believes is mistaken: that

wealth acquisition is the aim of the household. They open the way for the argument of 1.13, that

the cultivation of virtue, different in kind and not only in degree among the different inhabitants of



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53

structure of Book 1 as a whole. I understand the structure of Politics 1 to depend

on the two controversies Aristotle mentions in 1.3: one concerning slavery and one

concerning the sufficiency of "science" (?nioxr\[xy\) for ruling well (1253bl8-23).

The argument of 1.13, I want to suggest, indicates how Aristotle understands

these two controversies to be connected.

First, the account of the argument. Aristotle begins the discussion of virtue in

1.13 by posing and clarifying a question. That question is not so much whether

slaves can have virtues (since even instruments have virtues?e.g., knives can be

sharp or dull ), as wh ether slaves can have hum an virtues .12 The contrast is not just

with inanimate instruments, but also with animals. If slaves provide only "bodily

services" (x?q acouaxiKa^ urcepecua?) then slaves can be virtuous only in the way

that animals can, by excelling in certain tasks that require bodily excellence. So the

question is whether slaves can have virtues other than the virtues of instruments

or animals?whether they can have the virtues of free persons. Aristotle then

extends the question to women and children, by asking whether in general natural

subjects can have the virtues of free adult men (1259b21-36).

Aristotle makes clear that there are two affirmative responses to this question

that are unacceptable. The first is to say that the virtues of slaves, women, and

children are identical with the virtues of adult free men. This cannot be right

because, were the virtues of natural rulers and natural subjects to be identical,

the naturalness of both the rule and the subjection would be threatened (el uev

y?p bei ?uxJKtt?pou? ??sx?xeiv KOtloKayaOia?, ?i? xi x?v uev apxeiv ??oi av

x6v ?? apxeaGai KaOarcaC; "If both of them should share in what is noble and

good, why should one of them rule once and for all or the other be ruled once

and for all?," tr. Reeve 1998: ad 1259b34-36).13 The second affirmative answer

to the question that Aristotle treats as unacceptable is to say that natural subjects

and natural rulers have the same virtues, but possess them in different degrees.

He rejects this for the same reason that he rejects the suggestion that the virtues

are simply identical: he thinks that if natural rulers and natural subjects had the

same virtues, even if natural rulers were to have more of those virtues, the rule of

natural rulers would not be legitimate (to jii?v y?p apxeaOca Kai ?pxeiv e??ei

?iou|)?pei, to ?? \x?XXov kgu tjttov o???v; "Ruling and being ruled differ in kind,

but things that differ in degree do not differ in that way," tr. Reeve 1998: ad

1259b36-38). This is the argument against Plato and Xenophon, whose views I

consider in section in below.

12 We might remark the oddness of Aristode's choice of domestic slaves as the focus of his

discussion of slavery, since domestic slavery was certainly not the only, or even the most prevalent,

contemporary form of slavery. Pierre Pellegrin (1982) acknowledges this and argues that Aristode

is interested in particular in defending "l'esclavage lignager." Aristode's focus on domestic slavery is

important here for two reasons: first, because it makes the case of women and that of slaves seem

parallel, when they might not so seem had Aristode focused rather on industrial slavery, and second,

because slavery in the context of the household is more likely than industrial slavery to appear to be a

natural relation.

13 Notice that Aristode here takes it as an assumption that there are natural rulers and natural

subjects.



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54

PHOENIX

The difficulty as Aristode sees it is that we cannot say that slaves and women

have the same virtues as men, even if we allow that they might have different

degrees of those same virtues, and still hope to justify the relations of natural rulers

to natural subjects. At the same time, while accounting for the differences in the

virtues of slaves, women, and free men, we must maintain that all the different

kinds of virtue are human kinds.

We should notice that Aristode does give the same names to the virtues that

he attributes to natural subjects and natural rulers. He asks whether slaves can

have temperance, courage, justice, and the like (1259b21-6), whether a woman

ought to be temperate and courageous and just, whether a child can be temperate

(1259b28-32); and responds by asking rhetorically whether a natural subject

can obey well if he is intemperate and cowardly or unjust (1259b40-1260a2).

Moreover, at 1260a20-24 Aristode explicidy attributes temperance, courage, and

justice to women as well as men, insisting that they are different, specifying that

the courage of a man is manifest in commanding and that of the woman in

obeying. And at 3.4 1277b25-29, he states clearly:

T) ?? (|>povT|ai? apxovio? ??io? ?peiT) u?vr|. x?? y?p ?XXaq ?oucev ?vaymiov e?vou

Koiv?? Kai tcdv ?pxou?vcov K?? tcov ?pxovicov, ?pxou?vou ?? ye ook ecmv ?pexT|

povTiai?, ?XX? ?o?a ?Xr|9r|?.

Practical wisdom is the only virtue peculiar to a ruler; for the others, it would seem, must

be common to both ruler and ruled. At any rate, practical wisdom is not the virtue of one

who is ruled, but true opinion is (tr. Reeve 1998).

Thus at the same time that Aristode argues that the virtues of slaves and

women are not simply identical with, or different in degree from, the virtues of

free men, he insists that denying human virtue to slaves and women is equally

unacceptable. If slaves, and, by extension, women, were utterly without human

virtue or incapable of developing that virtue, then how could they be good natural

subjects, i.e., how could they obey well (1259b40-1260a2)? Yet, implicidy stated,

there are virtuous women and slaves, as evidenced by their capacity for obedience.

So women and slaves cannot be incapable of virtue. Moreover, were slaves to have

no virtues at all, then the relation of master to slave would not be a relation among

people and persuasion would have no role to play. Force and coercion would be

the appropriate mechanisms for ensuring the compliance of the slave. In arguing

that slaves have virtues Aristode is arguing that one ought to offer reasons to one's

slave for obedience. So the virtues of women and slaves are human, which will

turn out to mean that they involve reason, but they are different in kind, and not

in degree, from the virtues of free men (the virtues which Aristode describes at

length in the Nicomachean Ethics).

Aristode has set the parameters of his own response to the question of the

virtue of natural subjects: natural subjects must have virtue, that virtue must be

human (i.e., it must involve reason), and that human virtue must be different in

kind from the virtue of free adult men. What he has then to explain is just how

the virtues of women, children, and slaves differ one from the other and in general



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55

how they differ from the virtue of free men, while remaining recognizably human.

To do this he exploits an analogy between the parts of the soul and the parts of

a relation of rule, where what naturally rules is identified as some faculty which

has reason (presumably, practical reason or the deliberative faculty), and what is

naturally ruled is some faculty which does not have reason (but which, presumably,

i s capable of obeying reason, 1260a4-7 ).14 Aristot le then dist inguishes the v irtue

of women, children, and slaves from the virtue of free men according to the nature

of the deliberative faculty in each and the relation of that deliberative faculty to

the part of the non-rational soul which can obey.

I will not discuss these distinctions in virtues in more detail here. But in order

to understand why Aristotle differentiates several kinds of human virtue, the first

question to ask is: how does the argument of 1.13 fit into the structure of Book 1

of the Politics} That is, if we assume that the argument of 1.13 must contribute in

some way to the project of Book 1, what does that suggest about what the project

is? And if we can interpret Book 1 in such a way that the argument of 1.13 does

make a contribution to the Book as a whole, how might that influence how we

understand the argument of 1.13?

III. THE CONTRAST: XENOPHON AND PLATO ON THE IDENTITY OF VIRTUES

I turn now to the arguments of Xenophon and Plato for the identity of

virtues across free men, women, and slaves, in order to suggest something of the

philosophical context in which Aristotle claims that slaves and women do not

have v irtues ident ica l with those of free m en.15 Aristot le 's argum ents in 1 .13 are

explicitly targeted at the political implications of the claim that virtue is the same

in everyone, and so it is useful to consider the contexts in which that claim is

expressed by som e of h i s contem porar ies. I do not wish to overst ate the d ifferences

between Aristotle and Plato, in particular. It is clear that Xenophon and Plato as

well as Aristotle believed that the good ruler must have certain intellectual and

moral virtues. The differences lie in their claims about who can have such virtues,

what the virtues amount to, and how distinct the intellectual virtues are from the

moral virtues.

I begin with Xenophon. In the Memotabilia Xenophon has Socrates say:


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56 PHOENIX

is needed and is able to procure it, he will be a good presiding officer whether it

is a chorus or a household or a city or an army that he presides over") and: ^r\

Kaxap?vei, styr\, ... x v oiKovojaiKcbv ?v?p?v. r| y?p x?v i?icov ?ni^i?Xeia

nXr\Qsi ?l?vov 8ia?pei xi\q xcov koivg?v ("do not hold in contempt men who are

skilled at household management. For attending to private affairs differs only in

terms of multitude from attending to public ones," tr. Bonnette 1994: ad 3.4.6,

3.4.12). These two passages make the claim that ruling in different contexts (a

household or a city or an army, private affairs or public affairs) is the same, because

the contexts differ only insofar as the number of the ruled differs. That is, ruling

a city is different from ruling a household only in that there are more people in

a city than in a household. Aristode rejects this claim in Politics 1.1, as we have

seen

Xenophon also suggests that the art of household management is necessary for

the political art: ?'va 8? \?\ Suvajaevo? a>e?,f|aai rccoc av rcoMo?c ye ?uvr|9eir|?

("But if you are unable to benefit one [household] how would you be able to

benefit many?," tr. Bonnette 1994: ad 3.6.14). Someone who is good at ruling

a city (benefiting many) will be good at benefiting one (ruling a household).

This again implies that there is no difference intrinsic to the knowledge or virtue

required for ruling, whether the rule occurs in a household or a city.

Moreover, Xenophon seems to assume that the virtue of women and men and

slaves is identical. In Xenophon's Oeconomicus we find passages which attribute

the same virtue of self-control (aa>pove? or ?yicpaxei? x? eiaiv) to women and

slaves as well as free men. At 7.14-15, Ischomachus reports to Socrates his own

words in reply to his wife, who has said:

xi 5' av ?ya> aoi, ?r|, ?uvaiuriv ouiinp??ai: xi? ?? n ?jir) ?uvaui? i?X ?v aoi rc?vxa

?axiv. ?u?v 8' 6Tiaev r\ \ir\rr\p epyov ??vai a?)pov??v. val u? Ai', ?r|v ?yco, a> yuvai,

ml y?p ?^ioi ? rcaxTJp. ?XX? a?p?vcov xo? ?axi Kai ?v?p?? Kai yuvaiKO? ouxco rcoe?v,

07WD? x? x? ?vxa cb? p?Xxiaxa e^si Kai ?tAAa ?xi nXeiaxa ?k xou KaXou xe Kai SiKaioo

7cpoay?VTJa?xai.

What should I be able to do to help you? What ability have I got? Everything depends

on you. My mother told me that my duty is to practise self-control." "By Zeus, wife," I

said, "my father said the same to me. But self-control for both man and woman means

behaving so that their property will be in the very best condition and that the greatest

possible increase will be made to it by just and honourable means (tr. Pomeroy 1994).

Moreover, in arguing that slaves can be taught household management,

Socrates in the Oeconomicus argues that slaves can acquire the virtues of their

masters, to the point where they might become not only masters but also kings.

In Oeconomicus 12, discussing the training of foremen, Ischomachus argues that

slaves can have, or can acquire, loyalty, self-control (with respect to drink, sleep,

and erotic adventures), and an interest in the profitability of the household. At

13.5 Socrates then says: ?crxi? y?p xoi ?pxiKOu? ?vGpamcov S?vaxai rcoie?v,

SfjXov ?ti ouxo? iced 8ea7toxiKoi)c ?vGpc?Tccov Suvaxai 8i8aaKeiv, oaxi? 8?



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ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS

57

?ecrcoTiKou? ?uvaTca rcoie?v, Kai ?aaiA,iKoi)c ("You know, whoever can make

people skilled in governing men can obviously also make them skilled masters

of men; and whoever can make people skilled masters can also make people

skilled to be kings," tr. Pomeroy 1994). Books 12 and 13 of the Oeconomicus

thus introduce another position that Aristotle wishes to refute: that slaves and

masters are capable of the same virtues and for that very reason are politically

interchangeable. A slave who can be taught to be a good foreman could also be

taught to be a good king; this is because both the role of foreman and the role of

king require that one rule over other people, and whether that rule is exercised in

a household or a greater community, it involves the same skills. The position that

slaves do not differ in kind from free men because they are capable of acquiring

the same virtues is thus connected to the claim that ruling in any context is the

same.16 If everyone?free man, slave, and woman?is capable of the same virtue,

then anyone can (in principle) become a ruler, and anyone can be ruled. So the

issue of virtue and its sameness underlies the claim that ruling is the same in any

context .

The sameness of virtue is also asserted by Plato. In a passage in the Meno

(71a-73d) he establishes that men and women have the same virtues, although

exercised in different realms: rc?vTec ap' avOpcorcoi T(p ai>T(p Tp?rccp ayaOo? eiaiv

( For all people are good in the sam e way, 73cl-2).17 Th is passage is pertine nt to

the discussion of the virtue of slaves, although slaves are not mentioned, because

the point of the passage is that all activities of directing or managing require the

same virtues, whatever the scale of the task. And, of course, later in the dialogue

Socrates takes on the instruction of a slave boy, part of the point must be that

anyone can learn. Just as Socrates argues in the Oeconomicus that a slave who

can be taught to run a household could equally well be taught to be a king, so

here Socrates argues implicitly that a woman who can manage a household could

equally well manage a city (73a6-9):

xi ??: o?k ?v?po? ?i?v ?perriv eXsyec, n?Xiv e? ?ioikew, yuvaiK?? ?? o?K?av; ?yoye. ?peiv yv?\i\[ to?? ?T?pou? t?v ?T?pcov (aI agree, Socrates, that men differ very much

from each other in intelligence [yvo?urt] when it comes to the skills of governing that are common to

a l l sk i l led activ ities, to farm ing, po l it ic s, estate m anagem ent, and warfare, tr . Pomeroy 1994: ad 21.2 ) .

17 Translations of Plato's texts are from Cooper 1997.

18 The arguments Socrates uses to establish this claim are not convincing. At 72d-73a he argues

that if the virtue in men and the virtue in women are both really virtue, then the virtue of women

and men must be the same; but this does not follow unless we suppose that virtue is indivisible,



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PHOENIX

This passage makes clear the connection between sameness of virtue and the

capacity to rule; if one is acting with temperance and justice, then whether one is

ruling a household or a city, the good rule one practices will be the same.

This connection is made even more explicidy in the Platonic dialogue, Lovers

138c, where Socrates asserts:

ectxiv apa xaux?v, cb? ?oike, ?aai>.??c, x?pavvo^ tcoXixiko?, o?kov?uoc^ oeott?xtî

ac?(()po)v, ??Kaio? Kai [l?a xe/vrj ?ax?v ?aaiîKii, xupavviKtj, tioîxiktj, ??a7roxiKT|,

oikovouiktj, 8iKaioauvr|, acopoa?vr|.

"So they are all the same, it seems: king, tyrant, politician, head of the household, master

of slaves, the temperate person, and the just person. And they are all one art: kingly,

tyrannical, political, household management, justice, and temp?rance/'

Moreover, in the Statesman at 259b-c, the Visitor asks, x? S?; \izyaXy\q crxrjua

oiicr|ae(?? f\ ajaiicpa? au n?Xe&q oyKO? ?icov xi npoq ?pxtjv Sioiaexov ("Well

then, surely there won t be any difference, so far as ruling is concerned, between

the character of a large household, on the one hand, and the bulk of a small

city on the other?") and, when Socrates agrees that there will be no difference,

continues, o?kouv ... (|)avep?v ob? ?7iiaxrj|ar| |u?a rcepi ticxvx' ?axi xauxa. xa?xrjv

Se 8?X6 ?aaiîKT|v e?xe 7toA,ixikt|v e?xe o?kovoîktjv xi? ?vo|aa?ei, |^r|8?v a?x$

5ia(|)8pcc)>xe9a ("So ... it's clear that there is one sort of expert knowledge

concerned with all these things; whether someone gives this the name of expertise

in kingship, or statesmanship, or household management, let's not pick any

quarrel with him"). These passages indicate something more than we found in the

passages of Xenophon: namely, that the virtue necessary for ruling is identified

with an art or a kind of expert knowledge. This is a claim that Aristode rejects

in saying that, while of course the ruler might have a science, it is not because he

has the science but because of the kind of person he is that he rules. Aristode is

separating the science from the virtue of the ruler, which Plato will not do.19

which is just the point in question. Similarly, at 73b~c Socrates begs the question by arguing that

men and women have the same virtue since men and women both become good by coming to possess

temperance and justice; but he has not established that temperance and justice are the same in men

and women?on the contrary, that is what he needs to show. But as the Laches passage (191c-e)

I quote below (59) shows, Plato represents Socrates as taking it to be a fundamental assumption

of the discussion of any virtue that it should be one, because if it is not, then it is not a single

v irtue .

19 This should not surprise us. Outside the discussion of political and household rule, Plato argues

that virtue is just a kind of knowledge, while Aristode argues that virtue is something in addition to a

kind of knowledge?a certain training of one's desires. See the Protagoras, especially 329b-333b and

357a-c, and the Nicomachean Ethics at 1144bl7-21. The views of both Plato and Aristode are most

obvious perhaps in the discussions of weakness of will and the Socratic contention that what we call

weakness of will is just ignorance (at 357e). Aristode responds that weakness of will is indeed a kind

of ignorance, but challenges the understanding of ignorance in question. That challenge rests on the

possibility that we can indeed know what the best thing to do is and yet fail to do it because we lack

the desire to do it. See Eth. Nie. 7.3 1147all-24.



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Moreover, in those dialogues that take the definition of a particular virtue as

their focus, Socrates takes pains to insist on the importance of a definition that

will recognize the identity of the virtue across varied circumstances and persons.

So, for example, in the Laches (191c-e), he says:

?ouAxSuEvoc yap aoo rcuOeaOai utj u?vov to?? ?v T

o?ouc, ?XX? Kai rcpo? S7ii9uuia? r\ Tj?ov??

?eivoi uaxeaGai, Ka? uevovte? Kai ?vaaTp?(()ovT???slai y?p rco? tive?, ? Aaxn?, Kai

?V TOI? TOIOUTOI? ?v?pElOl.

I wanted to learn from you not only what constitutes courage for a hoplite but for a

horseman as well and for every sort of warrior. And I wanted to include not only those who

are courageous in warfare but also those who are brave in dangers at sea, and the ones who

show courage in illness and poverty and affairs of state; and then again I wanted to include

not only those who are brave in the face of pain and fear but also those who are clever at

fighting desire and pleasure, whether by standing their ground or running away?because

there are some men, aren't there, Laches, who are brave in matters like these?20

Aristotle objects then to two of the claims made in the discussions in the

Memotabilia, Oeconomicus, Meno, and Laches (among other Socratic dialogues):

that directing, or managing, or ruling is always the same activity, and that virtue is

the same in different kinds of people. Looking at those discussions we can see the

connection between the two claims, which in turn allows us to see why Aristotle

believes that in arguing in Politics 1.13 that virtue is different in kind in different

kinds of people he is supporting the claim that ruling is different in different

contexts. In arguing that the virtues of slaves and women are different from those

of free men and from one another, and yet are human virtues nonetheless, Aristotle

is arguing, against Xenophon, Plato, and Socrates, that there are different kinds

of people and hence different kinds of rule. Ultimately, he wants to show that,

because the different kinds of rule are determined by natural differences in people,

what it is to rule well cannot simply be a question of science.

IV. THE TWO QUESTIONS OF BOOK 1

I have suggested that the examination of the household and its relations

in Politics 1 is intended precisely to demonstrate that there are different kinds

of natural subject and hence different kinds of rule. Moreover, the argument

of Book 1, on this understanding, is more closely connected to the discussion

of the constitution than many commentators seem to suppose: that there are

20 The list of circumstances in this passage seems broad enough to include the possibility that

women, children, and slaves might display courage. Notice, however, that later in the dialogue Nicias

seems to suggest that when anyone other than a free man (anyone who does not have understanding)

acts in a way that seems courageous, we have to attribute it to "rashness" (197a-b).



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60 PHOENIX

different kinds of people, and that these differences are natural, is fundamental

to Aristode's argument that there is more than one "correct" kind of constitution.

This is not to say that every natural relation of rule can be manifested in some

correct constitution (despotic rule, while natural to masters and slaves, is not

a correct form of constitution), but only that every correct constitution will be

mirrored by some household relation.

This overview of the structure and the aim of Book 1 is confirmed by Aristode's

discussion of two questions, introduced in 1.3 and referred to at various points

in Book 1 when Aristode summarizes his argument. The two questions concern

slaves and masters, and are, more generally, questions about all relationships

between rulers and ruled. The first is whether ruling is simply a science; the

second is whether slavery is natural and just. In introducing these controversies

in 1.3 Aristode clearly believes that they are connected?indeed, he seems to

treat them as a single controversy, but the connection between them is not made

explicit in 1.3. In what follows I shall examine Aristode's attempts to resolve

each of these questions and consider the connection between them. It appears to

me that the connection is this: to show that ruling well is not simply a science,

Aristode needs to show that it involves virtues other than theoretical virtues, and

to demonstrate the importance of the practical intellectual virtues to good rule, he

needs to show that there are significant differences in the soul faculties of different

kinds of people. My aim in discussing these questions and Aristode's answers to

them is to elaborate the claim that the primary project of Politics 1 is to show that

there are different kinds of rule, that ruling well is not simply a science, and that

the argument of 1.13 has to be understood as contributing to the support ofthat

cla im .

Consider Aristode's presentation of th? first of these controversies. He says

at 1253b 18-20 that some believe (a) that the rule of a master is a science and

(as a corollary) (b) that the management of a household and the mastership of

slaves and the political and royal rule are all the same. He seems to suggest that

(a) entails (b); if the rule of a master is a science, then to exercise that science

will be the same in any context, whatever the nature of the subjects to be ruled.

I want to suggest that the subsequent discussion in Book 1, the discussion of

the master/slave relation and the other household relationships is intended by

Aristode to show that while the rule of the master does require the science of rule,

more importandy the rule of a master requires a certain character. Hence, at 1.7

1255b20-35, reiterating the point, he says:

? n?v oSv Searcoxri? ou Aiyexai Kax' ?maxr|fir|v, ???? xq> xoi?aSe eiva?, ?uo?coc 8? Kai

? 8ouXo? Kai ? ???00epo? ?maxrmri 8' ?v eirj Ka? 8ea7toxiK?| Ka\ Sod?iki] ... ?axi 8'

auxT| r\ ?7uaxrmr| o?8?v u?ya exouaa o?>8e aeuv?v. a y?p x?v 80GA.OV erciaxaaGai Sei

Ttoie?v, 8K8?VOV 8e? xaGxa erciaxaaOai 87ux?xxeiv.

The master is not called a master because he has science, but because he is a certain kind

of person, and the same remark applies to the slave and the freeman. Still there may be



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a science for the master and a science for the slave_ Yet this science is not anything

great or wonderful; for the master need only know how to order that which the slave must

know how to execute (tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

The point again is that to be a master it is not sufficient to have the science

necessary for being a master.21

What, then, is the something more than science? Or, what kind of person must

the master be? Aristotle's point is that science as a theoretical intellectual virtue is

importantly different from phtonesis as a pract ica l intel lectual virtue that informs

moral character. I have cited above (54) the passage at Politics 3.4 1277a25-29

that makes clear that in Aristotle's view the ruler differs from the subject insofar

as he has phtonesis. We should notice also the passage at 1260al4-20:

?uo?coc to?vuv ?vaymito? E^eiv Kai TtEpi Ta? rjGiK?? ?pET?i? ?rcoXnTiTEov, ?eiv uev

UETExeiv 7tavTa?, aXX o? t?v a?T?v Tp?rcov, aXX ?aov ?Kav?v EKaaTip Ttp?? t? a?ToG

EpyOV. ?I? T?V UEV apXOVTa TE?iaV E^EIV ?E? TT|V T|6lKT|V ?p?TT|V ..., TCOV ?' &XX(?V

EKaCFTOV ?GOV ETtl?aXXEl a?TOl?.

So it must necessarily be supposed to be with the virtues of character also; all should

partake of them , but not in the sam e way, but only as mu ch as i s required by each for the

fulfillment of his function. Hence the ruler ought to have complete virtue of character ...

the sub jects , on the other hand, require only that m easure of virtue which is proper to each

of them (tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

Moreover, in the discussion of the virtues of the good citizen and of the good

person, at 3.4 1277al4-16, Aristotle insists that the good ruler will always be a

good m an, because he i s (| >p?viuov.22

Although saying that natural rulers must have phtonesis while natural subjects

cannot will allow Aristotle to argue that ruling well includes something other

than science, and will allow him to distinguish the natural ruler from the natural

subject (I will have more to say about this later), it seems to run counter to the

claim that the rule of the master, of the father, and of the head of a polis are

21 Newman (1887: 133-135) sees the extremes here as, on the one hand, the view of Socrates (as

attributed to him b y Xenop hon in th e Oeconom icus and Plato in the Statesman ) that rul ing i s a sc ience , .

i dent i fying the ru l e of the m as t er wi th hous eho ld m anagement and po l it i c al and k ingly ru l e , and, on

the other, the view that the distinction between master and slave rests only on convention, not on

nature, and is therefore based on compulsion and consequendy unjust (it is less clear to whom to

attribute this view). The contrast, then, is between a view of ruling as a science, where the possession

of the sc ience legitimizes the rule, and a v iew of ru l ing as an unjust practice without justif ication by

intellectual skill. We might also see here Aristode entering a contemporary debate about the role of

theory in political life. Plato is a proponent of the view that rule is a science?that to rule well is to

have a scientific understanding of the principles of rule (see, e.g., Rep. 443e). Isocrates, by contrast,

denies that i t i s poss ible to have a sc ience w hich al lows one to determ ine wh at one ought to do (Antid.

271). I am grateful to Denis Vlahovic for pointing out this second contrast of views to me.

22 The passage in 1.3 setting out the question speaks of r\ ?eojioxeia, whereas in 1.13 Aristode

contrasts the virtues of t?v dpxovxa with those of slaves and women. Similarly, at 3.4 Aristode is

speaking of t?v ?pxovta. Because of the contrast with slaves and women in 1.13,1 take it that we

can extend the point to interpret the sense of the passage in 1.3.



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PHOENIX

different in kind. That is, if every kind of rule depends on the possession of

phtones i s by the ruler , then it might seem to fo l low that someone w ho has phtones i s

could rule a household, a slave, or a polis. So how does Aristotle argue that these

kinds of rule are different? My suggestion is that the discussion of 3-13 (and

particularly of 12-13) is intended to demonstrate the differences among natural

subjects. Because the nature of the subjects of a household and a state is different,

and because rule is a relation between ruler and subject, the rule of these different

kinds of subject wil l be different.23

So there are two issues at stake in the controversy about rule as a science: the

first is the issue of difference between rulers and subjects, and Aristotle's claim

is that that difference is fundamentally a difference in the capacity or incapacity

for phtonesis (more on this below); the second is the issue of differences among

subjects, which Aristotle argues is a question of the differences of incapacity

for phtonesis. It is this set of differences?the differences in incapacity of the

deliberative faculty in natural subjects?that determines that kinds of rule are

naturally different even though the ruler is the same. Aristotle uses these two

discussions of difference (between ruler and subject, and among subjects) to argue

that there are naturally different kinds of persons, and hence that the possession

of science is insufficient for being a good ruler because it fails to include the

23 One m ight suppose that Aristode is arguing for the c la im that kinds of rule are different in this

way: since phronesis requires experience, and the experience of ruling a household is different from

the experience of ruling a city, the phronesis acquired in each context is different. But this cannot

be Aristode's point. First, because there is textual evidence against it: at Eth. Nie. 6.8 1141b23-24

Aristode says that the political art is the same hexis as phronesis, although they are not the same in being

(t? uivToi e?vcu o? to:?t?v). If phronesis and the political art are the same, then they cannot require

different kinds of experience, and this makes it unlikely that the political art and the art of household

rule require different experience. Moreover, if phronesis, excellence in household management, and

excellence in rule are all the same virtuous state, the virtuous states of women, children, and slaves

m ust be d iffer ent hexe i s from the hex i s of fr ee m en ( and no t ju st the s ame hex i s d iffer endy d i spo sed ).

This is because the virtue of women, children, and slaves, unlike the virtue of free men, is not to

function as a ruler of any kind, but to function in some kind of role of obedience. This is a difference

that Aristode does not treat as circumstantial, because were he so to treat it, it would amount to a

difference in degree of virtue?a difference which would suggest then that women, children, slaves,

and free men could, in principle, exchange places. That is, in saying that the difference in virtues

among different kinds of people is not a difference in degree but in kind, Aristode is saying that the

virtues of different kinds of people cannot be the same hexis differendy disposed, or the same hexis

but less so (what could this mean?), but must be different hexeis. Second, Aristode cannot argue that

the experience necessary to develop phronesis is different from the experience necessary to develop

oikonomike or politike, because to do so would beg the question: Aristode's opponent need only deny

that the exper ience of ruling a c ity is s ignificandy different from the exper ience of ruling a househo ld .

Aristode 's interest in deny ing that rule i s s imp ly a quest ion of th e possess ion of a certain sc ience i s not

then a concern about the varieties of experience. So Aristode's point in arguing that rule is not simply

a science, and that the rule of household and that of a city is different, is not that there are different

kinds of phronesis and accordingly different kinds of ruler?but rather that there are different kinds of

subject .



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practical and moral aspects of character which distinguish the ruler from the

subject. Ultimately the theme of Book 1?that there are different kinds of rule in

nature?is important to the discussion of different constitutions in two ways: first,

the discussion of slavery and in particular the contrast between the rule of a master

and the rule of a king allows Aristotle to introduce the primary division between

correct and incorrect constitutions, according to whether they are organized for

the benefit of the ruler or the ruled; and second, the discussion of the differences

between slaves, women, and children, intrinsically and in their different relations

to the head of the household, allows Aristotle to introduce the distinction within

the class of correct constitutions between monarchy and polity.

I turn now to the second controversy Aristotle sets out in 1.3. This concerns

the naturalness and justice of slavery. At 1253b20-23 he notes that there are

those who affirm that the rule of master over slaves is contrary to nature, and

that the distinction between slave and freemen exists by convention only and

is therefore unjust.24 This second controversy is connected to the first, the

controversy concerning whether science is sufficient for ruling well, and the

connection explains Aristotle's interest in Book 1 in establishing the naturalness

and justice of slavery. If there are natural slaves (people who, by nature, are such

that they should be ruled by others), then slavery is natural and just, which is to

say that the rule of master over slaves is a natural kind of rule. The naturalness

of slavery is a function of differences in intellectual and moral virtues. It is

because the natural ruler has (or can acquire) certain virtues that he is able to rule

legitimately over the natural slave. So the controversy about slavery connects to

the question whether science is sufficient for ruling well, because establishing that

there are natural slaves is a matter of demonstrating that people who lack certain

psychic faculties and their virtues are incapable of rule, and thus that ruling well

requires a certain moral and practical intellectual authority, and not just a certain

science.25

From the passage at 1.7 1255bl6-22 we can see that Aristotle connects the

project of showing that ruling is not so much a question of science as it is a

question of moral character, of being a certain kind of person, with the project of

showing that ruling over equals (constitutional rule) is different from ruling over

slaves (despotic rule):

24 Aristode appears to be arguing against the position that slavery as such is unjust. Who held

this position? While there were those who thought that slavery was "undesirable socially" (because it

deprived free men of labour), and those who thought that certain forms of slavery were unjust, we

have evidence of only three people who might have argued that slavery in any form is unjust: (1)

Alcidemus, who is reported to have said that nature made no one a slave; (2) Onesicritus the Cynic;

and (3) Philemon, who also said that no one becomes a slave by nature. These fragments may explain

why Aristode poses the question in terms of nature. See Schlaifer 1960:127-129.

25 Aristode is not of course content to rest his argument on a difference between those who are

naturally free and those who are natural slaves, and insists that there are least two other "kinds" of

people?women and children?different from free men, slaves, and one another.



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PHOENIX

(|>av?p?v ?? Kai ek to?tcov ?ti o? Ta?TOv ?cru ?EarcoTE?a Kai 7toA.iTiKr|, o??? rcaaai

?XXr\Xai


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are different from adult free men, but also from women and slaves, in order to

demonstrate the legitimacy (byway of the naturalness) of constitutional rule and

monarchy. I will elaborate these claims in section v below.

If this is right, then it is not so much the naturalness of the state or of the

household that Aristotle is interested in establishing in Politics 1; it is rather that

there are different kinds of people and hence different kinds of rule, and no science

of ruling the acquisition of which is sufficient to make one an excellent ruler. The

question of virtue arises in this context: if there were a science of ruling, and if

everyone were the same, then virtue would also be the same for everyone. If there

are different kinds of people, then there must be different virtues attributable to

those kinds. This suggests one of the many connections Aristotle draws between

moral theory and political theory: both are concerned with inculcating the virtues.

The aim of the household, like the aim of the polis, is to instill virtues in those

under its rule. But the household has the particular task of instilling virtue in

non-citizens (slaves and women as well as children) and hence of understanding

the differences among different kinds of non-citizens.28

v CONCLUSION

I have been arguing that Aristotle argues in Book 1 of the Politics that there

are different kinds of people and different kinds of rule. What it is, then, to be

a master is not (merely) to have a certain science but to be the kind of person,

morally and intellectually, who can legitimately rule over others. I want now to say

something about the relation between that conclusion and the claims about nature

in 1.1-2. Those connections emerge most clearly, I think, when we consider the

claims about natural relations of rule in the family together with the distinctions

Aristotle draws in Book 3 between natural or correct constitutions, and unnatural

const itut ions .

The argument in Politics 1.1-2 depends on the claim that the dominance of

the head of household over women and slaves is natural. The naturalness of this

dominance is crucial in maintaining the naturalness of the state. Aristode says

(1252al8-bl):

coarcep y?p ?v xo?? aAAoic x? ct?vOexov \i?%pi T?v ?apvG?xiov ?vayKr| ?iaipE?v (xauxa

y?p ?Xaxiaxa ?l?pia xou rcavxo?), ouxco ko? 7toA.iv ??


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66 PHOENIX

?pxov ?? ?a?i u?v o?v

?KopiciTai to 9r?A,u Kai to ?oGXov.

For just as in other cases it is necessary to divide the compound into its uncompounded

[parts] (for these are the least parts of the whole), so too we must look at the city,

considering [the elements] of which it is composed, and especially these things, namely

how they differ from one another and if it is possible to grasp in some technical way each

of them. If someone considers things as they grow and from their origin, just as in other

cases, so in these cases he will get the best view of them. In the first place there must be a

union of those who cannot exist without each other, namely, of male and female, for the

sake of procreation (and this is a union which is formed, not of choice, but because, in

common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind

them another like themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, because of preservation.

For that which is capable of foreseeing by intellect is by nature lord and by nature master,

and that which is capable of working with its body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence

master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished between the female

and the slave (tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

He goes on to describe the formation of families, then villages, and ultimately

states from the combination of villages. He concludes (1252b30~1253al):

?i? Ttaoa n?Xiq ?a?i ecftiv, EUtEp Kai ai Tipokai Koivcov?ai. x?Xoq y?p ainn eke?vcov,

r\ ?? ?c?i? T??,o? ectt?v. o?ov y?p EKaaTOV eoti ttj? yeveci?co? T?A.?a6??ar|?, Ta?Tnv

afx?v TTjv (|)?aiv E?vai ?maTou, coaTiEp ?vGpamou ?tcttou oiK?a?.

Therefore, all cities are natural, if indeed the first forms of association are [natural], for it

is the end of them, and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully

developed we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a person, a horse, or a household

(tr. Jowett 1885 [modified]).

So the naturalness of the state is indicated by the naturalness of the most

primitive social relations, which Aristotle identifies as the relation between men

and women and that between natural subjects and natural rulers (i.e., masters and

slaves). Establishing the nature of the state by examining its elements is, as the

first lines of the first passage cited above make clear, intended to show us how

the different kinds of rule differ from one another. My claim is not that the

naturalness of household relations causes the naturalness of the polis (if anything

the causal relations work in the other direction, since the city, as the end of

the households, causes them to be natural social entities). It is, rather, that the

claim that the naturalness of household relations (which, Aristode presumes, are

relatively easy for us to observe) is evidence of the naturalness of xht polis. That is,

relations of rule in the polis are not modeled on relations of rule in the household,

but we can know by considering the structure of relations of rule in the household

something about the structure of relations of rule in the city. Aristotle claims,

then, that the state and its elements are natural in order to show that different

kinds of people, with different kinds of virtue, occur naturally, in order to show



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that there are different kinds of rule. The problem lies in the initial claims that

there are certain natural wholes.

In Politics 3 Aristode argues for the correctness or naturalness of certain kinds

of constitutions, based on their resemblance to certain household relations, where

the resemblance lies both in the character of the ruler and of the ruled, and in the

relation that obtains between them. The sign of a correct constitution is that it

involves rule for the common benefit (3.7 1279a25-29). This claim refers back to

the discussion in 3.6 of two issues: (1) what is a city for? and (2) how many kinds

of rule are there? In answering the second question, Aristotle mentions again the

household relations he has detailed in Book 1, and then adds, as an answer to the

first question (1278b37-1279a2):

r| Se xEKVtov ?pXT? Kai yovaiK?? Kai xrj? oiKia? 7iaar|?, r?v ?tj raA.o6|XEV oikovouikt|v,

rjxoi x?v ?pxou?vcov x?piv ?axiv r\ koivou xivo? ?uo?v, raG' aux? fi?v xcov ?pxou?vcov

..., rax? aou?E?rjK?c ?? rav a?xcov ei?v.

But rule over children, wife, and the household generally, which we call household

management, is either for the sake of the ruled or for the sake of something common to

both. Essentially, it is for the sake of the ruled ... but coincidentally it might be for the

sake of the rulers as well (tr. Reeve 1998).

So the claim that constitutions in which rule is for the common benefit

are correct is based on the naturalness of household relations (other than the

master/slave relation) in which the rule of children and women is for the common

benefit. The arguments for monarchy and aristocracy are thus based on the

naturalness of the relation between father and children in the household; the

argument against despotism (except in the case where an entire citizen body is

constituted by natural slaves) depends on the injustice of slavery (except when

the slaves are natural). The argument for constitutional rule depends not just on

showing that there are people who are equal, but that there is some household

(and hence natural) relation where ruler and ruled are equal. And that, I want to

suggest, is why Aristode claims that the relation between husband and wife is one

of constitutional rule, although constitutional rule in which ruler and ruled do not

exchange places. If the rule of husband over wife is a natural relation of rule, then,

just so long as there are kinds of people who are naturally equals, there is some

relation of rule between them that is natural. So it is important to the argument

of the rest of the Politics that Aristode should establish the distinctions he does in

Politics 1 among natural subjects, and among the relations these different natural

subjects bear to the natural ruler. My point, again, is not that Aristode takes

household relations to be primary in a causal sense, but rather that he takes them

to be readily observable, more so than the relations of rule within an individual

soul or the relations of rule in a city, and hence prim ary to the inquiry.29

29 An interesting question is just how Aristode conceived the connections among the different

levels of rule (in the individual soul, the household, and the city). Moraux (1957: 32) clearly takes

the political level to be primary, treating justice within the household as derived from political justice,



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PHOENIX

The discussion of the naturalness of the relations of the household and

consequent naturalness of the polis in 1.2 is then in preparation for the distinction

between natural and unnatural constitutions in Politics 3. More particularly

the distinctions established in 1.3-13 among slaves, women, and children and

the relations of subjection in which they participate are intended to justify

the distinctions among natural constitutions, as drawn by Aristotle. But the

naturalness of conventional household relations was assumed by Aristode, not

demonstrated. That assumption is then used to demonstrate that there are

different kinds of people, and hence different kinds of rule, and that to be a

master is more than a matter of science. That conclusion, and the elaboration of

the natural relations among different kinds of people, is then used to support the

distinctions among constitutions.

Department of Philosophy

McGill University

855 Sherbrooke Street West

Montreal, Quebec

H3A 2T7 [email protected]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AubonnetJ. 1968. Aristote, Politique. Paris.

Bonnette, A. L. tr. 1994. Xenophon, Memorabilia. Ithaca.

BurnetJ. ed. 1903[1968]. Platonis opera. Oxford.

Bywater, I. ed. 1894[1962]. Aristotelis ethica Nicomachea. Oxford.

Cooper, J. M. ed. 1997. Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis.

Jowett, B. ed. 1885. The Politics of Aristotle 1. Oxford.

Kahn, C. H. 1990. "Comments on M. Schoneld," in Patzig 1990: 28-31.

Kelsen, H. 1977. "Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian Policy," in J. Barnes et al. (eds.),

Articles onAtistotle 2. London. 170-194.

Marchant, E. C. ed. 1921[1971]. Xenophontis opera omnia2. Oxford.

Miller, F. D. Jr. 1995. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle s Politics. Oxford.

and households to manifest political constitutions. This certainly makes sense in the context of the

ideological claims Aristode makes in Politics 1.1-2 with respect to the city and smaller social units:

that they are for the sake of the city. The question also arises about the kinds of rule possible at

any level (i.e., within the household, within the polis, etc.). Is there some focal form of rule, with

reference to which all the others are kinds of rule? That is, is there a primary and are there then

derivative kinds of rule? (For Aristode's account of the np?q ?v, see Metaph. 7.4 1030a31-b3.) I think

it l ikely that there is a rcp?? ev relation among the different kinds of rule, judging at least by indirect

evidence. Moraux (1957: 37, n. 47), who argues that the theme of different forms of friendship and

different forms of justice is found consistendy with the theme of different forms of rule, points out

that the d ifferent form s of friendship are certa inly ne ither univoca l nor equivoca l uses of friendship ,

but rather are rcp?? ev uses (with friendship of virtue as that form to which the others refer). We can

speculate that, in a similar way, Aristode supposes the different kinds of rule are used Ttp?? ?v, with

monarchy perhaps as the focal meaning of rule, because, in an ideal state, it is the best.



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