Robert R. Wadholm

W.V. Quine’s “On What There Is”…Knock, Knock?Robert R. Wadholm, Missouri UniversityAugust 30, 2012

The ontological problem, according to W.V. Quine, is simply contained in the question

“What is there?” Quine posits that the answer is “Everything”, and further, that “everyone will

accept this answer as true.” Thus begins a lengthy exposition about how the ontological problem

has been framed and answered historically, with particular focus (strangely, to me) on what is

not (nonbeing). What may and what may not be counted in our answer “Everything”, and how

may we judge our dialogue about existence and nonexistence (and through what conceptual

schema)? In Quine’s words, “…there is what there is. There remains room for disagreement over

cases….” Simple question, simple answer, just disagreement over cases and methodologies.

Here I will argue that Quine’s framing of ontology glosses over the complexity of the

fundamental first (or at least earlier) question(s) of ontology, and provides an answer that is at

first blush self-evident, but upon further investigation may be lacking in universal acceptance. I

hope that this attempt is not merely argument or squabble over words just for the sake of

argument (or a letter grade), but is a simplification of what for me is meaningful about the quest

for existence. How we frame the quest, and the basic building blocks of that quest need attention.

While for Quine this discussion is a mere appetizer to the meat of an argument about Plato’s

unkempt beard (the problem of nonbeing), I find it hard to get past the question and answer:

The Question: “What is there?”

The Answer: “Everything.”

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Robert R. Wadholm

I’m interested first in the composition of the question. Forgive me if I take the words out

of order as I explicate – it seems somehow easier for me to understand.

If Quine means by there “What is there?”, rather than “here”, his question doesn’t

include the existence of the perceiver/questioner, perhaps creating a subject/object duality in

ontology (a problem, since then “Everything” would not seem to include the questioner, who is

“here”). Given his answer, I doubt that he means “there” in that way. If Quine is using “there” as

in the title of the piece (On What There Is), as merely the beginning of a clause (as in “There is

what?”), then we must look at his usage of the word “is”, because that is where the meaning in

the question seems to lie (and we could perhaps dispose of the word “there” as an extra syllable).

Use of “is” rather than “are” seems to assume that reality is singular rather than plural,

and thus that we should speak of it that way. If we were to assume that reality is plural (realities

instead of reality, or things instead of a thing), we could ask “There are what (realities/things)?”

rather than “There is what (reality/thing)?” Better yet, could we not ask “What are/is there?” to

be fair? We could further simplify, since “there” seems to be used superfluously as the mere

beginning of a clause, and ask “What is/are?” or even “What exist(s)?”

What could perhaps be substituted for another question word with equal substantiveness.

We could ask “Why exist(s)?” or “When exist(s)?” or “How exist(s)?” or “Where exist(s)?” But

these questions do not seem to be as central to the problem of ontology (and “Why” is more

teleological than ontological). But what about “Who exist(s)?” This is a question that is very

central to ontology. Some philosophers have said that it is the only important question, and the

only way to truly get at “what” exist(s). For myself, it is the starting point of ontology (and a

basis for epistemology), and perhaps a bigger “problem of ontology” than “What is there?”

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Robert R. Wadholm

Here we see that the simple question of ontology as Quine has framed it is not simple,

and is not universally agreed upon. If we cannot see eye to eye on the question, we may not be

able to agree upon an answer (if there is one).

Further, the problematic question “What is there?” is a question about existence. If we

hold a question about existence as the container of the ontological problem (or problem of

ontology, or problem of the study/knowledge of being/existence(s)), we seem to assume that the

problem of ontology would not exist if there where no one around to question existence. Is the

problem that something exists that asks “What exist(s)?” Or is the problem ontology itself (i.e.,

that we ask, or study, or presume to know anything about “What exists?”)? Is the problem the

questioner, the question, or the act of questioning “What exist(s)?” It seems from a simple

reading, Quine means the question itself, as he points to the problem as being identified/identical

with “What is there?” In this case, where/whom did the question come from, and upon what is it

based/constructed? Also, is the question of the existence of the question of existence (i.e., the

existence of the question “What exist(s)?”) under the purview of ontology? From Quine’s

answer, we can assume that it is. That doesn’t sound simple to me.

Leaving the seething complexity of the question itself, what can be said of Quine’s

universally acknowledged answer “Everything”? Is there no one who has ever answered

“Nothing” (whether they were wrong or right or whether we can even judge their wrongness or

rightness)? Is there no one who has ever answered “Someone” (as in “There is no everything,

only a person or persons”)? Is there no one who has ever answered “Everything other than

nothing” or “Everything other than nonexistent things” (as he later discusses). Is there no one

who has ever answered “Some one thing” (perhaps in contrast to Everything). Or has no one ever

turned the question into the answer (“What is there?” “What there is.” “What exist(s)?” “What

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Robert R. Wadholm

exist(s).”) as Quine himself does later in the same paragraph? Is “What there is” identical with

“Everything” in every way?

This brings us, I think, to some of the complexity of ontology: questioning existence,

question(s) about existence, and questioner(s) of existence. Does questioning existence

(ontology) exist? Of what does questioning existence exist? Does at least one question of

existence exist? Of what does the question of existence exist? Does at least one questioner of

existence exist? Of what does the one questioner of existence exist? Of what (or whom) are we

questioning, and how? For me it doesn’t seem to be a simple three syllable question or one word

self-evident answer. The questions of ontology remaining to be answered satisfactorily are more

complex than “What is nonbeing?” (as important and worthwhile as that is). And perhaps the

fundamental question is not as simple as “What is there?” …and maybe the answer could be a

personal question turned into an answer: “Who’s there.” This makes knock knock jokes central

to the complexity of the ontological problem.

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