working 05-3 paper - ploughshares.caploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/WP5.3.pdf · The co-sponsoring organizations are grateful for the financial support provided for this

workingppaappeerrBridging the Divide:Addressing Key Challenges to the NPTPrepared by Bill Robinson on behalf ofThe Canadian Pugwash Group, Physicians for Global Survival, Project Ploughshares, Lawyers for Social Responsibility, and the Middle Powers Initiative

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About this Paper This paper is the report of a roundtable event held on February 21st in Ottawa with government officials and non-governmental experts. The co-sponsoring organizations are grateful for the financial support provided for this paper and the accompanying roundtable by the John Holmes Fund of Foreign Affairs Canada. About the Author Bill Robinson, freelance writer and editor, acted as rapporteur for the roundtable and compiled the report of its proceedings. The Canadian Pugwash Group The Canadian Pugwash Group represents the interests of the international Pugwash movement in Canada through which scientists and policy specialists work to mobilize national governments and the international scientific community to meet the threats posed by nuclear weapons. The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, together with its then President, Sir Joseph Rotblat, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995. Contact: Adele Buckley, Chair, [email protected] [email protected] www.pugwashgroup.ca Physicians for Global Survival Physicians for Global Survival (PGS) is a registered Canadian charity led by physicians, and supported by physicians and non-physicians. It is the Canadian affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW). Concerned for global health, PGS is committed to the abolition of nuclear weapons, the prevention of war, the promotion of nonviolent means of conflict resolution, and social justice in a sustainable world. National Office: 208-145 Spruce St., Ottawa, ON K1R 6P1 tel: 613-233-1982 [email protected] www.pgs.ca Lawyers for Social Responsibility Lawyers for Social Responsibility (LSR) is a national, non-profit corporation, with no political affiliations, composed of legal professionals who seek to use law and legal tools to resolve conflicts and eliminate nuclear weapons. Contact: Bev Delong, President tel: 403-282-8260 [email protected] www.peacelawyers.ca Middle Powers Initiative Through the Middle Powers Initiative, eight international non-governmental organizations work primarily with "middle power" governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Contact: The Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., Chairman, tel: 780-466-8072 cell: 780-984-8292 [email protected] www.middlepowers.org Project Ploughshares Project Ploughshares is an ecumenical agency of the Canadian Council of Churches with a mandate to carry out research, analysis, dialogue, and public education on peace and security issues in Canada and the world. It is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo. National Office: 57 Erb St. W., Waterloo, ON N2L 6C2 tel: 519-888-6541 [email protected] www.ploughshares.ca First published April 2005 ISSN 1188-6811 ISBN 1-895722-45-4

ABSTRACT

The persistent and serious erosion of confidence in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) means that the Treaty is in crisis and that the 2005 Treaty Review Conference must begin to rebuild commitment to the Treaty and its full implementation. The sources of the crisis are multiple. Many of the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) parties to the Treaty charge that the nuclear disarmament process is stalled and that the United States and the other nuclear weapon states (NWS) do not take their nuclear disarmament obligations under Article VI seriously. At the same time, recent established and alleged violations of the Treaty by NNWS, notably North Korea, Libya, and Iran, call into question the Treaty’s non-proliferation effectiveness. The de facto acceptance of the nuclear status of the non-signatory states of India, Israel, and Pakistan further undermines non-proliferation efforts. In addition the Treaty lacks the institutional infrastructure needed for effective decision-making and compliance monitoring. The Government of Canada is challenged to become part of a “bridging” strategy at the Review Conference by working with like-minded NATO and New Agenda Coalition states to pursue the kind of balanced attention to both disarmament and non-proliferation that recognizes the foundational bargain of the NPT, and through such an approach to build a bridge between the NWS and the NNWS. A balanced approach to disarmament and non-proliferation must include increased attention to Treaty verification measures, drawing on inspection expertise gained through the UN operations in Iraq, and strengthened safeguards administered by the IAEA. At the same time, heightened attention to disarmament should include renewed efforts to redefine NATO’s strategic doctrine to end its reliance on nuclear weapons and to end the nuclear-sharing arrangements with some NATO NNWS members of the NPT. All states parties to the Treaty would benefit from an improved institutional framework, including a small secretariat, a timely decision-making mechanism, improved transparency through reporting, and more formalized engagement with civil society.

INTRODUCTION This document is a report on the Roundtable on the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) held in Ottawa on February 21, 2005. The roundtable was co-sponsored by five organizations: the Canadian Pugwash Group, Lawyers for Social Responsibility, the Middle Powers Initiative, Physicians for Global Survival, and Project Ploughshares. Funding support was provided by the John Holmes Fund of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The purpose of the roundtable was to discuss the key challenges facing the Non-Proliferation Treaty in preparation for the Treaty’s 2005 Review Conference and to assist the sponsoring organizations in identifying a coherent middle-ground strategy for addressing those challenges that can be recommended to participating governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Participants in the Roundtable included Ambassador Sérgio Duarte, President Designate of the 2005 Review Conference; officials from the governments of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, and New Zealand; representatives of Canadian and international NGOs; and a number of individuals with special expertise in the NPT and related issues (see Appendix I). This report and its recommendations were informed by the discussions that took place at the roundtable, and by the conclusions of the Atlanta Consultation II,1 but they remain the responsibility of the five sponsoring organizations. As the roundtable was conducted under the Chatham House Rule,2 no views expressed during the discussions are attributed to specific individuals or organizations.

STATE OF THE NPT The roundtable began with an overview of the state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by Ambassador Sérgio Duarte and a briefing on the results of the Atlanta Consultation II by the Hon. Douglas Roche. The NPT is facing a crisis. Recent years have seen a persistent and serious erosion of confidence in the effectiveness of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its mechanisms, in the apparent willingness of States parties to fulfill their obligations under the Treaty and to live up to the political commitments that they have made as part of the Treaty’s review process, and in the value of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime in general. The situation is exacerbated by a perception, right or wrong, that States parties lack the will to confront the situation squarely and agree on effective measures to avert further dangers. One aspect of the crisis relates to compliance by the nuclear-weapon states. It is widely perceived that the United States and the other NWS do not take their nuclear disarmament obligations seriously, that they are not pursuing the implementation of Article VI in good faith, and that they are now attempting to back out of the political commitments they accepted in 1995 and 2000. The NWS deny that they are failing to meet the requirements of Article VI and point, in the case of the US and Russia, to continuing reductions in the size

Addressing Key Challenges to the NPT 1 Ploughshares Working Paper 05-3

of their nuclear forces and to the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002. But while these achievements are welcomed by the international community, they do not go nearly far enough. They leave thousands of nuclear weapons in place, many on hair-trigger alert, and lack verifiability, irreversibility, participation by the other NWS, and any kind of defined target or process for achieving further reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The NWS have failed to live up to the promises they made in the “13 Practical Steps” that were incorporated into the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and US officials have suggested that the 13 steps are no longer relevant. The historic opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War has been fumbled, and NWS policies on matters such as nuclear doctrine, weapon design, and testing point to an intention to retain nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, to modernize those weapons, and even to contemplate their use. Another aspect of the crisis concerns compliance by the non-nuclear-weapon states. North Korea had a vigorous nuclear weapons program prior to its withdrawal from the Treaty. Libya had until recently a nuclear weapons research program in violation of its NPT obligations. Serious doubts exist about Iran’s nuclear program. Numerous other NNWS, while not suspected of working on nuclear weapons, have failed to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and only a relatively small number have brought into force additional protocols on the basis of the IAEA’s Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements. A third aspect relates to states that are not members of the Treaty. India, Israel, and Pakistan, all of which possess nuclear weapons, have never been members of the NPT and have never undertaken any nuclear disarmament treaty obligation. De facto acceptance of Indian, Israeli, and Pakistani possession of nuclear weapons on the part of many states is a major problem, in that it sends a mixed message that is highly corrosive to global non-proliferation efforts. North Korea declared its withdrawal from the Treaty in 2003 and is now also thought to possess nuclear weapons. A fourth problem facing the NPT is its lack of virtually all major components of institutional infrastructure. A promising start has been made in encouraging “reporting” on implementation of NPT commitments, but the level of participation by States parties remains modest. Moreover, the preparatory part of the Treaty’s review process has become largely dysfunctional: the three Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings that preceded the 2005 Review Conference ended in disarray, unable even to agree on an agenda for the conference. Finally, the NPT suffers from a lack of high-level political attention. The US and other NWS might take their NPT obligations more seriously if the subject appeared regularly on the talking points of world leaders. The fact that non-proliferation, but not nuclear disarmament, receives some attention at this level only reinforces existing doubts about the will of the international community to stop the erosion of the Treaty.


Atlanta Consultation II The Atlanta Consultation II was sponsored by the Middle Powers Initiative (one of the sponsors of the Ottawa Roundtable) and held at the Carter Center, in Atlanta, Georgia, in January 2005. In its report on the Consultation, the Middle Powers Initiative emphasized three requirements for success at the 2005 Review Conference and beyond: finding a balance in implementing the disarmament and non-proliferation obligations of the NPT; respecting the disarmament/non-proliferation bargain struck when the Treaty was negotiated; and strengthening the pragmatic, middle-ground positions in the nuclear debate and thus building a bridge between the NWS and the NNWS. The countries currently occupying the middle ground in the nuclear debate are the New Agenda Coalition countries, some NATO members, and a number of other like-minded states. The report of the Atlanta Consultation II made 11 recommendations. The Middle Powers Initiative tried to avoid laying out specific requirements for what would, in its view, constitute success at the 2005 Review Conference. Of its recommendations, however, three or four are probably essential to a successful outcome: the Review Conference must “address equally every aspect of the Treaty” in “a balanced way” (Recommendation 1); it must “refer to the substance” of the consensus decisions of the 1995 and 2000 conferences (Recommendation 2); States parties should support negotiation of a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, including dealing with existing military materials (Recommendation 7); and States parties should agree on a program of work for the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that includes a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, or in the absence of such an agreement, they should pursue alternative venues (Recommendation 9). It was noted that the CD has been blocked for eight years now, and states are increasingly willing to consider whether a different venue would open the way to making progress. The roundtable then turned to three topics for more detailed discussion: enhancing compliance with the Treaty, addressing exceptionalism, and repairing the NPT’s institutional deficit.

ENHANCING COMPLIANCE The second session of the roundtable focused on measures and agreements needed to advance compliance with the Treaty and reinforce an overall culture of compliance. Discussions began with presentations by two speakers: Dr. Bob Lawson and Dr. Jane Boulden. The NPT needs a better system to monitor, assess, and correct compliance issues – a better system for managing compliance. Compliance tools include discussion fora; national reporting; transparency measures, which include safeguards, inspections, and verification measures; and mechanisms for dealing with non-compliance. More broadly, compliance relies not just on institutions and procedures but on the existence of a culture of compliance. In this sense, compliance is a social norm, a learned behaviour, something that needs to be worked at and built over time. Addressing the NPT’s institutional deficit (see session on


Repairing the Institutional Deficit) will do much to improve the regime’s ability to manage compliance, but the international community’s broader approach to compliance also needs to be addressed. Recent trends Four trends in the politics of non-proliferation verification and compliance were discussed: a tendency to differentiate among “hostile” and “non-hostile” proliferators, increasing reliance on the threat and use of force, questions about the role of the UN Security Council, and attention to the possibility of nuclear terrorism. With respect to the first of these trends, it was noted that heavy emphasis is placed on the proliferation potential of states considered to be “hostile” to the Western world (e.g., North Korea, Iran, and, until 2003, Iraq) while much less attention is focused on “non-hostile” proliferators (e.g., Israel, India, Pakistan). The basis of the distinction is not capability but intent, as judged by the US and other Western states. The primary determining factor has not been the nature of the regime in question but the nature of the regime’s relationship with key Western states. This distinction is troublesome both in practice, as regimes and relationships change, and in principle, as it undermines the universal prohibition against nuclear acquisition and retention by implying that proliferation and/or possession is acceptable for some states. Another recent trend has been a tendency to turn to the threat or use of force to respond to compliance concerns, most notably in Iraq, but also as potential responses to events in Iran and North Korea. The Proliferation Security Initiative, insofar as it does not rely on the consent of the intercepted parties, can also be seen as part of this tendency. It is now evident that the UN inspections process was highly effective in Iraq, but even in that case it might be argued that the credible threat of force was an important factor in making the inspections work. Even indirect reliance on the threat and use of force raises vital questions of legitimacy, however. When is the threat or use of force legitimate? Who gets to make that decision? Who is responsible for carrying out such threats? Why does non-compliance with certain articles of the Treaty justify the use of force, while non-compliance with other articles evidently does not? These questions lead to the third area of contention: the role of the UN Security Council. With the exception of self-defence, the UN Charter vests the power to determine when the use of force is legitimate in the UN Security Council. The Charter also requires the UN to develop a system of international arms regulation. There are disadvantages and advantages to Security Council involvement in questions of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Security Council is not fully representative of the international community as a whole, and the permanent presence of the NWS inevitably skews the Security Council’s priorities on these issues. Moreover, division among its members frequently leaves the Security Council deadlocked and unable to act. But when the members of the Security Council do decide to work together on an issue they bring tremendous power and legitimacy to their cause. Finally, there is the possibility of terrorism involving nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Attention to this possibility has increased dramatically since 2001. The UN


has taken some strong measures on terrorism in recent years (e.g., Resolutions 1373 and 1540). Resolution 1540, in particular, calls on states to strengthen their international and domestic measures to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors. Four new UN experts are available to help assess the reports of states on their activities in this regard, and the US, Canada, and some others are helping other states to improve their measures. These various tendencies pull in different directions. The role of the UN may end up being enlarged, but the UN is itself an institution in crisis, and it may be that it and the NPT will end up marginalized and ignored by the US and other powerful states. Meanwhile, acceptance of the “hostile” versus “non-hostile” proliferator dichotomy threatens to undermine the essential linkage between nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation; this approach is thus especially pernicious, cutting at the core of the NPT bargain. Verification The roundtable also looked at ways to improve the contribution to compliance made by verification and safeguards. It was suggested by several participants that the UN should try to preserve, at least to some degree, the verification expertise and capability that was developed by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and its predecessor, UNSCOM. Full preservation of an UNMOVIC-like capability is unlikely, however. For one thing, it was noted, US verification capabilities are essential to any such enterprise; the US would need to be fully on board with such a decision. Preserving such a capability would also require major resource increases in the UN’s Department of Disarmament Affairs. It also would be necessary to avoid duplicating or harming the verification capabilities of the IAEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. However, it might be possible to retain a small nucleus within the UN secretariat or at least an experts/skills roster. In any case, the lessons learned from previous inspections processes need to be worked out and collected; this would help to rehabilitate the idea of inspections as part of the solution to compliance issues. It is also necessary to consider the other ingredients needed to manage compliance. UNMOVIC was very successful, but its circumstances were unique and included 10 years of almost unlimited access in Iraq, a strong international regime imposing severe constraints on Iraqi activities, and a credible threat of force. How important were these ingredients, and how can they be recreated in other cases? What can we learn from other recent compliance cases, e.g., Libya, Iran, North Korea, and South Africa? Canada is proposing the establishment of a UN experts group on verification.3 Such a group might be able to examine some of these questions, compile the lessons learned on verification, and recommend the best path to take from here. Safeguards Improved safeguards also could make a contribution to monitoring and ensuring compliance. Acceptance of the IAEA Additional Protocol remains relatively low. (As of January 2005, 90 states had signed the Additional Protocol and 62 had brought it into force.) There is increasing interest in making acceptance of the Additional Protocol the standard for


compliance with Article III of the NPT, but questions remain about how this could be done. The Additional Protocol is at present voluntary. The IAEA could decide that the Additional Protocol should be mandatory, but such a decision is not likely. There is some consideration within the Nuclear Suppliers Group of making the Additional Protocol a condition of nuclear trade. It is likely, however, that any attempt to make the Additional Protocol mandatory will require that the NWS also undertake new obligations, or at least revisit the hedged Additional Protocols that the NWS themselves have offered.

ADDRESSING EXCEPTIONALISM The third session of the roundtable considered ways to build credible responses to three challenges to the goals and effectiveness of the NPT: states outside the Treaty that deny it represents a universal norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons; states that violate the Treaty and then claim they are absolved from obligations under it merely by announcing their withdrawal from the Treaty; and states that claim they are exempt from the specific provision against the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. Discussions began with presentations by three speakers: Greg Thielmann, Dr. Wade Huntley, and Drs. Karel Koster. India, Israel, and Pakistan The first topic of discussion concerned states that possess nuclear weapons but have never been members of the NPT, e.g., India, Israel, and Pakistan. These states sought nuclear weapons, it was suggested, for the same reasons that the NPT NWS did: security, power, and prestige. A number of guidelines were suggested for addressing the nuclear capabilities of these states. First, it is important that the security concerns of these states be recognized; progress toward addressing these concerns would improve the chances of nuclear disarmament. It was noted that the Brazilian-Argentinian agreement to forgo nuclear weapons capabilities4 might provide a useful model for India and Pakistan, whose security concerns relate in part to each other’s possession of nuclear weapons. Second, the international community could work together to increase the costs of continued pursuit of the nuclear option. Possible penalties might include greater limitations on nuclear-related trade, imposition of special taxes or travel bans on individuals involved in nuclear activities or decision-making, and, in the case of India, blocking moves toward a permanent Security Council seat for India as long as it possesses nuclear weapons. Third, the international community could provide increased rewards for steps taken toward the limitation and elimination of nuclear capabilities by India, Israel, and Pakistan. As with the levying of penalties, the purpose of offering rewards would be to tilt the internal cost/benefits analyses within these countries against nuclear possession. Positive steps such as India’s policy of not mating its warheads to its missiles should also be commended (and imitated by the NWS). Finally, it was noted the states have little to gain by adopting or maintaining a policy of silence on Israel’s nuclear arsenal.


North Korea The second topic of discussion was North Korea, which in 2003 announced its withdrawal from the NPT, becoming the only member of the Treaty ever to have done so, and subsequently announced that it possesses nuclear weapons. It is unclear whether North Korea can be induced to abandon its nuclear weapons program, or if it is willing to enter into, and comply with, such an agreement. The North Korean state is not necessarily a unitary actor. Some elements of the state may want an agreement, while others probably do not. It was suggested, therefore, that the strategy of the international community should focus on bringing North Korea to a decision. It is useful to consider the broader effects of North Korea’s current proliferation-related activities. One possible effect would be to spur Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons. It was suggested, however, that the relationship between the United States and Japan is a more important pivot point on that question. The possibility of a regional arms race should therefore be considered a worst-case scenario, not the most likely result. A more direct threat to the NPT regime is the North Korean export of nuclear weapons-related technologies and material. This is the only effect that the US seems to be taking seriously. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was created largely in response to this problem. The effectiveness and legitimacy of the PSI are open to question, however. Enduring and effective agreements need the widest possible participation. It was suggested that linking the PSI to the NPT might be a way to add international oversight and legitimacy to the initiative while strengthening the NPT itself. In this respect, international action might either enhance or diminish the strength of the NPT: actions that increase the role of the NPT as the locus of non-proliferation action would strengthen the Treaty, while actions that further marginalize its role will undermine it. Should North Korean actions lead to accelerated proliferation elsewhere, this clearly would further undermine confidence in the NPT. Finally, there is the issue of the legal and symbolic precedents set by North Korea’s actions. North Korea is the only state to have declared its withdrawal from the NPT. Would letting North Korea off the hook, or providing rewards in return for full or partial compliance, encourage other states to take a similar path? How will the effort to resolve the situation affect the NPT regime as a whole? It was noted that North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but did not complete a safeguards agreement until 1992 and never provided full compliance with its obligations under the Treaty: North Korean compliance was always a problem. In this sense it is unlike other States parties, and it was argued that priority should be placed on solving the problem, with less worry about the precedents that might be set. Care should of course be taken in efforts to resolve the issue: special treatment, provision of incentives for compliance, or acceptance of partial compliance might have the effect of undermining the broader NPT regime. The right kind of efforts, on the other hand, might end up strengthening the NPT even if North Korea remained nuclear armed. On the whole, however, it was suggested that the NPT will probably be stronger if, 10 years from now, the Korean Peninsula is nuclear-free.


NATO The third topic of discussion was the NATO alliance, which persists in maintaining nuclear policies that contradict the NPT commitments of its members. These policies include support for the retention of nuclear weapons by the NATO NWS “for the foreseeable future,” continuation of the nuclear-sharing arrangements under which US nuclear weapons are deployed on the territory of five NATO NNWS and pilots and aircraft of those NNWS are trained and equipped to deliver those weapons,5 and refusal to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons. Efforts were made in 1999, notably by Germany and Canada, to encourage NATO to bring its nuclear policies more into line with NPT obligations. These were largely unsuccessful, however: the final report of the resulting review of NATO arms control policy (known as the “Paragraph 32” review) declared its members’ support for the NPT and the 13 Practical Steps, but it also reiterated support for NATO’s existing nuclear policies while blandly refusing to address the contradiction between these positions.6 The trend since 2000 has been negative. The enlargement of NATO has meant an increase in the number of states that support the existing nuclear policy and shelter under the “nuclear umbrella.” It also was noted, although as a fairly speculative possibility, that NATO may be moving towards countenancing the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in “out-of-area” operations.

It was suggested, however, that progress might be made on ending NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements, which violate the spirit and arguably the letter of the NPT.7 Greece recently ended its participation in this program (as Canada did in the 1980s), and the subject is regularly raised in the parliaments of the remaining participating states. Elimination of nuclear-sharing might be considered only a small victory in that it would not change overall NATO nuclear policy, but it would be highly significant nonetheless, and an important start. NATO action on this issue should not be tied to a prior commitment by Russia to respond with reductions in its own tactical nuclear forces. This kind of linkage has been suggested by some members of the NATO political establishment in order to shift the onus for action to Russia, but unilateral steps on the issue are fully justified in order to bring NATO into compliance with the NPT. Russian weapons can be addressed later. Canada might have a role in moving this issue forward, working with Germany and other NATO states to restart the “Paragraph 32” review process.8 It was also suggested that Canada and like-minded states act not just as “nuclear nags” at NATO, but as nuclear “spoilers,” withholding consensus on NATO nuclear policy decisions that undermine NPT objectives. A couple of participants argued that NATO had already made important reductions in its nuclear forces and that what NATO really needed to do was to better explain its nuclear policy. It was suggested by others that although the reductions NATO had made were worthy of being (and had been) applauded, quantitative questions are not the most important; overall NATO nuclear policy, with its permanent reliance on nuclear weapons in violation of NPT commitments, is the main problem and one that NATO has consistently failed to address despite sea changes in the international system.


REPAIRING THE INSTITUTIONAL DEFICIT The fourth session of the roundtable examined ways in which institutional arrangements and mechanisms might be developed to enable NPT States parties to press more effectively for compliance with existing commitments. Discussions began with presentations by three speakers: Dr. Trevor Findlay, Dr. Detlev Wolter, and Ernie Regehr. Institutional deficit Participants noted that the NPT lacks virtually all major components of institutional infrastructure, including an annual conference of states parties; an executive council; an executive secretariat; an inspectorate; and procedures to monitor, assess, and address compliance. Safeguards and related aspects of the Treaty are overseen by the IAEA, but other aspects, notably Article VI, have no oversight body of any kind. Ad hoc developments are gradually taking place in some of these areas, but are not implemented in any planned way. The IAEA role in the US-Russia-IAEA Trilateral Initiative hints that the IAEA may someday evolve into the body to verify nuclear disarmament. The IAEA may also receive the verification role in a future Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty. For the time being, however, no international body is assigned these tasks. In short, the NPT institutional train may have started to leave the station, but it is doing so only in a gradual and uncoordinated way. The features that the NPT is most in need of include the means to monitor and verify compliance with the full range of the Treaty’s provisions, strong mechanisms to review implementation and compliance (e.g., at an annual meeting of States parties); and an institutional home for the NPT. A number of specific possibilities related to these areas were raised by participants. For example, it was suggested that States parties agree to hold annual meetings to review the functioning of the Treaty, discuss ideas, and report extraordinary events. Such meetings would provide an integrated forum for discussions, and their regular appearance on the calendar would put NPT issues on the bureaucratic work agenda, ensuring a continuous level of attention that does not now exist. Other suggestions included establishment of subsidiary organs to address subjects such as compliance and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, establishment of formal points of contact to strengthen communications and monitor compliance, creation of a global inventory/database on fissionable material, and adoption of a code of conduct for addressing non-compliance issues, possibly including automatic responses to violations and procedures for UN Security Council involvement. It was also suggested that States parties might spell out clear procedures for withdrawal from the Treaty, specifying, for example, that the option of withdrawal could not be exercised by a State party while it was not in compliance with the Treaty, that withdrawal would require termination of nuclear technology programs facilitated by Article IV of the Treaty, and/or that notice to withdraw would automatically result in an extraordinary meeting of States parties to address the question. Creation of a small official or unofficial secretariat, it was suggested, would also help to fill a number of gaps. Among other roles, such an institution could serve as an information clearinghouse, a source of NPT documents from past review conferences, a collection point


for national legislation related to NPT implementation, a central source for data on national compliance, and a place to get practical assistance on reporting, drafting of national implementing legislation, and so on. Reporting Another major area of discussion concerned the prospects for further institutionalization of the practice of “reporting” by States parties. Treaty parties agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference to provide “regular reports” on implementation of their NPT-related commitments.9 Provision of such reports serves to reaffirm the mutual accountability of States parties and to demonstrate their commitment to implementation of the Treaty, while the information provided would help States parties to assess progress in implementation of the Treaty and, potentially, to build mutual confidence. The level of reporting to date has been modest, but it is not insignificant. Of the 36 NNWS parties to the NPT listed in Annex II of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,10 24 have provided one or more formal reports since 2000. Reporting by the remaining 147 NNWS parties has been more sporadic. The five NWS parties to the NPT, for their part, have avoided the term “report,” due at least in part to resistance to admit an obligation to report.11 That said, all five regularly submit documents that to a greater or lesser degree provide at least some of the information sought in such reports, and the quality of information in these documents has improved in recent years. A number of aspects of reporting would benefit from being clarified:

• Frequency: Reports should be submitted annually and preferably well in advance of the conference.

• Scope: Reports should cover the entire Treaty and associated decisions (including, e.g., the 13 Practical Steps specified in the 2000 Final Document).

• Content: Content should go beyond national advocacy positions on disarmament and non-proliferation issues and focus instead on factual information, e.g., reports on implementation activities, nuclear holdings, policies, agreements, initiatives, compliance declarations, etc.

• Format: How should reports be organized? Should there be a standardized format?

Efforts to increase the number and quality of reports should focus on the NNWS as well as the NWS. A perceived lack of information to report may be one cause for the low level of participation by NNWS to date. Lack of capacity in the foreign ministries of small states is likely to be another cause. It was suggested that some states may also be reluctant to acknowledge their lack of progress on issues such as safeguards agreements. According to one participant, setting a deadline for provision of reports, as was done in Resolution 1540, would be helpful. Provision of model reports by one or more States parties would also be very helpful, especially for those states that lack capacity.


NGO access Ways of improving NGO access to the NPT review process were also discussed. A greater role for NGOs is increasingly accepted both by the UN and by NPT States parties. For example, reports of the chairs of recent PrepComs have noted and encouraged the trend towards greater access. The “Cardoso report” on the relationship between the UN and civil society12 also encouraged this trend. The informal, ad hoc access of the past is gradually becoming the standard, and it may be time to formalize that access. Formal access would not mean that NGOs get the ability to vote; it would mean that they have the right to be in the room and to provide input during open meetings. (It was acknowledged that closed meetings may sometimes be required, but the presumption is that meetings normally would be open.) To participate effectively, NGOs require appropriate seating within the conference area, access to all conference materials, and the means to provide NGO materials to states. The procedure for addressing PrepComs and Review Conferences needs to be revamped, and the geographic representation of NGOs (currently mainly Western/Northern) needs to be “democratized.” Participants noted that NGOs have much to bring to the process. Political will is crucial to making progress on NPT issues, and the NGO role in building public demand for action can play an important role in generating political will. Within the review process itself, NGOs offer information, ideas, and critiques that have the potential to contribute significantly to the discussions. One role could be to encourage (and provide feedback on) national reports by States parties. It was noted that to date NGOs have not picked up this issue as much as might have been hoped. Other possibilities A number of other possibilities were briefly discussed: one or more states might establish an unofficial NPT secretariat along the lines of the one that was created for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention;13 one of the NPT depository states, e.g., the UK, might offer to provide clearinghouse/secretariat services; a “coalition of willing” States parties or NGOs might establish a virtual compliance support mechanism to provide information and expert advice on compliance matters; and Frank von Hippel’s suggestion for an international panel on verification and irreversibility. Possibilities such as these could be pursued as interim steps in the absence of more concrete institutional progress. It was also suggested that progress on various NPT-related matters could be pursued through regional nuclear-weapons-free zone organizations. It was noted that regional arrangements are encouraged by the NPT. How to proceed The challenge is to find out which of these steps States parties might be willing to support. The US, for example, is interested in measures to improve compliance by the NNWS, and is especially interested in improvements in national legislation and internal controls to prevent access to nuclear materials by non-state actors. The question of non-state actors is not specifically within the province of the NPT; UN Security Council Resolution 1540 addresses


this issue. But the Review Conference could seek to enhance or show support for these initiatives or take related actions, such as pushing for wider adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol. In return, it might be possible to obtain the support of the NWS and other States parties for steps to repair the institutional deficit, forging a package deal that serves the needs of all. It was noted that the EU is working on a joint position for the upcoming Review Conference and that the EU position may include at least some support for institutional reform. An important caveat was raised about proposals to make changes in the nature of legal obligations under the NPT (such as making acceptance of the Additional Protocol mandatory in order to receive Article IV benefits or adding conditions to the withdrawal provisions in Article X): decisions of Review Conferences are politically binding, but they are not legally binding. They do not amend the terms of the Treaty itself. Therefore, the question of how such decisions can be implemented requires consideration. Steps that might be achievable, it was suggested, include progress on institutionalizing reporting, creation of a small standing bureau/small secretariat for the Treaty, agreement to preserve at least a nucleus of UNMOVIC’s expertise, and the creation of a virtual network of experts on various NPT issues, along the lines of the network working in support of the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD). Progress on reporting might become an important focus, especially if the conference is unable to agree on a final document.

CONCLUSIONS The final session of the roundtable was a review of the day’s discussion with the intention of identifying a coherent middle ground strategy to commend to participating governments and NGOs. Discussions began with comments by three speakers: Ambassador Sergio Duarte, Marina Laker, and the Hon. Douglas Roche. Prospects for the 2005 outcome The prospects for a successful outcome at the 2005 Review Conference are not good. The divisions that stymied progress at the PrepComs leading up to the 2005 Review Conference remain unresolved. It now appears distinctly possible that the Review Conference will end with no Final Document, no Decisions, and no agreement on any point of substance. In this sense at least, there can be no doubt that the Treaty and its review process are in crisis. At its most fundamental level, this crisis reflects a sharp decline in confidence on the part of many States parties with respect to the commitment of other parties, NWS and NNWS alike, to the thorough fulfillment of their obligations under the Treaty. Different States parties will have different priorities at the 2005 Review Conference, but a number of issues are certain to be high on the agenda of many states. These include nuclear disarmament action, non-proliferation efforts, compliance in general, institutional reform, universality of the Treaty, and the value and status of the decisions and other commitments made during the Treaty’s various review conferences over its history, including most notably the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the commitments made in


the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Some states have suggested that the decisions and commitments made at previous Review Conferences are no longer relevant; other states are likely to view this position as a repudiation of the 1995 bargain under which the NPT was extended indefinitely. Indeed, as one participant pointed out, the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995 was itself a review conference decision. It was one element of a politically binding bargain made in 1995 and is no more legally binding than any other review conference decision. If the results of the Treaty’s review process cannot be expected to survive for more than five years, it may be open to question whether the Treaty itself will last much longer than five years. Other issues likely to be the focus of attention include the Middle East regional issue, which remains of fundamental importance for a number of states, and how to address specific concerns about Iranian compliance; Libya’s prior non-compliance; and North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty. What would constitute success? A crisis, it was suggested, can also be an opportunity to improve something that has become stagnant. But there must be sufficient will to make those improvements. The key requirement for progress in 2005 is the willingness of all States parties to reaffirm their commitment to the thorough fulfillment of all elements of the Treaty, both nuclear disarmament-related and non-proliferation-related. Also required is a willingness to respect and live up to the “Permanence with Accountability” bargain that was the basis of the Treaty’s indefinite extension in 1995, including respect for the decisions and commitments made during the Treaty’s review proceedings and a commitment to improvement of the review process and of the Treaty’s institutions as a whole. States parties will need to recognize and address one another’s interests and concerns; confrontation and the selective pursuit of exclusive national interests is a sure recipe for failure. Whether the conference will produce a consensus final document, a number of specific decisions, or no agreement at all remains unknowable. However, a broad consensus document would require a balanced set of commitments addressing nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as recommended in the “Balance, Bargain, Bridge” middle-ground approach advocated by the Middle Powers Initiative. It is questionable whether sufficient agreement can be found to make this feasible. Another possibility is a series of specific decisions on issues of particular importance. Some States parties favour this approach while others do not.14 Here, too, however, balance will be essential for progress to be made. It may be that the gaps are too wide to bridge during this Review Conference. Failure to reach any agreement will further undermine international confidence in the NPT and may lead to further movement away from NPT-based efforts to address both disarmament and non-proliferation. The value of the NPT itself will be questioned more frequently if its parties show themselves unable or unwilling to address its problems. Failure of the 2005 Review Conference to produce a final document or other agreements should not be seen as the worst possible outcome, however. Compromising on the fundamental principles of the NPT or on the integrity of its review process for the sake of obtaining “agreement” would be worse. An agreement that voided the essential bargain of


the NPT or rendered its review process irrelevant would only hasten the Treaty’s ultimate demise. It is important that States parties remain true to the purposes and principles of the NPT. In this sense, refusal to acquiesce to a bad final document might itself be considered a form of success, or at least a means of minimizing failure, by keeping the essence of the Treaty alive to fight another day. Limited progress may still be possible in certain areas, assuming the core principles are preserved. Here, again, balance will be essential, but tradeoffs that accomplish this end may be possible. The US and other NWS may prefer to avoid concrete nuclear disarmament obligations, for example, but they have a strong interest in seeing advances in non-proliferation, and in addressing the issue of terrorism. The possibility of making parallel advances on some of these issues, directly through the NPT process or indirectly through other fora (e.g., fissile material negotiations at the CD or elsewhere), exists and is worth pursuing. In the worst case of complete deadlock at the NPT Review Conference, parallel efforts in other fora in the years preceding the 2010 review may provide the best chance of advancing the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation cause while preserving the NPT and laying the groundwork for an eventual resumption of progress within the Treaty. Success ultimately must be judged by results: if proliferation is slowed or stopped, if nuclear arsenals are reduced and made safer, if the day of their elimination is brought closer, if overall the world is a safer place because of these efforts, then they will be considered successful.


RECOMMENDATIONS The roundtable sponsoring organizations, having considered the discussions at the Ottawa Roundtable and the conclusions of the Atlanta Consultation II:

1. Endorse the “Balance, Bargain, Bridge” approach recommended by the Middle Powers Initiative, including the specific recommendations arising from the Atlanta Consultation II (see Appendix II).

2. Call on the government of Canada to work with the New Agenda Coalition and

other like-minded States parties, including non-nuclear NATO members, at the 2005 Review Conference to advocate pragmatic, middle-ground measures consistent with the “Balance, Bargain, Bridge” approach.

3. Urge these states to refuse to accept any outcome that would compromise the core

principles of the Treaty and its review process, including the necessity of balanced implementation, the need to achieve concrete forward movement on all elements of the Treaty, the requirement for increased accountability of all States parties for implementation of Treaty-related commitments, and the need to respect and build upon past Review Conference commitments.

4. Recommend, in the event that the 2005 Review Conference is unable to produce a

balanced and substantive Final Document or set of decisions, that states pursue interim or parallel measures to advance disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, and rebuild consensus on the path to the 2010 Review Conference, in particular: • establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament at the CD or, if

necessary, elsewhere; • negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons

and dealing with existing military materials at the CD or, if necessary, elsewhere; • adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol as the standard for compliance with NPT

non-proliferation obligations; • support UN Security Council reform, coupled with insistence that only non-

nuclear-weapon states can be accepted as new permanent members of the Security Council;

• reactivate the NATO “Paragraph 32” process with a view to reforming NATO nuclear policy, reducing reliance on nuclear weapons, and ending nuclear-sharing arrangements;

• enhance efforts to deepen and embed a culture of reporting and of accountability within the NPT, including lobbying of States parties to provide reports, active assistance to States parties in preparing reports, and preparation of a model report for use by States parties; and

• support the creation of an unofficial “NPT secretariat” as a stopgap measure until the creation of a formal secretariat.


NOTES 1. The Atlanta Consultation II on the future of the NPT was organized by the Middle Powers Initiative in co-operation with former US President Jimmy Carter. It was held at the Carter Center, in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 26-28, 2005. The report of the consultation, Atlanta Consultation II: On the Future of the NPT, is available on-line (http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs/2005atlantareport.pdf). A copy of the report was provided to all participants at the Roundtable. The recommendations contained in it are reproduced in the Roundtable report as Appendix II. 2. For further information on the Chatham House Rule, see http://www.riia.org. 3. The Department of Foreign Affairs plans to focus more attention on verification issues in coming years. In addition to advocating creation of a UN experts group on verification, areas of work will include conducting baseline analyses of verification issues, and establishing a verification centre of excellence in Canada. 4. Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, signed by Argentina and Brazil in Guadalajara, Mexico, 18 July 1991. 5. The five countries are Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Until recently, Greece was also a participant in NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements. 6. “Report on Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament,” NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-2(2000)121, 14 December 2000 (http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2000/p00-121e/home.htm). 7. One roundtable participant voiced disagreement with this assessment, however, arguing that NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements are consistent with the Treaty. 8. NATO opponents of nuclear policy reform insist that the “Paragraph 32” process is finished. However, NATO pledged in the “Paragraph 32” report that its arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation policies “will be kept under review in the light of the evolving security environment” (para. 71; see note 6 for full document citation); there is, therefore, a clear basis for insisting that NATO nuclear policy remain under review. 9. Subparagraph 12 of paragraph 15, subsection on “Article VI and the eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs,” 2000 Final Document (NPT/CONF.2000/28, Volume I, Part I, p. 15). 10. The Annex II states include the NWS and all states considered to have significant proliferation-related nuclear capabilities. The states are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,


Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, and Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo). 11. The NWS reporting obligation derives not only from subparagraph 12 of paragraph 15 (on “regular reports”) but also from subparagraph 9b, which calls for “Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament” (NPT/CONF.2000/28, Volume I, Part I, p. 15). However, some NWS deny that their acceptance in 2000 of the 13 practical steps remains relevant in 2005. 12. We the peoples: Civil society, the United Nations and global governance, Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, UN document A/58/817, 11 June 2004 (http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/PDF/N0437641.pdf). 13. Developed by the Government of Canada and administered by the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford, the unofficial BTWC website (http://www.opbw.org) functions as an information clearinghouse for work related to the BTWC, and serves as a placeholder for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons that may one day exist, paralleling the existing Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (http://www.opcw.org). 14. The Canadian government prefers an outcome involving concrete, measurable commitments applied equally to all three pillars of the NPT (nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. See: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/nulear4-en.asp.


APPENDIX I LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Matthias Bertl Embassy of Germany to Canada Dr. Jane Boulden Royal Military College Dr. Adele Buckley Canadian Pugwash Group Robin Collins UN Association of Canada – Ottawa Branch Paulo Cordeiro de Andrade Pinto Embassy of Brazil to Canada Bev Tollefson Delong Lawyers for Social Responsibility Dr. Walter Dorn, Observer Canadian Forces College Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte President Designate, NPT Review Conference; Ambassador-at-Large, Brazil Sarah Estabrooks Project Ploughshares Dr. Trevor Findlay Norman Paterson School of International Affairs Debbie Grisdale Physicians for Global Survival James Groen Arms and Proliferation Control, Department of National Defence Dr. Wade Huntley Simons Centre for Peace and Non-Proliferation Research, Liu Institute for Global Issues, UBC High Commissioner Graham Kelly New Zealand High Commission to Canada Drs. Karel Koster Project for European Nuclear Non-Proliferation, the Netherlands

Marina Laker, Acting Director Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Foreign Affairs Canada Dr. Robert Lawson International Security Research and Outreach Programme, Foreign Affairs Canada Ambassador Valdemar Leão Ambassador of Brazil to Canada Dr. Peter Meinke Canadian Pugwash Group Norberto Moretti Embassy of Brazil to Canada Dr. Derek Paul, Observer Canadian Pugwash Group Ernie Regehr, O.C. Project Ploughshares The Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C. Middle Powers Initiative Jacqueline Simon Non-Proliferation and International Relations Division, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Dr. Erika Simpson Canadian Pugwash Group Greg Thielmann Board Member, Arms Control Association Bert Versmessen Embassy of Belgium to Canada Matt Werner, Observer Global Security Institute Dr. Detlev Wolter Permanent Mission of Germany to the UN in New York


APPENDIX II RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATLANTA CONSULTATION II

The Middle Powers Initiative recommends the following policy options to states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for their consideration:

1. A successful outcome of the Review Conference depends on its ability to address equally every aspect of the Treaty. The strengthening of the commitments contained in the NPT regarding nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament should be done in a balanced way.

2. The Review Conference must refer to the substance of the consensus decisions from

the 1995 and 2000 Conferences, including the 13 Practical Steps adopted in 2000 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995.

3. The United States and Russia should build upon their progress in the Moscow Treaty

by applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification to reductions under the Treaty, and by negotiating further deep, verified, and irreversible cuts in their total arsenals, encompassing both warheads and delivery systems.

4. Russia and the United States should engage in a wider process of control of their

non-strategic weapons, through formalization and verification of the 1991-1992 initiatives, transparency steps, security measures, US withdrawal of its bombs deployed on the territories of NATO countries, and commencement of negotiations regarding further reduction/elimination of non-strategic weapons.

5. Nuclear weapon states should implement their commitment to decreasing the

operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems (“de-alerting”) by planning and executing a program to stand down their nuclear forces, culminating in a global stand-down by the 2010 Review Conference.

6. Nuclear weapon states should further implement their commitment to diminishing

the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies by not researching or developing modified or new nuclear weapons and by beginning negotiations on a legally binding instrument on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT.

7. States should begin and rapidly conclude negotiations on a treaty banning the

production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, with the understanding that negotiations can and should address a range of issues, including dealing with existing military materials. As soon as possible a technical advisory panel should be created to assist with issues regarding verification of the treaty. In addition, states should work to develop a global inventory of weapons-useable fissile materials and warheads, and the nuclear weapon states should accelerate placing their “excess” military fissile materials under international verification. States should seriously


consider proposals to ban production of all weapons-usable fissile materials, and to establish multilateral controls on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology and a moratorium on supply and acquisition in the meantime.

8. Adherence to the Additional Protocol on Safeguards should become a universal

standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations and treatment as a member in good standing of the NPT with access to nuclear fuel.

9. Prior to or at the Review Conference, a firm agreement should be reached on a

program of work in the Conference on Disarmament that includes a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Achieving such an agreement in advance would greatly enhance the prospects for a cooperative outcome to the conference. Should it not prove possible to overcome the deadlock on a program of work, alternative venues should be pursued.

10. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date.

In the meantime, states should continue to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing, fund the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, and support completion of the International Monitoring System.

11. States should use the opportunity provided by the NPT review process to build upon

the 13 Practical Steps to undertake deeper consideration of the legal, political, and technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons, in order to identify steps that could be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally that would lead to complete nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom’s initiative on verification, the New Agenda Coalition’s proposals on security assurances and the strengthening and expanding of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are positive examples in this regard. Such consideration should include the investigation of means to enhance security without relying on nuclear weapons.


Project Ploughshares was established in 1976 as an agency of the Canadian

Council of Churches to implement the churches’ imperative to seek and pursue

peace. Our mandate is to work with churches and related organizations, as well as

governments and non-governmental organizations, in Canada and internationally,

to identify, develop, and advance approaches that build peace and prevent war,

and promote the peaceful resolution of political conflict. Project Ploughshares is

affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,

Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo.

…. and they shall beat their swords into ploughshares and spears

into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against nation;

neither shall they learn war any more. (Isaiah 2:4)

Project Ploughshares

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Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2

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