Whither constructivism?—A chemistry teachers’ perspective

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Teaching and Teacher Education 24 (2008) 400–416

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Whither constructivism?—A chemistry teachers’ perspective

Mansoor Niaz�

Epistemology of Science Group, Department of Chemistry, Universidad de Oriente, Apartado Postal 90, Cumana,

Estado Sucre 6101A, Venezuela

Received 30 October 2006; received in revised form 3 October 2007; accepted 30 October 2007

Abstract

Constructivism in science education has been the subject of considerable debate in the science education literature. The

purpose of this study was to facilitate chemistry teachers’ understanding that the tentative nature of scientific knowledge

leads to the coexistence and rivalries among different forms of constructivism in science education. The study is based on 17

in-service teachers who had registered for a 11-week course on ‘Epistemology of Science Teaching’ as part of their Master’s

degree program. The course is based on 17 readings drawing on nature of science and a critical evaluation of constructivism.

Course activities included written reports, classroom discussions based on participants’ presentations and written exams.

Based on the results obtained, it is plausible to suggest that participant teachers experienced the following transitions leading

to greater understanding, as they acquired experience with respect to constructivism: (a) Active participation of students as a

pre-requisite for change; (b) Different forms of constructivism represent competing and conflicting interpretations of

progress in science; (c) Acceptance of the present state of constructivism as a Kuhnian paradigm; (d) Social constructivism

as the preferred form of constructivism; (e) Critical appraisal of social constructivism; (f) Despite its popularity, social

constructivism does not constitute a Kuhnian paradigm (due to controversies, there is no consensus in the science education

community); (g) Contradictions faced by constructivism in science education provide the base for its advance and evolution

towards more progressive forms, and hence the need to consider, whither constructivism?

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Keywords: Constructivism; Science education; Nature of science; Tentative nature of scientific knowledge

1. Introduction

The decline of positivism during the latter half ofthe 20th century facilitated the development ofconstructivism in various forms as an alternativephilosophical and educational theory (Louden &Wallace, 1994). Most science educators would agreethat during the 1970s and the 1980s among otherforms of constructivism, Piagetian and Ausubelian

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constructivism played a dominant role. Piagetianconstructivism emphasized the need for goingbeyond expository teaching practice in order tofacilitate development of reasoning based on thelearning cycle. In contrast, Ausubelian constructi-vism promoted meaningful receptive learning basedon prior knowledge of the students and conceptmaps. Since then, constructivism in science educa-tion has developed in many forms by drawinginspiration from various philosophical and episte-mological sources (Geelan, 1997; Good, 1993;Phillips, 1995). Of the different forms, radical (von

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ARTICLE IN PRESSM. Niaz / Teaching and Teacher Education 24 (2008) 400–416 401

Glasersfeld, 1989) and social constructivism(Glasson & Lalik, 1993; Tobin & LaMaster, 1995)have enjoyed more popularity with science educa-tors. For radical and some social constructivists,experience is the ultimate arbiter for decidingbetween scientific theories and how students acquireknowledge. Despite the popularity, almost all formsof constructivism have also been the subject ofscrutiny and critical appraisal (De Berg, 2006;Geelan, 2006; Kelly, 1997; Matthews, 1993; Niaz,2001a; Osborne, 1996; Solomon, 1994; Suchting,1992; Taber, 2006).

An important aspect of the development ofdifferent forms of constructivism in science educa-tion is the need for a continual critical appraisal.Early debates (Novak, 1977) provided the stimulusfor this continued progressive development. Morerecently, Nola (1997) has emphasized that popular

Atomic Structure Co

1897 Thomson 196

1911 Rutherford 197

1913 Millikan

1913 Bohr 198

1916 Sommerfeld

1924 De Broglie 199

1925 Pauli

1925 Heisenberg 199

1926 Schrödinger

1932 Chadwick

1963 Gell-Mann(Postulating Quarks)

1997 Perl(Isolating Quarks)

Fig. 1. Tentative Nature of Scientific Theories. Notes: (1) Under Atomi

significant contribution towards a greater understanding of atomic st

(markers), indicating the tentative nature of atomic theories; (2) Un

prominent psychologists who facilitated a greater understanding of co

theorists (besides those mentioned) influenced the different forms of con

structure and constructivism in science education draws a parallel betw

domains of knowledge was discussed throughout the course and this fi

forms of constructivism (radical and social) willhave to compete and often unfavorably with rivalviews. Competition between rival theories, tentativenature of science and theory ladenness of observa-tions are important contributions of the newphilosophy of science, which has permeated scienceeducation research (Lederman, Abd-El-Khalick,Bell, & Schwartz, 2002). Tsai (2006) has emphasizedthe importance of these aspects of nature of sciencefor constructivism and teacher training programs.Fig. 1 provides an outline of the tentative nature ofscience in the two domains, viz., atomic structureand constructivism in science education.

At this stage, it is important to note that thedifferent forms of constructivism in science educationhave as much to do with the different psychologicalmodels of teaching and learning (developmental stagetheory, socio-cultural, motivational perspectives, etc.)

nstructivism in Science Education

0 Trivial Constructivism (Piaget)

0 Human Constructivism(Ausubel, Novak)

0 Radical Constructivism(von Glasersfeld)

0 Social Constructivism(Vygotsky)

9 Pragmatic Constructivism (Perkins)

c Structure appear the names of prominent scientists who made a

ructure. Inclusion of these names follows a historical sequence

der Constructivism in Science Education appear the names of

nstructivism. Again, although the sequence is historical, various

structivism at the same time; (3) Comparison of progress in atomic

een two domains of knowledge. (4) Comparison between the two

gure is a reconstruction of those discussions.

ARTICLE IN PRESSM. Niaz / Teaching and Teacher Education 24 (2008) 400–416402

as with different views on scientific epistemology.Kitchener (1986) an important scholar on geneticepistemology has expressed this in cogent terms,‘‘yPiaget attempts to explain the growth of knowl-edge as Popper and Lakatos do, by providing arational reconstruction of the course of epistemicchange in which transitions occur by virtue of certainnormative principles’’ (p. 210). Similarly, Pascual-Leone (1987) a leading neo-Piagetian psychologist hasemphasized the constructive perspective which:‘‘ypresupposes that subjects construct their ownworld of experience (objects, events, transformations)by means of cognitive structures and organismicregulations/factors. This constructed world, however,is valid only if it epistemologically reflects distalobjects, distal events and transformations actuallyoccurring in the environment’’ (p. 534, original italics).Niaz (1992, 2005a) has postulated a ‘progressiveproblemshift’ (Lakatos, 1970) between Piaget’s epis-temic subject (a general model that neglects individualdifferences) and Pascual-Leone’s metasubject whichincorporates a framework for individual differencevariables.

More recently, a group of science educators haveinterpreted the present state of constructivism inscience education as, ‘‘yan impressive developmentthroughout the last two decades’’ (Gil-Perez et al.,2002, p. 557) which has facilitated an ‘emergentconsensus’ leading to a ‘paradigm change’. Thisperspective has Kuhnian overtones (periods of‘normal science’ separated by paradigms) and lacksthe understanding that a ‘consensus’ is at most atransitory feature of scientific progress in bothscience and education. In contrast, Niaz et al.(2003) have argued that constructivism in scienceeducation (like any scientific theory) will continue toprogress and evolve through continued criticalappraisals. Given the popularity in education ofthe Kuhnian thesis of paradigms being replaced(Lincoln, 1989) and not the coexistence and rivalryamong paradigms, it is not surprising that manyscience educators also follow the same philosophicalthesis (Loving & Cobern, 2000). The relationshipbetween Kuhnian philosophy and constructivism inscience education has been recognized explicitly byHodson (1988): ‘‘yKuhnian models of science andscientific practice have a direct equivalent inpsychology in the constructivist theories of learning.There is, therefore, a strong case for constructingcurriculum along Kuhnian lines’’ (p. 32). Similarly,Matthews (2004) has traced the historical origins ofKuhn’s influence and the acceptance of relativist

and anti-realist views by constructivists in scienceeducation, viz., as different scientific theories wereincommensurable, no rational decision could bemade between competing theories. Interestingly, theKuhnian thesis has also been questioned by aleading educational theorist:

Where Kuhn erred, I believe, is in diagnosing thischaracteristic [controversies/conflicts] of the so-cial sciences as a developmental disabilityyit isfar more likely that for the social sciences andeducation, the coexistence of competing schoolsof thought is a natural and quite mature state(Shulman, 1986, p. 5).

This shows that Kuhnian theory is not veryhelpful in understanding constructivism and scienceeducation in general. Various critiques have shownthat science educators have been overly influencedby Kuhn (cf. Loving & Cobern, 2000; Matthews,2004). This course took a special interest in makingteachers aware of the pitfalls involved in applyingKuhnian theory in science education. It is preciselyfor this reason that Matthews (2004) was includedas a reading material in this course (see CourseContent). Furthermore, two of the evaluation items(3 and 6) in this study explicitly dealt with Kuhnianparadigms (see Course Evaluation). To recapitulate,research on constructivism in science education overthe last three decades has been a process ofcompeting research programs (Piagetian, Ausube-lian, Radical, Social and other forms of constructi-vism), that has facilitated a constructive dialogueleading to ‘progressive’ transitions (Lakatos, 1970).Among other forms of constructivism, Dialecticconstructivism was mentioned which refers to theneo-Piagetian (Pascual-Leone, 1987) attempts tounderstand construction of knowledge by thestudents (cf. Niaz, 2001a).

A review of the literature shows that two previousstudies (Glasson & Lalik, 1993; Tobin & LaMaster,1995) explored the experiences of science teachers asthey moved from traditional positivist teachingpractices to implementing social constructivism.These two studies formed part of a course in theprevious year (cf. Methodology of Investigation inthe section Rationale and Design of the Study), andthus provided the background knowledge for thepresent study. Consequently, this study goes beyondby presenting teachers a perspective based on thetentative nature of scientific theories and hence theneed to understand the different forms of construc-tivism in science education.


Based on these considerations the objectives ofthis study are to:

1.
Familiarize chemistry teachers’ understandingthat different forms of constructivism are aconsequence of the proliferation of theories thathelp us to understand scientific change. (Forexample, Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s theories ofscientific change provide distinct ways of under-standing constructivism.)
2.
Facilitate chemistry teachers’ understanding thatthe tentative nature of scientific knowledge leads tothe coexistence and rivalries among different formsof constructivism in science education. (In otherwords, critical appraisals of the different forms ofconstructivism facilitate the resolution of contra-dictions and thus lead to further development.)
2. Rationale and design of the study

This study is based on 17 in-service chemistryteachers who had enrolled in the course, ‘‘Epistemol-ogy of Science Teaching’’, as part of a Master’s degreeprogram in education, at a major university in LatinAmerica. Nine teachers worked in secondary schoolsand eight at the university level (male ¼ 6, female 11,age range: 25–45 years), and their teaching experiencevaried from about 5–20 years. In the previous year, allteachers had enrolled in the following courses:

(a)
Methodology of Investigation, in which basicphilosophical ideas of Popper, Kuhn andLakatos were discussed, in order to provide anoverview of the controversial nature of progressin science (growth of knowledge) and itsimplications for research methodology in educa-tion. Teachers were familiar that basic ideas likethe scientific method, objectivity and inductivenature of science were considered to be con-troversial and questionable by philosophers ofscience. Constructivism was another topic dis-cussed in this course, based on the followingreadings: Brown (1994), Tobin and LaMaster(1995), and Glasson and Lalik (1993). Brown(1994) critiques Glasersfeld’s radical constructi-vism as it down plays the role of the teacher.Based on post-structuralism and hermeneuticphenomenology, an alternative is provided thatreasserts the teacher’s role. Tobin and LaMaster(1995) and Glasson and Lalik (1993) recount theexperiences of two teachers who start out with
traditional positivist strategies and finally grap-ple with the difficulties involved in implementingsocial constructivism. Comparison of the teach-ing strategies of Sarah (a teacher in Tobin &LaMaster, 1995) and Martha (a teacher inGlasson & Lalik, 1993) based on social con-structivism facilitated participants’ understand-ing of classroom practice.

(b)
Investigation in the Teaching of Chemistry, inwhich students’ alternative conceptions andconceptual change strategies were discussedwithin a history and philosophy of scienceperspective, with particular reference to histor-ical controversies. For example, J.J. Thomsondid not find E. Rutherford’s interpretation ofalpha particle experiments as logical, despitechemistry textbooks’ claim to the contrary.Similarly, Bohr’s postulation of the ‘quantumof action’ was not accepted as a logicalalternative by many renowned physicists (cf.Niaz (1998), this was one of the readings in thiscourse). The Millikan-Ehrenhaft controversywith respect to the oil drop experiment wasanother controversy discussed in this course.This provided evidence for alternative interpre-tations of similar experimental data (Duhem-Quine thesis) and was discussed in one of thereadings (Niaz, 2000). This course facilitatedparticipants’ understanding with respect to thetentative nature of science and that progress inscience inevitably involves rivalries amongdifferent interpretations/research programs.
2.1. Course content (reading list)

In order to provide an overview of the coursecontent, participants were provided the article byGallegos (1996). The course itself was based on 17readings and was subdivided into the followingsections:

Unit 1: Nature of Science

1. Campanario (1999); 2. Mellado (2003); 3.Matthews (2004); 4. Smith and Scharmann(1999); 5a. Niaz (2001b); 5b. Scharmann andSmith (2001); 6. Fernandez, Gil, Carrascosa,Cachapuz, and Praia (2002).Unit 2: Critical Evaluation of Nature of Science

7. Blanco and Niaz (1997); 8. Petrucci and Dibar(2001); 9. Osborne, Collins, Ratcliffe, Millar, andDuschl (2003); 10. Lin and Chen (2002); 11.Lederman et al. (2002).


Unit 3: Critical Evaluation of Constructivism

12. Moreno and Waldegg (1998); 13. Marın,Solano, and Jimenez (1999); 14. Martınez (1999);15. Gil-Perez et al. (2002); 16. Niaz et al. (2003);17. Abd-El-Khalick et al. (2004).

2.2. Course organization and activities

On the first day of class (2 h), all participants wereprovided copies of all the readings and salientfeatures of the course were discussed. It wasemphasized that the course called for activeparticipation. As all teachers worked in nearbyschools and universities, three types of courseactivities were programmed:

(a)
Class discussions were planned on Saturdays ofthe 6th and 8th week of the course (3 h in themorning and 3 in the afternoon). Readings 1–9were discussed in the first meeting and readings10–17 in the second meeting. Teachers weresupposed to have studied each of the readingsbefore the meetings. Each meeting started offwith various questions and comments by theparticipants. The instructor intervened to facil-itate understanding of the issues involved.(Total time devoted to class discussions ¼ 12 h.)
(b)
Class presentations by the participants wereprogrammed during the 11th and the final weekof the course (Mon. to Sat., total time ¼ 44 h).On the first day of class all participants selected(by a draw) one of the 17 readings for apresentation. Each participant was assigned90min (30min for the presentation and 60minfor interventions and discussions). Each ofthe presentations was moderated by one ofthe participants. The instructor intervened whena deadlock was reached on an issue. It wasexpected that the participants would presentthe important aspects of the readings, withthe objective of generating critical discussions.All participants prepared PowerPoint presenta-tions.
(c)
During class presentations in the final week(11th week) participants were encouraged to asktheir questions in writing, which were then readout loud by the moderator. The presenters weregiven the opportunity to respond and then ageneral discussion followed. At the end of eachsession all written questions were submitted tothe instructor, which provided important feed-back with respect to issues, conflicts and
interests of the participants. Each participantsigned her/his question. The same procedurewas followed in all 17 presentations, generatinga considerable amount of data (a pool of 345questions and comments). Besides these data,the instructor also took class notes throughoutthe course. These data facilitated the corrobora-tion (triangulation of data sources) of partici-pants’ responses to the seven exam questions inthis study.

2.3. Course evaluation

All participants presented an Initial exam inthe first session and a Final exam during thelast session of the final week (11th). There wasno particular reason for labeling these evaluationsas ‘Initial’ or ‘Final’, except for the fact that,university regulations used these labels. However,the rationale behind these evaluations in thisstudy (could have been named differently) wasnot merely evaluation in the traditional sense.Both exams were ‘open book’ (about 3 h each)and participants were allowed to consult anymaterial that they felt could be helpful. Initial examreflected participants’ experience during the first10 weeks, including 12 h of class discussions.Final exam reflected an additional experience of36 h of class presentations and discussions duringthe final week. Furthermore, both exams werebased on the premise that oral presentations anddiscussions can be complemented by written re-sponses and thus facilitate greater understanding.This study is based on participants’ writtenresponses to four items of the Initial exam andthree items of the Final exam. These seven itemswere formulated in order to provide possibleanswers to the two objectives of this study. Theseven items included in the Initial and Final examsare presented below:

Initial exam

Item 1: What do you understand by constructi-vism?Item 2: Why are there so many forms ofconstructivism?Item 3: In your opinion, the present state ofconstructivism in science education can beconsidered as a paradigm, as conceived by Kuhn(1962)?Item 4: Which form of constructivism do youprefer?


Final exam

Item 5: Indicate one aspect of social constructi-vism that you do not share and suggest analternative.Item 6: Given the popularity of social constructi-vism, do you think it constitutes a paradigm(Kuhn, 1962)?Item 7: If scientific knowledge is tentative, do youthink that the present state of constructivismmust also evolve towards other forms?

Items 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Initial exam referexplicitly to the first objective of the study, viz.,various forms of constructivism are a consequenceof the proliferation of theories of scientific change.The four items form almost a logical sequence:participants’ personal understanding of what isconstructivism (Item 1), cognizant of the fact thatthere are many forms of constructivism (Item 2),constructivism as a Kuhnian paradigm (Item 3) andfinally participants’ preference for a particular formof constructivism (Item 4). Items 5, 6 and 7 (Finalexam) refer explicitly to the second objective of thestudy, viz., scientific knowledge is tentative, whichleads to rivalries and controversies in both scienceand constructivism. Item 5 explicitly asked theparticipants to be critical and suggest an alternative.Item 6 explicitly referred to social constructivism asa Kuhnian paradigm and Item 6 suggests thepossibility of new forms of constructivism.

2.4. Multiple data sources

Based on the different course activities this studygenerated the following data sources:

(a)
Question–answer sessions after each of the 17formal presentations, in which participantswrote their questions/comments (interventions),which were then discussed in class and latersubmitted to the instructor (a pool of 345questions and comments were generated).
(b)
Initial and Final exams during the final week,separated by 36 h of class presentations anddiscussions (total time ¼ 8 h).
(c)
Instructor’s class notes, based on the followingactivities throughout the course: class discus-sions during the 6th and 8th week of the course(total time ¼ 12 h), 17 formal presentationsduring the final week, question–answer sessionsafter each presentation. These notes consisted ofquotes from student (including their names)
interventions during presentations and discus-sions, accompanied by general comments.

(d)
Critical essay. As part of their evaluation allparticipants were required to submit a criticalessay based on any one or various readings. Theobjective of this essay was to present a critiquebased on epistemological, philosophical andmethodological aspects. This essay was sub-mitted 10 days after having finished the Finalexam, which provided the participants ampletime to reflect and elaborate their ideas.
At this stage it is important to emphasize the roleplayed by multiple data sources in educationalresearch (note: teachers in this study participated in56 h of various class activities). Given the nature ofthe paradigm wars (Gage, 1989; Howe, 1988),educational literature has suggested the need tomove beyond the quantitative versus qualitativeresearch designs and called for mixed methodsresearch, viz.,

yresearchers should collect multiple data usingdifferent strategies, approaches and methods insuch a way that the resulting mixture orcombination is likely to result in complementarystrengths (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p. 18).

Recent research considers the mixed methodsresearch as a new and emerging paradigm (Johnson& Christensen, 2004; Johnson & Turner, 2003;Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; Sale & Brazil, 2004).Qualitative researchers have also generally endorsedtriangulation of data sources and Guba and Lincoln(1989) consider that:

ytriangulation should be thought of as referringto cross-checking specific data items of a factualnature (number of target persons served, numberof children enrolled in a school-lunch programy)(p. 24, emphasis added).

More recently, Guba and Lincoln (2005) haveclarified that although qualitative and quantitativeparadigms are not commensurable at the philoso-phical level (i.e., basic belief system or worldview)still, ‘‘ywithin each paradigm, mixed methodolo-gies (strategies) may make perfectly good sensey’’(p. 200). Interestingly, however, Shulman (1986)had advocated the need for hybrid research designsmuch earlier:

These hybrid designs, which mix experiment withethnography, multiple regressions with multiple


case studies, process-product designs with ana-lyses of student mediation, surveys with personaldiaries, are exciting new developments in thestudy of teaching (p. 4).

Within this perspective, it is plausible to suggestthat this study has a hybrid research design. Researchreported here is based on actual classroom practiceand participants did not feel constrained by theresearch design. All the data generated (56h of classactivities) was based on regular classroom activities.Example of a similar study is provided by Niaz (2004).

2.5. Issues related to constructivism discussed in class

In order to facilitate participant teacher’s under-standing of constructivism, various aspects ofnature of science, history and philosophy of scienceand Kuhn’s philosophy were discussed in thefollowing readings:

(a)
Gallegos (1996) critiques inductivism within anepistemological perspective (Popper, Kuhn,Lakatos, Toulmin, Polanyi and Chalmers) andprovides a rationale for the different forms ofconstructivism.
(b)
Mellado (2003), Reading 2, establishes ananalogy between science teachers’ conceptualchange and various models of progress inscience, such as positivism, Popper, Kuhn,Lakatos, Toulmin and Laudan.
(c)
Matthews (2004), Reading 3, presents a criticalappraisal of Kuhn’s philosophy of science anddraws attention towards the uncritical accep-tance of his ideas by the science educationcommunity, and how this has influenced con-structivism.
(d)
Smith and Scharmann (1999), Reading 4, drawattention to the importance of nature of sciencefor science teachers and suggest the following asessential for understanding progress in science:Science is empirical, scientific claims are testa-ble/falsifiable, science is tentative and self-correcting.
(e)
Niaz (2001b), Reading 5a, critiques Smith andScharmann (1999) and suggests that the follow-ing aspects of nature of science also beincluded: Competition among rival theories,same experimental data can be interpreted inmore than one way (theory ladenness ofobservations) and inconsistent foundation ofsome scientific theories.
(f)
Scharmann and Smith (2001), Reading 5b, is aresponse to Niaz (2001b) and facilitates furtherunderstanding of the nature of science.
(g)
Blanco and Niaz (1997), Reading 7, drawattention to the epistemological beliefs ofchemistry teachers and students in Venezuelaand how that can affect their understanding ofprogress in science.
(h)
Petrucci and Dibar (2001), Reading 8, studiedunderstanding of the nature of science bystudents in Argentina.
(i)
Osborne et al. (2003), Reading 9, refer to thecontested nature of science and constructivismwithin the science education community.
(j)
Lin and Chen (2002), Reading 10, provide ateaching strategy for promoting preservicechemistry teachers’ understanding of the natureof science through history.
(k)
Lederman et al. (2002), Reading 11, providedetails of an instrument for assessment ofstudents’ conceptions of nature of science.
(l)
Moreno and Waldegg (1998), Reading 12,present Piagetian constructivism within a per-spective of psychogenesis and history of science.
(m)
Marın et al. (1999), Reading 13, present acritical appraisal of the various forms ofconstructivism (social, radical, human, Piage-tian).
(n)
Martınez (1999), Reading 14, presents a criticalappraisal of radical constructivism within aphilosophy of science perspective.
(o)
Gil-Perez et al. (2002), Reading 15, consider thepresent state of constructivism as that of anemergent consensus, that approximates to thatof Kuhn’s ‘normal science’.
(p)
Niaz et al. (2003), Reading 16, have critiquedGil-Perez et al. (2002) and drawn attention tonot a consensus but a continual criticalappraisal of constructivism within the scienceeducation community.
(q)
Abd-El-Khalick et al. (2004), Reading 17,discuss issues such as, constructivism, natureof science and inquiry learning within a historyand philosophy of science perspective.
This synopsis of the course content shows quiteclearly how participant teachers were constantlyprovided feedback with respect to constructivismand related topics such as nature of science, historyand philosophy of science. Furthermore, teachersparticipated and became aware of the continuingdebate on these topics.


3. Results and discussion

In this section participants’ responses to the sevenitems are presented and discussed. Participants inthis study had discussed various issues related toconstructivism in previous courses (cf. section,Rationale and Design of the Study), and were quitefamiliar with the controversial aspects of radicaland social constructivism. Furthermore, the pre-vious courses also provided a framework to under-stand the tentative nature of science based onhistorical controversies.

3.1. Participants’ responses to item 1 (What do you

understand by constructivism?)

All participants understood that knowledge is nottransmitted passively but rather constructed activelythrough the participation of the students andfollowing are some of the examples:

As an epistemological paradigm, the central ideaof constructivism is that individuals constructtheir own knowledgeyit recognizes that theobjective and value free nature of science is amyth popularized by positivism.

Constructivism is a heterogeneous movement,which has many variants, such as: contextual,dialectical, empirical, Piagetian, pragmatic, radi-cal, social, trivial, etc. The basic idea, however,is that an individual constructs her/his ownknowledge.

According to constructivism, learning is a socialand dynamic process in which the learnerconstructs its significance.

These responses show that for most participants,constructivism had many forms and that studentsplay an active part in the construction of theirknowledge.

Note: In order to provide reliability of results(triangulation of data sources), participants’ criticalessays and interventions during the 17 classpresentations were checked (see section Multipledata sources, for a pool of 345 questions andcomments). It was found that all 17 participantsexpressed similar ideas on at least two differentoccasions. It is important to note that Guba andLincoln (1989) consider such ‘cross-checking spe-cific data items of a factual nature’ (p. 241) as anessential part of triangulation of data sources.

3.2. Participants’ responses to item 2 (Why are there

so many forms of constructivism?)

All participants understood that the differentforms of constructivism in education are in responseto attempts at integration of psychology of learningto the epistemology of the construction of knowl-edge. Just as there are epistemological differenceswith respect to the construction of knowledge, weinevitably have different forms of constructivismand following are some examples of participants’responses:

It occurs to me that the different forms ofconstructivism are a consequence of the dy-namics of progress in science; we are wellaware of the ample range of considerations,conflicts and controversies in the last fewdecades. This provides evidence for the com-plex nature of scientific progress, and hencewe are far from having theories that aredefinitive.

Just as in science, the different postures inconstructivism reflect the considerations andpraxis of the scientist. In other words, science isnot rigid and various methods can be used tosolve the same problem.

The different forms of constructivism can beunderstood as depicted by Hilary Putnam’s ‘boatmetaphor’, in which people on different boatsform part of a fleet and thus provide not onlystimulus but also criticisms and sometimespeople abandon one boat in favour of another.[Comment: Putnam’s ‘boat metaphor’ was usedin Niaz et al. (2003), Reading 16, to illustratecritical appraisals of constructivism in scienceeducation. In both science and psychology, wemay have the same data and still our interpreta-tions may differ widely. The oil drop experiment(cf. Niaz, 2000, 2005b) is a good example ofhow two leading scientists (Millikan and Ehren-haft) interpreted very similar data in entirelydifferent ways. Similarly, Piaget is critiquedprimarily for his interpretations (cf. Carey,1986). The ‘boat metaphor’ thus helps to under-stand that parallel research progrmmes arealmost inevitable, especially due to the complex-ity of the problems.]

These responses show participants’ understand-ing with respect to the conflicts and controversies


involved in the construction of scientific knowledgeand that this inevitably leads to alternative forms ofconstructivism.

Note: In order to provide reliability of results(triangulation of data sources), participants’ criticalessays and interventions during the 17 classpresentations were checked (see pool of 345 ques-tions, in section on Multiple data sources). It wasfound that all participants expressed similar ideason at least two different occasions.

3.3. Participants’ responses to Item 3 (In your

opinion, the present state of constructivism in science

education can be considered as a paradigm, as

conceived by Kuhn, 1962?)

As compared to Items 1 and 2, this item providedthe participants with a bigger challenge and hencethe need to understand constructivism within anepistemological perspective. Nine participantsagreed (see Table 1) with the thesis that the present

Table 1

Profile of participants’ responses to different items (n ¼ 17)

Participant Item 3 Item 4

1 Agreed Integral

2 Agreed Social

3 Disagreed Social

4 Disagreed Social

5 Agreed Integral

6 Agreed Integral

7 Agreed Social

8 Agreed Integral

9 Agreed Integral

10 Disagreed Social

11 Agreed Radical

12 Disagreed Social

13 Disagreed Ausubel-Piaget

14 Disagreed Social

15 Disagreed Novak

16 Disagreed Dialectic

17 Agreed Social

Item 3: In your opinion, the present state of constructivism in science e

(1962)?

Item 4: Which form of constructivism do you prefer?

Item 5: Indicate one aspect of social constructivism that you do not sh

Item 6: Given the popularity of social constructivism, do you think it

Item 7: If scientific knowledge is tentative, do you think that the prese

Notes:

1. In Item 4, Integral means the integration of the different forms of

2. In Item 5, critical means that the participants explicitly pointed out

agreement with social constructivism.

state of constructivism in science education can beconstrued as that of a Kuhnian paradigm andfollowing are some of the examples:

The presence of so many forms of constructivism(Piagetian, radical, social, etc.) demonstrates howeach one of these [forms] critiques the otherbased on a particular paradigm. According toKuhn’s thesis of paradigmatic incommensurabil-ity this precisely shows that, scientific theoriesbased on different paradigms cannot be com-pared objectively.

Based on the idea that the degree of consensuswithin the scientific community denotes theparadigmatic character of a theory, the presentstate of constructivism in science education canbe considered as a Kuhnian paradigm.

These responses contrast sharply with respect tothose participants (n ¼ 8) who disagreed with thethesis that constructivism in science education could

Item 5 Item 6 Item 7

Critical Agreed Agreed

Uncritical Disagreed Agreed

Critical Disagreed Agreed




Uncritical Agreed Agreed



Critical Agreed Agreed








ducation can be considered as a paradigm, as conceived by Kuhn

are and suggest an alternative.

constitutes a paradigm (Kuhn, 1962)?

nt state of constructivism must also evolve towards other forms?

constructivism.

some aspect that they did not share. Uncritical means generally in


be construed as a Kuhnian paradigm and followingare some examples:

Different forms of constructivism in scienceeducation represent alternative interpretationsof progress in science based on limitations,conflicts and difficulties faced by the scientists.In contrast, Kuhn (1962) has emphasized theimportance of ‘normal science’ for scienceeducation, which ignores the rivalries and hencecompeting schools of thought.

A paradigm represents a position that has acquiredconsensus—well this is what we have been doingso far, viz., teaching ‘normal science’ and text-books represent a good example of this consensus.However, the debate that started in the 1970s(Piaget, Ausubel) and continues with differentforms of constructivism (radical, social, others),provides a scenario that can hardly be consideredas that of consensus and hence lack of a paradigm.

Responses to this item show that participantswere about equally divided with respect to depictingthe present state of constructivism in scienceeducation as a Kuhnian paradigm. Those in favorof this thesis argued that the many forms ofconstructivism was a manifestation of the incom-mensurability of scientific theories and hence couldbe understood as Kuhnian paradigms. Participantswho disagreed with the thesis, faced a dilemma:Textbooks presented a consensus view that approxi-mated Kuhn’s ‘normal science’, and still there weredifferent forms of constructivism which reflectedalternative interpretations of progress in science.The reference to textbooks and Kuhn’s ‘normalscience’ is interesting as in a previous course varioushistorical controversies and their presentation intextbooks were discussed (e.g., Niaz, 1998, 2000).

Note: In order to provide reliability of results(triangulation of data sources), participants’ criticalessays and interventions during the 17 classpresentations were checked (see pool of 345 ques-tions and comments). It was found that both groupsof participants (those who agreed or disagreed withthe thesis) expressed similar ideas on at least twodifferent occasions.

3.4. Participants’ responses to Item 4 (Which form

of constructivism do you prefer?)

This question was particularly difficult for theparticipants, as one may be critical of the different

forms of constructivism, and still have difficulty inhaving preference for a particular form. Followingresponse from one of the participants illustrates thedilemma faced by most:

Knowing the different forms of constructivism, itis difficult to have preference for any particularform. What I would prefer is the possibility ofhaving available all the forms so that I can pickand choose different elements according to thedilemma faced in the classroom. I must add,however, that I am more inclined towards socialconstructivism. [Comment: Many participantsexpressed a similar concern and finally inclinedtowards some form of constructivism.]

Despite a critical appreciation of most forms ofconstructivism, all participants finally did express apreference for some form of constructivism: Social ¼ 8,Integral ¼ 5, Radical ¼ 1, Novak ¼ 1, Ausubel andPiaget ¼ 1, Dialectic ¼ 1. One of the participants whopreferred social constructivism explained: ‘‘It providesan opportunity for interaction among students andteachers in a creative and dynamic process. The facet Ilike most is its emphasis on students’ prior knowledgeand experiences.’’ Following is an example of aresponse from a participant who preferred integrationof the different forms:

Although the different forms of constructivismhave their pro and contra, I would prefer ahybrid. Mixing of the different forms wouldadapt better to my classroom practice for thefollowing reasons: classes can be heterogeneous,possibility of applying different methodologiesand time available during the semester.

Note: In order to provide reliability of results(triangulation of data sources), participants’ criticalessays and interventions during the 17 classpresentations were checked (see pool of 345 ques-tions and comments). It was found that 15participants expressed a preference for the sameform of constructivism on at least four differentoccasions. Two of the participants expressed someambiguity with respect to their preferred form ofconstructivism.

3.5. Participants’ responses to Item 5 (Indicate one

aspect of social constructivism that you do not share

and suggest an alternative)

As compared to Items 1–4 (Initial exam),this item formed part of the Final exam in the


last session of the 11th week. Between the Initialand the Final exam participants engaged in 36h ofclassroom presentations, discussions and question–answer sessions, which provided considerableamount of experience with respect to the issuesbeing discussed and a good overview of thecomplexities involved. Interestingly, 12 participantscritiqued social constructivism for having over-emphasized the importance of prior knowledge ofthe students as the most important variable in theclassroom. Of these 12 participants, 10 suggestedthat as an alternative it is necessary to take intoconsideration the cognitive development of thestudents (1 participant suggested that the role ofthe teacher be emphasized). Following is an exampleof a response from this group of participants:

Initially, I was more disposed towards socialconstructivism. However, as I have reflected, Iconsider that the cognitive development of astudent is facilitated in the degree to which thesocial environment provides cognitive perturba-tions leading to: assimilation–accommodation–equilibration (Piaget).

Five participants were in general uncritical of socialconstructivism and only made minor observationsfor improvement and clarification, such as: Twoparticipants suggested that the rapidly changingnature of constructivism in science education, led toheterogeneity and overlapping among differentforms of constructivism and thus created confusion;1 participant disagreed with the metaphor of ‘childas a scientist’ and instead suggested ‘child as adeveloping scientist’; 2 participants considered thatmore work needs to be done in order to elucidatecriteria for student evaluation. These participantsreferred to the dilemma faced by Martha (Tobin &LaMaster, 1995) and Sarah (Glasson & Lalik,1993), that was discussed in the methodology coursein the previous year. Although both subscribed tosocial constructivism, Martha believed that theevaluation must include questions that only thevery capable students could answer, whereas Sarahbelieved that students should be evaluated based onwhat they have learned.

Note: In order to provide reliability of results(triangulation of data sources), participants’ criticalessays and interventions during the 17 classpresentations were checked (see the pool of 345questions and comments). The group of 12 partici-pants who critiqued social constructivism for havingoveremphasized prior knowledge of the students,

expressed similar ideas on at least two differentoccasions. The other group of 5 participants whowere generally uncritical of social constructivism,maintained a similar stance on at least two differentoccasions.

3.6. Participants’ responses to Item 6 (Given the

popularity of social constructivism, do you think it

constitutes a paradigm, Kuhn, 1962?)

It is important to note that this item is quitesimilar to Item 3 (Initial exam). There are, however,two important differences: (a) In Item 3, partici-pants were asked if they considered constructivismin general to be a Kuhnian paradigm, whereas inItem 6 the question refers to social constructivism;and (b) Item 6 formed part of the Final exam, whichmeans participants had considerably more experi-ence (36 h of classroom presentations and discus-sions). Fourteen participants did not agree thatsocial constructivism constitutes a paradigm andfollowing are some examples:

Social constructivism is very important, however,it cannot be considered a panacea, as in contra-position we also have other forms of constructi-vism. Observing from the Kuhnian point of view,social constructivism has not totally displacedanother theory, but on the contrary has gener-ated many controversies, which does not permit aconsensus within the scientific community. [Com-

ment: This response has important features: first,social constructivism has not displaced otherforms of constructivism, as would be expectedfrom the Kuhnian perspective, second instead ofa consensus we have many controversies, thirdhow the scientific community perceives the roleof different forms of constructivism.]

The Kuhnian position presupposes the idea of‘normal science’ which facilitates an emergentconsensus leading to a paradigm. Social con-structivism cannot be considered to be theconsensus in science education. Furthermore,consensus at best is a transitory feature ofscientific progress, both in science and education.[Comment: This response not only disagreed withrespect to social constructivism being a Kuhnianparadigm, but rather goes beyond by suggestinga Lakatosian thesis, namely progress in science isnot necessarily characterized by consensus butrather controversies.]


There will always be paradigms as we areconstantly engaged in controversies. We arealways in the pre-paradigmatic stage, that isengaged in the development of a researchprogram. Thus the different forms of constructi-vism cannot be considered as paradigms butrather research programs that are constantlyfaced with controversies. [Comment: This re-sponse draws attention to the fact that we donot have to understand the present state ofconstructivism as necessarily a paradigmaticmanifestation but rather a constant process ofcritical appraisals.]

Three participants agreed that social constructivismcan be considered a paradigm in the Kuhnian senseand following is an example:

Observing, how social constructivism is imple-mented in our educational system, especially atthe secondary level, it can be considered as aparadigm. In my opinion, scientific progressconsists of new paradigms that are more con-sistent and have more capacity for solvingproblems. In contrast, for many teachers socialconstructivism will solve all the problems in theirclassrooms. [Comment: This response raises animportant issue for the teachers and classroompractice. Given the popularity of social con-structivism, many teachers may construe this tobe a ‘panacea’ and thus consider its implementa-tion as simple and straight forward. It isinteresting to note that this participant (# 10,see Table 1) had disagreed on Item 3, as at thatstage constructivism did not seem to be verypopular. This precisely shows the importance ofunderstanding scientific progress in the historicalcontext, that is the tentative nature of science andhence the importance of critical appraisals bothin science and education. See Fig. 1 for details.]

At this stage it is important to compare resultsobtained in Items 3 and 6, as in both itemsparticipants were asked to evaluate the present stateof constructivism in science education as a Kuhnianparadigm. On Item 3 (Initial exam), 9 participantsagreed that constructivism could be conceived as aparadigm and 8 disagreed. In contrast, on Item 6(Final exam), only 3 participants agreed thatconstructivism could be conceived as a paradigmand 14 disagreed (see Table 1). Given the impor-tance for science educators to understand thephilosophical underpinnings of progress in science,

this could be interpreted as a progressive conceptualchange, providing greater understanding of con-structivism as a scientific theory. Failure to under-stand that research in science (and education) israrely free of controversy and that progress isintricately woven with the confrontation of ideas,can lead the teachers to consider constructivism as aplethora of ‘truths’ that can be memorized andapplied as an algorithm. Recent literature inphilosophy of science has recognized the role ofcontroversies in very clear terms:

Controversies are fated to arise when the newclaim does not fit with the accepted endoxa and thecommunity cannot neglect it. This creates aproblem of consistency that cannot be solvedunless the set of accepted endoxa is altered in someway or another. Rival parties then emerge withdifferent solutions as to how a remedy can befound for the anomaly, and which endoxa need tobe altered or modified. The deeper and wider thescope and effects of the needed alterations, thegreater and more important the controversy(Machamer, Pera, & Baltas, 2000, p. 16).

Although, these philosophers of science wererepresenting the role of controversy in scientificprogress, it reflects quite cogently the developmentof constructivism in science education during thelast three decades.

Note: In order to provide reliability of results(triangulation of data sources), participants’ criticalessays and interventions during the 17 classpresentations were checked (see pool of 345 ques-tions and comments). It was found that 14participants who disagreed also expressed similarideas on at least two different occasions. Again,the 3 participants who agreed also expressed similarideas on two different occasions.

3.7. Participants’ responses to Item 7 (If scientific

knowledge is tentative, do you think that the present

state of constructivism must also evolve towards other

forms?)

Interestingly, all 17 participants agreed that thepresent form of constructivism must eventuallydevelop and progress towards other forms ofconstructivism and following are some examples:

Due to the tentative nature of scientific knowl-edge—when constructivism does not provideconvincing answers for teaching science—when


new evidence contrasts with that provided byconstructivism—at that stage constructivism willstop being a panacea and undoubtedly musttransform into other forms. [Comment: Thedegree to which this response reflects the samebasic idea as that presented by philosophers ofscience, Machamer et al. (2000), cited above, isthought-provoking indeed, as these teachers werenot aware of this publication.]

The multiple contradictions and controversiesthat surround constructivism, show that there isno absolute truth and if scientific knowledge istentative, then this provides the base for theadvance of constructivism. [Comment: It isimportant to note that participants in this coursebeing chemistry teachers constantly referred tothe historical episodes that are represented inFig. 1 as markers (both for science and scienceeducation). All participants had a fair grasp ofthe historical context in which these atomicmodels developed through readings such as: Linand Chen (2002), Niaz (1998, 2000). Forexample, when Rutherford presented his modelof the atom, did that mean that the previousThomson model was not correct or not true.Participants were fully aware that in thisparticular context we cannot expect science toprovide an ‘absolute truth’.]

The present stage of constructivism must changeand improve—this is the nature of science andthat of the different epistemological, psychologi-cal and philosophical currents. Now, where dowe go? I do not know! [Comment: This response,like those of other participants, shows that theseteachers have grasped the idea that if constructi-vism is a scientific theory then it must continuallychange towards more progressive forms. Never-theless, this particular participant ends on anuncertain note (I do not know) as it is preciselythe teachers and classroom practice that can playa crucial role in the future development ofconstructivism.]

Note: In order to provide reliability of results(triangulation of data sources), participants’ criticalessays and interventions during the 17 classpresentations were checked (see pool of 345 ques-tions and comments). It was found that 7 partici-pants had expressed similar views on at least fourdifferent occasions (this group of participants haddisagreed on Items 3 and 6). The remaining 10

participants expressed similar views on at least twodifferent occasions.

4. Evidence for greater understanding of

constructivism

Research design of this study provided evidencefor transitions leading to greater understanding ofconstructivism by the participants. Different itemsof the Initial exam (first day of the last week) andthe Final exam (last day) were carefully selected forthis purpose. As the Initial and the Final examswere separated by 36 h of classroom activities anddiscussions, it is plausible to suggest that thefollowing comparisons provide evidence for greaterunderstanding: (a) Comparison of Item 3 (Initial

exam) and Item 6 (Final exam): In both itemsparticipants were asked to evaluate the present stateof constructivism as a Kuhnian paradigm. On Item3, 9 participants agreed that constructivism could beconceived as a Kuhnian paradigm. In contrast, onItem 6, only 3 participants agreed that socialconstructivism could be conceived as a paradigm(see Table 1). Most participants who experienced achange, reasoned cogently with respect to contro-versies in the development of constructivism andhence it could not be construed as a paradigm. Thisis a clear evidence for greater conceptual under-standing; (b) Comparison of Item 4 (Initial exam)

and Item 5 (Final exam): On Item 4, 8 participantsselected social constructivism as their preferredform of constructivism. On Item 5, based on theexperience gained in classroom discussions, 4 ofthese 8 participants were critical of social construc-tivism. This once again showed greater under-standing of the issues involved; (c) Comparison of

Item 2 (Initial exam) and Item 7 (Final exam): OnItem 2, all participants understood that the differentforms of constructivism were a consequence of thedifficulties/contradictions involved in understandingscientific change and hence a proliferation oftheories in both science and education. On Item 7,all participants went beyond by understanding thatthe contradictions faced by the existing forms ofconstructivism would inevitably lead to new formsof constructivism.

5. Conclusions and educational implications

The course content and the seven evaluationitems used in this study served as probes and at thesame time provided stimulus to participant teachers


to think beyond their initial understanding ofconstructivism. Item 1 facilitated the understandingthat construction of knowledge requires activeparticipation of learners. Item 2 suggested that thedifferent forms of constructivism represent compet-ing and conflicting interpretations of progress inscience. On Item 3, participants were about equallydivided with respect to accepting the present state ofconstructivism in science education as a Kuhnianparadigm. Given the popularity and influence ofKuhnian philosophy in education (Loving &Cobern, 2000; Matthews, 2004), the position ofthose who agreed with the thesis is not surprising.Interestingly, those who disagreed, argued cogentlywith respect to chemistry textbooks being represen-tative of Kuhn’s ‘normal science’ and thus ignoringalternative interpretations of progress in science.Item 4 referred to participants’ preference for aparticular form of constructivism, and eight pre-ferred social constructivism, whereas five suggestedintegration of the different forms according to theneeds and requirements of classroom practice. Items1–4 formed part of the Initial exam.

Item 5 formed part of the Final exam (whichprovided more time and opportunities to think andreflect) and asked participants to indicate one aspectof social constructivism that they did not share.Twelve teachers critiqued social constructivism foroveremphasizing the prior knowledge of the stu-dents and suggested that cognitive developmentneeds to be taken into consideration. Interestingly, 4of these 12 teachers had selected social constructi-vism as their preference in Item 4.

Item 6 explicitly asked participant teachers ifthey considered social constructivism as a Kuhnianparadigm. Fourteen participants disagreed (3agreed with the thesis) and argued cogently bypointing out that: (a) social constructivism, despiteits popularity, has not displaced other forms ofconstructivism; (b) there is no consensus in thescience education community with respect to con-structivism; and (c) we are always engaged incontroversies based on different research programs.Interestingly, of the 14 participants who disagreedwith the thesis that social constructivism constituteda Kuhnian paradigm, 7 had previously (Item 3)agreed that constructivism constituted a paradigm.This clearly facilitated greater understanding of theteachers with respect to constructivism and progressin science. Interestingly, a recent critique hasanalyzed constructivism in science education as aLakatosian research program and suggested that it

may be ‘degenerating’ or on the verge of ‘a morepromising candidate’ (Taber, 2006, p. 209).

Item 7 clearly provided teachers the experiencenecessary to understand that if scientific knowledgeis tentative, then constructivism must also evolvetowards more progressive forms. Arguments pre-sented by some of the participants provideevidence for such a conceptual change, such as:(a) when new evidence contrasts with that providedby the existing form of constructivism; (b) con-structivism cannot be a panacea; (c) contradictionsfaced by constructivism provide the base for itsadvance; (d) where do we go from here. This looksmore like an outline of a new research program andpossibly a response to, whither constructivism? Themost important aspect of these responses by theteachers is the understanding that it is precisely thecontradictions faced by the existing forms ofconstructivism that would facilitate alternative andrival theories, leading to new advances. This mayrequire more eclectic and perhaps pragmaticapproaches, which has been cogently argued byPerkins (1999):

The term constructivism, with its ideologicalovertones, suggests a single philosophy and auniquely potent method—like one of thosemiracle knives advertised on late-night TV thatwill cut anything, even tin cans. But we couldlook at constructivism in another way, more likea Swiss army knife with various blades forvarious needsyit’s high time we got pragmaticabout constructivism (p. 11).

This study has implications for teacher educationand in-service training. It is important for teachersto understand that constructivism cannot be appliedas an algorithm in the classroom, leading to apanacea. On the contrary, based on an explorationof the nature of science and its critical appraisal (cf.Units 1 and 2 of Course Content), this studyfacilitated a critical appraisal of the current statusof constructivism in science education (cf. Unit 3 ofCourse Content). For example, if the teachersconsider social constructivism as a Kuhnian para-digm, that may lead them to ignore the controver-sies with respect to the different forms ofconstructivism in science education. Even vonGlasersfeld has recently acknowledged that, ‘‘yradical constructivism is not a dogma and it doesnot claim to be ‘true’ ’’ (Interview with Cardellini,2006, p. 185).


Teachers in this study were exposed to a widerange of opinions with respect to constructivism,such as: Abd-El-Khalick et al. (2004), Gil-Perezet al. (2002), Marın et al. (1999), Martınez (1999),Matthews (2004), Moreno and Waldegg (1998),Niaz et al. (2003), and Osborne et al. (2003). It isimportant to note that teachers made considerableeffort to understand these readings based on formalpresentations (PowerPoint), followed by questio-n–answer sessions and critical essays. Teachersfound these readings interesting as they couldclearly identify the instructor’s position on variousissues and contrast them with other authors. Thisencouraged the participants to be critical as theyfound multiple opinions about the same issue. Atthis stage it is necessary to clarify that this studydoes not espouse a philosophically relativist theory.On the contrary, both science and psychologyprovide many good and useful answers to theproblems we face. Science curricula and textbooksin most parts of the world (Niaz, 2007), bear witnessto the fact that students and teachers do notunderstand the dynamics of scientific progress,neither in science nor in psychology/education. Inother words, most educational systems are simplyprescriptive, that is Bohr’s atomic model waswrong, Piaget’s theory of cognitive developmentand especially views on constructivism were wrong,etc. It would be more helpful if we make studentsand teachers understand as to how atomic modelshave evolved since Bohr and similarly how Piaget’stheory must be complemented with more recentdevelopments in cognitive psychology (progressiveproblemshifts, Lakatos, 1970).

Finally, a word of caution is necessary as under-standing constructivism inevitably involves thenature of science and psychology of learning, whichin turn requires multiple perspectives. In thisparticular study, constructivism and its criticalappraisal were developed within a history andphilosophy of science perspective and hence theimpression that only nature of science helps under-stand constructivism. In other words, our currentmodels are partial and incomplete, and furtherresearch and critical appraisals are needed to refineour models towards a more complex all-embracingand progressive constructivist approach. Althoughteachers in this study had fair amount of exposureto these areas of knowledge in this and the previouscourses, it is plausible to suggest that such coursesand readings become a permanent part of in-serviceteacher training programs.

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Documents

Whither constructivism?—A chemistry teachers’ perspective