WHAM Negative Updates

8/14/2019 WHAM Negative Updates

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SDI 2008 p. 1 of 125WHAM! Pre tournament supplement

*****AFFIRMATIVE UPDATES***** ......................................................................................4

AT DA LOST impact takeouts ...................................................................................................5

AT DA Lost Its bad for hegemony ............................................................................................6

AT CP Regulatory Negotiations ....................................................................................................8

AT DA Hedge funds .....................................................................................................................13

AT DA India Deal bad .................................................................................................................14

*****CELLULOSIC ETHANOL NEG***** ...........................................................................15

AT ADV Global Warming ...........................................................................................................16

AT ADV Dead Zones ....................................................................................................................17

AT ADV Economy ........................................................................................................................18

AT Solvency ..................................................................................................................................19

AT Solvency fast implementation fails extensions .................................................................21AT Solvency increases CO2 extensions ...................................................................................22

DA Politics Turns the case ........................................................................................................23

*****CHINA NEG***** .............................................................................................................24

CP States AT: Violates Constitution ...........................................................................................25

CP States AT States Cant Be Modeled ......................................................................................26

CP States AT: Federal Action is Key to Business Initiatives ....................................................28

CP States AT Federal Government will Pre-empt ....................................................................29

CP States AT: Uniform Action Bad ............................................................................................30

Chinese economic growth bad ....................................................................................................31

AT China will start wars .............................................................................................................33

*****DOD NEG***** .................................................................................................................34

CP Staqi 1NC (1/2) ......................................................................................................................35

CP Staqi 1NC (2/2) .....................................................................................................................36

CP Staqi Readiness Exts ...........................................................................................................37

CP Staqui AT: No Solvency Advocate .......................................................................................38

CP Staqi AT: CP Not Solve Afghanistan ....................................................................................39

CP Darpa will implement energy efficiency measures .............................................................40

AT Solvency ..................................................................................................................................41

DA Environment 1NC ..................................................................................................................44

DA Environment link extensions ................................................................................................45

DA Environment DA turns the case ........................................................................................46


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DA F-22 bad 1NC Shell ...............................................................................................................47

DA F-22 Uniqueness its on the chopping block .....................................................................48

DA Oil link .................................................................................................................................49

DA Oil link expander ...................................................................................................................50

T Substantially DOD specific ...................................................................................................51

T Substantial contextual definitions ...........................................................................................53

T Efficiency is not Alternative Energy .......................................................................................55

*****NUCLEAR POWER NEG***** ......................................................................................56

AT ADV Nuclear power choice is either nuclear power, climate change or poverty .... ......57

AT ADV Coal Clean coal tech increasing now .......................................................................58

AT ADV Coal Clean coal will reduce ghg ...............................................................................63

AT ADV Dependency Coal can reduce oil dependency .........................................................65

AT ADV Coal they say peak coal .........................................................................................66

CP States They can do clean coal .............................................................................................67

*****TRADABLE PERMITS NEG***** ................................................................................68

CP Tradable permits auctioning 1NC ........................................................................................69

CP Tradable permits auctioning 1NC .......................................................................................71

CP Tradable permits auctioning 1NC .......................................................................................72

CP Tradable permits grandfathering more popular than auctioning extensions ..................73

CP Tradable permits auctioning better for the economy and competitiveness extensions . . .74AT Solvency tradable permits ..................................................................................................78

AT ADV Banking Crisis ..............................................................................................................83

DA Coal links .............................................................................................................................84

*****Elections updates***** ......................................................................................................85

DA Politics McCain winning now Swing States generic ........................................................86

DA Politics McCain winning now Colorado ...........................................................................87

DA Politics McCain winning now Missouri ............................................................................88

DA Politics McCain winning Nevada ......................................................................................89

DA Politics McCain winning now - Pennsylvania .....................................................................90

DA Politics McCain winning now Evangelicals .....................................................................91

DA Politics Obama winning now generic ..................................................................................92

DA Politics Obama winning now Independents .....................................................................95

DA Politics Obama winning now Michigan ............................................................................96

DA Politics Obama winning now Pennsylvania .....................................................................97


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DA Politics Obama winning now Virginia ..............................................................................98

DA Politics Obama winning Wisconsin ...................................................................................99

DA Politics AT: Uniqueness overwhelms the Link ..................................................................100

Bush Political Capital Low Now ...............................................................................................101

Bush Political Capital Low Now ...............................................................................................102

Bush Political Capital High Now ..............................................................................................105

AT: Bush is a lame duck bills have failed ..............................................................................106

AT: Bush is lame duck in Middle East ....................................................................................107

DA Politics links Clean Coal ..................................................................................................108

DA Politics links hybrid tradable permits ............................................................................109

DA LOST New impact cards ..................................................................................................110

*****DA Oil Updates***** .......................................................................................................112

DA Oil AT Saudi economy diversified ......................................................................................113

DA Hedge Funds 1NC ................................................................................................................116

DA Hedge Funds Uniquenesshedge funds strong ................................................................118

DA Hedge Funds Link-AE decrease oil prices extensions ......................................................119

DA Hedge fund Impact extension-economy ............................................................................120

DA Hedge Fund Uniqueness-Perception key to oil prices (1/2) .............................................121

DA Hedge Fund Uniqueness-Perception key to oil prices (2/2) .............................................122

DA Hedge Fund Impact-Volatility outweighs war/terror .......................................................123DA Hedge fund Impact Calculus ..............................................................................................124

DA Hedge Fund Overview .........................................................................................................125


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*****AFFIRMATIVE UPDATES*****


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AT DA LOST impact takeouts

LOST wont improve our forward deployment or power projection.

Gabriel Malor, September 27, 2007, The Law of the Sea Treaty is a Bad Idea,http://malor.wordpress.com/2007/09/27/the-law-of-the-sea-treaty-is-a-bad-idea/

Former Secretaries of State James Baker and George Shultz had an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal yesterdayentitled Why the Law of the Sea Is a Good Deal. They take the usual strategy for LOST advocates:touting treaty benefits that we already possess under customary international law and domestic law.

Our participation would increase our ability to wage the war on terror. The convention assures maximummaritime naval and air mobility, which is essential for our military forces to operate effectively. It providesthe stability and framework for our forces, weapons and materials to be deployed without hindrance ensuring our ability to navigate past critical choke points throughout the world. Its almost insulting that thesecretaries start with the War on Terror, as if the mere invocation of those words will line people up insupport of whatever they are selling. In this case, they ignore the the fact that the passage of shipsthrough straits within territorial waters, critical choke points, has long been protected under

customary international law. For example, in the 1949 Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ held that there is

no right for coastal States to prohibit [innocent] passage through straits in time of peace. LOSTincorporates this rule of customary law, but goes further in providing exceptions. For example, LOSTmember states can deny innocent passage to ships which engage in any threat or use of force in violation

of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Given the incorrect-but-widespread perpetuation of the Illegal Iraq War meme, it is not a stretch to imagine states attempting toapply this provision of the treaty against the U.S. What happens if we join the treaty and another state raisesan objection to our passage? According to the Treaty, we are required to take our dispute to a newinternational court, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Somehow, the secretaries pass that offas a good thing: Some say its good enough to protect our navigational interests through customary law. Ifthat approach fails, then we can employ the threat of force or the use of it. However, because customary lawis vague, it does not provide a strong foundation for critical national security rights. Meanwhile, the use offorce can be risky and costly. Joining the convention would put our vital rights on a firmer legal basis,

gaining legal certainty and legitimacy as we operate in the worlds largest international zone. Only

there is no guarantee that the Tribunal will be impartial. Even worse, by the time the Tribunal can be

convened, it is a certainty that the U.S. will already have moved its ships through the contested area.

Any decision by the Tribunal will be mere post-hoc sniping. In other words it doesnt make a

confrontation between the U.S. and other countries any less likely.


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AT DA Lost Its bad for hegemony

Passing LOST would undermine our ability to use force at sea.

The Boston Herald, October 7, 2007, EDITORIAL, lexis, nnahttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4242886638&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4242886641&cisb=22_T4242886640&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=145223&docNo=3

The Bush administration wants the Senate to ratify a new incarnation of the Law of the Sea Treaty. Nomatter how dressed up, though, the treaty should be rejected. The treaty would effectively abolish the

freedom of the United States to use force at sea on the rare occasions when the national interest

requires it. Instead, there would be compulsory arbitration. Can you imagine President Ford sending toarbitration the Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez in 1975? He sent the Marines. Or President Reaganarbitrating Libya's claim of the Gulf of Sidra as territorial waters? He sent two aircraft carriers in 1986,which sank or damaged four Libyan patrol boats and knocked out a missile battery that disputed the carriers'

passage. Suppose it had fallen to a U.S. warship, instead of Israeli forces, to intercept the Karine A carrying50 tons of weapons from Iran to Gaza in 2002. President Bush would have been insane to call forarbitration. The treaty purports to uphold the long-established right of ``innocent passage'' throughterritorial waters. But it says ships on such passage may not commit ``any act aimed at collectinginformation to the prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal state'' and ``submarines and other

underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag.'' That would shutdown a major source of intelligence, eavesdropping on telecommunications of potential enemies by

submarines lurking out of sight close to shore. It's a good bet that the Navy's subs have been brushing upagainst whatever China and Iran use for lobster pots. One wonders if the Pentagon officials who endorse thetreaty have even read it. The treaty went into effect for 120 nations in 1994. President Clinton soughtratification then, but the Senate refused to take it up. There is now an International Seabed Authority toregulate mining on the ocean floor, an unneeded job-creating machine for international bureaucrats. U.S.companies are not likely to prospect at sea without ratification, but that's a small price to pay for retaining the

Navy's freedom of action.

Passing LOST would put our transit powers at the whim of an International tribunalPHILLIP E. BAYSTON, June 27, 2007, Chattanooga Times Free Press, First Things First event a big success,lexis, nna

http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4242913996&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4242913999&cisb=22_T4242913998&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=155832&docNo=5

Law of the Sea Treaty is bad for America In 1982 the United Nations spawned the Law of the Sea Treaty tocreate a global bureaucracy allegedly to manage the ocean and its resources. It would give management oftwo-thirds of the Earth's surface to another unaccountable international body, all allegedly to ascertain thethird world got a "fair" share, regardless of any contribution. President Reagan refused to sign. Pastexperience with U.N. participation has not generally been in the best interest of the United States because ofanti-American agendas. The 202-page treaty signed by 153 countries does not improve the U.S. position.Our country would have the same vote as Cuba. We surrender our sovereignty, independence of action andwealth. The law grants power to levy international taxes transferring our wealth to socialist, anti-Americannations. All ocean research, exploration, minerals and transit requires authorization. The InternationalTribunal would have sole authority to decide disputes and enforce judgments without appeal or

restrictions. Our sovereignty, national security and economic interests would be controlled by othernations. Alarmingly, President Bush is soliciting support. Our House and Senate representatives should beinfluenced


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Lost will surrender freedom of movement for our ships and submarines.

Chattanooga Times Free Press, November 8, 2007, Surrender us to whom?, lexis, nnahttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T4242913996&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T4242913999&cisb=22_T4242913998&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=155832&docNo=2

To what international body would you like to surrender some of your freedom and the sovereignty of the

United States of America? Would you like for the United Nations to take over more control? Would you liketo be under the International Court at the Hague, Netherlands? How about subjecting much of our control toan International Seabed Authority in Hamburg, Germany? Or maybe you wonder why anyone in Americawould even consider surrendering any American freedom or American independence to any entanglementsunder an international treaty that would make our country just one party to a body of about 155 or moreforeign nations. Most of those countries are backward, far from being democratic, certainly do not share our

personal or national values, and some are openly antagonistic toward the United States. And most would loveto dictate to us and force us to pay them taxes! If those prospects do not appeal to you, you should tell ourUnited States senators to vote against a very bad and dangerous "Law of the Sea Treaty" that is being

proposed for ratification. Sen. Trent Lott, R-Miss., summed the situation up succinctly when he said: "If youwant a U.N. on steroids, you want the Law of the Sea Treaty." What's this all about? The treaty seeks tohave us surrender control of more than two-thirds of the earth's surface -- about 70 percent -- to the control ofirresponsible international authorities. The Law of the Sea Treaty was first proposed in 1982 in an effort to

establish an international legal regime for international control of waters outside our 200-mile coastal area.President Ronald Reagan opposed Senate ratification and it has never been taken up -- till now. So far, 154nations have ratified it and a push is on for the U.S. Senate to make the grave mistake of giving approval. As

bad as the U.N. is, the United States does have veto power in the U.N. Security Council. The United Stateswould have no such power under the Law of the Sea Treaty. Why should we limit ourselves to anyinternational control of such things as mining and the movement of our submarines and other ships in

the oceans -- and have us pay taxes to numerous backward foreign nations if American companies

engage in productive enterprises under sea waters? The treaty, if ratified, would subject us to all sorts

of unpredictable international dictation and controls by nations that certainly do not have any interest

in our freedom or the welfare of the United States. The proposed treaty has 320 articles and nine annexes.If you asked for a show of hands among the 100 senators, how many of them do you think would claim theyhave even read the thing -- much less understood its complex terms and possible ramifications? Do youunderstand such things as "Anadromous stocks" and "Catadromous Species"? We do not think most senatorsunderstand, either. But the treaty covers them. Do you want to be under the "Jurisdiction of the SeabedDisputes Chamber"? Shockingly, alarming, the horrifying Law of the Sea Treaty has been mistakenlyapproved by a 17-4 vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and seems to be headed for a vote bythe full Senate. Distressingly, it is likely to receive approval by a majority of the senators -- but fortunately,ratification requires a two-thirds majority. So the votes of 34 senators can prevent a mistake of proportionsthat neither proponents nor opponents can accurately predict. Let us pray that 34 or more senators will vote"No" and kill ratification! A great deal of U.S. freedom and sovereignty is at risk. And we do not believemany senators and most Americans understand the far-reaching ramifications of this treaty proposal.


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AT CP Regulatory Negotiations

Perm do the plan and all non mutually exclusive parts of the counterplan

Too late the regulatory negotiation was already done. The nuclear industry agreed to

certain conditions and regulations including contributing to a fund for nuclear wastedisposal in exchange for the federal government creating a permanent repository. The

industry met their commitments but the federal government hasnt met theirs. No future

reg neg can work since the industry doesnt trust the government to meet their obligations.Watkiss 8, staff writer, Electric Light and Publishing, May/June 2008 Edition, Lexis. tk

Temporary or interim storage in dry casks, pending completion of Yucca Mountain or some other permanentdeep geologic storage, remains an economically viable and secure option, but violates the 1982 Act pursuantto which nuclear utilities agreed to pay the federal government a fee of a tenth of a cent per kilowatt hour andthe government agreed to begin taking control of their nuclear wastes for transport to permanent storage

beginning in 1998. The government's 20-year-plus breach of this agreement has resulted in 60 lawsuitsagainst the Department of Energy, damage awards of $342 million as of February 2007, and ultimate liability

projected at $7 billion if Yucca Mountain opens for business as currently projected in 2017, or $11 billion ifthat date slips to 2021 as is widely expected. Recently, Congress mandated the DOE to study potential

temporary storage for high-level nuclear waste in order to demonstrate that the nation is capable of movingforward "in the near term with at least some element of nuclear waste policy." But the DOE balked,contending that interim storage "is clearly not the solution" and argued that the 1982 Nuclear Waste PolicyAct bars the DOE from taking title to spent fuel until after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission grants alicense for the permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. A self-imposed June 2008 deadline for submittingthe application to license Yucca Mountain was recently postponed.


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No solvency agency decisions about membership, details not covered in reg-neg sessions,

and heightened sensitivity.

Cary Coglianese, April 1997, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy Schoolof Government, and Affiliated Scholar at Harvard Law School, TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL ADMINISTATIVELAW ISSUE: ARTICLE: ASSESSING CONSENSUS: THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF

NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING, RKS, Lexis Nexis Academic.

In seeking consensus over the s ubstance of regulations, negotiated rulemaking has long been considered a means of reducing conflict in the regulatory process. Yet formalnegotiation can actually foster conflict. It adds three new sources of conflict stemming from decisions

about membership on negotiated rulemaking committees; the consistency of final rules with negotiated

agreements; and the potential for an overall heightened sensitivity to adverse aspects of rules. The first

of these new sources of conflict stems from agency decisions about membership on negotiated

rulemaking committees. As discussed above, the criteria for negotiated rulemaking have [*1323] led agencies to

prefer rules that affect a limited range of parties. n297 Even with this tendency, agencies have sometimes still not been able to include all theorganizations who feel they will be affected by a rule. Although the Negotiated Rulemaking Act insulates the agency from judi cial review of its decisions about membership on

negotiated rulemaking committees, n298 the exclusion of groups from membership on the committees adds a source of

discontentment not otherwise present in notice-and-comment rulemaking. The decision to use a select

committee whose representatives will develop a draft rule apparently attracts even closer scrutiny by

organizations not represented at the negotiating table. Not surprisingly, the EPA has been criticized by parties who were not invited toparticipate on the agency's negotiation committees. In the asbestos rule, for example, the negotiations were temporarily disrupted while additional parties sought to participate in thenegotiations. n299 In the disinfectant byproducts negotiation, the chlorine industry complained that it had been "unfairly excluded" from full participation in the negotiatedrulemaking. n300 As I have already shown, the reformulated gasoline rule elicited a legal challenge from a tank truck trade association which was n ot represented on the negotiated

rulemaking committee, n301 as well as trade challenges from two countries not included on the committee. n302 The negotiations over the Grand Canyon visibility rule and the wood

furniture coatings rule also prompted litigation by groups not participating on the negotiation committee. n303 One organization alone is capable

of upsetting a consensus built on unanimity or filing a petition for judicial review. Consequently, even a

small number of excluded parties can pose a threat to the effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking. In Kerwinand Langbein's study, twelve percent of the respondents reported that they had to "press" the EPA to let them participate. n304 [*1324] Thirty-five percent of those same respondentsreported that at least one affected interest was not represented at the negotiating table, a noteworthy finding considering that it is based on responses by those who were represented.

n305 The likelihood that an agency excludes even one organization from a negotiated rulemaking

committee poses an inherent threat to the effectiveness of a procedure that depends on consensus to

foreclose litigation. In addition to conflict over committee membership, negotiated rulemaking adds conflict over the

meaning of any consensus and the extent to which an agency's decision reflects that meaning.

Sometimes conflicts arise simply between participants over what each thinks a negotiated agreement

means. In the disinfectant byproducts rule, for example, a representative from the Natural Resources Defense Council reportedly criticized the American Water WorksAssociation for subsequently urging EPA to set action levels rather than the more stringent maximum contaminant levels NRDC supported in the negotiation. n306 AWWA thought itsposition was consistent with the negotiations because it only agreed to support maximum contaminant levels once the agency could provide adequate microbial data. n307

Conflicts can also arise over what was not agreed to in the negotiated agreement - what might be

termed expressio unius disputes. These disputes center on whether a negotiated agreement's silence onan issue reflects an agreement that the agency take no action. n308 In the reformulated gasoline case, the American Petroleum Institutecharged that EPA's decision to impose second phase nitrogen oxide standards contravened the agreement because the agreement did not address second phase standards. n309 TheEPA rejected API's administrative petition, concluding that the agreement's silence allowed the agency to proceed without retreating from the consensus. n310 [*1325] More

notably, conflicts arise over the extent to which the agency has adhered to the stated terms of the

negotiated agreement. For example, in the reformulated gasoline case, the petroleum indus try felt betrayed by the EPA's subsequent decision to issue a separate rulefavorable to the ethanol industry. n311 Similarly, in the Department of Education's s tudent loan rulemaking, loan servicers charged that the Department breached commitments itmade during the negotiated rulemaking. n312 More recently, the petroleum industry criticized the Department of Interior's Minerals Management Service when it decided to reopen

the comment period over its natural gas royalties rulemaking. n313 Without an attempt at negotiated rulemaking, these conflicts

over the commitment of the agency to a negotiated agreement could not arise. The third way

negotiated rulemaking can add conflict is by heightening the sensitivity of the parties to adverse

portions of a rule. Negotiated agreements raise expectations. When the agency does not follow the

negotiated agreement, the existence of the agreement itself stirs up dissatisfaction.For example, consider aconventional rulemaking in which an agenc y fails to follow the input provided by an affected organization. In that case, t he organization has mainly to complain about how adverselythe rule affects its interests and how its comments were not accepted. If the agency were to enact the very same rule in contravention of a negotiated agreement, the organizationwould suffer both the adverse effects of the rule as well as the impression that it had been "sandbagged." n314 Such a reaction in this latter case would seem even more likely if the

organization had compromised on other portions of the rule in order to secure gains on the portion subsequently undercut by the agency. Even if the underlying rule were the same inboth cases, we would expect the organization to perceive its interests to be more severely aggrieved in the latter case. n3 15 Similarly, we might expect representatives of organiza-[*1326] tions excluded from a negotiation committee to react more acutely to an adverse portion of a rule if they knew the rule was developed in explicit consultation with otherorganizations having potentially divergent interests. In a more general sense, we can expect negotiated rulemaking to heighten conflict simply because of the intensity with whichgroups scrutinize the rules that are the subject of negotiations. One side benefit often attributed to negotiated rulemaking is that it facilitates learning, both by agency staff and interest

group representatives. n316 The additional time and resources groups devote to discussing rules developed through

negotiation provides greater awareness of the issues underlying the rule. n317 When groups invest

these additional resources in negotiation, their representatives presumably also learn more about how

aspects of the rule may adversely affect their group interests. Groups may also find that the more time

they invest in a rulemaking proceeding, the less willing [*1327] they are to overlook imperfections in

the rule. In these ways, the quest for consensus unintentionally contributes new sources of conflict to

the regulatory process that can limit negotiated rulemaking's ability to reduce rulemaking time and

litigation.


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No Solvency consensus building.

Cary Coglianese, April 1997, Assistant Professor of Public Policy, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy Schoolof Government, and Affiliated Scholar at Harvard Law School, TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL ADMINISTATIVELAW ISSUE: ARTICLE: ASSESSING CONSENSUS: THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF

NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING, RKS, Lexis Nexis Academic.Even if a search for consensus could avoid creating new kinds of conflicts, negotiated rulemaking still would

have a difficult time succeeding in many cases for another reason altogether. Any procedure that dependsfor its success on the maintenance of a consensus is, given the realities of the federal regulatory process,

fighting uphill. n318 A consensus forged at the earliest stages of the rulemaking process is inherently

fragile because the structure of the American administrative state provides numerous opportunities for

that consensus to unravel. Even if all the participants in the negotiated rulemaking reach a consensus,

the agency must still prepare a preamble to a proposed rule and provide an opportunity for public

comment on that proposal. n319 If the public comment period is to be meaningful, the agency mustconsider changing the proposed rule in light of any negative comments it receives on a proposal, even if sucha change entails a retreat from a consensus. n320 In addition, during the development of the proposedand final rule, the agency receives input from the Office of Management and Budget (and sometimes otherexecutive branch officials) which may lead the agency to modify features of a rule. n321 Members ofCongress [*1328] may step in and attempt to pressure the agency or change the underlying statute in such away as to disrupt the consensus. n322 As we have seen, other interest groups may also challenge the rule

in court, which can lead an agency to change the rule further. n323 Finally, even if a consensus reachedduring the early stages of rulemaking could remain intact through all the subsequent stages, theagency can decide at a later time to revise the rule. n324 Theories predicting the success of negotiated

rulemaking are based on the assumption that everyone who could ever conceivably take an interest in

a rule will come to a complete and stable agreement on every particular aspect of that rule. If that couldhappen throughout government as well as throughout the interest group community, a rule could theoreticallysail undisturbed through the entire rulemaking process. Yet what is theoretically possible is different thanwhat is realistically probable. The intervention by a few well-placed agency managers, or by OMB, theWhite House, or Congress, can lead to modifications that begin the unravelling of a consensus. It onlytakes one interest group excluded from the negotiation, or one included but defecting group, to begin

unravelling the consensus from outside government. n325 Any heightened sensitivities created by theprocess of reaching a consensus may serve to accelerate the breakdown of consensus. In practice, thefact that agencies are embedded within a dynamic political environment makes maintaining consensus a bitlike building a house of cards. n326 [*1329]

No Solvency Regulatory Negotiations cant work without involving all the relevant

parties and thats virtually impossible.

John S. Applegate, Fall 1997, Writer for the Northern Kentucky Law Review, SPECIAL ESSAY:COMPARATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES PROJECTS: A FORUM, NOT AFORMULA, RKS, Lexis Nexis Academic.

Collaborative decision making has been discussed most extensively in connection with proposals forregulatory negotiation. n108 Regulatory negotiation proponents identify many of the same defects ofadversarial decision making that deliberative democratic theorists do, but the collaborative decision

making advocates see the problem in instrumental terms. That is, the problem with adversarial regulationis not a democratic deficit, but regulations that are unduly rigid or unnecessarily costly or ineffective becauseeach side was unwilling to listen to the information provided and points of view of the others. Win-win

solutions are lost to the struggle for victory by one side or the other. While the goal of dialogue is the same,one of the real weaknesses of regulatory negotiation is its failure to involve a broad cross-section of

affected persons. n109 Such negotiations remain largely the preserve of the environmental cognoscenti-persons with technical expertise who regularly deal with each other on these issues. This excludes

ordinary citizens who are affected by the decisions or who are simply interested in them. Therefore,while this version of collaborative decisionmaking fails as a device for democratic decisionmaking, itreinforces, on technocratic grounds, the case for deliberative processes.


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No solvency administrative agencies cant account for the diversity of public interests.

American Bar Association, No Date Cited, American Bar Association, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKINGAND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, RKS, http://www.abanet.org/dispute/essay/goldfiend.doc.

Most criticism of reg-neg, however, hinges on the second argument: that administrative agencies areuniquely able to discern the public interest. ProfessorFunk, for example, embraces the notion of theagency as rational expert, seeking the one true answer that best reflects the needs of the nation. He

states that: Underlying the APA and all other statutes directing or authorizing agencies to adopt regulationsis the notion that the agency will be acting in the public interest. While this is undoubtedly true, he franklyadmits that [w]hat is meant by the public interest is not always clear. Funkthen demonstrates(perhaps unintentionally) the truth of his own observation, in offering his own definition of the publicinterest: I mean it to be the best interests of the nation, the people, the body politic. Funksdefinition does little more than substitute one word (best) for another (public). This troublesome

wordbestbegs the question, however, and Funks circular argument seems to comes down the

assertion that the agency must avoid collaboration and make the decision alone, becausewell, becausethats what the theory says. Similarly, Michael McCloskey echoes this concern about movingtowards explicit collaboration in the production of administrative regulations. McCloskey focuses hisconcern on the use of consensus as a rule of decision in such negotiations, calling this a prescription forfrustrating the national will of the majority. McCloskey argues that: [T]he consensus rule serves tooverthrow the basic suppositions of representative democracy. Instead of the direction of public policy

being set by those garnering the greatest support among the electorate, those directions would be setby collaborations in which those with little support can thwart the will of the majority. This turns

democracy on its head. Ironically, the consensus rule allows minorities to veto progress along certain

lines. This seems an odd claim coming from the (then) Chairman of the Sierra Club, a group that hasdevoted itselfadmirably in my opinion to challenging the correctness of decisions made by these veryadministrative agencies.

[*Funk is a Professor and McCloskey is the Chairman of the Sierra Club*]

No Solvency Reg neg takes time, hundreds of hours of labor and effort, do not do what

they are intended to do, and produce indefensible and ineffective policies

David H. Rosenbloom, 1996, Marcel Dekker New York, Public Administration and Law, RKS,http://books.google.com/books?id=qjtNMdIFtVAC&pg=PA81&lpg=PA81&dq=reg+neg&source=web&ots=WeBzT

e_wkL&sig=TvSRy48SQMcyjJzY746ocWD5g3I&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPA81,M1.

Despite the positives of this relatively new approach, regulatory negotiation has been used only sparingly.The EPA, for example, routinely finalizes an estimated 100 regulations a year, but uses reg-neg an

average of only two to three times a year. The reasons for this are several. Reg-neg is time consuming.The average reg-neg process at the EPA takes nearly two years (Polkinghorn, 1994). Tied in with this,reg-negs require a tremendous infusion of labor; parties must be willing to dedicate hundreds of hours

to such an effort. Several authors have expressed not only practical, but theoretical concerns with reg-

neg. The first concern is that reg-neg participants may not be truly representative of the interests of

society at large (Fiorino, 1988:769; Bingham, 1986:77-83; Rushefsky, 1984:142-147; Wald, 1985: 18-22).The second concern is that the final outcome may be more reflective of the needs of the parties as they

seek consensus, and less reflective of defensible, fact-based standards and principles (Fiorino, 1988;Reich, 1985; Eisenberg, 1976).


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No Solvency Reg Negs are very time consuming, their benefits are speculative, and wont

help enforcement.

Susan Rose-Ackerman, April 1994, Duke University School of Law, Consensus versus Incentives: A SkepticalLook at Regulatory Negotiation, RKS, JSTOR.

According to Improving Regulatory Systems, the aims of regulatory negotiation are to reduce the time ittakes to put a rule into effect and to obtain high levels of compliance.18 Because affected parties have signed

on to the negotiated regulation, they may be both less likely to challenge the rule in court and more likely tocomply with it. However, as the authors of the report recognize, regulatory negotiation under current lawintroduces an extra step that is time-consuming and difficult. One observer ad- vised participants to

expect a "roller coaster experience."19 Even though regulatory negotiation may shorten the regulatoryprocess in terms of calendar time,20 the actual hours of participant time may be greater than underother regulatory procedures.21 Al- though a number of regulatory negotiations have been success- ful,22the claims of widespread benefits are mostly speculative. And when it comes to enforcing the

regulation, reg neg may not help significantly; even for rules promulgated by standard methods,

compliance seems high.23

Reg Negs are time consuming Prefer the plan over the CP

Ellen Siegler, April 1997, Duke Law Journal, REGULATORY NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER RULEMAKINGPROCESSES: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES FROM AN INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT, RKS,

http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?46+Duke+L.+J.+1429.Finally, of course, the reg neg involves intense negotiations at the formal reg neg table, at whichrepresentatives of state and [*pg 1432] federal agencies, public interest environmental groups, andperhaps others, join industry representatives. Building enough trust among these groups to reach an

agreement is a long and difficult undertaking. The complex and cumbersome nature of the reg neg processis one reason why API does not greet with enthusiasm invitations to participate in a reg neg.

Reg Negs fail failure to incorporate constituents

Angela Libby Jankousky, April 2000, EME Solutions, Inc., Winning at Regulatory Negotiation, RKS, eme-solutions.com/images/Winning%20at%20Regulatory%20Negotiation.doc.

Before beginning agency negotiations, establish a process to frequently update association members viameetings, conference calls, updates on your Web site, newsletters, faxes, or e-mails. "It is important to

provide some way for those who are not members of the negotiating team to respond and provide feedback tothe negotiators," says Suzanne Ghais, a program manager with CDR Associates, a mediation, training, andconsulting organization based in Boulder, Colorado. "Many negotiations fail because negotiators workcooperatively with the other parties but don't bring their constituents along, and ultimately the

constituents (in this case, association members) won't approve the deal."


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AT DA Hedge funds

Non unique -shortage and China/IndiaIsmael Hossein-Zadeh, Globalization and oil market expert, 7/10/2008, Global research, Is there an OilShortage, AB, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9557

The popular perception of the recently skyrocketing oil price is that there is an oil shortage in global

energy markets. The perceived shortage is generally blamed on the Organization of PetroleumExporting countries (OPEC) forinsufficient production, or on countries like China and India fortheir increased demand for energy, or on both. This perception is reinforcedindeed, largelyshapedby the Bush administration and its neoconservative handlers who are eager to deflectattention away from war and geopolitical turbulence as driving forces behind the skyrocketing energy

prices.

Non uniqueMiddle East warIsmael Hossein-Zadeh, Globalization and oil market expert, 7/10/2008, Global research, Is there an OilShortage, AB, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9557

The answer, in a nutshell, is: war and geopolitical instability in oil markets. Contrary to the

claims of the champions of war and militarism, of the Wall Street speculators in energymarkets, and of the proponents of Peak Oil, the current oil price shocks are caused largely by thedestabilizing wars and political turbulences in the Middle East. These include not only the raging wars

in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also the danger of a looming war against Iran that would threaten the

flow of oil out of Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz.

Oil investment is volatile now-Any little single comment by politician or investment banker

Industry Standard [June 9, 2008, http://www.thestandard.com/predictions/oil-prices-spike-150-barrel-july downloaddate: 7-6-08]

Oil prices have been on a roller-coaster ride this year, sensitive to all kinds of events, ranging from a

weak US dollar to a single comment made by a politician to a prediction by investment bank Morgan

Stanley.

Oil prices depend on the DollarMacDonald '08 [Elizabeth, Fox Business Network stocks editor, "Part Two: Oil Speculators vs Supply and Demand," July 1,http://emac.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2008/07/01/part-three-oil-speculators-vs-supply-and-demand/ download date: 7-7-08]

And a key driver is the strength of the US dollar. Since oil is traded in dollars, the plunging value of theUS dollar likely has traders scrambling, as the amount earned from future oil sales may get slammed

as the dollar loses real value.
http://www.thestandard.com/predictions/oil-prices-spike-150-barrel-julyhttp://www.thestandard.com/predictions/oil-prices-spike-150-barrel-julyhttp://emac.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2008/07/01/part-three-oil-speculators-vs-supply-and-demand/http://www.thestandard.com/predictions/oil-prices-spike-150-barrel-julyhttp://emac.blogs.foxbusiness.com/2008/07/01/part-three-oil-speculators-vs-supply-and-demand/


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AT DA India Deal bad

Non-unique Congress recently passed a housing bill and Bush will sign it

Julie Hirschfeld Davis, AP writer, 7-26-08, Despite reservations, Bush ready to sign mortgage relief for 400,000strapped homeowners, http://www.newsday.com/business/nationworld/ats-ap-congress-housingjul26,0,7211787.story

WASHINGTON - Congress approved mortgage relief for 400,000 struggling homeowners Saturday aspart of an election-year housing plan that also aims to calm jittery financial markets and bolster the

sagging economy. President Bush said he would sign it promptly, despite reservations. The measure,regarded as the most significant housing legislation in decades, lets homeowners who cannot afford

their payments refinance into more affordable government-backed loans rather than losing their

homes. It offers a temporary financial lifeline to troubled mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pillars of the home loan market whose losses have sparked investor fears and tightens controls over thetwo government-sponsored businesses. What began as a showdown between the White House and theDemocratic-led Congress over how far the government should go in rescuing homeowners evolved into

a bipartisan effort that could be the last such compromise before Bush leaves office in January. In arare Saturday session, the Senate voted 72-13 to send the bill to the president; the House passed itWednesday. President's reluctance Bush had withdrawn his veto threat earlier in the week over $3.9 billionin neighborhood grants. He contended the money would benefit lenders who helped cause the mortgage

meltdown, encouraging them to foreclose rather than work with borrowers. "Because of the DemocraticCongress' delays and the need for action now, President Bush will sign this bill when he receives it, despiteour concerns with some provisions, including nearly $4 billion to help lenders, not the homeowners thislegislation is intended to serve," said Tony Fratto, deputy White House press secretary. Many Republicans,

particularly those from areas hit hardest by housing woes, were eager to get behind a housing rescue asthey looked ahead to tough re-election contests. Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson's request for theemergency power to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac helped push through the measure. So did thecreation of a regulator with stronger reins on the government-sponsored companies, as Republicans longhave sought. Democrats won cherished priorities in the bargain: the aid for homeowners, a permanentaffordable housing fund financed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the neighborhood grants. "Thisis far more than sending a bill to the president's desk for his signature. It's sending a message to the

American people that the Congress of the United States despite an alternative reputation canactually get things done, and can work together to achieve a good result," said Sen. Christopher J. Dodd,

chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee.

Turn our plan is massively unpopular. There nuclear power links arent specific to our

plan which is waste disposal.


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*****CELLULOSIC ETHANOL NEG*****


16/125


AT ADV Global Warming

Cellulosic ethanol refineries require fossil fuels offsetting solvency.

IEE (Institute for Energy and the Environment), 2007, The Rush to Ethanol, AB,http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/RushToEthanol-rep.pdf

Ethanol refineries are significant sources of greenhouse gases and other polluting emissions. Coal and

natural gas are commonly burned in order to generate the enormous amounts of energy and heat

needed to run biofuel refineries. These facilities discharge many of the same pollutants ethanol is

intended to reduce, including CO2, CO, NOX, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), sulfur dioxide, and particulate matter.218Emissions from coal-fired ethanol plants are notably higher than those from plantsrunning on natural gas. In fact, according to the DOE, ethanol produced using coal results in greater overallgreenhouse gas emissions than gasoline.219.While an estimated 85 percent of ethanol plants run on naturalgas, as it is less capital-intensive to construct a plant that uses this highly manageable fuel,220 as natural gasis becoming more expensive, more refiners are expected to turn to coal as their fuel source.

Turn cellulosic ethanol increases nitrous oxide which is 300 times worse for greenhouse

effect.

CEC (Commission of the European Communities), 10/1/2007, COMMUNICATION FROM THECOMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, AB,http://ec.europa.eu/energy/energy_policy/doc/07_biofuels_progress_report_en.pdfFor example, during the 1990s, there was a tendency to evaluate the greenhouse gas impact of

biofuel production purely in terms of carbon dioxide emissions. Nitrous oxide emissions

caused by fertilizer use and by the cultivation of land were not taken into account. The global

warming potential of nitrous oxide, weight for weight, is about 300 times that of carbon

dioxide. The omission of these emissions tended, therefore, to lead to an exaggeration of the

greenhouse gas benefits of biofuels.


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AT ADV Dead Zones

Cellulosic ethanol uses a significant amount of fertilizersturning their dead-zones

advantage

IEE (Institute for Energy and the Environment), 2007, The Rush to Ethanol, AB,

http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/RushToEthanol-rep.pdfFertilizers and pesticides will still be applied to cellulosic feedstocks, though in lesser quantity than forcorn and soy. According to NRDC projections, which account for higher rates of uptake of chemicalsthrough root mass, switchgrass yields 9.7 kg/hectare/year runoff of applied nitrogen (the chemical of

utmost concern for eutrophication, along with potassium and phosphorus) as compared to 78.8 and16.25 for corn and soybeans respectively.402 But while the amounts of chemicals applied are lower andpercentage runoff is less, they are by no means negligible. Concerns about chemical runoff from

cellulosic feedstock fields become very significant when one considers the scale of cellulosic ethanol

production that the federal government and environmental organizations are proposing.


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AT ADV Economy

Cellulosic ethanol increases transportation costs which means it isnt economically

competitive.

Diane Greer, reporter, January 2007, BioCycle, REALITIES, OPPORTUNITIES FOR CELLULOSIC

ETHANOL, AB, http://www.jgpress.com/archives/_free/001220.htmlCellulosic ethanol is produced from a great diversity of biomass including waste from urban, agricultural,and forestry sources. In terms of agricultural residues - which this article focuses on - this includes thenonfood portion of plants, i.e., the leaves and stem. While chemically identical to ethanol made from foodcrops, such as corn and soybeans, the production process is more complicated. Preprocessing steps are

required to liberate the sugars locked in the complex carbohydrates, called cellulose and hemicellulose,

which form the cell walls of plants. During preprocessing, biomass materials are broken into smaller

pieces and then treated with enzymes to accelerate biochemical reactions that break down the complex

carbohydrates into fermentable sugars. As with grain-based ethanol, the remainder of the process

involves the fermentation and distillation of the sugars into alcohol. To date, efforts to improve theeconomic viability of cellulosic ethanol have focused on decreasing enzyme costs and improving

efficiency of preprocessing. But economics also depend on the ability of farmers to supply feedstocks

profitably and at prices that enable these operations to produce a competitive product. You have towork on conversion and distribution in parallel, says Kevin Shinners, Professor of Agricultural Engineeringat the University of Wisconsin. This stuff will not magically appear at the biorefineries. Logisticalchallenges in collecting and transporting agricultural residuals add costs to otherwise inexpensive

feedstocks. The goal is to develop the machines and processes to harvest, store and transport these materialsin the most economic way for the [farm] producers, adds Shinners. If it can't be done economically forproducers, the whole value chain is going to fall apart.


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AT Solvency

Without removing the subsidies for corn based ethanol the aff solves ZERO of the case.

Farmers wont give up thos subsidies and even if a few did the best case scenario is a very

small increase in cellulostic ethanol by 2020. Even the sources you think would be biased

recognize that cellulosic ethanol is a fantasy.Gristmill, Online Environmental Newspaper, March 2008http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2008/3/3/125745/7746

Now we get a new study (PDF) from a trio of ag economists at Iowa State University. For the record, theauthors are conventional ag scholars firmly entrenched within the corporate-dominated research

world described so well by Nancy Scola in her recent "Monsanto U." post. Indeed, one of the authors holdsthe Pioneer Hi-Bred International Chair in Agribusiness. (Pioneer is the genetically modified seed arm of thechemical giant Dupont.) The researchers' patrons -- i.e., the agribiz giants -- benefit from the corn-as-bridge-to-cellulosic myth; it keeps those highly profitable government goodies coming. Soit'ssurprising to see these mainstream economists deliver such a dismal forecast for cellulosic ethanol. Tocome up with their forecasts, the authors do their economists' trick of creating a model and plugging invarious assumptions. They start by calculating that without the latest round of goodies -- i.e., the fat"Renewable Fuel Standard" of the 2007 Energy Act -- cellulosic ethanol (and biodiesel, too) would have

withered away. In that scenario, corn ethanol would keep ramping up from the current level of about 7 billiongallons, pushed by high oil prices and the $0.51/gallon tax credit that's existed for years. Here's what theysay would have happened by 2022, if the 2007 Act had never happened (economists lay out their conditional,speculative scenarios in the simple present tense): The corn ethanol sector expands until total productionexceeds 18 billion gallons per year. Biodiesel and cellulosic ethanol from switchgrass are not viable in thisscenario. Cellulosic ethanol never expands, and the biodiesel sector contracts so that there are no biodiesel

plants operating in the long run. They add a bit that I found particularly devastating: "These results suggestthat [without the 2007 Energy Act], once the opportunity cost of land is taken into account, rational farmerswill not grow switchgrass or soybeans for biofuel production, and rational investors will not build these

plants." Believe me, that thing about "rational" farmers and investors is strong stuff, coming fromconventional economists. Now, what happens when we account for the 2007 Act's hefty mandate?Current production, almost all from corn, stands at about 7 billion gallons. The act demands 36 billion

gallons of biofuel by 2022, of which 15 billion comes from corn, and the other 21 billion gallons comes

from cellulosic (and to a much less extent biodiesel). The authors seriously doubt the cellulosic target

can even come close to being met. They reckon that the mandate can inspire "rational" farmers and

investors to churn out 4.5 billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol by 2022 -- but there's a catch. In order to

reach even that level, the government will have to significantly jack up the tax credit awarded to

mixers -- from the current 51 cents to $1.55. The message is this: Even with the fat 2007 Act mandate,cellulosic ethanol can only offset a tiny amount of petroleum use -- and then only if it's borne aloft by

titanic amounts of public cash.

2nd Generation Ethanol isnt ready yet the plans push for widescale use before its ready

undermines the solvency of all their advantages.


Investing time, land, energy, and money in short-sighted solutions will not only result in unnecessary

environmental damages, but also impede a meaningful transition to the best possible productionscenario for biofuels. Modern agriculture has demonstrated that we can grow any crop to the

detriment of the land and the people farming it. We must remember that while some plants may hold

certain benefits over others, it is the manner in which they are planted, grown, and harvested that are

the measure of environmental impact. After all, it is not plants themselves that are sustainable, but ratherthe practices by which they are managed. While there are environmental benefits inherent in cellulosicover corn for ethanol production, if these feedstocks are planted and harvested in unsustainable ways

those, benefits could easily become moot.


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Ethanol alone cannot solve environment, global warming, or dependency.


Ethanol should not be seen as the solution to our pressing energy crisis. Any plan to expand the use of

biofuels must be part of a larger strategy to promote an overall transition to a more sustainable

transportation model that focuses on reducing total energy use. Instead of a silver bullet, we need a

toolbox of measures that will reduce the huge amount of oil we use every day to move people and goodsaround. Ethanol, either from corn or from cellulosic feedstocks, is not the solution to green house gasemissions, high oil prices, or dependency on foreign oil. The potential of ethanol to displace gasoline is

limitedthere is just not enough land or water to produce ethanol in quantities that would

significantly displace gasoline at projected demand levels without tremendous impacts on the

environment and on food production.

No solvency lack of suitable refineries stops mass adoption of cellulosic ethanol.


Because no commercial cellulosic ethanol refineries are currently operating, there are no concrete

models by which to conclude what cellulosics water intake needs will be. However, there are concerns

that the added pre-washing or pre-processing401 step necessary for breaking cellulose down into

ethanol will be a serious limiting factor in determining where refineries can be built, possibly excludingarid western states from production of this fuel. While it is presumed that added water demand for

processing will not be greater than water use for row irrigation, the number and density of refineries slatedfor the Midwestern region alone are cause for concern. Furthermore, this additional step will add a

suite of largely untested chemicals that would be treated and discharged.

No solvencyCellulosic ethanol would require 60 times more land than is available for

ethanol which turns all their environment advantages.

NRDC (National Resource Defense Council), 2007, Growing Energy, How Bio-fuels can help end AmericasOil Dependence, AB, http://www.nrdc.org/air/energy/biofuels/biofuels.pdf

How much land would we need to meet that level of light-duty vehicle energy demand with cellulosicethanol? With status quo switchgrass yields at 5 dry tons/ acre/year and currently achievable cellulose-to-ethanol conversion efficiency of about 50 gallons per ton (the equivalent of 33 gallons of gasoline), about1,750 million acres would be required to meet projected 2050 light-duty gasoline demand. In

comparison, the area of the contiguous 48 states is about 1.9 billion acres, U.S. cropland and rangeland

is about 700 million acres, and U.S. cropland is about 400 million acres, and the only land on which

switchgrass is growing now is part of about 30 million acres of Conservation Resource Program land.

The conclusion based on the status quo can only be that cellulosic biofuels would be bit players.

Cellulosic Ethanol will never be viable feedstocks.

Gristmill, Online Environmental Newspaper, March 2008http://gristmill.grist.org/story/2008/3/3/125745/7746

Cellulosic ethanol represents a beacon on the horizon -- the justification cited by wiseguys like VinodKhosla for dropping billions per year in public cash to prop up corn ethanol production. Corn ethanol, yousee, is a bridge to a bright cellulosic future. But the beacon is looking more and more like a mirage, a

ghost, a specter; the bridge we're hurtling down may well lead to a chasm. A quiet consensus seems to beforming among people you'd think would know the facts on the ground: cellulosic ethanol, touted as fiveyears away from viability for decades now, may never be viable. Last fall, a researcher from the USDA --an agency that has lavished ethanol with research cash since the '70s -- declared that while cellulosic has"some long-term promise" (some?), we shouldn't expect it to contribute significantly to fuel supplies before2013. Then in January, Colin Peterson -- chair of the House Ag Committee and a long-time friend ofagribiz -- let slip that "I'm not sure cellulosic ethanol will ever get off the ground." He muttered

something about "a lot bigger problem to overcome here than people realize in terms of the

feedstocks."


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AT Solvency fast implementation fails extensions

Their evidence is best on best case scenarios pushing for cellulosic ethanol now takes out

solvency because it isnt ready to be deployed on a mass scale.


http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/RushToEthanol-rep.pdfThe extent of the potential environmental impacts of the two prominent categories of cellulosic fuels islargely unknown. In fact, the land-use methods associated with agricultural residues and energy crops,specifically grasses and fast-growing woody varieties, greatly impact the relative environmental

footprint of that fuel source. In general, ecosystem and environmental impacts will chiefly depend on

what kind of land is being used, what is being grown, and in what manner. This may seem an obvious

and overly general characterization, but there is much to consider. The wide diversity of potentialfeedstocks and landscape scenarios, taken with the massive scale of future cellulosic deployment, requiresignificant attention in forming policies and practices that reflect prioritization of environmental

sustainability.

Cellulosic ethanol isnt ready for incentive policies yet.


http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/RushToEthanol-rep.pdfThe impacts of producing biomass for energy could in some cases degrade and in others improveenvironmental integrity, based on type of feedstock, cultivation methods, and land used. For example,removing agricultural residues beyond what is needed to maintain and replenish soil organic matter

(SOM) will exacerbate erosion vulnerabilities and negative environmental impacts from conventional

row-crop production. On the other hand, transitioning vulnerable or low-yielding agricultural lands toenergy crop production would enhance soil, water, and wildlife health. However, turning protected lands,such as those enrolled in the USDA Conservation Reserve Program, to energy crops will sacrifice

ecological quality. The potential yields and impacts of widespread cellulosic production are, at this

time, combinations of extrapolation, projections, and hope. Estimations of yield increases for hybridizedcorn stalks, grasses, or trees are based on genomics applied to corn yields. The wildlife and carbonsequestration benefits of perennial grasses and trees are delicate, and depend largely on sustainable

implementation and responsible land stewardship priorities. Therefore, before cellulosic biofuels areadopted as the alternative fuel, federal, state, and local planners must work in earnest conjunction

with farmers, environmental scientists, conservationists, and other stakeholders to ensure that the

great actual potential of cellulosic ethanol is not forsaken by flawed implementation and

incentivization. In real terms, only programs that prioritize environmental protection, sustainability, andefficiency will be cost-effective and long lasting, and deployment of a cellulosic biofuel economy shouldfaithfully represent those imperatives.

Cellulosic Ethanol is not ready for use and unsustainable-this evidence subsumes their

solvency cards because it assumes future R&D


Cellulosic ethanol offers a better alternative than corn based ethanol, but technological breakthroughs

are needed for it to play a significant role. Moreover, cellulosic ethanol production is not inherently

sustainable and there are potential environmental risks in its mass production. Given ethanolsshortcomings and limitations, we should be looking into other alternatives for the transportation sector.Conservation and efficiency measures are waiting to be implemented; an aggressive plan should berapidly put in place to curb transportation greenhouse gas emissions and limit the countrys dependency onforeign oil.


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AT Solvency increases CO2 extensions

Your studies claiming a positive energy net balance does not take into account other

factors. Cellulose Ethanol cannot supply our current energy consumption, and it will

actually make warming worse. Prefer our evidence- its from Pimentel who is a renownedspecialist in the field.

Grist, Online Environmental Newspaper, 08 Dec 2006http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/12/08/philpott/Yet Pimentel's provocations continue. Not only is corn-based ethanol a net energy consumer, he says, butcellulosic ethanol -- simultaneously biofuel's holy grail and sacred cow -- is "worse." Grist recently spoke toPimentel about why he thinks biofuels are an environmental dead end. Enthusiasts for crop-based energy would do well to at least examinehis analysis. question You claim corn ethanol's energy balance is negative, and there's a growing consensus that it's positive. Why the

difference? answerPro-ethanol people make it out to be positive by omitting many of the inputs that go into

corn production. For example, they omit the farm labor -- I'm not talking about the farm family, I'm

talking about the farm labor. They omit the farm machinery. They omit the energy to produce the hybridcorn. They omit the irrigation. I could go on and on. Anyway, if I did all of those manipulations, I couldachieve also a positive return. However, that's not the way these assessments are made. You can go check the noted agriculturaleconomists who have looked at corn as well as other crops, and they do include the labor, they include the farm machinery, they include

repair of the farm machinery, and so forth and so on. And so, those are all inputs that the ag economists include. Why are the pro-ethanolpeople leaving them out? Story continues below question When you say that the ethanol crowd fails to include the farm machinery, are youtalking about the energy that's needed to manufacture a tractor, for example? answer That's right. Or an automobile used by the farmer.

question From your experience, how do these researchers justify that omission? answer They don't. Theyjust omit it. question I also see that in your studies, your calculation of how much energy goes into producing synthetic fertilizer ishigher than the USDA's assessment. Why that difference? answer Our data come from the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. We'reactually using a lower number than [the FAO's]. We're using 16,000 kilocalories per kilogram [of fertilizer], and I say the FAO is using18,000. So again, we're using the most accurate data that are available, and not trying to manipulate these numbers. question Another placewhere you clash with other researchers is over the byproducts of ethanol: stuff like distillers grains that go into animal feed, etc. For those

researchers,byproducts are what push ethanol's energy balance solidly onto positive ground. answer We doaccount for it. Distillers grains, incidentally, are being used as a substitute for soybean meal. So we went back to the soybean meal, andexamined how it's produced, and the energy that is required to produce it. Instead of giving [distillers grains] a 40 to 60 percent credit as the

pro-ethanol people do, we found that the credit should be more like 9 percent. They [pro-ethanol researchers] are manipulating the data

again. question All of that is very controversial, but let's get to the really provocative part of your work. You claim cellulosicethanol's energy balance is "worse" than that of conventional ethanol. How can that be? answer It's quite

easy. Number one, if you have a handful of sawdust, and a handful of corn, which one has the moststarches and sugars? That's easy. It takes almost twice as much sawdust to make the same gross energy as

[corn] from cellulose, or wood. Number two, it takes two additional treatments to release the starches andsugars [from cellulose]. That is, you're going to treat the cellulose. It's held by the lignin, and the lignin is thestuff that holds the trees up straight. And the cellulose is trapped inside that lignin. And you've got torelease it, and that requires an acid or an enzyme. And so that's one treatment, and then you've got to use analkali to stop the acidity at some stage. And now you can introduce the bugs for the fermentation. But No. 1, ittakes more cellulose, and No. 2, you've got two additional treatments. But wouldn't the response to that bethat it's a lot less energy intensive to grow material for cellulosic ethanol because you don't need to focus

on plants that have high sugar concentrations? answer That's right. And we did that [in a recent study(PDF)]. But we found negative energy balances for both wood and switchgrass. question Don't you figurethat after 35 years the industry will figure out how to make cellulosic ethanol work? We're always hearing abouta big breakthrough that's about to happen. answer Well, we know how to make it work. The question is, can you

do it energetically, with small amounts of energy? That I seriously doubt. question You recently wrote that"green plants in the United States collect about 53 exajoules of energy per year from sunlight. Americansconsume slightly more than twice that amount, however." How did you arrive at these figures? answer All you do is sitdown with a pencil and paper, total up all the crops being produced, along with any of the additional biomass that goes with it. Like withcorn, you not only total up the corn, but the corn stalks. You total up all the crops, and then with the wood material, you total up all theannual production in forests, and we use a rather optimistic number, three tons per hectare per year, under a range of conditions. So you canmake this calculation yourself. question So if we converted 100 percent of a year's worth of solar energy stored in plant matter to fuel, we'donly supply half of our current energy consumption. What's that telling us? answer It's telling us we're using too goddamn much fossilenergy! And another thing it tells us is that you're not going to be self-sufficient, or even produce half of our energy from biomass in the U.S.,if we want to eat. And that's using an optimistic figure for ethanol production. I don't know why [biofuel proponents] don't sit down with

pencil and paper and make these calculations instead of spouting off on all the wonderful things we can achieve.


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DA Politics Turns the case

Obama solves better than the aff he will get substitute cellulose for corn based ethanol

which the aff cant do.

Wendland 8

John, May 14, Obama Pushes Cellulosic Ethanol, Wind Energy, and Solar Power,http://www.politicalaffairs.net/article/articleview/6852/1/334/Slamming John McCain for failing to vote for renewal of the Investment Tax Credit for alternative energy,

presumptive Democratic nominee BarackObama at a campaign stop May 13 in Cape Girardeau, Missouritouted a plan to invest in cellulosic ethanol, wind energy, and solar power as alternatives to fossilfuels. These industries want to grow, Obama told the crowd. "But the problem is," he added,"Washington hasn't acted to give them the incentive where its economical for them to expand."Obama pledged to invest $150 billion in wind, solar, and ethanol over 10 years to help companiesdevelop new energy products. Significantly, Obama also stressed the need to convert from corn-basedethanol to "ethanol that is made from non-food stock." Obama linked corn-based ethanol to higherfood prices and as being less efficient than experimental cellulosic ethanol, a situation that hasimpacted consumers generally and livestock farmers specifically.

Prefer our evidence- their evidence never says Obama will promote Corn ethanol and our

evidence is from Barack himself

BarackObama.com No date citedhttp://www.barackobama.com/issues/energy/

Deploy Cellulosic Ethanol: Obama will invest federal resources, including tax incentives, cash prizes andgovernment contracts into developing the most promising technologies with the goal of getting the first two

billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol into the system by 2013.


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*****CHINA NEG*****


25/125


CP States AT: Violates Constitution

1. This argument is talking about formal agreements and treaties. Out counterplan

does not violate this because we just give incentives to our own businesses that are in

China. We dont have to talk agree formally with the Chinese government

2. There is no impact to this argument. Why does it matter if we violate this part of the

constitution?

3. Empirical proof - State cooperation with international actors is key to solve climate

and has constitutional precedent

Engel, Arizona University Law Professor, 2005[Kristen, "Colloquium Article: MITIGATING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES: AREGIONAL APPROACH," 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 54]

Because greenhouse gases are global pollutants whose emissions are the subject of mitigationefforts around the world, it is not surprising that policymakers crafting regional solutions to climatechange in the United States have many opportunities to link their proposals to those being pursued

by other nations. Normally such linkage would be pursued by the federal government or under the auspicesof an agreement or treaty. But in the absence of strong federal leadership on climate change, the statesare being left to work out the contours of international cooperation largely by themselves. This state-foreign nation linkage raises several questions: are states exceeding their authority by entering intocooperative agreements with foreign nations, and are the states subject to limitations upon linking a U.S.regional emissions trading program with a foreign government's trading program?One commentator claims that the joint regional climate change action plan developed by the New EnglandGovernors and Eastern Canadian Premiers exceeds the power of states under the [*79] Constitution. n82According to this commentator, Jon Reisman, the agreement is a "transparent attempt to implement theKyoto Protocol, without reference to the complex terms of the Protocol itself." n83 Consequently, accordingto Reisman, the plan violates Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which bars states from entering into atreaty, alliance, confederation, agreement or compact with another state or nation. n84 The agreement oftheGovernors and Premiers does commit both theNew England statesand several Canadian provinces to

greenhouse gas emission reduction goals, though the goals are actually less stringent than the targetscontained in the Kyoto Protocol for the U.S. and Canada. The Governors and Premiers are, however, doinglittle more than expressing their mutual intent to reduce greenhouse gases; nothing they are doingcommits either nation as a whole to reduction targets or to any other requirement of the Kyoto Protocol.Noaspect of the Governors' nonbinding agreement with Canadian states would seem to enhance thepowers of the states vis-a-vis the national government, and it would appear to stay outside of theSupreme Court's modern definition of an "agreement" or "compact" subject to the Compact Clause.n85 Nevertheless, in executing the agreement, the states do appear to be standing in the shoes of thefederal government.


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CP States AT States Cant Be Modeled

1. Uniform state action solves this argument. Even if states individually wont be

modeled or perceived, all 50 acting together would be perceived as United States

action and be modeled as much as the United States.

2. State action is internationally modeled here is proof

Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller

Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com, Yale Environment 360, 6-3-2008,http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015

Individually, the size of many of these state economies rivals those of most countries. State climatepolicy initiatives though not yet implemented on a national scale are collectively among the mostadvanced anywhere in the world. They provide a profound but largely unrecognized platform for

national action, and for a potential reassertion of global environmental leadership by the United States.Indeed, state climate initiatives have provided hope to those in the global community who have waitedpatiently for the United States to engage meaningfully in international climate efforts

3. And, the plan will result in federal action we access 100% solvency

Michael Northrop and David Sassoon, Program Director for Sustainable Development at the Rockefeller

Brothers Fund and administrator of SolveClimate.com, Yale Environment 360, 6-3-2008,http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2015

The federal government in the Bush era has done little to tackle our most pressing environmental problem climate change. Yet there is one bright side amid Washingtons inaction: Many states have been steppinginto the void and adopting comprehensive climate change policies that can be a model for the comingfederal legislation to slow global warming. The leadership of states such as California, Arizona,Connecticut, New Jersey, and Florida is crucial not only because it provides a template for federal climatelegislation that will no doubt be adopted under the next presidential administration. State action is alsovital because among the top 75 emitters of greenhouse gases worldwide, half are U.S. states.


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CP States AT: Federal Action is Key to Business Initiatives

1. The states can do all three things that the plan says is necessary to solve so

these generic federal action key cards are irrelevant.

2. State action spurs enough cooperation for long term innovation

CalCEF, California Clean Energy Fund, 6-23-2005, California Clean Energy Fund to Grant $1 Millionfor the Creation of the Worlds Leading Center on Energy Efficiency at a Northern California University,

NM, www.siliconbeat.com/entries/CalCEF_Challenge_Grant_Final_06.22.05.doc

The California Clean Energy Fund (CalCEF), a $30 million public benefit investment fund created aspart of the Pacific Gas and Electric bankruptcy settlement, today announced that it intends to award a

one million dollar grant to establish and maintain the worlds leading university center on energy

efficiency. The grant will be awarded to a Northern California university which aspires to internationalleadership in the development of energy efficiency technologies and the removal of barriers to their rapidcommercialization. Increasing energy efficiency is the single most important step California can take tominimize the long-term cost of reliable energy services, said Michael R. Peevey, chairman of CalCEF and

president of the California Public Utilities Commission. Establishing a university center on energyefficiency is a natural way to meet the states goals by tapping into a wealth of academic expertise indeveloping and bringing innovative technologies to market. By creat

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