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8/15/2019 WEBSTER, Steven. Dialogue and Fiction in Ethnography
http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/webster-steven-dialogue-and-fiction-in-ethnography 1/24
9
DI LO GUE ND FICTION IN ETHNOG R PHY
Steven Webster
My first aim in this essay is to try to close
the gap which still exists between ethnography
and hermeneutics. Anthropologists who have
heard out the occasionally pretentious claims
of herme neutic philosophers may suggest that
this all seems a needlessly elaborate extrapola-
tion of what ethnographers have always done
in the field. In response to this disciplinary
provincialism, I will try to clarify why an
epistemology of hermeneutics is nevertheless
needed in ethnography now. With the possible
exception o f history, no other form of social in-
quiry has really come to terms with this philo-
sophical tradition. It is doubly ironic that
theoretical natural science, after centuries of
setting a fatally misleading ideal for the under-
standing of society, may be discovering its
own hermeneutics before the social sciences
do. Sociology, in this herm eneutic matu ra-
tion , is far ahead of the o ther social sciences
but seems to have again been subtly co-opted
by the positivist tradition it seeks to transcend.
Social anthropology, on the ot her hand, ma y
be the natural home of this new epistemology.
Here, understanding has always - professional-
ly, so to speak - had to confront its own para-
doxes and prejudices, has had always to pro-
ceed with a certain irreducible hesitation. Let
me begin by epistemologically interpet ing
conventional ethnographic hesitancy, opening
up the way we think about what we do, and
the way we write about what we have done.
Steven Webster is Senior Lecturer in Social Anthrop ology
at the University of Auckland, New Zealand
I hope to trace a continui ty between two
situations of classical ethnography and their
recen t analogues which poses a dil emma of a
peculiar kind, perhaps an epistemological im-
passe whose time has come in anthropology.
As Ruby [ 1 ] has poin ted out, Malinowski
began his Argonauts with an invocation
which the much later revelations of his
Diary
imply he h imself was unable to live up
to
... every student o f the less exact sciences will do h is
best to bring home to the reader all the condition s in
which the exp eriment or the observations are made.
In Ethnogr aphy, where a candid account of such data
is perhaps even more necessary, it has unfor tunately in
the past not always been supplied with sufficient generos-
ity, and many writers do no t ply th e searchlight o
metho dic sincerity, as they move among their facts but
produce them before us out of complete obscurity [2].
Although refreshing, the ethnographic de-
scription of his observations stopped far short
of the candor he seemed to demand. Profound
personal struggles, disaffection and cynicism
about his hosts, guilty self-indulgence on the
margins of European society, are only a few
of the implications. The diary was meant to
keep his personal reflections separate from
his ethnography, and privately to discipline
himself to objectivity (cf. Firth's introducti on),
yet how can this aim be reconciled with his
demand for sincerity and an accounting of the
genesis of objective facts? Yet an integration
of such intimate reflections into ethnographic
work would still seem irrelevant to us as well
as to him. C ontempo rary ethnography can
0304- 4092/ 82/00 00-00 00/ 02.75 9 1982 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company
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countenance neither the view that these are
a part of the field expe rime nt which
Malinowski recomme nded on the model of
the natural sciences, nor the naive positivist
assumption that they are simply inconsequen-
tial. This is the dilemma we have inherited
(most directly ) from Malinowski.
Geertz fixes on the irony of Malinowski's
diary to expose the futility of the romantic em-
pathic ideal of ethnography [3]. But he ne-
glects to pursue in this context another sort of
irony he himself had defined in 1968: despite
the bitterness and disappointment of one
case he recounts,
Such an end to a nthropologist -informant relationships is
hardly typical: usually the sense of being members, how-
ever temporarily, insecurely and incompletely, of a single
moral communi ty can be maintained even in the face of
the wider social realities which press in at almost every
mome nt to deny it. It is this fiction - fiction not false-
hood - that lies at the heart of successful anthropological
field research; and, because it is never completely convinc-
ing for any of the participants, it renders such research,
considered as a form of cond uct, continuous ly ironic. To
recognize the moral tension, the ethical ambiguity, im-
plicit in the encount er of anthropologist and informant ,
and to still be able to dissipate it through one s actions
and one s attitudes, is what encounter demands of both
parties ff it is to be authen tic, ff it is actually to happ en.
And to discover that is to discover also something very
complicated and not altogether clear about the nature of
sincerity and insincerity, genuineness and hy pocrisy,
honesty and self-deception [4].
In his earlier insight Geertz had focused upon
what he called the anthropological irony, a
peculiar species of good faith between ethno-
grapher and informant which verged on bad
faith, and thereby constituted, strangely
enough, what he suggested was the basis of
authenticity in et hnography. Geertz reasoned
that there was always some form of reciprocal
pretence between anthropologist and host re-
flecting their situational agreement to wel-
come one another into their respective cul-
tures regardless of the few realistic grounds for
such participation. At least in the new states,
this reciprocity of touching faith takes the
form of an honorary cultural membership for
the anthropologist and a sanguine hope of
Western advantages to be gained by his hosts,
objective, deterr ent condi tions aside. The
impossibility of such unspoken promises is
both the tragedy of cultural difference-
domination and the ground o f its understand-
ing. Malinowski's recur rent disaffection from
his hosts and longing to be elsewhere suggests
another form of the same inevitable anthro-
pological irony. The authenticity of his ethno-
graphy was sufficient unto the times, but
Geertz's halting int uition regarding his own
fieldwork some 45 years later suggests that
authentic ethno graphy can no longer in good
positivist faith efface the diary from the ac-
count.
Perhaps not unlike Malinowski in his ethno-
graphic amnesia, Geertz [5] spared us further
discomfort and changed the subject from the
epistemology of a profound , if uniquely dis-
trusting, intimacy be tween ethnographer and
informant, to the epistemology of how the
ethnographer understands. An epistemological
con tex t which mystifies the native and over-
looks the ethnographer himself seems to sup-
plant the earlier insight where bot h were all
too transparent to one another, and authen-
ticity somehow unproblematic. As the article
reveals, Geertz, l ike Malinowski, had slipped
back into a false consciousness of how one
does ethnographic research. On the other
hand, while Malinowski had invoked the reifi-
cation of func tion ali sm to assure the ob-
jectivity for which he strove, Geertz does at-
tempt to recover a sense of the arbitrary
variety of inte rpretive analogues which consti-
tute ethnographic reality, there by foreclosing
on any such simple objectifcation. Neverthe-
less, these analogues are now comfo rtab ly
experience-distant from himself and his
own presumably still experienc e-nea r con-
course with his hosts. In this excavation of
ethnographic epistemology he reveals the inter-
pretive strata of our understanding, but stops
short of the ground of au thenticit y he had
exposed several years earlier. He has not, so
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far as I know, dug so deeply again.
Only a few years earlier, Kennet h Read had
made mirror-sharp the situations which Geertz
briefly reflects upon in less universal terms [6].
Makis and the Gahuku Gama were his hosts,
striving both for a share of Read's culture and
humane acceptance of his hesitant intrusion,
while Read struggled with the futility o f him-
self being a Gahuku Gama, the pa thos of a
future which he could see more clearly than
they, and the distractions of a private world of
nature and humanity whose graces seemed too
delicate to share except in the pages of his book.
The counterpoint is also between Malinowski
and Read, both of whom felt their radically
diffe rent forms of alienation and reverie must
be kept apart from their ethnographies. But
Geertz did suggest an epistemological basis
from which the conti nuity of all three ethno-
graphic introspections becomes apparent, and
perhaps no longer legitimately segregated from
the e thnography to which it gives rise.
Anoth er ethnographic and epistemological
situation which I will interpret as convergent
with the ironies of Malinowski and Geertz is
Evans-Pritchard's ambivalent attitude toward
Zande witchcraft, oracles, and magic [7].
Geertz's 1968 introspection broached the
relationship of ethnography and fiction, so I
will exploit the fortuitous appearance of the
same word in Evans-Pritchard's ethnography:
There is an established fiction that the
Avongara [the Zande nobility] are not
witches... [8]. The enduring brilliance of this
ethnogra phy is his demon stration t hat witches,
oracles, and magic do exist just as the Azande
think they do, while never for very long allow-
ing us to lose sight of the fact that they don't
really exist at all, or (to pu t it in terms of the
Azande's own response) at least they don't
exist in England. Writing when ethno graphy
still oft en had to convince its readers that
other cultures were human, Evans-Pritchard
walked a fine line between conscientious under-
standing of the way Azande themselves saw
these phen omena and a frank incredulity -
apparently not hidden from the Azande them-
selves - tha t the whole thing could be taken
so seriously. I am fascinated by a professional-
ism which seems to have left no stone un-
turned, an ethnographic candor which reveals
sufficient respect for his hosts to confr ont
them without patronising indulgence, and
sufficient respect fo r his readers to bare his
own innermos t epistemological prejudices and
ambivalences. Writing fully in the same posi-
tivist preconception as Malinowski, he never-
theless achieved the sincerity o f which
Malinowski was incapable because he could
not fully efface his diary from his ethnography.
The innocentl y paradoxical comme nt about
the Zande fict ion which I quoted above
leapt ou t at me from Evans-Pritchard's pages
as the quintessence of the epistemological
dilemma his candor had left bare: due to a
certain fiction the nobility are not witches,
but due to a radically different sort of fiction
many other Azande are witches (in daily,
ordinary, and t aken-for-granted fact).., and
due to yet again a radically different sort of
fiction Evans-Pritchard was unable to con-
vince himself, except for certain lapses in
his everyday practical experience of Zande
life and language, of the trut h of Zande fiction.
Toward the end of this essay I will suggest that
the fictions by which we constitute ethno-
graphy are not essentially different from
those by which the subject constitutes his
world; analysis of the two processes is neces-
sarily integral.
The subsequent ethnographic tradition of
explaining witches seems to have circumve nted
Evans-Pritchard's problem by means comparable
to what Malinowski, and later Geertz, adopted
to abstract themselves from the way things
had been in the field. Rather than struggle
with the shifting distinction between the trut h
and fiction of witches in an intercultural
epistemology , most of us have managed to cre-
ate the unintended illusion that this central
issue becomes irrelevant when witches can be
viewed as projections of anxieties, indicators o f
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social strains, or symbolic expressions of evil.
While ethnographers, and social anthropologists
in general, conti nued to explain witchcraft as
though Evans-Pritchard (influenced by Levy-
Bruhl and Pareto) had unequivocally vanquished
the witches themselves, philosophers of social
science have taken the issue up where Evans-
Pritchard left it.
Perhaps because ethnography since then has
been little help in this regard, the philosophers
continue to veer, much like Evans-Pritchard
did himself, between enchahtment and denial.
Winch [9] concludes that Zande witches
exis t in whatever terms the Azande them-
selves use, and that if we wish to understand
them we can only accede to their terms of
reference ; Gellner [ 10] no more thought ful-
ly than Evans-Pritchard in his dogmatic mo-
ments, scoffs at the whole absurd illusion, in-
cluding Winch's. Lukes [ 11 ] wants to have i t
both ways by urging both relativistic and uni-
versalistic criteria of rationality, but the Zande
nevertheless fail on the latter grounds. Jarvie
[ 12] and Giddens [ 13] accept forms of rela-
tivistic understanding like Winch's but avoid
the solipsistic implications of Winch's argu-
ment by pointing out that different cultures
are either historically or logically mediated by
com mon meanings. Jarvie implies that differ-
ences in cultural conception of reality get
worked out historically in a survival of the
fittest (and t ruest) mode. Giddens lucidly sug-
gests, on the other hand, that different cultural
realities are frames of meaning which are
already in the process of mediation (insofar as
the y are aware of each other). He refrains from
drawing conclusions about whet her in particu-
lar cases this mediation reflects the triumph
of rationality or, for instance, coercion or
delusion. This hermene utic form of relativism,
in which the historical situation is the one suf-
ficient absolute, certainly helps us underst and
why both the Azande and Evans-Pritchard
were fight about witches, and that while
British indirect rule was making progress in
overcoming the Zande preconception, Zande
rationalism was making progress in overcoming
Evans-Pritchard's assumptions.
We can further understand the relativity of
truth and fiction in this instance by comparing
it with the more recent but equally significant
ethnographic dilemma posed by Castaneda's
account of don Juan, the Yaqui bru]o or
shaman. This compari son reveals the ironic
disparity between the relationship of Evans-
Pritchard and Castaneda to their respective
audiences almost two generations apart.
Evans-Pritchard had sought to convince a
sceptical readership of the practical rationality
of the Azande beliefs (while convincing him-
self that their beliefs were nevertheless a fic-
tion); Castaneda sought to convince an en-
thusiastic counter-cu lture devoted to perceiv-
ing oth er realities of the practical irrational-
ity o f his experiences with don Juan (while
convincing himself that these experiences
were nevertheless true). Some anthropologists
appreciated his epistemological effort, while
others pursued the issue of ethnographic
veracity with a seriousness that perhaps better
than any other cir cumstance reveals to us the
ephemeral nature of ethnographic commit-
ment. The ironic reversal between
Witchcraft
Oracles...
and its sequel for ty years later not
only demonstrates the shifting relationship
between the ethnographer, his subject, and his
audience: the tension between the former as
palpably true ethnography and don Juan as
convincing fiction also places the tenuous dis-
tinction inescapably before us.
I have traced a continuity between a perspec-
tive implicit in Malinowski's ethnography (and
in Geertz's and Read's), and again between
Evans-Pritchard's ethnography and Castaneda's,
suggesting that these continuities converge as
exemplars of an epistemological dilemma for
con tempora ry social anthropol ogy. I have also
suggested that anthropologists have avoided
confronting this recurrent dilemma, Malinowski
and Evans-Pfitchard in their particular ways -
and Geertz, Read, and Castaneda (or his de-
tractors) in their's. Now I must make the im-
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plicit accusation clearer, and marshall behind
it more than a few tenuous ethnographic re-
interpretations.
To recapitulate: Malinowski experienced a
profound alienation in the midst of his hosts
that often betrays disdain for them, erotic
distractions, and doubts about himself that
would not be unfamiliar to m ost ethnographers.
He set many high standards fo r full field re-
porting, yet apparently assumed that the con-
ditions o f research were separable from his
scientific purpose. Geertz suggests that at least
in research in the communit ies of the new
states a tenuous trust must be built upon im-
possible ideals of reciprocal cultural mobili ty,
and concluded that this irony is nevertheless
integral to anthropological understanding.
Read's own lyrically ethnographic diary,
published as a supplement which ironically
may itself only be supplemented by his
conventional ethnography, suggests a media-
tion which extends to all ethnography. Al-
though Malinowski and Read may be obverse
sides of a personal predicament, I think they
also r epresent obverse sides of Geertz's episte-
mological predicament. Geertz's ambiguously
sincere reciprocation of touching faith
between et hnographer and hosts is implicit
in both Malinowski's and Read's accounts,
as is their disaffection from their hosts implicit
in Geertz's regression from a more penetrating
epistemology. Although the gap between cul-
tures may be theore tical ly bridgable, few field
researchers would presume to have overcome
it, and most would have to admit to an im-
penetrable alienation between themselves and
their hosts, ba lanced more or less by the ac-
complishment o f some degree of understanding.
I don't think my own efforts with recalcitrant
and suspicious Quechua has coloured my con-
clusions, because my personal experience among
Maori has been utterly to the contrary ye t can-
not rise be yond a similar sense of estranged in-
timacy. Whethe r this residual sense of mutua l
alienation arises from a wider context of politi-
cal, economic, or ideological domina tion by
the anthropologist's culture, or a narrower
cultural contex t of such domination of the
anthropologi st by his hosts, it seems likely
that the transcendance of such disparity is ne-
cessarily a fiction.
The convergence between this peculiarly ir-
reducible epistemological difficulty and that
which I have outlined through Evans-Pritchard
and Castaneda furth er extends Geertz's notion
of anthropological irony. Evans-Pritchard ex-
perienced a profound ambivalence between
the practical and discursive rationality of
Zande beliefs and his own conviction that they
constituted no more than an elaborately ratio-
nalized fiction, however real to the Azande.
The cultural basis o f his own conviction may
not have been so clear to Evans-Pritchard who,
after all, confronted a professional audience
no less dubious of primitive rationality than
the population at large. Castaneda's converse
labour decades later, to convince an enthusias-
tically credulous readership of the practical im-
possibility of believing in a sorcerer's world
for very long, however palpably true it might
be, puts this dilemma in fuller perspective.
However convinced Castaneda and his audience
may be of the t ruth of don Juan's world, its
fiction is apparent insofar as they must come
back to the straight world o f California; how-
ever convinced Evans-Pritchard and his
audience may remain of the fiction in the
Azande's world, its truth is apparent insofar
as they remain there, insistently reabsorbed
in Zande com mon sense. This version of the
anthropological irony seems to adumbrate a
more radical ontological polarity between an-
thropologist and hosts which underlies the
merely ethical tensions revealed by Malinowski,
Read, and Geertz. However, both forms of
polarity are existential in the sense that they
necessarily constitute the fieldwork experience,
not merely regulate its boundaries. That is to
say, the experience of such existenti al gaps is
itself the ground of the anthropological under-
standing which is indubitably accomplished,
and join tly built upon , by strangers living to-
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gerber. The gap is the foundation of under-
standing, not its subversion. As Geertz dimly
saw in 1968, the ethn ograp hy which is to re-
flect this accomplishmen t must in some sense
both perpetrate a fiction and claim truth.
This peculiarly produc tive epistemological
dilemma must not be confused with those
generic to the positivist tradition o f social
science. Such spurious dilemmas arise from the
illusory assumption that the understanding
subject and the object understood are primor-
dial realities each c onde mned to ineffable sub-
jectivi ty in an objective world which stands
apart. Descartes' cogito ergo sum gave rise to
a positivism which split the unity of concrete
experience into subjectivity cogito, or the
isolated consciousness) and objectivity res,
or substance), two polar forms of alienation
which appeared to leave no option between
an arrant subjectivism and a scientistic objec-
tivism. The epistemological perspective I am
urging, here deduced from ethnographic im-
passes, instead suggests that both subjectifica-
tions and objectifications are extrapolations
from the ground of mutual understanding
upon which any enco unt er necessarily begins
insofar as human beings recognize one an-
other as such. This accompli shment, however
ephemera l its inception, is necessarily the
primordial reality and unequivocal basis of
an authent ic understanding, which is neither
a subjectified understanding on the one hand
nor an objectified understood on the other.
This latter subjective-objective split is the
mystif icat ion which now misleads us, obscur-
ing the middle ground from which understand-
ing dialectically arises.
But, the polarity o f subject and object is
now very real, as derived from Descartes and
now assumed in the standard Western European
worldview. Understanding must be a dialectic,
that is to say, a dialogue between subject and
object. Although the dilemma may only be
historical rathe r than ontological, it is no less
inescapable. Interpretation of this spontaneous
dialectic of understanding can only waiver be-
tween tru th which reflects the alienation of
subject and object and fic tio n which regains
their existential media tion. This is, in most
general terms, the dilemma which Geertz called
the anthropological irony. I hope to clarify
the philosophical bases and implications of
this epistemological problem, and head o ff
some of the ways it may be subverted by the
positivist perspective which takes subjectivity
and objectivity as given.
Geertz, again as though his explicit episte-
mological enquiry in 1974 were a regression
from the clarity of his merely moral enquiry
of 1968, in the later essay raised the mislead-
ing issue of the inaccessibility of the native's
point of view . With Malinowski's disaffection
as a demonstrat ion, he suggests that an anthro-
pologist's understanding is instead derived
from the native's own experience-near con-
cepts , mediated by experience-distant con-
cepts which the anthropologist brings to bear
on the problem from whatever sources are in-
tuitively comparable, including ideas from
othe r cultures as well as his own. I do no t take
issue with Geertz's herm eneutic met hod here,
but rather with its truncation. Although he
suspects that no clear line can be drawn be-
tween the native's innermost point of view
and his experience-near concepts, Geer tz never-
theless leaves the impression that the former
would be the ideal basis o f knowledge were it
not in principle as inaccessible as the romanti c
ideal of empathy is futile in anthropological
understanding. The frustrated understanding
can only hope to approximate this ideal know-
ledge with out recourse to pretensions of
more-than-normal capacities for ego-efface-
ment and fellow-feeling... ; furthermo re,
... whatever accurate o r half-accurate sense
one gets of what one's informants are really
like comes not from the experience of that ac-
ceptance as such, which is part of one's own
biography, not of theirs, but from the ability
to construe their modes of expression... [ 14].
In 1968 Geertz had concluded that a certain
moral tension or ethical ambiguity be-
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tween anthropologis t and hi s informan ts l i es
at the heart of successful anthropological re-
search ; i ts recog ni t ion and dissipat ion is
w ha t enc oun t e r demands o f bo t h pa r ti e s if it
i s to be authen t ic [ 15] . But in 1974 he has
rever ted to ego-ef facement on the one hand,
and an ap proxim at ion to fe l low-fee ling on the
other ; he has abs t rac ted h i s b iography f rom
their s , and fur th ermo re my st i f ied the na t ive 's
b iography by ext rapola t ing an ephemera l sub-
jec t iv i ty tha t obscures the authent ic i ty once
t ransparent in d ia logue and com promise .
Simi lar ly , Geer tz ' s own exper ience-n ear con-
cepts , e th ica l and epi s temologica l, d i sappear
in thi s expl ic i t metho dolo gy o f unders tanding.
The na t ive 's point of v iew is objec t i f ied a t one
al ienated end of a t runcated symmetry be-
tween i t s own exper ience-near concepts and
Geer tz ' s ex per ience-di s tant analogues , the
nat ive speaking no w in to a void f rom which
Geer tz has absented h imsel f. A more re cent
vers ion o f Geer tz ' s v iew o f herme neut ics s ti ll
re f lec t s a s imi larly one-dimens ional a ccou nt
of anthropologica l und ers tanding [ 16] .
I t seems to me tha t the inef fabi l i ty of the
nat ive 's inn erm ost point of v iew i s a
chimera crea ted by th is rec iprocal a l i enation
f rom the prac t ica l d ia logue in which under -
standing necessari ly ar ises. T he dialect ic be-
tween subjec t and ob jec t has impl ic i t ly been
t ransformed by abs t rac t ion in to two a l ienated
subjec t iv i ti es, on e of which i s unapproach able
and the the o th er o f which is gone ent i re ly .
This backg round of subjec t i f i ca t ion impl ic i t ly
invokes an objec t i f i ed foreground which
Geer tz presents as a method olog y, i t se l f ab-
s t rac ted f rom any par t i cular s itua t ion . Th e
dialect ic of understanding is saved from Des-
car tes ' fa teful d ichotomizat ion of knowledge
only by Geer tz ' s proposal of an unres t ra inedly
arbi t rary and pancul tura l assor tment of ex-
per ience-di s tant concepts . Al though these
too are presented abs t rac t ly , they never the less
res tore authe nt ic i ty by sugges t ing a d ia logue
between Geer tz and some others , somewhere .
This is one way tha t the d ia logue in whic h
understanding necessari ly ar ises can be retained
in i ts subsequent ethnography, that is , i f a rei f i -
ca t ion of subjec t and objec t do no t obscu re it s
dialectic.
II
Having rejected D il they's fut i le ideal of em-
pathy, Geer tz accepts f rom him the model of
hermeneut ic unders tanding as t acking be tween
par t and whole or par t i cular and genera l [17] .
Dil they had dist inguished social science from
natura l s icence meth odo logy, emphas iz ing
that the former, by vir tue o f i tself being social ,
has direct access to i ts subject mat ter , whereas
the la t t e r can only impu te m eaning indi rec t ly
to i t s subjec t mat ter . He a l so emphas ized the
dia lec t ica l or re f lexive na ture of in te rpre ta t ion
which achieves unders tanding o f i ts ob jec t by
relat ing i t as part ial meaning within a whole
conte xt of meaning [ 18] . B ut as Gada mer has
argued [ 19] , Di l they 's incons i s tency was to
abs t rac t the herm eneu t ic c i rc le f rom the h i s tor-
ical and exi s tentia l con text of the in terpre ter ,
just as Geertz has d on e in re-segregating his
own f rom the na t ive 's b iography. Begui led by
the posi t ivist ideal of natura l scient i f ic kno w-
ledge , Di l they e levated empa thy to in tu i t ive
cer t i tude by t ranscending the h i s tor ical con-
text o f the in terpre te r and objec t i fy ing what
is interpreted; s imilar ly, Geertz pursues the
objec tiv i st chimera by abs t rac t ing not only
f rom any recogni t ion of h is own po int o f v iew,
but a l so: f rom any imm edia te unders tand ing of
the na t ive 's poin t o f view. This leaves us with
what Gadamer cal ls , in cr i t icism of Dil they,
a pu re l y fo rma l me t h odo l ogy unancho red
in real li fe conf r onta t io n be tween subjec t
and objec t , despi te the phenomenologica l
idea l of Di l they 's
Lebensphilosophie
G a d a m e r
furth er suggests that i t i s just this abstract con-
cept of unders tanding, der ived f rom Enl ighten-
ment Cartesianism and i ts posi t ivist apotheosis
in Comte and Mi ll, which rende red Di l they 's
me thod vulnerable to idea li sm and re la t iv i sm
[20] . I ronica l ly , then, wi th both the in ter-
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pre t e r 's and t he na t i ve ' s po in t s o f v iew gone
from Geer tz ' s her me ne ut ic c i rc le, in a s t il l
more r i gou rous app rox ima t io n t o ob j ec t iv i s t
kno wled ge it too i s l i able to inher i t the wind,
the very subjec t iv ism i t ab jures. G adam er ,
fo l l owing He idegge r' s r e inco rpo ra t i on o f t he
in t e rp re t e r i n to t he h e rme neu t i c c i rc le o f
h is tor ica l unders tanding , a rgues tha t the
t ru th o f unde r s t an d ing is ne i t he r ob j ec ti ve
nor subjec t ive , but a r ises in an in tersubjec t ive
d i a logue be tween two d i f f e r en t po in t s o f
view:
T r u e h i s t o ri c a l t h i nk i n g m u s t t a k e a c c o u n t o f i t s o w n
h i s t or i c a li t y . O n l y t h e n w i l l it n o t c h a s e t h e p h a n t o m
o f a n h i s t o r i c a l o b j e c t w h i c h i s t h e o b j e c t o f p r o g r e ss i v e
r e s e ar c h , b u t l e a r n t o s e e i n t h e o b j e c t t h e c o u n t e r p a r t
o f i t s e l f a n d h e n c e u n d e r s t a n d b o t h . T h e t r u e h i s t or i c a l
o b j e c t i s n o t a n o b j e c t a t a ll , b u t t h e u n i t y o f t h e o n e
a n d t h e o t h e r , a r e l a t io n s h i p i n w h i c h e x i s t b o t h t h e
rea l i ty of h i s tory and the rea l i ty of h i s tor ica l unders ta nd-
ing 121].
Elsewhere he cha ract e ri s e s t h is cou n te rpa r t
o r d i a lec t ic o f unde r s t an d ing a s a f f i n i t y ,
a concep t d r awn f rom He idegge r:
E v e r y n e w p o s i t i o n o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h i c h r e p l a ce s
a n o t h e r c o n t i n u e s t o n ee d t h e f o r m e r b e c a u s e i t c a n -
n o t i t s e l f b e e x p l a i n e d s o l o n g a s i t k n o w s n e i t h e r
in
w h a t
n o r
y
wha t i t i s oppos ed . . . We see tha t there a re d ia lec t ica l
r e l a t io n s b e t w e e n . . , o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e p r e j u d i ce
organica l ly a par t o f my par t icu la r sys tem of convic t ions
or opin ions , tha t i s the impl ic i t p re judice , and on the
o t h e r h a n d , a n e w e l e m e n t w h i c h d e n o u n c e s i t , t h a t i s ,
a f o r e ig n e l e m e n t w h i c h p r o v o k e s m y s y s t e m o r o n e o f
i t s e l e m e n t s [ 2 2 ] .
This i s t rue conve rsa t ion or d ia logue . How-
ever , f o r unde r s t and ing t o abs t r ac t i t s e l f f rom
i t s own h i s to ri ca l con t ex t , i n t he p r e t ense o f
ob j ec t ive und e r s t and ing , i n s t ead f a i ls t o pu t
i t s own im pl ic i t pre judices a t r i sk , and sub ver t s
in th i s evasive or pa t ronis in g indulge nce the
t ru th c l aim o f t ha t wh ich i t s eeks t o unde r -
s tand [ 23 ] . C onse que nt ly , a l l kno wle dge i s
necessar ily an ef fec t ive uni ty which can only
be ana lyzed a s a ne tw ork o f r ec ip roca l ac t i ons
[241.
Wha t appea r s , f rom the pe r spec t ive o f
pos i t iv i sm, to be a potent ia l conserva t ive or
e thno cen t r i c b i as r e t a ined i n t he sub j ec ti v i t y
o f t he i n t e rp re t e r , i s f rom the pe r spec t i ve o f
he rm eneu t i c s a neces sa ry pa r t i c ipa t i on i n t he
re fo rm ula t i on o f know ledge on i ts on ly ob -
jec t ive bas is , in te rsubjec t ive d ia logue . On ly
in th i s la t te r way can we d iscr iminate the
real ly c r it ic a l que s t i on o f he rm eneu t i c s ,
nam e ly o f d i s ti ngu i sh ing t he t rue p re jud i ces ,
by w h ich we unde r s t and , f rom the f al se ones
b y w h i c h we m i s u n d e r s t a n d [ 2 5 1. G a d a m e r
d i smi s se s t he im pu ta t i on t o h i s app roach o f
unc r i ti c a l a ccep t ance o f t r ad i t i on and socio -
po l i ti c a l conse rva ti sm, po in t i ng ou t t ha t t he
bourgeois h is tor ica l consc iousness ,which
th rou gh r e l a t iv i s a ti on o f t he o ld embraces
eve ry th ing new, a l so cou r t s t he hegem ony
of t he o ld t h roug h the r e l a ti v i sa t i on o f t he
new [261 . The roo t s o f Gadam er ' s d i al ec ti c
in Pla to a re c lear : S ocra tes fou ght the n ih i l is t ic
and hen ce po t en t i a l l y demagog ic s cept i c ism
of t he S oph i s t s w i th t he new a r t o f ph i l o sophy ,
whereby a pe rpe tua l d i a l ec ti c o f t he se s and
coun te r theses can on ly adumbra t e an ephem-
era l t ru th
( what
som e th ing i s ) bu t neve r
loses s ight of i t . Al th oug h he repres ented t rad i-
t ion agains t the new ideas of the day , the
d i a lec t ica l me tho d bo rne o f t h is a f f i n i t y
b e t w e e n p h il o s o p h y a n d i t s s h a d o w , s o p h i s m
insu red t ha t mer e ta lk , no th in g bu t t a lk, c an ,
howe ve r un t ru s tw or th y i t may be , st il l b r ing
o u t u n d e r s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n h u m a n b e in g s -
which i s to say tha t i t can s t i l l make human
b e in g s h u m a n [ 2 7 ] .
T h is c o m m e n t a b o u t n o t h i n g b u t t al k
br ings me to a f ina l cons idera t ion regarding
G a d a m e r ' s p h i l o s o p h y o f h e r m e n e u t i c s w h i c h
I hop e wi l l head o f f , or ra ther , co-o pt , a
Marxian cr i t ique . Gadamer has been charged
by h is c r it ical theo r i s t co l league Haberm as
wi th p ropo s ing a he rm eneu t i c s wh ich by r e -
ma in ing mere ly l i ngu i st i c i s im po ten t t o
pene t r a t e t he f al se consc iousnes s wh ich ob -
scu re s t he con t r ad i c t i ons o f cap i t a li s t soc i e ty
[28 ] . Bu t I cons ide r Gadam er ' s r e j ec t i on o f
t h e p u r e l y f o r m a l m e t h o d o l o g y o f D i l t he y i a n
hermeneut ics and i t s impl ic i t idea l i sm an ade-
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fu l i n conc re t e con te x t r a the r t han nonesens i ca l
on some spur ious log i ca l g rounds . These
" m i n i a t u r e " s e m a n t i c s it u a t io n s a p p l y " m a c r o -
scop ica l ly" t o " th e u nde r s t an d ing o f a li en be -
l ie f s y s t e m s " [ 4 7 ] . G i d d e n s ' a p p r o a c h t o
unde r s t and ing n o t on ly em phas i se s i t s d ia log i -
cal na tu re bu t a lso , li ke Gadame r ' s emphas i s
on p rac t ica l r a the r t han abs t r ac t po in t s o f
v i ew, r eminds us o f t he ob j ec t ive con tex t o f
soci a l a c t i on and pow er i nequa l i t y i n wh ich
mean ing typ i ca l l y occu r s .
I t h i n k t h i s s y n o p t i c r e vi e w o f c o n t e m p o r a r y
he rmeneu t i c t heo ry sugges t s a p rob lema t i c
e p i st e m o l o g ic a l c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n " t e m p o r a l
d i s t ance" a s cons t i t u t ive o f h i s to r i cal unde r -
s t and ing , and " cu l tu r a l d i s t ance" a s cons t i t u -
t i ve o f an th ropo log ica l unde r s t and ing . I f
Gid den s ' ins ight is r ight , these fo rms o f soc ia l
s c ie n t if ic u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e h o m o l o g o u s t o
cer ta in semant ic processes in the i r prac t ica l
use . I wou ld fu r th e r sugges t t ha t an th ropo log i -
cal unde r s t a nd ing i s p ro t o typ i c , because i t s
soc ia l bas is i s ins is tent and immedia te and
leas t l iab le t o an un re f l ex ive a s sumpt ion o f
unde r s t and ing . W he the r o r no t t he se c la ims
a re accep ted , it is at l ea s t dea r t ha t t he mo de l
o f t he d i a logue is necessa r il y t he c om m on
den om ina to r o f soc i al s c ien t i fi c unde r s t and ing .
Con sis tenc y wi th th is epis temo logica l bas is re -
qu i r e s t ha t bo th an th ropo log ica l s e lf - awareness
and e thn ograp h ic accou n t r e f l ec t t he d i a l ec t ic
by w h ich th i s unde r s t and ing i s cons t i t u t ed .
At l ea st i n t he ca se o f an th ro po log ica l unde r -
s t and ing , r ai s ing the conc ep t o f " cu l tu r a l d is -
t ance " t o t he l evel o f a basi c ep i s t emolog ica l
pr inc ip le appears espec ia l ly paradoxica l . The
he rm eneu t i c i n s i s tence on the r e in t eg ra ti on o f
the i n t e rp re t e r i n t he ob j ec t o f knowled ge ap -
pears to col l ide wi th cul tura l re la t iv ism and
inv i te o r l eg i t imize e thno cen t r i sm , t he obve r se
a p o d i ct i c s o f t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y a n t h r o p o lo g i -
ca l t heo ry . Howeve r , I t h ink th i s appa ren t
con t r ad i c t i on can be r e so lved in j u s t t he s ame
way a s Gad ame r has de fen ded h im se l f aga ins t
t he cha rge o f t r ad i t i ona l i sm o r conse rva t i sm.
Th i s r econs ide ra t i on o f bas ic t ene t s o f t he
disc ip l ine has the added advantage of in tegra t -
i ng t hem in t he r e f l ex ive c r i ti que w h ich mot i -
va tes the new approach. Gadamer ' s re la t iv isa-
t i on o f h i sto r i ca l unde r s t an d ing i s i n t en ded a s
a sword wh ich cu t s bo th ways : by r ea f f i rming
the logica l ly necessary pr ior i ty o f the in ter -
p re t e r ' s h i s to r ic i t y i n an apprehens io n o f
t ru th , he a l so g ives us the gro un d a lways to
suspect i t s mot ives , to d iscr im inate , as he says,
i t s fa l se f rom i t s t rue pre judices . The la t te r , in
turn , can only be provis ional ly to lera ted as
impl ic i t or invis ib le , subjec t to subsequent
con t rove r s ion by openness t o t he t ru t h c l a im
of ano th e r po in t o f vi ew. Whi le t he con v ic t i on
of " t rue p re jud i ce" i s the on ly bas i s up on
which unde r s t and ing can be bu i l t, t he m ove -
m e n t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g in t h e c h a n gi n g ci r cu m -
s t ances o f h i s to ry a l so conv ic t s t r ue p re jud i ce
of fa l se hood or i l lus ion . This d ia lec t ica l ap-
p r o a c h t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g p u t s t h e a n t h r o po l o g i -
ca l apodic t ic s on less dog ma t ic groun ds: i f
cul tura l re la t iv ism is t rea ted objec t iv is t ica l ly
i ts l og ica l conc lus ion i s j u s t ano th e r fo rm o f
e t h n o c e n t r i s m ; t hi s h a p p e n s i n m u c h t h e s a m e
w a y t h a t D i l t h ey ' s r o m a n t i c i s t h e r m e n e u t i c s
fo rge t s i t s e l f i n an apo theos i s o f em pa t hy a s
pos i ti v i st h i s to ry . On the o the r hand , e thno-
cen t r i sm mu s t unde r l i e t he p ro fe s s ion o f soc ia l
an th ro po log y in so fa r a s we can on ly t r ans l a te
o n e c u l t u re i n t o a n o t h e r . T o p u t i t a n o t h e r
way , e scape f rom e thn ocen t r i sm i s ou r busi -
ness , bu t a de f in i t i ve e scape pu t s u s o u t o f
bus ines s a l toge the r . M eanwhi l e , e thnocen t r i sm,
l ike t rue pre judice , i s the only bas is upon
which we und e r s t and a t a ll , and , whe n unavo id -
ab le , d i s c r imina t e good f ro m bad cu l tu r a l p r ac -
t i ce s (ou r own o r o the r s ) . S imi l a r t o G adam er ' s
f rag il e " t rue p re jud i ce" , R icoe ur sugges t s t ha t
t he d i a l ec t ic o f unde r s t an d ing seeks a " secon d
na ive t e " once c r it i c ism has pu rged the f i rs t
[ 4 8 ] . T h e s e p ar a d o x e s d o n o t e x p o s e a n t h r o -
po logy a s a cha rade any mo re t han G adame r ' s
he rm eneu t i c s is a r eac t iona ry sub te r fuge ; t hey
only reasser t the inescapably h is tor ica l and
d ia lec t ica l na tu re o f u nde r s t and in g , and r edi s-
cover cer t i tude as a d ia logue . From th is perspec-
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tive, positivist objectivism or scientism becomes
the ultimate ethnocentrism, at least in the pre-
sent conjuncture of our historical self-under-
standing.
I have extende d the anthropological iron y
from Geer tz himself to several other examples
of ethnography
in ex tremis
arguing with
Gadamer that this apparent difficulty is really
the vindication of ethnographic truth. Geertz
also sensed this at one time, furthermore point-
ing out how un comfo rtabl y close this irony
is to hypocri sy, bad faith, self-deception, false-
consciousness. I think these are the othe r side
of the coin of understanding, namely, mis-
understand ing of varying degrees of culpability,
and not separable from its dialectic except
through a positivist sleight-of-hand. Karl
Popper, in his matu rity, similarly suggests that
all forms o f distinctively human knowledge
arose originally in lies or story-te lling [49].
Now, embedde d in the long history of know-
ledge, we are in no bett er position than we
ever were to discriminate between the story
which is built truthfully on the epistemological
foundatio n of anthropological irony from that
which is falsehood or false-consciousness. This
discrimination must be made, but cannot be
made in abstraction from particular instances
of interpretation. In any case, if the positivist
vision of an undialectical tr uth is now revealed
as chimerical, we can no longer draw the line
between truth and fiction so simplistically.
Geertz's comments on the anthropological
irony also broach the issue of fiction, and give
me the oppo rtunit y to take it up where he has
left off. For Geertz in 1968 the touc hing
faith between anthropologist and informan t
suggests a ... fiction - fiction not falsehood -
tha t lies at the heart of successful anthropolog-
ical field research [50]. A few years later he
goes further, extending this perception of
understanding to ethnography itself, and draw-
ing comparisons with Madame Bovary and
painting, making the point that all are neces-
sarily multi-layered interpre tations which can-
not easily be discriminated from their referen-
tial reality [ 51 ]. He nevertheless asserts a dis-
tinction b etween this
f i c t io -
something
made - and falsehood or unfactuality, and
suggests that the intention to depict reality,
and other conditions of this depiction, serve
to distinguish it more or less from the fiction
of a novel. Although not really verifiable ,
the fictions of ethnography are appraisable,
not merely aesthetically, but as better or
worse than other accounts; and although co-
herence or thickness of description is a crite-
rion of such appraisal, correspondence to
action and events is indispensible:
If anthropological interpr etatio n is constructing a reading
of what happens then to divorce it from what happens
- from what in this time or that place specific people
say what they do what is done to them from the whole
vast business of the wo rld - is to divorce it from its ap-
plications and render it vacant [52].
This is one of the crucial points at which
Geertz opts at the last minu te for a vestigial
positivism that threatens to reincorporate and
paralyze his hermeneutics. There is no doubt
that the basic difference between ethnogra phy
and fiction is that the former intends, and is
taken to intend, truth. Realistic fiction, on the
other hand, encourages a suspension of doubt,
or signals its status in some even more subtle
way. But this distinc tion, far f rom being ob-
vious, instead seems to be the focus of the
thickest description of all, a broad semantic
no-man's land. Corresp ondence or pure
factual reference to wha t happens.. . is cer-
tainly a necessary illusion for ethnography to
maintain, but at the same time it must not in-
vite us to hypostatize the facts and lose sight
of the irreducible ambiguity of circumstance
Geertz is elsewhere at pains to make clear.
Such covert factualisation o f the world is, in
social science, the correlative of the magical
abstraction of the scientist from the under-
standing presented. The tricks through which
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e thn ogra phy c l a ims t ru th a r e no l es s com plex
than t hose t h rou gh wh ich t he nove l c l a ims
f i c t ion . Now, t h i s d i ff e r ence mus t be exam-
ined r a the r t han t aken fo r g r an t ed .
I f we a r e t o t ake up , pe rhaps mo re s e r iously
than Gee r t z does h imse l f , h i s sugges t i on t ha t
b o t h e t h n o g r a p h i c f i el d w o r k an d e t h n o g r a p h y
are sor ts o f f ic t ion , wh ere sha l l we go? My
ow n d i r ec t i on was i n it i al l y d i c t a t ed , I shou ld
confess , by a spu r ious hope t o mar ry e thno-
g raphy and t he a r t o f t he nove l . Bu t t h i s van i ty
was a l r eady be ing me t ha l fway by fo rm s o f
l i te r a ry c r i t i ci sm wh ich conce rn t hemse lves
wi th t he r e l a t ion be twee n f i c t i on , r ea l ism, and
rea l i t y . Th i s pa r t i cu l a r fo rm o f he rmeneu t i c s
has come to be ca l led nar ra t ive theory; I wi l l
su rvey t he pos i t i ons o f some o f it s con t r i bu to r s ,
fo l l owing these pa r t i cu l a r imp l i ca t i ons o f t he
g e n er a l r a p p r o a c h m e n t o f h e r m e n e u t i c s a n d
e t h n o g r a p h y . M y o w n c o n c l u s io n , w h i c h I
shou ld a t t h i s po i n t f o r ecas t, i s t ha t na r r a t ive
theo ry can mak e c l ea r e r to u s t he d i a logue im-
p l i c i t i n bo th f i e ldwork and e thnography , and
h e l p o v e r c o m e t h e d o g m a w h i c h o b s c u re s t h e
d i a lec t ic o f f i c t i on and t ru t h i n he ren t in bo th .
S o o n a f t e r G e e r tz e x t e n d e d R i c o e u r 's m o d e l
o f t ex tua l i n t e rp re t a t i on t o t he Ba linese cock -
f i gh t [ 5 3 ] , R i c o e u r e x t e n d e d i t e ve n m o r e
genera l ly to soc ia l ac t ion and h is tor iography
[54 ] . R i coeu r d r ew a t t en t i on t o na r r a t i ve as t he
co m m on ep i s t emolog i ca l ba si s o f t he t ex t ,
soc ia l ac t ion , and h is tory . Whereas ac t ion
f ixes d i s cou r se i n a way comp arab l e to t he
t ex t , h i s t o ry f i xe s ac t i on and i t s e l f becom es
a tex t . Al l a re s tor ie s in the sense of nar ra-
t ive , wh e the r t r u th o r f i c t ion , whose mean ing
has become f r ee f rom the o r ig ina l cond i t i ons
o f t h e i r p r o d u c t i o n a n d r e m a i n s o p e n t o n e w
socia l con tex ts an d an ind ef in i te ser ies of pos-
s ib l e r eade r s [ 55 ] . Th roug h th i s he rm eneu t i c
emphas i s on t he h i s to r i ca l r e l a ti v i ty o f m ean ing
in d iverse aspec ts o f soc ia l rea l ity , Ric oeu r a l so
sugges ts a d ia lec t ica l reuni f ica t ion o f na tura l
sc ience explanat ion and soc ia l sc ient i f ic under-
s t and ing i n a fo rm o f i n t e rp re t a t i on wh ich r e -
ma ins open t o h i s t o ry . F rom th i s pe r spec t ive ,
h is tor iography, l ike any tex t and l ike soc ia l
act ion i tself , is :
t h e o p e r a t i o n b y w h i c h t h e n a r r a t o r t e l ls a s to r y a n d h i s
l i s tener hears i t [561 . .. a rec iproca l re la t ion be twe en re -
c o u n t i n g a n d f o l l o w i n g a h i s t o r y w h i c h d e f i n e s a c o m -
ple te ly pr imi t ive language game. . . ; to fo l low a h i s tory i s
a c o m p l e t e l y s p e c i fi c a c t i vi t y b y w h i c h w e c o n t i n u o u s l y
a n t i c i p a t e a f i n a l c o u r s e a n d a n o u t c o m e a n d w e
succe s
s ive ly c o r r e c t o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s u n t i l t h e y c o i n c i d e w i t h
t h e a c t u a l o u t c o m e . T h e n w e s a y t h a t w e h a v e u n d e r -
s t o o d [ 5 7 1 .
In t h i s way R icoeu r sk ir t s t he p r e - empto ry
pos i t iv i s t v i s ion of a predic table wor ld , which
w o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e h e r m e n e u t i c s as a m o m e n -
tary i l lus ion , and ins tead re incorpora tes th i s
c lo su re i n t he i r r educ ib l e ope nnes s o f i n te r -
pre ta t ion . Geer tz s t ra ins for such a resolu t ion ,
bu t cann o t fo r l ong l e t go o f t he pos i ti v i st
v i s ion , a t le a s t in h i s mos t t heo re t i ca l m om en t s .
To m Wol fe, t he f i rs t o f t h r ee na r r a ti ve
theor i s t s I wi ll br ie f ly cons ider , s imi lar ly seems
c lose ly t o app roa ch bu t s t ops j u s t sho r t o f a
d i a lec t ica l unde r s t an d ing o f t he r ea li t y he
seeks to depic t [58] . Wolfe reve iws the r i se of
new jou rna l i sm in t he 1960s , a rgu ing t ha t
i t s r ecou r se t o t he dev ice s o f t he 19 th cen tu r y
t radi t io n of rea l i s tic f ic t ion (espec ia lly scene-
by - scene cons t ruc t i on , d i a logue , t h i rd -pe r son
poin t -of -v iew, and depic t ion of s ta tus l i fe )
h a v e en s u r e d a n i m m e d i a t e t o u c h w i t h t h e
rea l i t ies journa l i s t s must pa ins takingly docu-
me nt . I ronica l ly , l it e rary f ic t ion i t se l f has de-
ser ted rea l i sm, pursuing a ne w f orm of c lassi -
ca l s tory- te l l ing or neo -fab ul i sm which loses
a l l contac t wi th rea l i ty , i f only because i t can
n o l o n g e r c o m p e t e o n t h e s e g r o u n d s w i t h u p -
s t ar t j o u r n a li s m [ 5 9 ] . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e
ea rl i er be ige on s tud i ed ly neu t r a l j ou rna l i sm
r e a c te d w i t h c o m p l a i n t s o f p a r a j o u r n a l is m
or zoo t - su i t ed p rose , wh ich r eca ll s t he
ind ignan t cha rges o f pop u l i s t s ensa t i ona li sm
wi th wh ich t he o r ig ina l r ea l ism o f F i e ld ing ,
S t e rne , Smol l e t t , D ickens and Ba l zac were me t
[60 ] . Ye t t he se r eac t i ons o f t en be t r ay a mora l -
iz ing or pol i t ic iz ing e l it i sm w hich i s ve i led by a
p re t ence o f e i t he r ob j ec t i v i t y o r ae s the t i c ism
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sured [70] ; fu r t he rm ore , fa lse , ins id ious, o r
tota li tarian fic t ion is in principle dis t inguish-
ab le f rom innocen t f ic t ion insofa r as the la t te r
e x p lo re s r a th e r th a n d ic t a t e s th e h u ma n w o r ld
and on ly cal ls fo r condi t iona l a s sen t [ 71] .
Tha t these d is t inc t ions themse lves assume a
d i s c r imin a tio n o f t ru th f ro m f i c t ion i s th e
ex is ten t ia l d i lemma which fasc ina tes Kermode ,
reca l l ing to me Gadamer ' s d is t inc t ion be tween
true and fa lse p re jud ices. L ike Sar t re , Kerm ode
ends by requ ir ing of g rea t f ic t ion the pa radox-
ica l fa i th in , and vers imi l i tude to , the con t in -
gen t w orld o f rea l i ty w hich is los t in the ob-
jec t iv is t i l lus ion main ta ined by non-f ic t ion .
Consequent ly , a l though he speaks on beha lf
of f ic t iona l l i te ra tu re , h is con c lus ion para l le ls
Wolfe ' s regard ing the journa l ism of rea l ex-
per ience . E thnog raph y , as the non-f ic t ion a l ac -
cou nt o f o ther cu l tu res , can leas t o f a ll the
sciences maintain the objectivis t i l lus ion.
In the enesis of Secrecy [7 2 ] Ke rmo d e
views th is d i lemma a t the boundar ies be tween
f i c t ion a n d re a l i ty in t e rms o f a c o n te mp o ra ry
ambiva lence be tw een c lass ica l o r medieva l
P la ton ic Rea l ism (which assumed the world
to be i t se l f meanin gfu l) and the nom ina l is t
scep t ic ism ( to which we as he i rs o f the En-
l ig h te n m e n t a re a l so c o m mi t t e d ) . S p ino z a ,
in 1670 , fa te fu l ly d is t ingu ished be tw een mean-
ing and t r u th , see ing the l ike l ihoo d of au thor i -
ta r ian misuse in the i r equ ivoca t ion [ 73] . S ince
the ad ven t o f th is nomin a l is t scep t ic ism, we
mu s t admit the bas ic p r inc ip le tha t no narra -
t ive can be t ransparen t on h is to r ica l fac t [74] ,
tha t i s to say , t ru th i s never impl ic i t in the
meaning of d iscourse about the world . Ye t
th is ax iom is exceed ing ly hard to hang on to ,
and we invar iab ly sl ip back in to the m ore an-
c ie nt , i n n o c e n t , a n d c o mfo r ta b le a s s u m p t io n
o f th e Re a li s ts wh o in tu i t e d a p o te n t i a l c o n -
t inu i ty be tween words and th ings tha t guaran-
t e e d a t r a n s p a re n c y o f th e wo r ld . Ke rmo d e
quot es Bar thes :
W e c a n n o t e s c a p e t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e f a c t c a n e x is t
o n l y l i n g u i s t ic a l l y , as a t e r m i n a d i s c o u r s e , a l t h o u g h w e
b e h a v e a s if i t w e re a s i m p l e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g
o r o t h e r o n a n o t h e r p l a n e o f e x i s t e n ce a l t o ge t h e r , s o m e
e x t r a - s t r u c t u r a l ' r e a l i t y ' [ 7 5 ] .
The m eaning of the world a rises in the in t r ica te
imp u ta t io n s o f o u r n a r ra t iv e a b o u t i t, b u t d e -
s p it e th e s c e pt i ci s m o f th e E n l ig h te n m e n t we
cann ot fo r long see i t th is way , and again take
the m eaning to be t rue o f the world . Th is i s,
i ron ica lly enough , the same ambiva lence which
Evans -Pr i tchard (and Cas taneda) fe l t about the
compel l ing bu t unb e l ievab le t ransparency be-
twe e n Z a n d e (o r d o n J u a n ' s ) m e a n in g a n d t ru th ;
b u t a s I t h in k mu s t b e th e f a te o f e th n o g ra p h y ,
th e p e n d u lu m o f a mb iv a le n c e swing s b e twe e n
two or mo re a l te rnat ive worlds o f na ive rea lism,
c lear ac ross the pecu l ia r chasm of scep t ic ism
c re a te d b y E n l ig h te n m e n t no min a l i s m.
In i l lus t ra t ion of th e d i lem ma as i t faces
h i s to r ia n s , Ke rmo d e q u o te s P y n c h o n :
L e t m e n o w q u o t e a h i s t o r i c a l , o r p s e u d o - h i s t o r i c a l , n a t -
r a t i v e o f a v e r y d i f f e r e n t k i n d . I t p u r p o r t s t o d e s c r i b e a n
e n g a g e m e n t b e t w e e n a n A m e r i c a n a n d a R u s s i a n w ar s h i p
o f f t h e c o a s t o f Ca l i fo r n i a: ' W h a t h a p p e n e d o n t h e 9 t h
M a r c h , 1 8 6 4 . . . i s n o t t o o c l e ar . P o p o v t h e R u s s i a n a d m i r a l
d i d s e n d o u t a s h i p , e i t h e r t h e c o r v e t t e ' B o g a t i r ' o r t h e
c l i pp e r ' G a i d a m e k ' , t o s e e w h a t i t c o u l d s e e . O f f t h e c o a s t
o f e i t h e r w h a t i s n o w C a r m e l - by - t h e -S e a , o r w h a t i s n o w
P i s m o B e a c h , a r o u n d n o o n o r p o s s ib l y t o w a r d d u s k , t h e
t w o s h i p s s i g h t ed e a c h o t h e r . O n e o f t h e m m a y h a v e f i re d ;
f f i t d id t h e n t h e o t h e r r e s p o n d e d ; b u t b o t h w e r e o u t o f
r a n g e s o n e i t h e r s h o w e d a s c a r a f t e r w a r d t o p r o v e a n y -
t h i n g . ' T h i s p a s s a g e d e s c r i b e s a n h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t w h i c h i s
h e l d t o h a v e o c c u r r e d , t o h a v e l ef t n o t r a c e , a n d t o b e
s u s c e p ti b l e o f h o n e s t r e p o r t o n l y i n t h e m o s t u n c e r t a i n
a n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e m a n n e r . I t a d m i r a b l y r e p r e s e n t s a
m o d e r n s k e p t i c i s m c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e f e r en c e o f t e x t s t o
e v e n t s . E v e n t s e x i s t o n l y a s t e x t s , a l r e a d y t o t h a t e x t e n t
i n t e r p r e t e d , a n d i f w e w e r e a b l e t o d i s c ar d t h e i n t e r p r e t a -
t i v e m a t e r i a l a n d b e a s h o n e s t a s h i s t o r i a n s , q u i t e h o n e s t l y ,
p r e t e n d t o b e , a ll w e s h o u l d h a v e l e f t w o u l d b e s o m e
s u c h n o n s i g n i f i c a n t d u b i e t y a s t h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e f i r s t
e n g a g e m e n t e v e r to t a k e p l a c e b e t w e e n A m e r i c a n a n d
R u s s i a n f o r ce s [ 7 6 ] .
Such a purged chron ic le app l ies too s t r ic t a
d i s t in c t io n b e twe e n me a n in g a n d t ru th a n d
would leave few his torical narratives capable
of in te res t ing us [ 77] . Al t houg h it is i l lusory ,
we shal l con t inu e to wri te h is to r ica l na rra tive
as i f it were an a l toge ther d i f fe ren t m at te r
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from making fictions or, a fortiori, from telling
lies [78].
With my case already made for the episte-
mological equivalence of historical and cultural
distance, I can now claim that historians and
ethnographers, as well as journalists, are in an
epistemological predi cament similar to novelists.
Kermode's appreciation of the historical dialec-
tic between plerom atic certitude and
classical realism, the positivist certitude of the
Enlightenment, and the vertigo of a scepticism
which only gathers momentum since the
sophists and the nominalists (Gadamer' s
shadow of philosophy ), ending in the defi-
ant honest y of Sartre's fiction, all this leaves
little room for a facile epistemological re-
assurance which pictures itself as outside
history. The reorientation of journalism docu-
ment ed by Wolfe further fills in this herme-
neutic circle. The meaning which we hurry to
see as truth transparent to the world is not
only inevitably a narrative of our own making,
it is a dialogue in Gadamer 's and Ricoeur's
senses, a conversation with more than one
point of view, which is irrevocably part of its
historical moment and changing with history.
That this relativism does not relieve us of the
demands of truth and morality is ironic or
tragic, but nonetheless true.
Rabinowitz [79] has clarified a furthe r di-
mension in the narrative theory of fiction and
realism by examining the relationship between
author and audience. This more recen t reader-
orient ed approach, rather than the text-
ori ented approach still evident in Kermode
and Wolfe, reflects the convergence of literary
criticism and Gadamer's and Ricoeur's philos-
ophy of social science on the epistemological
model o f the dialogue. If one does not pre-
emptorily sever the te xt from its context, it
may be argued that all of the conventions of
realistic narrative point ed out by Wolfe and
Kermode are, phenomenologically, not nar-
rative at all but dialogue. I think that these
perspectives can help a reflexive ethn ograp hy
to better understand what it is doing.
Rabinowitz claims we must distinguish at
least four audiences implied in any narrative
literary text, correlative to as many different
modes of the author. The relationships between
these several audience-author levels o f narra-
tive meaning are the basis for contextual dis-
criminations between truth and fiction. Most
pivotal here is the aut hor and his assumed
or intended actual audience (authorial
audience), and the internal narrator, typical
of realistic fiction, and his intended audience
(narrative audience). For War and Peace the
authorial audience accepts the reality of the
War of 1812 while only the narrative audience
accepts the reality of Natasha, Pierre, and the
other characters. The tension between the
two is distinctive of fiction. For
Metamorphosis
the narrative audience is asked without apology
to accept what is incredible for the authorial
audience, although the entire context is per-
fectly realistic. When the distinction between
the two [authorial and narrative audiences]
disappears entirely, we have autobiography or
his tor y [80]. I would add that the device
whereby authorial and narrative audiences
are merged also includes ethnography, and
emphasize (as would Wolfe and Kermode) tha t
this is a device.
Rabinowitz furthe r points out that the
authorial and narrative audience each have
their f urth er levels. The former necessarily
implies a factually actual audience and
auth or (the social and historical facts); the
latte r fictional level often includes an ideal
narrative audience which is taken in or
duped by any fiction the fictional narrator
chooses to create. The two innermost fictional
levels readily become an infinite regress, as
Rabinowitz illustrates with Nabakov's Pale
Fire
[ 81 ]. Successful mana geme nt of the two
outer levels creates a sense of trut h against
which these levels of fiction are played off.
Just as the ambiguous levels of dialogue with-
in the fictional narration may exube rantly
explore the distinction between relative truth
and relative fiction, the central ambiguity
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between narrative and authorial audience
(and between their authors) explores the
more inclusive and less simply fictional dis-
tinction between its own fiction and an ac-
count of reality. It seems to me that each of
the four levels of dialogue which Rabinowitz
invokes serves as a true frame o f reference or
tru th- fra me relative to which its lesser in-
clusive levels are appreciated as fiction. Pheno-
menologically, we approach the whole as fic-
tion, y et take each more inclusive level as
true relative to our discovery of an included
fiction, suggesting the mutual definition of
these levels is dialectical. Rabinowitz empha-
sizes the simultaneity of the percept ion of
both truth and fiction [82], precluding any
simplistic resolution of this dialectic. The
dialogical natur e o f the monological narrative
illusion itself is made clearer by the author's
apparent intent ion o f such a simultaneous
and multivocal display of'meaning, and the
reader's appreciation of the author's intentions.
Fiction is here a sliding function of tru th, al-
though ne ither is ever unambiguous.
What I want finally to suggest is that in
ethnograph y, truth is a sliding function of
fictional frames of reference, although neith er
is ever unambiguous. This merely puts a some-
what different perspective on Gadamer's dia-
lectic of true prejudice . Along with auto-
biography and history, ethnogra phy works
from an assumption of truth, rather than an
assumption of fiction. I think it can be shown
that the illusion of meanings transp arent to
truth is achieved through the implicit accep-
tance of a more inclusive level of fiction.
Through the ethnographic exemplars with
which I started my discussion, I will now only
suggest some of the ways in which this per-
spective may be developed. At the very least,
such considerations would reopen our under-
standing of et hnograph y as a dialogue, as well
as a narrative, and reintegrate it in its own
social and historical context.
Rhetorical devices which encourage the
impression of veracity or transparency are in
the first instance simply grammatical. These
are less obvious than, for instance, the scholar-
ly form of d ocume ntati on which invokes
authorit y through citation o f the wider con-
text of scientific literature. In most non-
fictional literature, like history or biography,
third-person narration is the mode which
best produces the illusion of pure reference
[83]. On the other hand, the grammatical
patt ern most typical of social science is no
point of view at all, effacing on behalf of
neutral abstraction even the implied objectiv-
ity of third-person narration. Where some
narra tor mus t be invoked, usually some pas-
sive voice avoids dispelling the aura o f objecti -
fication. The first person plural is occasionally
asserted in what is still sometimes a fictional
claim of authority ( ... we have concluded... ).
The first-person singular I or me is con-
sistently avoided in order not to compromise
the sense of objectivity achievable in a de-
tached narrative.
Such innocent but careful modulation o f
locutions which introduce or evade introduc-
tion of specific points of view is probably
general throughout social science literature.
Perhaps peculiar to ethnogra phy is the ethn o-
graphic present , the previously unquestioned
convention whereby history may tacitly be ig-
nored. This sentimenta lism seems no longer
legitimate, but is survived by other conventions
such as the segregation of cultural change from
culture, extraneous from intrinsic factors, or
dysfuncti on from function. Even if ethno-
graphy can no longer be accused of these in-
nocent forms of decontextualisation, it is diffi-
cult not to conclude that there are others of
which we are not aware, or simply by consen-
sus not inclined to recognize as fiction in any
ideological sense. Omission is, of course, selec-
tive, and thereby also constitutes narrative.
Rarely is there a candid accounting of basic
conditions of understand ing such as linguistic
fluency, duration of time in the field, form
and degree of acceptance, or theoret ical biases
and the ir modificat ion. This seems avoided for
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much the same reason that the first-person
singular is judged inappropriate, and the speci-
ous plural fo rm occasionally invoked. Insofar
as auth ority is established through such con-
ventions, cultural strangeness, geographic re-
moteness or difficu lty of access, and the futil-
ity of replication, may be accepted implicitly
as credentials rather than deter rents to credibil-
ity.
It is by now apparent that in lieu of other
criteria of verifiability, clearly futile but never-
theless desired in th e social sciences, functional
explanation maintains the fiction of transpar-
ency in much the same way that Kerm ode's
teleological sense of an ending maintains
coherence of a narrative through followabil-
ity . Among the various structural, semiotic,
or he rmen eut ic alternatives which have suc-
ceeded functionalism, the implicit criteria of
coherence has increasingly come to rest in the
narrative form of ethnog raphy itself rather
than in some metaphysics which it invokes.
Geertz's thick descrip tion [84] may be seen
as an explicit recognition of ethnogr aphy as
narrative, even as implicitly recomme nding
such devices of social realism as championed
by Wolfe on behalf of the New Journalism.
More recen tly, Marcus has suggested approach-
ing ethnography as a genre in the interest of
appreciating the claim of authenticity implicit
in distinctive rhetorical devices [85]. Among
these he suggests that:
readers expect an ethno graphy to give a sense o f the con-
ditions o f fieldwork; of ev eryday life (Maiinowski's
impo ndera bilia ); of micro-process (an implicit valida-
tion of participant observation); of holism (a form of
portraiture integrated with the pursuit of particular claims);
and of translation across cultural and linguistic boundaries
(the broad, contextu al exegisis of indigenous terms and
concepts) [86].
He also points out tha t Rabinow [87] and
Dumont [88], like Bateson, appear conscious-
ly t o be experimenting (if only implicitly)
with an:
ethnographic genre which can accommodate reflexivity
while retaining the traditional author ity of its texts , that
is , the rhetorical usage of language and forma t by which
ethnographers have constructed their accounts as certain
and objective knowledge about other s [89] .
I only seek to press to its full epistemological
implications the insights which Geertz and
Marcus present as methodologies; unless these
implications are made explicit, such methodo-
logies are liable simply to be reincorporated in
the positivist precon ception of ethnography.
Having broached these considerations, I
suggest that the ethnographic dilemmas dis-
cussed in the beginning are problematic be-
cause the merger of authorial (that is, intended
or assumed) audience and narrative (tha t is,
internal or constructive) audience, necessary
to turn realistic fiction into non-fi ction, be-
comes uncomf ortab ly conscious. The tension
between the two audiences, which serves as
the focus of fictional narration, becomes super-
ficially the embarrassment, but more profound-
ly the authenticati on, of ethnography. The
grammatical and other conventions which I
have suggested above implicate a narrative
audience which is prepared to grant the ethno-
graphy many shortcuts to a transparent truth.
Behind this tacit narrator/narrative audience
agreement stand the author and his authorial
audience, ethnographe r and readers whose in-
nocence of a ny such conspiracy constitutes a
key factor in the truth of the narrative account.
Tacit fi ction serves as a frame o f reference for
the assertion of truth.
Furthermor e, the retrospective exposure of
ethnographic authorship through Malinowski's
diary, and its introspective exposure in Geertz's
and Read's reflections, suggest a background
of ot her audiences we have also overlooked.
At least two of these are the people we write
for and those we write about. Even in fictional
literature the subjects of the work are an
audience in some sense (e.g., an ideal narra-
tive audience ), so presumably even an ethno-
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eve r, t he supe rf i c ia l r e semblance o f he rm e-
neu t i c ope nne s s o r t he d i a l ec t i c o f t r ue and
fa lse pre judica l to the po s i t iv i s t c r i te r ia o f
ver i f iab i li ty or fa l s i f iab i l i ty i s equal ly l iab le
to subve r t he rme neu t i c s . Opennes s o f in t e r-
p re t ab i l i t y and t he po t en t i a l exposu re o f t r ue
p re jud i ce s ar e mi s t aken a s hypo th eses , t he t e st -
i ng o f w h ich r e su l t s i n d i sp ro o f o r p rov i s iona l
con f i rm a t ion . B u t t he se cha rac t e ri s t ic s o f
knowledge a r e u l t ima te , no t i n t e rmed ia t e ,
cond i t i on s o f unde r s t and ing . Na ively t o mi s -
t ake t h em as hyp o thes es s imp ly c lose s t he
d i a logue , a s sumes t ranspa rency , o r t akes t r ue
pre jud ice as s imply t rue , uni la te ra l ly sever ing
the d i a logue f rom which t he y a r is e and p re -
t end ing t ha t t h i s ab roga t i on i s no t i t s e l f a
f ic t ion .
Both subjec t iv is t and objec t iv is t miscons t ru-
a ls o f con t em pora ry he rm eneu t i c s ar is e f rom
the same i l lusory Car tes ian dual i sm which sub-
v e r t ed D i l t h e y ' s o w n h e r m e n e u t i c s a n d m a y
con t in ue t o m i s l ead Gee r tz ' s . Th i s d i cho tomisa -
t i on o f know ledge i t s e lf j o ined t he d i a lec t ic o f
en l i gh t enm en t and a l i ena ti on , r e su lt i ng ( t h roug h
the r i se of 1 9th cen tury p os i t iv i sm) in the
mo nopo l i s a t i on o f knowled ge by pos it i v is t ob -
jec t iv i sm and the re lega t ion o f al l a l te rna t ives to
sub j ec t iv i sm. Whereas En l ig h t en men t nomina l -
i sm had fo reve r s epa ra ted t ru th f rom m ean ing ,
En l ig h t en me n t pos i ti v i sm again pu r sued t r ans -
pa rency a s t hou gh th i s had neve r happened .
The new rea l i sm, founded in i t ia l ly on a fa l se
d i c h o t o m y , r e if ie d i ts t e r m s a n d p r o m o t e d i ts
own fo rm o f sub j ec t i v i ty t o s c i en ti f ic s t a tu s :
T h e o b j e ct i v it y o f t r u t h , w i t h o u t w h i c h t h e
dia lec t ic is inconceivable , i s t ac i t ly re placed
by vulgar pos i t iv i sm and pragm at i sm - u l t i -
ma te ly , t h a t i s , by bou rgeo i s sub j ec t iv i sm
[ 9 5 ] . G e r m a n R o m a n t i c i s m f r o m H e r d e r an d
idea li sm f rom K an t and Hege l, by r eac t i ng t o
t h is m o n o p o l i s a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e , e a r n e d t h e
s t i gma o f t he i r name s [96 ] . The pa t ron i z ing
of subjec t iv is t in i t ia t ives by objec t iv is t soc ial
s c ience mere ly con t inue s t h i s t r ad i t i on o f sub -
o rd ina t i on , pe rhaps dese rved ly among those
who na ive ly i n t he roman t i c i s t t r ad i t i on accep t
the Ca r t e s ian d i cho tom y und ia l ec t icaUy .
Bu t t he d i l emm a o f ob j ec ti v i sm and sub jec -
t iv i sm l ike o ther d i lem mas i s m et by going be-
tween i t s horns . Subjec t and objec t a re an
i r r educib l e d i a l ec t ic , and know ledge mu s t
a ri se i n t he un fo rec losed d i a logue be twe en
the tw o , n o t t he c lo su re o f some i l l u so ry r e so -
lu t i on i n beha l f o f one o r t he o the r . Sub jec t iv -
i ty a nd o bjec t iv i ty a re equal ly re i fy ing abs t rac-
t i ons f rom the p rac t i ca l i ty and pa r t i cu l a r i ty o f
d ia logue . Each has a l ready assumed a meaning
t ransparent to the wor ld , and so has g iven
away th e d ia lec t ic on w hich i t is based and
f rom which i t mu s t de r ive it s au then t i c i t y .
Never the less , these f ic t ions a re the f ramework
in wh ich an e lu s ive t ru th mus t con t inuous ly
be rees tabl i shed . The d ia lec t ic of en l ighten-
men t f rom P lan ton i c r ea l i sm to nomina l i sm
and Car t e s i an i sm, t o pos i ti v i sm, con t em pora ry
he rme neu t i c s , and c r i t ic a l t heo ry , i s no t me re ly
i l lu so ry bu t t he heavy co n t ex t o f h i s t o ry i n
which we necessar i ly th ink . However , th i s
m o v e m e n t i ts e l f i m p li e s th a t t h o u g h t c a n n o t
take i t se l f undia lec t ica l ly for gran ted as g iven
(as Descar tes d id) . The chal lenge for e thn o-
g raphy i s t o b r idge t he gap be tween f i e ldwork
and p re sen t a t i on i n j u s t t he s ame mod e and
s ty le tha t i t b r idges the gap be tween one cul -
t u r e and an o the r , and i n j u s t t he s ame way
tha t eve ryon e can b ridge t he gap be twe en
h imse l f and ano the r , enco mpass ing t he c lo su re
of objec t iv is t or subjec t iv is t a l iena t ion w i th
t h e o p e n n e s s o f d ia lo g u e. E t h n o g r a p h y m u s t
hang on i n good f a i t h t o t he myr i ad con t ingen -
c ies and opaq ue perso nal i t ies of rea l i ty , and
den y i t se l f the i l lus ion of a t ransp arent descr ip-
t ion, a luxury reserved for less reflexive sciences.
I f in so do ing i t mus t g ive up bo th t he ques t
for general know ledge of soc ie ty an d a par -
t icu lar ly indulgent form of subjec t iv ism, th i s
wi l l only cons t i tu te the loss of pre judices
wh ich a r e no l onge r t rue .
I have sugges t ed t ha t d i l emmas i nhe re n t i n
an th rop o logy , and a lso verg ing upon the d i s ci -
p l i ne f rom the ph i lo sop hy o f soci a l s c i ence ,
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3
20
Ibid.,
p. 124.
21 H.-G. Gadamer, Th e historicity of understanding, in
P. Connerton (ed.),
Critical Sociology: Selected Read ings
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976a), p. 125.
22 Gadamer,
op. cit.,
1979, pp. 157-158, also p. 132.
23 Gadamer,
op. cit.,
1976a, p. 125.
24 Gadamer, op. cit., 1979, p. 134.
25 Gadamer,
op. cit.,
1976a, p. 124.
26 Gadamer, op. cit., 1979, pp. 108-109.
27 H.-G. Gadamer,
Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneuti-
cal Studies on Plato (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1980), pp. 12 2-1 23.
28 H.-G. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermen eutics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1976b), pp. 2 6- 36 ; J .
Habermas, Systema tically distorted comm unicatio ns,
in P. Connerton (ed.),
Critical Sociology: Selected
Readings
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976); P. Ricoeur,
Ethics and culture: Habermas and Gadamer in dialogue,
Philosophy Today,
vol. 17, no. 5 (1972), pp. 153-165.
29 Dilthey, quoted in Gadamer,
op. cit.,
1979, pp. 124-125.
30
Ibid.,
pp . 125 -126 .
31
Ibid.,
p. 130.
32 T. Adorno,
Jargon o f Authenticity
(Evanston, Illinois:
Nor thw estern Un iversity Press, 1973).
33 F. Hearne,
Dom ination, Legitimation and Resistance;
The Incorporation of the Nineteenth Century English
Working Class
(London: Greenwood, 1978); J . Alt,
Revie w of domination, legitimation, and resistance by
F. Hearne,
Telos,
vol. 37 (1978), pp. 207-216.
34 Gadamer,
op. cit.,
1976a, p. 123.
35 Gadamer, op. cit., 1979, p. 108.
36 Gadamer,
op. cit.,
1976a, p. 123.
37 P. Ricoeur, The mo del of text: meaningful action con-
sidered as a te xt , in P. Rabin ow and W. Sullivan (eds.),
Interpretive Social Science: A Reade r
(Berkeley: Universi-
ty of California Press, 1979). See also the paradigm of
Geertz, Deep play: notes on the Balinese Cockf ight in
the same reader.
38 P. Ricoeur, Expla nation and understanding; on some
remarkable connect ions among the theory of the text ,
theory of ac t ion, and theory of h is tory , in
The Philosophy
of Paul Ricoeur
(Boston: Beacon, 1978), p. 153.
39 Ricoeur,
op. cit.,
1979, p. 100.
40 Ricoeur, op.
cit.,
1978, p. 166.
41 G.
Devereux,From A nxi ety to Method in the Behavioural
Sciences
(New York: Humanities Press, 1967).
42 Gadamer,
op. cit.,
1976a, p. 125.
43 G. Marcus, Th e Ethnograph ic Subject as Ethnograp her -
A Neglected Dimension in Fieldwork,
Rice University
Studies,
vol. 66, no. 1 (1980a), pp. 65-68.
44 Giddens,
op. cit.,
pp . 46 -47 .
45
Ibid.,
p. 58.
46 Ibid., p. 143.
47
Ibid.,
p. 147.
48 P. Ricoeur, Herme neutics: restoration of meaning or
reductio n of illusion? in P. Connorto n (ed.),
Critical So-
ciology: Selected Readings
(Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1976), p. 195.
49 K. Popper, Unended Quest; An Intellectual Autobiography
(Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), p. 190.
50 Geertz, op. cit., 1968, p. 154.
51 C. Geertz, Thi ck description: toward an interpretative
theory of culture, in C. Geertz, The
Interpretation of
Cultures
(London: Hutchinson, 1975), pp. 15-16.
52
Ibid.,
pp . 16 -18 .
53 Geertz,
op. cit.,
1979.
54 Ricoenr,
op. cit.,
1978, pp. 149 ff.
55
Ibid.,
pp. 152, 161.
56
Ibid.,
p. 154.
57 Ibid., pp. 154, 163-164.
58 T. Wolfe, The new journalism , in T. Wolfe and E.W.
Johnson (eds.), The New Journalism (Bongay, Suffolk:
Picador, 1973); T. Ludvigson, personal commun ication,
1979.
59 Wolfe,
op. cit.,
pp . 55 -56 .
60
Ibid.,
pp . 51 -52 .
61
Ibid.,
pp. 54, 58.
62
Ibid.,
pp. 11, 49, 57.
63 With Philips, mentioned
inlbid.,
p. 49.
64 F. Kermode, The
Genesis of Secrecy: O n the Interpreta-
tion o f Narrative
(Cambridge: MA: Harvard University
Press, 1979).
65 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 49.
66 F. Kermode, The
Sense o an Ending; Studies on The
Theory of Fiction
(New York: Oxfor d U niversity Press,
1968).
67
Ibid.,
p. 54.
68 IbM., pp. 150, 157.
69
Ibid.,
p. 59.
70
Ibid.,
pp . 43 -44 .
71
Ibid.,
pp . 37 -39 .
72 Kermode,
op. cir.,
1979.
73
Ibid.,
p. 119.
74
Ibid.,
p. 116.
75
Ibid.,
p. 117.
76 Ibid., pp. 107-108.
77
Ibid.,
p. 114.
78 Ibid., p. 109.
79 P.J . Rabinowitz, Tru th in fiction; a reexamin ation of
audiences,'
Critical lnqu iry,
vol. 4 (1977), pp. 121- 141 .
80
Ibid.,
p. 131.
81
Ibid.,
p. 140.
82
Ibid.,
pp. 125, 128 ff.
83 Kermode, op.
cit.,
1979, p. 117.
84 Geertz,
op. cit.,
1975.
85 G. Marcus, Rhet oric and the ethnographic genre in
anthropological research,
Current Anthropology,
vol. 21,
no. 4 (1980b), pp. 507-510.
86 Marcus,
op. cit.,
1980a, p. 509.
87 P. Rabinow, Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco (Berke-
ley: University of California Press, 1977).
88 J .P. Dumont, The Headman and L Amb iguity and Ambi-
valence in t he Fieldwor king Experience
(Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1978).
89 Marcus,
op. cit.,
1980a, p. 508.
90 Rabinow,
op. cir.,
1977.
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4
91 Dumont,
op. cit.
1978.
92 Marcus,
op. cit.
1980b, p. 508.
93 R. Jay, Personal and extrapersonal vision in anthrop ology,
in Dell Hymes (ed.),
Reinventing Anthropology
(New York:
Vintage, 1974).
94 J . Honigmann, The personal approach in cultural anthro-
pological research, Current Anthropology vol. 17, no. 2
(1976), pp. 243-250.
95 T. Ador no, Cultural criticism and society, in P. Conner-
ton (ed.),
Critical Sociology: Sele cted Readings
(Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1976), p. 270.
96 Cf. C. Taylor,
Hegel
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1975).