Vivek Issues n Options September 2013

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VIVEK : Issues and Options September2013 Issue: II No: IX 2

MEDIA

Cross Media Ownership - A Threat ToVibrant Democracy

- Shivaji SarkarBOOK REVIEW

Fountainhead Of Jihad: The Haqqani

Nexus, 1973-2012

Thoughts For Change - We Can Do It

Indias National Security: A Reader

EVENTS

Interaction With Daniele Mancini, Italia

Ambassador To India

Seminar On Pakistan After Elections An

Prospects Of Relations With India

Interaction With H. E. Mr Prasad

Kariyawasam

Press Statement On India-Pakistan

Relations By Members Of Indias

Strategic Community

Interaction With H.E Mr Stewart Beck,

Canadian High Commissioner To India

Launch Of Red Revolution 2020 And

Beyond: Strategic Challenges To Resolv

Naxalism

Launch Of Public Money, Private Agend

The Use And Abuse Of MPLADS

EDITORS NOTE

CENTRE STAGE

ome Common Myths About India-Pakistan

Relations

- Ambassador PP ShuklaDIPLOMACY

Why Pakistan Is Blowing Apart Loc Ceasefire?

- Sushant SareenWill Maoists Anti-India Tirade Impact India-

Nepal Ties?

- Prof Hari Bansh Jhandias Defence Diplomacy As A Component Of

ts Look East Policy

- Brig (Retd) Vinod AnandWill China Checkmate India On Chabahar?

- Radhakrishna RaoDEFENCE

trike Corps For The Mountains: Upgrading

ndias Military Strategy From Dissuasion To

Deterrence

- Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal

Contents

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Editors Note

The repeated violations of the ceasefire along the LoC by Pakistan hogged the nationalheadlines all through August. While initially it appeared that the Indian security forces

suffered some setback due to the unprovoked firing from across the border under the newregime of the peace posturing Nawaz Sharif, the Indian Army paid back in kind in abefitting manner subsequently. The blatant violations by the Pakistani troops wereapparently an outcome of frustration over their inability to push in more infiltrators due tothe eternal vigilance maintained by our gallant officers and men and a desperate attempt toprovide covering fire to the Jihadis planning mayhem in Jammu and Kashmir andelsewhere.

By month end, our highly competent intelligence agencies were also able to corner two ofthe most wanted ISI sponsored pawns bomb maker Abdul Karim Tunda and the elusivebrain behind the Indian Mujahideen (IM) Yasin Bhatkal. Apart from nailing thePakistani lie of having no links with home grown Indian terror outfits, these arrests have

also exposed political leaders who have questioned the very existence of IM for the sake ofperceived vote banks.

As part of his highly acclaimed series Neighbour from Hell, VIF Joint DirectorAmbassador P P Shukla has in this issue busted many a myth surrounding the India-Pakrelations. One sincerely hopes that this timely piece would not only open the eyes of theMandarins in South Block planning a summit between the two Prime Ministers but alsoexpose the utopian peaceniks of the Lahore Club who hold night long candlelight vigilsalong the Indo-Pak border dreaming about fraternity with Pakistan.

VIF Senior Fellow Sushant Sareen too has highlighted the reasons behind Islamabadblowing apart the LoC ceasefire. He has very aptly pointed out that the Pakistan army isnt

very comfortable with Nawaz Sharif at the helm of affairs and feels spooked by hisemphasis on civilian supremacy over all policy matters.

Defence and Strategic expert Brig Gurmeet Kanwal has analysed in detail theGovernments plans to set up a mountain strike corps along the India -China border while

VIF Visiting Fellow Radhakrishna Rao has dealt with the strategic importance of theChabahar port in Iran.

With the Indian economy also passing through one of its most turbulent phases, it is timethe leadership rises to the occasion and brings back the country on the path of stability andprogress.

K G Suresh

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The Neighbour from Hell

Some Common Myths About India-

Pakistan Relations

Phir ek baar kiya, to dekhna is not effective policy

- Ambassador PP Shuklas tensions rise betweenIndia and Pakistan, theusual arguments are being

repeated on both sides of a seriousdivide in India on how to deal withthat country. The reason we areunable to get the relationshipright is that the country and thepublic discourse is in the grip ofsome fallacies that we haveadopted unquestioningly,particularly at the official level.What follows is an attempt atbusting some of the myths. This is

important because it is theseerrors that are leaving us lurchingfrom one failed start to another.

A hard line response willstrengthen their hardlinersIt is commonly argued that ifIndia were hypothetically to

adopt a firm line in responding toPakistani provocations, that wouldonly play into the hands of themilitary and the terror networkssupported by the military. A bit of

history will be useful here. ThePakistan army first took power in1958. Since then, it has been ineffective control of security policiesmore or less without let-up tilltoday. There have been somemoments, though, when themilitary was weakened. The firstwas in 1971, after the defeat inBangladesh. The second, lessstark, moment was in 2011, afterthe US incursion in Abbottabad, tokill and snatch Osama bin Laden.On that occasion, the head of the

ISI had been forced to apologise tothe bloody civilians in thePakistan National Assembly andoffer to quit.

Both these were occasions whenhard power had been exercisedagainst the army, and it had beendefeated. Indeed, this is a basic

rule of statecraft: when you defeata policy, you defeat the authors ofthat policy.

Parallels from other countries

CENTRE ST

* Ambassador PP Shukla, Joint Director, VIF


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abound. Hitler was not stopped byappeasement; he was finallystopped only by war. And it wasonly when defeat looked certain

that there was a move from withinto unseat him, in July 1944.Similarly, Khrushchev wasstrengthened and the Sovietmilitary weakened after theCuban Missile Crisis ended withthe Soviets pulling their missilesfrom Cuba.

To look at it another way: if it istrue that a hard line on our sidestrengthens thehardliners inPakistan, then thecorollary must bethat a soft line[appeasement,which we havebeen practising fordecades now]should strengthen the moderates.But this has clearly not happened;in fact, over the years ofappeasement, the contrary hashappened, and the military hasonly got stronger, as its policies ofbleeding India have goneunchallenged.

We shall all grow together or nonewill growIt is also sometimes formulated interms that suggest that peace is

vital for the Indian economy togrow. Again, history is a goodguide. We had peace withPakistan in the 1970s, and

indeed, Gen Zia-ul-Haq called itthe golden period in Indo-Pakistanrelations. And yet, the decade ofthe 1970s was the very bleakest inthe economic history ofindependent India. By contrast,the period after 1993 has been themost turbulent in thesubcontinent, and this has been

the period of the best Indianeconomicperformance.

Pakistan hasmaintained its ownpace through thisperiod, somewhatbetter than Indiain the 1970s andsignificantly worse

since the 1990s, to the pointwhere it has become the sick manof Asia. There is no correlationbetween the rates of growth inIndia and Pakistan. And there islogic in this. There is little tradebetween us for India the totaltrade turnover with Pakistan isless than 1% of our global tradeturnover of US$ 600 billion. OurGDP is ten times that of Pakistan,a fact our analysts rarely mention,though we are constantly told

To look at it another way: if itis true that a hard line on ourside strengthens the hardlinersin Pakistan, then the corollarymust be that a soft line[appeasement, which we havebeen practising for decadesnow] should strengthen the

moderates.


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wrongly that Chinas GDP isfour times that of India.

We have to help [current leader]survive and strengthen him/herTime was when it was the

Americans who used to tell us thatthis or that leader was our bestbet it started with Ayub, andthereafter, we did not need to betold. We sold this hokum toourselves. After Zulfikar AliBhutto the man who promised a

thousand-year war, it was GenZia. Of course, it was but naturalthat it had to be Benazir afterthat, and then it was Mian NawazSharif. And so goes the drearycycleit turns out it is now in ourown interest to strengthen MianNawaz.

This begs two questions: is anyleader worth strengthening at thecost of our own interests, and canit be done by any outsider? As tothe first, the proposition that weneed to strengthen this or thatleader is dangerous nonsense. Itwas in this mistaken belief thateven as shrewd a leader as Indira

ji was led astray at Simla in 1972.Her laudable motivation was toshore up Bhutto, so that he, inturn, could keep his promise to

settle the Kashmir issue on termsacceptable to both sides. But justas soon as he could, he turned hisback on the understanding, and

we are paying in the blood of oursoldiers and innocent citizens forthe misplaced generosity. Yetagain, the same Bhuttossubsequent career is instructive onthe second point too: by 1977, hewas overthrown, and by 1979, hewas executed.

Admittedly, this is an extremecase, even by Pakistans gorystandards. However, the case isillustrative of what these kinds ofsimplistic ideas can lead to. Itneeds to be borne in mind, becauseonce again, voices are being raisedthat we need to help Mian sahibstrengthen his position. No, we donot need to, and we should havethe modesty to accept also that wedo not know how to go about it.Ignoring hostile acts and goingahead with business as usual even if we accept for argumentssake that it is the army that isbehind the latest burst of hostility

will not strengthen him; in alllikelihood, it will weaken him andfurther embolden the army.

If you dont talk, you are pushingthe subcontinent to war


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This is an argument that crops upeach time there is a flare-up intensions between India andPakistan. Talk is actually a

euphemism for the more accuratedescription for what we have beendoing appeasement. ThePakistanis are particularly good atusing this argument, and this isthen amplified by like-mindedpersons on our side. The reality isthat there are any number ofoptions between appeasement and

war. There are diplomatic,economic, political, and, yes,military measures that can beemployed, all belowthe level ofconventional war.We do not need tolook very far:Pakistan is doing

all of this quite successfullyagainst us, and we just need topay them back in the same coin.

The odd thing is that Pakistan ismuch the weaker country in thisstand-off its GDP is one-tenththat of India, as has already beenmentioned. Its military cannotmatch ours even after decades ofunder-spending on defence byIndia. We have mesmerisedourselves by how far China isahead of us by exaggerating thegap, but we never look at the gapbetween India and Pakistan. It is

vulnerable to economic pressure,both on water and on powerandwe are holding out a lifeline tothem on both. This can be

changed, and must change.

Similarly, we need to get ourperspective right on the issue ofMFN treatment for Indian exportsto Pakistan. Hardly any of thetalking heads have pointed outthat this is not really a decision forPakistan to make in exercise of itssovereign rights. It is an obligationunder WTO rules. And for sixteenyears, it has flouted this

obligation, and wehave accepted thiswithout eitherwithdrawing MFNfrom our side too,or taking the

country to the Dispute SettlementProcedure in WTO. This is how weencourage hostility from Pakistan

by making it a cost-free policy.

In talking of options short of war,it must nonetheless be kept inmind that we are operating in adangerous security environment,and war may be visited upon us,

whether we wish it or not. Forthat contingency, we need to befully prepared to defend ourselves,and along multiple fronts.

Cannot change geography

Hardly any of the talking headshave pointed out that this is notreally a decision for Pakistan tomake in exercise of its sovereignrights.


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This is especially hard tounderstand, coming from India.We have seen geography changeright from the dawn of

Independence. The creation ofPakistan itself was a change ofgeography, and a very importantone, from our perspective. ThenChina became a neighbour, and acountry called Tibet was removedfrom the map of sovereigncountries. Bangladesh emerged in1971. All three happened right on

our borders, and yet we keepsaying one cannot changegeography.

In point of fact, change ofgeography has only gathered pacesince the end of the Cold War. TheUSSR disappeared and fifteenindependent countries emerged inits place. Yugoslavia disappearedand six new countries replaced it.More recently, new countriescalled Timor Leste [East Timor]and South Sudan have appearedon the map.

The point is that we should beclear that, contrary to ourofficially-stated position, we have

no interest in a strong, stable,united Pakistan. We cannot hold ittogether if it is on the way tobecoming a failed state. And we donot need even to try and do soeither. What we need to do is to

prepare for this contingency,should it arise.

Pakistan is itself a victim ofterrorismThis is a particular favourite ofthe Pakistanis. They frequentlymention that they have lost fortythousand lives to terrorism, ofwhich four thousand are soldiers.This is a figure of losses over atleast a decade, and works out tosome four hundred a year on

average. That is admittedly alarge number, but not such anumber as to deter an army fromits strategic goals. The Indianarmy was losing more than thisnumber in the 1990s toPakistan-sponsored terror - butthat did not deflect us from ouraims.

More to the point, the terror thathas taken this toll in Pakistan is acreation of that country itself. It isas if a bomb-maker dies becausethe bomb goes off prematurely, ashas been known to happen, heshould be regarded as a victim.Surely, this is a grotesque

misrepresentation of the reality.

Morality and an eye for an eyeFinally, there is that hoary oldchestnut we are the land ofGandhi. An eye for an eye makes


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the whole world blind veryemotive, completely fallacious. Aneye for an eye makes twoadversaries one-eyed, and keeps

them on par in respect of physicalability. Nothing more, nothingless.

But more substantively, it isimportant to remember thatGandhi [who never said what isattributed to him about an eye foran eye] was fighting against a verydifferent enemy. There is a quotefrom President Kennedy in hisletter to Nehru written just afterthe 1962 war hadbegun, where herefers to Nehrusefforts for peace -and Nehru wassurely the mostdevoted of followers of Gandhiunlike the ersatz variety so muchin evidence these days. Here iswhat Kennedy wrote:

You have put into practice whatall great religious teachers haveurged and so few of theirfollowers have been able to do.Alas, this teaching seems to beeffective only when it is sharedby both sides in a dispute.[Emphasis added].

And this is the element that thevotaries of no-change towards

Pakistan seem to miss. The otherparty does not share the teaching,and, ironically, it was none otherthan Gandhi himself who failed in

his dealings with the futureleaders of Pakistan.

What is more, it is ahistorical tocall for us to persist in this failedpolicy. This is precisely the policythat India has followed at leastsince the days of then-PrimeMinister VP Singh all to noavail.

The purpose of this myth-bustingis not to scoredebating points.India is facing veryserious securitythreats, probablythe most serious inour independent

history. This is no time for woollythinking or ego-driven policies even less is it permissible to lookto vote banks. Statecraft demandsthat we unshackle our minds fromthoughts that have held ushostage for far too long, and workout alternative policies that willaddress our security challenges.

Tailpiece.

New York, 26 September 2013(Agencies)

This just in.

An eye for an eye makes twoadversaries one-eyed, and keepsthem on par in respect ofphysical ability. Nothing more,nothing less.


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It is reported that the PrimeMinisters of India and Pakistanmet in New York, and had ahighly successful meeting. Prime

Minister Singh had prepared wellfor the meeting and told hiscounterpart: This time I reallymean it. Phir ek baar kiya to dekhlena.

The use of the word reallycaused some ripples, and one of the Party General Secretaries,who knows so little about so much,felt that Singh had beenunnecessarily jingoistic in theconversation. He suspected thatsome communal elements hadsmuggled this into the PrimeMinisters talking points.

Nonetheless, the meeting was agrand success from the Indian

point of view. The Prime Ministerpersonally briefed acorrespondent, who occasionallywrites for a misleadingly-namednewspaper. This correspondentreported after the briefing that the

Pakistanis were shaken by thisremark of the Prime Minister.

This is the same correspondent

who recently broke the story aboutthe existence of a group in Indiacalled the Teach Pakistan ALesson school, which was

propagating irresponsible ideaslike upholding the sovereignty of India. It was he who also brokethe story that this same schoolwas wrong to suggest that thePakistanis were indeed shakingafter the meetingwith laughter.

A large group of deshbhaktas, whosee Pakistan much better than therest of the country because theysee it by candle-light, averred onemore time that Pakistan waschanging. They confirmed that thePakistanis had indeed been

shaken to the core by Mr Singhsremarks, and promised that terrorattacks would never happen again.

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Why Pakistan Is Blowing Apart Loc

Ceasefire?

- Sushant Sareenven though there have beenoccasional violations byPakistani troops of the

ceasefire agreement on the Line ofControl (LoC) in Jammu andKashmir, the recent flare-up hasplaced an enormous strain on theConfidence Building Measure(CBM) that had been mutuallyagreed by the two countries in late2003. The violations of theceasefire are no longer limited toeither a small section of the LoC orto use of small arms but are takingplace all along the LoC withhigher calibre ammunition beingused. What is more, the exchange

of fire has continued unabated inone or the other sector of the LoCfor nearly three weeks now. Onthe Indian side, the restraint thatwas being shown by the army inthe face of regular provocations bythe Pakistan army and its jihadistparamilitaries pushing ininfiltrators, firing on Indian

positions, carrying out cross-LoCraids etc. has now all but run itscourse. With the gloves coming off,the Indian Army has started toretaliate in a calibrated and

proportionate manner.

The message being sent is clear:unless the Pakistanis back off(after all they started the shootingmatch with the killing of fiveIndian soldiers on the Indian sideof the LoC), there is a clear and

present danger of the ceasefireagreement collapsing. If thishappens, things will return to thepre-ceasefire situation in whichboth sides suffered heavycasualties of not only troops butalso civilians living close to theLoC. The problem for Pakistan isthat open hostilities breaking out

on its eastern front is the lastthing that the over-stretchedmilitary can afford at this point intime. As it is, Pakistan is sinkingin a sea of crises, not the least ofwhich is a tanking economy,rampant terrorism, two and a halfinsurgencies (the Islamist one inKhyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA,

a separatist movement inBalochistan, and the stirrings of anationalist insurgency in Sindh),abysmal state of law and orderwith sectarian violence and

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* Sushant Sareen, Senior Fellow, VIF


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criminal mafias tearing thecountry apart. Add to this thelooming spectre of instability andchaos post 2014 after the Western

forces withdraw from Afghanistan.By all standpoints of normalrationality then, it just doesntmake sense for Pakistan to ratchetup tension with India at thisstage. Or does it?

Many Pakistani analysts,assuming an air of injuredinnocence to mislead bothdomestic and internationalopinion, wonder what Pakistanstands to gain byheating up theLoC, and that tooat a time when thenew governmenthas expressed itskeenness to reachout to India and normaliserelations. Asides of the fact thatPakistan has been quite adept atplaying both sides of the game professing commitment to peaceon the one hand andsurreptitiously promotingterrorism and proxy war on theother hand there are a numberof reasons why the Pakistanimilitary establishment, if not theentire Pakistani state machinery,could be turning normal rationalbehaviour on its head and actuallycoming to the conclusion that

rising tension on the frontier withIndia serves not just the corporateinterests of the Pakistan army butalso the security and strategic

interests of the Pakistani state.

The most benign explanation forthe LoC flare-up is that thePakistanis made a tacticalmiscalculation by crossing the LoCto attack an Indian patrol and kill5 soldiers. The strident reactionfrom the Indian side hadnt beenfactored in because for some timenow such actions by thePakistanis never evoked any

major responsefrom India. Butthis time thingsspiralled out ofcontrol and thepressure of publicopinion coupled

with the anger within the armyforced the hand of the governmentto raise the ante and give back toPakistan as good, if not better,than it got. With India refusing toback down or climb down from theescalation ladder, the Pakistanismight have bitten more than theycan chew and are now trying tobring things back to normal. Butthis explanation doesnt quiteexplain why, for a number ofmonths now, the Pakistanis havebeen trying to reignite the flamesof Jihad in Kashmir. The sharp

The most benign explanationfor the LoC flare-up is that thePakistanis made a tacticalmiscalculation by crossing theLoC to attack an Indian patroland kill 5 soldiers.


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rise in number of infiltrationattempts, ceasefire violations andambushes and attacks inside thestate of Jammu and Kashmir

suggests a more sinister gameplan than just testosteroneimbalance among Pakistani troopswhich made then indulge inneedless adventurism along theLoC. Indeed, there are goodreasons to believe that Pakistancould once again be preparing theground for putting Jammu and

Kashmir back on the boil and boththe recent heating up of LoC aswell as the spike in acts of terrorwithin the state are part of thisplan for Kashmir Jihad 2.0.

Yet another reason why theeastern front has become hot,while tangentially related to theissue of Kashmir, has to do withPakistans domestic power playbetween the militaryestablishment and the civiliangovernment. The Pakistan armyisnt very comfortable with NawazSharif at the helm of affairs andfeels spooked by his emphasis oncivilian supremacy over all policymatters. There is a widespreadperception inside Pakistan thatNawaz Sharif is unlikely to let thearmy wield the veto on foreign andsecurity policy and will sooner orlater make a play for whittlingdown the militarys influence in

domestic politics. If the army hasto remain top dog, it must pullNawaz Sharif down a few pegs.The best way for doing this is

raising tensions with India, a ploythat catapults the army to thecentre-stage, and allows it toacquire the image of the saviour ofthe nation in the face of a hostileIndia. Related to this is thediscomfiture of the Pakistanimilitary establishment withNawaz Sharifs desire for

normalising relations with India.The overtures made by NawazSharif to restart some sort of anengagement with India hasntgone down well with the army.There are reports of the Pakistanarmy chief Gen Ashfaq Kayanicautioning Nawaz Sharif not to behasty in reaching out to India.

Renewed hostilities along the LoCeffectively sabotage the peacemoves of Nawaz Sharif. In otherwords, the Pakistan military haskilled two birds arrested anypossibility of political irrelevanceand shot down Nawaz Sharifpeace moves with one stone ramping up tension on LoC. Forhis part, Nawaz Sharif too isbelieved to have been spooked bythe sudden rise in temperature onthe eastern front. Whispers incorridors of power in Islamabadsuggest that Nawaz Sharif and hisclose associates fear and suspect


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that the Pakistan army could bedoing another Kargil to him. He,therefore, is trying to play downthe LoC incidents and not fall for

the trap which he thinks has beenset for him by the army.

Domestic politics aside, there areother advantages also that thePakistani establishment could behoping to reap from the risingtension with India. Hints of thiscame in a report by one of theembedded journalists who quotedan unnamed senior army officer assaying thatPakistan wasconsideringwithdrawing troopson the border with

Afghanistan andredeploying themon the border withIndia. This is athinly disguised ploy of invitingUS intervention on Pakistan'sside. At a time when the US is inwithdrawal mode from

Afghanistan and is to all intentsand purposes outsourcing

Afghanistan to Pakistan, the lastthing it would want is for Pakistanto shift its focus from its westernborder to its eastern border, or sothe Pakistanis calculate. Theexpectation is that the US will, atthe very minimum, lean uponIndia to cool things down and

there is also a reasonably goodchance that it could also go a stepfurther to press India to seek aKashmir solution which satisfies

Pakistan. This sort of Pakistanicalculation fits in well with the oldand tired narrative (but one whichhas once again acquired sometraction) that the problem in

Afghanistan is not one of radicalIslam or Islamist terror butactually an India-Pakistan proxywar. This nonsensical narrative

peddles the line that the road toKabul runsthrough Kashmirand the end pointof this is that oncethe Kashmir issueis settled, radicalIslam will die anatural death and

South Asia willtransform into aland of milk and honey.Ratcheting up tensions with Indiaon LoC is therefore the first stepin drawing the attention of theinternational community, inparticular the US, to the Kashmirissue.

What is important to note is thatPakistan is willing to dismantle itssecurity grid against the Talibanin order to beef up its defencesagainst India. At one level, this istantamount to an acknowledgment

Hints of this came in a reportby one of the embedded

journalists who quoted anunnamed senior army officer assaying that Pakistan wasconsidering withdrawing troopson the border with Afghanistanand redeploying them on the

border with India.


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that Pakistan sees India as amuch greater threat to itsexistence than the terrorism anddevastation caused by the Taliban,

and as such punctures holes in theairy-fairy talk about internalthreats (Taliban and Islamicradical groups) replacing India asthe primary threat to Pakistan'ssecurity. At another level, such aredeployment of troops and shift offocus will help the Pakistaniauthorities create space for a

dialogue, even a deal, with theTaliban. On their part, theTaliban (about whom thePakistanis never tire ofinsinuating that they are beingfunded by India!) have announcedthat they will defend Pakistan'sborders from any Indianaggression and that while their

fight against Pakistan army is forthe sake of Islam, they would notallow the enemies of the country(India) to attack their homeland.India therefore serves as a perfectexcuse for both the Taliban andPakistani authorities to enter intoan accommodation of sorts, whichin turn will create the opening fora possible peace deal. That anysuch deal will probably be verytenuous and at best tactical is ofcourse another matter. But in theimmediate at least, it will reducethe violence inside Pakistan andas such provide breathing space to

both the Pakistani authorities andthe Taliban.

The big question is whether Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif is party tothis double game, in which heplays good cop and is all sugar andhoney to disarm India while hisarmed forces play bad cop to hurtand bleed India. His past record israther mixed. The last time hewas PM, Pakistan was merrilyexporting terrorism into Indiaeven as he was engaging India inthe Bus diplomacy. Members of hislast cabinet used to openly hobnobwith terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and some of themprovided support and sanctuary toKashmiri terrorists. There arereports of his links with Osamabin Laden and his turning a blindeye to sponsoring of JihadInternational by his handpickedISI chiefs. In his first term as PM,the ISI carried out the serial bombblasts in Mumbai in 1993. In hissecond term, there was Kargil andother acts of terrorism. Even inthe last five years, his partysgovernment in Punjab has beenfunding the activities of the parentorganisation of LeT, JamaatudDawa, from the provincial budget.

Of course, if Nawaz Sharif is thechanged man that many claim heis then he will need to prove his


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bona fides about wanting toimprove relations with India byacting against his own jihadists,both the uniformed variety and

the ones in Shalwar-Kameez.Until Nawaz Sharif walks the talkon peace with India, he can neverbe considered a credible partner inthe normalisation process. India,meanwhile, must respond andreact appropriately andproportionately to any and everyprovocation from Pakistan.

Equally important, India needs todisabuse the West (especially theUS) of any notions it might beharbouring of playing a mediatory

role between India and Pakistanon the issue of Jammu andKashmir. The US must be made tounderstand that if it couldnt

pressure Pakistan into stoppingsupport for the Taliban despite theheavy cost such a Pakistani policywas imposing on the US in men,money and material, then there isnot much traction it will get fromIndia on Jammu and Kashmir orfor that matter on Pakistan.

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Will Maoists Anti-India Tirade Impact

India-Nepal Ties?

- Prof Hari Bansh Jhaonflict does not end for allthe time once it breaks upin a country. It happened so

in Africa, Latin America, Asia andother parts of the world.Experience shows that conflict re-emerged in at least 40 per cent of

the countries that at one or theother point of time were engulfedby conflict.Though unfortunate,certain ominous symptoms ofanother conflict have alreadyappeared in Nepal that wastriggered by violent conflictbetween 1996 and 2006 and inwhich more than 18,000 innocentpeople were killed and there washuge loss of property. What wouldhappen to the Himalayan countryand in its neighbourhood,particularly in India, if anotherviolent conflict arises? Time hascome to ponder over this.

The violent conflict in Nepal hadstarted in 1996 after the then

Prime Minister of Nepal SherBahadur Deuba failed to meet 40-point demands of the CommunistParty of Nepal (Maoist). Like in1996, the Communist Party of

Nepal (Maoist) with its leaderMohan Baidya (alias Kiran)submitted 70-point demand to theleader of Unified CommunistParty of Nepal Maoist (UCPN-Maoist) and Prime Minister ofNepal, Baburam Bhattari, on

September 10, 2012. However, thedifference in the situation in 1996and 2012 is that BaburamBhattarai submitted the 40-pointdemand to the government ofNepal as a rebel leader of Maoists.But now Bhattarai is PrimeMinister and the 70-point demandwas submitted to him by noneother than his own colleagues ofCPN (Maoist) who split from themother party UCPN (Maoist) onJune 19, 2012.

Strikingly, many of the demandscovered in 40-point demand in1996 resemble the 70-pointdemand in 2012 and this is moreso when it comes to opposing deals

with India. In their bid to lend anationalist fervor to theirdemands, the Maoists in 2012 asin 1996 tried to raise differentissues like the scrapping of all the

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* Prof Hari Bansh Jha


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unequal treaties and other dealswith India. Towards this end,emphasis was laid on scrappingthe 1950 Treaty of Peace and

Friendship with India, which isvirtually a security pact betweenthe two countries. Besides,abrogation of Arms Treaty of 1965,Mahakali Treaty of 1996 andBilateral Investment Protectionand Promotion Agreement of 2011with India has also beendemanded. Other issues that have

been covered in the demandinclude stricter control of theNepal-India border,scrapping ofcontracts given tothe Indiancontractors such asto GMR and othersfor the construction

of Karnli and ArunIII hydropower projects,preventing the movement ofvehicles with Indian numberplates, and banning Indian Hindimovies as well as Indian music inNepal.

The Mohan Baidya led Maoistparty even threatened to takeresort to violent means if their 70-point demands were not met. Asthe Bhattarai-led government inNepal did not do anything aboutthe 70-point demands as it cannotbe done, the CPN (Maoist) in the

first phase of their struggledeclared ban on the movement ofvehicles with Indian numberplates in Nepal. Cinema halls

across the country have beenthreatened not to show Hindimovies and play Hindi music.

Argument has been placed thatsome of these measures wereessential to give opportunity to theNepalese industries to grow,which many of the intellectualshave questioned.

Of course, the Prime Minister ofNepal, BaburamBhattarai, hasgiven instruction tothe securityagencies to dealwith themiscreants if at allthey tried to stop

the vehicles with Indian numberplates because that could createshortage of basic essential goods inNepal, including petroleumproducts and food items. But inreality, the Maoist call seems tohave been working as most of thevehicles with Indian numberplates have stopped plying on theroads in Nepal out of fear ofattack. Even buses that used tobring Indian tourists to Nepalhave been affected. On top of that,the cinema halls do not want to

Besides, abrogation of ArmsTreaty of 1965, MahakaliTreaty of 1996 and BilateralInvestment Protection andPromotion Agreement of 2011with India has also beendemanded.


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take the risk of showing Hindimovies and playing Indian music.

In the meantime, Nepals other

political parties like the NepaliCongress, the Communist Party ofNepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)and the Madheshi parties haveopposed the 70-point demand ofthe CPN (Maoist). There is certainnews of retaliation across theborder in India when effort wasmade to stop the vehicles withNepalese number plates. In Nepalitself, many people are dissatisfiedwith the move of CPN (Maoist) asthey have started facing shortageof petroleum products and otheressential items. Even the cinemaviewers who like the Hindi moviesand Indian music aredisappointed. Most of the Nepalesemedia have also opposed theMaoist demands.

Notwithstanding the opposition,the CPN (Maoist) cadres are not ina mood to retreat from their 70-point demands. Media report sconfirm that the CPN (Maoist)have among their cadres thoseelements who could not be

accommodated within the motherUCPN (Maoist) led by PushpaKamal Dahal (alias Prachand). Ata time when the political situationin the country is fragile and thelaw and order situation is fragile,

efforts are being made by theparty to bring to its fold thoseMaoist fighters who weredischarged from the Maoist

cantonments in 2012. Of the19,000 plus Maoist fighters, morethan 16,000 have already beendischarged from the cantonmentsas they opted for voluntaryretirement scheme. Now effort isbeing made to bring those peopleinto the fold of the party. Besides,those thousands of Maoist workers

who were disqualified in thecantonments in the initial stagefor being child soldiers or on othergrounds are also being mobilized.Consequently, the Maoists spiritis emboldened and the cases offorced donation, bandh and othersuch activities have startedgrowing.

However, it is beyondcomprehension as to how theMaoists, who took shelter in Indiafor years during the conflictperiod, are targeting India. It wasthrough the Indian interventionthat the Maoists and the sevenpolitical parties of Nepal enteredinto 12-point agreement in NewDelhi in 2005, which ensured safereturn of the Maoists in Nepal. Ina way, the 12-point agreementpaved the way for the secondPeoples Movement in Nepal in2006 and the emergence of the


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Maoists as the single largest partyin the Constituent Assembly in2008. It was then only that themonarchical institution of 239-

long years was abolished and theMaoists were able to head thegovernment in 2008-2009.

It is also difficult to understand asto why several Maoists want tomaintain closer relation withChina when the Chinesegovernment provided even lethalweapons to Nepal to crush theMaoists during the time KingGyanendra ruled the country in2005.

It appears that theCPN (Maoist)might try to takeNepal on the pathof conflict again to serve their

motto of capturing power, thoughsuch a move might provedisastrous to Nepal. They mightdo so with the help of the oldfighters who were heavilyindoctrinated during the conflictperiod in Nepal. Yet the groundreality does not favour theMaoists. Perhaps, many of such

cadres might not return to thejungle and work as guerillas asthey did in the past because theyhave been so much accustomed tothe life of the cities and townsnow. They have neither genuine

support from the common mass ofthe Nepalese population nor dothey have any internationalbacking as such. Even the decade-

long conflict made the people somuch wary that they cannot thateasily be diverted. They are in nomood for any conflict as they aredisgusted with the selfish natureof the leaders. But this does notgive room for complacency. In casethe conflict of even low intensitybreaks, of which there is some

probability, it might not only havean impact within Nepal but also itmight affect India most as being

the closestneighbour and alsodue to the fact thatthere is an openborder between thetwo countries.

Therefore, before the situationgoes out of control, all theNepalese and other internationalstakeholders including Indiashould see to it that peace andstability in Nepal is not disturbed.Conflict anywhere is threat topeace everywhere.

(The author is former Director,Centre For Economic andTechnical Studies, Nepal)

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They might do so with the helpof the old fighters who wereheavily indoctrinated during theconflict period in Nepal.


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Indias Defence Diplomacy As A

Component Of Its Look East Policy

- Brig (Retd) Vinod Anandhe dominant impulse ofIndias Look East Policy(LEP) that was launched in

1992 was economic and cultural,the objective being to reintegrateIndia economically and culturallywith our civilisational neighboursof South East (SE) Asia. InDecember 2012, the ASEAN-IndiaCommemorative Summit was heldin New Delhi to signify twodecades of Indias LEP. Growingtrade ties have corresponded withthe expansion of relationship inthe areas of defence and securityand thus the engagement whichwas primarily political and

economic has acquired strategiccontent in the recent years. Indiaand countries of South Asia sharemany threats and challengesespecially in the areas of non-conventional security. India andSE Asian nations have beenstrengthening their defence andsecurity relationship both at

bilateral and multilateral levels toaddress such threats. Defencecooperation with ASEAN membersis geared primarily towardsexchanges of high-level visits,

strategic dialogues, port calls,training exchanges, joint exercisesand provision of defenceequipment.

Prime Minster Dr ManmohanSingh during his visit to Myanmarin April 2012 observed that both

India and Myanmar need toexpand our security cooperationthat is vital not only to maintain

peace along our land borders butalso to protect maritime tradewhich we hope will open upthrough the sea route betweenKolkata and Sittwe.

India ramped up cooperation withMyanmar through high level visitsby the Defence Minister Mr AK

Antony in January, 2013 and lastyear through the visit of ChairmanChiefs of Staff Committee andChief of the Air Staff, ACMNorman Browne from November26 to 29. Myanmar army has been

looking for hardware and Indiahas been providing items such astransport aircraft, helicopters andother defence equipment. India isalso focussed on expanding

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* Brig (Retd) Vinod Anand, Senior Fellow, VIF


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training and capacity building ofthe Myanmar armed forces.Further, Myanmar navy has beenregularly taking part in Indias

Milan series of naval exercisessince 2006.

Malacca Straits is the pivotaltransiting point through whichmost of the oil and gastransportation of India, Southeastand East Asian countries takeplace. Increasing incidence ofpiracy for ransom and smugglingin the high seas, which threatensuninterrupted transportation of oiland gas, hasprompted thesestates to secure thesea lanes. Herecooperation withIndonesia,Singapore,Thailand and Malaysia to secureMalacca Straits and theneighbouring areas remainsstrategically important.

Malacca Straits are important toboth India and Indonesia and thetwo countries signed a DefenceCooperation Agreement in 2001

and have had regular defenceexchanges including the exchangeof high level visits, ship visits,officers studying in Staff Collegesin either country and jointcoordinated patrols in the mouth

of the Malacca Straits. IndonesianNavy ships have consistentlyparticipated in the Milan series ofexercise conducted near the

Andaman and Nicobar islands bythe Indian Navy.

Last October, Antony visitedIndonesia to attend the firstMinisterial level biennial defencedialogue between the twocountries, where he observed Wehave a vital stake in the evolutionof balanced security andcooperation mechanisms throughwhich we can build consensus and

pursue dialogue.We seek to improveour partnershipwith all countriesin the IndianOcean Region onbilateral basis as

well as through multilateral foralike Indian Ocean NavalSymposium (IONS), Indian OceanRim Association for RegionalCooperation (IOR-ARC) etc. Indiahas also been supporting thefreedom of navigation and UnitedNations Convention on the Law ofthe Sea (UNCLOS) through SouthChina Sea where some of the

ASEAN countries are at thereceiving end of Chinas assertivepolicies.

Here cooperation withIndonesia, Singapore, Thailandand Malaysia to secure MalaccaStraits and the neighbouringareas remains strategicallyimportant.


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Further, as part of deepening itsengagement with the Southeast

Asian countries through militaryto military relations, India has

provided access to Singaporearmed forces to use Indiantraining facilities like Air Forceand Artillery firing ranges.Singapore has signed DefenceCooperative Agreement in 2003and a Bilateral Agreement for theConduct of Joint Military Trainingand Exercises in India. Naval

exercises between both the Naviesare being conducted annuallysince 1994; in 2011, the navalexercise between both the Navieswere conducted in South ChinaSea and the shore phase of theexercise was conducted at theChangi Naval Base of Singapore.

During Mr Antonys visit toSingapore in June this year, Indiaand Singapore signed a freshagreement to extend the use oftraining and exercise facilities inIndia by the Singapore Army for afurther period of five years. Abilateral agreement for utilizationof facilities in India by theSingapore Air Force and Armywas signed in October 2007 and

August 2008 respectively.Singapore is the only country towhich India is offering suchfacilities.

The third country which remainsimportant in the context ofMalacca Straits and adjoiningmaritime area is Malaysia. India-

Malaysia defence relations havebeen growing over the years aftersigning of MOU on DefenceCooperation (MIDCOM) in 1993.The ninth meeting of theMIDCOM was held in KualaLumpur in January 2012. IndiasChief of Air Staff visited Malaysiain February 2012 and Malaysias

Chiefs of Army and Navy bothvisited India in April 2012. TheIAF Training Team deployed inMalaysia trained Malaysian pilotson the SU-30 MKM aircraft fortwo-and-a-half years sinceFebruary 2008. Malaysia has alsobeen looking for training itsScorpene submarine crew and

maintenance of the submarines.These are areas where both sidescan cooperate as India is alsoacquiring such submarines.

Thailand is another importantIndian Ocean littoral state withwhich India shares maritimeboundary. Cooperation betweenthe two countries is based on theJoint Working Group on securityestablished in 2003 has been nowupgraded to include defenceexchanges. The first meeting ofIndia-Thailand Defence Dialoguewas held in New Delhi in


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December 2011 and a bilateralMOU on Defence cooperation wassigned in January 2012. Thecurrent Defence cooperation

comprises regular joint exercises,coordinated maritime patrols nearthe international maritimeboundary to counter terrorism,piracy and smuggling; training ofofficers at each others ArmedForces Training institutions andparticipation as observers inmilitary exercises. Defence

Minister Mr AK Anthony visitedBangkok in June this year. Thetwo Ministers reviewed regionalsecurity situationand expressed theirsupport forcollaborativeregionalmechanisms such

as AEAN Defence MinistersMeeting (ADMM) Plus formaintaining regional peace andsecurity, freedom of navigation,keeping open sea lanes ofcommunication, and cooperation inareas such as anti-piracy, disasterrelief and rescue.

Securing Sea Lines ofCommunication (SLOCs) andMalacca Straits is also importantfor the South East countries like

Vietnam that has intensified itsdefence relationship with India.For the ASEAN countries, it is

geo-strategically prudent to forgea defence relationship of a greateror lesser degree with India and theUS as some sort of balance of

power arrangements possiblyagainst a rising and assertiveChina that is hardly going toremain status quoist.

An MOU between Vietnam andIndia was signed in 2009 fordefence cooperation though thedefence exchanges between bothnations pre date this period. Indiaand Vietnam face a commonchallenge from China and bothhave been target of its muscular

policies. Some ofthe engines of

Vietnamese MiG-21 aircrafts havebeen overhauled in

India. There are also mechanismsfor sharing of strategic perceptionsand naval cooperation between thetwo countries. Coordinated patrolsby the Vietnamese seapolice andthe Indian Coast Guard areconducted jointly in addition totraining of Vietnamese air forcepilots. Besides providing somedefence equipment, India has alsobeen helping Vietnam to set up adomestic defence industry.

Similarly, India has defencecooperation and exchanges withCambodia, Laos, Brunei and

India and Vietnam face acommon challenge from Chinaand both have been target of itsmuscular policies.


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Philippines. For instance, India issetting up an Air Force Academyin Laos. An Indian militarydelegation led by the Army Chief

visited Laos in December 2011.Discussions revolved around ongoing defence cooperationinitiatives between India andLaos. The Army Chief reaffirmedIndias commitment to thecapacity building of the LaoPeoples Army and discussed arange of defence cooperation

initiatives with the Lao armyleadership. The delegation visitedthe Kaysone Phomvihane

Academy for National Defence,where a two-member trainingteam from the Indian Army hasbeen in place for the last 15 years.

Exchange of visits of defenceofficials, goodwill visits by IndianNaval Ships to Cambodias ports,gift of medical equipment & otherstores and imparting of trainingcourses to Royal Cambodian AirForce (RCAF) personnel indemining and peace keepingoperations have been part of thedefence exchanges. On thesecurity front, India andCambodia have signed an

Agreement on CombatingInternational Terrorism,Organized Crimes and Illicit DrugTrafficking in December, 2005.With Brunei, there has been some

degree of defence cooperation withIndian naval ships participating inthe first-ever Brunei InternationalFleet Review to mark the 50th

anniversary of Royal BruneiArmed Forces.

So far as Philippines is concerned,an impetus to defence cooperationhas been imparted in recent years.With defence cooperation betweenthe two countries having beenformally established through the2006 Philippines-India AgreementConcerning Defence Cooperation,Indian Navy and Coast Guardships regularly visit thePhilippines. The participation ofofficers of the armed forces of bothcountries in various specializedtraining courses in each otherscountries has increased. There arealso arrangements for sharing ofintelligence and perceptions oncertain other sensitive issues. Toenhance the defence cooperationfurther, a Joint DefenceCooperation Committee wasconstituted which had its firstmeeting in Manila in January2012.

At the multilateral level, India hasalso become a member of ASEANDefence Ministers' Meet PlusEight (ADMM-Plus). The basicobjective of creating thisframework was to bring about co-


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operative security, especially inthe areas of humanitarianassistance, disaster relief,maritime security, counter-

terrorism and peace keepingoperations. ADMM-Plus Eight hasalso proposed furthering ofbilateral and multilateral dialogueand sharing of expertise amongthe military forces of memberstates. The arrangement alsoadvanced proposals to counterparticular threats and issues such

as piracy and natural disasterthrough joint military exercises.

Both India andASEAN membershave been on anupward economictrajectory and asthey grow, thesecurity andstrategic environment has alsobeen becoming complex. Whilethese nations have been in abeneficial economic relationshipwith India and China, they remainwary of Chinas growing assertionand irredentist tendencies. Indiasefforts in defence cooperation with

ASEAN also aims at addressing

its own strategic concerns both inthe Indian Ocean littoral as wellas in South China Sea. BothMinistry of Defence and Ministry

of External Affairs need tocoordinate their efforts in order toadd meaningful substance to theevolving defence and securityrelationship with the ASEANmembers as part of a compositeendeavour to achieve success inthe strategic objectives of its LEP.The MOD also needs to allot more

vacancies to the defence officers ofthe SE Asian countries fortraining at our defence

establishments.Frequency of jointmilitary exercisesalso needs to beincreased toimprove levels of

interoperability.There is also a case for reviewingour restrictive policies on export ofdefence hardware to South East

Asian nations.

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While these nations have beenin a beneficial economicrelationship with India andChina, they remain wary ofChinas growing assertion andirredentist tendencies.


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Will China Checkmate India On

Chabahar?

- Radhakrishna Raon a development that couldvery well upset Indias geo-strategic apple cart, China is

making deft and vigorous moves towoo Iran to accept its offer ofUS$80-million to upgrade theChabahar port located on the coastof Gulf of Oman, off the Strait ofHormuz. Perhaps it could be a wellthought out move on the part ofChina, which through its string ofpearls strategy is busy expandingits area of influence across theIndian Ocean region, to keep Indiaaway from the project and slowlyintrude into the Indian geo-political space in Tehran. A

toehold in Iran could drive Chinato cast its net of influence farand wide, across the West Asianlandscape, with seriousconsequences for the Americanpresence in this oil rich part of theworld.

From building the deep sea ports

and launching satellites toconstructing all weather highwaysand putting in place telecomnetworks, China has become apartner in progress for many

countries in the Indian Oceanregion. Sri Lanka, Maldives,Myanmar, Nepal and Bangladeshare among the Indian neighbourswhere an impressive Chinesepresence has become a faitaccompli. In the context of theadministrative control of theGwadar port located on Makrancoast, overlooking the Arabian sea,in Pakistans sparsely populatedand restive Balochistan province,passing on into the Chinese hands,Chabahar has come to assumeimmense strategic and economicsignificance for India. Clearly andapparently, Indias participation

in Chabahar port developmentcould, to some extent, work as acounter-poise to the advantagesthat China could derive frommanaging Gwadar port.

Gwadar port, which stands out asa vibrant symbol of strategicpartnership between China and

Pakistan, could very well giveChina an easy access to the keyenergy markets in the MiddleEast. Further, it could also provideChina a convenient access to the

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* Radhakrishna Rao, Visiting Fellow, VIF


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warm waters of Indian Ocean anda listening post near the Strait ofHormuz. Incidentally, about 20%of the worlds petroleum and 35%

of the petroleum traded by seapass through the Strait ofHormuz, described as one of theworlds busiest and moststrategically located sea lanes.

As part of the ambitious US$18-billion economic corridor projectconnecting Kashgar in China withGwadar, it is planned to build apipeline as well as road and raillinks that will involve engineeringof around 200-kms of tunnelsacross thetreacherousmountainouslandscape. Theroad link willinvolve upgrading and realigningthe strategically locatedKarakoram highway. Kashgar islocated in Chinas disturbedwestern Xinjiang province whereMuslim Uighur separatists arequite active.

Of course, the Gwadar-Kashgarpipeline may help China reduce its

dependence on Malacca Strait inso far as transporting oil fromWest Asia is concerned. Further, itcould help meet a part of theenergy needs of the Western partsof China. More importantly, this

pipeline makes a strategic sensefor China in terms ofstrengthening its long term energysecurity. On another front, in

order to bring down its reliance onthe Strait of Malacca fortransporting crude, China hasinvested heavily in building an oiland gas pipeline in Myanmar. Asthings stand now, China isexpected to overtake US as theworlds largest crude importer in2014.Currently,three fourth of

Chinas crude import from MiddleEast are channelled through theStrait of Malacca which is

vulnerable topiracy and geo

politicaluncertainties. Butthen the economiccorridor project is

still at a conceptual stage and itwould be sometime before it getsgoing. However, both thecountries, while highlighting theeconomic importance of theproject, have downplayed itsstrategic aspects. Meanwhile,reports emanating from Beijingquote Chinese Governmentofficials as saying that securityconcern could hinder the 2000-kmlong economic corridor project.

On their part, US securityanalysts believe that China couldvery well make use of its control

The road link will involveupgrading and realigning thestrategically located Karakoramhighway.


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over Gwadar for furthering itsmilitary interests. In the ultimateanalysis, there are many strategicgains that China can derive from

the port with particular referenceto protecting its long terminterests in the Indian Oceanregion in addition to ensuring itsenergy security. Significantly,Gwadar is located just 72 nauticalmiles east of Chabahar. However,the daring pre dawn attack on acheck post of coast guards near

Gwadar in late July has exposedthe vulnerability of the port to theprevailing volatile conditions inPakistans restive Balochistanprovince. This attack is believed tobe the handiwork of the bannedmilitant group, BalochistanLiberation Front.

Though the development of theChabahar port has been on theagenda of India-Iran bilateraldiscussions since 2003, thepolitical leadership in New Delhiwas far from serious about Indianparticipation in this vitalmaritime project from which Indiacan stand to make substantialgains. After sitting on this projectproposal for nearly ten years, theruling elite of the country hassuddenly realized the vitalimportance it holds for countryslong term geo political interests.

This appears to be a sequel toChinese move to edge out India.

Of course, Indias External Affairs

Minister Salman Khurshid duringhis visit to Teheran earlier thisyear had driven home the pointthat India could provide uptoUS$100-milliion assistance toupgrade the port. About theproject, Kurshid had this to say,The two sides have pushed fortransit pact between India, Iranand Afghanistan which would helpIndia get access to the land lockedand resources rich countries inCentral Asia. We are going aheadwith the Chabahar project.Cabinet has already cleared it. Asthings stand now, Iran is yet togive its final clearance for theIndian investment in project.However, political observers areclear in their perception that Indiashould seek fast track negotiationswith Tehran to pave the way forthe Indian participation in the up-gradation of this port. This couldprevent China from upstagingIndia.

But then USA has all along been

hostile to the Indian proposal ofjoining hands with Iran for thismaritime project. Unfortunately,Indias track record in standing upto the US political pressure andpsychological intimidation is far


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from impressive. As such, in thebackdrop of the Chinese move tocorner India, New Delhi should bedriven by its own domestic

compulsions and interests and getthe decks cleared for Indianparticipation in Chabahar portdevelopment without any loss oftime. There is no need for India tobuy the American argument thatIran should be isolated for itsnuclear weapons developmentprogramme.

Meanwhile, in Tehran, in earlyAugust, the newIranian PresidentHassan Rouhaniwhile addressingthe Majlis(NationalParliament) statedthat if the Westwants an adequate responsefrom Iran, it should not speak thelanguage of sanctions but that ofrespect. There is no denying thefact that Iranian economy hassuffered heavily due to US andEuropean sanctions and threatagainst the countries thatcontinue to do business with Iran.

But the grim ground reality is thatthe routine trade between Indiaand Iran have been affected bypayment issue following sanctions.The recent visit of an Iranian

business delegation to the teagardens in north east India hasraised the hopes of exporting anappreciable volume of high end

tea varieties to Iran. As it is, earlylast year, the powerful AmericanJewish Committee had told theIndian Ambassador to USA,Nirupama Rao, that it was deeplytroubled by the recent reports ofIndias efforts to intensify traderelations with Iran at the verymoment when the US and fellow

democracies are applying neweconomic pressure to persuadeTehran to halt its

nuclearprogramme.

In May this year,Hassan Nourian,Consul General ofIran in Hyderabad,

had observed that the bilateraltrade between the two countries ispoised to cross US$25-billionwithin four years. We havealready entered the second year.Currently, most of the exportsfrom Iran to India are primarilybased on oil and petroleumproducts. To effect this, both haveencouraged focussing on non oilexports from India in order tostrike a balance between the twocountries, he said. Followingsanctions, the annual Iraniancrude import by India valued at

There is no denying the factthat Iranian economy hassuffered heavily due to US andEuropean sanctions and threatagainst the countries thatcontinue to do business withIran.


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US$15-billion is being paid for inthe Indian Rupee. However, theannual Indian export to Iran ispegged at around US$2.5-billion

per annum. It is planned to boostthis to S$4-billion.Even with thisfigure, it means a surplus creditbalance of US$11-billion in favourof Iran. How to offset this hugetrade imbalance happens to be thecrux of bilateral trade discussionsbetween the two countries.

There is no denying the fact thatIndian investment in Chabahar isimportant for India to protect itsbusiness and commercialinterests in the landlocked

Afghanistan as Pakistan hasdenied India transit access to

Afghanistan through its landroute. It is planned to construct arailway network connectingChabahar with Zahedan in

Afghanistan. Moreover, the port isalready linked to the city ofZarang located in south westernNimroz province of Afghanistan.This road link can serve as Indiasentry point to Afghanistan,Central Asia and beyond. Indeed,Chabahar could invest India withability to move quickly goods andsupplies and if necessary evendefence personnel straight to

Afghanistan through Iran whichassumes significance in thebackdrop of US and allied troops

planning a phased pull out fromthe war torn Afghanistan. Ofcourse, India should nudge Iran toagree to the idea of moving

military forces to Afghanistanthrough Chabahar. But this wouldagain be subject to Iran gettingsome long term strategic benefitsin such an arrangement. However,India is yet to take up this issuewith Iran.

Chabahar has been designated asa Free trade and Industrial zoneby Tehran. It has also beendescribed as Irans best accesspoint to Indian Ocean. Iran hasalready spent US$350-million onthe development of this port.Without doubt, Indianparticipation could help the port,which because of the sanctions,has not been in a position tocorner the business in proportionwith its potential, to earn morerevenue from catering to theIndian needs on a variety of fronts.India, Iran and Afghanistan havesigned an agreement to giveIndian goods heading for Central

Asia and Afghanistan preferentialtreatment and tariff reductions atChabahar. With many of theIndian enterprises keen onentering the lucrative miningsector of Afghanistan, Indianparticipation in Chabahar project


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could prove a win win deal forIndia Inc.

As it is, Indias growing role in

Afghanistan focuses on the plan toextract iron ore from the mountainranges at Hajigak, located about100-kms to the northwest of thecapital city of Kabul. According to

Ali Jalali, a Professor at the USNational Defence University inWashington and a former AfghanInterior Minister, Indian andChinese investment will be amajor contributor to Afghanistansstability as the USis preparing towithdraw its maincombat forcesbetween now and2014.

On another front,

India and Iran arealso discussing building a gaspipeline between the two countriesalong the bed of the Arabian Seato bypass Pakistan usingChabahar port. Rattled as it is byIndias drastic reduction inpurchase of its oil, Iran deemed itprudent to offer India oilfields on

lucrative terms along with aproposal to route the gas throughthe undersea pipeline. Of course,in the wake of sanctions, NewDelhi has difficult times paying forthe imported Iranian oil in foreign

currency. Further, there is alsodifficulty in getting ships to ferryoil along with the insurance cover.

As it is, India was forced to pullout of Iran-Pakistan-India pipelineproject on account of a variety offactors including security issues,differences over pricing as well asUS pressure. The security concernstemmed from the fact that thepipeline will pass throughBalochistan where Balochseparatists and Islamic radicaloutfits could pose a threat to the

safety of thepipeline. But thena section ofstrategic analystshold the view thatIndias withdrawalfrom this vitalenergy pipelineproject was a sort

of geo-political blunder as Indialost an opportunity to create a newequation in the region.

As envisaged now, a consortiumwith state owned JN Port andKandla port on-board, is likely totake up the development of

Chabahar port. The Indian side isproposing a phase wisedevelopment of Chabahar on longterm operations, maintenance andtransfer basis spread over 60-90years. Iran has successfully

But then a section of strategicanalysts hold the view thatIndias withdrawal from thisvital energy pipeline projectwas a sort of geo-politicalblunder as India lost anopportunity to create a newequation in the region.


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positioned Chabahar as the focalpoint for development of the eastof the country through expansionand enhancement of transit routes

among the countries situated inthe northern part of the IndianOcean and Central Asia. But thenas is the case with Gwadar,Chabhar too could face a threatfrom Sunni Baloch insurgents whohave no love lost for the regime inTeheran.

For quite sometime now, India hasbeen more than keen on getting aconvenient access route to thelandlocked Afghanistan throughIran. And in this quest lays theimportance of Chabahar for India.By all means, Chabahar is thebest option left for the country toreach Afghanistan in a hassle freemanner .Indeed, India, Iran and

Afghanistan are now edging closerto concluding a transit treaty thatwould facilitate easier linkagebetween India and Afghanistanthrough Iran. As it is, both NewDelhi and Kabul are keen onending their dependence onPakistan for transit. Both Indiaand Iran have agreed that theproject would provide connectivitywith Afghanistan and provide animpetus to Afghanistans economicdevelopment.

Going beyond Indian investmenton the development of Chabahar,Iran has also made a proposal toIndia for joint investment and

production sharing contract for oilexploration. Indeed, this offer hastremendous strategic significancefrom the point of view of ensuringIndian energy security. But thenNew Delhi will have to deviseingenious ways and means tocircumvent sanctions if it wants toparticipate in the Iranian oil

exploration venture. For theenergy deficit India, collaborationwith Iran in the area of oil andpetroleum cannot but be a positivedevelopment.

By all means, Indias interest indeveloping strategically importantsouth eastern Iranian sea port ofChabahar as well as New Delhiscraving for better bilateralrelations is seen as a positive steptowards regional cooperation andeconomic gains for theparticipating countries. Indiasconstruction plans for Chabaharport could also be viewed asreviving of old links and buildingnew bridges of friendship throughcollaboration. While Iran is all setto derive benefits from positioningChabhar as a logistical hub and apotential alternative to Bandar

Abbas, for Afghanistan, Chabaharcould be an alluring alternative to


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the dependence on PakistansKarachi port for carrying out itsinternational trade. In theultimate analysis, it is advantages

all the way from the Chabaharproject for Afghanistan, India andIran.

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Strike Corps For The Mountains: Upgrading

Indias Military Strategy From Dissuasion To

Deterrence

- Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwaln July 17, 2013, theCabinet Committee onSecurity (CCS) finally

approved the armys proposal forraising a Strike Corps for themountains. Though the approval

came after considerable delay, it isa pragmatic move that will sendan appropriate message across theHimalayas. It will help India toupgrade its military strategyagainst China from dissuasion togenuine deterrence as the StrikeCorps, in conjunction with theIndian Air Force (IAF), will

provide the capability to launchoffensive operations across theHimalayas so as to take the nextwar into Chinese territory.

The new Strike Corps willcomprise two infantry divisionsand will be supported by threeindependent armoured brigades,three artillery brigades to providepotent firepower, an engineer andair defence brigade each, anaviation brigade and unitsproviding logistics services. The

Corps will cost Rs 64,000 crore toraise and equip over a period offive to seven years. Approximately90,000 new personnel will beadded to the armys manpowerstrength, including those in

ancillary support and logisticsunits. The army has alreadyraised 56 and 71 MountainDivisions and deployed them in

Arunachal Pradesh to fill existinggaps in the defences. Someelements of these divisions will actas readily available reserves forthe new Strike Corps to add

weight along the axis of attack andexploit success. These divisionswill also be employed to securelaunch pads for offensiveoperations across the Himalayas.Hence, these must be seen asplaying a significant supportingrole for the Strike Corps.

Territorial DisputeOf all the areas of concern thathave dampened relations betweenIndia and China, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary

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* Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Visiting Fellow, VIF


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dispute that is the mostdisconcerting. Since well beforethe 1962 border war, China is inoccupation of large areas of Indian

territory. In Aksai Chin inLadakh, China is in physicalpossession of approximately38,000 square kilometres (sq km)of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. China surreptitiously builtits alternative route from Tibet toXinjiang through this part of

Aksai Chin. In addition, in March

1963, Pakistan illegally ceded5,180 sq km of Indian territory inthe Shaksgam Valley of theNorthern Areas of PakistanOccupied Kashmir (north of theSiachen Glacier and west of theKarakoram Pass) to China under abilateral boundary agreement thatIndia does not recognise. Through

this area China built theKarakoram highway that nowprovides a strategic land linkbetween Xinjiang, Tibet andPakistan.

In Indias north-eastern region,China continues to stake its claimto about 96,000 sq km of Indianterritory that includes the entireIndian state of ArunachalPradesh, even though physicallythe territory has always beenunder Indian control. In terms ofarea, Arunachal Pradesh is overthree times the size of Taiwan.

Sun Yuxi, the then ChineseAmbassador in New Delhi, hadpublicly reiterated this claim justbefore President Hu Jintaos visit

in November 2006. Theambassador single-handedlyensured that his Presidentreceived a cold shoulder in Delhiand the visit turned out to beinconsequential. Since then,Chinese interlocutors haveclaimed several times that theTawang Tract is part of Tibet

because one of the Dalai Lamaswas born there. Chinese scholarsvisiting New Delhi always hintthat the merger of the TawangTract with Tibet is non-negotiable.Chinas often stated officialposition on such issues is that thereunification of Chinese territoriesis a sacred duty.

An inherently destabilisingsituation stems from the fact thatthe Line of Actual Control (LAC)between India and China,implying de facto control after the1962 war, is yet to be physicallydemarcated on the ground anddelineated on military maps. TheLAC is quite different from thedisputed 4,056 km long boundarybetween India and Tibet. The un-delineated LAC is a majordestabilising factor as patrol face-offs are common and could resultin an armed clash between patrols.


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Also, incidents such as the NathuLa border clash of 1967 and theWang Dung standoff of 1986 canrecur. Such incidents have the

potential to escalate into anotherborder conflict similar to the warof 1962. Also, over the last decade,China has spent considerabletime, effort and resources toupgrade the militaryinfrastructure in Tibet. The PLAhas stepped up the number ofmilitary training exercises that it

has been conducting in Tibet everyyear. An airborne division, whichis a dedicated rapid reaction force,has also practisedinduction anddeployment inTibet.

Joint Operationsduring War in the MountainsHence, despite the ongoing bordertalks between India and China toresolve the territorial andboundary dispute, oftenpunctuated by ugly incidents likethe PLA incursion in the DaulatBeg Oldie sector in April-May2013 and repeated incursions into

Chumar since then, a limitedIndia-China border conflict cannotbe completely ruled. As theterritorial dispute with Pakistanover Jammu and Kashmir is alsoin the mountains, there is a very

high probability that the nextconventional conflict involvingIndia will again break out in themountains. Since the war will be

fought under a nuclear overhang,particularly with Pakistan, thereis a fair possibility that it willremain confined to the mountainsso that it does not escalate out ofcontrol to nuclear exchanges.Hence, it was time for India topivot to the mountains in its questfor building military capacities

and it is creditable that thegovernment has given the goahead to raise a new Strike Corps.

In any future warthat the armedforces are calledupon to fight in the

mountains,gaining, occupying and holdingterritory and evicting the enemyfrom Indian territory occupied byhim will continue to remainimportant military aims. Whilethese will be infantry predominantoperations, no war plan willsucceed without achieving massiveasymmetries in the application offirepower to destroy the enemyscombat potential andinfrastructure. Therefore, army-IAF operational plans must befully integrated. These must be

jointly evolved, meticulouslycoordinated and flexible enough to

The PLA has stepped up thenumber of military trainingexercises that it has beenconducting in Tibet every year.


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be fine-tuned to exploit fleetingopportunities and to takeadvantage of the enemys reactionsduring execution. This is

especially so in the mountainswhere the military aims andobjectives are limited in scopebecause of the terrain. Both theServices must work together tocreate the capabilities that arenecessary to take the battle intoenemy territory during the nextwar in the mountains.

As artillery batteries andregiments cannot be moved andre-deployed easily, operations inthe mountains place a premium onbattlefield air support.Operational mastery over air-to-ground strikes can influence theoutcome of tactical battles in themountains extremely favourably.Firepower ratios can be enhancedto levels necessary for achievingoverwhelming superiority onlythrough a major upgradation inthe availability of artillery guns,rocket launchers and missiles andoffensive air support. A contractfor the acquisition of 144howitzers of 155 mm caliber hasbeen hanging fire for long andneeds to be expedited. The newartillery units that will be raisedmust be equipped with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs)that can engage targets deep

inside Tibet from deploymentareas in the plains. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) need tobe acquired in large numbers both

by the artillery and the IAF toaccurately destroy importanttargets such as communicationscentres. The government mustalso hasten the acquisition ofintelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance equipment.

Ancillary SupportThe peculiarities of terrain andthe lack of sufficient roadcommunications, particularlylateral roads that connect the roadaxes leading to the border, willplace heavier demands onhelicopter lift for the movement ofreserves within divisional andbrigade sectors. At the operational

level, only an air assaultformation can turn the tidethrough vertical envelopment andenable deep offensive operations tobe carried out when employed inconjunction with Special Forces.

An air assault brigade groupinducted across the LoC or LAC byhelicopters after the IAF has

achieved a favourable air situationcan seize an objective in depth.Ideally, each of the infantrydivisions of the strike Corps musthave one air assault brigade withthe requisite air lift. Air-


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transported operations can alsoplay a major role in influencingthe course of the war. DuringOperation Parakram in 2001-02,

almost a complete brigade groupwas airlifted to Kashmir Valley toenhance the reserves available in15 Corps for offensive operations.In addition to attack helicopters,which will provide sustainedfirepower support, a large numberof utility helicopters will berequired to support offensive

operations across the Himalayas,including medium- and heavy-lifthelicopters.

The successful launching of StrikeCorps operations will depend onthe availability of goodinfrastructure, including double-

lane roads with all-weathercapability and suitably placedlogistics nodes. Indias plans toupgrade the infrastructure in the

states bordering China have notbeen progressing at an adequatepace. In fact, there have beeninordinate delays due to the lackof environmental clearances andother reasons. While the newStrike Corps is being raised,equipped and trained, thegovernment must make vigorous

efforts to speed up the completionof infrastructure projects.Otherwise, the army will have anew Strike Corps and not be ableto launch it effectively.

Back to Contents


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Cross Media Ownership - A Threat to

Vibrant Democracy

- Shivaji Sarkarndia has been debating theissue of cross-media ownershipfor the last over 60

years.However, it is only now thatit is being raised by TelecomRegulatory Authority of India(TRAI) at the behest of theMinistry of Information andBroadcasting for the first time.

In fact, TRAI in its paperexpresses limitation oncheckmating cross-mediaownership. Rather, softly it hasgiven it up. TRAI Chairman RahulKhullar said the regulator would,with the help of the Competition

Commission of India (CCI),attempt to ensure that there are aminimum number of mergers andacquisitions. A consultation paperwill spell out restrictions, makemandatory disclosurerequirements, spell out levels ofmarket share which will ensureplurality and diversity, list

general disqualifications,recommend how cross mediaownership can be dealt with, setrules for disaggregated markets,and ensure minimum mergers and

acquisitions

The Indian Media andentertainment industry isestimated at about Rs 1052 billionand is growing by the day. Apartfrom the monetary value, theindustry is important as it can

influence opinion in politicaldomain and trends in business.Groups owning a cross section ofmedia have the capacity to tilt thebalance in their favour though theindustry does not accept it.

Veteran journalist Paranjoy GuhaThakurta says the sheer number

of media organisations and outletsoften conceals the fact there isdominance over specific marketsand market segments by a fewplayers in other words, themarkets are often oligopolistic incharacter. The absence ofrestrictions on cross-mediaownership implies that particular

companies or groups orconglomerates dominate marketsboth vertically (that is, acrossdifferent media such as print,radio, television and the internet)

I

MED

* Shivaji Sarkar


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as well as horizontally (namely, inparticular geographical regions).

It is also well-known that political

parties and persons with politicalaffiliation own/control increasingsections of the media in India.There are two kinds of suchnewspapers or channels. The onewhich are known to be publishedby political parties while othersare published as independentpapers or run as independentchannels but show a marked tilt infavour of the owners politicalpreference.

There are a fewinstances wherethe promoters haveused the profitsfrom their mediaoperation to

diversify into otherunrelated businesses. These arethe issues that need to beaddressed to strengthen thedemocratic principles. But evenTRAI guidelines are not sospecific.

The credibility of news has always

been an issue. But despiteconcerns about it, the Nehrugovernment did not do much tocontrol varied interests ofnewspaper owners. It was debatedoften. Everyone stressed on the

merits of having a free press.Many agreed that when anewspaper owner has variedinterests to serve, it compromises

with news publication.

Journalism evolved in India over along period since the firstnewspaper, Bengal Gazette andCalcutta Advertiser of JamesHickey, was published in 1780.Journalism took a new turn in thehistory of the sub-continent andthe Indian press graduallyreached a stage where it could

begin to influencethe countryseconomics, politicsand culture. Herewe are talking of aperiod when theIndian press wasconfronted with the

might of British imperialism inwhose domain the sun never set,as was the common refrain.

The press in the Indiansubcontinent developed preciselyfor awakening of the masses in thepre-independence era, pittedagainst colonialism and

imperialist tyranny. Marx hadalso commented in 1853, whilediscussing about the probableresults of British rule in India,that this was the first time a freepress, owned by the common

The one which are known to bepublished by political partieswhile others are published asindependent papers or run asindependent channels but showa marked tilt in favour of theowners political preference.


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inheritors of Indians andEuropeans, had originated in

Asiatic societies, and it wouldbecome a new and powerful

instrument of Indiasregeneration. In so far as the firsthalf of the 20th century isconcerned, the press playedprecisely this role in the sub-continent.

However, here we must bear inmind that the evolution of thepress took place in thesubcontinent on a totally differentline after the countrysindependence and partition in1947. The Press Commission,formed under the chairmanship ofJ.S Rajyadhyaksh in 1952, thusdrew attention to this aspect inthe first part of its report,submitted in 1955.

He wrote, Formerly, most of theIndian Press had only oneobjective and that was politicalemancipation of the country. Mostof the journalists of that era wereactuated by fervent patriotism anda feeling that they had a missionto perform and a message to

convey. Political emancipationhaving been achieved, theemphasis has shifted and thenewspapers are no longer run as amission, but have become

commercial ventures. (PressCommision, p. 482).

In the same report, the

Commission also commented thatnow the big newspapers, inparticular, either kept mum onimportant occasions or hesitatedfrom leading the public opinion,because they have to take care ofcertain business interests; theymoved very cautiously and theyhad to act on the orders of thepowers-that-are.

Therefore, some of them arepartisan in the presentation ofnews in respect of the financialinterests with which they areallied; there is a certain timidity toexpose courageously theshortcomings of those who are in aposition of power and authority;

there is a tendency to suppressfacts which are unfavourable totheir own interests or to thefinancial interests with which theyare associated, Press Commissionnoted.

It was precisely this press whichthe late V.K. Krishna Menon, an

important member of JawaharlalNehrus Cabinet, had dubbed asthe Jute Press. The termoriginated as in early independentIndia most of the press was ownedby jute industry barons and was


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used to further their owninterests.There was another thatwas called steel press beingowned pri

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Vivek Issues n Options September 2013