VIVEK : Issues & Options : November 2011

VIVEK November – 2011 Volume: I No: III 2

Pakistan : Malfeasance in Maldives

- Satish Chandra

India, Pak & a happy mirage - Sushant Sareen

Afghanistan : The Darkness in Afghanistan

- Kanwal Sibal

China : China Aims for Global Space Leadership

- Radhakrishna Rao

Maldives : The Maldives

- Sripathi Narayanan

Myanmar :

Indo-Myanmar Security Cooperation: An Analysis

- Jaideep Saikia

Nepal : Dr Baburam Bhattarai's India Visit

- Satish Chandra

Indo – US ties : Indo - Us Ties will see better days

- Kanwal Sibal

Miscellaneous : The Police in India

- Dr. M.N. Buch

Briefs: Pakistan Monthly brief Nepal Monthly brief

Activities : Seminar on : Disasters Risk Reduction : Another Important Route To Poverty Alleviation

Interaction with a Taiwanese Delegation

Vimarsha - India 2021 - Hazarding Guesses, Guessing Hazards

VIVEK is the monthly magazine of

Vivekananda International Foundation

Address : 3, San Martin Marg,

Chanakyapuri, New Delhi–110021

Ph. : +91 (0)11 24121764

Fax : +91 (0)11 43115450

Email : [email protected]

Website : www.vifindia.org

Contents

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Malfeasance in Maldives

- Satish Chandra

anmohan Singh is

taking huge risks in appeasing Pakistan in

the hope that it will lead to a thaw in bilateral relations and

mould his stature as a „statesman'. But his gestures

have been disproportionate to the existing ground realities. He

is offering Pakistan far too many concessions while

overlooking India‟s national interest

The outcome of the interaction between the Indian and

Pakistani Prime Ministers in the Maldives bears testimony

as much to the UPA Government‘s continued

mendacity vis-a-vis the nation on India-Pakistan relations as

to its compulsive pusillanimity in its dealings with Pakistan.

Mr Manmohan Singh would have us believe from his

statement to the media in the Maldives following his meeting

with Mr Gilani that the India-Pakistan dialogue process has

―yielded some positive results.‖

This is palpably false as

Pakistan has neither brought to book the perpetrators of the

November 2008 Mumbai attacks nor shut down the

infrastructure of terror. Indeed, security agencies report that

there are 2,500 militants in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir

poised for infiltration into Jammu & Kashmir and

covering fire by Pakistan has been provided from time to time to facilitate the same.

Far from the dialogue process

having yielded ―positive results‖ it is having a negative

fall out. For instance, on the eve of the Prime Ministerial

level discussions, Pakistan took the Jamaat-ud-Dawa‘h off

its terror list and rubbished the evidence provided by India

linking Hafiz Saeed to the Mumbai attack. In the light of the overwhelming evidence of

Pakistan‘s continued sponsorship of terrorism

against India, Mr Singh‘s claim that his approach to Pakistan

is to ―trust but verify‖ is utterly

M

* Satish Chandra - Distinguished Fellow, VIF


meaningless.

It may also be mentioned that the wide-ranging India-

Pakistan dialogue is in clear contradiction to Manmohan

Singh‘s assurances to the nation against holding such

talks until Pakistan provided India with satisfaction on

terrorism. In this context, one need

only recall his statement in Parliament on

July 29, 2009 that ―Pakistan has to

act and act effectively on

terrorism before there can be a

comprehensive dialogue covering

all areas of disagreement or

concerns of the two countries‖.

While deliberately misleading the

nation is the standing operating procedure of the UPA

Government, the dialogue process, more importantly,

underlines that the Government does not intend to

penalise Pakistan in any way for its involvement with

terrorist activities directed

against India. The stern statements made by the Prime

Minister on this score in Parliament were only rhetoric,

merely for show and not to be taken seriously.

Though Pakistan has

consistently given us cause for anxiety, whether on account of

terrorism or its machinations in

collusion with China such as their joint

exercises on the Rajasthan border,

we, far from taking any

punitive measure, have gone out of

our way in providing comfort

to it at a time when its

relationship with its most important

partner — the US — is under stress.

Some of the important moves made by us

on this account are as follows:

Decision to resume the

dialogue process with Pakistan rather than demand it be

branded as a terrorist state. This has prevented its isolation

and encouraged it to persist

It may also be mentioned that

the wide-ranging India-

Pakistan dialogue is in clear

contradiction to Manmohan

Singh‟s assurances to the

nation against holding such

talks until Pakistan provided

India with satisfaction on

terrorism. In this context, one

need only recall his statement

in Parliament on July 29,

2009 that “Pakistan has to

act and act effectively on

terrorism before there can be

a comprehensive dialogue

covering all areas of

disagreement or concerns of

the two countries”.


with the export terror to India in a business as usual mode;

Move to support Pakistan‘s

membership to the Security Council even though it

vigorously opposes our own quest for a permanent seat

thereon. Since Pakistan was elected by the thinnest of

margins our support was critical;

Support European Union decision to provide duty-free

access to Pakistani textile

exports even though this will

adversely affect our own textile

exports. The opposition of our

Union Ministry of Commerce to the

European Union move was reversed at the

express intervention of the

PMO; Conclusion of a

visa agreement, which awaits

signature, significantly easing travel restrictions between the

two countries which will signal that we are not overly

concerned about Pakistan‘s

use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy

against us.

The argument that there is a change of heart in Pakistan as

it is moving towards giving us the ‗most favoured nation‘

status holds no water as we had accorded Pakistan MFN

status over 15 years ago. By reciprocating this gesture

Pakistan is doing us no great favour. On the contrary, by not

according MFN

status to India, Pakistan has been

hurting itself all these years as it

deprives itself of Indian goods

which are available at lower

prices than comparative

goods from elsewhere and to

the extent that such goods are

smuggled into the country it loses

revenues.

Finally, one is

apprehensive that the Prime Minister is on the verge of

making some additional magnanimous gestures to

Pakistan to the detriment of

The argument that there is a change of heart in Pakistan as it is moving towards giving us the „most favoured nation‟ status holds no water as we had accorded Pakistan MFN status over 15 years ago. By reciprocating this gesture Pakistan is doing us no great favour. On the contrary, by not according MFN status to India, Pakistan has been hurting itself all these years as it deprives itself of Indian goods which are available at lower

prices than comparative goods from elsewhere and to the extent that such goods are smuggled into the country it

loses revenues.


the national interest arising from his assertion that the

next round of talks should be ―far more productive‖. This,

together with hints of the Prime Minister visiting

Pakistan may well point to deals on issues like Siachen

and Sir Creek.

Since Pakistan is unlikely to make any compromises an

Indian sellout under the Manmohan Singh dispensation may well be on the cards. This

is all the more so as the Prime Minister has anointed Mr

Gilani as a ―man of peace‖ and as he feels that the time has

come to write a ―new chapter‖ in India-Pakistan relations.

Pakistani leaders appear to have a transformative effect on

our professorial Prime Minister who, after meeting then

Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf in New York

in September 2004, had similarly expressed confidence

that the two would write a new chapter in India-Pakistan

history. Could this transformative urge be inspired

by the hope of garnering the Nobel Prize?

back to contents


India &, Pak a happy mirage - Sushant Sareen

here is no policy change

The positive vibes

emanating from the meeting between the Prime

Ministers of India and Pakistan in Addu, the Maldives, have

generated a lot of misplaced optimism on the

future of Indo-Pak relations.

Notwithstanding

the encomiums heaped on each

other by the two Prime Ministers

and their declared intention of

―writing a new chapter‖ in

relations between the two countries, the fact of the matter is that

neither of them has the political capital to break the

logjam. There have been innumerable occasions in the

past when the promise of a new dawn in relations between

the two countries was very soon eclipsed by the harsh

ground realities.

Despite the excellent

atmospherics, there has been really no change in policies,

even less in mindsets. The claim that ―trust deficit‖ has

been shrinking — the Pakistani foreign minister

has been brave enough to say it is

―zero‖ — is laughable.

Consider the following: Even

though India has publicly

withdrawn its objections to EU

trade concessions for Pakistan,

unnamed senior Pakistani officials

have accused India of putting the Bangladeshis to the task of

opposing these concessions; the Pakistanis removed Jamaat-ud-Dawa (responsible

for 26/11 attacks) from the list of banned terrorist outfits; the

Jaish-e-Mohammed is making

T Notwithstanding the

encomiums heaped on each other by the two Prime Ministers and their declared intention of “writing a new chapter” in relations between the two countries, the fact of the matter is that neither of them has the political capital to break the logjam. There have been innumerable occasions in the past when the promise of a new dawn in relations between the two countries was very soon eclipsed by the harsh ground realities.

* Sushant Sareen - Senior Fellow, VIF


a very strong comeback; Pakistan‘s entire policy of

backing Islamic militants in Afghanistan is India-centric

and given that the Pakistani people are fed on a daily diet of

anti-India, anti-Hindu poison (in schools, newspapers, TV

channels, public discourse), only someone purblind would

say that trust deficit is shrinking.

While the Indian Prime Minister insists that he will

follow an approach of ―trust and verify‖, his approach is

more aptly described as ―trust in spite of verification‖. After

all, his intelligence agencies have been highlighting the

continuing inimical actions by Pakistani terror groups backed

by the Pakistani military establishment. And yet if Dr

Singh continues to trust the Pakistanis, then either he is

being misled by the Indian intelligence agencies, in which

case heads should roll; or else he is misleading India, in

which case his head should roll.

A repeated blunder committed by Indian policymakers and

opinion-makers is to superimpose their personal

relationships with Pakistanis on national policy-making. It is

delusional to imagine that excellent personal

relationships and, indeed, friendships can be replicated at

the national level. Personal relationships, between people,

politicians and even military officers, survived even the

holocaust of 1947. But these didn‘t help much in improving

relations between the two countries. Until Pakistan can

accept the reality of India and learn to live in peace with its neighbours despite differences

and disputes, there can be no normalisation of relations. One

litmus test of such a change having occurred will be when

Pakistani citizens are not harassed by spooks when they

apply for an Indian visa.

back to contents


The Darkness in Afghanistan - Kanwal Sibal

he West is describing the

current situation in Afghanistan as one of

transition. This assumes that the situation is moving from

one state of things to another in a planned and controlled

manner. It is clear that US and NATO want to reduce their

military presence and commitment to Afghanistan.

President Obama has announced a draw-down of US

forces, limited in number this year, but bigger in scope next

year. US forces will declaredly withdraw from an active combat role by 2014, shifting

to a supportive role as the responsibility for providing

security to the country devolves on the Afghan

National Security Forces.

But transition should not be looked at from the security

perspective alone. In that regard too the situation lacks

clarity. Even as the US is withdrawing its leaders insist that they are not going to

abandon Afghanistan, that

they will maintain their long

term commitment to it and not allow any single country to

dominate Afghan affairs. The US is already discussing a long

term strategic accord with President Karzai and a Status

of Forces Agreement. It is widely accepted that the US

will retain a sizable military contingent in Afghanistan

beyond 2014 and probably four or five bases. This has

implications for regional countries, as well as Russia.

President Karzai will have to allay their concerns by seeking some sovereign control over the

US presence and operations in the longer term perspective,

especially as US‘s continued presence in Afghanistan will be

integral to its Central Asian policy.

The political and economic

dimension of transition is equally important. Here there

is even more uncertainty. While the military transition takes place will the political

situation in Afghanistan

T

* Kanwal Sibal - Member Advisory Board, VIF- Distinguished Fellow, VIF


stabilize? If not, how to handle the disconnect between the

military and the political situation? President Karzai is

politically weak even if he has survived all these years. He is

distrusted by other ethnic groups, although he has struck

political bargains with some notable non-Pashtun figures.

He has surrounded himself with Pashtuns, including Hizb-

e-Islami elements. His policy of

reconciliation is contested by

powerful non-Pashtuns.

The relationship between President

Karzai and the Afghan parliament

remains blocked; half of his cabinet

has not been approved by the

parliament. In 2014 President Karzai theoretically gives up

office. Who will replace him? Just when the reduced US

forces would be ending their combat role, a political crisis would be surfacing within the

Afghan polity.

It is well accepted that the writ of the Karzai government does

not run in most parts of the

country, The warlords enjoy immense power in their

respective regions. There are serious questions about the

viability of the form of centralized government that

Afghanistan has been constitutionally saddled with.

While the plan to hand over

security responsibilities to the ANSF may look good on paper,

can the ANSF effectively assume

this

responsibility? How motivated are

they? Reports persist that the

desertion rate amongst them

remains high. Will they adequately

equip, including with air power?

The Pashtun representation in

the Afghan National Army, especially in the officer corps,

remains inadequate, which would seem to detract from its

status as a national army. The creation of militias at the service of regional leaders

introduces a dangerous element into the overall

security situation.

The relationship between President Karzai and the

Afghan parliament remains

blocked; half of his cabinet

has not been approved by the parliament. In 2014

President Karzai theoretically

gives up office. Who will replace him? Just when the

reduced US forces would be

ending their combat role, a political crisis would be

surfacing within the Afghan

polity.


The economic situation in the country remains critical. It is

hardly likely that, as the West withdraws militarily from

Afghanistan, it will maintain the levels of its economic

assistance. Afghanistan will need very considerable

budgetary support for running the government and for

sustaining the size of its security forces. With the

western economies in recession, the likelihood of

maintaining the needed aid flows to Afghanistan remains

doubtful. Afghanistan no doubt has enormous natural

resources, but in the time frames under consideration these cannot be developed to

provide requisite revenues to the government.

In reality, Taliban activity has

now spread beyond the eastern and southern parts of the

country, infecting the western and northern parts too, with

some non-Pashtun reportedly joining the Taliban ranks. The

policy of reintegration does not seem to have achieved any spectacular result.

Reconciliation as a policy is

now openly embraced by the US and NATO countries.

Germany and the UK have

been pro-active visibly, but there are other intermediaries

in the fray such as Turkey, Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia etc.

At what levels conversations are taking place is not clear.

While Mullah Omar in a recent speech seemed to endorse

some opening to the West, doubts persist about Taliban‘s

willingness to compromise on some of the red-lines the West

has drawn.

The Afghan insurgents are not

monolithic. There is the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani group, and

those belonging to the Hekmatyar group. Supporting

them are the Pakistani Taliban and the non-Afghan

organisations like the LeT. How do you promote reconciliation

with multiple power centres within the insurgents? There is

of course the obvious contradiction between talking

to the Taliban and simultaneously wanting to

eliminate their leaders.

The brutal assassination of the

former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani who

was chairing the High Peace Council set up to bring about

internal reconciliation in Afghanistan has dramatised


the precariousness of the situation facing the country.

President Karzai, having

reached the conclusion that a solution to the Afghan

imbroglio cannot be found through external intervention,

has leaned towards finding an internal way out through an

intra-Afghan reconciliation process. US will and finances

to sustain its Afghan engagement have been visibly depleting. America has already

publicly conceded that a military solution in

Afghanistan is not realisable; its allies are suffering from

political exhaustion there. This is hardly propitious for a

successful outcome of the Afghan war from the western

perspective.

President Karzai‘s relationship with the Americans is tense and distrustful even though

his survival depends on them. The US has a low opinion of

Karzai because of his perceived inadequacies and failings, but

sticks with him for lack of a viable alternative. To survive as

the end game in Afghanistan nears, Karzai has tried to

explore some entente with the Taliban-his fellow Pashtuns.

Some success in the reconciliation process would

transfer the political initiative to Karzai and make him less

dependent on the Americans. But his freedom of manoeuvre

is limited so long as US/NATO forces occupy Afghanistan,

conduct military operations there and train and equip the

Afghan National Security Forces. Karzai‘s bargaining

power with the Taliban, in fact, derives from US military

deployment in Afghanistan.

If reconciliation serves Karzai‘s

interests, it serves that of the US and NATO too as they are

looking for a political way out of the Afghanistan conflict, and

this would require talking to their principal adversary, the

Taliban. For them, reconciliation is a political tool

with multiple functions: it signals a scope for power

sharing with the adversary, it can serve to divide the Taliban

by persuading those willing to compromise to respond to

western overtures, it can keep the negotiating track open even if progress is slow, and it

provides a platform for some important Islamic countries to

intervene as intermediaries.


Rabbani‘s assassination is a powerful rebuff to the

reconciliation strategy. The 79-member strong High Peace

Council that Rabbani presided was Karzai‘s conspicuous

investment in this strategy. Rabbani as a Tajik and a

former head the Northern Alliance

gave the reconciliation

strategy an ostensible intra-

Afghan rather than an intra-

Pashtun stamp. With several

powerful non-Pashtuns elements within

the Afghan polity opposing

reconciliation this was important.

With his assassination,

President Karzai has been

weakened politically. It

would also be difficult to find an adequate replacement for

Rabbani.

While it is not clear how much

breadth and depth the reconciliation process had

developed in reality, the

outlook now has become heavily clouded. The

reconciliation process cannot proceed with any great sense of

hope in the face of Taliban elements stepping up their

attacks against key regime figures and penetrating well

protected areas to demonstrate their

reach and daring, probably in

collusion with elements within

the regime‘s security

apparatus. President Karzai‘s

half-brother has been killed, a NATO base has

been truck-bombed, the

British Council office has come

under attack, and, much more

provocatively, the US Embassy and

the NATO Hqs in Kabul have been

struck. These acts of defiance not only call into question the

premises of the reconciliation policy, they also expose the

weakness of the western strategy of a controlled and

graduated withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The US now realizes that the

military defeat of the Taliban would require a heavy

commitment of manpower

and resources over too long a period of time. It is aware

that this option is not only no

longer available politically, exercising it to protect any

non-negotiable US national

interest is no longer

necessary. The aim is to degrade the fighting capacity

of the Taliban sufficiently

either to induce it to negotiate a political

settlement that respects

certain botttomlines, or allow the US/NATO to reduce the

level of their engagement to

politically and financially manageable proportions

through a policy of

Afghanisation of the conflict.


The US now realizes that the military defeat of the Taliban

would require a heavy commitment of manpower and

resources over too long a period of time. It is aware that

this option is not only no longer available politically,

exercising it to protect any non-negotiable US national

interest is no longer necessary. The aim is to degrade the

fighting capacity of the Taliban sufficiently either to induce it

to negotiate a political settlement that respects

certain botttomlines, or allow the US/NATO to reduce the

level of their engagement to politically and financially manageable proportions

through a policy of Afghanisation of the conflict.

The psychological aspect of the

war being conducted in Afghanistan is important too.

Public perceptions can be shaped by some dramatic acts

that may not be militarily too significant but which may

highlight the problems on the ground, with political repercussions. In the

asymmetrical war being fought, the Taliban do not have to

match the tally of US/NATO successes on the ground. A few

spectacular actions by them

can have a political and psychological resonance far

beyond their actual import. Rabbani‘s assassination and

the attack on the US Embassy magnify the resilience and the

determination of the Taliban. Even if the person of Rabbani

is replaced, the promise of the reconciliation process has

already been etiolated.

The core problem is Pakistan as the safe-havens of the Taliban are located there.

Those who sheltered Osama bin Laden for years will not

deny shelter to those who are seen as kith and kin by some

and strategic assets by others within the Pakistan

establishment. The US is now openly accusing the ISI of

complicity in the attack on the US Embassy in Kabul, which

also removes any remaining doubt that the ISI instigated

the earlier assault on the Indian Embassy there. The

outgoing US Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman has in his

Congressional testimony called the Haqqani group a veritable extension of the arm of the ISI,

which he has moreover indicted for using militant

groups as an instrument of policy. The US wants Pakistan

to delink itself from the


Haqqani group, a demand Pakistan has rejected as it

would mean giving up a crucial leverage vis a vis the US as

also an instrument for securing its future interests in

Afghanistan.

Despite mounting public pressure on Pakistan by the

US and Congressional threats on aid cuts, the Pakistani

political and military leadership has closed ranks in defiance. Pakistan has weighed

the balance between its need

of the US and vice-versa and

concluded that the limited options

available to the US give Pakistan

room to persevere in what to

outsiders would seem to be

dangerous, self-destructive

policies. After the Osama bin Laden

episode which deeply hurt the image of the Pakistan Army,

the Army reacted by stoking nationalist feeelings against

the US in order to recover its standing with the public. In

these circumstances, it can

hardly be seen to be doing the US bidding in North

Waziristan. The deteriorating state of US-Pakistan relations

is, in fact, problematic for immediate US interests in

Afghanistan and will make the transition process there that

much more difficult.

Pakistan sees itself as the country most vitally interested

in shaping Afghanistan‘s future. For 30 years it has intervened in that country

politically and militarily. It was

the staging ground for the

mujaheddin offensive against

the Soviets in Afghanistan and

after the Soviets departed it was

entangled in the civil war there. It

then was complicit in unleashing the

Taliban into Afghanistan and

has been host to the Taliban after

their ejection from Afghanistan

by the Americans. With the US neglect of Afghanistan after the

Taliban ouster, lack of development in the country,

the backward and obscurantist

After the Osama bin Laden

episode which deeply hurt

the image of the Pakistan Army, the Army reacted by

stoking nationalist feeelings

against the US in order to recover its standing with the

public. In these

circumstances, it can hardly be seen to be doing the US

bidding in North Waziristan.

The deteriorating state of US-

Pakistan relations is, in fact, problematic for immediate US

interests in Afghanistan and

will make the transition process there that much

more difficult.


mentality of the Afghan tribes, the uncontrolled tribal areas

across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and the

inexorable rise of religious extremism in Pakistan itself,

Pakistan is now deeply embroiled in Taliban‘s

resurgence within Afghanistan. It is unable to reconcile its

ambitions in Afghanistan and the demands the US makes on

it to combat those very Afghan elements that are the

instruments of its ambitions there. Pakistan‘s aversion to

any reconciliation process in which it is denied a central role

may account for the acts that are undermining it. We need to recall the Baradar episode.

President Karzai‘s relations

with Pakistan have fluctuated between various degress of

distrust. President Musharraf has just acknowledged publicly

how terrible his personal relations were with the Afghan

President. In his strategy for survival Karzai made overtures

to post-Musharraf Pakistan by, amongst other steps, easing out some prominent figures

from important positions who were seen as too anti-Pakistan.

But the overbearing way in which Pakistan treats

Afghanistan has rocked the

relationship again. With the problems created by the

Pakistani Taliban on the Afghan side of the border and

retaliatory action by the Afghans on the Pakistani side

of the border, mutual recriminations continue.

Efforts by the US, Turkey, Iran,

Russia and others to develop some cooperative arrangements

involving Afghanistan and Pakistan haven‟t succeeded. India has proposed to Pakistan

talks on Afghanistan, if only to expose Pakistan‟s self-serving

canards about an Indian threat to Pakistan emanating from

Afghanistan, but Pakistan calls such a proposal premature. Any

tripartite India-Afghanistan-Pakistan talks are therefore out

of the question for now.

India‘s position on the reconciliation strategy has evolved from frontal opposition

to any accommodation of the Taliban to supporting a diluted

version of it in the form of re-integration to, finally,

endorsing it as an Afghan-led initiative subject to acceptance

of the provisions of the Afghan constitution. Any genuine

reconciliation in Afghanistan in the present circumstances

seems almost impossible. If


reconciliation is manufactured so to say in order to provide a

cover for US and NATO to withdraw prematurely because

of the compulsions of an electorally-dictated political

time-table, India cannot but have concerns. India has once

again cautioned the US against any premature withdrawal

from Afghanistan, but India has little say in formulating US

policies in Afghanistan which are dictated by its own

priorities.

India supports President

Karzai, who, whatever his overtures to Pakistan and the

Taliban, accords a place to India in Afghanistan‘s regional

strategy. Any enlightened Afghan leadership has to factor

in India‘s positive balancing role in the region in the years

ahead, besides profiting from trade and investment linkages

with a country growing as fast as India, not only within the

SAARC framework but also the wider connectivity

arrangements being forged in the Central Asian region. Karzai, it would seem, wants

India to play a more robust and confident role in

Afghanistan, the foundation for which is sought to be laid by

the document on Strategic

Partnership signed by the two countries during the

President‘s current visit to India.

India remains cautious about

being caught in the Afghan tangle more than necesary,

even if India is firm about its right to be present in

Afghanistan and rejects any veto in this regard by Pakistan.

India is providing limited training to Afghan police and military personnel. It has

earmarked US$ 2 billion as economic asistance to

Afghanistan for development work, in projects in the

medical and education sectors etc. For security reasons India

may now be compelled to move away from large infrastructure

projects to more of capacity building.

The question of India sending troops to Afghanistan is raised

at times, without thinking through sufficiently the issues

involved. It would be a grave mistake to induct Indian

troops into Afghanistan while western troops are being

withdrawn. Would one perceived occupying force be

replacing another? If US/NATO are politically and materially

unable to maintain the level of


their engagement in Afghanistan, how will India

find the resources to do so? Such a move in a situation of a

quasi-civil war, with Pakistan serving as a hinterland for one

of the parties, would be disastrous. Pakistan will

exploit the situation to the hilt, directing the jihadi elements,

both Afghan and Pakistani, at India. In the fractured

sectarian situation in the sub-continent it would be unwise

for a regional country like India to send troops to Afghanistan.

In any case, how will India send and maintain armed

troops in a country with which it has no direct borders, unless this is mandated by a Security

Council resolution?

A regional solution to the Afghan problem is always an

attractive idea, but the reality is less promising. Can a

regional solution leave out US and NATO, especially as the

US intends to maintain forces and bases in Afghanistan?

What is the value of regional countries meeting without the US and NATO and

recommending a solution? If the US and NATO as non-

regional powers are included how can it be called a regional

solution? Would it be a

regional solution if a solution worked out by US/NATO in the

light of their own needs is presented to regional countries

for endorsement? In any case, who will take the lead in

promoting such a regional solution? Can different

perspectives of countries be accommodated? Can there be a

shared view about the Taliban? How will Pakistan defer to

India‘s legitimate interests? India favours continuing US

presence in Afghanistan. Does Iran have the same

perspective? Or China? Or, for that matter, Russia?

India wants a stable and sovereign Afghanistan, with no

country having any special strategic interest there that

gives it right to intervene in Afghan affairs directly or

through proxies. Afghanistan is a vital element for India‘s

security in an environment of rising religious extremism and

terrorism. it is key to india‘s Central Asian strategy, as it is

a vital transit country for trade and energy flows, besides the interest it now attracts because

of its unexploited natural resources. India can have

access to Afghanistan through Iran, but it is more practical

through Pakistan for historical


reasons. India has to keep an eye also on China‘s interest in

Afghanistan for which it is integrating Pakistan Occupied

Kashmir in its larger Central Asian strategy.

The worst case scenarion for

india would be US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan

with the odour of defeat. The desperation with which some

NATO countries want to exit Afghanistan is

making them define

management of failure as success.

The forces that would have forced

US/NATO ouster would then

become dominant in the region with

their baggage of religious

extremism and terrorism, posing a serious

threat to India‘s security.

The best case scenario would

be US success in forcing Pakistan to change its policies

fundamentally, abandon its terrorist links and see its own

advantage in normalising relations with India and join in

the larger project of creating a

shared stable and prosperous space covering Central and

South Asia.

The third scenario, the most likely one, is an unhappy and

unstable stalemate, with neither defeat nor victory for

the actors involved. The Afghan conundrum, in fact, has no

easy solution in sight. The clarity with which the US now

sees Pakistan‘s pernicious role should lead to

some robust corrective action

to compel it to change its

conduct, but Pakistan‘s

continued defiance and

American reluctance to

ratchet up levels of coercion makes

this unlikely. The inclination even now is to find

some way to appease Pakistan.

The Afghan tunnel remains

dark for all except those whose plans for the future of the

country will maintain darkness there.

back to contents

The worst case scenarion for

india would be US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan

with the odour of defeat. The

desperation with which some NATO countries want to exit

Afghanistan is making them

define management of failure as success. The forces that

would have forced US/NATO

ouster would then become

dominant in the region with their baggage of religious

extremism and terrorism,

posing a serious threat to

India‘s security.


China Aims for Global Space Leadership - Radhakrishna Rao

or China, which joined the global space league in

a modest way with a launch of a lightweight satellite

in 1970, the year 2011 is all set to stand out as

both ―eventful and exciting‖. Indeed,

for this Asian communist giant,

which has set its eye on emerging

as a space and military power on par with USA and

Russia, the launch of eight

tone box car sized space module

Tiangong-1 by means of March-

2F rocket from Jiuquan space

centre in Gobi desert in late

September was a veritable space spectacular. Launched

amidst a blaze of national pride and publicity blitz, Tiangong-1

will be the precursor of China‘s ambitious plan for a 60-tonne

orbital complex to be realized by 2020. In the aftermath of

this launch, western space commentators were quick to

point out that that ―Tiangong-1 is primarily a technology test

bed. It is not going to immediately

provide China any military

capabilities.‖ Even so, there is no

denying the fact that this space

accomplishment has all the potentials to bring

Beijing closer to Moscow and

Washington with a long term manned

outpost in space.

The launch of Tiangong-1 was

complemented by the successful

orbiting of Shenzhour-8 unmanned spacecraft on November 1.

Shenzhou-8, which is now heading for rendezvous with

the target orbiter Tiangong-1, will pave way for carrying out

docking experiments which

F Launched amidst a blaze of national pride and publicity blitz, Tiangong-1 will be the precursor of China‟s ambitious plan for a 60-tonne orbital complex to be realized by 2020. In the aftermath of this launch, western space commentators were quick to point out that that “Tiangong-1 is primarily a technology test bed. It is not going to immediately provide China any military capabilities.” Even so, there is no denying the fact that this space accomplishment has all the potentials to bring Beijing closer to Moscow and Washington with a long term

manned outpost in space.

* Radhakrishna Rao - Hon. Research Fellow, VIF

India, as a nation, seems t


holds the key to the building and operationalization of a full

fledged space station. As things stand now, Chinese and

German scientists will conduct 17 research programmes on-

board Shenzhour-8 spacecraft. To sharpen its expertise in

docking and associated techniques, China will launch

of Shenzhou-9 and Shenzhou-10 spaceships during 2012

and one of these will be a manned mission. ―The most

important point is that this is developing docking techniques

and technology, which, in turn means precision controls for

thrusters and the like which has obvious military/anti satellite implications,‖ says

Dean Cheng, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation‘s

Asian Studies Centre in Washington D.C. In political

terms, hurling Tiangong-1 into earth orbit, Cheng said, is

another reminder that China intends to be a space player for

the foreseeable future, including the realm of human

space flight. Undertaking the Tinagong-1 mission at about

the same time as the US space shuttle programme ends ―is a

powerful political signal that China is ascendant and the US

is descendent,‖ observed Cheng. Indeed, after the US

Space Shuttle Atlantis made its final touch down at Kennedy

Space Centre for the last time in July this year, US has been

left without a manned space vehicle for the first time in five

decades. ‖Over the past decade, China has arguably

gone further, faster than any other space faring nations,‖

says an analysis by the technology management

consulting firm Futron Corp.

More importantly, the Chinese

orbital complex will become operational at about the same

time as the International Space Station(ISS) is slated to shut

its operations. Though the Chinese orbital station will be

much smaller than ISS , it would nonetheless provide

China with the necessary level of expertise to place into orbit

larger space stations with a longer life span. An

autonomous orbital complex could also help China, besides

furthering space science research, bolster its space war

efforts by serving as a strategic outpost in outer space. The successful accomplishment of

China‘s first manned mission in 2003 followed by the second

human flight in 2005 along with the ―space walk‖

performed in 2008 have all


gone to give a quickening impetus to the Tiangong-1

project. As space commentators put it, in the

event of US and its partners in the ISS project failing to come

up with a follow on project, China would have permanent

human presence in space. ‖Space leadership is a highly

symbolic of national capabilities and international

influence and a decline in space leadership will be seen

as a symbolic of relative decline in the US power and

influence,‖ says Scott Pace, a former functionary of the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration(NASA) of USA. Joining Pace are other

US experts who hold the view that USA could indeed slip

behind China in human spaceflight programme

especially in the context of Obama administration‘s failure

to support the much touted Constellation programme.

What‘s more, US space activities have ended up as a

victim of budgetary constraints compounded by the ―changing

perception and shifting priorities‖ of the White House.

On the other hand, funding on time is not a problem for the

Chinese space programme. ‖One of the biggest advantages

of the Chinese systems is that they have five years plan so

they can develop well ahead. They are taking a step by step

approach, taking their time and gradually improving their

capabilities. They are putting all the pieces together for a

very capable advanced space industry,‖ noted Peter Bond,

Consultant Editor for Jane‘s Space Systems. On the other

hand, Ashley Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace drives home the point

that space has come to acquire a privileged position in China‘s

military thinking. According to Tellis, China sees space as a vital platform to effectively use

its armed forces against adversaries. There is also a

speculation that PLA(Peoples Liberation Army) would use

Tiangong series missions to test dual use technology to

perform military missions. Strategic advantages apart,

Tiangong project will help China expand its soft power

along with its political and diplomatic clout. Indeed, space

stands out as a centrepiece of China‘s long term geo strategic

ambitions.

While Chinese space

programme is gathering


momentum, the Indian Government is yet to give its

final go ahead and budgetary approval for India‘s manned

space flight programme which was mooted by ISRO around

five years back. Indeed, budgetary approval for the

entire programme involving the launch of two or three crew

members to low earth orbit and

their safe return to earth without

further loss of time is quite vital

for realizing this nationally

significant space mission by 2016. While the Indian

space programme has to make do

with a single operational

launch vehicle in the form of the

four stage space workhorse

PSLV(Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle),

China has a range of launch vehicles under its Long March

family. The Long March series of vehicles are designed to

insert satellites of different weight class into a variety of

orbital slots. Unlike China, India has only a solitary space

port , Satish Dhawan Space Centre(SDSC) in Sriharikota

island on India‘s eastern coast. Meanwhile, ISRO is preparing

a feasibility report for developing India‘s second

launch complex. For SDSC is vulnerable to cyclonic storms

originating in the Bay of Bengal. Moreover, a

second/alternative launch pad could

lend a strategic edge to country‘s

space programme.

Right from the

outset, the Chinese space

venture enjoyed many distinctive

advantage over the Indian space

programme. To begin with, during

its formative days it was guided by

Hsue Shen Tsein, a US trained

aerospace engineer with a sound

background in rocketry. On the top of this, Russians made available vital elements of

missile technology to China which was imaginatively

exploited to build civilian space vehicles. For a strategic missile

and a satellite launch vehicle

While Chinese space

programme is gathering

momentum, the Indian

Government is yet to give its

final go ahead and budgetary

approval for India‟s manned

space flight programme which

was mooted by ISRO around

five years back. Indeed,

budgetary approval for the

entire programme involving

the launch of two or three

crew members to low earth

orbit and their safe return to

earth without further loss of

time is quite vital for realizing

this nationally significant

space mission by 2016.


have many common technological elements. And

with the Chinese defence set up being closely involved with

the space activities, the expertise available at various

institutions under PLA were utilized to support the Chinese

space enterprise to the hilt.

On the other hand, India‘s peace oriented space

programme had to start virtually from scratch

without any outside

assistance. Moreover, id did

not get the kind of funding and

autonomy that was available to

the Chinese space programme. Being

a fully civilian venture operating

in a democratic set up, the Indian space

programme is invariably subject to parliamentary

scrutiny and public criticism. On the other hand, far from transparent Chinese space

programme with its pronounced militaristic

ambitions is free to pursue its goals without being subject to

public scrutiny and criticism.

China, which has launched two lunar orbiters for a

detailed scientific study of moon‘s environment and

resources, is now preparing for the robotic landing mission to

moon in 2013. Incidentally, India‗s second lunar spacecraft

Chandrayaan-II planned for launch in 2014 will release a

robotic rover on the lunar surface for studying the

geological and mineralogical

features. In keeping with its

grand strategy of staying ahead in

the race for space, China has already hinted at putting

a man on the moon by

2020.‖The moon is an obvious target

for China and they would be there by

2020,‖says Ken Pounds, Professor of Space Science at

Liecester University. Clearly, neither the Europeans nor the

Russians have evinced interest in sending a manned mission

to the moon. Sometime before the end of this decade, China

has also planned up its sleeve to realize a sample return

mission to the moon.

Being a fully civilian venture

operating in a democratic set

up, the Indian space

programme is invariably

subject to parliamentary

scrutiny and public criticism.

On the other hand, far from

transparent Chinese space

programme with its

pronounced militaristic

ambitions is free to pursue its

goals without being subject to

public scrutiny and criticism.


Not be left behind, China has also hinted at setting up a base

on the lunar surface as part of its long term vision of staying

ahead in the ―space industrialization race‖. One of

the key objectives of the proposed Chinese lunar base

would be the extraction of Helium-3, considered a clean

and abundant energy source and its transportation back to

the earth. To realize this challenging mission, China has

started concentrating on developing rockets capable of

generating ―massive thrust‖. As stated by Wu Weiren, chief

designer of China‘s lunar exploration programme,‖ The lunar probe is the starting

point for the deep space exploration. We first need to do

a good job for exploring the moon and work out the rocket

transportation technology that can be used for a future

exploration of Mars and Venus‖. Of course, ISRO too

has lined up an ambitious programme for planetary

exploration. Meanwhile, China‘s much awaited launch

of its first Mars probe mission is planned to be accomplished

in November this year. It would represent China‘s one more

attempt at making a deeper foray into outer space. The

Chinese Martian probe Yinghuo-1,a micro satellite

weighing 110-kg. will be sent into space with Russia‘s

Phobos-Grunt mission at the Baikonur cosmodrome in

Kazakhstan. The probe is expected to enter a pre set

orbit around the Mars between August and September 2012.

China expects to accomplish

the launch of 25 satellites during 2011, making it the second country after Russia to

log such a large number of orbital missions. According to

Yun Jiajun of China Aerospace and Technology Corporation,

China‘s space projects have entered a stage of high

intensity development and launching. Interestingly,

Futron Corporation‘s Space Competitive Index reveals that

China matched America‘s number of launches during

2010 for the first time. Meanwhile, with a view to

boost its launch frequency , China is working on building

its fourth advanced space launching complex near the city of Wenchang on the north

eastern coast of the Hainan island .Incidentally, Hainan

island happens to be the epicentre of a massive Chinese

naval build up. The well


equipped ultra modern orbital complex at Wenchang which is

expected to go stream by 2013 will be designed to launch

modules of large space stations, deep space probes as

well as heavier class satellites into the geostationary transfer

orbit. Moreover, it will be China‘s first coastal launch

pad that could help China grab an increasing share of the

global market for launching

satellites on commercial terms.

According to Chinese space

experts, the strategic location of this new launch

pad close to the equator would

help increase the payload mass of

the launch vehicles taking off

from here by a substantial extent. All the

currently operational three Chinese space launch

complexes are landlocked without any access to the sea.

The defence oriented thrust of the Chinese space programme

was clearly demonstrated by the anti satellite test it carried

out in early 2007.In a brazen

move to build up the capability for a full fledged space war of

the future, China deployed a ground based medium range

ballistic missile to hit and destroy an aging weather

satellite located in the medium earth orbit. It is also an open

secret that China is concentrating on developing

beam weapons based on laser devices which can serve as an

anti satellite weapon while

acting as a substitute for

missiles. Against this backdrop,

China‘s rapidly expanding space programme has

the potential to alter the power

dynamics in much of Asia and

adversely affect US defence forces

untrammelled hold on the region.

According to a study by the

Washington based World Security Institute, Chinese reconnaissance satellites can

now monitor targets for upto six hours a day. Till eighteen

months back, PLA could just manage doing three hours of

daily coverage from the vantage

The defence oriented thrust of

the Chinese space programme

was clearly demonstrated by

the anti satellite test it carried

out in early 2007.In a brazen

move to build up the

capability for a full fledged

space war of the future, China

deployed a ground based

medium range ballistic missile

to hit and destroy an aging

weather satellite located in

the medium earth orbit.


position in space. ‖Starting from almost no live

surveillance capability ten years ago, today the PLA has

likely equalled the US ability to observe targets from space for

real time operations,‖ say researchers at World Security

Institute. Clearly, the rapidly expanding network of

reconnaissance satellites provides China with the ability

to harness its defence assets. Not surprisingly then USA is

concerned that it would have difficult times moving its naval

forces close to Taiwan without coming under the prying eyes

of Chinese space birds.

Of course, not long back

V.K.Saraswat, chief of India‘s Defence Research and

Development Organisaton(DRDO) had

projected the need for India to protect its space assets from

―rogue satellites‖. He had also hinted at DRDO initiating

program to build killer satellite

devices, laser beam weapons and a range of military

satellites for boosting India‘s defence preparedness. But

India‘s weak political leadership lacking in vision

could prove to be a major stumbling block in preparing

India for a space war. Of course, there is a growing

consensus in India over the need to seamlessly integrate

the elements of its civilian space programme into the

space weaponization plan being envisaged by DRDO. The

need of the hour is to exploit the resources and expertise

available in India to launch a comprehensive space weaponization programme

without any loss of time.

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The Maldives

- Sripathi Narayanan

he Maldives is an archipelago nation

situated in the Indian Ocean and stretches in a

north-south direction off India's Lakshadweep islands,

between Minicoy Island and Chagos Archipelago. It stands

in the Laccadive Sea, about 700 km south-west of Sri Lanka and 400 km south-west

of India. The archipelago chain of the Maldives consists of

approximately 1,190 coral islands grouped in a double

chain of 26 atolls, along the north-south direction, spread

over roughly 90,000 sq.km. The archipelago is 823 km long

and 130 km at its greatest width. This makes the

Maldives one of the most dispersed countries in the

world. Of the islands, only 202 are inhabited. The average

height of the islands is about 1.5 m above sea level and the

highest point is 2.5 m above sea level. This makes the island- nation a country with

the lowest high point in the

world.

The total population of the Maldives is under 400,000. This includes the immigrant

labour force that constitutes a quarter of the population. For a

country that converted to Islam wholesale as far back as the

twelfth century, religion in Maldives continues to remain

moderate though citizenship is granted only to Sunni Muslims.

From a tradition of autocracy of both Republican and earlier

forms, the country took to multi-party democracy as

recently as 2008, thus possibly heralding a wave of pro-

democracy protests elsewhere in the Islamic world. The

introduction of the presidential form of Government coupled with an Opposition-controlled

Parliament, or People‘s Majlis, at inception has contributed to

certain confusion and consequent defining/re-

defining of the role and responsibilities of individual

institutions.

T

* Sripathi Narayanan - Research Fellow, VIF


History: from the past to the present

The original inhabitants of

Maldives were migrants from South India and Sri Lanka.

Archaeological findings suggest the islands were inhabited as

early as 1500 BC. But then the islands boast of its history

being as old as 2500 years. Around AD 947, recorded

contact with the outside world began, with the first Arab traveller. Early traders found

Buddhist customs and practices. But the greatest

contribution was made by the Persian and Arab travellers

after the islanders converted to Islam in AD 1153. Dhivehi, the

Maldivian language, also underwent a certain

conversion as a result of constant contact with the

outside world, particularly with Sinhala and other South Asian

languages. For instance, the Dhivehi word for ‗boat‘ is

„dhoni‟, a term differently pronounced in some of the

Indian languages.

During the sixteenth century,

the Portuguese launched an expedition against the Maldives

and administered their holdings from Goa on India's

west coast. For 15 years, the

invaders tried to maintain control over the islands. But

Maldivian islands being scattered over the seas it

became difficult for the colonisers to administer the

nation. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Dutch replaced

the Portuguese as the dominant power in Ceylon, and

established hegemony over Maldivian affairs without

involving themselves directly in local matters, which continued

to be guided by to centuries-old Islamic customs. By the

1800‘s, European Oriental trade had expanded

dramatically since the Maldives straddle trade routes from Europe and Africa to the East,

and surveying and charting the Maldivian seas became an

urgent international necessity, with the ever increasing need

for and improvement in sea-borne communication and

transport. Therefore, when the British Admiralty survey of the

Red Sea was completed in 1834, Commander Moresby

was dispatched to the Maldives. And thereafter the

Maldives became a Protectorate of the British who were

stationed in Ceylon. The internal affairs of the

archipelago were left to be administered according to local


law and customs with the Sultan continuing as the Head

of State. The overbearing presence of the British in the

region resulted in the Maldives‘ foreign policy and external

affairs being guided by the British.

The Maldives was never

colonised by European powers

like other countries in the region. The

primary reason for this is that very

nature of the archipelago made

it difficult for the Maldives to be

colonised. This apart, the

Maldives had very little to offer in

terms of economic interest and did

not figure highly in meeting the

trade needs of European colonisers in the

region. This resulted in the Maldives not figuring highly in the strategic calculations of the

powers-that-be and powers-to-be. Yet, the Gan Island in

southern Addu Atoll served as a Royal Air Force (RAF) base

during the Second World War.

The UK also retained the air base even while granting

freedom to Maldives, and let go off it only later. The

comparison with the British colonial power retaining

possession of the Trincomalee Harbour and Kattanayake

airbase, both in Sri Lanka, after granting

freedom to what was then Ceylon,

cannot be missed. Though the

situation has changed over the

decades, and more so in the ‗Cold

War‘ era, what with the emergence of

China as a regional/global

power has sought to re-write certain

past beliefs and preferences. In a

strategic sense, the Maldives today

is important for India, and by extension to

other regional/global powers, including the US and China in

particular.

This island chain officially

remained a Protectorate of the British Empire from 1887 till

25 July 1965, wherein the

This island chain officially

remained a Protectorate of the

British Empire from 1887 till

25 July 1965, wherein the

State was administered by

the indigenous Sultanate. The

British guaranteed the

security of the Maldives and

in turn decided the foreign

policy affairs of the

archipelago. After a period of

internal political developments

that witnessed the rise and

fall of the First Republic and

the reinstatement of the

Sultanate, the Maldives

became a Republic on 11

November 1968, when the

monarchy was abolished.


State was administered by the indigenous Sultanate. The

British guaranteed the security of the Maldives and in turn

decided the foreign policy affairs of the archipelago. After

a period of internal political developments that witnessed

the rise and fall of the First Republic and the

reinstatement of the Sultanate, the Maldives became a

Republic on 11 November 1968, when the monarchy was

abolished. The Republic‘s first President was Ibrahim Nasir,

who stayed in office till 1978, when he had to resign when

faced with political opposition. This also coincided with the country facing economic

hardship. For his part, Nasir as the President, was alleged to

have looted the treasury of millions and had taken the

money with him when he fled to Singapore. He died in

Singapore in November 2008, days after the conclusion of the

first multi-party presidential polls in the Maldives.

President Nasir‘s successor, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom

became the President and stayed in office for next 30

years. He won six continuative presidential elections within

that time-frame, but all of

them under a single-party, single-candidate format.

Gayoom‘s tenure as President witnessed a period of political

stability and economic prosperity, the latter initiated

by his predecessor but effectively implemented later.

Gayoom was credited with improving the economy of the

otherwise improvished country as he transformed the Maldives

into a destination for high-end, high-value resort-tourism. He

also strengthened the relations of the Maldives with other

countries without compromising the interests of

the country. At the same time, Gayoom has also been criticised for his totalitarian

style of governance. Political opponents and other forms of

dissent were quelled by limiting freedoms and a resort

to political favouritism.1 Where neither worked, critics were

sent to prison for long terms. His successor, President

Mohammed Nasheed, was one and the most popular one, and

was named ‗Prisoner of Conscience‘ by Amnesty

International. In short, President Gayoom ruled the

country with an iron-hand.

Faced with political protests in

2004 and 2005, the Maldives


under President Gayoom underwent a series of political

reforms. This culminated in the drafting of a third

Republican Constitution in 2007, and fresh elections to

the presidency a year later. The 2008 election resulted in

Mohamed Nasheed, popularly known as ‗Anni‘, being elected

as the President in what was to be the country‘s first multi-

party elections and there by ending reign of

President Gayoom. This also

marked the advent of the

current era of democratic governance in the

country.

Political system

Under the 2007 Constitution, the Maldives follows the

presidential form of governance. In a way, this is a

continuance of the earlier scheme but with a difference in

that multiple candidates and multi-party nominations are

allowed under the new Constitution. The President is

both the Head of State and the Head of Government. The

President and his Vice-

President running-mate are directly elected to office for a

term of five years, with the latter filling in the vacuum, if

and when created. The winning candidate should be the one

who tops the list with more than 50 per cent of the polled

votes, with a run-off poll in case of necessity. In the first

election under the new scheme, incumbent President

Gayoom topped the first round but was still short

of a majority. In the second round,

he lost to Mohammed

Nasheed of the Maldivian

Democratic Party

(MDP), for whom other losing

candidates from the first round of

polling pledged their support.

As in the US scheme, and

unlike in parliamentary democracies as in the UK and

India, the Cabinet members are selected by the President, and have to be approved by the

Legislature. The Parliament of Maldives, the People‘s Majlis, is

a unicameral legislature body with 77 members. Elected in

2009, six months after the

Under the 2007 Constitution,

the Maldives follows the

presidential form of

governance. In a way, this is

a continuance of the earlier

scheme but with a difference

in that multiple candidates

and multi-party nominations

are allowed under the new

Constitution. The President is

both the Head of State and

the Head of Government.


presidential poll under the 2007 Constitution, the present

Parliament did not give absolute majority to any single

party. However, a combined Opposition, contesting the

parliamentary polls separately, commanded majority in the

House. The Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) of

President Nasheed was the second largest party at the

time with the Dhivehi Rayyathunge Party (DRP),

founded by his predecessor Gayoom becoming the single

largest party. However, there are certain shifts in the

numbers, since, and splits in parties like the DRP. The ruling MDP has witnessed both

legislative supporters like Dhivehi Qaumee Party (DQP)

and the Republican Party (RP), and also non-legislature

partners like the Islam-centric Adhaalath Party (AP) quitting

the Government. However, in most such cases, the

ministerial nominees of the parties concerned have chosen

to remain in the Government.

The last parliamentary

election, under the new Constitution was held on 9

May 2009. A total of 465 candidates - 211 from 11

political parties and 254

independents - were vying for seats in the People's Majlis.

The 2009 elections were the first multi-party elections in

the country for electing a Parliament. During the

election, 78.87 per cent of the 209,000 registered voters

turned out at the polls. The final results gave the DRP and

the People‘s Alliance (PA) 28 and seven seats respectively,

three short of a parliamentary majority. The PA was founded

by Abdullah Yameen, a half-brother of Gayoom and

erstwhile Finance Minister under his regime. The MDP

became the second largest party, winning 26 seats. The Dhivehi Qaumee Party (DQP)

and the Republican Party (RP) took two seats and one seat

respectively. The remaining 13 seats went to independents.

Decentralised Administration

Under the new Constitution, there should be a Provincial

Council to administer the atoll and an Island Council to

administer each Island. The Island councillors are elected

by the people of that Island, and the Provincial Council

members are elected by the Island councillors. Under the

earlier scheme, the island


councillors and the atoll councillors (whom the

Provincial Councillors have since replaced) used to be

nominated by the Government. In political terms, the change-

over has also contributed to the changing political hue of

the grassroots-level administration in most cases,

first with nominations to the newly-constituted Provincial

Councils in 2009, followed by elected Councils

at all levels a year later.

To underline the purpose of taking

democratic administration to

the grassroots-level, the

Government has also been making

meaningful gestures in the matter.

President Nasheed held a meeting of his Cabinet at Gan

in the South some time ago. Departing from the past, the

Government also chose Gan as the venue for hosting the SAARC Summit in November

2011. This is expected to be followed by more meaningful

efforts at decentralisation of political power. In a nation

where the scarce population is

distributed unevenly across islands (in some cases, the

population of an island not crossing the three-digit figure),

such gestures and departures are expected to fill a gap that

could not be filled otherwise, but has to be filled,

nonetheless if democracy has to take deeper roots.

The "Freedom in the World"

index, a measure of political rights and civil liberties published

by Freedom House, judged the

Maldives as "not free" until May 1,

2009, when it was raised the level to

"partly free". The "Worldwide Press

Freedom Index", published by

Reporters Without Borders, lists Maldives as a

"very serious situation" (a verdict also passed on to Libya,

Cuba, and China). While there is a general belief that freedom

of expression, and of the Press have improved since regime-change and scheme-change in

2008, concerns do remain. The political Opposition in

particular, and sections of the Press, have voiced their worries

The Maldives under the new

Constitution is a multi-party

democracy. The process for

registering political parties

commenced with the advent

of the new Constitution and

fresh elections in 2008.

Under the law, a party

should have a verifiable 3000

members for being registered

with the Election

Commission.


on specific issues and cases, from time to time.

Political Parties

The Maldives under the new

Constitution is a multi-party democracy. The process for

registering political parties commenced with the advent of the new Constitution and fresh

elections in 2008. Under the law, a party should have a

verifiable 3000 members for being registered with the

Election Commission. The scheme provides for internal

democracy in the choice of office-bearers. From the first

presidential poll of 2008, the Maldivian Democratic Party

(MDP), which was at the vanguard of pro-democratic

protests, introduced the scheme of primaries, as in the

US, for the choice of its nominee. This seems to have caught on with other parties in

the country – a welcome departure from the existing

practice of ‗imposed‘ candidates in other South

Asian countries and Third World democracies. Of all the

political parties there are at present four that are relatively

important at a national level. Of these the MDP and the DRP

are the two major political

parties that present are perceived to be the most

important political entities in the country. Of them, the DRP

split recently, leading to the creation of the ‗Progressive

Party of Maldives‘ (PPM), by supporters of former President

Gayoom. Their legislative strength after the split is not

yet known, so is their membership, as yet.

Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP)

The MDP is the ruling political

party of Maldives at present. It is also the first political party

to register itself with the Election Commission, when

multi-party democracy was introduced in the country. The

MDP along with the DRP constitute the two major

political parties of Maldives. The present President is a member of the MDP. The

party‘s first attempt to be reorganised by the State by

registering itself in February 2001 ended up as a futile

attempt. But the MDP declared its existence from Sri Lanka

with 42 members, who were all on a self-imposed exile, on the

10 November 2003. This was done under the backdrop of

changing political climate in


the Maldives. On 2 June 2005 the Majlis unanimously voted

in favour of a multi-party system and the MDP was

legally reorganised on 26 June 2005.

Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party

(DRP) or Maldivian People’s Party

The DRP was the political party founded by former President

Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, under the new politico-

constitutional scheme. Though it was the single largest party

in Parliament after the 2009 elections, the DRP has since

been pushed to the second place after the MDP, following

cross-overs to the MDP from this and other parties. After

losing the presidential election, the party elected Mohammed

Thasmeen Ali, Gayoom‘s running-mate as the new leader and presidential

candidate for the 2013 elections. Though this had

Gayoom‘s blessings and support, there have been a

drift, with the Gayoom faction launching the PPM, in mid-

2011.

Adhaalath Party

The Adhalath Party (AP) in

Dhivehi means ‗Justice Party‘.

This political party, like the MDP, came into existence as a

result of the political reforms that Maldives underwent. At

present it is the third largest political party in terms of

membership, but does not have elected members in

Parliament. The party used to dominate in the affairs of the

Ministry of Islamic Affairs and its member used to be the

Minister concerned. However, with the AP resolving to

withdraw from the MDP-led coalition recently, the Minister

has decided to stay with the Government.

The Adhaalath Party is considered to be pro-Islamic,

and not liberal like the MDP or the DRP. The Ministry of

Islamic Affairs had imposed restrictions for the first time on

January 2009 for New Year party celebrations. The

Ministry also issued a statement that all religious

discourses had to be delivered only by qualified religious

scholars. The AP discourages women from running for leadership roles. The party

openly propagates the abrogation of any law if it is in

conflict with the Shariah.


Islamic Democratic Party (IDP)

This party was founded by

Umar Naseer, Mohamed Haneef, Ahmed Inaz, Mohamed

Ibrahim Didi, Abdulla Waheed and Mahamed Hassan Manik.

Umar Naseer was a police officer liked by his superiors

and subordinates alike. He was trained in the UK and other

countries. Mohamed Haneef was a Police Officer, later he

resigned from his services and

began his Political career. He is well

known among Maldivians as the

person who organised two

protests against then President

Ibrahim Nasir in 1975.

Emerging Scenario

The other political parties that are registered include the

Maldives Social Democratic Party (MSDP), whose founder

Ibrahim Ismail alias Ibra, has since joined hands with

President Nasheed, the Maldives National Congress

(MNC), Dhivehi Qaumee Party

(DQP), People's Alliance (PA), People's Party (PP), Poverty

Alleviating Party (PAP), Social Liberal Party (SLP), Republican

Party or Jumhooree Party (JP). Of them, the AP was founded

by former Finance Minister and Gayoom‘s half-brother,

Abdulla Yameen, the JP by another ex-Finance Minister

Gasim Ibrahim (who is also among the richest men in the

country) and DQP by one-time presidential

hopeful (like the other two) and

later-day Presidential

Advisor, Dr Hassan Saeed, a Supreme Court

lawyer.

The emerging scenario after the

presidential polls of 2008 had

witnessed the DQP under its original name, Maldivian

National Front and the JP under Gasim Ibrahim leaving

the MDP front. Indications are that the two have since moved closer to the undivided DRP,

though their respective positions in the days after the

DRP split are yet to be assessed. The PA, as was to be

expected, has moved closer to

The legal system is based on

Islamic law with admixtures

of English common law,

primarily in commercial

matters. But it is mainly

derived from traditional

Islamic law. However, there is

scope and need for further

improvement to the legal

system and legislations. The

new Government has taken a

special interest in the matter.


the dissident DRP, formed into a new party, PPM.

Legal and Judicial System

The legal system is based on

Islamic law with admixtures of English common law, primarily

in commercial matters. But it is mainly derived from traditional Islamic law.

However, there is scope and need for further improvement

to the legal system and legislations. The new

Government has taken a special interest in the matter.

In a nation with limited exposure to formal education

at the university level, owing to the absence of the same until

now, qualified legal professionals are few in

numbers – be it as lawyers or judges. The new university,

started by the Government some months ago, is expected to have faculties of higher

learning, including law, in due course, to fill this gap. The co-

existence of Islamic of law and the British common law

practices together means that Maldives could benefit from

interaction with the legal and judicial system in India, where

such a combination have succeeded in addressing the

concerns of the people and the

nation. The Maldives has not accepted the International

Court of Justice jurisprudence.

There is a Supreme Court with five judges, including the Chief

Justice. The Chief Justice is appointed by the President on

the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission

(JSC), and Parliament needs to approve his appointment

before he takes office. There is a High Court, a criminal court, civil court and lower courts in

the atolls/islands. The working of the new scheme needs to be

fine-tuned, as became evident when the Executive and the

Judiciary on the one hand, and the Executive and the

Legislature on the other, collided, head-on during 2010,

with the Supreme Court attesting some of the

decisions/directions of the Majlis, for the Government to

follow/not to follow. Most of those problems seem to have

been sorted out, since.

Fiscal and Economic Policies

The Maldivian economy is

dominated by tourism sector and fisheries. Tourism

contributes 28 per cent of the nation‘s gross domestic

product2 (GDP). These two


sectors and Government employment are the primary

source of family incomes. State employment used to cover a

third of the work force in the country. However, the trend

has begun to change after the new Government, having

inherited a severe fiscal situation on assuming office,

was forced to cut down on jobs and slice away 20 per cent off

the salaries of Government employees, to meet IMF criteria

for long-term credit facility. Reports have indicated that the

IMF was unhappy with the Government in the same vein

creating the elected offices of Provincial and Island Councillors, who are being

paid from the Government exchequer.

The tourism sector is

predominantly staffed by expatriates. In addition to this,

expatriates dominate the services sector of the

archipelago. The primary reason for the overwhelming

presence of non-locals in Maldives is the absence of skill-based education. The

country boasts of high literacy but then does not have any

higher education institutions. Lately, some career-based

institutes have commenced

functioning, addressing the demands of the tourism and

hospitality industry to a limited extent. Maldivians who

are to pursue their higher education have to go to other

countries like Sri Lanka and India, Australia and Malaysia,

the UK and the US, to meet this need. This is not restricted

to technical and formal education but also to religious

and theological studies.

On the other hand, the

fisheries sector is not modernised to the extent it is

possible. The State discourages those methods of fishing such

the use of trawlers that can have a negative impact upon

the environment and the maritime as ecosystem. During

the Asian tsunami of 2004, the country lost economic assets to

the tune of about 62 per cent of the GDP and the economic

growth declined to a mere one per cent from a 20-year

average of eight per cent. This was because the economy was

based on the twin sectors of resort tourism and fisheries, where the infrastructure too

suffered. It needed US $239 million in emergency relief and

another $1.3 billion for reconstruction over the next

five years.


In addition to this, the Maldivian economy is also

linked to the vagaries of global economy. This is so as the

tourists that visit Maldives are high-end earners, whose

personal fortunes are linked to the economic wellbeing of the

developed countries. However, the Maldives has been

diversifying on attracting tourists from other countries,

and has also recorded success. In the years after the tsunami,

when the Maldivian economy was further affected by the

global economic meltdown, affecting tourism industry in

particular, it turned to China, India and Africa for tourism promotion. The campaign met

with success, with the result, the nation‘s economy has

found alternate ways of managing tourist flow and

incomes, but not necessarily diversification into other

sectors.

Purportedly under IMF diktat, the Government of President

Nasheed has also been reviewing economic practices from the past, and has

introduced new taxation measures, property legislation,

and taken to large-scale privatisation of economic

infrastructure and services.

While the privatisation of the Male International Airport,

through a private-public partnership with the Indian

infrastructure conglomerate, GMR Group is the most visible

and important one to date, down the line, the Government

has privatised utilities like power and water-supply across

the country.

The more significant change on the economic front in toto relates to the Government‘s

decision in 2011 for a ‗limited float of the rufiyaa‘, the

Maldivian currency. Pegged at a fixed rate against the US

dollar for long, the artificial forex rate for the rufiyaa meant

that the Government was subsidising heavily not only on

infrastructure and supplies but also on the currency. The

‗managed float‘ or ‗devaluation‘ as the critics of the

Government describe it, has led to steep increases in prices

of commodities, and is hence considered as a not-so-popular

a measure. Simultaneously, the Government has also been working to do away with the

past practice that allowed payment of taxes and other

duties in dollars, as also free repatriation of business

earnings in foreign exchange.


The new scheme involves payments to the Government

to be made in rufiyaa. However, no clear-cut decision

has been taken about free repatriation of all earnings by

foreign investors – something that was thought of as

necessary for attracting the latter, but felt to be not

required any more.

Given the small size of the islands, their salty sands

and water (which is being

desalinated for consumption),

and also the limited market

that it offers, the Maldives is highly

dependent on imports to meet

its basic needs with limited

resources for export. The country to this end is an

imports-based economy. From sand for the construction of

resorts and other infrastructure material, food grains and pharmaceuticals,

stationery and most other needs for daily living are

imported from other countries, particularly from Sri Lanka

and India. The Government of

India in particular has been careful to exempt the Maldives

(along with Bhutan), from the periodic ban on imports,

particularly of food grains, sugar, etc, often necessitated

by shortages on the home front.

Strategic Issues and Security

Concerns

The security concerns of the

Maldives are none that are specific.

Yet they impose a grave threat to the

island nation in the form of

extremism, piracy and global

warming, to name a few. Some neo-

cons in the West are often tempted

to include Maldives as a

future part of their ‗String of

Pearls‘ theory, of China wanting to strangulate India,

all around. Independent of the China angle, these security

concerns were a threat to the State in the past and might

even haunt them in the future. The common thread that binds

all the security concerns of the State can be attributed to the

State system and geographical

The security concerns of the

Maldives are none that are

specific. Yet they impose a

grave threat to the island

nation in the form of

extremism, piracy and global

warming, to name a few.

Some neo-cons in the West

are often tempted to include

Maldives as a future part of

their „String of Pearls‟ theory,

of China wanting to

strangulate India, all around.


limitations of the country, coupled with lack of resources

– which is as much human as fiscal.

Given the vast seas that mark

the borders and the large number of islands that it

comprises, and the equally high number of uninhabited

islands among them, the Maldives should ordinarily be

the nightmare of any strategic analyst planning for the security of the nation. The

increasing relevance of the country in geo-strategic terms

and the consequent geo-political importance that is

vested on it, burdened however it is by the economic realities

of being an islands-nation, the Maldives poses a complex

problem for solution. The fact also remains that the problem

should not be allowed to be flagged or fester in anyway

whatsoever.

The nation‘s vulnerability was

exposed when in 1988, a non-LTTE mercenary Tamil militant

group from neighbouring Sri Lanka targeted Maldives from

the seas. The coincidental presence of an Indian Navy

ship in the adjoining waters while on its way back home

from an overseas assignment

meant that New Delhi could respond to the SOS from Male,

routed through an overseas point after the coup leaders

had blocked telephone lines in the capital. New Delhi also

despatched Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft, and the coup

attempt was defeated. In a more complex situation arising

in the twenty-first century, the Maldives would remain mostly

unprotected; its strategic security ensured only by

relative diplomatic neutrality, still inevitably leaning on India

and possibly Sri Lanka, too, and not allowing non-regional

players to enter the Maldivian waters with a geo-political intent.

Extremism

The Maldives is a Muslim

country for all intents and purposes, and the officially reorganised religion of the

State is Sunni Islam. All other forms of worship and religious

beliefs are discouraged by the State and are forbidden. This

includes denying citizenship to non-Sunni Muslims. This has

remained so under the new Constitution, which has

borrowed most democratic tenets from the West. Despite

the Government‘s stated


position on religion, Maldives is not a theocratic State and

does not confine itself to the narrow interpretations of Islam

or has a dogmatic view on religion. The Government, to

its credit, has been in a position to negate the influence

of the ulemas on the affairs of the State. This is an interesting

facet of Maldives politics and theology, as former President

Gayoom was educated in Islamic

jurisprudence in Egypt, at the Al-

Azhar University, Cairo. As

President, he was also the religious

and theological head of the country, and also

introduced the Shariat to the

islands-nation3.

Yet, Maldivian Islam has remained tolerant and private

as far as the nation and/or its people go. There are no

complaints against non-Muslims working in their

midst, in the name of religion and traditional practices. Even in the interior islands, India-

born female teachers and nurses could be seen adorning

the tilak on their foreheads and

flowers on their plait. Islam that is being practiced in

Maldives is of Shaafi-Sunni school, and not the

fundamentalist version of Wahhabis‘ Salafism4. But

Shaafi-Sunni Islam is now losing ground to Salafist

Wahabism because of external influence. The popularity of

Salafist-Wahabism is directly influenced by the Maldivians

who have been educated in conservative

madrassas in foreign countries.

This is so as a large number of

Maldivians pursue higher education in traditional

institutions overseas,

particularly for want of such

facilities in the country.

A large number of Maldivians

pursue Islamic theological education in madrassas and

other educational institutions in countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This results

in a few Maldivians being influenced by conservative and

narrow interpretations of Islam in Pakistani and Saudi Arabian

madrassas. These madrassas

Despite the Government‟s

stated position on religion,

Maldives is not a theocratic

State and does not confine

itself to the narrow

interpretations of Islam or has

a dogmatic view on religion.

The Government, to its credit,

has been in a position to

negate the influence of the

ulemas on the affairs of the

State.


profess the dogmatic Wahabi school of Islamic philosophy. A

few of the madrassas that are frequented by Maldivian are

those whose alumni have been leading figures of terrorist

organisations like al-Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

President Nasheed has acknowledged that that 50

Maldivians were students in Pakistani madrassas and 40

students were studying in „radical madrassas‟. In 2010,

among the militant cadres detained by the US forces

along the Afghan-Pakistan border were some Maldivians.

The influence of such radical madrassas have resulted in

Maldivian nationals either being associated with or

joining Islamic terrorist organisations, outside the

country thus far. Inside the country, there is a discernible

increase in the activities of religious political parties with a

relatively fundamentalist approach to issues and

ideology. In a way, it should be welcome as the democratic

scheme provides them with a voice to express, and a way to evaluate their own support-

base. The alternative would have been for some of these

peripheral groups to feel

frustrated and react accordingly. Despite

predictions to the contrary, the Maldivian voter overwhelmingly

side-lined fundamentalist political parties in the first

multi-party presidential poll in 2008. Together, they could not

garner more than 1.5 per cent of the polled votes. None of

them could win a single seat in the parliamentary elections the

next year. In the March 2011 local council elections, the

Adhaalath Party in particular did manage to send a few

Island Council members. It owed mostly to local conditions

and issues. However, given the melting-pot that Maldivian politics has become since

taking to multi-party democracy, any frustration of

the youthful voters could be a cause for future concern.

The Government of the day

distanced a lone incident of reported bomb-explosion in

recent years from religious groups. The blast in Sultan

Park in the capital city of Male in September 2007 left 12 tourists injured. The Gayoom

dispensation attributed it to pro-democracy groups, based

in Europe, whose aim, it was claimed, was to deter tourist-

arrival to the country.


Independent security analysts, including Mr B Raman from

India, argued that the modus operandi of the explosion was

similar to the earlier ‗London rail station blast‘. Religious

extremists were blamed for the latter. It was further known

that the archipelago too had become a part of the

international network of Islamic

terror groups. Maldivian

nationals were known to be in

contact with terrorist

organisations like the Lashkar-e-

Taiba, al-Qaeda and the Taliban,

and that Maldivian nationals were

involved in jihad elsewhere. A

number of Maldivian

nationals have been fighting in the Af-Pak region. A few have

been killed in Jammu and Kashmir. Ibrahim Fauzee, a

Maldivian national, was detained in Guantanamo Bay

when his affiliation to al-Qaeda was unearthed by the US

agencies. He was subsequently

released, at the end of his detention period.

The terrorist network with

respect to Maldives is not specific to Pakistani ISI but

also extends to other countries. Maldivian nationals have been

detained in Sri Lanka en route to Pakistan to join Islamic

jihadi groups. Their suspected presence in India

is also well documented. A

planned attack by the LeT on the ISRO facility in

Thiruvanathapuram was called off

as the Maldivian national code

named ‗Ehsham‘ backed out at the

last minute. Maldivian

nationals wanting to take part in

terrorist operations in

India use a number of routes to enter the country. A few of

the known routes include infiltration across the LoC in

Jammu and Kashmir and through Nepal. A Maldivian national was arrested, again in

Thiruvananthapuram, where he was attempting source

Maldivian nationals were known to be in contact with

terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and that Maldivian nationals were involved in jihad elsewhere. A number of Maldivian nationals have been fighting in the Af-Pak region. A few have been killed in Jammu and Kashmir. Ibrahim Fauzee, a Maldivian national, was detained in Guantanamo Bay when his affiliation to al-Qaeda was unearthed by the US agencies. He was subsequently released, at the end of his detention period.


weapons and explosive components.

The issue of Islamic extremism

in Maldives is also magnified by the changing nature of the

Maldivian society. The Arabic influence is visible in the

island nation, where long-flowing dress and the

(mandatory) beard for men, as is the wont in South Asia, and

burqa for women have become a common sight in the national capital of Male. This was not

the case earlier, as Maldivians, particularly the city-dwellers

practised a moderate form of the religion, where dress codes

did not exist. The city houses a third of the nation‘s population

and internal migration, in search of jobs and better

school education for children, is on the rise. This has meant

families from far-off islands have brought with them their

traditional customs. But there is also an equally visible

increase in the number of people who have taken the

back-to-the-basic routes, owing mainly to developments, particularly in other parts of

South Asia. Posters in praise of Osama bin-Laden and

ransacking of shops that sold figurines of Santa Claus during

Christmas have also been

reported in recent years. But to the credit of the Government,

all foreign religious leaders have been barred from entering

the country unless invited by the State. This is aimed at

limiting the possibility of their influencing the population on a

conservative thought process.

Piracy and External Help (‘Operation Cactus’)

Another factor that can possibly be a source of external

threat Maldives is the possibility of an armed

invasion or aggression by either a State or non-State

actor. The concern is real as unsuccessful coup attempts

had been launched against the Government of then President

Gayoom in the years 1980, 1983 and 1988. Of the three it

was the 1988 coup attempt that came close to success. In 1988 a Sri Lankan Tamil

militant group called PLOTE (‗People‘s Liberation

Organisation of Tamil Eelam‘), acting as mercenary, failed in

their bid to overthrow the Gayoom leadership. Around 80

armed militants were recruited by a Maldivian businessman

named Abdullah Luthufi. India diverted a Navy ship in the

vicinity and despatched Air


Force planes to secure the Maldives after President

Gayoom sought military assistance to repel the armed

mercenaries.

The Indian forces reached Maldives in a move that was

code-named ―Operation Cactus‖. The operation

resulted in the Indian forces securing Male, which was then

under threat and was holding up to enemy fire, within hours. The perpetrators of the coup

were neutralised. Investigations showed that the

PLOTE was rumoured to have been promised access to

Maldivian islands, to be used as base for their struggle

against the Sri Lankan State. The rebels were also believed to

have been promised financial assistance with estimates

varying between US$ 1 million to $10million.

Op Cactus exposed the inherent inadequacies,

weaknesses and the consequent inability of the

nation‘s security forces, since rechristened as Maldivian

National Defence Force (MNDF), to ensure the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation. In times

of crises, the 4,000-strong

force would be woefully inadequate to meet the

security demands of an open-to-water and open-to-skies

nations, whose island territories are spread out over

a 90,000 km area in the seas. The inherent resource-

constraints, both in terms of personnel, naval and air assets

and other equipment, is an added cause for concern. These

apprehensions have since been revived and reinforced with the

advent of Somali piracy in the neighbourhood waters. The

Indian Navy and Coast Guard have undertaken the

responsibility to patrol and securing the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the

Maldives. India has donated Coast Guard ships and

helicopters for the MNDF to patrol their seas. The two

nations, in recent years, have also established networked

access to information and intelligence data to help in

this. Cooperation between the navies of the two countries in

particular has been on a steady increase since the 1988

coup. Lately, the Maldives is also reported to have

diversified its personnel‘s training, to include US

instructors equipped in counter-terrorism and counter-


piracy measures in particular. There has been limited, or no

interaction of the kind involving China, Russia or

Pakistan.

Global-Warming, Narcotics and Economy

The Maldives‘s other concerns relate to narcotics and global-

warming. Both are very real concerns

for the State and are not seen as

issues or irritants that can be

tackled, as is the case with other

countries. In the case of the

Maldives, climate-change and

global-warming are real as the

rising sea-levels have threatened to submerge the

islands, including those that are inhabited. This

is so as the average elevation of the country is around a metre

and a half, the lowest in the world. If the sea-level were to

rise as a result of climate-change, there is a real

possibility of the whole country being submerged over the next

50-100 years. The islands

constituting the country being a coral archipelago and not a

volcanic archipelago have not helped matters. The change in

the climate and rise in sea temperature will not only affect

the nation‘s territory, but also the marine ecology. This will

begin impacting on the local fishing industry, one of the

economic mainstays of the nation.

To this end, the Maldives along

with other small island-nations,

has taken the lead in sensitising the

world on the issues of global-

warming and climate-change.

The Maldivian efforts in this

regard received a further boost in

recent years in particular. Named

by the UN as ‗ambassador‘ on climate issues, President

Nasheed made a point when he chaired an underwater Cabinet meeting, which drew the

world‘s attention to global-warming ahead of the

Copenhagen Summit in December 2009. Earlier, ahead

of assuming office in November

In the case of the Maldives,

climate-change and global-

warming are real as the rising

sea-levels have threatened to

submerge the islands,

including those that are

inhabited. This is so as the

average elevation of the

country is around a metre and

a half, the lowest in the

world. If the sea-level were to

rise as a result of climate-

change, there is a real

possibility of the whole

country being submerged over

the next 50-100 years.


2008, President-elect Nasheed flagged the issue for the first

time for the world to hear. He indicated that going by the

pace of the rising sea-levels, caused by global-warming, the

Maldives may have to look elsewhere for transplanting an

entire nation. He mentioned enclaves in countries such as

Sri Lanka, India and Australia in this regard.

In addition to fishing, the Maldivian economy is based on

tourism. The Maldives is among the preferred

destinations for high-end, high-value, high-cost tourism.

This viability of this sector is primarily based on a few key

factors. International economic outlook and political stability

in the country are only two. This is so because tourism as a

sector is most affected during times of economic recession. At

the same time, safety and security are two other

perquisites for tourism to flourish. Any perception about

political stability and the nation‘s security at any given point could affect tourism

industry in a big way. Since the Maldivian economy is

based mostly on tourism, it cannot sustain itself if the

tourism sector is to be affected.

The second issue that Maldives faces is that of drugs and

narcotics. For a country with a small population the drug

problem is two-fold. The first being the problems that the

country is facing on the law and order front because of

narcotics, the second one is social impact that this will

have in a small country. The issue of drug-addiction is so

acute that every Maldivian family is touched by this5. The

drug problem, if unchecked, is said to impact the labour

market and could also contribute to health issues like

HIV, Hepatitis-C and other blood-borne diseases. Added to this, narcotics in the Maldivian

context need not only be an internal issue. The

geographical position of the nation and also the existence

of uninhabited islands could result in Maldives becoming a

transit/logistics hub for international drug cartels. The

Maldives till date has not been known as a transit route for

the drug trade despite being in close proximity of the ‗Golden

Triangle‘ (Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia) and the

‗Golden Crescent‘ (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran). Adverse

reports of the kind could also affect the tourism sector.


International Power Politics

One situation that could lead to a security risk for Maldives

in the near future is that of it being sucked or pulled into a

regional geostrategic political tug-of-war. The archipelago

had managed to maintain its distance from the ‗super

powers‘ during the Cold War years. It had declined the offer

to ally with both the US and the erstwhile Soviet

Union. This is despite the fact

the Maldives occupies geo-

strategic locale in the India Ocean,

because of its close proximity to

South Asia, the waters of the

Arabian Peninsula and the eastern

coast of Africa. This in turns makes this

country a valuable staging post in the region that covers a

sizeable part of the India Ocean, including key choke-points.

To its credit, the Maldives did

not seek, nor was it enticed to offer any of its islands to either

of the super-powers. After the

closure of the Second World War airfield in Gan in 1978 by

the British Government, the Shah of Iran (for his own

reasons), Mohammed Gadaffi of Libya, and the Soviet Union

all tried in vain to secure the base (the latter two, to counter

the US military presence in Diego Garcia.)6 The US on their

part were interested in utilising the serine beauty

of Maldives as a rest and

rehabilitation place for their

military personnel, posted

in the Indian Ocean region.

The current dilemma that

Maldives could face would be with

respect to China, India and the US.

The US is already present in the Indian Ocean, at

Diego Garcia, with their Seventh Fleet, south of the

Maldives. India is the north (Lakshadweep), while possible Chinese presence at

Hambantota in Sri Lanka (the ‗jewel‘ in the ‗Sting of Pearls‘)

adds to the current political discourse in geo-strategic

terms in the Indian Ocean.

The current dilemma that

Maldives could face would be

with respect to China, India

and the US. The US is already

present in the Indian Ocean,

at Diego Garcia, with their

Seventh Fleet, south of the

Maldives. India is the north

(Lakshadweep), while

possible Chinese presence at

Hambantota in Sri Lanka (the

„jewel‟ in the „Sting of Pearls‟)

adds to the current political

discourse in geo-strategic

terms in the Indian Ocean.


This three-way ballet will by default result in the Maldives

becoming the dancing floor for regional and global powers.

The future prospect for the island-nation would be based

on its ability to manage its relations with all three nations

as they have a stake in the Maldives to enhance and also

secure their respective geo-political interests in the Indian

Ocean. On the other hand, the Maldives is also depended on

all three nations, independent of one other. It is a recipient of

assistance from both India and China.

India is helping the Maldives in setting up a series of radars

that will help in surveillance and also in security. In total

there will be 26 radars in the Maldives which would be

linked with the Indian coastal command.7 At the same time,

it is speculated that the Marao Island is being developed into a

submarine facility by the Chinese – a speculation that

the Maldivian authorities have denied, whenever made. This has already resulted in a race

in the India Ocean by both India and China, to secure

their respective national interests and also project their

power in this region. The

Maldives though a bystander at present may not have such

a luxury in the future.

Conclusion

The Maldives‘ security concerns arise from both its

geographic nature and its geographic position. These concerns are further

complimented by the limited economic and human

resources. The geographic nature of the Maldives itself

makes it a difficult proposition to secure all the outlying

islands. In addition, the nation is also faced with limited

economic resources, which end up hindering the prospect of

the State investing enough to ensure minimum security.

These deficiencies have been exposed and exploited in the

past. This has resulted in a situation wherein the State is dependent on external

guarantees for ensuring its security. This is the reality that

the Maldives would have to realise and that every

Maldivian would have to live with. The acceptance of the

situation that the archipelago faces would throw up the next

question - with whom to align with, whom to depend upon,

and who is dependable? The


obvious choices that the Maldives faces are limited to

India, the next-door neighbour and long-standing friend.

China, a prospective global power and the US, the sole

super-power at present, are the others. Managing the tri-lateral

relations will be another aspect of Maldivian

foreign and security policy in

the years and decades to come.

The limitations that the Maldives

faces with these three countries

are that the neighbour though

reliable and non-interfering may

not be in a position to bank-

role Maldives the way Male expects.

On the other hand, China,

given its economic might and fiscal liquidity, is

poised to aid the unstable Maldivian economy as and when the need arises. China

can also invest heavily in capital infrastructure projects

that the country can do with. Whereas for the US, the

Maldives may not be the blue-

eyed boy of the Indian Ocean since their navy is already

present in Diego Garcia, yet it would be interested in

ensuring that the Maldives did not play host to another power

in the Indian Ocean. In addition to this, any perceived

proximity to any extra-regional power could

become counter-productive,

considering Maldivian linkages

to India and also Sri Lanka.

The interests of Maldives would be

best served if it can assure itself

that the waters of the Indian Ocean

would be stable and not engulfed

by one crisis after another. This is

an imperative as tourism will

flourish only in an environment that is free of

instability and security-threats. To this end, piracy, environmental issues and

armed conflicts will not benefit the Maldives in anyway. At the

same time, international power politics and tug-of-war will at

best result in the Maldives

The acceptance of the

situation that the archipelago

faces would throw up the next

question - with whom to align

with, whom to depend upon,

and who is dependable? The

obvious choices that the

Maldives faces are limited to

India, the next-door neighbour

and long-standing friend.

China, a prospective global

power and the US, the sole

super-power at present, are

the others. Managing the tri-

lateral relations will be

another aspect of Maldivian

foreign and security policy in

the years and decades to

come.


becoming a pawn in the hands of others, without the nation

gaining anything significant in return.

Notifications

1. http://articles.cnn.com/2

008-11-11/world/maldives.president_1_sea-levels...

2. S. D. Muni, Maldives: Towards Open Polity, 31

October 2008 se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/

Files/ISN/93796/.../403DCA83.../86.pdf

3. Philip Sherwell and Ben Leapman, 30 September

2007, http://www.telegraph.co.

uk/news/uknews/1564623/Has-Islamic-

terrorism-arr...

4. Praveen Swami, http://www.hindu.com/2

007/11/24/stories/2007112455381200.htm

5. Sarah Crowe and Rajat Madhok,11 March 2009,

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/maldives_48

581.html 6. Balaji Chandramohan, 13

October 2009, http://www.idsa.in/idsas

trategiccomments/IndiaMaldivesandtheIndianOcea

n_... 7. Ibin

back to contents

http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-11/world/maldives.president_1_sea-levels-maldivian-climate-change?_s=PM:WORLD




http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1564623/Has-Islamic-terrorism-arrived-on-Maldives.html




http://www.hindu.com/2007/11/24/stories/2007112455381200.htm



http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/maldives_48581.html



http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/IndiaMaldivesandtheIndianOcean_BChandramohan_131009





Indo-Myanmar Security Cooperation: An

Analysis - Jaideep Saikia

he cooperation that India

has received from its neighbours in its quest to

combat terrorism and insurgency has waxed and

waned like irregular lunar cycles. While Pakistan has

been the least cooperative: an influential section of the country‘s officialdom even

promotes terrorist action inside India, countries like Bhutan

and Bangladesh have been quite accommodating. Bhutan

acted decisively, albeit somewhat late, against ULFA,

NDFB and KLO, and the Royal Bhutan Army‘s Op All Clear of

December 2003 cleared the Himalayan kingdom of Indian

Insurgent Groups. Action in Bangladesh had to await the

return of a forthcoming dispensation. But once that

happened the level of collaboration went on to

become remarkable.

The fortunes of the insurgent

groups that operate in the

North East have always rested

on three ―Bs‖ (Burma, Bangladesh, and Bhutan) and

a ―C‖ (China), intermittently guided by a once proximate,

but presently distant ―P‖ (Pakistan). Indian security

policy—particularly in the manner it obtains itself to North East insurgency—had

(and would have) to, therefore, letter its stratagem with the

vitals of the aforesaid five ―alphabetical‖ imperatives.

Indeed, despite the robust assistance that Bhutan and

Bangladesh has accorded India, watchfulness must

continue to be the catchphrase in the latter‘s conduct with the

two countries. Tides turn, times change, and, as has been

witnessed in the past, even a particularly favourable

situation can become disadvantageous.

Circumspection must be the unwavering watchword.

Myanmar‘s engagement with

T

* Jaideep Saikia - Senior Fellow, VIF


India, vis-a-vis the North East insurgents has been

ambivalent. Despite the fact that the liberated northern

borderlands of Myanmar continue to both cradle and

conduit (to China) numerous insurgent bands, Naypyidaw

has occasionally extended some cooperation towards

India‘s anti-insurgency drive. One of the most important

instances of joint cooperation was Op Golden Bird in 1995

when armies of both the countries tracked and trapped

a column of more than 200 ULFA, NSCN and PLA

insurgents as they were returning to India with a huge shipment of arms and

ammunition from Bangladesh. It is another matter that

success was not complete: the Myanmar‘s military junta

pulled out of the operation because New Delhi decided to

honour Myanmar‘s opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi with

the Nehru Award for International Understanding

even as the operation was on. But, Op Golden Bird left its

mark, and became the basis for possible cooperation in the

future. In November 2001, the Myanmar‘s army raided four

Manipuri insurgent bases, apprehending 192 rebels

including UNLF chief Rajkumar Meghen (who was

later released), and there have been quite a few instances of

raids on ULFA and NSCN (K) camps in Sagaing Division of

Myanmar. However, what has eluded such cooperation (a

word that is euphemistically used in Indian security circles

for cooperation from Naypyidaw is ―jungle bashing‖)

is correct follow-through. Despite the fact that both the

countries currently have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty

(MLAT) in place, which is expected to enhance the ability

of the two countries to pursue their common objective of law enforcement, and anvil a legally

binding mechanism that would enable law enforcing agencies

in both the countries to cooperate and provide

assistance to each other on matters relating to

investigation, prevention and suppression of crime, including

insurgency, the fact of the matter is not much has been

translated on ground.

It was hoped that with the

signing of MLAT, India would be provided with a leverage to

pressure Myanmar to decisively act against the

Indian Insurgent Groups. The


accent should have shifted to coordinated joint operations, in

the manner of Op Golden Bird, but that has not been quite the

case. Despite the successes of the high level visits between

India and Myanmar, the sought for clamping down on

the Indian Insurgent Groups is yet to happen. But to be fair to

India‘s eastern neighbour,

Myanmar has not been able to act in

the manner that New Delhi has

expected it to because many

parts of northern and north-western Myanmar are not

quite in the control of

Naypyidaw. The ethnic groups that

dot the region are in strength in the

area and—despite certain

agreements—are unwilling to allow the

Myanmar army to enter areas in which their writ runs.

Moreover, the relationship between groupings such as the

Kachins and the Was with the North East insurgents is warm.

Indeed, it is such groups that provide both bases and a

corridor to places like Yunnan for the Indian Insurgent

Groups. Also, there have been reports that a section of the

Myanmar‘s army (particularly the junior cadres) has a tacit

understanding with the North East insurgents. Past efforts

have, therefore, primarily been confined to the aforesaid

―jungle-bashing.‖ Indeed, it is a

combination of affiliation and

commerce with groups such as

the Kachins as well as the ability

to ―buy peace‖ with a section of the Myanmarese

army (in 2001, after being

apprehended, the UNLF chairman,

Rajkumar Meghen was reportedly

released after a huge sum of

money was paid) that oversees the fortunes of

the North East insurgents in parts of Myanmar, which has

reconstructed itself as a new corridor to China.

The corridor that had taken Naga and Assamese bands to

Yunnan in the past is once

The corridor that had taken

Naga and Assamese bands to

Yunnan in the past is once

again ferrying these

insurgents after what is being

termed as China‟s “renewed

interest” in North East India.

Anthony Shimray, in NIA

custody, has reportedly

confirmed that both NSCN (IM)

and ULFA (anti-talk) have

“very close connections” with

China. China, it is reported,

has helped in the training of

select batches of insurgents

from these two groups and

has provided them with arms

during the past two years.


again ferrying these insurgents after what is being termed as

China‘s ―renewed interest‖ in North East India. Anthony

Shimray, in NIA custody, has reportedly confirmed that both

NSCN (IM) and ULFA (anti-talk) have ―very close connections‖

with China. China, it is reported, has helped in the

training of select batches of insurgents from these two

groups and has provided them with arms during the past two

years. The arms deals reportedly took place with a

relatively unknown Chinese organisation known as the

―Five Tigers‖, which reportedly has easy access to Chinese companies like Norinco,

which among a plethora of other business, also produce

armaments.

The Chinese connection is, therefore, all set to be

translated on ground in the coming months. ULFA (anti-

talk) leader, Paresh Baruah is reportedly making active plans

to deploy the freshly China trained cadres of his faction in Assam. He has presently kept

them at a PLA base in Taka, which is close to the Chindwin

River. The video that was released to the press in Assam

in January 2011, and one

which showed Baruah dancing to a Bihu song with his newly

trained cadres was reportedly taken in Taka. Indeed, there is

considerable apprehension in Assam about the manner in

which ULFA (anti-talk) would manifest itself, especially as

New Delhi is readying itself for dialogue with ULFA (pro-talk).

The recent visit of the

Myanmar‘s president, U Thein Sein witnessed yet another affirmation. India and

Myanmar agreed to strengthen the intelligence sharing

mechanism to combat insurgency, smuggling and

drug trafficking. Leaders of both the countries issued a

joint statement reaffirming their ―unequivocal and

uncompromising position against terrorism in all its

forms and manifestations.‖ The two countries agreed to

―enhance effective cooperation and coordination between the

security forces of the two countries in tackling the

deadly menace of insurgency and terrorism, which has caused the loss of countless

innocent lives.‖ Better border management mechanism, too,

was discussed. A schedule for inspection and maintenance of

pillars in the 1,643 kilometre


boundary in 2011-12 in a time bound manner was agreed

upon. It was also set down that each other‘s territory would not

be allowed for activities inimical to the other.

The above mentioned

agreement—if implemented—would clearly be to

India‘s advantage. After all it is in

Myanmar‘s territory that Indian insurgents

are billeted and not the other way

round. Indeed, the details of such

camps are well known. It is also

common knowledge that

the twin districts of Tirap and

Changlang of Arunachal

Pradesh not only continue to be the

hunting-grounds of NSCN (IM),

NSCN (K), ULFA (anti-talk) and NDFB (anti-talk), but also the favoured insurgent route to

and from Myanmar. Tirap and Changlang is an important

conduit to the rich oil, coal and tea belt of Upper Assam, and

with extortion as the present

primary aim, the insurgent groups have an important

stake in keeping the causeway alive. There was an

announcement in 2010 by the Indian Home Minister that a

full-scale operation would be launched against the

insurgents in the two districts, but

this has not yet translated into

reality. Meanwhile, NSCN

(IM), which is on a ceasefire mode

with New Delhi, regularly sends its

cadres to Tirap and Changlang on ―field postings‖

and continues to carry out

conversion of the local population

under what it terms, ―Op

Salvation.‖ The avowed objective

of the Naga group is the complete

transformation of the region into a Christian-dominated

area. The makeover would aid NSCN (IM)‘s demand for

including the two districts into a Greater Nagalim.

Myanmar is the only intact

sanctuary left for NSCN (K),

ULFA and certain Meitei

groups. But the groups are

well-entrenched in their

camps. The reasons for the

undisturbed existence of the

Indian Insurgent Groups in

Myanmar have been

mentioned above. What is,

therefore, needed is a

blueprint for coordinated joint

operation against the

insurgents. Indeed, in the

event of a joint operation, the

Indian security forces,

comprising primarily the

Assam Rifles, would guard

the Indo-Myanmar border,

while the Myanmar‟s army

raids the camps.


Myanmar is the only intact sanctuary left for NSCN (K),

ULFA and certain Meitei groups. But the groups are

well-entrenched in their camps. The reasons for the

undisturbed existence of the Indian Insurgent Groups in

Myanmar have been mentioned above. What is, therefore,

needed is a blueprint for coordinated joint operation

against the insurgents. Indeed, in the event of a joint

operation, the Indian security forces, comprising primarily

the Assam Rifles, would guard the Indo-Myanmar border,

while the Myanmar‘s army raids the camps. However, it must be understood that

unlike Bhutan where the operation resulted in ULFA-

NDFB-KLO cadres fleeing to India (where they were netted

by the Indian security forces), the Indian Insurgent Groups

can go deeper into Myanmarese territory, to the

safe sanctuaries in the Sino-Myanmar border, or into areas

dominated by the Kachins who have affinity with such groups.

Appropriate military arrangements must be made to

avert such a possibility. Any anti-insurgency plan must also

take into account that cadres of the disbanded ULFA‘s 28

Battalion in Myanmar are billeted close to the GHQ of

NSCN (K). Since NSCN (K) is in a ceasefire mode with New

Delhi, it is almost certain that NSCN (K) camps would not be

disturbed. The possibility of ULFA cadres spiriting away

into the NSCN (K) camps in the event of an attack is high.

NSCN (K) and ULFA have a natural kinship, and the

cadres belonging to the former would almost certainly aid the

latter, especially as they have resided in each other‘s

proximity for long. Another aspect that should merit the

attention of security planners of both countries is the ―early-warning‖ system that is

provided to the insurgents by a section of the Myanmar‘s army.

Senior officials of the Myanmar‘s army would have to

ensure that the traditional bonhomie that has been

characterising the army‘s lower echelons with the Indian

Insurgent Groups does not come in the way of a

coordinated operation.

Formal agreements for joint

cooperation against insurgency look pretty on paper. But the

elegance of high table diplomacy has to reach the

grime on ground. A detailed


design for a comprehensive security arrangement is what

is required. Visitations by officials of Myanmar and India

to New Delhi and Naypyidaw must now ―graduate‖ to sector

level field visits. Military commanders that are stationed

in the affected areas must meet, discuss and team up.

Military exercises that would fine tune each other‘s anti-

insurgency idiom would have to be planned and undertaken.

A methodology that calibrates joint performance has to

evolve. The emphasis has to shift from know-how to

(already) did-how. Furthermore, while it is fine to have institutionalised the

mechanism for intelligence sharing, the fact of the matter

is that both Indian and

Myanmar‘s security apparatus are already aware of all the

aspects that govern the Indian Insurgent Groups‘ modus

operandi in Myanmar and abutting areas in India.

Intelligence is, therefore, aplenty, and since both the

countries have credible, actionable intelligence about

the insurgent groups the new phraseology ―sharing of

intelligence‖ does not amount to much. What is required

instead is a determination to end the menace that such

intelligence has already documented and analysed.

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Dr Baburam Bhattarai's India Visit - Satish Chandra

n evaluation of the visit to India, from October

20 to October 23, of Nepal‘s Prime Minister, Dr

Baburam Bhattarai, must take into account not only what he

and the Indian side have been projecting but equally of what

was done and how it was done.

On symbolism the visit cannot be faulted. Dr Bhattarai came with his wife at the head of a

large 37 member delegation including several ministers.

During the visit apart from the delegation level talks he had a

one on one meeting with Dr Manmohan Singh, who also

hosted a banquet in his honour, and had meetings with

the top echelon of India‘s leadership including the

President, the Vice President and the Finance, Home,

External Affairs and Defence Ministers. Equally important is

the fact that Dr Bhattarai‘s India visit constitutes his first

purely bilateral official visit after assuming office. It is

understood that he will also visit China but he has wisely

chosen do go there after having been to India.

Both Dr Bhattarai and the

Indian side have made out that his visit was very successful.

While Dr Bhattarai termed it as ―very productive‖ and the key

to ―building trust‖ between the two countries the Indian side called it an ―unqualified

success‖.

The aforesaid assessment could be perceived to be overly

optimistic when simply seen through the prism of the two

agreements and the MOU signed during the visit. The

MOU is for a Rs1.875 crore Indian grant for goiter control.

The two agreements concluded are much more substantive.

Under one India would provide a $250 million soft loan for infrastructure development

and under the other investments of each country

would inter alia be provided national treatment in the other

A

* Satish Chandra - Distinguished Fellow, VIF


including compensation in the event of nationalization or

damage in the event of war, conflict etc. The latter was

concluded to take care of the concerns of Indian industry

which has had to face attacks by Maoist elements. None of

these agreements can be termed as game changing. The

quantum of the soft loan though sizeable is far smaller

than the amount of assistance being provided by India for

other neighbours like Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Sri

Lanka or Myanmar.

Some of the agreements which

could and should have been inked particularly from India‟s

point of view were the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement,

the Extradition Agreement and the Mutual Legal Assistance

Agreement. Their non conclusion could be seen by

some as a sign of Nepal‟s reluctance to move forward on

issues of concern to India.

The absence of any far

reaching agreements arrived at while at one level explicable by

the underlying tensions which have bedeviled India-Nepal

relations for some time is, of course, also due to the fact

that Dr Bhattarai‘s government

is shaky and its longevity uncertain. With a mandate of

only up to end November, and with no certainty that it will be

able to get a further few months extension in order to

deliver on the peace process and on constitution making, it

is living on borrowed time. This fundamental reality no doubt

constrained Bhattarai from taking any bolder moves to

upgrade India-Nepal ties and perhaps similarly induced

India to go slow.

Nevertheless as apparent from

a careful reading of the Joint Press Statement issued on Dr

Bhattarai visit to India it is quite clear that an effort has

been made by both sides to put the past behind them and get

the relationship back on the rails. In this context, specific

mention may be made of the following elements contained in

the Joint Press Statement:

1. The decision that all

bilateral institutional mechanisms ―be revitalized

and convened regularly‖. In this regard particular mention

was made of early meetings of Joint Ministerial Commission

on Water resources, Home Secretaries, and inter


Governmental Committee of Commerce Secretaries.

2. The receptivity shown by

India to requests made by Nepal for enhanced

connectivity and transit facilities as well as additional

electricity supply. India also made known its readiness to

provide assistance for ―priority development projects‖ as

requested for by Nepal.

3. The willingness of the two

sides to the establishment of an ―Eminent Persons Group to

look into the totality of India-Nepal relations and suggest

measures to further expand and consolidate‖ them.

4. Establishment of a Foreign Secretary level committee to

―review, adjust and update the 1950 Treaty of Peace and

Friendship and other agreements.‖

5. Nepal ―assured that it would

not allow its territory to be used for any activity against

India‖ and India provided a reciprocal assurance.

In view of the foregoing it would be reasonable to

conclude that Dr Bhattarai‘s visit to India, while no game

changer, has been useful in

terms of easing tensions between the two countries and

paving the way for creating a climate in which improvement

of India-Nepal ties can be facilitated through a revival of

existing institutional links and creation of new mechanisms. It

has also been helpful in underlining that India is

prepared to do business with a Maoist regime and favours the

evolution of Nepalese on a consensual and inclusive basis. This cannot but have a

very favourable psychological impact in Nepal.

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In view of the foregoing it

would be reasonable to

conclude that Dr Bhattarai‟s

visit to India, while no game

changer, has been useful in

terms of easing tensions

between the two countries

and paving the way for

creating a climate in which

improvement of India-Nepal

ties can be facilitated through

a revival of existing

institutional links and

creation of new mechanisms


Indo - Us Ties will see better days - Kanwal Sibal

ublic readings of the temperature of the India-

US relationship keep fluctuating depending on

assessments of the moment. Doubts are being raised again

whether the relationship has reached a plateau and

enthusiasm has waned on both sides. Lack of delivery on US

expectations in the nuclear and defence fields as well as its

inward preoccupations because of recessionary and employment concerns and the

upcoming Presidential elections have suppposedly

taken American eyes off the India story.

Neither India nor the US need,

however, to be too narcissistic about the condition of their

ties. These will find a natural equilibrium based on the

enlightened self-interest of both sides based on their longer-term political, economic

and security congruence.

More important than any immediate material results of

the changed relationship is the change in Indian thinking about

America. The educated Indian middle class is positively

oriented towards the US and so is the business community and

the media. There is no real political cost today in being

seen as pro-American. It is widely accepted that good

relations with America is a good thing.

Relationship

The changing defence relationship with the US is a

tangible sign of this. To a country that arms Pakistan,

the opening India has given reflects an altered appreciation of national interest. The US

has currently secured the largest number of arms

contracts, despite intrusive end-use monitoring

requirements. India no longer allows fears of a cut-off of US

arms supplies in the event of regional tensions to block an

enhanced defence relationship. The elimination of US fighters

P

* Kanwal Sibal - Member Advisory Board, VIF


from the competition for the MMRCA contract is not a

defining decision.

The Indo-US nuclear agreement has symbolized the

changed India-US relationship, though its parturition was

politically painful. The attention now is on realizing

actual commercial benefits from it. The Indian Nuclear

Liability Act had stultified the US nuclear suppliers in particular, but the rules

drafted under the Liability Act limiting supplier liability to a

manageable period should deblock the situation. In any

case, if the nuclear deal was strategic in intent it should not

be reduced to a transactional one of repayment to the US for

ending India‘s nuclear isolation.

On issues involving terrorism, religious extremism and

Afghanistan, which are vital for Indian and US security, while

concerns are shared, their treatment reveals serious gaps

in thinking. The US no longer ignores Pakistan‘s terror

affiliations and its duplicity. But it has not found a way to

translate its frustrations with Pakistan into a policy that

meets both indian and American demands.

India is not comfortable with

US willingness to promote reconciliation with the

obscurantist Taliban leadership provided it breaks

links with Al Qaida and confines its Islamist agenda to

Afghan terrirtory. Our problems arise from the

strength of Islamist ideology in our region, embodied all along by Pakistan and now set to

gain strategic depth in Afghanistan. Whatever the

likelihood of potential problems between the Taliban Pashtuns

and Pakistan, India cannot manoeuvre in a Taliban

influenced political dispensation in Afghanistan.

India needs a moderate Islamic government in Kabul with no

religious bias against india and not vulnerable to manipulation

to serve Pakistan‘s anti-Indian obsessions.

The US has been exhorting India to strengthen its Look

East policy. In actual fact india‘s Look East policy has

been deepened over the years with trade agreements with

Asean as well as individual Asian countries, an active role

in the Asean Regional Forum


and participation in the East Asia Summit where it intends

to work closely with the US and others.

India has been holding

numerous naval exercises with the US to ensure the security

of the sea lanes of communication in the Indian

Ocean through which trade and energy flows of China

pass, not to mention those of Japan and South Korea. Naval exercises have

been held in a larger format with

Japan, Australia and Singapore.

Now a decision has been taken to

have trilateral exercises involving

India, US and Japan, as well as

a trilateral dialogue between these three

countries at the Foreign Office level. These are signs of a

developing hedging strategy against China‘s rise that is

already causing anxiety in the region with its claims in the South China Sea etc.

Problems

Yet, here again, there are

question marks in India‘s mind

about US‘s China policy with its mixed messages on account

of the limits imposed on US choices because of the

unhealthy mutual financial and economic interdependence

that has developed between the two countries.

India must also take into

account that Chinese protests against the India-Vietnam

agreement on oil exploration in the South China Sea apart, its

real problems with

China are in South Asia, not in

East Asia. These relate to its claims

on Indian territory, Jammu

and Kashmir‘s legal status,

transfers of nuclear and

missile technologies to Pakistan,

Chinese presence in POK, the militarization of Tibet etc. On

these issues the US is silent.

Democracy cannot be a geo-

political glue for Indo-US ties as India has, over the years,

benefitted little from the democracy dividend in its

relationship with the US. If this factor has been peripheral to

the relationship all this while,

Yet, here again, there are

question marks in India‟s

mind about US‟s China policy

with its mixed messages on

account of the limits imposed

on US choices because of the

unhealthy mutual financial

and economic

interdependence that has

developed between the two

countries.


it cannot easily become central now.

If India is accommodated in

leading global groupings the assumption should not be that

it must or should endorse decisions taken by western

powers and help enlarge their consensual basis without

expressing differences. It is this assumption that explains

the ire at India for its recent voting in the Security Council on Libya and Syria.

India‘s history, its thinking, its

cultural instincts, the working of its

political system do not allow it to

endorse western policies

unquestioningly, whatever the

importance of the US factor today in policy making.

Our differences over Libya and

Syria are not because we owe anything to the leaders of these

countries, but because we owe something to our own vision of

living together and overcoming differences.

Assessment

The report card of the Indo-US relationship is a mixed one.

The strategic relationship has to be imparted greater content.

The backlog of past misunderstandings is being

steadily removed. There is general goodwill for the US

though some aspects of US policies continue to cast a

shadow on the relationship.

The main drivers of the relationship on the Indian side are the acceptance that the

relationship is vital and that no other relationship can

substitute for it in its entirety; the

people to people relationship is

unmatched; educational

linkages are very important; the

India-American community is a

positive force.

The major sources

of constraint are the mismatch between US interests and

priorities as a global power and India‘s as a regional power,

outdated conditionalities linked to arms supplies, the

negative activity of American non-proliferation diehards, the

complexity of export controls

The report card of the Indo-US

relationship is a mixed one.

The strategic relationship has

to be imparted greater

content. The backlog of past

misunderstandings is being

steadily removed. There is

general goodwill for the US

though some aspects of US

policies continue to cast a

shadow on the relationship.


especially on dual technology items, policies towards

Pakistan and on issues of terrorism and religious

extremism, the uncertainties about the end-game in

Afghanistan and US limitations in conducting its China policy

even when it steps up its Asia-Pacific commitments and seeks

more Indian commitment keeping the rising China threat

in mind.

The eventual India-US relationship will have unique

aspects as India is unique and US exceptionalism is a reality.

back to contents


The Police in India - Dr. M.N. Buch

recent incident in Kolkota has set alarm

bells ringing. A rowdy crowd from the ruling

Trinamul Congress in West Bengal blocked a public street

during some celebrations. This led to clashes with workers of

the opposition and the police intervened, cleared the street

and arrested two persons who happened to be senior workers

of the ruling party. The Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, personally

went to the police station, publicly insulted the Police

Commissioner and senior officers, humiliated the Station

Officer of the police station and forced the police to release the

two arrested persons. Quite apart from demoralising the

police the action of the Chief Minister in forcing the release

of the two arrested persons was an act of goondaism and

totally contrary to law. We accuse the police quite often of

being highhanded and taking the law into its hands. Why is

there not similar criticism of

the action of the Chief Minister of West Bengal?

The police was organised as a

disciplined force having legal powers to maintain public

order, prevent the commission of offences, investigate crimes

and prosecute criminals and for this purpose the British enacted the Police Act of 1861.

Prakash Singh, who served as DGP U.P and DGP C.R.P. filed

a Public Interest Litigation in which he has alleged that the

Police Act of 1861 is excessively restrictive and

subjects police officers to outside control, thus adversely

affecting their autonomy and their efficiency as a Force for

law enforcement. The Supreme Court has directed that the

police must be reformed so that it begins to act as an

agency for law enforcement and does not degenerate into a

handmaiden of politicians and bureaucrats. Government set up the Soli Sorabjee

Committee for suggesting the draft of a new Police Act, which

committee submitted its report

A

* Dr. M.N. Buch - Visiting Fellow, VIF


to government in October 2006. Let us begin with the Act

of 1861. Section 3 of the Act vests superintendence of the

police in the State Government. Certain words of

section 3 need to be reiterated because they are of vital

importance in ensuring that the police functions according

to law. These words are, ― …

except as authorised under

the provisions of this Act, no

person, officer or court shall be

empowered by the State Government to supersede or

control any police functionary‖. No

member of the Legislature, no

bureaucrat unless authorised by the

Act or the Code of Criminal

Procedure and no court has any control over any

police functionary, which establishes the fact that so

long as the police functions according to the law it is free to

act without let or hindrance.

Section 4 of the Act vests the

administration of the police

throughout the State in the Inspector General of Police

(Now Director General of Police), just as the

administration of the police in a district vests in the

Superintendent of Police. The District Magistrate does have

general control and direction, but this is only in consonance

with the fact that he is the chief

coordinating officer in the

district and direction and

control would be exercised only in

a coordinating role. There is nothing in this

Act which subordinates the

police to any other authority and no

other legal reform can really give

more strength to the police than is

available to it under the 1861 Act.

Unfortunately neither the police officers calling for

reforms nor the Supreme Court have tried to understand the

spirit of the Act of 1861. The sole attack on this Act is that it

is a carry over from British rule. By that argument the

These words are, “ … except

as authorised under the

provisions of this Act, no

person, officer or court shall be

empowered by the State

Government to supersede or

control any police functionary”.

No member of the Legislature,

no bureaucrat unless

authorised by the Act or the

Code of Criminal Procedure

and no court has any control

over any police functionary,

which establishes the fact that

so long as the police functions

according to the law it is free

to act without let or hindrance.


Constitution of India should be scrapped because it is also

substantially a carry over from the Government of India Act

1935.

The police derive powers not from the Police Act, which is

aimed at providing an organisation for and structure

of the police, but from the Code of Criminal Procedure

and various other laws dealing with criminal justice. Broadly speaking, Chapter XI Cr.P.C

authorises the police to take preventive action so that

cognizable offences may be prevented. For this purpose the

police have the powers under section 151 to arrest a person

to prevent the commission of a cognizable offence and under

section 152 the police has the power to intervene in order to

prevent injury to public property. Under Chapter VIII

Cr.P.C on police initiative an Executive Magistrate has the

power to bind over persons to prevent a breach of peace, to

ensure good behaviour from persons disseminating seditious matters, to bind over

persons suspected to be contemplating the commission

of a cognizable offence and bind over habitual offenders.

Under Chapter V the police

have the power to make arrest under sections 41 and 42 and

under section 47 the police can search a place entered by a

person liable to be arrested. Under Chapter VII the police

can issue summons to produce documents or other material

necessary for the purpose of an investigation and, on a

warrant, to conduct a search of any premises for letters and

telegrams, stolen property, forged documents, prohibited

publications and to search premises for persons

wrongfully confined or females abducted.

In the matter of offences the principle powers of the police

are derived from Chapter XII Cr.P.C. In fact all the

investigations begin with the filing of a First Information

Report in a cognizable offence under section 154 Cr.P.C.

Under section 156 the police have the power to investigate

any cognizable offence and other sections from 157 to 173

give the procedure for investigation, prosecution or closure of a case. The

procedure laid down is quite comprehensive and it is only

the police which have the power to investigate. No other

authority, not even a court,


may intervene in investigation. The only authority which may

give any direction to an investigating officer is a

superior officer of police designated by the State

Government by general or special order under section

158 Cr.P.C. Certainly no executive officer or politician

has any authority whatsoever to

interfere with investigation. The

autonomy of the police in the

matter of investigation,

therefore, is absolute and once the FIR is

recorded it is only a competent court

with which the investigating

officer will interact, either

directly or through a superior officer

under section 158 Cr.P.C. Mamata Banerjee‘s

intervention in a police station in Kolkota, therefore, was

totally illegal and is an offence under sections 353 and 186

IPC. She both assaulted a public servant and obstructed

him in discharge of public functions and regardless of the

fact that she is Chief Minister she should have been booked

for these offences. The day a police officer does this when

some person of influence tries to interfere in the investigation

of an offence, the police will truly become a servant of the

law.

Chapter X Cr.P.C. provides for maintenance of

public order and tranquility. This is a function which

devolves on the Executive

Magistracy and the police. Where

an Executive Magistrate feels

that civil force is inadequate to deal

with the situation he may use the

armed force to restore order.

Under section 129 Cr.P.C an

Executive Magistrate, an officer in charge of a police station or

any police officer not below the rank of Sub Inspector may command an unlawful

assembly to disperse and use necessary force to enforce his

order. This force could extend to using lethal force if the

situation so demands. Under

The procedure laid down is

quite comprehensive and it is

only the police which have the

power to investigate. No other

authority, not even a court,

may intervene in

investigation. The only

authority which may give any

direction to an investigating

officer is a superior officer of

police designated by the State

Government by general or

special order under section

158 Cr.P.C. Certainly no

executive officer or politician

has any authority whatsoever

to interfere with investigation.


section 132 Cr.P.C the officer who took the action is immune

from prosecution. The decision whether an assembly of five or

more persons is unlawful because either there is a

prohibitory order in force or, in the opinion of the officer

concerned, it is likely to cause a disturbance of public peace,

lies within the discretion of the officer on the spot and unless

the action which follows is palpably wrong and excessive

the officer cannot be questioned for his decision.

Nowhere does the Code of Criminal Procedure say that

any other person, a Minister, a politician, a bureaucrat or a member of the general citizenry

can interfere with the action of the Executive Magistrate or the

police officer in the matter of restoration of public order.

When the Communists took

power in West Bengal they ordered the police not to

interfere in any labour unrest in which criminal force was used

to prevent the ingress or egress of management officials in any industrial or business

establishment. This is commonly called gherao. Every

gherao amounts to wrongful restraint and confinement.

These are cognizable offences

and anyone committing these offences automatically becomes

part of an unlawful assembly. Under the power of

superintendence the State Government can give

instructions to the police on the manner in which force is to

be used when dealing with an unlawful assembly. For

example, it would be lawful for government to direct the police

that when dealing with a communal riot or major

insurrection it must not hesitate to use force and must

ensure that public order is restored in the shortest

possible time so that lives can be saved. When dealing with industrial unrest, a student

agitation or agitation over some social evil in which women and

children participate it would be legitimate for government to

direct that the police will exercise utmost restraint.

What government cannot do is to tell the police to ignore

cognizable offences such as obstructing a public street or

wrongfully confining people in the name of a public agitation.

In the maintenance of public order the law gives the police

and the Executive Magistrate complete independence,

subject to directions given under the power of


superintendence. It is wrong on the part of government to

try and intervene in such matters and tell the police to

act with bias or otherwise behave one-sidedly in the

maintenance of public order or, for that matter, not act at all.

That power just does not vest in government.

The existing law gives a great

deal of operational autonomy to the police. The allegation is that political interference takes

the form of postings and transfers, denial of promotions

and other forms of discrimination against police

officers doing their duty. The National Police Commission

under the chairmanship of Shri Dharma Vira was set up

to find ways and means of stopping such undue

interference and immunising the police from outside

influence. The thrust of the Commission‘s report was

three-fold:

1. Set up National and State

Security Commissions which would lay down the

guidelines and generally prevent government form

interfering in police work 2. Loosen the hold of the

District Magistrate.

3. Ensure security of tenure to police officers.

The report of the Commission

was never implemented for two main reasons:-

(a) The politicians looked upon

the so-called Security Commission as a rival which they were not prepared to

accept.

(b) Secondly, they were not prepared to loosen their hold

over police postings and transfers.

Regarding the District Magistrate, even the

Commission ultimately recognised that we need a

coordinating officer in a district and the D.M is not in any way

responsible for the present sorry state of the police. The

Supreme Court, in the PIL filed by Prakash Singh, has

basically reinforced what the National Police Commission

said, but has gone further by stating that there should be

separate authorities for police accountability. It is not as if

there is a shortage of authorities which can question the police. The National and

State Human Rights Commissions, Women‘s

Commissions, Child Rights


Protection Commissions, Minority Commissions, etc.,

are all agencies which can call the police to account. The role

of the District Magistrate as a coordinating officer is

important because he is the one agency whom the common

man could approach for redressal of grievances and,

because of his close relationship with the

Superintendent of Police, he could

get most of these grievances settled

at the district police level. He

could be supportive of the police when

necessary and yet persuade the

Superintendent of Police to take

necessary corrective action

when this was called for. Replacing his authority by a

State Police Complaints Commission or the District

Complaints Authority will not improve the system but will in

fact add further confusion to it. What the Supreme Court has

not appreciated is that the chain of command has to be

clear and the local level grievance redressal machinery

has to be simple but effective. The proposed police reforms

will not achieve this.

Of course the police should have legal protection, there

should be a tenure and the head of the police should be

the one to decide who is best suited to serve where.

Government‘s true role should be to prepare a plan of

policing, give specific directions to the head of the

police about what is expected of him

and his Force and then to call him to

account from time to time. Action

must follow if there is failure on

the part of the police. This action

has to be based on an objective

assessment of police performance. The head of the

police must insist that his authority in the matter of

administration of the police must not in any way be diluted and he must stand up to

government if he finds that there is undue interference.

The Secretary in charge of the Home Department in every

State must not only liaise

It is the responsibility of the

Chief Minister to ensure that

his Ministers and party

workers do not intervene in

the operational autonomy of

the police. The police is

accountable to the Home

Minister but the Home

Minister is not empowered to

intervene in day-to-day

policing. This is the ideal

position in which the police

can become truly an

instrument of the law.


closely with the D.G. Police but must also be supportive of his

actions. It is the responsibility of the Chief Minister to ensure

that his Ministers and party workers do not intervene in the

operational autonomy of the police. The police is

accountable to the Home Minister but the Home Minister

is not empowered to intervene in day-to-day policing. This is

the ideal position in which the police can become truly an

instrument of the law.

One thing which causes

anxiety is that in any large-scale breakdown of law and

order, whether it is militancy, Naxalite terror, external

injection of terrorism, communal rioting or otherwise

widespread unrest, the police is extremely hesitant in taking

action. Therefore, the State Police cannot be trusted and

Central Police Forces are brought in. No Central Police

Force can ever be a real substitute for the State Police

because it does not know the local terrain and the people and, therefore, it is likely to

arouse hostility in the local people. A good, effective State

Police does know how to handle local people and the

local situation and our efforts

should be aimed at making the State Police efficient, well-

equipped, knowledgeable and with adequate operational

freedom to maintain public order. Our experience of the

Punjab is that it is only when K.P.S. Gill forged the Punjab

Police into an efficient anti terrorism weapon that

militancy came under control in that State. A recent study of

Naxalite hit districts in Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh by the

National Centre for Human Settlements and Environment

indicated that the State Police was more effective and more

readily acceptable by the people in any anti-Naxalite operation than the Central

Reserve Police. These two examples prove the point that

whereas the Central Armed Police Forces can provide back

up where needed, it is the State Police which has to be in

the forefront of crime control. Terrorism is also a crime. Just

think what a difference it would have made in Mumbai if

the Colaba Police Station had been adequately equipped and

manned so that it could intercept the ten terrorists

from Pakistan who landed on the Colaba sea front and

wreaked havoc in the city for three whole days. Had the


Colaba Police been able to intercept these terrorists they

would have been neutralised on landing and the horrors of

26.11.2008 could have been totally avoided. For the

inadequacy and the inefficiency of the Maharashtra

Police as represented by a single police station we lost

almost two hundred people dead. This must never happen

and for this purpose the nation must empower the police,

adequately equip it in both equipment and manpower, give

it room to operate freely, call it to account from time to time,

punish failure but equally importantly reward good work.

The least that citizens deserve is a good police force.

back to contents


Pakistan Monthly Brief

he PPP-led coalition

government came under

tremendous pressure in

November after the simmering

controversy over an unsigned

memo, allegedly dictated by

Pakistan‘s ambassador to USA,

Hussain Haqqani, to a

Pakistani-origin American

businessman seeking US

pressure on the Pakistan

military establishment in

return for significant

assurances on dismantling the

terror infrastructure and

securing Pakistan's nuclear

arsenal, erupted into a full-

blown crisis. The Pakistan

army used the memo to its

advantage to force the

government to get rid of

Haqqani, a man whom the

army treated with great

suspicion and regarded as a

major stumbling block in its

efforts to make the Americans

tow the Pakistani line on

Afghanistan. Having got

Haqqani‘s head, the army did

not let the controversy die, and

used it against President Asif

Zardari by orchestrating

insinuations that he was the

man who was behind the

memo.

The campaign gained greater

traction after the main

opposition party, PMLN,

latched on to the memo for

furthering its anti-government

and anti-Zardari programme

and filed a petition in the

Supreme Court seeking a

detailed inquiry into the entire

affair. With speculation

running wild that the

‗memogate‘ scandal could

sound the death knell of the

President Zardari, if not the

PPP government, the party

leadership showed clear signs

of being seriously unsettled,

more so since just as the

memo controversy was

reaching a crescendo, the

Supreme Court dealt another

major blow to the government

by dismissing the review

petition filed in the NRO case.

The import of this ruling was

that the government would

have to reopen the money-

laundering cases against

T


President Zardari in the Swiss

court.

Alongside the memo and NRO

crises, the PPP government

also confronted not just an

aggressive opposition from the

PMLN, but also the phoenix-

like rise of Imran Khan who is

threatening to shake up

Pakistani politics like it hasn‘t

been since the late 1960‘s

when the PPP emerged on

Pakistan's political firmament.

Initially, Imran Khan‘s rise was

welcomed by the PPP which

calculated that he would cut

into Nawaz Sharif‘s vote bank

thereby benefiting PPP. But if

Imran Khan can retain the

momentum that he has got

after his path-breaking rally in

Lahore, then it will not just be

the PMLN but also the PPP that

stands to lose big. Impressed

by the wave of public support

in Imran‘s favour, as well as a

growing impression that he is

being backed by the military

establishment, many

politicians, including some

heavyweights, are making a

beeline for the Pakistan Tehrik-

e-Insaaf.

The biggest name so far to join

Imran Khan was that of the

former foreign minister Shah

Mehmood Qureshi who after

weeks of dilly-dallying between

joining PMLN or PTI, finally

jumped on Imran‘s

bandwagon. He has been made

Senior Vice Chairman and is

now virtually the number two

in PTI. Qureshi‘s decision dealt

a big blow to Nawaz Sharif who

expected him to join the PMLN

and bolster the party‘s position

in South Punjab. The inroads

made by Imran Khan has

shaken up the PMLN which

until now was seeing itself as

the natural choice of the

people for forming the next

government. Nonplussed by

the rise of the PTI, the PMLN

has gone ballistic accusing

Imran Khan of being an ‗agent‘

and a ‗proxy‘ of the

establishment. Bizarrely

enough, the PMLN has even

accused Imran Khan of being

hand in glove with Zardari to

cut into PMLN votes. Wild

accusations aside, the PMLN‘s

problem is that it no longer has

the ‗buzz‘ surrounding it and

appears to have run out of


ideas on how to meet the

challenge posed by Imran

Khan. What is worse, many of

the politicians who were seen

to be gravitating towards the

PMLN – for instance, a large

section of the ‗unification‘ bloc

of the PMLQ which is propping

up the PMLN government in

Punjab – are in the process of

shifting their loyalties to PTI.

The state of flux in the political

scene has prompted even the

PPP leadership to start

preparing for the next general

elections. Though the polls are

not due before February 2013,

the general feeling is that 2012

will be the election year.

Despite the hubris that comes

with being in government, the

fact remains that the PPP is in

a state of disarray. Apart from

the creation of a ‗forward bloc‘

of its lawmakers in Punjab

assembly (most of whom are

Qureshi supporters and likely

to jump ship in favour of PTI

before the next election), the

party is also facing major

problems in Sindh where its

policy of reconciliation

(detractors call it appeasement)

with the MQM has riled its

Sindhi vote bank. Zardari‘s

oldest friend (by some

accounts, now estranged)

Zulfikar Mirza has become

another major headache for

the party, not only because of

his criticism of the PPP‘s

alliance with MQM but also

because he is doing and saying

everything possible to target

the MQM and its leadership.

Mirza went to London with

‗evidence‘ that implicated the

MQM supreme leader Altaf

Hussein in the murder of

senior party leader Dr Imran

Farooq. At first, it seemed that

the MQM was seriously

concerned about what evidence

Mirza was taking to present to

British authorities. Eventually

however Mirza‘s visit turned

out to be a damp squib.

There was a spate of reports

that peace negotiations‘ were

underway between the

Pakistani Taliban groups and

the Pakistan government.

While the official spokesman of

the Pakistani Taliban denied

these reports, and the

government too did not confirm


them, it appeared that some

sort of contacts had been

established between the two

sides. This impression was

further strengthened after

reports that the Afghan Taliban

chief, Mullah Omar was using

his influence to nudge the

Pakistani Taliban to hold peace

talks with the Pakistan

government. The talk about

talks did not however stop the

two sides from targeting each

other and while the

government continued with

operations in Kurram and

Orakzai agencies in FATA

region, the Taliban carried out

terror strikes and ambushes

all over the Pashtun belt. But

not only there was no

spectacular incident of

terrorism, data on terrorism

suggests a significant drop in

the number of terror attacks

over the last few months.

Whether this is because the

Taliban are on the run or is

some sort of a confidence

building measure related to the

peace negotiations is

something that is still unclear.

Strangely, even as the media

was reporting on peace

negotiations with groups that

had been targeting Pakistan,

militant commanders who were

aligned to the Pakistani state –

for instance, Hafiz Gul

Bahadur – declared an end to

their peace talks with the

government because of military

actions in North Waziristan.

Towards the end of the month,

relations between Pakistan and

US went into a tailspin after

NATO helicopters bombed two

Pakistan army posts along the

Pak-Afghan border in

Mohmand agency killing over

two dozen soldiers. The attack

took place even as the top

military commanders of

Pakistan and the US were

discussing ways and means to

strengthen their coordination

along the border. Reacting with

fury to the attacks, Pakistan

suspended the NATO supply

lines indefinitely, asked the

Americans to vacate the

Shamsi airbase in Balochistan

(used by US drones), cancelled

all meetings of officials,

suspended intelligence

cooperation, withdrew its

officials from the border


coordination centres and

boycotted the Bonn conference

on Afghanistan. But with the

US and NATO refusing to

apologise and offering only

regrets and condolences for the

incident, the stand-off shows

no sign of ending anytime

soon. The Pakistanis are of

course using the incident to

revisit and reorder their

relations with the US and

rework the terms of

engagement in the War on

Terror. While the US

administration seems inclined

on putting the relations with

Pakistan back on track, the

mood in the US Congress is

rather ugly. A senior US

Congressman, Gary Ackerman

went to the extent of saying

that the US should stop

treating Pakistan as an ally.

Moves have also been made to

restrict the aid being given to

Pakistan and impose tough

new conditions.

Serious strains were also

visible in Pakistan's relations

with two South Asian countries

– Afghanistan and Bangladesh.

In the case of the former, the

assassination of the former

Afghan President,

Burhanuddin Rabbani,

continues to cast a shadow

over the bilateral relations.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai

has a rather unpleasant

meeting with Pakistan‘s Prime

Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani on

the sidelines of the SAARC

summit in Maldives which

ended in an exchange of

recriminations. With

Bangladesh, the demand by

the foreign minister Dipu Moni

for a formal apology for the

genocide carried out by the

Pakistan army during the

Liberation War in 1971, hasn‘t

gone down well with Pakistan.

Moreover, Bangladesh‘s refusal

to withdraw its objections to

the trade concessions given by

the EU to Pakistan has become

another irritant in the bilateral

relations.

With India, however, despite no

substantial progress on issues

of core and critical interest to

India, the optics and

atmospherics surrounding

bilateral relations have been

rather good if the interactions


between the leaders of the two

countries on the sidelines of

the SAARC summit are

anything to go by. Prime

Minister Manmohan Singh

called his Pakistani

counterpart ‗a man of peace‘

and the two leaders reaffirmed

their resolve to take forward

the dialogue process between

the two countries. Pakistan's

foreign minister Hina Rabbani

Khar claimed that relations

between the two countries had

entered a ‗positive zone‘ and

while she said that trust deficit

between India and Pakistan

was ‗zero‘, the Indian Minister

of External Affairs SM Krishna

proclaimed that trust deficit

was ‗shrinking‘. Incidentally,

shortly after these remarks

were made, Pakistani

authorities removed the

international terrorist

organisation, Jamaatud Dawa,

from the list of proscribed

outfits.

There was some progress on

the trade front. Despite the

government of Pakistan

backtracking from an

announcement declaring the

in-principle grant of MFN

status to India, a road map of

sorts has been unveiled

according to which Pakistan

will take a series of steps that

will culminate in giving India

the MFN status by the end of

2012. But the normalisation of

trade relations has come under

scathing attack from the

Islamists with the JuD holding

public rallies against the move

and declaring that India can

never become a ‗most favoured

nation‘ for Pakistan. Other

Islamist fundamentalist parties

and groups like the Jamaat

Islami have also been agitating

over the issue of trade with

India. There are reports that

the Pakistan army is not very

keen on opening trade with

India.

back to contents


Nepal Monthly Brief

Internal Political

Developments

onstituent Assembly

Term Gets Extension

for “Final” Six-month:

As the tenure of the

Constituent Assembly (CA) was

all set to expire on November

30, 2011, the Parliament on

November 29, 2011 amended

the Interim Constitution 2007,

and extended the term of the

CA by six more months.

In fact, the term of CA has

been extended only after three

major parties--United

Communist Party of Nepal

Maoist (UCPN-M), Nepali

Congress (NC), the Communist

Party of Nepal-United Marxist

and Leninist (CPN-UML)-- and

the Samyukta Loktantrik

Madhesi Morcha (SLMM)

signed a six-point agreement

on November 29, 2011. The

latest six-point agreement is

the deal which, in fact,

reiterates their commitments

to implement the seven-point

deal signed almost four weeks

back. Before that, the top

leaders of the major political

parties had many rounds of

meetings, and eventually they

agreed to go for endorsing the

proposal put forth by the four-

member taskforce formed by

the government to formulate

the time-bound calendar for

the Constitution Drafting

process. In fact, the taskforce,

which was formed on

November 27, 2011 to prepare

the time-bound calendar

keeping in view the six-month

limit imposed by the Supreme

Court order Before fixing the

period of extension, had come

up with a proposal to extend

the CA tenure along with the

implementation of the seven-

point agreement, signed on

November 1, 2011. The task

force also asked the top

leadership of the major parties

to initiate the process of

forming a national consensus

government as envisaged in the

seven-point understanding.

More so, the task force agreed

C


on completing the work

relating to the Constitution

Drafting within a week,

extended the deadline to

complete the regrouping of

Maoist combatants to

December 15 from November

23, 2011 and implement the

agreement to return the seized

property at the earliest.

Along with the new extension,

the Secretariat under the

Constitutional Committee (CC)

of the CA has come up with a

13-point new calendar of

events with the target to

promulgate the new

Constitution within May (21-

27), 2012. According to the

calendar it is planned to forge

consensus on all the disputed

issues except the state

restructuring issue by

December 30, 2011, and the

Constitutional Committee will

take final decision after holding

deliberations on the report to

be submitted by the sub-

committee on or Before

January 5, 2012. The first

integrated Draft of the new

Constitution would be

prepared within February 13 to

27, 2012 and endorsement of

the first Draft done by March

5, 2012 after holding major

discussions on the same at the

CA meeting. Thereafter, the

Draft will be sent to the Public

Opinion Collection and

Coordination Committee for

campaign and the views of the

people obtained on the first

Draft of the Constitution from

March 6-28, 2012. The

collected views would then be

analysed and the committee

would present it at the CA,

which would then discuss

upon it and direct the

Constitutional Committee to

endorse the first Draft

accordingly. The proposal

states that the Constitutional

Committee would then review

the analysis presented by the

Public Opinion Collection and

Coordination Committee and

present the bill for further

discussion in the CA from April

20-May 20, 2012.

Furthermore, the Constitution

Draft, which would be

promulgated within May 21-

27, would be signed by all the

members of the Constitutional


Committee and then presented

to the president.

Before six-point agreement on

the issue of CA tenure

extension, the ruling UCPN-M

had been pushing for

extending the term by six

months while the NC and CPN-

UML had proposed a three-

month extension. In fact, the

CPN-UML had put forth two

conditions—implementation of

the seven-point deal and a

time-bound calendar to ensure

timely completion of statute

writing—for lending its support

to extending the term of the

CA. A Standing Committee

meeting of UCPN-M held at the

party‘s headquarters in Balkhu

on November 22, 2011

endorsed a four-point special

political proposal to this effect

and asked Prime Minister Dr.

Bhattarai to clear the way for

the formation of a National

Consensus Government. The

party has also asked the

government to make public the

progress made in Constitution-

writing and in the work of

dispute resolution

subcommittee as well as the

role of the CA in a written

form.

In the meantime, the Supreme

Court (SC) of Nepal had

directed the government to

extend the CA term finally for

one time. Advocates Bharat

Jungum and advocate

Balkrishna Neupane on

September 21 had filed a writ

petition at the apex court,

arguing that it was completely

unConstitutional and

illegitimate to extend the CA

term against the Article 64 of

the Interim Constitution.

Given the new situation along

with the SC verdict, it is said

that the major parties decided

to endorse the already-tabled

government bill to extend the

CA by six more months after

adopting yet another "time-

bound calendar" on statute

writing. In fact, major parties

including the UCPN-M, NC,

CPN-UML and SLMM had

formed a four-member

taskforce on November 27,

2011 to prepare the time-

bound calendar keeping in

view the six-month limit

imposed by the SC order


Before fixing the period of

extension.

Regrouping Process of Maoist

Combatant Ends; Maoist

Party Found engaged in

“Institutional Corruption”:

The Special Committee has

completed the regrouping

process of the former Maoist

combatants in all the seven

main cantonment sites. The

process was started on

November 20, 2011, and

concluded on December 1,

2011. According to the

Secretariat of Special

Committee, only 16,996

combatants attended the

regrouping process though the

United Nations Mission to

Nepal had registered 19,602

combatants in the verification

process carried out in 2007.

Among the combatants,

around 9,000 have opted for

integration into the Nepal

Army, 7,000 have opted for

voluntary retirement and only

six have chosen the

rehabilitation package on offer.

Along with the new statistics,

the number of combatants who

did not show up in the

regrouping process has

reached more than 2600. As

the number of the Maoist

combatants has been found

significantly less than the

figure recorded by the United

Nations Mission in Nepal

(UNMIN) in 2007, the long-

standing accusation to the

UCPN-M of misusing the state

funds by showing fake

numbers of combatants in the

cantonments has become an

established truth. Here, a

pertinent question is what will

happen to the money taken by

the Maoist party in the name of

distributing to those fake or

non-existent combatants?

According to reports, the

Maoist party has received

government money in the

name of salary and allowances

for 19,525 combatants

cantoned in the various

temporary camps even in the

month of Kartik (October-

November). The Office of the

Cantonment Management, a

government body which has

been given responsibility to

look after Maoist combatants,

has revealed that it has

released allowances to 19,525


combatants even last month.

The new situation seems to

have dragged the UNMIN into

the controversy once again. If

one calculates the amount, the

UCPN-M has bagged more than

2 billion Nepali Rupees from

the state coffers in name of

salaries and rations by

producing figures exceeding

the actual number of

combatants residing in the

cantonments.

In the meantime, the UNMIN

disqualified Maoist combatants

have formed an organisation

called Discharged People‘s

Liberation Army (DPLA). A

gathering of Maoist

combatants disqualified by

UNMIN, in the presence of

some of the leaders of

hardliner faction of the UCPN-

M, in Butwal on December 1,

2011 formed a seven-member

committee under the command

of Sagar Limbu. ―The PLA

combatants who fought for

peace and Constitution cannot

stay without a dignified

existence and rights. They are

ready to challenge the state

and even the party if need be

for their rights and dignity,‖

media quotes Limbu.

Eventually State

Restructuring Commission

Takes Shape: After almost a

four-year long debate and

discussions, the major parties

have finally formed an eight-

member State Restructuring

Commission (SRC) to

recommend the CA a best

possible model to federate the

country. The parties had

provisioned the Commission in

the Interim Constitution 2007

to recommend on state

restructuring, one of the most

contentious issues in the

process of drafting the new

Constitution.

The major three political

parties—the UCPN-M, the NC

and the CPN-UML--along with

the SLMM on November 22,

2011 forged consensus to form

the SRC without a Chairman

for the time being. They also

decided to rotate the post of

coordinator of the Commission

among its members in their

alphabetical order.


The Commission is assigned to

present its report within the

next two months. As per the

terms of reference, the

Commission will have to

recommend restructuring the

state mainly on the bases of

―identity and capability‖ and

taking into account the

opinions and aspirations of the

State Restructuring and

Devolution of State Power

Committee of the CA.

Strong Protest against the

Decision to Provide Amnesty

to the UCPN-Maoist

lawmaker Bal Krishna

Dhungel: Opposition parties of

Nepal have urged the

government to roll back its

decision to grant amnesty to

Maoist lawmaker Bal Krishna

Dungel saying that Dhungel's

crime was "apolitical" as it was

committed with a "purely

criminal intent" and, therefore,

cannot be pardoned.

Dr. Baburam Bhattarai led

cabinet had decided to

recommend to President Ram

Baran Yadav that Dhungel ,

who was convicted by the

Supreme Court on a murder

charge, be pardoned. Earlier,

the Okhaldhunga District

Court had slapped life

imprisonment along with

confiscation of entire property

on Dhungel, convicting him in

the murder of one Ujjwal

Prasad Shrestha in

Okhldhunga district on May

10, 2004 during the armed

insurgency. Dhungel later

moved the Rajbiraj Appellate

Court, which gave him a clean

chit on June 25, 2006.

However, the Supreme Court

on January 3, 2010 upheld the

district court's life-term

verdict.

Prime Minister Dr. Baburam

Bhattarai Reshuffled the

Cabinet twice within a Week,

and made it the Biggest in

Nepali History: Along with the

first expansion of the cabinet

on November 13, 2011, Prime

Minster Bhattarai has formed

the biggest Cabinet in the

history. With this expansion,

the total number of ministers

in the Cabinet has reached 49,

breaking the record of 48-

member Cabinet led by former

Prime Minister Sher Bahadur


Deuba. As the Defense

portfolio is still vacant, it

seems that the number of the

ministers will reach 50.

Amidst criticism of Prime

Minister Dr. Baburam

Bhattarai‘s move to form the

biggest Cabinet in the history,

the Prime Minister said that it

was his compulsion to appoint

the ministers in the

recommendation of the

coalition partners because of

the coalition government. Dr.

Bhattarai said, "It was my

responsibility to incorporate

the wishes of coalition

partners."

Maoist Chairperson Dahal

Keeps Postponing Party’s

Central Committee Meeting:

The Central Committee (CC)

meeting of the United

Communist Party of Nepal-

Maoist (UCPN-M) was once

again postponed owing to busy

schedule of party Chairman

Pushpa Kamal Dahal.

However, the Maoists had a

brief CC meeting on November

14, 2011, in which Chairman

Pushpa Kamal Dahal and

leader of the dissenting faction

and party Vice-Chairman

Mohan Baidya expressed their

views.

In fact, the CC meeting was

called after hardliner faction

led by senior Vice-Chairman

Mohan Baidya expressed

dissatisfaction over the four-

point agreement signed with

the Madhes parties while

forming the government,

seven-point consensus among

major four parties as well as

the Bilateral Investment

Promotion and Protection

Agreement (BIPPA) agreement

signed during the Prime

Minister Baburam Bhattarai‘s

India visit. It is also said that

there are serious differences

between Dahal and Baidya

regarding key issues of

Constitution, integration of

PLA combatants and the

party‘s goal.

In the meantime, leaders of All

Nepal Peasants Association

(Revolutionary), one of the

sister organisations of the

UCPN-M party, have accused

Maoist Chairman Dahal of


working against the rights of

peasants and landless.

Organising a press meet in

Nepalgunj city of Western

Nepal on November 17, 2011,

the association leaders

denounced the party‘s decision

to return the seized property to

the rightful owners. General

Secretary of the association

Nanda Bahadur Buda Magar

not only termed the seven-

point deal as anti-national but

also urged the peasants to

prepare for a protest if the

government tried to remove

them from the land under their

occupancy.

Maoist Chairperson Dahal’s

Eyes on Lumbini

Development Project: The

Maoist-led government had

appointed UCPN (Maoist)

Chairman Dahal as the

Chairperson of the Lumbini

Development Steering

Committee after his alleged

engagement in bringing

international aid for the same.

As is well known, Dahal's

initiative to bring in an

investment of USD 3 billion

from a little-known Chinese

NGO called Asia Pacific

Exchange and Cooperation

Foundation (AEPC) was

dragged into controversy when

Dahal was the leader of the

opposition during Madhav

Nepal government. The APEC

in collaboration with United

Nations Industrial

Development Organization

(UNIDO) had claimed to have

signed a Memorandum of

Understanding that would

convert the birth place of Lord

Buddha into a "Mecca for

Buddhists". Later on, Modraj

Dotel, the then Secretary in the

Ministry of Culture, had quit

from the post on August 2011

alleging "non-transparent"

functioning of the government

in the proposed Lumbini

project.

After such a controversy, the

Bhattari-led government, on

October 17, 2011, formed a

six-member national

committee led by Chairman

Dahal for the development of

Greater Lumbini Area. Also

Dahal-led team was given

responsibility to generate

funds for the same. That is


why Dahal-led team reached

New York on November 7, 2011

to hold talks with United

Nations Secretary General Ban

Ki-moon for the project.

According to the reports, Dahal

along with NC leader Rijal and

CPN-UML leader Mangal

Siddhi Manandhar called on

United Nations General

Secretary Ban at UN

headquarters in New York on

November 8, 2011, and briefed

the UN Secretary General

about the commitment of the

Government of Nepal to

develop Lumbini as a world

peace city. In response, Ban

expressed his positivity

towards the proposal and

promised to provide full

assistance.

Foreign Relations

Relations with India

BIPPA Controversy Once

again; Supreme Court Asks

Government to Seek

Approval of the House: While

top government officials of

Nepal were busy in referring

the Bilateral Investment

Protection and Promotion

Agreement (BIPPA) and Double

Taxation Avoidance Agreement

(DTAA) recently signed with

India for improving Nepal‘s

investment climate, the

Supreme Court on November

28, 2011 stayed the scheduled

exchange of diplomatic notes

between Nepal and India on

the enforcement of the BIPPA.

The interim order has the effect

of staying the exchange of

notes until the government

gets the agreement approved

by the Parliament or until the

court issues a final decision.

The court, however, said the

deal need not be annulled as

that would hamper the

objective with which the

agreement was signed. The

legal and Constitutional

questions raised in the writ will


be answered in the final

verdict, the court said.

Earlier on October 30, 2011

advocate Balkrishna Neupane

had filed a writ demanding

immediate annulment of the

deal signed in Delhi on October

21, 2011 during Prime Minister

Dr. Baburam Bhattarai‘s India

visit. According to the writ,

BIPPA is not in the larger

interests of Nepal, as it gives

undue privileges to the Indian

side, particularly in the use of

air space and breaches the

existing labour laws. The writ

has taken serious exception to

the provision in the deal that

allows Indian companies to

bring in their own staff and

has challenged the

compensatory provision in case

an Indian company incurs

non-commercial losses. ―One of

the reasons why Indian

companies have not been

coming to Nepal is the threat of

Maoists attacks and shutting

down of industries‖ the writ

reads.

Indian Finance Minister

Visits Nepal: Finance Minister

of India, Pranab Kumar

Mukharjee arrived in

Kathmandu on November 27,

2011 on a day-long visit to

Nepal. During his nearly seven

hours stay in Kathmandu,

Mukherjee separately called on

President Dr. Ram Baran

Yadav, Prime Minister Dr.

Baburam Bhattarai, Finance

Minister Barshaman Pun and

the top leaders of major

political parties. According to

media reports, matters relating

to mutual cooperation and

bilateral interests along with

the issues of Nepal-India

relations were discussed

during Indian Finance

Minister‘s meeting with


President Dr. Yadav. Recalling

his past visits to India,

President Dr. Yadav praised

the cordial relations existing

between the two neighbours.

Similarly, expressing

happiness over the

acceleration of the peace

process, Mukharjee said India

always wanted to see peace,

prosperity and political

stability in Nepal. "India is

committed to extend possible

support to Nepal which is

passing through a historic

transition", added the Indian

Finance Minister.

During his meetings with the

top leaders of various political

parties Mukherjee stated that

India wants political stability

in Nepal and assured Nepali

officials of all possible support

to take the Constitution

Drafting and the peace process

to its logical end. In fact,

Finance Minister Mukherjee

had arrived just a day after the

arrival of Indian Foreign

Secretary Ranjan Mathai.

According to reports, Mathai

had arrived in Kathmandu on

November 26, 2011 to carry

out preparations for the

signing of the Double Taxation

Avoidance Agreement (DTAA)

between the two countries.

Mathai also stated that the

bilateral cooperation between

the two nations was the result

of that very concern. ―India has

been abiding interests in the

peace, stability and prosperity

of Nepal and whatever we wish

to do in the cooperation

between our two nations is

aimed towards this end,‖ said

Mathai.

In the meantime, Nepal and

India signed the DTAA on

November 27, 2011. Nepal and

India were supposed to sign


the DTAA during Bhattarai's

visit to New Delhi, but the plan

was postponed citing need for

more preparations. This

agreement replaces the old

agreement signed between

Nepal and India in 1987. The

agreement is aimed at

facilitating exchange of

information on banking

between the two countries and

to help prevent tax evasion.

Also, it will enable Indian

investors and traders to enjoy

tax relaxation in India once

they pay taxes in Nepal. "The

revised DTAA will provide tax

stability to the residents of

India and Nepal and facilitate

mutual economic cooperation

as well as stimulate the flow of

investment, technology and

services between India and

Nepal," said Mukherjee in his

remarks after signing the pact.

―In the area of exchange of

information, the revised DTAA

provides for internationally

accepted standards including

sharing of bank information

and sharing of information

without domestic tax interest,‖

said Mukherjee.

Indian Prime Minister to

Visit Nepal Soon: Indian

Prime Minister Manmohan

Singh has agreed to visit Nepal

in ―near future‖. According to

reports, Indian Prime Minister

Singh accepted the invitation

extended by his Nepali

counterpart Baburam

Bhattarai during a meeting

between the two on November

11, 2011 on the sidelines of

the 17th SAARC Summit in

Maldives. Both the Prime

Ministers agreed to expedite

homework to materialize the

visit at the earliest. The two

also discussed Nepal's recent

efforts on concluding the peace


and Constitution Drafting

processes.

According to Bhattarai's official

website, Prime Minister

Bhattarai briefed his Indian

counterpart on the recently

signed seven-point deal,

assuring him that all

imperative tasks related to the

peace-process would be

completed by November 30,

2011.

Relations with China

Chinese Prime Minister’s Nepal Visit in December:

According to Kathmandu Post, Chinese Prime Minister Jiabao

will arrive on a three-day official visit to Kathmandu on

December 20, 2011.

As everybody knows, the 20-

member Chinese delegation led

by Liu Qi, a member of the

Communist Party of China

(CPC) and secretary of the CPC

Beijing Municipal Committee

had arrived in Kathmandu on

November 5, 2011 for a four-

day visit to Nepal. ―Prime

Minister Bhattarai signed the

formal letter of invitation on

November 8, 2011, accepting

the dates proposed by the

Chinese side for Wen‘s visit‖,

Kathmandu Post reports. As

per the understanding, a

Chinese military delegation led

by the Lieutenant General

(Military Commissioner) of the

People‘s Liberation Army (PLA)

will be arriving in Kathmandu

soon to prepare for Wen‘s visit.

The delegation will assess the

security situation and hold

meetings with senior military

officials.

If political equations do not

change, PM Bhattarai is also

planning to visit China after

Wen‘s trip. In the meantime,

Prime Minister Bhattarai, once

again assured that Nepal was

aware of its northern


neighbour‘s security concern.

He also said that Nepal was

firmly committed to its ―one

China‖ policy saying no activity

against their country would

take place in Nepal‘s territory.

The PM‘s assurance came on

November 7, 2011 during a

meeting with Liu Qi-led

Chinese delegation.

As a ground work to welcome

Chinese Prime Minister in

Nepal, Deputy Prime Minister

and Foreign Minister Narayan

Kaji Shrestha left for China on

November 22, 2011 for a ten-

day long official visit at the

invitation of his Chinese

counterpart. It is in fact a

much awaited Nepali visit

which is believed to be a

curtain raiser for Chinese

Prime Minister Wen Jiabao‘s

visit to Kathmandu slated for

the third week of December,

2011. Deputy Prime Minister

Shrestha is expected to

concentrate on five areas of

cooperation: infrastructure,

hydropower, cultural

exchange, connectivity and

trade facilitation, sources

confirmed.

Deputy Prime Minister (DPM)

Shrestha leading a nine-

member delegation started his

visit from Lhasa where he met

Chairman of the Tibet

Autonomous Region Padma

Choling. In his meeting with

Choling, Shrestha has

requested that the Chinese rail

be extended, from Shigatse, up

to the northern border.

Development of two border

ports in Tatopani and Rasuwa

was also discussed. After

Lhasa, DPM Shrestha reached

Beijing, and held bilateral talks

with his Chinese counterpart,

Yang Jeichi at the Diaoyutai

State Guesthouse. Shrestha


also called on Chinese Prime

Minister Wen Jiabao at the

latter's office in Beijing on

November 26, 2011. In the

meeting, Nepal‘s DPM Shrestha

not only conveyed the Nepali

Prime Minister's greetings and

best wishes to the Chinese

Prime Minister, but also told

Wen that the people and the

Government of Nepal were

eagerly looking forward to his

Nepal visit. "In the meeting,

matters related to bilateral

relations, economic

cooperation and mutual

interests were discussed. The

DPM reiterated Nepal's firm

and principled position of

upholding the 'One-China'

policy and assured the Chinese

Premier that Nepal will not

allow its territory to be used

against the interests of the

People's Republic of China‖.

In the meantime, Nepal and

China have agreed to construct

another ―friendship bridge‖ in

Rasuwagadhi on the Nepal-

China border. The 100-meter

long bridge will be constructed

over the Trishuli River with Rs

100 million Chinese

contributions. Tulsi Prasad

Sitaula, secretary at Ministry

of Physical Planning and

Works. According to Sitaula,

the Chinese have already laid

the foundation of the structure

on their side. It is said that the

bridge is second of its kind: in

1964, a bridge was built over a

river bordering Sindupalchok

on the Nepali side and

Zhangmu port in China‘s

Nylam. The bridge—proposed

to be located along the

Rasuwagadhi highway that

stretches to the border with

China—is expected to help the

two countries expand their


cross-border trade and

transport as it will link Nepal

with major highways in that

part of the northern neighbour.

Relations with United

Kingdom

British Prime Minister

Cameron has Shown His

Interest to Visit Nepal: Prime

Minister of the United Kingdom

(UK) David Cameron has

expressed his desire to visit

Nepal, and assured that he

would visit Nepal soon.

According to Nepali media

reports, Cameron said so to

the Nepali Ambassador to the

UK Dr. Suresh Chandra

Chalise at a programme

‗Remembrance Sunday‘,

organised to give tribute to the

British army personnel who

were killed on November 13,

during the First World War, in

the UK. ―I cannot fix the date

yet but I assure you that I

would pay a visit to Nepal,‖

Cameron reportedly told

Chalise. According to the

media reports, Prime Minister

Cameron is interested in

visiting Nepal if he received a

formal invitation for the same.

The Embassy had already

written to the Jhala Nath

Khanal-led government to

consider sending a formal

invitation to the British Prime

Minister. However, neither

Khanal-led government nor the

current government responded

to the letter. Interestingly, no

British Prime Minister has

visited Nepal in the almost-200

years of mutual relation

between the two countries.

However, Queen Elizabeth had

visited Nepal twice while other

British political dignitaries had

visited on several occasions.

back to contents


Seminar on ‘Disasters Risk Reduction: Another

Important Route to Poverty Alleviation’

he Vivekananda

International Foundation (VIF), in conjunction with

National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), organized a

day long seminar on ‗Disasters Risk Reduction: Another Important Route to Poverty

Alleviation‘ at the Foundation‘s auditorium on November 24,

2011. The seminar was

attended by a large number

of luminaries and guest

speakers included Dr. A

P J Abdul Kalam, former

President of India, Dr. (Ms.) Syeda S.

Hameed, Member Planning Commission, Mr. M S Reddy,

Vice Chairman, NDMA, Mr. Aslam Pervaiz, Head of Disaster Risk Management

System at Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, (ADPC),

Bangkok, Dr. Mohan Kanda, former Chief Secretary Andhra

Pradesh and former member NDMA and Prof. V K Menon,

former member, NDMA, among others. Mr. Ajit Doval KC,

former Chief of Intelligence

Bureau and Director VIF, Gen (Retd.) N C Vij, former Chief of

Indian Army and former Vice Chairman of NDMA, and Lt.

Gen (Retd.) Ravi Sawhney, former Deputy Chief of Army Staff and Distinguished Fellow

at VIF formed the core group of in-house experts who shared

their perspectives on

linkages between

disaster risk reduction and

poverty alleviation at

the seminar. Mr. Doval

presented the welcome address while Gen Vij,

who was instrumental for organizing the conference,

delivered the key note address on reducing poverty through mainstreaming of disaster

management into governance. The valedictory address was

made by Mr. M S Reddy who outlined the various efforts

undertaken by the NDMA in addressing disaster related

problems across the country.

T


Affable and widely respected for his inspirational speeches,

Dr. Kalam exhorted the youth to strive for innovations and

emulate qualities of creative leadership. His speech at the

seminar, ‗Poverty Reduction through Management – An

Indian Perspective at national Level‘, was replete with

personal references, drawn from a highly illustrious career

spanning over forty years in space and defence research,

culminating finally as the President of India. Dr. Kalam

dwelt upon the need for integrating development with

disaster risk reduction policies. He however suggested that the 12th Five Year Plan should take

up Bihar as a modal for integrating inland waterways

both as a measure for flood control and diverting surplus

river water to drought prone areas. A noted nuclear

scientist, Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam also tried to allay fears raised

over the potential damage to Koodankulam Nuclear Power

Plant in Tamil Nadu due to environmental hazards. He

also stressed that the nuclear power plant at Koodankulam

met the highest standards of safety.

In his welcome address, Mr. Ajit Doval noted with concern

that as India progresses further on the path to

development, especially with industrialization and

urbanization poised for quantum jump in the years

ahead, the country would be further exposed to

environmental hazards. He was at pains to elaborate that

India‘s increasing vulnerabilities to disasters,

both natural and man-made, could result in washing away

the hard earned gains of economic development which

the country had painstakingly accumulated over the decades. Mr. Doval however expressed

hope that the suggestions that would emerge over the course

of seminar would be picked up by policy makers in

consolidating policy framework on disaster management.

Mr. Anil Sinha, Vice Chairman

Disaster Management Authority, Bihar, also a

panelist at the conference, pointed out that there is no mention of word ‗disaster‘ in

the approach paper to the 12th Five Year Plan, which is an

indicator to the fact that disaster risk reduction is

hardly a priority for the Central


Government. He suggested the need to evolve a PPP (Public-

Private Partnership) modal as part of disaster management

plan. Dr. (Ms.) Syeda S. Hameed, Member Planning

Commission however opined that the seminar was being

held at an opportune moment as the final chapterization of

the 12th Five Year Plan was underway. She expressed her

hope that inputs gathered from the seminar would be utilized

towards better formulation of policies for disaster

management. Ms. Syeda Hameed however felt that while

women remain the worst sufferers of all disasters, various relief measures which

are undertaken in the post-disaster scenario display a

distinct gender-bias against them. General NC Vij stated

that policy planners needed to take a paradigm shift away

from the erstwhile relief-centric approach to a pro-active,

holistic and integrated approach on disaster

management. A key note speaker at the conference,

General Vij while establishing the connection between

development and disasters, as also between disasters and

poverty, said that poverty alleviation policies needed to

be linked with poverty reduction and developmental

policies.

The seminar clearly brought out that Disaster Management

Act 2005 lacks sufficient teeth, especially at the state and

district level. The act needs to be made more transparent and

accountable with inclusion of penal clasuses. Against the

backdrop of country‘s projected economic progress, there is greater need to accord priority

to disaster management at the planning level. No government

can act alone against natural or man-made disasters.

Disaster Management is in fact everyone‘s responsibility.

International and regional cooperation is equally crucial

for disaster risk reduction measures. Countries can learn

from each other‘s experiences and present a united front

against disasters. Sensitizing government apparatus and

general public alike however is the key to success in

combating disasters.

Spread over three sessions

with a session each devoted to a regional perspective, an

Indian perspective at functional level and challenges

and road ahead, the seminar


on Disaster Risk Reduction and Poverty Alleviation focused

squarely on every single dimension of the problem

including role of the corporate, NGOs, Panchayati Raj

institutions, technology etc towards disaster risk

reduction. Prof Vinod Sharma, Dr. J V Thomas, Mr. Mihir R

Bhatt, Mr. Bajaj Singh

Chowhan, Mr. Nirankar Saxena, Lt General JR

Bhardwaj, a former member NDMA, were among other

prominent panelists at the seminar.

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Interaction with a Taiwanese Delegation

he Vivekananda International Foundation

(VIF) held an informal closed-door interaction with a

visiting delegation from a Taiwan-based Cross-Strait

Interflow Prospect Foundation at its premises on 18

November 2011. The delegation was led by Mr. Kuang-Chung

Liu, President Prospect Foundation

and comprised four other

members including Ms Migonne Chan,

Executive Director,

Taiwan Institute of

Economic Research,

Chinese Taipei APEC Study Center and Prof Tuang Y.

Cheng, National Chengchi University Taiwan, R.O.C. The

Taiwanese delegation was welcomed by General NC Vij, a

former Chief of the Indian Army, who briefed them on the

various activities of VIF besides providing them with an Indian

perspective on the security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region. Besides General Vij,

Mr. Sushant Sareen, Shri RNP Singh, Prof. Makkhan Lal, Mr

Sanjay Kumar, Mr. Anirban Ganguly, Mr. Manoharan and

Ms Neha Mehta were part of the team that interacted with

the Taiwanese delegation.

The interaction focused, inter alia, on the security dynamics in the Asia-Pacfic region

against the backdrop of an

increasingly assertive

China, cross-strait relations

between Mainland

China and Taiwan, and

the prospects for an improved

relationship between India and Taiwan. Complimenting the

VIF for its innovative ideas and thoughts, Mr. Kuang-Chung

Liu sought an expanded cooperation between the two institutions. He also opined

that Asia‘s rising prominence, primarily due to economic

reasons, had significantly altered the dynamics of

security in the region. He also alluded that much of the

T


volatility in the region could be ascribed to the increasing

competition amongst nations for the region‘s abundance in

energy resources and the sea routes for international trade.

He also maintained that India was in a position to play a

stabilizing role in the Asia-Pacific region due to its fast

rising status as a major power. General vij, on his part, said

that he valued the Taiwanese perspective. The Taiwanese

side however stressed that R.O.C. needs to be part of any

regional dialogue on the

security of Asia-Pacific. Bilateral cooperation between

India and Taiwan however remained the prime focus at

the interaction. Information technology and academic and

cultural exchanges between the two countries were

amongst a few areas identified for cooperation between India

and Taiwan.

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Vimarsha - India 2021: Hazarding Guesses,

Guessing Hazards

hri Gopal Krishna

Gandhi, former Governor of West Bengal, and

grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, presented his vision of India in

2021 to an enlightened audience at Vivekananda

International Foundation (VIF) on Nov 7, 2011. Crystal-gazing,

Shri Gandhi portrayed a kaleidoscopic

image of India in 2021 – young,

impatient and angry despite a

vibrant economy with

projected economic

growth hovering around eight percent.

The growing resources crunch, especially those related to

employment, food, water, housing et al could lead to

further deepening of the present crisis, Shri Gandhi

cautioned. He went on to add that generation of the deprived

young and the enriched young would demand a leadership more representative of its age

and status. Shri Gandhi‘s predictive analysis categorized

hazards that India is likely to

encounter over the next decade into two broad segments –

those caused by forces beyond our control, and those posed

by situations which are caused by human actions, human

decisions and public policy. His talk at VIF was a

significant pointer to the challenges he

foresaw India facing over the next decade -

environmental hazards caused

by forces of nature and

human actions, pandemics,

growing phenomenon of urbanization,

Maoism, terrorism etc. Mr. Gandhi‘s narrative however

had some positives to count as well. He said that by 2021

India will be three or four years away from landing on the

Moon.

While foreseeing monumental

changes that India would go through over the course of next

decade, Shri Gandhi argued that some of these pivots of

S


change could also come from the ranks of simple citizens,

including real-life renunciates who give up the gradients of

power as also honest whistle-blowing officials. Behavioural

changes, especially among those in power, accompanied

further by such changes at the societal level could help in

mitigating some of these hazards, Shri Gandhi advised.

The talk was highly

appreciated by the audience who applauded Shri Gandhi for

taking them through India‘s tumultuous journey over the

next ten years.

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Documents

VIVEK : Issues & Options : November 2011