Book Review: Viet Cong: Organization and Techniques

\:IJ<T (x)FJ(;: The Org;tttiz;llir)tt and Techtliques of tttattttw in \ytIich the NI,F is controlled by its Commu- ttist core. the People’s Rr~olu~ionar~ Part!.--the South- ern branch of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party of Ho Chi llitth. \vhich is thr self-st?.ted “engine and pilot of the i~cvoltiiintt.” Se1)itt.a tc chapters describe the organiza- lion a”(1 rsccutiott of t11~ “struggle movement”; the pi-oscl>.littg program: the violence campaigns: commu- tticali(Jtts efforts. both domestic and foreign; and the ttinhilizitlioti fJf llic peasantry for the “liberation war.”

,,(,li<\ ;tttC] it(.[iott itt \‘icltt;~tll. a set-ious SlUClNlt or nb- qr,.vtk,. ,,f l]lp j\-;tr \vitt \\-i& to lxtsc his vir\Ys upon sound fi,(.l,,itl ~tlo~~l~~dgt~ of lh Cc)nlntuttist movrment in Viet- ,t;t’~‘. ittld pat~licttl~tt~t~~ ils S~n~lt~tt~n manifestation. the \*ipl (:~~tl,~. IJc is Ilo\\ ilt>lC ItI (IO $0 \vi12i iissuratice. fOt ])t,,l:r]its pike has p~~111c1d i i i Ihi? impwssivr wlume iltl ry]t;ttts[ivr. prttr~lrirlittg c 311(1 lh0’t~l~tful stuclv of thr \‘ipl (:ottg tnc,vrntrttl III ;rltticJsl all of its ramifications.

Pttl)lisl~r(l i’s ;I rt;11‘1 cbf i l crt.ir< of Studies in Inter- t,;jfi())]i)] (~~~mtttttiiistti l)?. ttlc Ccntcr for Ititcrnational Sl\tclirs ;t~ ?,I;tss;rcItttsr~lz Tttslitutc of Trchnology. Viet (‘r,,‘,< t.(~l)rrwttl5 iiti itt~~;~tt’;thlr addition to the scholilI~l~~ \\.()t’l($ ott llir Cotnt~tutti~l \\.Ot‘lCl rnianatitie. fl-0111 tht ittsli{tttiott. 111 lhr \\.rJrfls (Jf ttir Gtitrr’s director. the ,)t’t.pose of lliis sItid\. is lo “hell) clarify the comples inler\vea\~ing COF Ltic ttalionalistic. social. political. and it[r’Jlogic;tl clrrt~c~ttt5 ltiiil charactrrizt~ the phrnnmenon of itttc~t.tl;tlir~tt;tt conirttt~ttisnt I~Jfla~~ and its local parti- <;ttts.” 911.. Pikr is itt ;I ttttiqttr p&lion trJ clarify these c-ot~iplrsilics. 1 i -’ I ~\III~ twrtt an itifortiiation officrr in lhe 1T.S. ~lissicrtl i i i Virlttitttt for it period nf six >~rnr-s-from Itic> rarlv dil\‘S elf lhr Vie1 Cnng movement until 1967. He has bawd his \\wk on a stuclv of hundreds of cap- lurrrl Vitt Cnttg documet~ls. ntatt~~ intervie\vs with Cnninitniisl dcxfrc-lnrs. thousands nf pieces of propn- gandn. and \-r~lunirs of trsts front the press and radio of Ihe Cnt~iniirt~isl <talcs and parties.

Its orientation is to~vatxl the communications proc- rsws nf the \~icltiiJnirsr Communists. and particularl>. the manner in \vhich the National Liberation Front (N1.F). the T’ict Cc’ttg’s nolitical arm. has brought its brand of social chatiPr to lhr Soitth Vietnamese country- side. The cxcnce of 111c Viet Cnng movement emerges from thr rscellent atid \vell-eclited documentation in Illis ~~olutnc. esprciallv in the NLF’s ceaseless efforts to explain itself-to its ow caclrrs. to the people of South Vietnam. lo its cnemics. and to the outside world.

Mr. Pike clearlv demnttstt~ntrs and accentuates some of the ilS]XYlS of thr \‘irl C01l.q movrnient \vhich var\ from the C1iitie.w and Virl !Uitih models and whicil co’tstilulr its urtir~~tc cr~ntrihu~ion to ihe art of “people’s re\.olutinnar\~ \varfarr.” Hc summarizes h>. stating that \Yttetwts thr’ rssrticr of l11(> Cliittcse Communist revolu- liOtt \vas slritleg>. and Itxtt d Ilie Viet Rlinh \var- against Iltc F’-ench \vas spirit. tt~r key IO ttlr Viet Gong mow- Iwnl is Organizalion. It also hccntncs vet-l- evident in Ihis Qt’d\ thtl tlir ot.p;~ittization;11 genius ;vhn controls Ihilt k~>.‘is Ho Clli \qinh.

M’llat tuakrs this hook so wluahtr is IIIC exhaustive srL’cl?- of this Or~aniz;tliottal rssetlce of tlie Viet Cotlg t”“\-emw Pike has pt~~ent~cl in painstaking, hut “esh. Clctail Ihr multifacetctl oru~nizatinn of the NLF, frotn Central Comntiltce clnxvtt !I llittlIll?‘t cell. as well as the str~tc~~tritl d\.ttamics of Viet Gong operations and adnlit~ishtiot~ in the rural areas. He also delineates the

v 2 MARcH-AP~w.

Ottr could \yish 111a1 the author had devoted more StX1C-P II) other unique features of the Viet Cong. An rxtrrmety useful hingraphical appendix contains infor- mation ott itbottt -co lcaclrrs of ~hc Viet Gong, hut it ~~Juld haw heen most stimulating if Pike had also ttr~~lopetl SOIIIP hJ,potheses 011 \~h?- ~OIIP of these has rvcr rtitergerl as a comniancling figure. it fact totally at ~iirii~tlcc \Yilli previous Communist revolutionary ex- pc’riettcc. To \vhat extent. for instance. does this obscur- it\- rellrct Hanoi’s jwlousv of its control. or to what drgrec is it AII indication ihat for the Viet Cong tight organization is mow important than popular leadership?

Rclatccl to 111r ahsencr of hero-figures is the Viet Cnrtg’s failure IO tlevrlop the kind of program that sttggrsls itself nitraclivelv to the average Vietnamese as i’ real snlutintt to his’ and the country’s problems. One of Ihr most ettlightcning rwelations that emerges front Mr. Pike’s hook is the fact that it has been almost as difficult for the Viet COII~ as for the Saigon govern- ment to gel Ihe \vholeheartecl cooperation of the basical- ly passive prasant. He has been quite willing to accept a gift of land from the Viet Cone and then forget about Ihe Revolution’s larger goals. The massive Viet Cong cntnmunicit tions effort which the author so eloquent13 desrrihrs and analyzes has been designed to overcome this inertia. but the NLF has distinguished itself among Asian rrvolutionary movements by the extent to which it has hem forced to supplement persuasion by ever larger doses of coercion. terror and confiscation in order to maintain its momentum. The Viet Cong will pro- vide a veritable twasury of data for future studies of the use of yinlence in social mobilization.

As the information in this outstanding work covers the period up to mid-t g(i*j. it essentially deals with the Viet Cong in its ascendancy-its development to the verge of a victory which eluded its grasp. This was also the period prior to the massive direct North Vietnamese takeover of the movement. during which some sem- hlattcc of Southern authority remained. American com- hat intervention has changed the military and political situatiott immensely. hut one cannot foresee the Viet Gong’s ultimate fatr. Certainly the events of the last t\ycJ ~xwrs have demonstrated the tenacity of this revolu- tionary organization under stress. It may eventually have to backtrack to its earlier political forms of strug- pie in order to survive. But the words of on& Commu- nist defector. quoted by the author, speak eloquently of the difficulties of such a course. To go back, he said, “\vould be LO slow down a typhoon; there is no such thing as a ~101~ tvphoon, for when a typhoon slows do\vn it breaks up:“---H.M.R.

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